Primed for intuition?

Researchers have not yet agreed on a general definition of intuition. A “condensed definition” has been put forward emphasizing that intuition is based on automatic processes that rely on knowledge structures acquired through different kinds of learning. This definition further posits that intuitions operate at least partially without a person’s awareness but nevertheless result in feelings, signals, or interpretations. In short, intuition is a non-conscious process exerting influence on behavior by drawing on implicitly acquired knowledge that signals higher processing areas in the conscious brain. Such a minimal definition of intuition resembles the generally accepted definition of implicit memory, at least as it appears in priming, which is itself understood as “a change in the ability to identify, produce, or classify an item as a result of a previous encounter with that item or a related item”. This superficial similarity, however, raises the fundamental question of whether the concepts of intuition and implicit memory, as it functions in priming, do in fact differ, and whether this comparison could yield a clear and precise definition of intuition. Based on a synopsis of the conceptual, paradigmatic and neural levels, we suggest that intuition and priming are distinct processes, differing both in terms of the format in which information is assumed to be stored in memory, as well in the kind of signal accompanying the respective cognitive process.