Bargaining Success in the Reform of the Eurozone

Lundgren, Magnus and Bailer, Stefanie and Dellmuth, Lisa M and Tallberg, Jonas and Târlea, Silvana. (2019) Bargaining Success in the Reform of the Eurozone. European Union Politics, 20 (1). pp. 65-88.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/74933/

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This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft
08 Cross-disciplinary Subjects > Europainstitut
UniBasel Contributors:Târlea, Silvana and Bailer, Stefanie
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:27 Jan 2020 09:25
Deposited On:27 Jan 2020 09:25

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