Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?

Queloz, Matthieu. (2018) Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch? The Philosophical Quarterly, 69 (274). pp. 100-120.

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This paper examines three reasons to think that Craig's genealogy of the concept of knowledge is incompatible with knowledge-first epistemology and finds that far from being incompatible with it, the genealogy lends succour to it. This reconciliation turns on two ideas. First, the genealogy is not history, but a dynamic model of needs. Second, by recognising the continuity of Craig's genealogy with Williams's genealogy of truthfulness, we can see that while both genealogies start out from specific needs explaining what drives the development of certain concepts rather than others, they then factor in less specific needs which in reality do not come later at all, and which have also left their mark on these concepts. These genealogies thereby reveal widespread functional dynamics driving what I call the de-instrumentalisation of concepts, the recognition of which adds to the plausibility of such instrumentalist approaches to concepts.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement K√ľnste, Medien, Philosophie > Fachbereich Philosophie > Theoretische Philosophie (Wild)
UniBasel Contributors:Queloz, Matthieu
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:21 May 2022 10:33
Deposited On:28 Sep 2018 12:53

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