Was ist falsch an der Lüge? Lüge als Verletzung von Achtung und Vertrauen

Schmetkamp, Susanne. (2010) Was ist falsch an der Lüge? Lüge als Verletzung von Achtung und Vertrauen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 58 (1). pp. 127-143.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A6002734

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In Philosophy, there are two central questions conceming the phenomenon of lying: First, what is lying? And, secondly, what is morally wrong with lying? Those who deal with the second question usually ask if, when, and why lying can be morally justified. Hence, the liar and his reasons stand in the limelight. But what does actually happen when someone is lying, particularly to the addressee of the lie? What is harmed by lying? This paper goes the other way around and focuses on the addressee. It defends the thesis that two principles are concemed: the respect of the person and his/her autonomy on the one hand. And trust on the other hand. Furthermore, the paper is an attempt to answer the question why we consider some lies worse than other lies: Namely, if something essential for our self-conception is involved. Here, different kinds of interpersonal relations and trust - thin and thick - play a central role.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Künste, Medien, Philosophie > Fachbereich Philosophie > Praktische Philosophie (Krebs)
04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften
UniBasel Contributors:Schmetkamp, Susanne M.
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:De Gruyter
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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edoc DOI:
Last Modified:09 Feb 2018 09:43
Deposited On:11 Oct 2012 15:25

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