Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry. (2003) Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability. Journal of theoretical biology, 221 (1). pp. 53-59.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5249186

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We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of lower-quality males (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:14 Nov 2017 08:07
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:08

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