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Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform

Târlea, Silvana and Bailer, Stefanie and Degner, Hanno and Dellmuth, Lisa M. and Leuffen, Dirk and Lundgren, Magnus and Tallberg, Jonas and Wasserfallen, Fabio. (2019) Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform. European Union Politics, 20 (1). pp. 24-44.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/68536/

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Abstract

This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments' preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries' financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften
04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft
04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft > Politikwissenschaft (Bailer)
08 Cross-disciplinary Subjects > Europainstitut
UniBasel Contributors:Bailer, Stefanie and Târlea, Silvana
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:SAGE Journals
ISSN:1465-1165
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Language:English
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Last Modified:27 Jan 2020 09:29
Deposited On:12 Feb 2019 13:40

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