A Scotist Nonetheless? George Berkeley, Cajetan, and the Problem of Divine Attributes

The problem of divine attributes was one of the most intensely debated top- ics in the 17-18th century Irish philosophy. Simply put, the problem revolves around the ontological question (i) whether human and divine attributes differ in degree or in kind, and the semantical (ii) how we ought to describe these di- vine attributes by means of our human language. While there was a consensus that analogies play a key role in solving the semantical problem there was a con- troversy about the kind of speech they allow for. Especially, it was contested if using analogies for divine predication allows for a separate kind of speech, i.e. allows us to speak neither literally nor metaphorically but analogically. The aim of my paper is to contextualize George Berkeley's position on the problem of divine attributes as developed in § 21 of the IV. Dialogue in Alciphron.More specifically and contrary to what most scholars hold, I argue Berkeley fails to follow Cardinal Cajetan with remarkable closeness. Despite paraphrasing parts of Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia in § 21, the solution Berkeley advances is closer to the position of John Duns Scotus - and hence, ironically, with the posi-tion Cajetan aimed to reject.