Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind?

Meylan, Anne. (2014) Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind? Philosophical inquiries, 2 (1). pp. 173-190.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/44372/

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The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epistemic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The first part is devoted to the question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Künste, Medien, Philosophie > Ehemalige Einheiten Philosophie und Medienwissenschaft > Cognitive Irrationality (Meylan)
UniBasel Contributors:Meylan Massin, Anne
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:University of Pittsburgh Press
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:23 Apr 2018 11:50
Deposited On:10 Jan 2017 15:34

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