Aristotelian Naturalism and Critical Theory

Both Critical Theory and Aristotelian Naturalism take issue with subjectivism in meta-ethics, and with formalist “law conceptions” of ethics—both of which they take to be characteristic of modern moral philosophy. Aristotelian Naturalism aims to rectify these faults by elaborating on the idea that practical rationality is essential relative to the human form of life, or to our nature. I distinguish three consecutive versions of this argument, and discuss objections against each. The meta-critique put forth by Critical Theory provides, I argue, a sympathetic and kindred amendment to these basic tenets of Aristotelian Naturalism: it facilitates an understanding of practical reason as receptive to objective claims stemming from the human form of life, but at the same time allows for an understanding of categories like “nature” and “reason” as essentially historically and socially mediated.