Sheffer, Lior and Loewen, Peter John and Walgrave, Stefaan and Bailer, Stefanie and Breunig, Christian and Helfer, Luzia and Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Varone, Fréderic and Vliegenthart, Rens. (2023) How Do Politicians Bargain? Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries. American Political Science Review, 117 (4). pp. 1429-1447.
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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/93524/
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Abstract
Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians' careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.
Faculties and Departments: | 04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft > Politikwissenschaft (Bailer) |
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UniBasel Contributors: | Bailer, Stefanie |
Item Type: | Article, refereed |
Article Subtype: | Research Article |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
ISSN: | 0003-0554 |
e-ISSN: | 1537-5943 |
Note: | Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article |
Language: | English |
Identification Number: | |
edoc DOI: | |
Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2023 13:23 |
Deposited On: | 27 Oct 2023 13:23 |
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