A moneymaking scan: Dual reimbursement systems and supplier‐induced demand for diagnostic imaging

Zabrodina, Véra and Dusheiko, Mark and Moschetti, Karine. (2020) A moneymaking scan: Dual reimbursement systems and supplier‐induced demand for diagnostic imaging. Health Economics, 29 (12). pp. 1566-1585.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/80816/

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In complex health systems with growing healthcare spending, combining reimbursement systems that incentivize cost-efficient healthcare provision within and across care sectors is key. This study investigates whether dual reimbursement systems lead hospitals to offset financial pressures in one care sector by inducing demand in another. We find that hospital imaging units induced demand for costly and unnecessary ambulatory imaging examinations reimbursed under fee-for-service, following a reform that introduced prospective payment and increased competition in the inpatient sector in Switzerland in 2012. Market structure, competitive pressures, and price regulations also influence demand inducement by varying the response to the reform. Reimbursement systems can influence supplier-induced demand in other care sectors within hospitals where revenue is tied to the intensity of care provision. In particular, the possibility to self-refer patients to high-margin diagnostic examinations bears negative consequences on healthcare expenditures and potentially patient health.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics
06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Arbeitsmarktökonomie (Wunsch)
UniBasel Contributors:Zabrodina, Véra
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:26 Jan 2021 10:51
Deposited On:26 Jan 2021 10:51

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