

This article was published as

Frithjof Benjamin Schenk: Travel, Railroads, and Identity Formation in the Russian Empire, in: Eric Weitz, Omer Bartov (Hg.): Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, Bloomington (Indiana University Press) 2013, pp. 136-151.

No part of this article may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or distributed in any form, by any means, electronic, mechanical, photographic, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Indiana University Press. For re-use, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center (www.copyright.com, 501-744-3350). For all other permissions, please visit <http://iupress.indiana.edu>.

SHATTERZONE OF EMPIRES

COEXISTENCE AND VIOLENCE IN
THE GERMAN, HABSBURG, RUSSIAN,
AND OTTOMAN BORDERLANDS

Edited by
Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Bloomington and Indianapolis

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands	OMER BARTOV AND ERIC D. WEITZ	1
--	-------------------------------	---

PART ONE Imagining the Borderlands

1 The Traveler's View of Central Europe: Gradual Transitions and Degrees of Difference in European Borderlands	LARRY WOLFF	23
2 Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth-Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlands	GREGOR THUM	42
3 Between Empire and Nation State: Outline for a European Contemporary History of the Jews, 1750–1950	DAN DINER	61
4 Jews and Others in Vilna–Wilno–Vilnius: Invisible Neighbors, 1831–1948	THEODORE R. WEEKS	81

PART TWO Imperial Borderlands

5 Our Laws, Our Taxes, and Our Administration: Citizenship in Imperial Austria	GARY B. COHEN	103
6 Marking National Space on the Habsburg Austrian Borderlands, 1880–1918	PIETER M. JUDSON	122
7 Travel, Railroads, and Identity Formation in the Russian Empire	FRITHJOF BENJAMIN SCHENK	136
8 Germany and the Ottoman Borderlands: The Entwinning of Imperial Aspirations, Revolution, and Ethnic Violence	ERIC D. WEITZ	152
9 The Central State in the Borderlands: Ottoman Eastern Anatolia in the Late Nineteenth Century	ELKE HARTMANN	172

PART THREE Nationalizing the Borderlands

10 Borderland Encounters in the Carpathian Mountains and Their Impact on Identity Formation	PATRICE M. DABROWSKI	193
11 Mapping the Hungarian Borderlands	ROBERT NEMES	209
12 A Strange Case of Antisemitism: Ivan Franko and the Jewish Issue	YAROSLAV HRYTSAK	228

Publication of this volume was supported by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University and the Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Chair in the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Minnesota.

This book is a publication of

Indiana University Press
601 North Morton Street
Bloomington, Indiana 47404-3797 USA

iupress.indiana.edu

Telephone orders 800-842-6796
Fax orders 812-855-7931

© 2013 by Indiana University Press
All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

♾️ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1992.

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shatterzone of empires : coexistence and violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman borderlands / edited by Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-253-00631-8 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-253-00635-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-253-00639-4 (e-book) 1. Ethnic conflict—Europe, Eastern—History—19th century. 2. Ethnic conflict—Europe, Eastern—History—20th century. 3. Europe, Eastern—Ethnic relations—History—19th century. 4. Europe, Eastern—Ethnic relations—History—20th century. 5. Borderlands—Europe, Eastern. 6. Europe, Eastern—Boundaries. I. Bartov, Omer. II. Weitz, Eric D.
DJK26.S53 2013
305.800947'09041—dc23

2012025509

1 2 3 4 5 18 17 16 15 14 13

13	Nation State, Ethnic Conflict, and Refugees in Lithuania, 1939–1940 TOMAS BALKELIS	243
14	The Young Turks and the Plans for the Ethnic Homogenization of Anatolia TANER AKÇAM	258
PART FOUR Violence on the Borderlands		
15	Paving the Way for Ethnic Cleansing: Eastern Thrace during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and Their Aftermath EYAL GINIO	283
16	“Wiping out the Bulgar Race”: Hatred, Duty, and National Self-Fashioning in the Second Balkan War KEITH BROWN	298
17	Failed Identity and the Assyrian Genocide DAVID GAUNT	317
18	Forms of Violence during the Russian Occupation of Ottoman Territory and in Northern Persia (Urmia and Astrabad), October 1914–December 1917 PETER HOLQUIST	334
19	A “Zone of Violence”: The Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Eastern Galicia in 1914–1915 and 1941 ALEXANDER V. PRUSIN	362
20	Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: <i>Krakivs’ki visti</i> , the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation JOHN-PAUL HIMKA	378
21	Communal Genocide: Personal Accounts of the Destruction of Buczacz, Eastern Galicia, 1941–1944 OMER BARTOV	399
PART FIVE Ritual, Symbolism, and Identity		
22	Liquid Borderland, Inelastic Sea? Mapping the Eastern Adriatic PAMELA BALLINGER	423
23	National Modernism in Post-Revolutionary Society: The Ukrainian Renaissance and Jewish Revival, 1917–1930 MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ	438
24	Carpathian Rus’: Interethnic Coexistence without Violence PAUL ROBERT MAGOSCI	449
25	Tremors in the Shatterzone of Empires: Eastern Galicia in Summer 1941 KAI STRUVE	463
26	Caught in Between: Border Regions in Modern Europe PHILIPP THER	485

List of Contributors 503

Index 507

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The present volume is the result of a multiyear project that involved workshops, conferences, symposia, and lecture series at Brown University, the University of Minnesota, and the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany. More than one hundred scholars participated in one or more of the events that we held. We could not include every person in a volume that is already quite large, but we gratefully acknowledge everyone’s participation in our various events. All of the various scholars gave us new insights into the problems of ethnic and national identity in the borderlands and helped us sharpen our understandings.

We would not have been able to organize the project without the generous support of numerous institutions, programs, and centers. We thank each and every one of them. At Brown University, the Watson Institute for International Studies provided an institutional home for the Borderlands Project and generous financial support. At the University of Minnesota, the Institute for Global Studies and many of its constituent centers—the Center for Austrian Studies, the European Studies Consortium, the Center for German and European Studies, Modern Greek Studies, and the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies—also provided generous financial support and major intellectual resources. In addition, the College of Liberal Arts, the History Department, and the Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Chair in the College of Liberal Arts provided much-needed resources. Two University of Minnesota research assistants, Melissa Kelley and Eric Roubinek, provided excellent technical help. Our final conference was graciously and generously hosted by the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany. We thank two of its directors, Professor Eduard Mühle and Professor Peter Haslinger, for their enthusiastic support.

Two anonymous reviewers for Indiana University Press provided insightful comments on the manuscript. We thank them immensely for their very helpful criticism. Dimitri Karetnikov was our excellent mapwriter for maps 1–7. We also would like to thank Paul Robert Magosci for providing two additional maps on the Carpathian Rus’ (chapter 24). We are very grateful to our editor, Janet Rabinowitch, for her enthusiasm for the project and the skill and efficiency with which she guided it through the review and production process.

Finally, we thank our contributors, whose abiding commitment to scholarship and intellectual engagement made the project so stimulating and fulfilling, and even—despite the grimness of the topic at times—eminently enjoyable.

Omer Bartov	Eric D. Weitz
Providence, Rhode Island	New York City

7

TRAVEL, RAILROADS, AND IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

FRITHJOF BENJAMIN SCHENK

Historians often perceive railroads primarily as an infrastructure helping a state to consolidate its territory and to integrate distant regions into one economic and political space. This is also true for most of the literature on the history of railroads in nineteenth century Russia. Undoubtedly the steam engine was an important tool in the Tsarist Empire to link various geographical parts of the large country one with another and thereby to enhance the exchange of commodities and the mobility of the population. In the second half of the nineteenth century both the government and private investors helped to create an iron network, which was envisioned already by contemporary cartographers as a skeleton strengthening the cohesive forces within the huge polyethnic empire. But by increasing the mobility of a significant number of Russian subjects, railroads also opened new opportunities for people to experience ethnic and religious diversity. Contemporary travel accounts bear witness that travelers on Russian railroads perceived the empire less as a homogeneous space of communication than a fragmented territory inhabited by a great and sometimes uncomfortable variety of ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, the railroad proved to be an effective tool in the hands of those political actors who were trying to undermine political stability. In particular, in the western borderlands railroads repeatedly became a target of politically motivated violence and were used by militant groups to spread the seeds of ethnic hatred. The Russian example bears witness that the railroad, envisioned by its proponents as a golden path to social and spatial integration, in the immediate term enabled violence and contributed to developing social disintegration.

My essay may be read—in a more general sense—as a plea for the inclusion of railway history into the broader discourse on the history of the borderlands of European empires in the long nineteenth century. As a matter of fact historians have treated the history of infra-

structure in general and of railroads in particular for a long time as an exclusive domain of scholars studying either economic or technical history. Railway historians, conversely, have often neglected the great cultural and social impact of the construction and the use of networks of modern infrastructure in the era of the steam engine, but in recent years there has been a “cultural turn” in railway history.¹ In this spirit, we have to bring the history of infrastructure back into the general narrative of the development of European societies in the era of industrialization. The history of the borderlands of the Romanov, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Hohenzollern empires in particular gains substantially from insight into the social and cultural impacts of the construction and the use of modern infrastructure in the era of the steam engine.

The construction of railway networks altered significantly the structures of social spaces within these contested regions of the continent's polyethnic empires. In the imperial capitals the invention of the railroads inspired far-reaching spatial fantasies by politicians, military experts, and geographers alike. Both the state and private actors made a strong effort to use the new means of transportation in order to transform geographically and culturally heterogeneous territories into politically and economically integrated spaces. But in the borderlands of the continental empires of Europe, populated by a variety of ethnic and religious groups, the introduction of networks of modern transportation had extensive and often unintended social and cultural side effects. On the one hand, railways became an effective tool of imperial rule, helping imperial administrations to exert political and military control more effectively over large territories at the empires' peripheries; construction of railroads thereby helped to integrate borderland areas into the political, economic, and cultural space of their respective empires. On the other hand, the construction of railroads led to a significant increase in human mobility in all countries encountering the process of modernization of their infrastructure. Increasingly mobile societies became a growing threat to the social and political order of the *anciens régimes* in the polyethnic empires for various reasons. The new means of transportation opened up new possibilities for an increasing number of people to explore the various geographical regions of the imperial territories personally and thereby to encounter the empires' ethnic and religious heterogeneity. It is an open question whether this confrontation between an increasing number of subjects and the “imperial characters” of their respective empires consolidated feelings of imperial identity or—on the contrary—enforced processes of increased national or ethnic alienation. As the Russian example shows, the new means of transportation were also used by proponents of national liberation movements in the borderlands, enabling them to build up their own networks of communication and to destabilize mechanisms of imperial rule by attacking railways and telegraph lines. This chapter will analyze the ambivalent impact of the modernization of networks of transportation in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century.²

In the following, I will provide some observations on the ambivalent impact of infrastructure building and use in imperial contexts in nineteenth century Europe. First, I will briefly outline the political debates among Russian bureaucrats in Saint Petersburg in the latter half of the nineteenth century concerning the construction of railroads in the western part of the Russian Empire, and describe the development of the rail network in this part of the country prior to World War I. Second, I will focus on the travel accounts of nineteenth century railroad passengers traversing the Western Empire, describing their encounters with multiethnicity inside and outside the railroad cars. Finally, I will reflect on the issue of rail-

roads and politically motivated violence, focusing first on the anti-Jewish pogroms of the early 1880s and second on the train raids conducted by the Polish Socialist Party at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The term "western borderlands" is used in this context in a rather broad sense. It comprises a geographically large region that was extremely heterogeneous in both socioeconomic and cultural terms. "Western borderlands of the Russian Empire," as they are understood in this article, encompassed the so called "western region" (*Zapadnyi krai*), the territory of the Polish Kingdom, the provinces of "left-bank Ukraine" (Chernigov and Poltava), New Russia (*Khersonskaia guberniia*, *Tavricheskaia guberniia*) and the province of Ekaterinoslav in the southwestern part of the country.³ Despite the mixed character of this large region, it was nonetheless shaped by a number of common historical and structural features.⁴ To a large extent the western borderlands were parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before they were incorporated into the Russian Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; other parts belonged until the eighteenth century to the Ottoman Empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century the density of population in this region was much higher than in any other of the border zones of the imperial realm. In terms of socioeconomic development the region—the Polish Kingdom in particular—toward the end of the nineteenth century surpassed not only the other peripheries but also the core area of imperial Russia. Finally, the population of the western borderlands comprised a large number of different ethnic and religious groups. Since the boundaries of the region were almost identical with the Jewish Pale of Settlement, the area was also the homestead of the majority of Russian Jews. Toward the end of the century the political development in the region was increasingly dominated by the conflicting agendas of the Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Russian national movements, along with various kinds of revolutionary parties that strove to extend their social bases.

Railroads and the Consolidation of Territory in the Western Borderlands

When the Russian administration started to debate the possibility and utility of building railroads in the Tsarist Empire in the 1830s, proponents of the steam engine argued from the very beginning that the new means of transportation might help strengthen the links between the Russian heartland and the politically troublesome periphery in the West. In his note for Tsar Nicholas I, Franz Anton von Gerstner, an Austrian entrepreneur who applied in 1835 for the concession to build an entire network of railroads in European Russia, deliberately alluded to the revolutionary events in the Kingdom of Poland in 1830–1831 in order to convince the Emperor of the necessity of covering his realm with railway lines. Gerstner informed Nicholas I that the British government had successfully applied the new means of transportation for the quick dispatch of troops to suppress a revolt in Ireland.⁵ He argued, "if Petersburg, Moscow, and Grodno or Warsaw had been connected by rail, it would have been possible to subdue the Polish insurgents in four weeks."⁶ Although Gerstner's reference to the Polish November uprising was a good example of the applicability of the steam engine for strategic purposes, a railroad from Petersburg or Moscow to Warsaw or Grodno was ironically not part of the rail network he suggested setting up in European Russia in 1835.⁷

A few years later, the construction of long-distance railroads in Russia began—in the Western part of the empire.⁸ In 1839 Nicholas I approved the application of a group of private investors from Warsaw, who planned to connect the city with the Austrian capital by rail.⁹

The plan was initiated by the Russian viceroy of Poland, Count Ivan Paskevich, who wanted to deflect the flow of Polish trade from Prussia to the Habsburg Empire. When the private stock company went bankrupt in 1843 the Russian government took over and completed the line in 1848.¹⁰ Just a few years later Nicholas I gave the go-ahead for the construction of the strategically important railroad from St. Petersburg to Warsaw. The head of the empire's Board [later Ministry] for Ways of Communication, Count Petr Kleinmikhel' and other leading bureaucrats had openly criticized this project because they doubted its economic usefulness. Nevertheless the Emperor ordered the erection of the line in February 1851, half a year before the first overland railroad in Russia from St. Petersburg to Moscow was officially inaugurated.¹¹ Nicholas I perceived the railroad to Warsaw as a means to tighten the bonds between the politically unreliable Polish Kingdom and the Russian heartland and to strengthen the western borderlands strategically.¹² He argued that "in case of a sudden outbreak of war with the present state of the rail network in Europe, Warsaw, and with it our entire west, could be overrun by enemy forces before our troops could succeed in getting from Petersburg to Luga."¹³ Although the beginning of the Crimean War in 1855 interrupted the construction of the Petersburg–Warsaw railroad, work resumed in 1857 and the line opened in 1862. Soon after its inauguration the railroad to Warsaw proved its utility for imperial rule. In 1863 the line enabled the autocratic regime quickly to dispatch guard regiments to the western provinces and the Polish Kingdom to suppress the January uprising.¹⁴ In the same fashion, some years earlier the railroad from Warsaw to Vienna had enabled the Russian government in 1849 to relocate troops to Hungary, helping to contain the revolutionary upheaval there.¹⁵

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the western borderlands of the Russian Empire remained in the focus of infrastructure politics for two reasons. First, leading strategists in the Russian Ministry of War predicted a future military confrontation between the Tsarist Empire and its neighboring countries in the West. Therefore they urged their government to follow the example of Prussia and the Habsburg Empire, which were developing their networks of modern means of transportation in quick pace, improving their abilities to dispatch their troops to the Russian border with rapidity in the case of war.¹⁶ Second, the experience of the January uprising in 1863 seemed to underscore the need to consolidate further the empire's territory in the west with the help of railway lines. Many contemporaries were influenced by the idea that a network of modern means of transportation would not only integrate a country economically but in the meantime would help overcome cultural and ethnic borders.

A good example of this way of thinking is the lecture that General of Infantry Sergei Buturlin gave in 1865 at the Imperial Society for History and Archaeology in Moscow.¹⁷ This presentation was part of a larger campaign by the Ministry of War against the plans of the Board of Ways of Communication for the development of Russia's network of railroads, drafted by the administration's head Pavel Mel'nikov in 1862–1863.¹⁸ Mel'nikov, a representative of the first generation of Russian engineers of transportation, perceived railroads first and foremost as an instrument to integrate the territories of the Tsarist Empire economically. His aim was primarily to connect the centers of Russian agricultural (and to a lesser extent industrial) production with the highly populated areas in European Russia and with the empire's harbors at the Baltic and the Black Seas. In earlier years Mel'nikov had openly criticized the construction of a strategic railroad from St. Petersburg to Warsaw. Therefore it was not surprising that he included in his 1862 master plan just one more railway line

crossing the western borderlands (from Briansk to Odessa via Chernigov, Kiev, and Balta). Mel'nikov's draft was published in 1863 and ignited a large public debate about the principles of Russia's future railway policy. Proponents of an economically sustainable network argued with advocates of strategic railroad building; supporters of regional business interests were confronted with activists seeking to serve the interests of the empire as a whole; adherents of a state-funded railroad were facing experts reminding them of the limited resources of the government's budget and arguing for cooperation with private investors. Sergei Buturlin represented the camp of railway politicians promoting the construction of *strategic* railways in general and in the western borderlands of the empire in particular.¹⁹

Referring to a possible scenario of a war of defense (*voina oboronitel'naia*) against Russia's Western neighbors, Buturlin reminded his listeners in 1865 of the fact that Warsaw was located 200 *versts*²⁰ closer to the river Rhine than to Moscow and that the distance between the Polish capital and Moscow was in fact even larger due to the poor state of the roads in Russia. The countries of Europe, having built a dense network of railway lines in the last 20 or 30 years, had accordingly succeeded in "shortening the distance between themselves and Russia" significantly, whereas the distance between Russia and the West had remained almost the same.²¹ Buturlin argued that Russia must not stand idle facing this problem. Instead he formulated a detailed plan for the construction of approximately 6,095 *versts* of new railway lines in the western part of the country. The author, who wisely did not touch the difficult question of costs and funding for his ambitious project, planned not only to strengthen Russia's military potential against attacks from her Western neighbors, but also to crisscross Russia's western borderlands from the Baltic Sea to the Crimea with a network of strategic railroads as an answer to separatism and revolutionary movements in this region. Alluding openly to the January uprising of 1863 Buturlin stated:

Railroads have a great strategic importance as a means of national defense [*oborony kraia*] against enemies both from outside and from inside. [This is particularly true] in that case when a state has integrated by force territories inhabited by tribes [*plemena*] of different ethnic origin which have not merged yet morally with the conquering people. Integration and acculturation [*slitianie*] can be and must be reached with the help of legal and political measures. . . . But if there exist elements which openly or secretly obstruct the moral integration of all parts of the political body to which they belong . . . , the government has to ground its regime in the revolting areas on the basis of military institutions. These include, among others, the permanent presence of armed forces, the building of fortifications and the construction of ways of communication serving the army to move easily and quickly to any destination in order to prevent or to suppress internal disorder or to throw back an assault from outside.²²

Buturlin argued that it would serve Russia's strategic interests better if one built railroads "which join the Western parts of the empire with the country's core area" than railways connecting Russia's periphery with the country's Western neighbors or improving the mutual exchange and traffic between the various parts of the western borderlands.²³ That's why Buturlin identified the city of Brest-Litovsk as the most Western outpost of Russia's strategic railway system. According to his plan the territory of the Polish kingdom should not be further developed by a network of modern infrastructure.²⁴

Buturlin's outline reflected almost perfectly the main features of the Ministry of War's official railway policy in the 1860s. Three years later, in 1868, Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin urged Tsar Alexander II in a memorandum to make further investments in strategic

railway building in Russia's western borderlands.²⁵ He reminded the Tsar of the superiority of Russia's Western neighbors in terms of infrastructure development. Both Prussia and the Habsburg Empire could rely on more railway lines leading to the common border than the Tsarist Empire, enabling them to dispatch troops more quickly to the front in a future war. Like Buturlin, Miliutin made a strong argument for the construction of strategic railroads from the Russian heartland to the western borderlands and agreed that Poland should *not* be part of the program of railway construction in the future.

In fact the question whether the Tsarist administration should encourage the construction of railroads in the Kingdom of Poland remained disputed within the Ministry of War until World War I. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, which Prussia managed to win in large part due to the quick movement of troops and armaments on strategic railroads, Miliutin himself looked at the issue of railroad building in Russia's Western periphery from a different perspective. In 1873 the Minister of War demanded at an official meeting on national security affairs the construction of 5,000 *versts* of new strategic railway lines in the Western part of the country, 1,000 within the borders of the Polish Kingdom. But due to a lack of sufficient funding none of the 11 lines he demanded were constructed until 1881 and only three until 1888. After a new shift in strategic planning at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ministry of War in 1910 again opposed the construction of new railroads in the Polish Kingdom, on the grounds they could help a future aggressor quickly to invade the Russian heartland.²⁶

The repeated shifts in railway policy by Russia's Ministry of War clearly illustrate the undecided attitude of the Tsarist elite toward the issue of infrastructure building and its possible impact in the western borderlands in the second half of the nineteenth century. Already in December 1861 the General-Governor of the northwestern region (*Severo-Zapadnyi krai*), General V. I. Nazimov, had warned of the "ambivalent attitude of the administration of the newly opened [St. Petersburg–Warsaw] railroad and the personnel of the line who are almost exclusively Poles and foreigners."²⁷ Nazimov apparently was afraid of the regime's dependence on the loyalty of the representatives of national minorities who were running the new system of transportation. The experience of the January uprising would soon show that Nazimov's fears were not at all ill-founded. When the national revolt began, Polish insurgents not only burnt several railway bridges and cut the wires of the strategically important telegraph; they found active supporters among the staff of the privately run railroad company who were happy to further obstruct the quick dispatch of loyal Tsarist troops by rail to the revolting provinces.²⁸ After the uprising's suppression the railwaymen who had collaborated with the insurgents were harshly punished and the Tsarist administration made a strong effort to enhance its control over the strategically important network of railway lines in the Western districts.²⁹ In 1880s Warsaw Governor-General I. Gurko even advocated that Poles not be employed in the railway sector any longer. Subsequently it was decided to ban Polish staff from the most important strategic railway lines. But this decision remained difficult to implement as there simply were not enough qualified Orthodox technical and engineering specialists to substitute for the professionals of Catholic backgrounds.³⁰ The Tsarist administration was not only afraid of disloyal Polish railwaymen. Bureaucrats in the administration of the General-Governor of Vilna had warned back in 1867 against further consolidating the regional railway network between the *Zapadnyi krai* and the Polish Kingdom. In a letter from August 23rd the official A. P. Storozhenko reported that the construction of the railroad from Vil'na to Warsaw had significantly increased the reach of Polish nationalist propaganda

in the province of Grodno. The local bureaucrat lamented that the railroad brought not only pork salesmen from Mazuria but also "agents of the Polish cause" "spreading unrest" in the region.³¹

Notwithstanding these misgivings, neither the Minister of War, who was afraid of further developing the network of modern infrastructure in the Polish Kingdom, nor the local representatives of the Tsarist regime in the western borderlands who warned of the unintended political effects of railway building at the empire's periphery could stop the process of modernization and industrialization that Russia in general and her western borderlands in particular were experiencing in the second half of the nineteenth century.³² Between 1868 and 1872 the Tsarist Empire encountered its first boom of railroad building, with a second one coming in the 1890s. During these periods the western borderlands became the region with the best developed regional railway network in the entire empire.³³ Already the public debate about the construction of the so-called "Southern Line" had shown in the 1860s that the arguments of those political forces stressing the importance of the steam engine for the *economic* development of the country often exceeded those of the representatives of the national security agencies.³⁴ Despite the hesitant attitudes of several agencies regarding the modernization of the region's infrastructure, it was the western borderlands that experienced the quickest development of railroad networks, and consequently the greatest increase in passenger mobility, of any region of the Russian Empire toward the end of the nineteenth century.³⁵

The Railway Journey and the Experience of Ethnic Diversity

Despite the fact that railway passengers traveling from the Russian heartland to the Habsburg Empire had to change trains in the city of Warsaw due to different gauges on the tracks eastward and westward of the Vistula River, cartographers of the nineteenth century envisioned the vast expanses of the Tsarist Empire as a single, homogeneous space structured and bound together by a integrated system of black, iron arteries.³⁶ From the 1880s on every waiting room of the first two classes in Russian railway stations had to be equipped with such a map of Russian networks.³⁷ But it is an open question whether cartographical artifacts of this kind had an enduring effect on the mental maps of Russia's railway passengers. Did, one may ask, passengers traveling by rail in the western borderlands experience the space outside the railway car really as an integral part of one national or imperial space? Was the image of an iron network holding together the various parts of the multiethnic empire only a product of the wishful thinking of engineers and cartographers, or did it also have a significant impact on the patterns of spatial perception of Russian railroad passengers? The analysis of a small number of randomly selected travel accounts by Russian railway passengers who visited the western borderlands during the last decades of the nineteenth century make a different hypothesis more likely. Apparently the new possibilities for easy travel from one part of the country to another in the railway age did not consolidate images of territorial integrity but, on the contrary, strengthened the awareness of the multiethnic and multi-religious character of the huge country. Different ethnic and religious groups came into focus in these travelers' perceptions according to the geographical regions they covered. When taking a closer look at travel accounts from Russians who made their trip to or through the western borderlands of the empire in the late nineteenth century, one is repeatedly surprised by the omnipresence of anti-Jewish stereotypes and detailed de-

scriptions of Jews as embodiments of the internal "other." Apparently many Russian railway travelers perceived these regions mainly as a "Jewish" space that differed significantly from the Russian heartland.

For travelers in railway cars in late nineteenth century Russia, experiencing the internal borders of the empire was first and foremost a matter of acoustic perception. Aleksandr Klevanov, a historian and translator of ancient literature, made a trip in 1870 from St. Petersburg to the German lands, crossing the Western periphery in a first-class carriage of the St. Petersburg–Warsaw line.³⁸ In the city of Dünaburg/Dvinsk, at the intersection with the railway line to Riga, Klevanov noticed a large number of Germans entering the train who accompanied the traveling society to Vilna. Getting closer to the empire's western border he remarked that he had left the Russian heartland acoustically: "the employees of the railways are without exception Polish. The sound of the Russian language can't be heard anywhere except from travelling passengers."³⁹ After he had gone through passport control at the Russian checkpoint, which was conducted by a Polish border guard, he stated: "In general the last impressions of my fatherland [*rodiny*], at least those of the Polish borderland [*okrainy*], were not too pleasant." In order to illustrate his estrangement in the borderzone, he added that a Jew addressed him at the station, offering to change his Russian money into Austrian currency.⁴⁰

The encounter with the Jews in the western borderlands left a deep impression on most of the Russian railway voyagers who gave an account of their travel experiences in this region. This was also true for those Russians who lived in the western part of the empire and who in principle were well acquainted with the polyethnic reality of social life in these regions. For example, Vasilii Liakhotskii, an Orthodox priest from the city of Kholm/Chełm, made a roundtrip from his Polish/Ukrainian hometown through the Russian Empire by train in 1898 and published his travelogue two years later.⁴¹ At the railway station of Kovel' in Volhynia, where Liakhotskii and his fellow passenger came into contact with Jews offering them accommodation in a local hotel, the author made fun of the "*zhidki*" and their Russian accent.⁴² Two years later Liakhotskii left again his hometown for a journey to the southern Caucasus, documented in another travel account.⁴³ This time he bought a ticket for a third-class carriage, which took him from Kholm via Kovel' southwards to Berdichev, Kazatyn and further to Rostov na Donu. On the first part of his journey, his carriage was almost completely populated by Jewish passengers. In his travelogue Liakhotskii frankly reveals his feeling of discomfort in this situation:

This tribe [*plemia*] stands out because of its [extraordinary—FS] forbearance, which can be studied particularly on journeys like this. In order to travel as cheap as possible a Jew [*zhid*] is even happy to sleep the whole way underneath an ordinary bench. Since there were so many Jews in the car (it was after Saturday), many of them had almost to sit down on somebody else.⁴⁴

Liakhotskii did not hide his anti-Jewish sentiments when he called the city of Berdichev a *zhidovskaia stolica* (capital of Jews) and described Jewish passengers on their way to Kiev in the following strongly derogatory terms: "This tribe, repudiated by God and other people, strives to the capital, to the mother of Russian towns, the sanctuary of Rus', meanwhile our folk are wandering from the North to the South and the way back just in order to make a living."⁴⁵ Obviously Liakhotskii perceived the western borderlands as an integral part of an all-embracing imperial space of communication. Nevertheless, he interpreted the increasing

mobility of the different ethnic and religious groups less as an indicator of growing spatial cohesion and more as an erratic and ominous development.

Despite the increasing density of the local network of railroads in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire before World War I, the region did not lose its image as a sphere of political unrest and instability. This spatial stereotype was based not only on the perception of the polyethnic composition of the region's population but also on the imagination of its landscape. The report of Vasilii M. Sidorov, who traveled in the late 1880s by train from Vilna to Kiev, is a lucid example of this kind of mental mapping.⁴⁶ Sidorov, who had a choice between a rail connection via Brest and one via Gomel, chose the latter option and got stuck in the swamps of Pripiat. After days of rain the river had flooded wide areas of the embankment and train traffic was stopped in order to avoid serious accidents. After having passed "endless forests" Sidorov got "deeper and deeper into the land of nowhere, into the woods, into the horrible marshes of Pinsk." In his train that could move neither forward nor backward he experienced the "feeling of absolute loneliness [*chuvstvo polneishago odinochestva*], . . . of horrible depression [*strashnoi tosiki*] and alienation of everything familiar [*otchuzhdennosti ot vsego blizkogo*]."⁴⁷ There were almost no other passengers in the train, except three huntsmen in the second class and some peasants in the third. On the railway stations he met just "crowds of Jews [*zhidy*], who curiously stared at me without understanding what I am doing in this solitude."⁴⁸ After having arrived in the city of Gomel he was shocked by the "filthy hotel room in the provincial town that was crowded with Jews."⁴⁹ When he finally got to Kiev, two days later than originally planned, he felt as if he "saw the light again" after a journey through the darkness.

The Russian perception of the western borderlands in late nineteenth century was affected both by patterns of ethnic diversity in general and the Jewish population in particular. This becomes even more obvious if one takes a closer look at the memoirs of a Jewish writer who reported on a railway journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow in the 1860s.⁵⁰ Vladimir Garkavi, a son of a wealthy Jewish family in Vilna, moved to Moscow in 1864, in order to start his studies in law at the city's university. Garkavi went first to St. Petersburg, from where he took the train to his new hometown. Traveling in a cheap third-class carriage, the young student was surrounded by Russian peasants, women and children who were sitting on the "benches and on the floor." Every passenger carried a lot of luggage; people drank tea, sang songs, slept on the floor and underneath the settees. Garkavi was surprised that during the whole journey, which lasted about 36 hours,

nobody pronounced the word "*zhid*." I became acquainted with almost every passenger and—what seems to me quiet naïve and funny from today's perspective—I read loudly poems of Nekrasov and Nikitin to the peasants [in the train]. The peasants listened attentively, giving a deep sigh from time to time, and I realized that I was in touch with the essence of [Russian] folk life. In the carriage I made first acquaintance with an educated Russian woman. . . . We talked about literature, about Belinskii, Dobroliubov, Pisarev, Chernyshevski, and about the female protagonists in Turgenev's novels. From my accent and manner of speech she recognized that I was a "foreigner" [*inorodets*]. But when I told her that I was a Jew, she was more than surprised.⁵¹

Garkavi's travelogue is a fascinating source. It illustrates that the railways as a modern means of communication could open up new spaces of social integration and interethnic communication. But this was apparently true to a larger extent for the railways in the heartland of the Russian Empire than for its western borderlands.

The perception of the western borderlands of the Tsarist Empire by Russian railway passengers as a "Jewish" space corresponds in an interesting way with the patterns of description of trains and railway stations in this region in Yiddish literature at the turn of the century. Analyzing novels and short stories by Elyokum Zunser, Sholem Abramovitch, Sholem Aleichem, and David Bergelson in which railroads play an important role both as settings for the story and/or as a signifier of modernity, Leah Garrett writes of a tendency to "Judaize" Russian railroads in the Yiddish literature of the time.⁵² Contemporary Jewish writers repeatedly depicted the railroads as a means of helping Jews either to escape or to pull them out of the narrow world of traditional shtetl life. Although Jews were neither allowed to work for the telegraph service of the Russian railroads (decree of 1875) nor to rent restaurants and buffets at railway stations (decree of 1894) and were not even allowed after 1897 to practice their religion openly in train compartments or the waiting rooms of Russian railway stations, Jewish writers developed various imaginative techniques to appropriate these public spaces.⁵³ Garrett unveils an ambivalent mode of perceiving the railroads in Yiddish literature in the second half of the century.⁵⁴ Zunser, Abramovitch, and other Yiddish authors depicted the railroads in the Pale of Settlement as a space of social encounter where Jews got in touch with men and women from different parts of the country and representatives of other religious and ethnic groups. Whereas Zunser praised the steam engine in his poem "Der ayznban" ("The Railroad"), written in 1865, as a "democratic, positive force to literally transport the Jews into the modern world," Bergelson depicted a Ukrainian railroad depot in his 1909 novel *Arum vokzal* (*At the Depot*) as a location of complete stagnation and social desperation.⁵⁵ Overcrowded compartments in third-class railway cars inspired both Sholem Abramovitch's short story "Shem un Yefes in a vogn" ("Shem and Japheth on a Train") in 1890 and Sholem Aleichem's *Ayznban-geshikhtes* (*Railroad Stories*), written between 1902 and 1909.⁵⁶ Abramovitch uses this framework to tell a mythical story of reconciliation and fraternization between a Jewish tailor and a Polish shoemaker during a time of modern ethnic persecution, while Aleichem depicts crowded railway cars as an almost ideal site for the exchange of information, gossip, and Jewish storytelling.

Railroads and Politically Motivated Violence

Aleichem's *Railroad Stories*, though they have to be treated of course primarily as literary fiction, give us a good impression of the extent to which the steam engine altered social life in the Jewish Pale of Settlement at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁵⁷ From his narrative we learn a lot about the narrowness and noisiness of overpopulated third-class carriages, and about Jews ignoring the law prohibiting prayers in the public sphere. Aleichem depicts the ceremonial welcome of trains by the populace of small towns in the western borderlands, and the increased mobility of Jewish traders and salesmen. Vicariously, we experience the encounters and conflicts between different religious and ethnic groups in trains and railway stations. Moreover, Aleichem's stories can be read as an attempt "to explore a new kind of Jewish experience and to describe a Jewish society that had reached a new level of development or of disintegration."⁵⁸ His tale, "The Wedding That Came without Its Band," written in 1909, is of particular interest in our context.⁵⁹ In this short story Aleichem treats the subject of railroads and their role in anti-Jewish pogroms in early twentieth century with a hearty dose of black humor. The population of a small Jewish settlement called Heysin is informed about a group of Ukrainian roughnecks planning to conduct a pogrom in their shtetl. As the Ukrainians approached the settlement by train, the Jews, aware of the impending catastrophe, alarm a Russian prefect and plead for his

help. In return for a large payment or bribe the representative of the Tsarist authorities orders a company of Cossacks from a nearby city to protect the Jews from the pogromists. But when the Cossacks, the Jews, and other residents from Heysin gather at the railway station awaiting the train's arrival they find out that the drunk driver of the steam engine had forgotten to connect it to the passenger cars at the point of departure. Thus the locomotive arrives at Heysin while leaving the cars with their precarious passengers on its way. The Jews are saved from another wave of ethnic hatred thanks to the stupidity of Russian railwaymen.

Although Aleichem's story about the impeded pogrom at Heysin is purely fictitious, it nevertheless consists of historically reliable elements.⁶⁰ It is particularly interesting that Aleichem was aware of the fact that the construction of railroads in the western borderlands contributed to the increased regional mobility both of ordinary salesmen and workers and of perpetrators spreading hatred and ethnic violence from one part of the country to the other. This observation was later affirmed by the studies of Michael Aronson, Omeljan Pritsak, and other historians who analyzed the origins of the anti-Jewish pogroms of the 1880s in the western borderlands of the Tsarist Empire.⁶¹ Aronson convincingly demonstrated the high degree of involvement of railway employees and workers in the riots of 1881; he also pointed out the importance of railway lines in enabling militant groups to move easily from one location to the other and to conduct their destructive activities in the whole region. Despite the fact that the government later tried to blame Ukrainian peasants for the outburst of ethnic and religious violence, the pogroms had their origins less in rural than in urban contexts. The critical role railwaymen, who were suffering from bad working conditions and alienation from their home regions, played in the pogroms of the 1880s brings Aronson to the conclusion that "the pogroms were more the result of Russia's modernization and industrialization process than of age-old religious and national antagonisms."⁶² Already fearful of pogroms in the early 1880s, the inhabitants of Jewish settlements were well aware of the dangerous potential of the railroads as a network for the spread of ethnic violence. As John Klier has shown, in some Jewish towns in the western borderlands in 1881 and 1882 the populations set up armed self-defense units, which made rounds by night and tried to stop potential perpetrators from disembarking trains at railway stations.⁶³

As the example of militant destruction of railway bridges and telegraph lines during the January uprising in 1863 has shown, railroads and other strategically important infrastructures were used by militant groups to spread ethnic violence and were identified as highly sensitive targets of politically motivated criminal acts. Further examples of this often neglected side of railway history in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire are found in the attempts of political underground movements in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to target sites of Russian infrastructure like trains and railway stations. In this context one may point, for example, to the attempt of the terrorist organization "People's Will" (*Narodnaia volia*) to blow up the train of Tsar Alexander II near Odessa on its way from the Crimea to Moscow in November 1879.⁶⁴ Due to changes in the Emperor's travel route, the Populist activists quickly halted their preparations at the site near Odessa and shifted their activities to two other spots on the road. When one of the bombs finally exploded underneath the railway track near Moscow, the Emperor escaped the attempt at his life only by chance.

But the railroads in the western borderlands remained in the following decades a contested space in the struggle between the Tsarist authorities and various political underground movements. On 26 September 1908, the Revolutionary Faction of the Polish Socialist Party under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski committed an armed train raid at the small railway

station of Bezdney (Lithuanian: Bezdonys) 25 km. from Vilna. The rebels had learned that every Saturday the government sent tax money with the night train from Vilna to St. Petersburg. The train was identified as an ideal target for an action of expropriation to fund the party's militant activities and to equip the newly founded Union of Active Struggle (*Związek Walki Czynnej*) with weapons. Nineteen activists carried out the operation, planned in detail one year in advance. When the train reached the station, a bomb was thrown under the postal coach and the door of the carriage was opened by force. The rebels started shooting at the escort and left one Russian soldier dead and five seriously injured. Within 45 minutes the rebels succeeded in capturing more than 200,000 rubles. The police detained only four of the 19 raiders; they received lifelong prison sentences.⁶⁵ It was obviously difficult or almost impossible for the administration to find adequate measures to meet this form of revolutionary attack, reminiscent of partisan war. The authorities had to realize again and again that the network of railways they had created in the western borderlands, imagined and constructed not least to politically consolidate and stabilize the periphery of the Tsarist Empire, were also being used by the opponents of the autocratic regime for quite the opposite purpose.

Conclusion

The construction of railroads in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire had different and to a certain extent contradictory effects. On the one hand, the Polish Kingdom and other parts of the region possessed toward the end of the nineteenth century one of the densest rail networks in the entire Russian Empire. Run by both private and state-owned companies, Russian railroads helped to develop the country economically and to consolidate the multi-ethnic empire as one political space. On the other hand, the development of Russia's infrastructure led to a significant increase in geographical mobility that opened up for many people new possibilities for encountering the large variety of the country's ethnic and religious groups and to experience the empire less as a homogeneous and more as a highly fragmented space of communication. Railway passengers who were Gentiles perceived the region primarily not as a Russian but a Jewish space, a reaction that corresponds, interestingly enough, with similar forms of imagination in the Yiddish literature of the time. Jewish writers depicted the railroads in the western borderlands as a space of both communication and estrangement that confronted the Jews with new challenges of modernity. The victims of anti-Jewish pogroms in the 1880s as well as the Jewish writers at the turn of the century realized that the railroads brought to their traditional habitat not only blessings but also the violence of the modern era. The traditional master narrative of railway history, which has emphasized the integrative force of the new means of transportation, has failed to take into account its impact on the modes of perception among polyethnic populations. The intensification of ethnic and politically motivated violence on the Russian railroads, in the empire in general and its western borderlands in particular, is a case that points to the darker effects of railroad development.

NOTES

1. Michael Freeman, *Railways and the Victorian Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Ian Carter, *Railways and Culture in Britain: The Epitome of Modernity* (Manchester: Man-

chester University Press 2001); *The Railway and Modernity: Time, Space, and the Machine Ensemble*, ed. Matthew Beaumont and Michael Freeman (Oxford: Lang, 2007). Most of these works, which can all be considered parts of a "New Railway History," are still inspired by Wolfgang Schivelbusch's trailblazing study *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) (originally published in German in 1977).

2. On the Russian case from a general perspective see Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "Mastering Imperial Space? The Ambivalent Impact of Railway Building in Tsarist Russia," in *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Jörn Leonard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 60–77.

3. *Zapadni Krai* covered the territory of the provinces (*guberniia*) of Kovno, Vitebsk, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev, Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. The Polish Kingdom was subdivided into the provinces of Suwałki, Łomża, Płock, Kalisz, Warsaw, Siedlce, Piotrków, Radom, Lublin, and Kielce.

4. Mikhail Dolbilov and Aleksei Miller, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2006), 13–14.

5. "Zapiska glavnoupravliaiushchego putiami soobshcheniiami gr. K. F. Tolia, 17 fevralia 1835 g.," in *Krasnyi Arhiv* 3(76) (1936): 90–98, here 90.

6. Quoted in Walter McKenzie Pinter, *Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I.* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), 137.

7. Gerster suggested building three trunk lines in European Russia: 1) St. Petersburg–Moscow; 2) Moscow–Nizhnii Novgorod–Kazan; 3) Moscow–Taganrog.

8. Russia's first railway line for public use was a 27 km.-long connection between St. Petersburg and the Tsarist residences of Pavlovsk and Tsarkoe Selo, inaugurated in 1837 and built by a private stock company founded by Franz Anton von Gerstner.

9. On the history of railroads in the Polish Kingdom, see Stanisław M. Koziarski, *Sieć kolejowa Polski w latach 1842–1918* (Opole: Państwowy Inst. Naukowy–Inst. Śląski, 1993); Zbigniew Taylor, *Rozwój i regres sieci kolejowej w Polsce* (Warsaw: Polska Akad. Nauk, Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania im. Stanisława Leszczyńskiego, 2007), 25–46.

10. Richard Haywood, *The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of Nicholas I., 1835–1842* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), 193–200; *150 lat drogi żelaznej Warszawsko-Wiedeńskiej* (Warsaw: Centralna Dyrekcja Okręgowa Kolei Państwowych, 1995).

11. Pavel Mel'nikov, "Svedeniia o russkikh zheleznykh dorogakh," in *P. Mel'nikov. Inzhener, uchenyi, gosudarstvennyi deiatel'*, ed. Mikhail I. Voronin (Saint Petersburg: Gumanistika, 2003), 223–398, here 345–47; Vladimir Verkhovskii, *Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkluchitel'no*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Tip. Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia, 1898), 72; Richard Haywood, *Russia Enters the Railway Age, 1845–1855* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 536–44; Aida Solov'eva, *Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 59–60.

12. Nikolai A. Kislinkii, ed., *Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika po dokumentam arkhiva Komiteta ministrov, Istoricheskii ocherk*, pod redakcii A. N. Kulomzina, (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1901), vol. 1, 53. In 1851 Nicholas also abolished the tariff border between the Polish Kingdom and the Russian heartland. This measure was perceived as a means to further integrate Poland economically into the imperial realm. Rosa Luxemburg, *Die industrielle Entwicklung Polens* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1898), 9–10.

13. "Imperator Nikolai v soveshchatel'nykh sobraniiaakh iz sovremennykh zapisok shtats-sekretaria barona Korfa," in *SIRIO* 98 (1896), 125–27, quoted after Alfred Rieber, "The Rise of Engineers in Russia," in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 31(4) (1990): 539–68, here 562.

14. L. G. Zakharova, ed., *Vospominaniia general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina. 1863–1864* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 46, 54–58.

15. M. Annenkov, "Voennaia sluzhba zheleznykh dorog," *Voennyi sbornik* 19 (1876): 112–42, 115–16; Regierungsrat Werneke, "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahnen an den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa," *Archiv für das Eisenbahnwesen* (1912): 930–58, esp. 930; W. Baumgart, "Eisenbahnen und Kriegsführung in der Geschichte," *Technikgeschichte* 38 (1971): 191–219, 202.

16. In fact the difference of density of the networks of railroads in the Polish partition zones between Prussia and Austria at the one hand and the Russian Empire on the other was appalling. See the map of Polish railroads in 1914 in Taylor, *Rozwój i regres*, 37.

17. Sergei Petrovich Buturlin, "O voennom znachenii zheleznykh dorog i osobennoi ikh vazhnosti dlia Rossii. S proektom seti sikh putei i kartoii," *Chteniia v imp. o-ve istorii i drevn. ross. pri Mosk. u-te* 4 (1865): 1–62.

18. Pavel Mel'nikov, "Set' glavnykh linii zheleznykh dorog Evropeiskoi Rossii, sostavleniia v Glavnom upravlenii putei soobshcheniia i publicnykh zdaniia," *Zhurnal Glavnogo upravleniia putei soobshcheniia i publicnykh zdaniia* 41(5) (1863): 22–34.

19. Representatives of the conflicting camps clashed for the first time in 1863–64 during the public debate about the so-called Southern Line, a dispute analyzed in detail by Alfred Rieber in his "The Debate over the Southern Line: Economic Integration or National Security?," in *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, ed. Serhii Plokhyy and Frank Sysyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 371–97.

20. 1 verst = 1.07 km.

21. Buturlin, "O voennom znachenii zheleznykh dorog," 13.

22. Buturlin, "O voennom znachenii zheleznykh dorog," 2.

23. Buturlin, "O voennom znachenii zheleznykh dorog," 48.

24. Buturlin, "O voennom znachenii zheleznykh dorog," 16. Similar ideas were articulated in 1868 by General Nikolai N. Obruchev, a professor at the Academy of the General Staff. Cf. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Voennye reformy 1860–1870 godov v Rossii* (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1952), 120–24; Jacob W. Kipp, "Strategic Railroads and the Dilemmas of Modernization," in *Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution*, ed. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 82–103, here 92.

25. *Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika*, vol. 1, 333–34.

26. William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 295–98, 305, 339, 440.

27. Rieber, "The Debate over the Southern Line," 377.

28. Vospominaniia general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina, 46, 54–58; *Dnevnik A. Valueva, Ministra vnutrennykh del v dvukh tomakh* (Moskva: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961), vol. 1: 1861–1864, 202–204; Mikhail N. Katkov, 1863 god. *Sobranie statei po pol'skomu voprosu pomeslavshikhia v Moskovskikh Vedomostiakh, Russkom Vestnike I Sovremennoi Letopisi* (Moscow: n.p., 1887), vol. 1, 10 (reprint of Katkov's editorial in *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 16 January 1863); "Obshchii Ustav Rossiiskikh Zheleznykh Dorog. Sankt Peterburg," (n.d.) in *Rossii. Gosudarstvennyi Sovet. Materialy* 158 (1885): 525 (Russian National Library, Saint Petersburg, call number 135/286.158).

29. V. A. D'iakov, V. D. Koroliuk, and I. S. Miller, eds., *Russko-pol'skie revoliutsionnye sviazi 60-kh godov i vosstanie 1863 goda. Sbornik statei i materialov* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1962), 253; *Sbornik svedenii o zheleznykh dorogakh v Rossii, 1867, otel III, Vysochaishiaa povele-niia, ukazy pravitel'stvuiushchago senata i ministerskii postanovleniia*, ed. Departament zheleznykh dorog (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1867), 613–17.

30. A. Chwalba, *Polacy w służbie Moskali* (Warsaw: Wydawn. Nauk. PWN, 1999), 214.

31. Michail Dolbilov, "We are at one with our tsar who serves the Fatherland as we do: The Civic Identity of Russifying Officials in the Empire's Northwestern Region after 1863," (unpublished paper, 2004), 11.

32. W. L. Blackwell, "The Historical Geography of Industry in Russia during the Nineteenth Century," in *Studies in Russian Historical Geography*, ed. James H. Bater and R. A. French (London: Academic Press, 1983), vol. 2, 387–422, here 390–96, 402–10; Ezhi Edlitskii, "Gosudarstvennaia promyshlennost' v Tsarstve Pol'skom v XIX v.," in *Genezis kapitalizma v promyshlennosti*, ed. S. D. Skazkin (Moscow: n.p., 1963), 278–304; Arcadius Kahan, "Kongresspolen," in *Handbuch der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985), vol. 5, 584–600.

33. "Raspredelenie seti russkikh zheleznykh dorog po guberniiam," in S. Iu. Vitte, *Sobranie sochinenii i dokumental'nykh materialov*, vol. 1: *Puti soobshcheniia i ekonomicheskoe razvitiie Rossii*, book 2, pt. 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 531–33.

34. Rieber, "The Debate over the Southern Line."

35. It's difficult to determine exactly the increase of regional mobility on the railroads in the western borderlands in late nineteenth century. The increase of the number of passengers of

those railway companies operating in the region gives a first impression of this process. South-western Railroad: in 1883, 3.05 million; in 1912, 15.23 million. Warsaw-Vienna: in 1883, 1.87 million; in 1912, 11.49 million. Privislinskaia zheleznaia doroga: 1883, 0.95 million; 1912, 11.78 million. *Statisticheskii vremennik Rossiiskoi Imperii*, series 3, vol. 8; Tsentral'nyi statisticheskii komitet, ed., *Sbornik svedenii po Rossii za 1883 god* MVD (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1886), 228; *Statisticheskii sbornik Ministerstva Putei Soobshcheniia*, vol. 131, pts. 2–3, (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1916), chart 7.

36. In addition to the trunk line from Warsaw to Vienna, the spur from Lobkowicz to Bromberg in Prussia (inaugurated in 1863) and the railway linkage to Łódź (put into operation in 1866) were also built on European standard gauge (1435 mm). Only in the late 1860s did the Tsarist government decide that all future railway lines in the Empire should be built on Russian regular gauge (1524 mm). Richard M. Haywood, "The Question of a Standard Gauge for Russian Railways, 1836–1860," *Slavic Review* 28(1) (1969), 72–80, 79.

37. *Sistematicheskii sbornik deistvuiushikh na russkikh zheleznykh dorogakh zakoneni i rasporyazhenii pravitel'stva*, ed. Nikolai L. Briul' (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1889), pt. 1: S 1860 g. po 1 iuniia 1889 g., 63.

38. Aleksandr Semenovich Klevanov, *Putevyia zametki za graniceiu i po Rossii v 1870 godu* (Moscow: Tip. A.I. Mamontova, 1871).

39. Klevanov, *Putevyia zametki*, 46.

40. Klevanov, *Putevyia zametki*, 49.

41. Valentin Kantelinenko (Vasilii Fedorovich Liakhotskii), *Pervoe moe putesthestvie po Rossii* (Cholm: n.p., 1900).

42. Ibid., 6. On the pejorative *zhid*, see John Klier, "Zhid: The Biography of a Russian Pejorative," *Slavonic and East European Review* 60(1) (1982): 1–26.

43. Valentin Kantelinenko (Vasilii Fedorovich Liakhotskii), *Vtoroe moe putesthestvie po Rossii* (Cholm: n.p., 1903).

44. Ibid., 10.

45. Ibid., 11, 45.

46. Vasilij Mikhailovich Sidorov, *Okol'noi dorogoi. Putevye zametki i vpechatleniia* (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1891).

47. Ibid., 25–26.

48. Ibid., 27.

49. Ibid., 30–31.

50. Garkavi, Vladimir Osipovich: "Otryvki vospominanii," in *Perezhitoe* 4: 270–87.

51. Ibid., 279.

52. Leah Garrett, "Trains and Train Travel in Modern Yiddish Literature," *Jewish Social Studies*, New Series 7(2) (2001): 67–88; idem, *Journeys beyond the Pale: Yiddish Travel Writing in the Modern World* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 90–122.

53. "Tsirkuliar tekhnicheskoi-inspektorskogo komiteta zheleznykh dorog, Nr. 4926, 22 avgusta 1875" in *Sbornik ministerskikh postanovlenii i obshchikh pravitel'stvennykh rasporyazhenii Ministerstva Putei Soobshcheniia po zheleznykh dorogam* (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1877), vol. 2, 124; "Tsirkuliar po ekspluatatsionnomu otdelu, Nr. 21839–45," 12 June 1896, cited in *Sistematicheskii sbornik zakoneni i obshchikh rasporyazhenii, otnosiashchikhsia do postroiki i ekspluatatsii zheleznykh dorog kaznoi i posledovavshikh v period vremeni s nachala 1881 g. po 31 maiia 1898 g. vkluchitel'no* (edition of laws) (Saint Petersburg: n.p., 1900), 650. On the ban on Jewish prayers in railroad cars and stations: "Tsirkular Departamenta Zheleznykh dorog, Nr. 11592, 5 iuliia 1897 g.," quoted in Otton Fomich Glinka, *Mery k sobliudeniui passazhirami v poezdakh ustanovlennykh dlia nikh pravil* (Kiev: n.p., 1901), 12; *Die Welt* 1(12) (1897): 7; Aleksandr Vasil'evich Anisimov, "Palomnichestvo na russkii Sever," in *Dushepoleznoe chtenie* 1(1) (1903): 97.

54. Garrett, *Trains and Train Travel*, 67.

55. Garrett, *Trains and Train Travel*, 69, 81–85.

56. Sholem Yankev Abramovitsh, "Shem and Japheth on the Train," in *The Literature of Destruction: Jewish Responses to Catastrophe*, ed. David G. Roskies (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 123–36; Scholem Alejchem, *Eisenbahngeschichten*, 2nd ed., ed. Gernot Jonas, (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verl., 1996).

57. On Aleichem's *Railroad Stories*, see also Dan Miron, *The Image of the Shtetl and Other Studies of Modern Jewish Literary Imagination* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 256–334.

58. Miron, *The Image*, 278.

59. Alejchem, *Eisenbahngeschichten*, 108–15. Cf. Garrett, *Trains and Train Travel*, 80; idem, *Journeys beyond the Pale*, 111–12; Miron, *The Image*, 333. This story was published for the first time in the Warsaw newspaper *Di naye velt* (*The New World*) in 1909.

60. According to Miron this story (among others) is based on a detailed description of Jewish life in a small town in Podolia at the beginning of the twentieth century, provided by a stranger to Aleichem during his stay in a sanatorium in the Black Forest resort St. Blazienne in 1909. Miron, *The Image*, 260.

61. Michael Aronson, "Geographical and Socioeconomic Factors in the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia," *Russian Review* 39 (1980): 18–31; idem, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 108–24; Omeljan Pritsak, "Pogroms of 1881," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 11 (1987): 8–41; John D. Klier, "What Exactly Was a Shtetl?" in *The Shtetl, Image and Reality*, ed. Gennady Estrakh and Mikhail Krutikov (Oxford: Legenda, 2000), 23–35, here 31–32.

62. Aronson, *Geographical and Socioeconomic Factors*, 31.

63. Klier, *What Exactly Was a Shtetl?* 31. On attempts of Jewish self-defense in the town of Berdichev, see Simon M. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland: From the Earliest Times until the Present Day*, vol. 2: *From the Death of Alexander I. until the Death of Alexander III. (1825–1894)* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Soc. of America, 1918), 256–57.

64. Veraigner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 77–80. For greater detail, see Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "Attacking the Empire's Achilles Heels: Railroads and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 58(2) (2010): 232–53.

65. Wacław Jędrzejewicz, *Piłsudski: A Life for Poland* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), 41–43; Andrzej Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski, 1867–1935* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1990), 128–30; Heidi Hein, *Der Piłsudski-Kult und seine Bedeutung für den polnischen Staat 1926–1939* (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2002), 38; Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Akcja bojowa pod Bezdanami 26.9.1908* (Warszawa: Główna Księg. Wojskowa, 1933); P. Zavarzin, "Rabota tainoi politzii," *Okhranka. Vospominaniia rukovoditelei politicheskogo syska*, ed. A. I. Reitblat, (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2004), vol. 1, 409–508, esp. 459–62.