

THE CRETAN CONFLICT 1866-1869: COMPETING AND
COMPLEMENTARY IDEOLOGIES THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE
GREEK AND OTTOMAN PRESS

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Mytilene, December 2021

Notes on transliteration and date conversion

Ottoman to English

The system adopted for the Romanization of the Ottoman passages cited in the present work is based on the orthography followed in the lexicon of Develioğlu¹. Regarding Ottoman place names, their modern-time equivalent will be added within brackets whenever it is deemed necessary, e.g. Rethymno instead of Resmo. Furthermore, military or other ranks and administrative units will also be stated in their modern Turkish variant, e.g. *paşa* instead of *pasha*. On the other hand, Ottoman terms relating to administrative categories or subcategories, such as *kaza*, *sancak* etc., will remain unchanged.

In case a word cannot be found in the above mentioned lexicon, then transliteration will be conducted according to the following table.

ا	آ	ب	پ	ت	ث	ج	چ	ح	خ	د	ذ	ر
A a	Â â	b	P	t	s	c	ç	h	h	d	z	r

ز	ژ	س	ش	ص	ض	ط	ظ	ع	غ
z	j	s	ş	s	s	t	z	'	ğ

ف	ق	ك	گ	ل	م	ن	و	ه	ی
f	q	k	ñ	l	m	n	v	h	I, ı u

Alternative Greek-English transliteration

In an effort to avoid complications concerning the interpretation of the diacritical marks of the Greek polytonic orthography, a simplified version of the Library of Congress for the transliteration of the Greek passages/words into English system was adopted. However, there will be no tampering with the names of Greek authors that have already been transliterated in English titles. The generally accepted European

¹ Ferit Develioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lûgat. Eski ve zeni harflerle*, 18th ed. Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi Yayınları, 2001.

equivalents for the names of Greek regions have been adopted for the needs of this paper.

As a result, the novel transliteration system applied in the present work equates Greek letters and diphthongs into their Latin counterparts as follows:

A α	B β	Γ γ	Δ δ	E ε	Z ζ	H η	Θ θ	I ι	K κ
A a	V v	G g	D d	E e	Z z	Ē ē	Th th	I i	K k

Λ λ	M μ	N ν	Ξ ξ	O ο	Π π	Ρ ρ	Σ σ	Τ τ	Υ υ
L l	M m	N n	Ks ks	O o	P p	R r	S s	T t	Y y

Φ φ	X χ	Ψ ψ	Ω ω
F f	Ch ch	Ps ps	Ō ō

For the transliteration of the numerous diphthongs and the complex double consonants, the phonetical guidelines that have been opted for are the following:

AI	Äÿ	AY	ΓΓ	ΓK	ΓX	EI	EY
αι	äÿ	αυ	γγ	γκ	Γχ	ει	ευ
AI	Ay	AF ²	GG	Ng	Nch	EI	EF ³
ai	ay	af	gg	ng	nch	ei	Ef
		AV					EV
		av					ev
MB	μμ	MΠ	NΔ	NT	OI	OY	
μβ		μπ	νδ	ντ	oi	ou	
MV	mm	B b	ND	NT	Oi	OU	
mv			nd	nt	oi	ou	

Where necessary, region names have been transcribed as in their modern Turkish variants but in the English alphabet e.g. Istanbul rather than Constantinople; Izmir rather Smyrna or according to commonly accepted English versions of place names

² AF if the following letter is θ, κ, ξ, π, σ, στ, στρ, τ, χ. AV if the following letter is α, γ, δ, λ, μ, ν, ρ, σ, σμ, ω.

³ EF if the following letter if the following letter is θ, κ, ξ, π, σ, στ, στρ, τ, χ. AF if the following letter is α, γ, δ, λ, μ, ν, ρ, σ, σμ, ω.

e.g. Salonica instead of Thessaloniki. In cases where Ottoman words are widely used in English, I have opted for the modern Turkish version e.g. Paşa rather than Pasha. The names of Greek authors and other Greek names found in English language publications have not, in the context of this work, been subjected to the suggested form of transliteration.

Date conversion

The *hicri* dates of the Ottoman newspaper articles are cited in both the footnotes as well as in the bibliography along with their Gregorian equivalents.

Translations of foreign language titles other than English.

All foreign language titles other than the English ones will be translated in brackets.

1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the Paris Peace conference in January 1869 the 3-year Cretan conflict came to an end after 30,000¹ soldiers out of 200,000 (which composed the Ottoman Imperial army) had been mobilized, the Ottoman Treasury had been burdened with a total cost² of £15,000,000 and almost 70,000 Christian Cretans were forced to leave the island. With regards to the military facts of the conflict, some authors assume that the number of soldiers who fought in Crete was much bigger than the aforementioned. Reid argues that “the Ottoman army had deployed 82 battalions in Crete to quell the insurrection. Theoretically, the number of soldiers in these battalions should have come up to 65,600 men (at 800 men per battalion)”³. In order to comprehend the extent of the conflict and the importance the Ottoman statesmen attributed to Crete, it needs to be pointed out that the Ottoman military mobilization for the pacification of the island was much bigger than in similar cases of unrest in the Ottoman past. In 1842-43 for example the Ottoman Empire mobilized around 20,000 troops under the command of Ömer Paşa in order to control the power of the Druzes in Damascus, while a few years later 12,000 soldiers were engaged in the Empire's attempt to put down the Kurdish rebellion of Bedir Khan.⁴

In light of these facts, the Cretan crisis of 1866 can easily be classified as one of the most important military crises in the second half of the 19th Ottoman century. Greek historian Skopetea argues that the two crucial events which marked the Greek national cause in the period between the end of the Crimean War (1856) and the crisis of 1875-1878 were the unification of the Ionian Islands and the Cretan crisis of 1866. She

¹ According to the Athenian newspaper *Aiōn* the Porte sent around 35,000 soldiers to Crete. The Ottoman Army corps on the island comprised of 10,000 soldiers. This means that the ratio of military presence on the island in relation to the total Cretan population was roughly one to five. To the aforementioned 45,000 soldiers one should also count Egyptians, Circassians, Albanians and local Muslims. “Boreiē Tourkia n anthekseī kata tēs Krētēs;” [Can Turkey withstand the Cretan revolt?], *Aiōn*, no. 2160, September 15, 1866.

² Kalliatakē estimates that the total cost of the Cretan crisis from 1866 to 1872 was in the region of 385,000,000 *guruş*. Given that at the time an English pound was equal to 110 *guruş*, the toll of the war had reached up to £3,500,000.

³ James J. Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. Prelude to Collapse, 1839-1878* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), 222.

⁴ Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870. An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson, 2007), 428.

describes the Cretan conflict as a national movement the prehistory of which was “to a great extent independent from the Greek state”⁵, while Çiçek draws the conclusion that the Cretan crisis “proved to be a hallmark event in the destiny of the empire.”⁶Further, I would agree with Çiçek’s assumption that the Cretan conflict was evaluated and conceived by the Greek political elite as a case of high political risk, as it was too much of a reminder of the Crimean War the fatal consequences of which were well-known in the relations between the Great Powers and the Greek Kingdom.

Crete being at the periphery of the Ottoman realm undoubtedly constituted one of the most turbulent imperial provinces of the 19th century. A brief look at the island's recent Ottoman history shows a characteristic frequency of rebellions or revolutions breaking out at almost once every ten years. In the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence the Cretan Question unremittingly held a central position in the political agenda not only of the Ottoman statesmen but of the Great Powers as well. Apart from the Cretans' participation in the Greek War of Independence, the most important milestones of the Cretan issue during the 19th century were the crises of 1841, 1854, 1866-1869, 1878, 1885 and 1897.

The period being examined here, which constitutes the second phase of the Cretan Question explains the assessment Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha made in 1830 in a discussion with the Duke of Wellington, according to which:

“the separation of Crete from Greece is not good omen for the recently created nation. Greece is truncated morally and materially and becomes a poor and indefensible nation. If the fate of the Greeks improves, no one can expect them to abdicate their sympathies toward their own nationals. I am convinced that it is impossible to expect the peaceful return of Crete under Ottoman control...The use of arms is the only remaining solution.”⁷

⁵Ellē Skopetea, *To “Prototypos Vasileio” kai ē Megalē Idea. Opseis tou ethnou provlēmatis stēn Ellada (1830-1880)* [The “Model Kingdom” and the Megali Idea. Aspects of the National Problem in Greece (1830-1880)] (Athēna: Prototypos, 1988), 293-4.

⁶Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 23.

⁷Antonis. Th. Spiliotopoulos, *Istoria tou Ellinoturkikou polemou* [History of the Greco-Turkish War] (Athēna: S. Tsagaris, 1902), 1: 9, quoted in Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897* (New York: Boulder, 1984), 20.

It is a matter of fact, that the Cretan Question concerned the Ottoman political elites throughout 19th century. The period between 1866 and 1869 especially, proved to be a multidimensional challenge not only for the protective states of the local population on the island, namely Greece and the Ottoman Empire, but for the Great Powers, too. The dimensions as well as the effects of the crisis can be seen on the diplomatic, military, economic and political level as well. The importance of the Cretan crisis of 1866 is accentuated once more by scholars concerned with Ottoman history like Mardin who states that two events had an impetus on the formation and development of the Patriotic Alliance:

“One of these (...) was the beginning of a serious insurrection on the Island of Crete, which once more raised the question of the viability of the Ottoman Empire. The second was the publication by a Turco-Egyptian paşa of a letter addressed to the sultan, demanding a constitutional reform – (...).”⁸

Furthermore, the events on Crete forced Sultan Abdülaziz to travel to France in the summer of 1867 (21 June-7 August 1867), which was the first time an Ottoman Sultan had travelled abroad without the Empire being at war. The official reason for the Sultan's trip abroad was the invitation by Napoleon III to attend the exhibition of 1867. The actual reason, however, that led Abdülaziz to this without precedent action in Ottoman history was his intention to “reestablish Turkish credit, shaken by the events in Crete, in the capitals of Western Europe, and to try to forestall any possible Franco-Russian cooperation in favor of the Cretan rebels.”⁹

In addition, the period of the Cretan conflict was also marked by two important political texts written by two leading *Tanzimat* figures. These texts were the memoranda of Ali and Fuad Paşa addressed to the Ottoman government and the Great Powers respectively, both of them drafted in 1867 when the Cretan crisis was at its peak. In general terms, in light of the fact that the Cretan Question traditionally had a noteworthy place in the Ottoman public debate like in the case of 1841¹⁰, one can say

⁸Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962), 24.

⁹Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (New York: Gordian Press 1973), 235.

¹⁰ Regarding the Cretan rebellion of 1841, Kırılı states that it monopolized people's conversations in Istanbul “more than any other popular uprising.” Cengiz Kırılı, “Balkan Nationalisms and the Ottoman Empire: Views from the Istanbul Streets,” in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans 1760-1850: Conflict,*

that the events of 1866 monopolized public discussion as well, not only in the Ottoman Empire and Greece but also in the major European countries too.

1.1 Why the Cretan movement of 1866?

In my opinion the Cretan events of 1866 provide an excellent platform for the presentation of the conflicting relationship or in other cases the links between different ideological concepts whose historical-political weight had shaped the fates of Greece and the Ottoman Empire for the decades to follow. As the Cretan movement coincided with major tectonic ideological shifts in Southeastern Europe which were evident in the notions of *Megali Idea*, *Ottomanism*, its sub-ideology *Greek Ottomanism* and *Panslavism*, the armed conflict of 1866 becomes an interesting case study in order to examine the interaction of the aforementioned ideologies via the contemporary Greek and Ottoman press.

The Cretan Question has gained the attention of Greek scholars throughout its various phases. Despite its special place in Greek historiography, most studies tend to approach the conflict of 1866 by focusing on the narration of the events rather than on a systematic examination of other aspects such as the underlying ideological parameters of the issue. Thus, I believe that the events of 1866 require more attention for the following reasons:

- The political and historical weight of the crisis of 1866 for both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom.
- The timing of the crisis which coincided with important ideological fermentations in Southeastern Europe.
- The dynamic nature of the movement which evolved from a collective protest movement to a separatist-irredentist one.
- The failure of the movement.

Transformation, Adaption, eds. Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), 255.

- The distinct role of the Christian element on the island and its particular place between two ethnic cores.
- The notion of *Ottomanism* which was viewed from different angles by the ruling political elite and intelligentsia of the time, as well as its visible impact on the intra-communal relations, and finally,
- The underestimated role of the historical press as a scientific source for the examination of historical events like the case under examination.

With respect to the use of press as an historical source, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 titled “Press as an historical source,” historians appeared to use press material reluctantly and often in a complementary way compared to other sources. This skepticism in the minds of historians can be explained as the use of press material in scientific work can possibly lead to misinterpretations mainly due to the lack of expertise or specific information. Another practical reason which might explain the hesitation of the historical discipline to embrace the use of the press could be the lack of biographical details of the columnists or more importantly the affiliation of the newspapers to political parties and/or politicians.

However, in the present work I will unreservedly undertake the task of demonstrating the value of historical press as a useful source for the examination of ideological currents, at the very least. It is generally accepted that newspapers can usually ascertain information that has been gathered from their various sources but piecing together information gathered from articles of different newspapers can be a very good source of answers to specific questions concerning a particular period for the historian. In general, describing the press as a useful and valuable source is not at all unjustified due to the uniqueness of the information in newspaper articles.

In reality, just like other sources, the press too, “was not intended by the producers to be an historical source,”¹¹ therefore the raw information provided in the contents of the newspaper articles can shed some light on questions which cannot be answered with the use of other sources such as official documents for example. Nonetheless, the fact

¹¹Jane-Louise Secker, “Newspapers and Historical Research: A Study of Historians and Custodians in Wales” (PhD diss., University of Wales, 1999), 27.

that newspapers not only constitute an archival source but are also an object of study, allows us to approach the press as part of a society's power network. Accordingly, this will enable us to trace the nature of the press during the period in question and other elite groups by drawing useful conclusions concerning the reflection of ideological mainstreams from the content of the newspapers examined.

Taking the previously mentioned parameters of the study of the press into consideration, a preeminent thought which motivated my research revolved around the contribution of the press in the reproduction and representation of contemporary ideological concepts. Elaborating on that, another question on which I pondered and which progressed the present thesis even further is whether studying the press can help us draw useful conclusions with regard to the impact of opposing ideological concepts on intra-communal relations as well as on ethnic group mobilization.

1.2 The Cretan revolt in the literature

As historical events were approached strictly within the field of history until the final decades of the past century, the importance of their ideological or social dimensions might have been overlooked. The fact that the secessionist movements of the Ottoman 19th century were usually attributed to the notion of nationalism resulted in the negligence of several other factors that were directly linked to the internal dynamics of the ethnic communities. With the introduction of interdisciplinary or even multidisciplinary methods in the field of history new horizons have opened up before us in the quest of scientific research.

In relation to the subject under examination, most scholars¹² tend to approach the Cretan Question as a whole without paying particular attention at its distinct aspects and phases. Thus, approaching the Cretan cause as an uninterrupted continuation within the course of late Ottoman history entails the risk of losing information on the interdependent relation between specific aspects and phases of the subject. On the

¹²Zekeriya Türkmen, "Girit Adasını Osmanlı idaresinden ayırma çabaları: Yunan isyanını takip eden dönemdeki gelişmeler (1821-1869)" [Efforts to break the ties between the island of Crete and Ottoman governance. The developments following the Greek War of Independence (1821-1869)], *OTAM* 12, (2001): 219-244.

contrary, I firmly believe that in not “sacrificing” an almost hundred-year long matter, such as the Cretan cause, by throwing it in the historiographical melting pot, allows us the opportunity to uncover even more aspects of the collective movements during the Ottoman 19th century. In addition it provides us with answers to questions related to the political and ideological context of a given period.

With no intention of underplaying the importance of works written on the events of 1866, there is a need to point out that most of them deal with the political dimensions of the crisis, primarily by drawing on diplomatic archival sources.¹³ This, unfortunately led to the mere description of state policies, while failing to detect any other developments that were in progress within the framework of the conflict and could not possibly be expressed in the official political language of the diplomatic dispatches.

Furthermore, because most scholars who have been studying Ottoman Crete tend to put more emphasis on the examination of diplomatic-political dimensions of the matter, this has inevitably led to the neglect of other valuable sources such as the press, the utilization of which could undoubtedly offer new input to the historical research. Until today the – especially the Turkish-Ottoman - secondary literature on the Cretan movement of 1866 systematically underplayed the social background of the Cretan conflict by linking it solely to the underlying revolutionary and nationalist inclinations of the islanders.

Some of the most thorough works on the Cretan movement viewed from an historical-political angle belong to multi-voluminous *oeuvres* of Cretan scholars¹⁴ which have contributed in a decisive way to the reconstruction of the military and diplomatic events of the period 1866-1869. Scholars studying the Cretan Question are generally more attracted to its last phase, the most important one of the Cretan cause, as it led to the Greek-Ottoman war of 1896 and a few years later to the independency of the

¹³Wolfgang Elz, *Die Europäischen Grossmächte und der Kretische Aufstand 1866-1867* [The European Great Powers and the Cretan Rebellion 1866-1867] (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1988); Robert Wagner, *Der Kretische Aufstand 1866/67 bis zur Mission Aali Paschas* [The Cretan rebellion 1866/1867 until Aali Paschas mission] (Bern: Druck und Verlag von Gustav Grunau, 1908); Maureen M. Robson, „Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question, 1868-1869,“ *The Historical Journal* 3, no. 1 (1960): 38-55; Theodore G. Tatsios, *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A Study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967).

¹⁴ Nikolaos Tsirintanēs, *Ἐ πολιτικῆ καὶ διπλωματικῆ ἱστορία τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ Ἐθν. Ἐπαναστάσεως, 1866-1868* [The political and diplomatic history of the National Revolution in Crete, 1866-1868]. 3 Vols. (Athēna: N/A, 1950-1951); Vasileios Psilakēs, *Ἱστορία τῆς Κρήτῆς* [History of Crete]. Vol. 3 (Chania: Nea Erevna, 1909); Iōannēs D. Mourellos, *Ἱστορία τῆς Κρήτῆς* [History of Crete]. Vol. 3 (Heraklion: Eleftherē Skepsē, 1934).

island. It is at this juncture that the work of Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou¹⁵ becomes especially relevant as she examines the bearings of the Christian element on the island during the turbulent period between 1860 and 1875 and approaches Crete as a field of Ottoman experimentation by deploying diplomatic sources in a critical but often biased way.

With regards to the use of sources other than diplomatic documents, only in the very recent past has some works appeared which examines the period, and therefore the Cretan movement, by utilizing newspapers. For example, the Greek historian Antōnopoulos¹⁶ relied primarily on the use of press material in his work concerning the Constantinopolitan *Neologos*, in order to highlight the stance of the elite press towards contemporary issues (e.g. Bulgarian Nationalism) that interested the Greek Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. Antōnopoulos' work initiated a new era for the scientific contribution of the historical press in the study of the Greek and Greek Ottoman past and was followed by other Greek scholars on Ottoman history who paid attention to the *millet's* institutional history as well as the internal dynamics of Hellenism in the age of nationalism.

Thus, Stamatopoulos¹⁷ and Skopetea have both devoted their work to the examination of the Greek *millet* and the *Megali Idea* respectively, by making use of contemporary press in addition to other sources. Specifically, Skopetea's work along with the Kitromilides' contributions¹⁸ provides us with some interesting observations about the context within which Greek nationalism had evolved. Their work has undoubtedly contributed to our better understanding of the Greek Kingdom's role as an ethnic center as well as its part in the nation-building process by drawing our attention to the inner dynamics apparent in Hellenism.

¹⁵Kallia Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos alytrōtismos kai othōmanikes metarrythmiseis. Ē periptōsē tēs Krētēs* [Greek irredentism and ottoman reforms. The case of Crete] (Athēna: Estia Bookstore, 1988).

¹⁶Antreas Antōnopoulos, *Oi Ellēnes tēs Othōmanikēs Aftokratōrias kai to Anatoliko zētēma. Ē martyria tou Neologou tēs Kōnstantinoupolēs 1866-1881* [The Greeks of the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question. The Testament of Neologos of Constantinople 1866-1881] (Athēna: Ekdoseis Toukatou, 2007).

¹⁷Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, *Metarrythmisē kai ekkosmikefsē. Pros mia anasynthesē tēs istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou ton 19^o aiōna* [Reform and secularization: towards a rewriting of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th century] (Athēna: Alexandria, 2003).

¹⁸Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "To Ellēniko kratōs ōs ethniko kentro" [The Greek state as a national center], in *Ellēnismos-Ēllēnikotēta. Ideologikoi kai Biōmatikoi Aksones tēs Neoellēnikēs Koinōnias* [Hellenism-Greek Ethnicity. Ideological and Empirical Principles of Modern Greek Society], ed. D. G. Tsousēs (Athēna: Vivliopōleion tēs Estias, 1983), 143-164; Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," *European Quarterly* 19 (1989): 149-194.

So, while Skopetea addresses the Greek national question as it was expressed in the incorporation of *Megali Idea* in the Greek political ideals of post-revolutionary Greece by delving into the Greek press of the 19th century, Kitromilides describes the ideological transformation of Greek liberal nationalism into an irredentist policy by simultaneously presenting all those state mechanisms that contributed to the reconciliation of inner and outer Hellenism. Looking at Turkish scholars on the other hand, they seem to have a growing interest in studying the press. This is mainly due to the correlation between the emergence of the private press with the presence of the Young Ottomans in the political life of the Empire.

Çiçek¹⁹ for example devotes a remarkable portion of her work to the Cretan movement, accentuating its contribution to the genesis of the Young Ottomans. Contrasting Mardin's (Mardin, 1962) classic work on the Young Ottomans, which focuses mainly on the presentation of the political and philosophical orientation of the intellectuals, Çiçek touches upon issues like the Eastern Question, foreign interventionism, the Ottoman financial policies as well as the issue of equality which were an integral part of the Young Ottomans' criticism of governmental politics. As the Cretan movement coincided with the rise of the Ottoman opposition, she relies on the examination of the oppositional press and situates the Cretan conflict in the framework of the *Ottomanism* discourse, attempting to illustrate the interconnection between the political events while avoiding any detailed theoretical discussions on the ideological affiliations of the Young Ottomans.

Coming back to the discussion concerning the Greek *millet*, to which the Cretan Christians still belonged to, Stamatopoulos (Stamatopoulos, 2003) attempts to present the complex interaction between the different power networks in the Constantinopolitan Greek orthodox community that acted as a mediator on a central and peripheral level in times of crisis. Remaining within the same framework, Exertzoglou²⁰ focuses on the emergence of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie in the second half of the 19th century which, by taking advantage of the opportune conditions of the *Tanzimat*, challenged the primacy of the Patriarchate. In addition, we should not

¹⁹Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

²⁰Haris Exertzoglou, "The Development of a Greek Bourgeoisie: Investment Patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1914," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism. Economy and the society in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999), 89-114.

forget that the modernization process in the Empire reinforced the position of the Greek lay element not only within the *millet* but also in the Ottoman polity as well. With regards to that, the Greek historian Anagnostopoulou²¹ explored the geographically differentiated westernization process in the *Rum Milleti* and accentuated the lack of cohesion of the socioeconomic conditions in the Greek Orthodox community. She also quite colorfully illustrated the particular mechanisms of the Greek Orthodox community which advanced the integration of the peripheral and core areas of the Empire populated by the Greek element into the Ottoman reality.

1.3 Purpose

Relying on the use of the historical Greek and Ottoman press along with the employment of other primary sources like memoirs and diplomatic dispatches, the objective of the present work can be described as follows: One facet being to highlight the value of utilizing the historical press as a scientific source for the exploration of ideological concepts as well as the interconnection between the press, public opinion and politics. Given that the press had a strong persuasive role, public opinion formed the field where the process of ideological reproduction was taking place.

Furthermore, the present work intends to explore to what extent contemporary Greek and Ottoman newspapers functioned as means of the reproduction of various and, more often than not, conflicting ideological currents at play during the period under examination. Thus, relying on the news coverage of the Cretan conflict from the contemporary editorials and by illuminating the different facets thereof, I will attempt to give prominence to the historical press' contribution to the definition and portrayal of historical events as well as to the construction of an interpretative context within which we can better comprehend such a movement.

²¹Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia 19^{os} ai.-1919. Oi Ellēnorthodokses koinotētes. Apo to Millet tōn Rōmiōn sto Ellēniko Ethnos* [Asia Minor 19th Century – 1919. The Greek Orthodox Communities. From the Rum Millet to the Greek State] (Athēna: Ellēnika Grammata, 1998).

I will also attempt to investigate which aspects of the movement the press paid more attention to through its coverage, and which were not, as well as whether specific press worldviews were at all depicted in the news reporting.

To my mind, the press played a remarkably influential role in the societies of both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom by actively attempting to impel the developments not only through its criticism and control of the political elite but also through its power to influence and/or form public opinion. Ergo, the media elite of the mid 1860s in both countries could be described as “a select group which imposes attitudes and in ideas in a broader frame of social being.”²²

1.4 What is ideology?

Even though the Cretan crisis of 1866 is the subject of our case study, the issue will be examined from the viewpoint of non-local players. As the press makes up a considerable part of the sources utilized, it is safe to say that besides forming a part of the elite network in both Greece and the Ottoman Empire, it functioned primarily as a major transmitter of ideologies.

As we are dealing with a historical issue of significant political weight, it is of some value in this introduction to put emphasis on the interconnection between ideology and politics by defining ideology and adopting that definition as a tool for the present work. In the discussion about ideological mainstreams within the context of the Greek-Ottoman relations in the second half of the 19th century we usually refer to politics that were propelled mainly by the notions of *Megali Idea* and *Ottomanism* and later on by *Pan-Islamism* and *Pan-Turkism*. However, what the aforementioned concepts had in common was that they consolidated policies rather than abstract sets of beliefs in the confines of a theoretical framework.

²²Pinelopi Stathi, “Provincial Bishops of the Orthodox Church as Members of the Ottoman Elite (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries),” in *Ottoman rule and the Balkans 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaption*, eds. Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), 77.

Despite the long journey it has made through the centuries while being harshly criticised with regard to its content and intention as well as countless interpretations attributed to it by theorists, *ideology* still remains a general term with respect to its theoretical conceptualization.²³ Hence, discussing ideologies and their impact on real life in terms of political conduct is not at all an easy task, as the absence of a fixed definition poses an additional complication in an attempt to find a proper way to describe a set of ideas and beliefs evident in the implementation of politics as shown in the chapters that follow. Nevertheless, it is not my intention to enter into an unending discussion by integrating every possible definition of the term. Contrarily, the objective is to conclude on a scientific consensus among the different definitions of *ideology* as a model for the purposes of the present work which describes the correlation between ideology and politics in the best way possible.

When we are dealing with ideologies and in an attempt to approach them by moving from a more abstract and theoretical level to a more pragmatic and practical one, there are certain questions which naturally arise and they revolve around content, function and aim: Are the ideologies only philosophically abstract conceptions for example or can they be interpreted in practical ways for the advancement of reality? Are they expressions only of a dominant social/political group or of minorities too? Furthermore, are the ideologies resorted to in order to legitimise a specific set of beliefs and ideas, and if so, what direction does that process follow? Is it a top to bottom process which means the will of the powerful imposed upon their subordinates or can it also be a bottom to top process which reflects the needs of a given group or community? One could also argue about whether or not ideologies are “invented” concepts instrumentalised for the purposes of sanctioning the conduct of particular politics or if they are constructs which reflect belief systems or ideas of the commonpeople.

“Groups can remain dominant only if they have the resources to reproduce their dominance.”²⁴ Thus, all the aforementioned questions inevitably arise when dealing with the interactions of ideologies and political events as well as with the press' contribution to the reproduction of political events. Even if one attempts to classify

²³For a brief introduction into the history of the term see Bo Strath, “Ideology and Conceptual History,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3-18.

²⁴Teun Van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* (London, New York: Routledge, 1991), 32.

ideologies under specific categories, there are instances when political actions carried out in the name of an ideology can be proven contradictory to the content of that very ideology. Such a case is that of the *Ottoman Nationality Law* which we will encounter and examine in chapter 6 on *Ottomanism*. The fact that in certain cases the Young Ottomans' comprehension of *Ottomanism* was quite different to that of the Ottoman statesmen, never deviating however from the end goal of salvaging the Empire, is an indicator of the dynamic nature and content of this ideology. Similarly, in a more general sense, even though *Greek Ottomanism* was supported by specific segments of the Greek Ottoman community, counterbalancing the increasing ethnocentric sentiments within, it cannot be overlooked that it indeed was a sub-ideology which had sprung from the mainstream ideology of *Ottomanism*.

In order to avoid getting lost in the revived ideology discourse, at this point I would rather mention some general and broader definitions of ideology which could allow us to better understand the way the press was involved in the reproduction and channeling of ideologies.

Concerning the essence of the term ideology, it is traditionally loaded with negative connotations, inherited mainly from the critical theories and ethics in the works of Marx and Engels and later on from Mannheim and Habermas.²⁵ The common denominator in their work was that they attached a false consciousness to it. Only after empirical research conducted in fields such as sociology, psychology and political science did the term gain a somewhat “value-neutral”²⁶ significance. In an attempt at a relative approach of these two institutions regarding the conceptualization of ideology Jost, Federico and Napier proposed

“that a given ideology can reflect both genuine (and even highly accurate) attempts to understand, interpret, and organize information about the political worlds as well as conscious or unconscious

²⁵John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier, “Political ideology: Its structure, functions and elective affinities,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 60, (2009): 309. For a further contribution on the different theoretical approaches to the concept of ideology see J. Rehmann, “Ideology Theory,” *Historical Materialism* 15, no. 4 (2007): 211-239.

²⁶Jost, Federico and Napier, “Political ideology,” 309.

tendencies to rationalize the way things are or, alternatively, the desire for them to be different.”²⁷

Certain definitions of ideology, like that of Selinger, are beneficial to the purposes of the present work as they assist in the attempt to approach our subject in a more concrete and less abstract theoretical way. According to Selinger ideology can be described as “sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such actions aim to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order.”²⁸

Thompson argues that ideology is “the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination,”²⁹ in other words it is applied in order to legitimize certain belief systems of a dominant social group or class. On the same line Freedman defined ideology as “clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans of action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community.”³⁰

I believe it would be a mistake to regard the relationship between ideas and policies or political stances as a static and monolithic one, as differentiations are always possible depending on the personality of the policy-maker or intellectual, on the timing, on the occasion etc. With that in mind, Hunt’s definition of the term provides us with a broader range so as to interpret occasional policies, which could even contradict the content of an ideology. According to Hunt “an understanding of a nation’s ideology provides no certain insights into its behavior. Ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in which policymakers deal with specific issues and in which the attentive public understands those issues.”³¹ In light of that, ideologies should be viewed as a set of ideas or beliefs that play a major role in the formation of a policy or influence the stance towards a specific issue.

²⁷Ibid., 310.

²⁸Martin Selinger, *Ideology and politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), 11.

²⁹John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 4, quoted in Terry Eagleton, *Ideology. An Introduction* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), 5.

³⁰Duncan Bell, “Ideologies of Empire” in: *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, eds. Michael Freedman, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 538.

³¹Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1987), 16.

Thus, the reason for trying to find an applicable definition for ideology within the context of the present study, is that, even if we were to consider the press a highly important medium for the transmission of ideological concepts into society, it should not be taken for granted that contemporary newspapers, interpreted and pursued the mainstream ideologies in the same way that the political elite did. Despite being the framework within which the key players of the Ottoman conflict acted, one should not expect that the notions to be discussed here, namely *Megali Idea* and *Ottomanism*, were addressed by them in an absolute and inflexible manner.

1.5 Antagonistic and mutually interacting nationalisms

After attempting to adopt a definition for the concept of ideology, studying the various manifestations of nationalism in the Cretan case will enable us to better comprehend the contribution of the press to the representation of ideological concepts as well as to the creation of ideological contexts by drawing on terms such as ethnicity, ethnic community, national identity and ethnic mobilization.

Being that nationalism is one of the most powerful forces to drive the evolution of historical events, historians are in a sense obligated to pay it the appropriate attention when dealing with events whose reasoning is motivated by such notions. Historians have traditionally been skeptical towards the phenomenon as “they have attributed to nationalism a variety of harmful consequences, ranging from absurd social and cultural policies to totalitarian terror and global destabilization.”³² Nonetheless, one must recognize that the “attractiveness” of this ideology lies in its non-static nature and its ability to transform depending on the developments of each period. It would therefore be a mistake, in my opinion, to throw all nationalisms into the same basket or to adopt an axiomatic classification or a typology of ideology.

Additionally, the many different manifestations of nationalism become clearer when two opposing parties devoted to their own sacral objectives contest one another for

³²Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism and the Historians,” in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London, New York: Verso, 1996), 175-176.

their implementation, sometimes at any cost. Even during a conflict though, political ideologies are presented in a common way. This common way is encapsulated in stereotypical concepts such as “us/our,” “they/their,” “our community,” “motherland/homeland” only to be understood from different points of view.

The nation-building processes adopted by both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom imposed the desires of the political elite for the construction of a nation and were designed to meet their inner and immediate needs defined by the prevailing circumstances. As was mentioned above, nationalism’s complexity lays in the fact that it can manifest itself in ways of opposite nature. The notions of *Megali Idea* and *Ottomanism* characteristically reveal the reciprocal relation between different manifestation of an ideology which is apparent in a given time period and within the boundaries of a certain area. This reciprocity of both state policies is due to their interdependence as they did not only evolve in parallel, almost, but they were also influenced by each other.

But what is nationalism really? According to Hechter, “nationalism is better defined as a collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.”³³ Within this definition of nationalism, however, one can find different state policies, ranging from inclusive to exclusive strategies. In general terms, Hechter’s typologies³⁴ of nationalism can possibly concur with the definition of the notion’s two predominant manifestations we encounter during the Cretan conflict in the mid-1860s.

On the one hand, there is the Ottoman state-building nationalism focused on instilling patriotic sentiments to its multiethnic populations, and, on the other, we encounter the irredentist policies of the newly born Kingdom enveloped in an aggressive militant expansionism. In particular, while the multinational Ottoman Empire strove to defend its integrity under the pressure of centrifugal tendencies among its minorities by pursuing a supranational sense of common belonging, the newly established Greek Kingdom consisted of a homogeneous population which sought to become a nation state by incorporating its unredeemed co-ethnic populations in the name of an aggressive militant nationalism.

³³Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 15-16.

Coming now to the conflict *per se* and without getting into the discussion about the typology of the Cretan events of 1866, as scholars attribute to it a variety of terms (revolt, revolution, separatist movement, ethnic conflict etc.), I will limit its definition by arguing that the Cretan movement was primarily an act of resistance expressed in terms of a collective protest which developed into an ethnic separatist movement. The Cretan conflict of 1866 is automatically placed in the epicenter of two antithetic and competing types of nationalism. But most importantly the Cretan movement merely displayed the reaction of one section of an ethnic community living in a multinational empire.

There is no doubt that the members of this ethnic community were bounded with all these Smithian criteria which define the nature of every ethnic community, namely 1) the existence of a name as definitory feature of the collective identity, 2) the belief in common ancestry 3) historical memory 4) a shared culture 5) the attachment to a specific territory and 6) a sense of solidarity and common ethnicity.³⁵ However, the decision of the Cretans to break away from a larger unit in order to claim their self-determination and to demand their unification with the motherland, Greece, by believing themselves to be shareholders of a common identity not only demonstrated the mutual relation between irredentism and ethnic separatism but also raised the question of the diverse diffusion of national identification within an ethnic community. In other words, it seems that the potential for conflict already existed on the island, waiting only for the appropriate time to break out.

In fact, both irredentism and secessionism are to some extent related to each other, particularly with regard to their final purpose, as irredentism “refers to attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people who inhabit them in the name of historical, cultural, religious, linguistic, or geographic affinity”³⁶ while secessionism “is an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”³⁷ Another fact which proves the reciprocal relationship between Greek irredentism and Cretan secessionism is that both

³⁵ Anthony D. Smith, “The ethnic sources of nationalism,” in *Ethnic conflict and International security* ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 28-31.

³⁶ Naomi Chazan, “Conclusion: Irredentism, Separatism, and Nationalism,” in *Irredentism and International Politics*, ed. Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 139.

³⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, “Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections,” in: *Irredentism and International Politics*, ed. Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 9-10.

of them gained momentum from time to time whenever they coincided with “major political reordering, boundary readjustment, or restructuring of the international system.”³⁸

While the breakdown of indirect rule and the belief of individuals which belong to a nation that claim their self-determination would bring them to a better situation belong to the main reasons which often give wake to nationalist movements, when a state - in our case a multinational empire - enforces direct rule through the establishment of institutions for the better incorporation of culturally and ethnically different community members, then it is less likely that these individuals tend to express nationalist behaviors.³⁹

With respect to the imposition of direct rule, the *Tanzimat* reforms, whereby the letter of *Ottomanism* was mainly articulated, can be described as “a program of state-sponsored modernization in order to build civic ties among the empire’s populations”⁴⁰ and encompassed the rulers’ desire to secure the loyalty of ethno-religious heterogeneous communities which were dispersed over the vast Ottoman realm. On the same line Fortna argues that *Ottomanism*’s mission was to accentuate the “overarching imperial identity at the expense of “millet” or national sub-identities.”⁴¹ Following this top-bottom state-building process a multinational state undertakes the effort to impose direct rule aiming at the centralization of the powers which is usually achieved through the adoption of inclusive or exclusive strategies. In other words, Rudometof and Fortna implicitly attached civic characteristics to the Ottoman state-policy, as it “envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.”⁴²

³⁸Chazan, “Conclusion: Irredentism,” 143.

³⁹Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 33.

⁴⁰Victor Roudometof, *Nationalism, globalization, and Orthodoxy. The social origins of ethnic conflict in the Balkans* (Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 2001), 84.

⁴¹ Benjamin Fortna, “The Ottoman Empire and after: from a state of “nations” to “nation-states,” in: *State-nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey. Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945*, eds. Benjamin C. Fortna et al. (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 9.

⁴²Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Vintage, 1994), 3-4.

1.6 Intra-group variation of nationalist sentiment

It is not only the different manifestations of nationalism that contain a competing and antagonistic character. One encounters similar antithetical - if not conflicting – attitudes within an ethnic group as well. Regarding the previously mentioned brief introduction on the concepts of irredentism, ethnic separatism and state-building nationalism, one should not overlook further aspects of a dynamic interaction between an ethnic group, the host state and an external national homeland, which may impact an ethnic community's behavior within the framework of an ethnic conflict.

Despite the fact that scholars on ethnic separatist movements have approached the phenomenon from different perspectives, they usually tend to attribute ethno-separatist nationalist sentiments to an ethnic group as a whole, without taking into account the different voices or trends within. The assumption that the homogeneity in an ethnic group is a given, is quite problematic, as an ethnic community/group does not always act/react as a unified body.

Such a differentiation in the way the ethnic separatist notion was diffused within an ethnic community was vividly displayed in the case of the Cretan movement, due to the fact that the islanders' separatist inclinations represented the wishes of a part of the Greek Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the objective markers of an ethnic community's identity, namely common language and religion, shared traditions, beliefs and culture did not have the same impact on the diffusion of nationalist notion within an ethnic group in a multiethnic polity. Accordingly, this lack of unity within an ethnic group makes us adopt Brubaker's definition of national community according to which it is "not a fixed entity or a unitary group but rather in terms of the field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different (...), movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to "represent" the minority to its own putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world (...)." ⁴³

Finally, the lack of a unified voice within an ethnic group inevitably results in a non-linear diffusion of ethnic nationalist sentiment amongst its members, which in turn leads to their differentiated ethnic mobilization. Differentiated ethnic mobilization may range from no mobilization at all to the emergence of a counter-ideology within a

⁴³Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 61.

group. Nevertheless, effective state-building policies as well as imposition of direct rule⁴⁴ may decisively influence ethnic mobilization within an ethnic group “since the likelihood that a subgroup will support nationalist goals depends strongly on how connected its members feel to the rest of their ethnic group.”⁴⁵ In this sense the establishment of new institutions or the successful integration of segments of a society can decisively contribute to the change of the sense of a common identity as “especially in cases where the new institutions are imposed without regard to the traditional patterns of social interaction and/or government structure.”⁴⁶

1.7 Structure of the present work

The structure of the present work is primarily thematic rather than chronological. Furthermore, it will provide a panorama of the ideological mainstreams that influenced the course of the events being studied, in one way or another. To my mind, ideologies are dynamic social processes, thus, I will attempt to shed some light on the interrelation between the ideological concepts under examination and the specific aspects of the Cretan movement, viewed through the prism of contemporary press.

Chapter 2 deals with the Cretan conflict by highlighting the most important stations of it. After a short overview of the pre-1866 Ottoman Crete, I illuminate some useful demographic as well as socio-economic aspects of the island in the period under discussion. Furthermore, I put emphasis on the social background of the events in the context of the *Tanzimat* reforms as well as on the way both Ottoman and Greek newspapers approached the foundations for the upheaval. Thus, the reader will have the opportunity to more accurately comprehend the prevailing circumstances on the island at the time the revolt broke out. The final part of the chapter pays attention to the course of the conflict as well as to its diplomatic-political aspects based on the finding of the press analysis and other mostly primary sources.

⁴⁴ Hechter, *Containing nationalism*, 60

⁴⁵ Dmitry Gorenburg, “Not with one voice. An explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist sentiment,” *World Politics* 53, no.1 (2000): 121.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 121-122.

The value as well as the shortcomings of utilizing the historical press as a scientific source is the focal point of discussion in Chapter 3. The triadic relationship between the press, public opinion and politics will also be presented and looked into in the same chapter. An indirect concern of the present work is to demonstrate that the ideologies explored here were not only an abstract set of beliefs expressed by the contemporary political and social elite but contrarily, they were sets of ideas which impacted the masses. The significance of this chapter lays in the exploration of the dynamic and mutual relationship between the press and public opinion and in doing so we can paint a clearer picture of the interconnection between the press' capacity to function as a channel for the transmission of ideological concepts as well as its contribution to the formation of public opinion.

“Notes on the Greek and Ottoman press,” Chapter 4, is an introduction of the press material that was employed for the purposes of the present work. Athenian, Constantinopolitan and Ottoman newspapers will be presented separately while also focusing on historical data concerning the newspapers and on their ideological orientation in general, always within the context of the Cretan Question of course. The reader will have an overview of the ideological orientation of the newspapers before embarking on the discussion of the ideological concepts related to the Cretan cause. An illustration of the ideological orientation of the newspapers is also presented in the subchapter (4.5) concerned with the terminology. While dealing with press material more weight should be put on the way news coverage is conducted. With that in mind I decided to put emphasis on the way the press advocated certain ideological concepts/stances through the strategic selection of words or phrases in the coverage of the Cretan struggle.

Moving on to the next part of the work, I will present the ideological concepts related to the Cretan cause. The ideologies under examination, namely *Megali Idea*, *Ottomanism*, its by-product *Greek Ottomanism* and *Panslavism* are viewed separately. As for *Megali Idea*, I explore that in Chapter 5, providing the reader with a short overview of its theoretical origins so as to follow the evolutionary paths of Greek nationalism, a liberal nationalism at its dawn that grew into a military expansionist policy. In addition to the study of press material, the civilizing mission of *Megali Idea* is also emphasized as well as the centrality of the private factor in pursuing the irredentist notion in periods of crisis.

I approach the *Ottomanist* notion with regard to the Cretan issue from the perspective of the state policies implemented and the initiatives taken in order to resolve the conflict. However, the coincidence in time between the Cretan events of 1866 and the emergence of an internal intellectual opposition led me to pay considerably more attention to the Young Ottoman oppositional press than to the state sponsored journals. Even though both the Ottoman political élite and the Ottoman intelligentsia considered the suppression of the insurrection as an essential precondition for the maintaining of the Ottoman realm's territorial cohesion, the contributions of the Young Ottoman press offers us a unique opportunity to examine the contradictory perception of the political elite in power and the Young Ottoman intelligentsia with regard to further issues related to the salvation of the Empire encapsulated in the notion of *Ottomanism*.

In particular, the efforts of the Ottoman political elite to settle the conflict in Crete will be examined in relation to the letter of *Ottomanism*. To that end, I decided to make a special reference to Ali Paşa's mission in Crete, as it could be interpreted as a sign of the center's strong desire to maintain its control over the important Cretan province. Furthermore, the composition of the Grand Vizier's custody (consisting of Constantinopolitan Greek Ottomans) as well the introduction of the *Organic Statute* are conceived as strong evidences of the political elite's attempt to bridge the gaps between the Christian Cretans and the core of the *Millet* whose main function at that time was to defend the Ottoman sovereignty. Likewise in the case of the Central Committee, this chapter will also take a closer look at the private initiative of the Ottoman paper *Muhbir* for the relief of the Muslim element on the island, which I hold as an expression of Muslim proto-nationalism.

Even though the different ideological concepts are viewed in separate chapters, they are not disconnected from each other. After looking into *Megali Idea* and *Ottomanism* through the prism of the press, I focus on *Greek Ottomanism* which should be thought of as a byproduct of *Ottomanism*. Therefore chapter 7 highlights the dynamic nature of the three-way interaction between an ethnic group, the host state and external national homeland by illustrating the centrifugal dynamics within the body of Hellenism and the contesting relationship between the two ethnic centers of the *Genos*, namely Athens and Constantinople. The second part of the chapter focuses on aspects of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community, and especially on the presence of the lay element in the banking and educational activities of the reformed *millet*. Without

putting aside the Patriarchate's role as an ethnarchic pillar of Hellenism, I will also try to underline any interconnections between the emerging lay element of the *millet* and the Cretan cause which would allow us to comprehend the Cretan movement's place in the minds of their co-nationals.

Considering that both Greek and Ottoman newspapers made special references to Russian expansionism, the final part of the thesis provides us with some insight into the notion of *Panslavism*. Apart from the press' intense interest in Russia's policy concerning the Cretan conflict, my decision to include the notion of *Panslavism* in the present work is based on the Greek nationalists and the Greek Ottomans' perception of it. Along with a brief introduction of the theoretical facets of *Panslavism*'s evolution in the aftermath of Russia's defeat in Crimea, the aim the 8th chapter is to demonstrate the way the Greek and Ottoman press presented this ideological concept within the context of the Cretan Question's news coverage.

In lieu of epilogue, the final part of the thesis besides presenting some concluding remarks on the findings of my research puts special emphasis on the interconnection between the competing ideological currents of *Ottomanism* and *Greek Ottomanism* and the way they were represented by the contemporary press. Moreover, both of these ideological concepts pose opportunities for further research with regard to the interaction of intra-group or intrastate attitudes on the ground of social movements like secessionist one.

2 Overview of the Cretan conflict

The objective of this chapter is to sketch the Cretan movement by putting an emphasis on the diplomatic and political facets of the crisis which defined the course of the struggle. Parallely, we will attempt to, in a broader scope, observe the flow of the conflict, mainly between the two years from 1866 to 1868, a time during which the battle climaxed. Some other aspects of the movement like its social background as well as Russia's role in the developments are presented in a more thorough way in the 8th chapter. Finally, in the context of an overview of the conflict, I thought it to be necessary to briefly present Ottoman Crete before the uprising of 1866 as well as to put forth the demographic and economic statistics of the island during the period being examined.

2.1 Ottoman Crete before 1866

Before embarking on the description of the events of 1866, it would be useful to refer to some aspects of Ottoman Crete in the period before the events of 1866 in order to comprehend the general context within which the movement had taken place. Certainly, Crete proved to be one of the most turbulent Ottoman provinces in the 19th century since every 10 years an armed conflict took place on the Mediterranean island. Besides its revolutionary character, it was also a province of coral importance for the Ottoman Center, as it was composed administratively as “an eyelet or province in its own right, the only island in the empire to enjoy such a status.”⁴⁷ However, the turbulent Cretan 19th century was preceded by a calm period on the island, which was interrupted only by the Daskalogiannēs' revolt⁴⁸ in 1770-1771 during the Orloff uprisings (part of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774).

⁴⁷Molly Greene, *A Shared World. Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 22.

⁴⁸According to Greene, Daskalogiannēs' “vision was not a national one but rather one in which Christian Orthodox Russia would replace the Ottoman Turks in Constantinople and the East in general.” *Ibid.*, 208.

As far as the position of Crete in the Ottoman Empire is concerned, Greene talks about an “uncertain nature of Ottoman sovereignty on the island”⁴⁹ based on the fluent religious identities among the local populations on the island as result of the islamisation wave that had taken place during and in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of the island. However, there is a consensus among scholars of Ottoman Crete like Greene, Faroqhi, Adiyekke that Crete had turned out to be a quite favorable field for Ottoman (if not Islamic) experimentation. This became apparent for example in the introduction of new practices⁵⁰ with regards to the establishment of Ottoman rule in the remote provinces.

Nonetheless, the existence of an extended *vakf* system on the island demonstrated emphatically the centrality of Crete in the Ottoman political minds as well as the (Ottoman) Center’s wish to impose direct rule on that province. With respect to the aforementioned *vakf* system a characteristic case is that of Gazi Hüseyin Paşa’s vakfs in Rethymnon, to which eleven villages were dedicated.⁵¹

Istanbul did not manage to fully establish its rule on that maritime periphery of the Empire as the islamisation policies conducted on the island did not finally lead to the desired adaptation of an Islamic way of life. Whenever the island experienced periods of crisis and instability, the Cretan Christians made repeated references to the elements of shared tradition, common language⁵² and ancestry which defined the relations to their ex- coreligionists.⁵³ In this context, it should be underlined that “Crete was

⁴⁹Ibid., 203.

⁵⁰The innovations and specificities concerning the establishment of the Ottoman rule on the island revolved around the introduction of a new land and tax regime, alien to the traditional ottoman practices on the newly conquered territories which were defined mainly by their adherence to Islamic Law. Suraya Faroqhi, “Fifty Years after the Conquest: Eighteenth-Century Reforms in Ottoman Crete,” in *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete 1645-1840*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymnon: University of Crete Press, 2008), 243.

⁵¹Elif Bayraktar, “The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the Kadi Court,” (M.A. thesis, Bilkent University Ankara, 2005), 64. Regarding the first years of Ottoman rule on the island, Faroqhi states that “the island province thus continued to show certain features otherwise characteristic of borderlands. It is in this context that Cretan affairs came to play a more significant role in early-eighteenth-century bureaucratic correspondence than was true of Ottoman inland provinces such as, for instance, Karaman or Rum in the Anatolian heartlands.” Faroqhi, “Fifty Years after the Conquest,” 246.

⁵²According to Stavrakēs, Greek was spoken by almost the entirety of the population on the island, being thus not only the mother tongue of the majority of Muslim Cretans but also the language that imams and hocas used in the mosques and schools, respectively. Nikolaos Stavrakēs, *Statistikē tou plēthysmou tēs Krētēs meta diaforōn geōgrafikōn, istorikōn, archaiologikōn, ekklesiastikōn ktl eidēseōn peri tēs nēsou* [Population Statistics of Crete with some geographical, historical, archaeological, ecclesiastical etc information about the island] (Athēna: Paliggenesia, 1890), 201.

⁵³Bayraktar, “The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies,” 88.

among the four principal regions in the Ottoman Empire apart from Albania, Bosnia, Rhodope region where converted Muslims who spoke their native language formed the majority or a substantial part of the population by the first decades of the nineteenth century.”⁵⁴

It can be argued that the way Islam was established on the island, mainly through individual or mass conversions, inevitably led to several problems of economical, legal and an ethical nature within Cretan society. Moreover, the converts decisively contributed to the formation of Janissary military corps on the island, which functioned as a state within a state especially between 1770 and 1820 by undermining the local governors who were appointed by the Porte.⁵⁵ Additionally, the fact that the converts who participated in the Janissary corps were called *chainides*⁵⁶ (traitors) by the local Christians characteristically pointed to the schism within the local society as result of the islamization practices.⁵⁷

There is no doubt that the Cretans' participation in the Greek War of Independence had a disastrous impact on the local life of the island. As result, the demographic consequences for the island were tremendous, as the local population shrank from 213,000 to 129,000 within 10 years (1821-1831).⁵⁸ However, the end of the Greek War of Independence marked a new era for the islands' history as Crete was placed under Egyptian rule which lasted from 1831 to 1840. The principal figure of that period was Mustafa Paşa, who despite the short period of Egyptian rule on the island, remained Governor of Crete for almost 20 years, until 1851.

It should be noted here that the changes that were brought to Cretan society by the Governor of Albanian descent had an influence primarily on the Muslim element. Thus, in his attempt to bring tranquility back to the island, he established an administrative system based more on the equality rather than on the arbitrariness or

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Manōlēs Peponakēs, *Eksislamismoī kai Epanekchristianismoī stēn Krētē (1645-1899)* [Islamisations and Reversions to Christianity in Crete (1645-1899)] (Rethymnon: N/A, 1997), 53-55.

⁵⁶Theocharēs Detorakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs* [History of Crete], 2nd ed. (Heraklion: N/A, 1990), 303-304.

⁵⁷Kallivretakis informs us about the social practices of the Cretan converts and states that the “Turco-Cretans, as they came to be called, continued to speak Greek and drink the wine produced by their vineyards, contenting themselves with learning by rote some of the verses from the Koran to meet their new religious needs.” Leonidas Kallivretakis, “A Century of Revolutions: The Cretan Question between European and Near Eastern Politics,” in *Eleftherios Venizelos. The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2006), 14.

⁵⁸Pınar Şenişik, *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete. Revolts, Politics and Identity in the late Nineteenth Century* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 66.

discrimination of his predecessors. Mustafa Paşa refused access of Muslims to important offices of the administrative mechanism, he established Greek as the official language of the bureaucracy and promoted the creation of mixed councils in the provinces of the island.⁵⁹

Additionally, Mustafa Paşa introduced radical changes in the way taxes were collected by removing “a large part of the mukataas from the agas, thereby depriving them of an important source of economic and social power.”⁶⁰ Finally, another eye-catching development of that period was that the Albanian gendarmerie who were charged with the security of the island intervened often in favor of the Christian element. In sum, it may be argued that the previously mentioned changes had certain influences on the Muslim ruling class but most importantly they managed to secure *grosso modo* peaceful conditions of symbiosis on the island until the events of 1866.

The period after the Egyptian rule on the island can in general be considered a time of peace. However, at the dawn of the 1850s, Moustafa Paşa is succeeded by Salih Vamik Paşa whose tenure is characterized by an increase of excessive loaning on the island as well as the concession of rights to the Christian community who were then allowed to extend the disbursement of funds to their network of schools.⁶¹ Later on, Veli Paşa arrived in Crete as governor of island in the Fall of 1856 and brought with him winds of change as besides being the ambassador of the Ottoman Empire in Paris it was he who signed the treaty of Paris.

During his government many Christians who had converted to Islam in the past decided to return to Christianity due to the positive climate generated by the publication of *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*.⁶² Even though there was a feeling of exuberance at the time, Veli Paşa’s governance was tainted on account of severe taxation without there being any development in the infrastructure of the island. An incident that, however, provoked the Christian community and became the triggering event for the 1858 insurgence was the blunt interference of the governor in the the internal issues of the Patriarchate and more specifically the annulment of the cretan Maksimos Daskalakēs’ election as a member of the Permanent National Mixed Council [Diarkes Ethniko

⁵⁹Kallivretakis, “A Century of Revolutions,” 12-13.

⁶⁰Ibid., 13.

⁶¹Psilakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 3: 807.

⁶²Ibid. 815.

Mikto Symvoulio] in Constantinople. Veli Paşa's domineering behavior led to the rebellion of 1858 which resulted in both the discontinuation of his governance as well as to the announcement of reforms (Firman of 7 July 1858). The most significant of these reforms was the insertion of the institution of the Council of Elders [Dēmogerontia] which was mainly comprised of laymen whose area of authority chiefly pertained to the sphere of family and hereditary law.⁶³

2.2 Interconnected variables: Geography, demography and economic conditions in Crete

Crete constitutes a characteristic example of a region where geography, demography and the economy are inextricably intertwined, impacting the socio-political developments of the island throughout the 19th century. In this section of the work we will briefly refer to the particular geomorphological data of Crete while at the same time provide an overview of the progress of the island's population during the period under examination. Finally, in this context we will trace the nature and evolution of its financial life as it was shaped during the second half of the 19th century and in particular during the 1860s.

The significance of Crete's geography cannot be regarded in isolation since its study contributes to the better understanding not only of the island's human geography but also of its economic life as well as of the political developments⁶⁴ in the course of the centuries. Being the largest of the Aegean islands, one of its primary features is that it is a highly mountainous and hilly region.

It is this mountainous terrain that affects the attributes and behaviours of the local population and which led Marie Espérance von Schwartz to refer to two types of Cretan people in her travel account: The Sfakians who were the ones ahead of the

⁶³Detorakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 358.

⁶⁴ Spratt states that "many, if not most, of the lowland Greek peasantry felt little interest in the uprising [1859], well knowing that they would only suffer through it, by the loss of their trade and their property." Thomas Abel Brimage, Spratt, *Travel and researches in Crete* (London: John van Voorst, 1865), 1:53.

game and the rest of the Christians.⁶⁵ More specifically, the major mountain ranges of Crete are those situated in the inland areas of Kissamos and Selino, the White Mountains/Lefka Ori (2,452m) in Western Crete, Psyloritis/Ida (2,456m) at the center of the island in the province of Rethymnon and the mountain of Dikti (2,148m) in the province of Lasithi.⁶⁶

At the foothills of these mountains one finds plains that have contributed significantly to the economy of the island throughout its history. Messara in the southern regions of the province of Heraklion is the largest plain on the island and was a major contributor to the self-sufficiency of Crete.⁶⁷ Moving westwards, the wide plains of Apokorona in the province of Chania obtain special place in Taylor's travel account where he notices that it "presented a pleasant picture of fertility and cultivation. Wheat-fields divided by stone fences, and dotted with clumps of olive-trees, stretched as far as the eye could reach."⁶⁸ Finally, the plain of Lasithi in eastern Crete, which served as a base for the Ottoman military to launch attacks against the revolutionaries, is located in the Diktaian mountains and its surface laying in a median elevation of 800 m. is about 11 km long and 6 km broad.⁶⁹

2.2.1 Administration

Regarding the island's administration it remained virtually unchanged after the Ottoman subjugation. Specifically, Crete was divided into 3 administrative centers during the Ottoman rule and until 1867: Chania, Rethymnon and Heraklion which after the *Organic Statute* of 1867 were increased to 5 with the addition of the *sancaks* of Sfakia and Lasithi. This means that during the period being examined here the *vilayet* of Crete was divided into 5 *sancaks*, 17 *kazas*, 55 *nahiyes* and 1108 *villages* in total. According to Stavrakēs the 5 *sancaks* of late Ottoman Crete were partitioned into

⁶⁵ Elpis Melaina, *Periēgēseis stēn Krētē 1866-1870. Me 14 topiografies tou Joseph Winckler kai enan chartē tēs Krētēs* (Heraklion: Panepistēmiakes ekdoseis Krētēs, 2008), 73. Spratt describes the Sfakiots as "a by-word amongst the lowland Cretans, for talents perverted, and for unscrupulous intrigue, theft, and cruelty." Spratt, *Travel and researches*, 1: 54.

⁶⁶ Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 33.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶⁸ Bayard Taylor, *Travels in Greece and Russia; with an excursion to Crete* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1859), 104-105.

⁶⁹ Vance Watrous, Livingston, *Lasithi. A history of settlement on a highland plain in Crete* (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982), 5.

the following administrative divisions:⁷⁰

- The administrative division of Chania which included the town of Chania as well as the provinces of Kydonion, Selino and Kissamos. As Spratt, the Royal Naval hydrographical officer, informs us, after the demise of Egyptian rule Chania “was chosen as the seat of the government, from its proximity to the Bay of Suda, and from possessing also a more capacious and convenient port within it, combined with the other cogent reasons- of policy, and local tranquility.”⁷¹
- The *sancak* of Sfakia which consisted of the *kazas* of Sfakia, Apokoronas and St. Vasilios
- The *sancak* of Rethymnon which consisted of the *kazas* of Rethymnon, Amariou and Mylopotamos.
- The *sancak* of Heraklion which consisted of the town of Heraklion and the *kazas* of the Malevizio, Temenos, Pyrgiotisa, Kainourgiou and Monofatsiou provinces as well as part of Rizos and
- The *sancak* of Lasithi which consisted of of the *kazas* Merabelou, Ierapetra and part of Rizos and Sitia.

2.2.2 Demographic development

Looking at the demographic data of Crete during the 19th century one could say that it corresponds with the military developments on the island as well as with the economic and socio-political changes taking place at the time. Namely, the revolution of 1821 and that of 1866 as well as the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 were all major turning points for the demographics of Crete. The period of the Egyptian rule and the reforms which were introduced into the island the 19th century, such as the *Organic Statute* of 1867 and the *Pact of Chalepa* of 1878, are additional factors which influenced the demographic balances within the Cretan society.

According to Stavrakēs’ survey the population of Crete just before the revolt of 1821 came up to a total of approximately 213,000 and in 1832-3 it had been diminished to

⁷⁰Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 163; Even though population density was high in Heraklion, Chania remained the commercial, administrative and religious center of the island during the 2nd half of the 19th century. Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 44-51; Şemsettin Sâmî, *Kamûs-ül-a’lâm. Dictionnaire Universel D’ Historie et de Géographie* (Constantinople: Mihran, 1896), 5: 3855-6.

⁷¹Spratt, *Travel and researches*, 1: 36.

almost half that number, i.e. 112,000.⁷² However, after the end of the Greek War of Independence and during the establishment of the Egyptian rule on the island, under the government of Mehmet Ali and Mustafa Paşa, the island's population gradually began to increase and eventually doubled in numbers. Thereafter, from 1858 (278,908) up until the census of 1881 (279,165) the numbers of the Cretan population remained more or less stable, with the only exception of the Cretan revolution of 1866 which accounted for 30,000 fatalities.⁷³

Regarding the human geography and the dispersal of the Cretan population it must be underlined at this point that the urban centers were mainly inhabited by the majority of a Muslim population while the rural areas were monopolized by the Christian element. This of course did not present itself as an obstacle for the harmonious coexistence of these two elements. With respect to this Spratt says that "(...) from the use of a common language, social communication between the Cretan Christians and Mahomedans is consequently more close than in any other part of the Turkish Empire, intermarriage being not infrequent, in spite of the diversity of creed and the prejudices peculiar to the habits of each. The Cretans of both creeds, too, dress so much alike that the distinction is often not recognized by residents of long standing, or by Greeks of the neighbouring islands."⁷⁴

So, we can conclude that the population fluctuations in Ottoman Crete were affected by both its terrain and the intense revolutionary nature of its people. Similarly, as it will be shown below, the economy in that peripheral area of the Empire was just as unpredictable and exposed to the effects of random variables as its demographic conditions.

2.2.3 The Cretan economy

Due to the fact that references on the island's economy in the 1860s are really scarce, the main valuable source that provides us with information about the financial

⁷²Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 191-2.

⁷³Ibid., 192-3. According to the census of 1858 Crete's population was 278,908 of whom 215,863 were Christians and 62,138 were Muslims. In 1881 the population remains almost unchanged (279,165), however a slight increase of Muslims was observed (73,234) as well as a corresponding decrease of Christians (205,010). Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 44.

⁷⁴Spratt, *Travel and researches*, 1:47.

activities of the local population during the second half of the 19th century are the British and French consular reports which became subject of study by Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou and Perakis. In short, it can be argued that the Cretan economy of the 1860s was “a rural economy with a developed animal husbandry sector and industrial activities.”⁷⁵ Moreover, the advanced animal husbandry (mainly goats and sheep) contributed to the meeting of the nutrition needs of the local population in dairy products.

In particular, Crete’s economy primarily depended on olive farming, a practice which came up against serious obstacles during times of uprising and catastrophe. One narrative stating that the hostilities on the island were kicked off by Christians who wanted to take over the oil trade exclusively by means of crowding out the Muslim element, demonstrates the important role of olive cultivation in the intercommunal relations of the local population.⁷⁶ Furthermore, olive oil production was also a major bargaining point during uprisings, as can be observed in events of 1866 when many Christians ostensibly declared allegiance only to be able to harvest the year’s olives.

Due to its quality Cretan oil was used mainly “for the lubrication of engines, the manufacturing of soap and as lamp oil.”⁷⁷ Further, soap manufacturing, which reached its peak around 1880, was undoubtedly affected by the “off” seasons of the olive harvest as well as by unfavorable weather conditions. According to Perakis, because of the high price of soap, locals favoured its production in relation to the olive oil trade of previous years, namely 1840-1880.⁷⁸ However, during the 1860s other insular regions of the Ottoman Empire, such as Lesbos and Rhodes, began to compete with the Cretan soap manufacturers by manufacturing cheaper products, thus, along with the pure olive harvest of the following decade, contributing to the unavoidable decline of Cretan soap production.

⁷⁵Manos Perakis, „An Eastern Mediterranean economy under transformation. Crete in the late Ottoman era (1840-98),” *The Journal of European Economic History* 39, no.3 (2010): 493.

⁷⁶Pmar, Hayrettin, “Diplomasi ile Siyasetin Birlikteliği: Girit İsyanı ve Âlî Paşa” [The unity of diplomacy and politics. The Cretan rebellion and Âlî Paşa], *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 18 (2008): 3.

⁷⁷Perakis, “An Eastern Mediterranean Economy under Transformation,” 488.

⁷⁸Ibid., 490. Sâmi states that there were 10 soap manufacturers in Heraklion and 7 in Chania. Sâmi, *Kamûs-ül-a’lâm*, 5: 3854.

Besides olive farming, the cultivation of wheat⁷⁹, barley and viticulture⁸⁰ all played a significant role in Crete's economy during the second half of the 19th century. Perakis also mentions the cultivation of carob trees (to satisfy the demand for animal feed in western Europe), citrus fruit (oranges, citrons etc.) and almonds⁸¹ while Şemsettin Sâmî references herbs like labdanum as products of export.⁸² Cotton farming also flourished during the 1860s “due to a greater demand for cotton and the higher price it commanded in Europe following the outbreak of the American Civil War and the loss of the main supplier (USA).”⁸³ Despite the variety of commodities produced on the island the trade balance nevertheless remained negative during the period being examined here. Referring to Crete's farm produce Sâmî states that besides the olives the oranges, lemons, tangerines, grapes and acorns are the best quality products of the island.⁸⁴ The chart below presents an indicative overview of Crete's exports during the last quarter of the 19th century:

Export Goods and Export value in Crete around 1890	
	<u>Traded goods</u>
1	Olive oil
2	Soap ⁸⁵
3	Wine
4	Carob
5	Leather ⁸⁶
6	Citrus fruits (Oranges, lemons etc.)
7	Oak
8	Raisins
9	Almond
10	Cheese
11	Raw silk
12	Kinds of woolen cloth
13	Laudanum
14	Pine bark extract

⁷⁹The annual output of wheat on the island was approximately 17,000 tons and the place of production was mainly the area of Messara. Ibid., 3853.

⁸⁰The value of the annual production of wine came up to 2,500,000 Francs. Ibid., 3854.

⁸¹Perakis, “An Eastern Mediterranean Economy under Transformation,” 493.

⁸²Sâmî, *Kamûs-ül-a'lâm*, 5: 3854.

⁸³Perakis, “An Eastern Mediterranean Economy under Transformation,” 506.

⁸⁴Sâmî, *Kamûs-ül-a'lâm*, 5: 3853. Marie Espérance von Schwartz also makes a brief reference to the island's produce in her travel account. Melaina, *Periēgēseis stēn Krētē*, 17-21.

⁸⁵There were 41 soap factories in operation in Crete in 1874 and they were reduced to 22 in the 1890s. Sâmî, *Kamûs-ül-a'lâm*, 5: 3854.

⁸⁶Kalliatakē states that there were 100 tanneries in the three large towns of Crete in 1874. Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 71.

15	Whetstone
16	Bones and linen clothes
17	Silk-worm cocoons
18	Liquorice

Sâmi, *Kamûs-ül-a'lâm*, 5: 3855.

In brief, beginning from the 1870s and on, Crete's integration into the world economy gradually accelerated, mainly due to the island's connections to other ports in the Mediterranean while commercial activities unfolded in tandem with the development of international trade as a result of the improvement of merchant shipping.⁸⁷

It would of course also be noteworthy to reference the types of occupation that Ottoman Cretans held, as demonstrated in Stavrakēs' statistical survey before concluding this brief presentation of Crete's economy during the second half of the 19th century. The data on the chart, which are based on a sample size of approximately 100,000 Cretans (mostly occupationally capable men) in the census of 1881, reveal the intensified rural character of the Cretan economy a decade after the end of the insurrection of 1866. It is clear that the occupations in which the Christians were dominant are those of agriculture and animal husbandry (shepherds).

In the landowner subcategory we once again see a slight dominance of the Christians by one quarter, i.e. 1612 over 1210 Muslim landowners, suggesting that landownership in Crete was gradually being passed over to Christians. As Stavrakēs points out, the farmers on the island could appertain to the category of landowner because Cretan peasants usually owned a home as well as a lucrative big or small farming property.⁸⁸ He also states that the Muslim element on the island mostly engaged in commerce and was more diligent and affluent while owning the larger part of the Crete.⁸⁹ Another interesting statistic is that while in the commercialized

⁸⁷Manos Perakis, *To telos tēs Othōmanikēs Krētēs. Oi oroi katarrefsēs tou kathestōtos tēs Chalepas (1878-89)* [The end of Ottoman Crete. The conditions of the collapse of the Halepa Regime (1878-89)] (Athēna: Vivliorama, 2008), 33.

⁸⁸Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 198. The statistical data presented here wholly contradict Sâmi's view that the Muslim element on the island owned the larger part of the land.

⁸⁹Specifically in relation to commerce Sâmi states (that) „on this issue the Muslims were ahead of the Christians, the Islamic element on the island was more hard-working and busied itself more with commerce and industry resulting in it being more affluent and owning more land.“[bu husûsta Müslimânlar Hristiyanlardan ileri olub, cezîrenin ahâlî-yi Müslimesi daha câlışkan ve daha ziyâde ticâret ve sanâyi' ile meşgul ve binâen aleyh daha zengindirler, ve emlâklar çoğu Müslimânların ellindedir.] Sâmi, *Kamûs-ül-a'lâm*, 5: 3855.

agricultural economy of Crete Christians and Muslims shared an equal percentage of occupation (1956 Christians and 1858 Muslims) in the manufacturing sector the Christian element held the leading position (6090 Christians over 3818 Muslims).

Concisely, we can say that the financial development of Crete during the second half of the 19th century was impeded by several limiting factors such as poor infrastructure, the lack of technological innovation in the field of agriculture⁹⁰ and a sluggish growth of commercial activities on the island. To be more specific, only 1/3 of the soil was being cultivated in a regimented manner whilst the rest was either mountainous regions or infertile land. At the dawn of the second half of the 19th century, additional reasons for the stunted cultivation of the land were tax evasion by Cretan Christians, who were the majority in the rural areas as well as the shortage of labourers.⁹¹ However, after the Cretan Revolution of 1866 the island gradually began to connect with the rest of the Empire via a telegraph network. Hence, in 1871 a British company by the name of “Telegraph construction and Maintenance Company” undertakes the task of connecting Crete to Asia Minor while in 1873 another British company by the name of “Eastern” connected the island telegraphically to Egypt and Zakynthos.⁹²

2.3 Military Developments

As it was highlighted in the subchapter relative to the geography of Crete, its distinct terrain was of great significance and proved to perhaps be of the most pivotal factors to affect the character, the duration and the outcome of the martial activities on the island. The press at the time closely observed the course of the armed conflicts on the island and usually approached the events in such a way that would serve the particular editorial line of each newspaper. Both the Athenian and the Constantinopolitan papers would republish ample primary material in their reports concerning military developments, such as debriefs from the rebel headquarters and the central committee, chieftains' correspondence, debriefs from the Ottoman generals as well as

⁹⁰With regard to olive farming the primitive methods of harvest, production and storage of the fruit led to elevated levels of its acidity which brought on a drop in quality levels as a result. Perakis, “An Eastern Mediterranean Economy under Transformation,” 509-10.

⁹¹Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 69.

⁹²Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 198, note 2.

republications of foreign press articles.

It will be set forth further on in this paper that the influence the press had regarding the shaping of public opinion was not in the least negligible. This becomes apparent from the harsh criticisms expressed in newspaper articles with opposing viewpoints who called the accuracy of one another's reports into question. More specifically, the Greek newspaper *Amaltheia* referred to the reports concerning the outcome of the events in the Constantinopolitan Ottoman papers as a "real labyrinth."⁹³ On the other hand the Ottoman state driven semi-official *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis* observed that certain journalists, taking advantage of the Cretan Crisis, were trying to agitate the Eastern Question which was grounded in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁴ Another indication of the important role the press played is that, at times, even military commanders were obliged to refute press reports regarding the outcome of hostilities on the island.⁹⁵

With respect to the course of events, one could in a concise manner say that the Eastern provinces kept up the resistance for longer and that both sides made strategical mistakes which led to both a great loss in livestock and extensive damages. The primary strategic goal of the rebels was to keep the revolt alive for as long as possible so as to provoke the attention and intervention of the great powers. A tactic, which according to Stillman, the American consul on the island of Crete, was misguided, because as he states "the Greeks seem never to comprehend that governments are purely political, and never influenced by sentiment or religious affinities."⁹⁶ The Ottoman administration on the other hand strived for a swift cessation of hostilities precisely so as not to give cause for yet another European

⁹³"Neoterer Eidēseis" [Latest news], *Amaltheia*, no. 1449, November 25, 1866.

⁹⁴"bir takım gazeteciler Şark Meselesi memâlik-ı mahrûseniñ mukamesesi üzeriñe te'sîs etmişdir diyerek tâ Çanak Qalesine kadar Rusya devletine ve Mısır İngiltere'ye ve Tunus ile Tarâblus Faransızlara ve Rum iliñin bazı yerleri Avusturya ve adalarıñ bazisi daha Yunanlılara verileceğini tafsîlan beyân ediyorlar." [A group of journalists stating that the Eastern Question was based on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire went as far as to announce in detail that the regions up to Canakkale would be given to Russia, Egypt would be given to England, Tunis along with Tripoli would be given to the French and certain areas in Rumeli would be given to Austria and to the Greeks some more of the islands.] "Ecnebiyye" [Foreign news], *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 601, Şevvâl 22, 1283/February 27, 1867.

⁹⁵"Krētika" [Cretan Affairs], *Aiōn*, no. 2252, June 26, 1867.

⁹⁶William J. Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1874), 115.

intervention⁹⁷ and also to discourage any more uprisings in other regions of the empire. These were the tactics that determined the course and the intensity of the hostilities on the island.

The number of troops that took part in the battle was exceptionally large, something that points to the significance of the crisis for the Ottoman administration. On the 13th of July 1866, 7 steamships from Alexandria arrived carrying 6,000 Egyptian soldiers increasing the number of troops on the island to 22,000.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the Assembly of Cretans, which came together to represent the criticisms of the Cretan people, deployed the geomorphology of the island and initially convened in the villages of Kydonies, Apokorona and Prosnero, rocky and mountainous regions near the administrative capital of the island, namely Chania. This was a purposeful choice, as in the event of an Ottoman attack the mountains of Sfakia were an accessible escape.

On the 20th of July 1866, following the negative response the revolutionaries received from the High Porte, the Cretans refused to abide by Ismail Paşa's rule as governor of the island. At the same time, Sahin Paşa was the commander of the Egyptian troops, who, according to Tsirintanēs, had no intention of conquering the island. His plan was to sway the Christian population in his favour and to avert any potential brutalities of the Ottoman troops.⁹⁹ Following the Cretans' rejection of the Sultan's offer to their demands, Sahin Paşa sent a representative to persuade the revolutionaries to accept the return of Crete to Egyptian rule. As it later on became clear, France alongside the Egyptian king regent had mapped out a plan, unbeknown to the Porte, to win over the Cretans in order to request the island return to the hegemony of Egypt.¹⁰⁰ As a consequence the Egyptian General intended to act autonomously, in disregard of the Ottoman government, something, though, that was very quickly noticed by the local Ottoman governor, who, according to the American consul on the island, had his own plans, namely "to draw up a petition for signature by the Cretans, praying that the

⁹⁷Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* [Ottoman History], 6th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 7: 32.

⁹⁸Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 253.

⁹⁹Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*, 53-54.

¹⁰⁰Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 367-8.

island might be made a principality, with Ismael as prince.”¹⁰¹

The first military engagements took place in Selino on the 17th of August 1866 and the first substantive battle was fought at Vryses on the 28th of August 1866 where the Egyptian troops were vanquished.¹⁰² Following this defeat the Egyptian side decided to revitalize its troops by sending more forces to Crete. Specifically, 6,000 soldiers from Alexandria, along with the Minister of Military Affairs as well as another 8,000 Egyptian troops from Thessaloniki increased the number of Ottoman soldiers on the island to 40,000.¹⁰³ The Ottomans also recruited a reasonable number of Albanian and Circassian¹⁰⁴ irregulars who, however, were not familiar with the Cretan territory thereby creating problems for the advancement of the Ottoman troops. The Greek side was facing analogous problems with the advent of many volunteers and mercenaries such as the Garibaldi volunteers.¹⁰⁵ The situation in the multitudinous Ottoman army began to deteriorate, as mentioned in the Athenian newspaper *Aiōn*, since the troops were being plagued by typhus, they suffered from poor purveyance and also lacked clothing and experienced military personnel.¹⁰⁶

After the battle at Vryses, which boosted the spirit of the revolutionary forces, came the battle at Vafe in the province of Chania on the 12th of October 1866 where the rebels suffered a crushing defeat due to a strategic error caused by Iōannēs Zymvrakakēs (brother of Charalabos Zymvrakakēs who was minister of war in the cabinet of Voulgarēs) who had travelled from Athens to join the revolt on the island. Up until that point the Cretan chieftains, who were fully conversant with the terrain, utilized their forces in guerrilla tactics in the mountains and western provinces so as to wear out the enemy as much as possible. At the battle of Vafe, Zymvrakakēs decided to deploy his troops in formation against 10000 of Mustafa Paşa's soldiers.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*,55.

¹⁰²“Ektheseis tōn en Vrysais kai allachou Apokoronou syblokōn” [Reports on the battles in Vryses and elsewhere in Apokoronas], *Aiōn*, no. 2159, September 12, 1866.

¹⁰³Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 390,398.

¹⁰⁴“Mâh-ı hâliñ beşinci günü Girid’den gelen Damanhur nâm vapuruñ getirdiği havâdis-i sahhiye dir” [Valid news the ship Damanhur brings with it from Crete on the 5th day of this month], *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no.656 , 17 Muharrem 17, 1284/May 21, 1867.

¹⁰⁵Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*,112.

¹⁰⁶“N/A” *Aiōn*, no. 2164, September 29, 1866.

¹⁰⁷Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 463.

The rebels' defeat at Vafe proved to be a turning point as it shattered their confidence and Sfakia, which held a special place on the hearts of Cretans, finally submitted to Mustafa who threatened to invade the most well-fortified province on the island. This victory for the Ottomans lifted their spirits greatly, leading the Ottoman consul in Athens to consider it the final battle of the Cretan revolution.¹⁰⁸

Another crucial event that marked the course of the rebellion but also influenced the stance of the Great Powers as well as European public opinion was what took place at Arkadi on the 9th of November 1866, the self-sacrifice of hundreds of Cretans, mainly civilians, inside the walls of the monastery. The tragedy at Arkadi, however, made way for discord among the Cretan commanders¹⁰⁹ in relation to the question of the struggle's leadership. These most recent events along with the setbacks incurred due to bandits looting supplies, the reduced contributions of the Cretans to the struggle, the good yield of olives¹¹⁰ in 1866-7 as well as the presence of civilians in rural areas impeded the activities of the revolutionaries significantly.

Following the initial shock the rebels had to endure caused by the events at Arkadi, Mustafa Naili Paşa moved on to subjugate more villages in the province of Chania. On the 30th of November 1866 he seized Lakkous and invaded Selino on the 8th of December 1866.

As he believed that the Sfakiots feigned their submission to the Ottoman government, Mustafa Paşa ordered his troops to seize Sfakia in the final days of 1866 but was met with a bitter defeat which cost him his position.¹¹¹ Three months later, on the 17th of March 1867 the governor leaves Crete and is replaced by Hüseyin Avni Paşa. However, his term was brief, as the Porte chose to transfer him to Epirus and Thessaly so as to take on the command of the Ottoman forces there. The position of governor on the island was then assumed by Ömer Paşa who arrived in Crete on the 28th of March 1867, his sole mission to squash the rebellion with 60.000 soldiers at his

¹⁰⁸“Dâhiliyye” [Domestic News], *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 568, Şa’bân 28, 1283/January 1, 1867.

¹⁰⁹ Iōannēs Zymvrakakēs was commander of the Greeks in western Crete, Panos Korōnaios was the commander in Rethymnon and Michaēl Korakas in Heraklion.

¹¹⁰ Tsirintanēs states that the good yields of the first year of the rebellion drove the Cretans to abandon the military camps and to declare their submission to the Ottomans. Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 551.

¹¹¹“Girid’den tahrîrât-ı mahsûse fi 22 Şa’bân” [Private correspondence from Crete on 22 Şa’bân], *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, Şa’bân 29, 1283/January 6, 1867.

disposal to do so. Ömer Paşa was familiar with guerilla warfare as he was involved with the counter-insurgency of the outbreaks in Montenegro a few years earlier.¹¹² From mid- April 1867, the Ottoman army organized co-ordinated strikes against the rebels from two fronts, Ömer Paşa from the East and Sarhoş from the West. Despite the resistance from the Cretans, who were able to use the terrain to their advantage, the eastern provinces were seized by the Ottomans, thus allowing their three generals to focus on taking Sfakia.¹¹³

In the end of April there was yet another unsuccessful attempt to seize Sfakia, which still remained the chief objective of the Ottoman military. This failure led to a retreat of Ömer's forces, which raided many villages as the Ottoman troops were drawingback. He then moved toward the East reaching Rethymnon on the 28th of April 1867.¹¹⁴ It, however, was not only the Ottomans who in their passage devastated entire villages but the revolutionaries too pillaged agricultural areas (olive groves, vineyards) thus pauperizing the residents of the surrounding villages even more.¹¹⁵

In May of 1867 the Ottomans attempted to take control of Lasithi in the eastern provinces aiming to push the rebels toward Sfakia where they would plan their final attack.¹¹⁶ The main disadvantage the revolutionaries faced against the multitudinous Ottoman army in the province of Lasithi was the lowlands of the region, a terrain which the Ottoman troops were accustomed to in organized battle. Another disadvantage for the rebels in this province was the fact that Lasithi was inland, far from the coast from where they would be able to replenish with supplies freely and easily.¹¹⁷ It must be noted here that the main areas from which the revolutionaries filled up on supplies were Agia Roumeli, Sougia, Loutro, Trypiti, Preveli, Agia Pelagia, Fodele and Bali. In total 117 trips were made and 10,000 tons of supplies

¹¹²Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 7: 27.

¹¹³ Michaël Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai Agōnes tēs Krētēs 1856-1905. O rolos kai ē prosfora tou klērou kai tōn monastēriōn kata tēn periodo 1856-1905* [The Church and the Cretan struggles 1856-1905. The role and the contributions of the clergy and the monasteries in the period 1856-1905] (Chania: Siderēs, 2011), 249.

¹¹⁴The Greek press at the time reports widespread depredation by the Ottoman troops in retaliation to their inability to control the rebels. See "Krētika" [The Cretan affairs], *Aiōn*, no. 2257, July 13, 1867.

¹¹⁵"N/A," *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 752, 9 Cümâde-el-âhire 9, 1284/July 8, 1867.

¹¹⁶Stillman, *Cretan Insurrection*, 128.

¹¹⁷Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai agōnes*, 238.

were transported.¹¹⁸

As a result of all the above in early July of 1867 the Ottoman army began to organize at Dibaki and prepared to launch an attack on Sfakia while soldiers from Constantinople continued to disembark the Ottoman ships in Franco Castelli. Ömer Paşa however did not succeed in conquering Sfakia, losing thousands of soldiers in the process, something that led him to burn down hundreds of villages in retaliation. Sacking villages was a common tactic of the Ottoman troops so as to cause social tension that would discourage the revolutionaries. An event, indicative of the tragedy non-combatant Cretans had to endure but also of the European mobilisation concerning the humanitarian crisis, took place in the summer of 1867 when 13 foreign vessels were sent to Crete to receive defenceless women and children from her shores. In October of the same year Ali Paşa steps foot on the island so that he can put an end to the rebellion by means of reforms. Before his arrival he had ordered Ömer Paşa to cease fire and to declare a 45 day truce while offering an official pardon to whoever surrendered their weapons.¹¹⁹

In late 1867 (25th of October 1867) Hüseyin Avni assumed the position of governor of Crete and from that moment on the Ottomans' strategy to deal with the rebels was to focus on suffocating the movement by cutting off their supply routes and their communications. They put all their energy in building block-houses on land as well patrolling the shores from the sea.¹²⁰ Specifically, 320 towers were built on the Cretan

¹¹⁸Ibid., 217. Barouksakēs, the Greek ambassador on the island, dispraises the Greek press for making the bays from which the blockade runner “Arkadi” was providing supplies to the Cretans public, as by doing this the accusations of the Turkish side apropos Greece's involvement in the revolution are justified. Eleftherios Prevelakēs and Vasilikē Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis 1866-1869. Ektheseis tōn en Krētē proksenōn tēs Ellados” [The Cretan Revolution 1866-1869. Reports of the Greek consuls in Crete. April 1866-July 1867], *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970), 21. On the activities of “Arkadi” see also “N/A”, *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 722, Rebî-ül-âhır 25, 1284/August 23, 1867: “Yunanlılar mezkûr vapuru [Arkadi] Girid’iñ bidâyet-i ihtilâlîhnda on sekiz bin liraya mübâyaa ederek derûnuña yedi şeş-hâneli top ve yüz otuz tâife vaz’ederek ve uzaktan görünmemek üzere deryâ-yi renkte boyâyarak eşkiyâ’ ve mühimmât-ı harbiyye naklîhnda bi-l-istihdâm yegirmi beş def’a Girid’e sefer ettiğî (...)” [At the beginning of the insurrection the Greeks bought the abovementioned ship (Arkadi) for £7,000, which featured 7 internal cannon bombs and held a crew of 130. It was painted in the colors of the sea so that it could not be spotted from afar and for the transportation of rebels and armaments it travelled to Crete 25 times (...)].

¹¹⁹Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 7: 28.

¹²⁰Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai agōnes*, 261.

mountain ranges in a year's time.¹²¹ Any battles fought between December 1867 and early 1868 took place at the locations where these towers were going to be erected as Ottoman troops were trying to ensure the peace.¹²² At the same time the High Porte took diplomatic action in an attempt to put pressure on the Great Powers, so on the 23rd of December 1867 the Porte's emissary, Ali Paşa announced via a Firman the exemption from the tenth (exemption from the payment of the tithe) as well as from military taxes. Consequently, the *Organic Statute* which ratified all previous concessions from 18th September 1867 and 23rd December 1867 was published in early 1868. Ali Paşa's assignment in Crete lasted up until 14th February 1868, when he finally departed with the belief that he managed to restore the peace on the island through the all reforms he had introduced.¹²³

In brief, there were constant attacks from the rebels on the Turkish forces, which were under the command of Hussein Avni Paşa, during the final year of the revolution and mainly between February and May of 1868. However, fatigue from the long-lasting struggle along with the scaled-down diplomatic interest in the Cretan Question intensified dissension¹²⁴ among the revolutionaries concerning the course of the struggle, which had begun to gradually die out between September and the end of 1868.

2.4 The internationalization of the conflict

The Cretan Revolution of 1866 broke out in a period of political instability in the newly born Greek Kingdom. It being also economically and military totally unprepared to provide assistance to any separatist movement undertaken by co-nationals living abroad. Additionally, even if the *Megali Idea* monopolized the internal political scene, it cannot be argued that the Greek political parties kept a unified stance

¹²¹ Kallia Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos alytrōtismos*, 180. Marie Espérance von Schwartz states in her travel account that she had detected 27 such towers only in Apokoran while 200 of them in total had been built during the events of 1866. Melaina, *Periēgēseis stēn Krētē*, 364.

¹²² Regarding the significance of the erection of the towers, Nikolaos Sakopoulos, the Greek consul in Chania, predicted that it would have unfortunate results for the revolutionaries in his correspondence with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Petros Delēgiannēs on April 22, 1868. See Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, "Ē Krētikē Epanastasis," *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970), 186.

¹²³ Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai agōnes*, 270-1.

¹²⁴ The western provinces approved of English hegemony as a solution while the Eastern provinces with the support of the Russian consul, Iōannēs Mētsotakēs, were negative toward this option and fought for unity with Greece.

in the Cretan crisis. Therefore, contrary to the Russophile stance of Koumoundouros, King Georg and the Anglophile Voulgarēs were unfavorably disposed to any separatist movement as they believed that any involvement of Greece in the crisis would put her diplomatic position in great danger.

In general, the Greek political elite believed that the realization of *Megali Idea* would take place gradually without getting actually involved in any armed conflict or being confronted with the Great Powers.¹²⁵ The Greek side methodically tried to downgrade the Cretan struggle at least in its first months, thereby intending not to make the Great Powers suspicious of her interconnection with the reopening of the Eastern Question and the *Megali Idea*. However, this proved to be a difficult challenge for the Greek political elite as “all the parties were in competition with one another so as to publicly prove their patriotism concerning the Cretan case.”¹²⁶

The Powers which directly intervened in the Cretan issue were mainly Russia, France and Great Britain. Other states like Italy, Prussia and Austria just took one or another side whenever the circumstances demanded it, without having however any direct intervention in the issue. France’s stance in the Cretan cause was the most ambiguous one among the Great Powers. Russia’s diplomatic support towards France’s policy in the West and particularly in the issue of Luxemburg played a decisive role in the formation of the Napoleonic policy on the Cretan field. According to Bourne, the need of France to find a strong ally at that juncture in order to compensate Napoleon’s defeats in Europe had led to the birth of two tendencies within the French foreign policy: “a tendency to side with Russia to put pressure on the Porte, and a tendency, by taking the lead in such pressure, to rival Russian, (and, incidentally, British) influence in the East.”¹²⁷ In sum, it could be argued, when the Cretan revolt broke out, France’s foreign policy was mainly focused on the West rather than in the Balkans. The need however to build alliances forced the Second Empire to undertake diplomatic initiatives in the Cretan issue that worried Great Britain.

¹²⁵Gunnar Herring, *Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland 1821-1936* [The political parties in Greece 1821-1936] (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1992), 411.

¹²⁶“alle Parteien darin wetteiferten, der Öffentlichkeit ihren Patriotismus im Zusammenhang mit Kreta unter Beweis zu stellen.” Elz, *Die Europäischen Grossmächte*, 61.

¹²⁷ Kenneth Bourne, “Great Britain and the Cretan Revolt, 1866-1869,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 35 (1956/1957):79-80.

On the other hand, Russia's role in the events should be mainly examined from the angle of *Panslavism*. Especially, Russian foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe which was defined by the continuous effort of the Tsarist regime in the aftermath of the Crimean War to "condemn the failure of the other signatories to fulfill their obligations so as to cause a gradual weakening of the treaty and to facilitate its future amendment."¹²⁸ As expected, Russian foreign policy sought to take advantage of the Cretan events in order to get out from her isolation as result of the Treaty of Paris.

Due to the fact that the geostrategic interests of Russia and France were not identical at the point that the Cretan revolt broke out, both countries were not antagonistic to each other in the region of Southeastern Europe. Therefore, there was enough room for cooperation between the two powers, something that became evident in the first 18 months of the Cretan conflict. With respect to the stance of the Tsarist regime in the last phase of the crisis, it must be said that the Russians "were not willing to commit themselves to unlimited support"¹²⁹ to France's objectives in the West. Thus, Russia decided to rely again on Prussia in her attempt to find allies, while France looked at Austria. Prussia openly offered military aid to Russia on the Polish Question, thereby contributing to the formation of strong diplomatic bonds between the two states.

It may be argued that Great Britain's foreign policy compared to that of French and of Russia, remained quite stable during the years of tumult on the island. The dogma of the preservation of the Ottoman integrity which traditionally defined British foreign policy, was once more apparent in the British initiatives for the crisis resolution. Besides the British focus on the Ottoman Empire's integrity, Crete in particular, was of great importance for Great Britain's interests in the region for the following two reasons: Firstly, after the Suez Canal being completed the geographical position of the island served as "a vital link on the route to India,"¹³⁰ and secondly, having Stanley firmly favored the maintenance of the island under Ottoman sovereignty as he believed that the prevailing conditions in the Greek Kingdom were unfavorable for an annexation of the island to Greece.

¹²⁸"Vetragsverletzungen der anderen Signatäre anzuprangern, um somit die fortschreitende Aushöhlung des Vetragswerks herbeizuführen und eine zukünftige Revision zu erleichtern." Elz, *Die Europäischen Grossmächte*, 18.

¹²⁹Kenneth Bourne, *The foreign policy of Victorian England 1830-1902* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 114.

¹³⁰Bourne, "Great Britain," 81.

However, it becomes clear to the reader of the events of 1866 that the policies pursued by the Great Powers on the Cretan issue often differed from the guidelines of their official foreign policy. This fact shows us how delicate the balances were between the state's official policy and the ambassador's individual and autonomous conduct in the issue. Two characteristic examples are the cases of Moustier and Ignatiev, the French and Russian ambassadors at the Porte, respectively. Acting contrary to the official policy of France, Moustier favored the cession of Crete to the Egyptians at the beginning of the crisis by arguing that such a step would eventually relieve the Ottoman Empire from the vast cost of the island's preservation under direct Ottoman rule.¹³¹ His plan encountered however British resistance and remained unfulfilled. As far as the Russian policy in Southeastern Europe policy is concerned, this was defined by Gorchakov and Ignatiev. Contrary to Gorchakov's reluctance to implement the letter of *Panslavism* in Southeastern Europe by fear of an aggressive reaction on the part of the Great Powers, Ignatiev favored separatist movements in the region aiming at the destabilization of Ottoman rule.

The internal Ottoman conflict under examination not only posed a great challenge for the Ottoman Empire's integrity but also proved to be a crisis with international dimensions, as the island became a theater of diplomatic clashes between the main European powers. Especially, the British policy of non-interference¹³² belonged to the main obstacles that the Great Powers had to face in their attempts to impose reformative measures on the Porte or to achieve a conflict solution. The conservative British policy with regards to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the encouragement of the Ottoman statesmen to act in a more autonomous way concerning their endeavors to pacify the island without taking into consideration the initiatives of the other Great Powers on the issue.

With regards to the movement *per se*, it should be noticed that even the islanders' front against the Porte was not defined by a unified stance especially with regards to their demands and the movement's final goal. In sum, there were two main different groups among the revolutionaries, the *Unionists* and the *Autonomists*. While the Unionists exclusively aimed at Crete's secession to Greece, the second group supported a more

¹³¹Domna N. Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1863-1875* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966), 70.

¹³²Stanley, the British foreign minister, was known of his "natural aversion to extreme measures" against the Ottomans in the Cretan issue. Bourne, "Great Britain," 75.

moderate solution in the conflict by pursuing the granting of an autonomous status to Crete under the Sultan's sovereignty as well as the appointment of a Christian governor. Finally, there were also some Cretan Christians, though in a minority, who favored the scenario of Crete being under British protection.¹³³

Besides the existence of different groups within the body of the protesters, there were also other multilayered factors which in my opinion had an influence on the course of the events in one way or another. Such factors were for example private initiatives that were often interwoven with the objectives of the official Greek foreign policy, the revolutionary organs (General Assembly and Provisional Government), the numerous Greek and foreign volunteers, and finally the huge wave of Cretan refugees who functioned as a means of diplomatic pressure on the Greek government. Thus, it may be argued that the aforementioned factors decisively contributed to the lack of coordination and organization among the participants in the movement.¹³⁴ Notwithstanding this fact, the revolutionaries proceeded quickly to the election of their representative organs, namely the General Assembly and the Provisional Government of Crete, which actually served more as communication channels between the 20-30,000¹³⁵ revolutionaries and the Greek Kingdom, rather than as independent policy making organs.

Coming again to the issue of lack of cohesion of the Cretan movement, the incident which occurred in mid- 1867 characteristically demonstrated the absence of a uniform stance among the Cretan chieftains with regards to the way they should proceed against the Porte. In a crucial turning point of the conflict, the Christian Cretans of the Eastern Cretan provinces decided to send a delegation to Athens in order to examine the intentions of the Greek government for the future of the movement. They took that decision without coming to an agreement with the other provinces something that provoked negative responses on behalf of the latter.

Additionally, in June 1867 the General Assembly decided to secretly ask protection from the USA. When the Cretan supporters of the "European" solution in the Cretan issue were informed about that initiative, they threatened to denounce the General

¹³³Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai agōnes*, 155.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 175-178.

¹³⁵This number is in agreement with Sakopoulos' (the Greek consul in Crete) estimations. Eleftherios Prevelakēs and Vasilikē Plagianou-Bekiarē, "Ἐ Κρήτικῆ Επαναστάσις," *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967), λή.

Assembly, a step with unpredictable consequences for the Cretan movement.¹³⁶ These two incidents clearly show some weaknesses within the body of the insurgents which became more obvious over time and due to the diplomatic stagnation on the part of the Great Powers.

With regard to the Ottoman diplomacy, I hold the reaction of the Ottoman statesmen to the initiatives of the Great Powers to intervene in the crisis for successful as it was also proved in several cases during the conflict. In the late summer of 1866 for example France proposed the sending of a commission of inquiry on the Cretan demands. The Porte's reply to that proposal was immediate by sending Mustafa Paşa to the island in order to prevent European interference on the issue at this early stage of the crisis. Another successful Ottoman diplomatic manoeuvre occurred in the aftermath of the Cretan's independence declaration of the island. Again, the Porte reacted immediately by asking the protecting powers of Greece "to make a formal declaration of disapproval"¹³⁷ of the Greek Kingdom's policy, on the ground that the latter was interfering in the Cretan issue. By acting in this proactive way the Ottomans not only managed to repeatedly delay a possible direct European interference in their internal affairs but they brought out the Greek irredentist policies as well.

The European pressure on the Ottoman Empire continued in the last months of 1866 and at the beginning of 1867. Already at the end of 1866 Gorchakov proposed to Mustier the declaration of Crete "into a self-governing state united to the Porte merely by the tie of vassalage,"¹³⁸ while Great Britain's foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire remained unchanged by supporting the preservation of Ottoman integrity. Facing again the danger of a European intervention into her internal affairs, at the beginning of 1867 the Porte asked once more the Great Powers to undertake the appropriate measures in order to prevent Greece from backing¹³⁹ the Cretan cause.

Meanwhile, France was extremely concerned about the Russo-Prussian rapprochement as well the Tsarist support of a Greco-Serbian alliance against the Porte. These developments led the Napoleonic regime to make a radical proposal with regards to

¹³⁶Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai Agōnes*, 255, note 623.

¹³⁷Bourne, "Great Britain," 77.

¹³⁸Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers*, 87.

¹³⁹Elliot, the British Ambassador to the Porte, mentioned that "the prison doors were opened to the brigands and other criminals confined to them on condition of their going to Crete to join the insurgents." Henry G. Elliot, *Some revolutions and other diplomatic experiences* (London: John Murray 1922), 184.

the resolution of the Cretan conflict, which was based on the principle of nationalities.¹⁴⁰ As result, the first months of 1867 were marked by the peak of France's diplomatic pressure in the Cretan issue. A series of French initiatives prove the increasing French interest in finding a solution in the issue: On 8 January 1867, Prince de La Tour, the French ambassador in London, suggested to Stanley, that the Porte should grant autonomy to the Cretans. Only few days later, on 24 January 1867, Moustier, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Foreign, went a step further, supporting the cession of Crete to Greece thereby satisfying the Greek *Megaloidetic* aspirations.¹⁴¹ It becomes obvious that France, whether acting solely or in collaboration with Russia, was not in the position to achieve a joint *modus operandi* of the Great Powers in the Cretan issue. However, as expected, Stanley, who strove for the preservation of the given *status quo* in the region, did not favor the aforementioned France's proposals.

In March 1867, without abandoning her attempts to intervene in the conflict, France took the initiative to make a proposal to the Porte for conducting a referendum on the island in order to give the opportunity to the local element to decide on its own for the fate of Crete. The Porte rejected this proposal too, as it was not supported by the Great Britain. By the end of April and despite the negative response of the Ottoman government to the French proposal, France, Russia, Prussia, Italy and Austria proceeded into sending separate notes to the Porte, though without any success.

The Porte's stance towards the initiatives of the Great Powers was mainly justified by the fear of Fuad and Ali Paşa of making any kind of concessions to the Cretans. Both Ottoman statesmen were convinced that such a step would damage the image of the Ottoman government in Muslim public opinion, leading to further Cretan demands and fuel similar uprisings in other parts of the realm.¹⁴² At the same time Russia's diplomatic pressure on the Porte was concentrated on the Serbian front. Therefore, in order to avoid the formation of a Greco-Serbian alliance against her, the Porte decided on the cession of the fortresses to the Serbs. In general, it must be said, that the pro-Ottoman British foreign policy encouraged the Porte to handle in a free – and quite

¹⁴⁰Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers*, 85.

¹⁴¹Bourne, "Great Britain," 80.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 77.

often violent – way with regard to the solution of the crisis by undermining at the same time the Franco-Russian rapprochement.

The assassination of Prince Michael, in June 1868, brought to an end the attempts of the Russophile Koumoundouros to build a common Balkan front against the Porte as well as to achieve the Cretan issue's internationalization by incorporating it into the Eastern Question. Meanwhile, France withdrew gradually from the diplomatic field of the Cretan issue and Russia was not in the position to take a risk acting alone in such a sensitive case.

The retreat of these two Great Powers from the diplomatic field resulted in tensions and the formation of different wings among the insurgents, as it was described at the beginning of the historical overview. As result, on 2 July 1868 the General Assembly asked directly for British intervention in the crisis for the fulfillment of the national aspirations. Great Britain's response to the Cretan appeal was however negative, due to the fact that the Crown did not recognize the revolutionary organs of the Cretans.

As result of the negative British reply, the Cretans sought to put an end to the conflict by pursuing the solution of autonomy under the Sultan's sovereignty and the guarantee of the six European powers that were involved in the issue.¹⁴³ However, the efforts of the islanders remained unfruitful, mainly due to the fact that the Great Powers did not manage to adopt a unified stance in the issue throughout the last months of the conflict.

1868 was also marked by changes in the Ottoman tactics on the battle field as well, causing in this way severe problems to the insurgents. Thus, aiming at undermining the communication channels of the insurgents, Ömer and Hüseyin Avni Paşa ordered in mid- 1868 the building of towers in strategic points of the island as well as the construction of new roads. At the same time, on the political level, Voulgarēs' fundamental miscalculations with regards to the diplomatic situation in Europe led to the culmination of the conflict in the last months of 1868. The moderate and Anglophile Greek politician was convinced that the philhellenic sentiments of Gladstone (Great Britain's new Prime Minister) as well as the coming electoral victory of Grant in the USA would change radically the situation on the island in favor of the

¹⁴³Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 3: 299.

Cretans.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, by the end of 1868, he approved the participation of volunteer corps under the leadership of Petropoulakis in the Cretan movement, a decision which irritated the Porte.

The reaction of the Ottoman government was direct and decisive. Fotiadēs, Porte's ambassador to Athens, threatened the Greek government with immediate rupture of diplomatic relations something that Great Britain tried to avert during the course of the crisis.¹⁴⁵ The diplomatic tension between the two states reached its peak in the first days of December 1868, as public opinion in Greece was ready for a rupture in the relations with the Ottoman Empire. The increasing pressure of public opinion forced the Greek government to make preparations for war against the Ottomans. As result, on 5 December 1868 "the Greek Attaché in Trieste had been sent to St. Petersburg, Belgrade and Cettingue to ascertain whether help could be expected."¹⁴⁶

At the peak of the crisis between the two states, Russia saw her last opportunity for intervention. The Prussian proposal for a conference of the signatories of the Treaty of Paris extremely concerned Clarendon, the new British Foreign Minister. The main reason for these concerns was his justifiable fear that Russia "might reopen the whole Eastern Question and bring under review the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856."¹⁴⁷ Despite the consensus between Bismarck and Mustier with regards to Russia's proposal, Great Britain tried to define and to limit the subject of the conference. Therefore the goal of the conference was advisory aiming primarily to prohibit an armed clash between Greece and the Porte.¹⁴⁸

The strict specification of the conference's content demonstrated once more the Ottoman foreign policy's axiom, according to which the Ottoman government had to "avoid participation in international conferences unless the outcome could be

¹⁴⁴Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers*, 132.

¹⁴⁵Regarding the content of the ultimatum, which was handed over to the Greek government by Fotiadēs on 11 December 1868, see the Chapter on *Panslavism*. See also Bourne, "Great Britain," 90.

¹⁴⁶Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers*, 136.

¹⁴⁷Bourne, "Great Britain," 91.

¹⁴⁸The conference was described by the French foreign minister, La Valette, as follows: "(...) the Powers which it [the conference] represents constitute not a tribunal charged with giving a verdict, but an International Council, the views of which cannot pledge the parties otherwise than by the very freedom which it leaves them, and the entire absence of any other sanction than that which in a moral sense is necessarily implied by such a manifestation of public opinion, and in some respect of the conscience of Europe." *Ibid.*, 93.

predicted as favorable.”¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Powers decided that Greece should have only a consultative role in the conference, something that led the Greek government to refrain from that final stage of the Cretan conflict resolution.

The declaration of the conference which took place at its final session on 20 January 1869 was based on the ground of the Ottomans demands¹⁵⁰ that were included in the ultimatum. According to the conference’s results Greece should restrain from recruiting militia on her soil in order for the latter to embark on disturbances against the Ottoman Empire and from providing aid to the insurgents as well as from allowing and assisting the return of the refugees back to the island.¹⁵¹ Greece was now totally isolated and no other way was left to her but the acceptance of the declaration which was accompanied by a warning note¹⁵² in case the Greek cabinet would not satisfy the decision of the conference. The new Greek government which was formed on 18 February 1869 accepted the declaration something that led to the restoration of the relations between the conflict parts. Moreover, by the end of April 1869 a quite remarkable part of the Cretan refugees had already returned to Crete.¹⁵³

What remained in the aftermath of the crisis was without doubt the moral damage of the Greek Kingdom and of the *Megali Idea*’s spirit as well. The Ottoman Empire, on the contrary, by putting down the revolt managed to forestall European interference in its internal affairs, to strengthen the image of the Sultan in the Muslim public opinion and to achieve a joint European stance against Greece and her *megaloidetic* aspirations which were only temporarily were interrupted. Finally, as Mousouros, the Ottoman ambassador in London, had put it, the Ottomans “have won over European public opinion.”¹⁵⁴ His words demonstrated once more the role of the public opinion in conducting politics even in the 19th century.

¹⁴⁹Roderic H. Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the Ending in 1869 of the Crisis with Greece Caused by the Rebellion in Crete of 1866-1869,” *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 4 (1993):1193.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1195.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, 1200-1201.

¹⁵²According to that warning note, Greece should not expect any support of the Great Powers unless she accepted the content of the declaration within the days following conference’s last session. This warning was adopted by all participating powers, even by Russia.

¹⁵³Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai Agōnes*, 320.

¹⁵⁴ Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy,” 1203.

2.5 Pandora's box opened again. Reasons for the crisis of 1866

In this subchapter the focus is going to be on the reasons that led the Cretan Christians to challenge Ottoman rule on the island. Even though the majority of scholars in Ottoman Crete classify the events of 1866 *a priori* in the nationalist movements of the second half of the 19th century, an overview of the prevailing sociopolitical conditions could shed light on the Christian Cretans' decision to proceed into a protest movement against the local authorities. Therefore, examining the nature of the Cretan demands will reveal to us that the Cretan movement wasn't driven exclusively by separatist inclinations of the islanders but it was actually the outcome of an explosive combination between social discontent and nationalist aspirations.

There is no doubt that the contribution of the press to the description of the revolt's reasons is of great importance. The Athenian press compared to the Constantinopolitan and Ottoman newspapers systematically put more emphasis on the examination of the movement's background as well as on the living conditions of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire in general.

The Constantinopolitan newspapers' lack of interest in reporting on the conflict may be justified not only by the existing press restrictions but also by the ideological stance of the *millet's* elites towards separatist movement which could endanger their position in the Ottoman polity. Concerning the Ottoman press, it should be noted that the vast majority of the Ottoman newspapers avoided any reference to the roots of the Cretans' dissatisfaction, as they tried to underscore systematically the importance of the movement.

The Athenian newspapers tried to inform their readership about the conflict's dimensions by laying special focus on the background of the crisis as well as on the everyday (military and political) developments on the island. Therefore, on 19 September 1866 the Athenian *Aiōn* republished a report of the Christian Cretans addressed to the President of the USA which contained a well-summarized presentation of the islanders' complaints.¹⁵⁵ The whole petition of the islanders to the Sultan is to be found in the editorial of 21th May 1866 of the Greek provincial

¹⁵⁵ „Krētika” [Cretan affairs], *Aiōn*, no. 2161, September 19, 1866.

newspaper *Nomos*.¹⁵⁶ My intention to provide a thorough insight into the reasons which led to the Cretan movement will offer us the opportunity to challenge the teleological argumentation about the ethnic and nationalist aspirations as the only driving force for the conflict. The Christian petition reflected all these insufficiencies of the local Ottoman administration which had an impact on the lives of the Christian and Muslim element as well. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the local Ottoman authority to handle the situation was also intensified by its inability to objectively interpret the developments on the island. Consequently, this gave an impetus to the local dissatisfaction and therefore the final blow for the Cretans' decision to dispute in a dynamic and decisive way the Ottoman sovereignty on the island.

It should be stressed that the use of the monastic properties to the advantage of the Christians' educational affairs on the island particularly through the construction of a sufficient school network was one of the Christian demands in the course of the second half of the 19th century.

Moreover, public sentiment under the Cretan Christians deteriorated further due to the Catholic propaganda which was conducted by the Catholic clergy on the island since the beginning of the 1860s. In order to secure the sympathy of the Christians, the missionaries promised French protection to the islanders if they accepted the Catholic confession. It was widely believed among the Christians, that the Catholic missionaries took advantage of the illiteracy apparent in broad segments of the Cretan Christian community in order to pursue their proselytizing activities. This fact put more emphasis on the need for the monastic properties to be used for the commonwealth of the local Christian population. Accordingly, this situation posed a challenge for the fragile balance between the local key-players (Christian community, the local upper clergy), the patriarchate and the Ottoman authorities.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ "Krētika" [Cretan affairs], *Nomos*, no. 112, May 21, 1866.

¹⁵⁷ From the archive of Geōrgios Stefanidēs (a member of the General Revolutionary Committee in Crete) it becomes apparent that the monastic issue had led the local Christians to ask for the intervention of Ismail Paşa (local Ottoman Governor) as well as of the Patriarch already in February 1866. See Dēmōsthenēs Stefanidēs et al., *Archeio Dēmōsthenē G. Stefanidē. Istorias Prosōpōn Tekmēria* [Dēmōsthenē G. Stefanidēs' archive. Personal historical documents] (Heraklion: Ypourgeio Ethnikēs Paideias kai Thrēskevmatōn-Genika Archeia tou Kratous-Archeia Nomou Heraklion, 2006), 1:281-289. For further information about the issue of the monastic properties see Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 68-100; Psilakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 3: 866-9.

It should be noted at this point that the taxes imposed on the Christian flock by the local upper clergy for the purposes of the monastic properties' management were abolished with the reform edict of 1856 thereby relieving the local Christian element from an extra fiscal burden.¹⁵⁸ With respect to this, the provisions of the edict concerning the monastic properties laid down the election of a council composed of clergymen and laymen from every community. To the main task of this council also belonged the monitoring and supervision of the entirety of the communal affairs.¹⁵⁹

With regards to the conflicting parties in the monastic properties issue, it may be argued that the peasant's majority constituted a common front against the local Ottoman authorities, the Council of Elders [Dēmogerontia], the Archbishop of Crete and the local Bishops as well. The ordinary people's decisiveness against the local administrative authorities and their spiritual leaders was further reinforced by the fact that the latter were regarded to be pawns of the Ottoman central administration.¹⁶⁰

A characteristic proof of the aforementioned close relations between the upper Orthodox clergy and the Ottoman administration was the case of Dionysios Charitōnidēs, the Archbishop on Crete, who received a monthly salary of 60,000 *gurûş* that was paid by the Porte.¹⁶¹ Additionally, we encounter several cases of bishops on the island who were awarded by the Ottoman state with medals for their good services during the Cretan conflict.¹⁶² With respect to the nature of the relations between the local upper clergy and the administrative authorities Stefanidēs justified the support of the Council of Elders in Candia towards the upper clergy by arguing that the council was probably composed of persons who had benefited from the use of the monastic properties.¹⁶³

The intra-communal issue of the monastic properties also drew the attention of the Greek press as already in the early 1860s the Athenian *Aiōn* noticed that the

¹⁵⁸Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 71.

¹⁵⁹With respect to the impact of the introduction of the *National Regulations* [Ethnikoi Kanonismoi] on the millet administration as well as on the economic relations between the Porte and the Patriarchate see Paraskevas Konortas, *Othōmanikes Theōrēseis gia to Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio, 17^{os}- arches 20^{ou} aiōna* [Ottoman Assumptions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. 17th-early 20th century] (Athēna: Alexandria Publications, 1998), 204-206.

¹⁶⁰Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 103.

¹⁶¹Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 161.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, 161-2, note 130.

¹⁶³Stefanidēs et al., *Archeio Dēmostenē*, 1: λβ.

monasteries possessed quite a large property.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the Constantinopolitan press did not hesitate to directly refer to internal issues of the *millet* like that of its educational affairs. In this sense, *Tēlegrafos* suggested the Archbishop of Crete to undertake initiatives for the construction of a cohesive school network which would encompass the Christian communities settled in the remote areas of the island.¹⁶⁵

Besides the abovementioned factors the movement of 1866 was also an outcome of the Porte's failed attempt to implement its ambitious reformative program proclaimed through imperial edicts. The Center's insufficiency to execute a wide range of reforms in its periphery was also reflected in the appointment of the Ottoman Governors to the island in the period between the promulgation of the *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* and the events of 1866. When Veli Paşa, Emin Paşa's successor, arrived on Crete in the spring 1856, he embarked on an arbitrary use of power¹⁶⁶ which fatally resulted in heavy protests by the Cretans. The unwillingness of the new governor to implement the promises of the reform edict finally led to the revolt of 1858¹⁶⁷ which caused his dismissal and his replacement by Sami Paşa.¹⁶⁸ With regards to the arbitrary use of power by the local Ottoman authorities, it should be noted, that one of the main Christian complaints dealt with the heavy tax burdens and *agareia*, "a labour obligation analogous to the western corvée"¹⁶⁹, which was actually already prohibited by the Edict of Gülhane.

Interestingly, when the Porte decided to send a special envoy to the island in order to examine the Christian demands, Veli Paşa tried to stir up the local Muslims against the Christians under the excuse of the planned reforms posing a major threat to Muslim

¹⁶⁴“Ἐ Ellēnikē Anatolē to 1860” [The Greek East in 1860], *Aiōn*, no. 1948, December 17, 1860. According to Tsirintanēs the annual income of the 31 Cretan monasteries in Crete amounted to approximately 1,000,000 drachmas in the period under examination. See Tsirintanēs, *Ἐ politikē*, 1: 70.

¹⁶⁵“N/A,” *Tēlegrafos Kōnstantinoupolēs*, no. n/a, April 30, 1860.

¹⁶⁶His policy also included efforts to prevent converts from reverting back to Christianity. Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai Agōnes*, 36.

¹⁶⁷For an overview of the demands of the Christians which led to the revolt of 1858 see Giannēs Grintakēs, “Ἐ epanastasē tou 1858 sto Rethymno” [The Revolution of 1858 in Rethymnon], *Krētologika* 18 (2002-2003): 214-216.

¹⁶⁸Captain Spratt argued in his travel account with regard to living conditions of the Christians that “(...) on the whole there are few people in the Levant at the present time more free and independent, or less taxed and oppressed, than the Greek community of Crete.” Spratt, *Travel and researches*, 1: 49. Additionally, he praised Veli Paşa saying that he “was induced by his enlightened views and local interest (...)” since his governorship was marked by the “general introduction of mixed education, the construction of good roads, and the extension of the cure and sanitary treatment of the sick.” *Ibid.*, 49-50.

¹⁶⁹Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period: The Revolts in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 11, no. 2 (1975): 115. Similar complaints about the heavy tax burdens and the labour obligations for the construction of roads and bridges were also expressed by the Christian Bulgarian peasantry.

superiority. This reaction of the Ottoman governor demonstrated once more the failure of the Center to “(...) develop a means of exerting steady control over officials in the provinces (...).”¹⁷⁰

Under the pressure of the developments in Montenegro the Porte avoided opening a new front in the European part of the Empire by deciding to capitulate to the Cretans' demands. Thus, according to the firman of 7/19th July 1858 the Christians demands¹⁷¹ should be satisfied in their entirety. It was also decided that extra privileges should be granted to the islanders. Abdurahman Sami Paşa, the next governor of the island, arrived on Crete on 30 June 1858 and remained governor of the island until 25 February 1859 when he was replaced due to the fact that his governorship was vitiated by a misuse of powers. His successor, Hüsnü Paşa, failed to gain the support of the foreign consuls on the island which was an important precondition for the establishment of tranquility on the island. Therefore he was also replaced by Ismail Rahmi Paşa Tepelenli on 3 February 1860. To the great disappointment of the local Christian population, however, he failed to put into effect the *Tanzimat* reforms promised either and was finally replaced 15 months later (6 May 1861) by Hekim Ismail Paşa whose maladministration led to the events of 1866.

From the above, it becomes obvious that the reform edicts remained unimplemented on the island despite the frequent changes of the Ottoman governors on Crete. This situation resulted in the culmination of public discontent and finally to the movement of 1866. Especially with regards to the rotation of governors on the island, it may be argued that a direct consequence of the Porte's policies in these areas of the realm was that the newly appointed officials “brought no knowledge of local conditions with them to the job and did not remain at the post long enough either to acquire such knowledge or a feeling of identification with the interests of the area in question.”¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 104.

¹⁷¹The demands of the Christians in 1858 dealt with the infrastructure, the abolition of taxes, the revision of the *bedel-i askerî* [military payment-in-lieu] as well as with the arbitrary intervention of the mullahs in Christian cases dealing with inheritance and orphaned children. Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 30. Despite Porte's decision to ease the Christian revolutionary fever by satisfying their demands, the local Valis reacted again by not obeying the orders sent from Istanbul. Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai Agōnes*, 45.

¹⁷²Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria,” 103.

2.5.1 Christian demands

Without ignoring the existence of the national consciousness among the Cretans, Skinner noticed that “(...) in speaking of the causes of the Cretan insurrection, it must be distinctly understood that the great and permanent cause was the existence of Turkish rule.”¹⁷³ Thus, it will be attempted in this part of the work to present the Christian demands in a spherical way and within the context of the *Tanzimat* reforms.

Besides the Press reports on the Christian petition another important source which informs us about the Cretan complaints is the private archive collection of Mētsotakēs, the Greek origin consul of Russia on the island. By relying thus on Mētsotakēs' archive the points of the Christian petition that was submitted to the local Vali and to the Sultan on 26 May 1866 are summed up as follows:¹⁷⁴

- The abolition of the heavy taxation on tobacco, cotton, wine and alcohol, property sales, sales of animals, butcher shops, fish shops, dyer's shops and stamps.
- The introduction of changes in the tax collection system.
- The need for improvement of the island's infrastructure.
- The right of election in the [administrative] councils and in the Councils of Elders was set in stone.
- The need for the foundation of an agricultural bank as the tax-collective institution of the *mütesellim* proved catastrophic and ineffective.¹⁷⁵
- The need for improvement and reorganization of the judicial system as the

¹⁷³John Edwin Hilary Skinner, *Roughing it in Crete in 1867* (London: Richard Bentley, 1868), xxii. The first secretary of the Sultan came to a similar conclusion with regard to the war between Serbia and the Porte when he wrote to the Grand Vizier that “the causes which produce trouble among *the peaceful population* are in a great measure due to the unseemly conduct of some incapable functionaries, and particularly to the exactions to which the avaricious farmers of taxes lend themselves in the hope of a larger profit.” *Correspondence respecting affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Parliamentary Papers*, vol. 84, (London: 1876): 17, quoted in William Denton, *Christians of Turkey: Their condition under Mussulman rule* (1876) (London: Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1876), 85.

¹⁷⁴Iōannēs Mētsotakēs, “Pros tēn A.A. Megaleiotēta Soultan Aptoul Aziz Chan!! Ton Trisevaston ēmōn Vasilea!!!” [To his Majesty Sultan Abdūlaziz Chan!! Our most revered King!!!], May 14, 1866. Iōannēs Mētsotakēs' Archive, no. 27, f3α/52, Historical Museum of Crete, Heraklion. 1-5; Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 160-165. Elz also makes a detailed reference to the 10-point Cretan petition. See Elz, *Die europäischen Grossmächte*, 51-52.

¹⁷⁵Regarding the period looked at here, there are plentiful references concerning the arbitrary practices of the tithe collectors who usually demanded “multiple the amount the tax payers really owed to the state.” Halil İnalçık, “Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 5 (1973): 102. As far as the tax collection is concerned the Hatt foresaw the abolition of the farming out state-revenue [iltizam]. Additionally, İnalçık points out that “in particular, the farming out of the tithe collection and the system of state leases [mukâtaas] were ordered discontinued immediately.” Ibid.

Christians complained about the lack of the respect for freedom of religion by the judicial authorities. Furthermore, Christian testimonies were not equally admitted in the Muslim courts. The need for change of the language in which the court decisions were issued.

- Misuse of powers by the Ottoman governors on the island and violation of the subjects' personal liberties.
- The lack of schools in the countryside and especially in the departments outside of the three major cities of the island. The appointment of the educational staff should be carried out irrespective of their nationality¹⁷⁶.
- The construction of ports.
- The need for freedom of religion. This demand became more urgent since the matter of conversion concerned primarily the everyday life of the two biggest religious groups on the island. In comparison to the Christian converts, Muslim converts were able to remain on the island and retain the right of inheritance.
- An urge for amnesty as well as for the appointment of a person charged with the examination of the grievances on the island.

2.5.2 The *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* had no influence away from Istanbul

The fact that the movements of 1858 and 1866 coincided with the *Tanzimat* gives us the opportunity to examine the reasons for the events of 1866 in comparison with the promised reformative efforts. As it was mentioned above, the Center encountered difficulties in its attempt to implement the reformative measures in regions like Crete, which were not close to Istanbul. Such difficulties also arose due to the existence of considerable local subjective factors which are mentioned in a report of Abbott, the British consul at Monastir, to the English Ambassador to the Porte Sir H. Bulwer. Abbott argues characteristically that,

“these [local] councils, generally speaking, are not in favour of progress and good government, the principal members forming them being Beys who take their seats as members thereof, on account of

¹⁷⁶It is worth mentioning here that the local Ottoman authorities were highly suspicious of teachers of Greek origin as they were believed to be agents of nationalist ideas.

their position and influence in the country. For instance, if a Pasha arrives at Monastir with intentions to carry on a good administration, he is tied down by these members, who, having great local interests, try to shield this or that party guilty of crime of punishment.”¹⁷⁷

Despite the fact that the *Tanzimat* era and its application is one of the well-studied issues of the Ottoman 19th century, our main sources of information about their implementation are still made up by voluminous Greek works on Ottoman Crete which are mostly under the influence of ethnocentric biases. Besides this, reports on the misuse of powers by the local Ottoman administration, Christian written petitions as well as diffuse references on the state organization and the government policies on the island contribute to a better reconstruction of the late Ottoman Crete’s history, part of which also constitute the Porte’s attempt to implement ambitious reforms on the island.

Most secondary sources on the late Ottoman Crete agree on the difficulties that the Center encountered in its attempt to pursue the modernization in its periphery. These difficulties had mainly to do with the reaction of the local administrators against the state’s centralization efforts. The protest movement of 1858 for example was a characteristic case of the local governor’s strong desire to remain by any means bound to his post, even by ignoring the directives that came from Istanbul. Even if the special inquiry commission which was sent from Istanbul to Crete in order to examine the Christian complaints, reached an agreement with the protesters by recognizing the Cretan’s demands as fully justified, the local Vali tried to initiate a bloodshed between the two confessional groups in the island. His ultimate aim was to force Porte’s coercive suppression of the Christian protest movement.¹⁷⁸

According to Detorakēs, the years between the reestablishment of Ottoman rule on the island in 1841, after a ten-year Egyptian intermezzo, and the Cretan movement in 1866 marked to a great extent a peaceful period for Ottoman Crete. However, issues like the heavy tax burdens, the restriction of customary rights like the carrying of weapons, as well as their unequal representation of the Christian element in the Council of Elders

¹⁷⁷Great Britain. Foreign Office. *Reports received from Her Majesty’s Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey* 1860 (London: Harrison and sons, 1861), 6.

¹⁷⁸Iōannēs Mourellos, *Istoria tēs Krētēs* [History of Crete] (Heraklion: Eleftherē Skepsē press, 1934), 3: 1504-1517.

raised constantly concerns to the Christian community throughout these years.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, one of the main Christian demands in relation to the communal institutions revolved around the free election of Christian representatives in the local councils irrespective of the Vali's personal preferences.¹⁸⁰

As a more detailed insight into the *Tanzimat* period in Crete does not belong to the scope of the present work and due to constraints of space limit, I decided to put an emphasis on the presentation of some important points extracted from the Greek and English consular reports concerning the reforms' implementation on the island compared to that in other peripheral regions of the Ottoman realm. By doing this I intend to show whether and to what extent Crete constituted an exception in the modernization process in the Empire. Given that through their reports the consuls were primarily aiming to inform their head of state instead of making propaganda for the national interests, I tend to perceive the reports of Sakopoulos (Greek consul in Crete) on the progress of the *Tanzimat* on the island as a reliable source for the purposes of this part of the work.

First of all, it should be noted at this point we deal with two completely contradictory schools of thought. On the one hand, the Greek consul Sakopoulos representing the Greek state whose policy in the 1850s and onwards was defined by an aggressive militant nationalism and on the other hand, the English diplomatic agents who acted in the framework of the British dogma which dictated the preservation of the Ottoman Empire's integrity. However, as we are going to show below, the "sickness" of the Sultan's realm was so deeply rooted in the very existence of the Ottoman polity that even the British consuls could not avoid referring to the deteriorating conditions which affected primarily the non-Muslim populations of the Empire.

My decision to pay special attention to the British consular reports is grounded on the orientation of Great Britain's policy in the region which could be defined as pro-Ottoman. According to the priest William Denton, Sir Henry Bulwer (Great Britain's ambassador to the Porte) asked the English consuls to report on the administration as well as on the treatment of the Christians by the Ottoman authorities. Bulwer's aim

¹⁷⁹Detorakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 358-9.

¹⁸⁰Psilakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 3: 831.

was to “contradict the assertions of the Russian note”¹⁸¹ about the injustices that the Christians experienced in their everyday life. Moreover, in our case the use of the British consular reports gains more importance, if one takes Denton’s following assumption into consideration:

“English consuls who wish to stand well with the Embassy at Constantinople must make their reports as favourable as possible to Turkey, and conceal all facts which would enlighten the English public as to the true nature of Turkish rule.”¹⁸²

Sakopoulos was also asked by the Greek government on 10 May 1867 to compose a report by presenting the reasons for the *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* remaining unimplemented in Crete as well as to inform the Foreign Ministry whether the provisions of the reform edict concerning the foreign nationals’ right to land ownership were applicable at all.¹⁸³

With regards to the 2nd and 3rd article of the reform edict concerning the religious privileges which were granted to the non-Muslims, the Greek consul avoided to express himself utterly. The British diplomatic agents, however, who served in the European provinces of the Empire talked about the violation of the religious freedom by putting an emphasis on the enforced conversion acts on the part of the Muslims. Such a statement belonged to Longworth, the English consul-general at Belgrade, who referred to a custom according to which “Mussulman young man who elopes with a Christian girl, and whom he converts to his faith” was excluded from the military conscription as such a conduct was “considered a meritorious act for his religion.”¹⁸⁴

Sakopoulos noticed with regards to the religious tolerance of the Ottoman authorities and the implementation of the 4th article (unhindered repairing of churches, schools and hospitals) of the reform edict of 1856 that to his knowledge there was no sign of violation of the aforementioned article in Crete.¹⁸⁵ This was however not the case in other regions of the Empire with Christian populations for example in Jerusalem,

¹⁸¹Denton, *Christians of Turkey*, 16.

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, 10-11.

¹⁸³Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967), 338-349.

¹⁸⁴Denton, *Christians of Turkey*, 137.

¹⁸⁵Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967): 339.

where the local Christian element always met difficulties “till an order is obtained from Constantinople for building churches.”¹⁸⁶

In his report to the Foreign Ministry, Sakopoulos did not omit to refer to some positive aspects of the living conditions of the Christians as well. In this sense, he accentuated the improvements that were registered with regards to the respect of the honor and dignity of the Christian subjects as well as to the absence of Muslim discriminatory attitudes towards Christians, by pointing out characteristically that the latter were not being called “infidel” [gâvur] anymore in the public sector agencies.¹⁸⁷ Interestingly enough, the situation described by the Greek consul in his reports with regards to the religious freedom differed from the complaints of the petitioners. With respect to this Sakopoulos said characteristically that “(...) on Crete the free practice of the religion is in no way hindered”¹⁸⁸ by noticing that the religious freedom led quite a lot of Muslim converts to adopt again their initiate religion, a trend which was intensified in the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris. He continued by underlining, however, that this new trend among the Muslim converts did not take place without direct or indirect consequences for their private lives. In particular during the Governorship of Ismail Paşa Muslims converts who decided to again adopt the Christian faith faced hindrances in issues dealing with inheritance or land ownership.¹⁸⁹

Another interesting point that Sakopoulos elevated in his report dealt with the cultural division of labor on the island. According to his words and despite the provision of *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*'s 7th article the Cretan Christians did not have access to the highest positions of the local administration. He went on by saying that besides specific positions in the health services, educational sector as well as diplomacy, the most responsible posts in the administrative, economic and military bureaucratic mechanism were entrusted only to the Muslims.¹⁹⁰ However, Crete was not an exception with regard to these practices, as the exclusion of the Christians from high-ranking bureaucratic offices was a common feature of the Ottoman rule in other European provinces of the Empire as well. In particular, such phenomena were encountered in the Balkan where the Center had to cope not only with separatist phenomena nurtured

¹⁸⁶Great Britain. Foreign Office. *Reports*, 28.

¹⁸⁷Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967): 339-40.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 340.

¹⁸⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 341.

by the nationalist notion but also with the increasing influence of the foreign powers on the non-Muslim populations.

The next thorn in the implementation of the imperial reform edict dealt with the judicial reforms (articles 10th and 11th of the edict). The Greek consul argued that the institution of the *meclis* was composed of protégés of the local governor. Furthermore, the majority of the courts were presided by the *kadi*, *mullah* or governor and the jury was formed only by Muslims. In that sense, Sakopoulos criticized the extreme power accumulation in the hands of the local governor with regards to his judiciary responsibilities as well as the lack of separation between the judicial and administrative powers. Especially the latter inevitably resulted in the resistance to the introduction of any modern law.¹⁹¹

The fact that the reforms remained unimplemented in several regions of the Ottoman Empire had drawn the attention of the British diplomatic agents as well. Mr. Abbott from Monastir, Mr. J. E. Blunt from Pristina, Major Cox from Bucharest, Mr. Skene from Aleppo and Mr. Finn from Jerusalem put an emphasis on the legal conditions of the Christians by underlining the refusal of Christian evidence in the Muslim courts.¹⁹² With respect to this, Denton argued that “so long as Christian evidence is wholly refused, or is not allowed to have any weight in the determination of a civil suit, whilst it utterly rejected in all criminal causes, it is obvious there can be no security for life, limb, nor property for the great mass of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.”¹⁹³

With respect to the representation of the Christians in local councils and the free election of its members, Sakopoulos noticed that the 16th article of the Imperial edict actually remained a dead letter.¹⁹⁴ Concerning the issue of the Christians’ participation in the local representative organs, Mr. Calvert, the British consul in Salonica, assumed that “Christians are admitted into the local Councils, but they are so few in number compared with the Mussulman members as to be completely overawed, and therefore practically useless.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹Ibid., 342-3.

¹⁹²Denton, *Christians of Turkey*, 122-123.

¹⁹³Ibid., 129.

¹⁹⁴Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967): 344.

¹⁹⁵Denton, *Christians of Turkey*, 127.

In his reports to the Greek Foreign Ministry Sakopoulos also referred to the inefficiency of the state revenue system by underlining the unjust taxation methods which was one of the local Christian population's diachronic demands. The consul underlined that 22 separate taxes which were paid between 1864 and 1865 amounted to 53,390,000 *gurûş* (or approximately 6,673,750 drachmas) by affecting first and foremost the peasantry on the island.¹⁹⁶ The urgent need for equality in the taxation system and its readjustment was highlighted in the reports of almost all the British consuls as well.¹⁹⁷ In sum, there was a broad consensus among the diplomats that the taxation system should undergo structural changes. However, they placed a special emphasis on the improvements needed with regards to the provisions dealing with the tithe as it had an impact on "the welfare of the country by thwarting agricultural enterprise."¹⁹⁸

Finally, Sakopoulos referring to the non-Muslim's right to land ownership noticed that this could only be achieved through the adoption of the appropriate laws. With regard to the same issue the British consuls argued that even though the Christians could purchase land property without serious problems, they faced great difficulties in retaining this, especially in cases where the Muslim seller reclaimed his property from them. Under these condition "the Christian is in nineteen cases out of twenty dispossessed, and he may then deem himself fortune if he gets back the price he gave."¹⁹⁹

As expected, the Greek press systematically devoted space to the living conditions of the Ottoman Greeks. In this context, the Athenian paper *Mellon* was highly critical of the Greek government due to its apathy in the treatment of the Greek Orthodox subjects by the Ottoman State. The newspaper touched upon different issues related to the Christians' everyday life in the Ottoman Empire, such as the property confiscation of Christian subjects living in Epirus, the phenomenon of banditry in Thessaly, the

¹⁹⁶Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, "Ē Krētikē Epanastasis," *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 1 (1967): 345-6. It would be useful here to mention Sandwith, the British consul in Chania, who in 1872 stated that "(...) while Cyprus had had the heavier taxation and lesser administrative expenditures than any other province of the Ottoman Empire, Crete had had the highest administrative expenditures however with lighter taxation." Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos Alytrōtismos*, 189-190. Crete's advantageous position compared to that of Cyprus becomes clear if we consider Sandwith's estimations, according to which Crete's total revenues from agricultural and stock-farming activities amounted to 223,740,000 *gurûş* while Cyprus's total income was almost only 80,000,000 *gurûş*. *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁹⁷Denton, *Christians of Turkey*, 148-50; 202.

¹⁹⁸Great Britain. Foreign Office. *Reports*, 85.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 55.

closure of the schools in Macedonia, the injustices of the Ottoman judicial system, the arbitrary expulsion of Greek citizens from Crete as well as the shutting down of numerous workshops belonging to Christians on suspicion of the agitation of troubles.²⁰⁰ Besides the *Mellon*, the Athenian *Ethnofylaks* also referred to the Christians of the Ottoman Empire as well, by giving an emphasis to issues which were mentioned in the imperial reform edicts.²⁰¹

Whereas the Athenian press focused on the life of the Ottoman Greeks in a detailed way, the Ottoman press tried to underplay the conflict without pay the appropriate attention to the origins of the events. *Rûznâme-i Ayine-i Vatan*²⁰² was the only Ottoman newspaper that offered to its readership the opportunity to learn about the Cretans' demands though without acknowledging them as legitimate.²⁰³ In this context and with regards to the Cretans' assumption that the tax-collection system caused damages to the tax farms, the author of the article wondered about the reasons that a lot of Cretans entered the tax farming.²⁰⁴

In the same article it was argued in relation to the manipulation or hindering of representatives' free election in the local councils as well as to the Cretan complaints about the state's reluctance to confirm the elections of representatives that "since this lack of acceptance is rare that means that these people must have been unsuitable personalities."²⁰⁵ Last but not least, the author responded to the Christians accusations of the Porte's little interest in pursuing the public education on the island by arguing that:

“(…) the unselfishness of the Sublime State relating to educational issues is remarkable, except for the fact that the Cretan people are somewhat reserved when it comes to the provision of aid on a

²⁰⁰“To geitoniko kratos” [The neighboring state], *Mellon*, no. 136, January 19, 1865.

²⁰¹“È katastasis tōn Christ.en Tourkia” [The situation of the Christians in Turkey], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1440, March 5, 1868 and “È katastasis tōn Christ. en Tourkia” [The situation of the Christians in Turkey], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1442, March 8, 1868.

²⁰²*Ruznâme-i Ayine-i Vatan* was the first illustrated newspaper in the Ottoman Empire and it was first published in 1866 by Eğribozlu Mehmet Arif titled *Âyine-i Vatan*. The newspaper continued its publication until 1869. Nuri M. Inuğur, *Basın ve yayın tarihi* (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1982), 242.

²⁰³“Türkestan ve Avrupa” [Turkey and Europe], *Ruznâme-i Ayine-i Vatan*, no. 29, Rebî-ül-evvel 4, 1284/July 6, 1867. Unfortunately the following article of the newspaper dealing with the rest of the demands is not available.

²⁰⁴“(…) pek çok Giridli niçin birkaç def'a iltizâma giriyor?” [(…)Why do so many Cretans so often become tax farmers?] “Türkestan ve Avrupa” [Turkey and Europe], *Ruznâme-i Ayine-i Vatan*, no. 28, Rebî-ül-evvel 3, 1284/July 5, 1867.

²⁰⁵“böyle adem-i kabûl pek nâdir olduğu cihetle elbette uygunsuz adamlar olduğu için olmalıdır.” Ibid.

personal level, all that is left is support from the state. One notices a paradox when the Cretans begin to protest in 1866 against the construction of roads and schools, while in 1858 they had already expressed their dissatisfaction through written petitions for this very reason.”²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶“(…) Devlet-i Âliyye’niñ ma’arif yoluñda Girid’de ettiđi fedâkârlıklar fevk-al-âde dir. Ancak Girid ahâlîsi muâvenet-i zâtiyyede pek mümsik olduđuñdan devletiñ himmeti yalnız kalıyor. Burada bir garîblik var ki 1866 senesinde yollar ve mektebler yapıldığıñdan şikâyet eden Giridliler 58’ki arzuhalleriñde devlet yol açmağa mekteb yapmağa çok uğraşiyor diyerek şikâyet etmişlerdi.” Ibid.

3 Press as an historical source

It is a fact that the press's use as a source for historical studies has not drawn the attention of the scholarship until the past two decades when the interdisciplinary approach of the history study has gained interest and the benefits of the historical press's examination were accentuated. Without getting involved into the epistemological quarrel between postmodernists and realists concerning the way that the primary sources' study should be conducted, it may be argued here, that the application of a wide range of interdisciplinary methods contributed to our better understanding of the past.

The aim of this part of the work is to illustrate both the benefits and pitfalls of using newspapers in historical research. The following evaluation of the press as historical source is also partially based on my empirical experience from the study of numerous newspapers articles dealing with the Cretan conflict. These observations put an emphasis on some of the difficulties that the majority of the researchers encounter during historical press research in archives or libraries. However, it should be underlined at this point, that the grad of difficulty with regards to press research depends each time upon the subject under examination as well as its thematic, chronic or even geographical specification.

First of all the lack of indexes poses one of the major difficulties concerning the quick "scanning" of the newspapers. The researcher of the Greek and Ottoman press of the 1860s has to scrutinize the whole newspaper article in order to find the information they are looking for. This task becomes even more difficult, when the newspaper articles do not bear any title or the subject of investigation is not specific in the narrow sense of the word. Fortunately, in our case the small format (max. 7 pages) of the newspapers as well as the relative short period under examination reduced the time of the research to some extent.

One of the main question that arises before using the historical press as a primary source deals with the nature of the source *per se*, namely whether the newspapers should be regarded and used as a simple tank of "dry" information or they should undergo a textual interpretation that would enable us to draw more useful conclusions with regard to the subject under investigation. Through the examination of newspaper

articles for the purposes of the present work, it became apparent, that historical newspapers are not merely comprised of written pieces of text with plentiful day to day information, but most importantly they open to us further windows for the past's reconstruction.

With respect to this, McQuail accurately describes the newspapers' function and character as:

“a window, where it enables people to see for themselves what is going on without inference from others; a mirror of events in society; a filter or gatekeeper to select and block certain parts of experiences; a signpost, guide or interpreter pointing the way and making sense of things; a forum or platform for the presentation of information to an audience; or a screen or barrier indicating the possibility the media may provide a false view of the world.”²⁰⁷

Another crucial question which makes the historians reluctant in using historical papers as the main source for their research is the sense of lack of objectivity²⁰⁸ with respect to the news coverage. As far as the objective (or not) nature of the press is concerned, one has to take into account the general assumption made by press historians, according to which the newspaper “(...) like many other types of documentation, (...) was not intended by their producers to be an historical source.”²⁰⁹ Nonetheless, even the lack of objectivity can be remedied by applying different research methods such as cross referencing for example. Therefore, comparing the information contained in an article with other contemporary primary sources may finally seize the lack of accuracy of a single newspaper article.

A further complication concerning the study of historical press may be the sense of lack of professionalism. This sense is further reinforced by the fact that quite a respectable number of newspaper articles were defined by partisanship which was displayed in the language and the argumentation of the writer accordingly. Furthermore, the linguistic methods that some newspapers employed in order to serve

²⁰⁷Denis, McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction* (London: Sage, 1994), 65-66, quoted in Jane-Louise Secker, “Newspapers and Historical Research: A Study of Historians and Custodians in Wales,” (PhD diss., University of Wales, 1999), 40.

²⁰⁸A lack of objectivity in the press can also be explained by looking at the affiliations newspapers have with political parties or are due to censorship conditions apparent in authoritarian regimes.

²⁰⁹Secker, “Newspapers and Historical Research,” 27.

their ideological stance and political orientation were eye-catching and characteristically demonstrated the kind of relationship they had with their readership.

Despite the impact of the Gramscian claim²¹⁰ on the scholars' decision to deal with the historical press, it may be useful to underline here that "scholars have come to appreciate newspapers as both sources and subjects in their own right, rather than as mere funds of data into which to dip in order to buttress claims made about the past from traditional archival sources."²¹¹

With respect to the press material that is utilized for the present work, it may be argued with regards to the Greek press, that a remarkable number of Athenian newspapers were strongly bound to the governmental or oppositional parties. This fact, however, revealed the political stance of the newspaper which legitimated in a direct or indirect way the prevailing ethnic ideologies of the period under examination. In particular, with regard to the partisan press the journalism historian Baldasty acknowledges the importance of political newspapers by arguing that "they helped the party mobilize the voters and were an extreme efficient way to reach a dispersed rural population."²¹² Even if Baldasty's assumption does not fit exactly to the entirety of the newspapers examined for the purposes of the present work, it can be argued, that the majority of the Athenian papers implicitly or explicitly aimed at the mobilization of their readership as well as at motivating political activism in general.

Another challenge that historians often encounter in their use of newspapers, is the issue of topicality in the news coverage. During the study of the Ottoman and Greek press one comes across reports referring to events which occurred one or two days before. This happened mainly due to the fact that news from remote areas like Crete or elsewhere came to the newspaper with a delay sometimes of several days. Only after the spreading of telegraph lines in the late 19th century could the news be sent in a

²¹⁰ According to Gramsci the printed press has intertemporally been under the influence of the power holders. The lack of impartiality of the newspapers is further intensified by the fact that the newspapers are regarded as "(...) an integrated part of the ideological apparatus of capitalist societies and one of the main agencies for the reproduction of these societies through their interpretation, packaging, and distribution of reality throughout society." Roberto Franzosi, "The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issue in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers," *Historical Methods* 20, no. 1 (1987): 6.

²¹¹ Stephen Vella, "Newspapers," in *Reading Primary Sources. The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth-and Twentieth-century history*, eds. Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann. (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 193.

²¹² Gerald Baldasty, *The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 14.

more instantaneous way. For the purposes of the present work however, the matter of topicality does not affect the way the press material is treated, as our main concern is to trace the ideological background in the news reporting and not to rewrite the history of the Cretan conflict on the ground of the events' press coverage.

3.1 Discovering ideologies behind the lines

Moritz Busch, Bismarck's press officer, argued that the Prussian statesman "(...) does not appreciate diplomatic documents much. Governments have always, for their own ends, exploited the newspapers. Bismarck points out that one's intentions can quite often be more clearly expressed in a newspaper."²¹³ Bismarck's words vividly show us the important role of the press in politics as well as its decisive contribution to the historical research.

In general, it is acknowledged that ideologies are closely connected to power and that language is regarded as a key medium for expressing the power. Newspaper articles besides being simple pieces of written texts which contain valuable historical information, they also function as an excellent material and platform for interdisciplinary investigation. Thus, mass media do not only provide the audience with information but also contribute to the construction of meanings and the mediation of ideologies. This intense interaction between the media and the audience, the journalist and the reader, has been subject of thorough investigation and interdisciplinary approach. In the last 25 years discourse analysts (Fairclough, van Dijk, Fowler) have focused on the dynamic character of the written language being

²¹³“(…) halte wenig von diplomatischen Dokumenten. Die Regierungen bedienten sich aber für ihre Zwecke auch der Zeitungen. In diese, so betonte Bismarck, sage man »häufig deutlicher« als in den Berichten der Diplomaten, was man im Schilde führe.” Martin Wickler, “Die Rolle der Presse bei der Vorbereitung des deutsch-französischen Krieges 1870/71” [The press' role in preparation for the Franco-German War] in *Presse und Geschichte. Beiträge zur historischen Kommunikationsforschung. Referate einer internationalen Fachkonferenz der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft und der Deutschen Presseforschung/Universität Bremen 5.-8. Oktober 1976 in Bremen*, ed. Elger Blühm (München: Dokumentation, 1977), 1: 172.

“(…) interested in the function or the purpose of a piece of linguistic data and also in how that data is processed, both by the producer and by the receiver.”²¹⁴

After having sketched the most important restraints in the use of the press as a historical document, attention will be now paid to the value of employing historical newspapers for the purposes of a scientific work. First of all, as it was already mentioned above, the historical newspapers provide the historian with valuable material which covers a wide span of political, social and economic issues of the past. Therefore, national but also local newspapers contain large amounts of information which is not available in other “usual” sources such diaries, letters, memoirs etc.

With respect to our case for example, if one decides to shed light on the military developments on the island during the Cretan conflict, both the Greek and Ottoman press should be regarded as a very valuable source. There were dailies such as the Ottoman *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis* for example which reported on the day-to-day military developments on Crete and their contribution to the detailed reconstruction of the conflict on the battlefield is of great importance. However, it would be more useful for the purposes of a historical research, if this amount of press material is examined parallel and within the general historical, political, social and economic setting, due to the fact that even the description of military events was often influenced by the ideologically biased approaches both of the Ottoman and Greek press.

Furthermore, the fact that the relationship between newspapers and public opinion²¹⁵ is not only diachronic but also a mutual one, helps us to unfold prevailing issues in public debate as well as to trace the links between key societal players within a given period of time. In this sense, press’ contribution to the construction of public opinion and accordingly to the spread of the notion of ethnic and civic nationalism, is already underlined by theorists from different disciplines, such as Habermas and Anderson.²¹⁶

The reader’s letters to the newspapers for example should be considered as a useful tool for a press historian in his attempt to assess the newspaper’s tolerance towards different opinions. Furthermore, they would enable him to make evaluations about the

²¹⁴Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 25.

²¹⁵The interactive relationship between printed press and society and the newspapers’ function as key societal actor is merit of the following subchapter “The press, public opinion and politics”.

²¹⁶Secker, “Newspapers and Historical Research,” 39-40.

nature of the readership of a specific newspaper. However, it is acknowledged, that such readers' letters (occurring often on the front page) were usually written by the editor himself and were "baptized" as such, in order to manipulate the formation of the public opinion. Such a method belonged to the usual journalistic practices in order to indirectly reinforce the ideological orientation of the editorial policy.

Moreover, newspaper contents provide an excellent raw material for the examination of ideological currents as well, as the opinions expressed in the newspaper articles usually reflect the ideological stance of the writer, who in turn acts within the limits of the newspaper's editorial policy. In this sense, the reproduction of opinions in the newspapers helps us not only to have a spherical insight into attitudes and ideologies but also to understand the way the newspapers tried to reproduce socio-political contexts and construct accordingly ideological frameworks within a given period of time.

In my opinion, the fact that reality and news coverage may differ from each other should not necessarily be regarded as a negative aspect of the study of the press. On the contrary, the fact that the events were sometimes presented by the newspapers in a selective and even biased way, may lead us to other useful conclusions far from examining a text only as a written piece of information. In this sense, newspaper articles have gained great interest in recent years especially with regards to the discourse analysis of the news. According to van Dijk the discourse analysis poses a multidisciplinary field being actually "a domain of study in the humanities and social sciences that systematically examines the structures and functions of text and talk in their social, political, and cultural contexts."²¹⁷

Therefore, given that the main concern of the present study revolves around ideologies, it becomes obvious that our main occupation with the historical press deals

²¹⁷Teun A. van Dijk, "Power and the News Media," last accessed January 24, 2017, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f918/c60f05a64b0f0b5251e85aac538a8775df15.pdf>. Furthermore, critical discourse analysis (CDA) has become popular in the context of interdisciplinary content analysis of texts such as press articles. "Indeed CDA's marriage of text and context, and its ability to consider history as part and parcel of analysis, provide an excellent methodological basis for archival work (...) that doesn't sacrifice either theory or practice." Jennifer Andrus and Jennifer Clary-Lemon, "Critical Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric and Composition," *College Composition and Communication* 64, no. 1 (2012), 111-112. From this standpoint, press constitutes a highly valuable source for the reconstruction of the past and media communication researchers focus on the quantitative as well as qualitative content analysis in order to draw conclusions.

with the presentation, interpretation and analysis of the argumentation of the article texts.²¹⁸ By digging into the components of a newspaper article such as language, syntax or titles we even become able to discover hidden messages that the producer (writer) intends to transmit to the recipient. Furthermore, due to the fact that we do not possess satisfactory data about the recipient (readers) of the period under examination, the focus can still be laid on the producer of the article or the editor of the newspaper.

Besides paying attention to the important linguistic ingredients of a text such as lexicological selectiveness, the line of argument adopted in the articles dealing with a specific topic gains also a specific place in our approach. The selection of the titles, the usage of specific words/terms and the adoption of a certain argumentative line accordingly, reveal to a great extent “the ways in which reporters and editors thought about their own society and the world around them, how they organized and presented information, filtered out or neglected other potential news reports (...).”²¹⁹ A comparison of different newspapers’ articles on the same topic over a respectable period of time enables us to “classify” some papers according to their editorial policy and eventually to their political affiliation and ideological stance.

In conclusion, according to Hegel “reading the morning paper is the realist’s morning prayer. One orients one’s attitude toward the world either by God, or what the world is.”²²⁰ The decision to make use of the historical press as a primary source leans on the ability of the historian to expand the range of the commonly used primary sources in order to interpret historical events and manifold facets. Thus, the press besides helping us to reconstruct historical facts at a particular time, provides us also with a volume of valuable material which enables us to examine the reproduction or reflection of ideologies within a society as well.

²¹⁸ According to Vella “a critical reading of newspapers can lead to significant insight into how societies or cultures came to understand themselves and the world around them.” Vella, “Newspapers,” 192.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 191.

²²⁰ Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 242.

3.2 The press, public opinion and politics

Inasmuch as the present study focuses on the examination of ideas on the basis of the press' study, it would be of great utility to integrate press' role in the formation of public opinion into our discussion. A question of focal importance should be made here whether the press' reproduction of dominant ideological concepts had any influence on the public²²¹ and public opinion respectively. This will lead us to a further question, namely to what extent did public opinion influence on the decision-making processes²²² both in the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire during the Cretan conflict.

Even nowadays it is difficult to adopt a precise theoretical definition of the elusive term *public opinion*. Considering, however, the specific Greek and Ottoman sociopolitical context of the period under examination and for the purposes of the present study we tend to adopt a more simplified and broadly accepted definition for public opinion which is "the complex of preferences expressed by a significant number of people on an issue of general importance."²²³ By taking refuge within the adoption of a definition of the term in its simplest form, we avoid getting involved in theoretical labyrinthine paths that could further complicate our primary intention, namely to incorporate the concept into our discussion on the press' role in the construction of frameworks through the reproduction of prevailing ideologies.

In our attempt to answer the question whether public opinion was a mere theoretical and abstract reflection of the public sentiment or it actually encompassed specific or broader parts of the population, it should be taken into consideration that the Greek and Ottoman political elites did not constrain their perception of the local public opinion within the boundaries of a literate public but, on the contrary, they broadened it by encapsulating wide segments of the society as well. By leaning on evidence concerning the public's sentiment reaction (demonstrations, funding campaigns, open

²²¹ As for the term *public*, it refers to "a group of people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) who engage in discussion over the issue." Herbert Blumer: "The Mass, the Public, and Public Opinion," in *Reader in Public opinion and communication*, eds. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 46.

²²² "One of the functions of public opinion at this point in the policy-making process is to raise some issues to the attention of decision makers and to establish claims of importance or urgency." James J. Best, *Public Opinion. Micro and Macro* (Illinois: The Darsey Press, 1973), 225.

²²³ Bernard, Hennessy *Essentials of public opinion* (Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1975), 1.

recruitments of volunteers) to the developments in the Cretan conflict, we tend to believe that the Greek and Ottoman public opinions were not merely represented by a restricted number of newspapers' literate readers but they consisted of an active public which was highly prone to participate in the political developments and influence the course of the events. The study of the diplomatic dispatches and the press reports makes clear to us that references to public opinion dealt most of the times with the eventual feelings, fears, and reactions of ordinary people to the elite's initiatives.

An important question which arises when we deal with the press's role in the Greek and Ottoman societies in the late 1860s has to do with the homogeneity of the public opinion in both countries. However, it should be pointed out that the Greek public opinion was far more homogenized than the Ottoman one, as the latter consisted of "smaller" public opinions mainly due to the existence of ethnic-religious minorities.

While, for example, the Athenian people demonstrated publicly their discontent about the arrival of thousands²²⁴ of Cretan refugees in the Greek capital city, at the same time hundreds of citizens of Athens fully backed the nationalist separatist policies of the Greek state by massively taking part in armed volunteer bands or by donating funds for the purchasing of military equipment for the purposes of the Cretan struggle etc.

On the other hand, the ordinary Muslim Ottomans who were sitting in the coffeehouses or discussing in Istanbul's streets might also have expressed their worries about the prolonged crisis on the island as well as the huge costs of the Ottoman military campaign in Crete. The images of fleeing Cretan Muslims and the press reports or rumors about their devastated properties of Muslims might have certainly caused feelings of anger among the Muslims of the Empire and particularly of Istanbul. Therefore, there is no doubt that the portrayal of the situation of the Muslims on the island by the governmental and oppositional Ottoman press mobilized broader segments of Muslim society (and not only) in Istanbul, something that was characteristically displayed in *Muhbir's* fundraising campaign (see Chapter 6.4).

Additionally, as was mentioned above, the lack of homogeneity within the Ottoman public opinion was mainly intensified by and reflected in the existence of "smaller"

²²⁴According to some estimates the number of the Cretan refugees was reckoned to be as high as 50,000.

public opinions mainly due to the multiethnic nature of the Ottoman polity. Despite the prevailing *Greek Ottomanist* notion among religious, political and entrepreneurial circles of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community, it cannot be necessarily argued that the belief in the “united image of the empire”²²⁵ was adopted by broader segments of the ordinary Constantinopolitans as well. The rising ethnocentrism for example which was evident mainly in the educational activities of the Constantinopolitan middle class, might have reflected to some extent the way the broader Constantinopolitan masses perceived ethnic conflicts like the Cretan movement. This assumption may be reinforced by the fact that during the second half of the Ottoman 19th century the existence of “western-style schools, newly emerging professional and social organizations, secret societies, and Western and Ottoman books and periodicals, along with reading rooms and public libraries where they were circulated (...)”²²⁶ gradually contributed to the formation of a sphere “where private people transcending their private preoccupations come together as public and form an interactive body of citizens engaged in rational-critical discourse addressing common purposes.”²²⁷

In this context, both the Greek and the Ottoman press fulfilled in the late 1860s a range of educational, moralist and idealistic functions in their attempt to provide a platform of dialog between them and their readership. Therewith they were on setting the basis for the participation of their readers in questions and issues prevailing in the public debate such as the important political issue of the Cretan Question with its colorful aspects and dimensions (foreign policy, nationalism, humanitarian problems etc.).

Besides referring to the importance of the press’ impact on the formation of public opinion, we should also keep in mind that the period under examination was also marked by the attempt of Greek and Ottoman journalists to construct a professional identity. Nevertheless, the lack of professionalism did not prevent the gradual shift from the authoritarian to the libertarian theory of the press on both shores of the Aegean Sea at the end. This shift along with the gradual erosion of the state monopoly

²²⁵Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 118.

²²⁶Ibid.

²²⁷Sarbeswar Sahoo, “Civil Society, Citizenship and Subaltern Counterpublics in Post-colonial India,” last accessed February 10, 2013, <http://sahoo.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/civil-society-and-subaltern-counterpublics-in-india.pdf>.

in the press landscape led inevitably to what Hampton calls “educational ideal”²²⁸ of the press. According to Hampton the press fulfills a two-fold function: Firstly an educational function, where the press “(...) could “influence, “inform,” or “elevate” readers, bringing them into possession of certain supposedly established truths (...)” and secondly, a representative function, where the newspapers “did not influence readers or public opinion but reflected them. In this rendering, newspapers conveyed the opinions, wants, or needs of readers, crystallizing them into a powerful form that could bring pressure to bear on Parliament.”²²⁹

Furthermore, the affiliation of the Greek newspapers to specific political wings as well as the reaction of the Ottoman political elite against the rising Young Ottoman oppositional press implicitly confirmed the newspaper’s role as a watchdog for monitoring governmental policies. Even if it is not sure, whether the role of the press as watchdog of the political life contributed to the reinforcement of the newspapers’ credibility and effectiveness in the readers’ eyes, there is no doubt that the new press media provided an alternative communication channel between the elites and the people.

It is well asserted that “mass publics generally develop vague and inconsistent images about foreign countries, they are easily influenced by printed materials arguing specific points.”²³⁰ However, it should not be overlooked that responsiveness is dependent on the sociopolitical context as well as on the nature of the issues that are treated. The hypothesis, according to which “the responsiveness will be lower on foreign policy issues than on domestic issues is based on the general propositions that responsiveness increases with salience and with how well informed people are (...)”²³¹ seems not to fit in the Greek sociopolitical framework and reality of the mid- 19th century, where the atmosphere was highly explosive especially due to the impact of the prevailing nationalist notion.

Another reason for the high responsiveness of the Greek public had to do with the sentimentality of the issue of the “unredeemed brethren” living under the Ottoman

²²⁸Mark Hampton, *Visions of the press in Britain, 1850-1950* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 9.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰Melvin Small ed., *Public opinion and historians: Interdisciplinary perspectives* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1970), 24.

²³¹Paul Burstein, “The impact of public opinion on public policy: A review and an Agenda,” *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2003), 31.

rule. Additionally the Greek public seemed to be more active and prone to mobilization for ethnic purposes, a fact that systematically raised concerns to the political elites, as the people acted often in terms of a “mass” than in terms of a well-informed audience.

The press’ function as a formative factor of public opinion and of the political events respectively was accentuated in the Ottoman diplomatic documents which contained references with regard to the impact of *vox populi* on political life. Ali Paşa’s words for example help us to comprehend the press’ impact on ordinary people²³². In his report to the Sultan besides referring to the reasons of the crisis and to his mission in Crete, the Grand Vizier put an emphasis on the Greek press’ propaganda in relation to the events as follows:

“The third reason is the pressure exerted on governments affiliated to the Ottoman Empire by public opinion, as it [the public opinion] has without precedent been misled by the publication and dissemination of lies and accusations set forth by the newspapers (...)”²³³

While researching diplomatic texts, it becomes apparent that the Ottoman public opinion also influenced, even if indirectly, the Porte's decision making policies. Fuad Paşa, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, stressed in his response to M. Outre, the French Chargé d’ Affaires at the Porte, that if an annexation of Crete by Greece was to occur then “(...) public opinion will rightly be agitated due to the Greek people's beliefs (...)”²³⁴ Further diplomatic dispatches between the Ottoman Foreign minister and Fotiadis, the Greek origin Ottoman ambassador in Athens, revealed the Ottoman worries concerning the Greek press’ impact on the agitation of the masses. In a circular note of 22nd August 1866 addressed to the Ottoman ambassadors in London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Florence, Ali Paşa accused the Greek

²³²In his article about coffee-houses in 19th century Istanbul, Kırılı relies upon espionage reports in order to understand Ottoman public opinion and its reactions to the varying sociopolitical challenges of the 1840s. See Cengiz Kırılı, “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire,” in *Public Islam and Common Good*, ed. Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), 75-98.

²³³“Esbâb-i selâsenin üçüncüsü gazeteler vasıtasıyla neşr ve işâa olunmakta olan ekâzib ve müfteriyyât usul-i nâ-şenîdesiyle iğfâl olumuş olan efkâr-i umûmiyye tarafından Devlet-i Aliyenin dostu olan kabinetolar üzerine icrâ olunmakta olan tazyik maddesidir (...)” Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye* [Important political issues], 2nd ed., (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi 1987), 3: 128.

²³⁴“(...) bizim efkâr-i umûmiyyemiz Yunan halkının efkârından haklı olarak heyecana geleceğini (...)” Ibid., 141.

newspapers of disseminating falsehoods as well as of functioning under the aegis of political circles pursuing the notion of *Megali Idea*.²³⁵

It is fact that by laying great weight on the Cretan movement the Greek press aimed not only at informing the public on the developments in Crete but also at politicizing the masses by forming a cohesive public opinion for the better promotion of the notion of *Megali Idea*. Contrary to the Greek newspapers, the editorial policy of the official Ottoman press de-emphasized the importance of the conflict, while the oppositional newspapers took advantage of the crisis in order to exercise criticism against the Porte's conduct in different issues ranging from European interventionism to fiscal policies. In particular the Young Ottomans managed through their journalistic activities "to challenge authority implicitly by showing political power as something that was contested by competing authorities (...) and spreading political information."²³⁶

Interestingly, the portrayal of the Cretan events by the European press not only attracted the attention of the Greek and Ottoman newspapers but was also of great importance for the political elites in Athens and Istanbul, mainly due to the fact that the politicized European public opinion was considered to be able to take influence on the decision-making of the European governments.²³⁷ In this context, the Greek (and to a lesser extent the Ottoman) newspapers tried to present the European press' coverage of the Cretan issue to their audiences mainly through translated articles from German, English and French papers.

Unfortunately, besides some dotted references in secondary sources, we do not have any exact data concerning the distribution and the circulation of the Greek and Ottoman newspapers, which would enable us to assess the readership in both countries and to get an impression of their impact on the public in a more practical and

²³⁵Ypsēlē Pylē-Ypourgeio tōn Eksōterikōn. *Diplōmatika Eggrafa meta tēs peri Krētēs Ektheseōs tēs A. Y. Tou Megalou Bezyrou pros tēn A. M. Ton Souttanon* [Sublime Porte-Foreign Ministry: Diplomatic Documents Including His Highness Grand Vizier's report on Crete addressed to His Excellence Sultan] (En Kōnstantinoupolei: Ek tou Typografeiou tēs "Byzantidos", 1868), 4-6.

²³⁶Hannah Barker and Simon Burrows, introduction to *Press, Politics and the Public Sphere in Europe and North America, 1760-1820*, eds. Hannah Berker and Simon Burrows (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 17.

²³⁷The importance of the European public opinion is accentuated in an article of *Avgē* dated 23rd June 1867, wherein it was stated that the Greek embassies in the European cities did not manage to influence the foreign public opinion in favor of the Cretan struggle, as there were some incidents which damaged the Cretan cause abroad. "Oi ēthikoi symmachoi" [The moral allies], *Avgē*, no. 1956, June 23, 1867.

countable way. Besides the lack of circulation numbers there are no reliable statistics or data with regards to literacy²³⁸ in both countries either. On a local level however, Stavrakēs informs us that close to 82% of the Christian and 81% of the Muslim element of Ottoman Crete in 1881 was illiterate.²³⁹

It may be assumed, however, that a large number of people had access to the contents of the newspapers or at least to the news, as these were mostly read in public places such as coffee-houses²⁴⁰ and other places of sociability. Kırılı underlines the meaning of the coffee-houses by assuming that the Ottoman public “(...) had a dense oral communication network running through rumor and gossip, and the coffeehouse was at its center.”²⁴¹ The coffee-houses had already reflected in the 1840s the emergence of a dynamic public opinion which discussed different issues ranging from internal conflicts like the Ottoman-Egyptian rivalry²⁴² to foreign news of lesser importance like the Portuguese King’s visit to France. It could be assumed that both the increasing demand for information and the polarization of the public debate (under the impact of the Greek expansionism) might have led to the formation of a dynamic public opinion, which accordingly was able to put pressure on the government with regard to its policy conduct in the Cretan issue.

²³⁸Karpat refers to the literacy of the Ottomans by assuming that “although the Tanzimat intensified educational activities, the literacy rate at the end of the Ottoman state still was below 10%.” Mehmet Alkan, “Modernization From Empire to Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism,” in *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill 2000), 49.

²³⁹Stavrakēs, *Statistikē*, 200.

²⁴⁰Regarding the role of coffee-houses in late 19th century Greece, Curtis states that “coffee-houses have taken the place of the ancient forums, and one of the largest in Athens is called “Public Opinion Coffee-house.” William Eleroy Curtis, *The Turk and his lost province: Greece, Bulgaria Serbia Bosnia*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, London: F. H. Revell Company, 1903), 339. Taking into consideration that press historians estimate readership numbers in 18th to early 19th century Western Europe based on the approximation of a dozen or slightly more readers per newspaper, one can assume that newspapers in Greece and in the Ottoman Empire were read by a remarkable number of the population as coffee-house culture was a well-integrated part of daily life in Southeastern Europe. Finally, Lane-Poole, a British orientalist and archaeologist speaks of the access the Greek general public had to information and knowledge arguing that Greek peasants “display a great interest in passing events, as well as in politics, a knowledge of which they obtain by means of the numerous Greek newspapers they receive from Athens, Constantinople, and all the large towns of turkey. These journals find their way to the remotest hamlets, one or two being sufficient to make the round of a village.” Stanley Lane -Poole, ed., *The people of Turkey: Twenty years’ residence among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Turks, and Armenians* (London: John Murray, 1878), 1: 38.

²⁴¹Kırılı, “Coffeehouses,” 76.

²⁴²In particular to the quarrel between Mehmet Ali and the Porte, Kırılı paints a colorful picture of the emotions and reactions of ordinary Ottoman citizens to daily developments: “The pessimism and anxiety haunting the streets of Istanbul in early 1840 was transformed into an air of optimism toward the end of the year (...)” Ibid., 87. One can, therefore, easily guess what the reactions of the Ottoman subjects were to the Ottoman political elite’s ineffectiveness to resolve the Cretan Crisis quickly, as it had resulted in a massive increase of the state debt and many casualties.

Another useful source which could lead us to fruitful conclusions with regard to the reaction of the everyday people towards important ethnic issues like the Cretan conflict, are the discussions in public spaces recorded in spy-reports. Even if it is well-documented that the Ottoman political elites used spies²⁴³ in order to monitor the minorities living in the Empire in the 1840s, it is not sure whether such practices were applied in the late 1860s as well. Decrypting spontaneous discussions and the reactions of ordinary Greek subjects in the coffee-houses of Istanbul districts would provide us, for example, with further interesting evidence of the *Greek Ottomanism's* impact on the broader segments of the Greek Orthodox element in Constantinople or elsewhere in the Ottoman realm. Namık Kemal's criticism, however, of the "impertinence of the local Greeks in singing songs in their cafés that had as leitmotiv the extermination of the Turks"²⁴⁴ depicts somehow the dominating atmosphere in the lower segments of the Constantinopolitan society during the Cretan conflict. Further evidence of the prevailing situation in other cities of the Ottoman Empire is provided in article of the *Times* that was republished by the Constantinopolitan *Neologos* on 12th June 1867. According to the article, Sandison, the British consul in Bursa, reported about the increasing hatred between Christians and Muslims and the preparations of the latter for a struggle against the Christians.²⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the Greek racist songs that bothered Namık Kemal should be better regarded as a spontaneous, localized and impulsive reaction of some Greeks. It would be arbitrary to attach Kemal's words to the behavior of the whole Greek Orthodox community during the Cretan crisis, as I believe that there must have certainly been Ottoman Greeks as well, who shared Yanko's assumption made in 1842:

“nowadays the Greek [Rum] millet has so much freedom....
Everybody supports the Sultan. If this had been the case before, the
people of Morea [Greece] wouldn't have fought the war and perished

²⁴³“Throughout the reports, one finds records of conversations translated into Turkish from Arabic, Persian, Greek, Bulgarian, Russian, English, French, German and Rumanian.”Ibid., 89.

²⁴⁴Mardin, *The Genesis*, 27; “Eyâlat” [Provinces], *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, no. 425, Cemâzi-yel-evvel 22, 1283/October 2, 1866.

²⁴⁵“Ē katastasis tōn en Tourkia Christianōn” [The situation of the Christians in Turkey], *Neologos*, no. 258, June 12, 1867.

like that. They would continue to be the subjects of the [Ottoman] state.”²⁴⁶

Yanko’s assertion emphatically demonstrates the existence of different smaller public opinions within the multi-ethnic Ottoman mosaic whose importance should not be ignored.

As far as the Ottoman press is concerned, we have to notice here that the Ottoman (semi-) official newspapers functioned as intermediaries between the government and the citizens until the 1860s while the free opinion newspapers which emerged during the 1860s tried to fulfill a gap in the Ottoman society by reinforcing the representative role of the press. That meant that the rise of the oppositional Ottoman press formed an unofficial channel between intellectuals and the subjects of the Sultan. Further, the bureaucratic background of the Young Ottoman journalists enabled them to provide the Ottoman readership the opportunity to construct another worldview other than that which was the outcome of manipulated knowledge and information. Accordingly, the erosion of the state’s monopoly in the press landscape as result of the emergence of the oppositional Young Ottoman press, gave rise to concern among the Ottoman statesmen. Such concerns were apparent in the reaction of the political elites like in the case of Ali Paşa who attempted to “to intervene in a reconciliatory way offering to buy 2,000 copies of *Hürriyet*, if the Young Ottomans were willing to change its content.”²⁴⁷

Finally, I believe that the Ottoman private press aimed not only at the transmission of knowledge to the Ottoman citizens by educating them in different ways but also at building a framework for dialog with the public enabling it to meet rational choices with regards to the fortune of the *vatan*. This also explains the special relation between the Young Ottoman press and its audience which was often mirrored in the personalization of the contents on the part of the Young Ottomans. With respect to this, Henessy argues that “(...) the media make many efforts to “personalize” their content, using colloquialisms, first-person address, and ego associations with fictional

²⁴⁶ Kırılı, “Coffeehouses,” 94.

²⁴⁷ Christiane Czygan, “From London back to Istanbul: The Channel of Communication of the Young Ottoman Journal *Hürriyet* (1868-1870),” in *History of printing and publishing in the languages and countries of the Middle East* , ed. Philip Sadgrove (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 66.

characters, who are, indeed, typical in their thought processes, but unusual in their dialogue, since they appear clever beyond all commonness.”²⁴⁸

²⁴⁸Henessy, *Essentials*, 142.

4 Notes on the Greek and Ottoman press

The main objective of the present chapter is to provide the reader an overview of the newspapers that were examined for the purposes of the present work. Furthermore, special attention will be paid to the ideological character and the editorial policies of the Greek and Ottoman newspapers which will enable the reader to comprehend the stance and the role of the selected newspapers in a context of competing ideologies. The selection of the newspapers that are going to be presented follows some specific criteria dealing primarily with the intensity of a newspaper's interest in the Cretan Question and as well as with its ideological and political weight as a medium.

4.1 “Bad news” not allowed: The chains of censorship

Before embarking on the presentation of the newspapers special attention should be paid to the freedom of press in both countries during the period under investigation. Until shortly before the outbreak of the Cretan conflict Greek journalistic activities and initiatives had to cope with press restriction or censorship, particularly in the late years of King Otto's reign, when several newspapers were closed down and journalists were imprisoned. A relative freedom of press, however, had been gradually established in the aftermath of King Otto's expulsion from Greece in 1862 and especially after the adoption of the constitution of 1864 (article 14)²⁴⁹.

Nonetheless, the contemporary Athenian press referred quite often to symptoms of censorship as well as to press restrictions during the Cretan crisis. The Athenian newspaper *Paliggenesia* informs us that the editor of *Ethnegersia* was put in jail due to the publication of an article entitled “The government of Voulgarēs and Crete”. Similarly, the editor of *Nea Genia* was also imprisoned, as he was accused of defamation and ridicule of Voulgarēs' government and of King George as well.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹Kōstas Mager, *Istoria tou Ellēnikou Typou* [History of the Greek Press] (Athēna: Dēmopoulos, 1957), 1: 60.

²⁵⁰„Ai fylakiseis dēmosiografōn” [Imprisonments of journalists], *Paliggenesia*, no. 1440, June 10, 1868.

In sum, most Athenian newspapers besides being vital components of the local political life acted as party mouthpieces as their editorial policy was defined by a strong partisanship. Furthermore, it may be argued, that the Greek press landscape in the 1860s resembled that described by Curtis in the beginnings of the 20th century:

“Athens has more than her share of newspapers, dailies, weeklies and those of occasional publication, which are not intended for news purposes, but to express the opinions of the different owners or editors upon public affairs. Even these are not sufficient, however, and the politicians and the editors visit the cafes every evening, and often in the afternoon, in order to proclaim their views to whomsoever it may concern.”²⁵¹

In contrast to the condition of the press in Greece, where the newspapers were to some extent free of restriction, the advent of private oppositional press in the Ottoman realm inevitably led to the culmination of press restrictions in the Empire. Despite the fact that “the flowering of the Turkish press was aided both by a scarcely developed system of government sanctions and little government interference”²⁵² the imposition of strict press restrictions should be interpreted in the context of the emergence of an activist journalism in the 1860s, which was not met with sympathy by the governmental circles.²⁵³ Any critical editorial voice against the governmental policies was prohibited and led to severe consequences for the newspaper and its function.

In addition, it must be said that the policies of the Ottoman statesmen concerning the press developed in parallel to the evolution of the press in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the state’s interventionism in the press’ landscape through the enactment of press censorship laws becomes more apparent in the middle decades of the 19th century when the number of privately owned newspapers and periodicals increased rapidly.

The regime of censorship had an immense impact not only on the Ottoman private journalistic initiatives but also on the newspapers edited by members of the minorities living in the Ottoman Empire. During the study of the press material one comes across numerous cases of banning or suspending the publication of a newspaper. This

²⁵¹ Curtis, *The Turk and his Lost Provinces*, 339.

²⁵² Czygan, “From London back to Istanbul,” 59.

²⁵³ Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 187.

being the case, the efforts of the state to impose its control on press reached its peak through the publication of *Ḳararnâme-i Âli* on 29 March 1867 [20 Zi-l-ka'de 1283] which “(...) contained an institutional shift from the Meclis-i Ma'arif towards direct governmental control.”²⁵⁴

In the short interval between the first Publication Act [Matbuat Nizamnâmesi] and the appointment of Ali Paşa as Grand Vizier (1867), six new oppositional newspapers were published. Thus, on 9 March 1867 [3 Zi-l-ka'de 1283] the Ottoman government decided to suspend the edition of *Muhbir* on the grounds that the newspaper was dispersing falsehoods and inaccuracies in opposition to the government.²⁵⁵ Similarly, Namık Kemal's editorial effort was also suspended due to an article of his titled “Şark Mes'elesine dair bir layihadir” which was published in the *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* on 10 March 1867 [4 Zi-l-ka'de 1283].²⁵⁶

Minorities living in the Ottoman Empire were faced with press restrictions too. The Greek press in Istanbul was under continuous pressure as the issues it had to handle touched upon the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. On 14 January 1867, the Constantinopolitan newspaper *Armonia* republished an article from the newspaper *Efēmerida tēs Anatolēs* which implicitly criticized the state's control on the press' function. The paper suggested that the granting of licenses to publish should not be dependent on the decision of the Valis but rather on the decision of the central authorities in Istanbul. Furthermore, the Greek newspaper urged the introduction of a new more liberal Press law.²⁵⁷ Few weeks later, on 3 March 1867, *Armonia* commented that the presence of some rebels on the mountains of Crete, Epirus and Thessaly could not justify the Porte's measures against the press and that the press restrictions were completely unnecessary.²⁵⁸

In context of the newspapers' reaction against the press restrictions imposed by the Ottoman government, I would like to refer to the case of the Athenian *Aiōn*, which supported Mac-Coen, the editor of the English speaking *Levand Herald* and a fervent supporter of the Greek interests in the region, when he was brought to the court by the

²⁵⁴Czygan, “From London back to Istanbul,” 60.

²⁵⁵Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat Idareleri ve Politikaları* [The Press Administrations and Policies in Turkey] (Ankara: Başvekâlet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yayını, 1943), 23.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 24.

²⁵⁷“To Anatoliko Zētēma” [The Eastern Question], *Armonia*, no 427, January 14, 1867.

²⁵⁸“Ἐ episēmos peri typou koinopiēsīs” [Official notification pertaining to the Press] *Armonia*, no. 466, March 3, 1867.

accusation of spreading falsehoods with the regard to the situation on Crete.²⁵⁹ *Aiōn* wondered why newspapers like *Courier d'Orient*, *Turquie* and *Cerîde-i Havâdis* did not face the same treatment by the government, when they falsely announced the settlement of the Cretan crisis and the restoration of the peace, something that did not correspond to the reality at all.²⁶⁰

On 30 March 1867, few days after its comments on the press measures, the Constantinopolitan *Armonia* was suspended for three months, due to the fact that it violated Ottoman Press Law. After having reassumed its edition on 1 July 1867, *Armonia* went on by implicitly criticizing the governments' arbitrary conduct with regard to its suspension. Furthermore, the newspaper stressed the fact that in cases of internal disturbances the readership's need for more information as well as a wider newsroom could not be restricted by only publishing governmental announcements.²⁶¹

4.2 The Greek press: Multivocality and partisanship

As it will be shown in the following chapters, the Greek press on both shores of the Aegean Sea reflected and reproduced the different ideological streams which existed within Hellenism in the period under discussion. It may be argued that the entirety of the Greek speaking newspapers which are examined for the purposes of the present study served the national cause, though from different starting points. In particular, the editorial policies of the Athenian newspapers were defined by the emphasis on the need for the implementation of *Megali Idea*, irrespective of their different political inclinations. However, the polyphony in the Athenian press landscape often suffered from the phenomenon of partisanship in the newspapers' editorial policies, as the majority of newspapers were bound to the interests of the contemporary political fractions. *Elpis* for example quite often accused *Aiōn* of being on the side of the Anglophile Voulgarēs. In this sense, Kōnstantinos Levidēs, *Elpis*' editor, argued in an article published on 19 September 1867 that the Athenian *Merimna* was edited under

²⁵⁹“Ἐ Δικῆ του Ανατολικου Κῆρυκος” [The process of the Eastern Herald], *Aiōn*, no. 2182, November 10, 1866.

²⁶⁰Ibid.

²⁶¹“Ἐ διακοπῆ” [The close down], *Armonia*, no. 489, July 1, 1867.

the direction of Voulgarēs' son-in-law who was at the same time one of the newspaper's columnists.²⁶² Such accusations were not only taking place between Greek speaking newspapers but also between Ottoman and Greek newspapers demonstrating thereby the dynamic dialectic relationship between the opinion makers of the two states.

The background of the Athenian newspapers' editors had also played a major role in the promotion of *Megaloidatism*. This may be due to the fact that their majority had taken an active part in the Greek War of Independence, while some others were born and educated in Constantinople experiencing thus the formation, the visions and aspirations of the newly founded Greek Kingdom from the outside. Thus, their social background decisively contributed to the formation of their subconscious and accordingly the way they perceived every nation-building effort of Hellenism. In this context, the defense of national issues belonged along with the "protection of the constitutional order, the education of the public with regard to human rights and support of the institutions, political attitudes and democratic order"²⁶³ to the primary tasks of the press in the period under discussion.

4.2.1 *Elpis* [Hope]

Elpis was one of the historical Athenian newspapers and was founded by the Constantinopolitan Greek Kōnstantinos Levidēs²⁶⁴ on 7 October 1836. The newspaper was edited both in Greek and German until 17 November 1836 while it was published in both Greek and French language between 1 January 1859 and 16 June 1859. On 26 September 1843, few years after the end of the Greek War of Independence, the publication of *Elpis* was reassumed, this time under the title "Newspaper of the principles of September the 3rd."

²⁶²“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1423, September 19, 1867.

²⁶³Aikaterinē Koumarianou, "Istorikē diadromē tou Ellēnikou Typou, 1780-1922" [History of the Greek Press, 1780-1922], in *O ellēnikos Typos 1784 ōs sēmera. Istorikes kai Theōrētikes Proseggiseis. Praktika Diethnous Synedriou Athēna, 23-25 Maiou 2002* [The Greek Press 1784 until today. Historical and Theoretical Approaches. Proceedings of International Conference, Athens 23-25 Mai 2002], ed. Loukia Droulia (Athēna: Institutouto Neoellēnikōn Erevnōn/Ethniko Idryma Erevnōn, 2005), 60.

²⁶⁴Levidēs was born in Istanbul in 1790 and studied Political Science in Vienna. He was also a member of the secret society *Filikē Etaireia* [Society of Friends] and an active participant in the battle of Dragatsani during the Greek War of Independence. His anti-Ottoman stance got him arrested in 1837 and his newspaper closed down from the 17th of November 1837 to the 26th of September 1843. See Mager, *Istoria*, 1: 63.

During the Cretan crisis the paper was published under the editorship of Kōnstantinos Levidēs' brother, Dēmētrios Levidēs²⁶⁵ who was also born in Istanbul where he also completed his studies. The death of Levidēs on 4 October 1868 marked also the end of the newspaper lifetime.²⁶⁶

Besides tending to support the government of the Russophile Koumoundouros *Elpis* was highly critical of the Western russophobia and repeatedly referred to France as the nation which inspired the right for self-determination in the 19th century. Interestingly, *Elpis*' editorial policy identified the fate of *Megali Idea* with that of the Eastern Question by aiming, on the one hand, at the internationalization of the Greek national inspirations, and on the other hand, at the specifications of the territorial aspirations of the Greek state, whose historical task included the unification of all Greek populations living outside its borders.

4.2.2 *Aiōn* [Century]

Aiōn was one of the most historic, long-lasting and traditional russophile Athenian newspapers being edited by the Constantinopolitan Greek Iōannēs Filēmōn²⁶⁷. The newspaper's first issue occurred on 25 September 1838. Due to the newspaper's sharp criticism of the French and British policies in the Crimean War, Iōannēs Filēmōn was imprisoned and the newspaper's edition was suspended for the years between 1854 and 1857. In the aftermath of the Crimean War *Aiōn*'s editorship was passed to his son, Timoleōn Filēmōn. Under his editorship, *Aiōn* was published twice a week until 1876 when its editing was ceased again for the succeeding four years. On 24 June 1880, the paper reassumed its edition until 31 May 1888, when it was published for the last time.

The newspaper paid intensive attention to the developments of the Cretan conflict while it fervently defended the principle of nationalities. Even if *Aiōn* criticized the Russian policies in the context of *Panslavism* in the early 1860s, it may be argued that the paper kept a Russophile stance during the Cretan insurrection. However, despite

²⁶⁵ Levidēs's uncle was arrested during the Greek War of Independence as a member of the secret society Filikē Etaireia.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 62-68.

²⁶⁷ He was born in Istanbul in 1798 and took part in the Greek War of Independence. He also served as secretary of King George I as well as mayor of Athens from 1887 to 1891. Ibid., 71-72.

its Russophile tones, *Aiōn*'s tried to keep a moderate and independent editorial stance in the Cretan issue by avoiding the use of a polarized language.

4.2.3 *Avgē* [Dawn]

Avgē occurred under the editorship of Filippou Louēs between 1st May 1857 and 10th October 1857 and again between 6th March 1864 and 31st December 1876 appearing four days a week.²⁶⁸ The newspaper kept a close eye on the Cretan conflict by publishing reports on the development almost on daily basis. Except for being one of the most powerful megaphones of *Megali Idea*, *Avgē* favored France's role in the Cretan Question while it was suspicious of Russia's policy in the Balkans. It should be noted here that *Avgē* did not favor the solution of autonomy in the Cretan crisis but, on the contrary, it systematically supported the creation of a Balkan alliance against the Porte by simultaneously promoting the civilizing mission of Hellenism in the East. In general, the study of *Avgē*'s articles reveals that the newspaper's editorial stance with regards to the coverage of the Cretan issue was not stable but rather dependent on the political developments.²⁶⁹

4.2.4 *Ethnofylaks* [Nation's Guard]

The Athenian daily newspaper *Ethnofylaks* was published between 1862 and 1882 under the editorship of Chrēstos Doukas.²⁷⁰ In the context of the Cretan issue the paper mainly targeted Britain and France, even though it stood mostly on the side of the anglophile Voulgarēs. *Ethnofylaks* criticized the political choices Koumountouros which were believed to be harmful to the national cause. Similar to *Avgē*, *Ethnofylaks* rejected any other solution in the Cretan issue except for Crete's Union with the

²⁶⁸Ibid., 80.

²⁶⁹See "Ἐ Ἑλλάς καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ τοῦ Ναπολεόντος" [Greece and the politics of Napoleon], *Avgē*, no. 1866, March 3, 1867 and "Ἐ Ῥωσσία καὶ ἡ Κρήτη" [Russia and Crete], *Avgē*, no. 2079, December 22, 1867.

²⁷⁰Ellē Droulia-Métrakou, "Ethnofylaks," in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974. Efēmerides, Periodika, Dēmosiografōi, Ekdotes* [Encyclopedia of the Greek Press 1784-1974. Newspapers, Magazines, Journalists, Publishers], eds. Loukia Droulia and Gioula Koutsopanagou (Athēna: Institutouto Neoellēnikōn Erevnōn, 2008), 2: 63.

motherland.²⁷¹ This stance of the newspaper justified also its attacks against the French government, which was accused of favoring the solution of an autonomous status for the island under the Ottoman suzerainty. Moreover, *Ethnofylaks* urged for a Balkan alliance among the Christian ethnicities against the Ottoman rule without omitting, however, to criticize *Panslavism*. With regard to *Megali Idea* the paper regarded the civilizing character of Greek nationalism in the East as its most important component, thereby redefining the role of the Greek Kingdom in the East.²⁷²

4.2.5 The Cretan press

As regards the local press on the island the period between 1830 and 1870 was marked by a reduced editorial activity with respect to the publication of newspapers, as only four papers (two state- funded and two revolutionary papers) were published in that period of time. In particular, during the Cretan movement two papers were published on Crete: The Greek language newspaper *Krētē. Eleftheria ē Thanatos* [Crete. Freedom or Death] under the editorship of Charalabos Pappadakēs appeared on the island between 27 November 1866 and 10 June 1867 and the Ottoman paper *Girit* which was published until the declaration of the island's autonomy.²⁷³

²⁷¹ *Ethnofylaks*' editorial stance was in favor of the accession of the island to Greece as the only solution to the crisis, which consequently meant the rejection of any scenario involving autonomy. See “Ἐγemonia” [The Hegemony], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1312, August 28, 1867.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Giannēs Papiomytoglou, “O typos stēn Krētē” [The press in Crete], in *O Ellēnikos Typos 1784 ὁs Sēmera*.331; Shortly after the Cretan revolt came to an end, a newspaper appeared in Athens on the 3rd of March 1869, titled *Krētē*[Crete] and was published by Kōnstantinos Ksanthos. The main intent of its editorial policy was to be supportive of the Cretan struggle and to, at the same time, provide the Athenian readership with information on the developments in Crete. In addition to this, the editor criticised Voulgarēs' policies based on the fact that the Greek politician had failed to prepare the Greek Kingdom so as to be able to back Crete up on the battlefield. On the other hand, *Krētē* favorably disposed towards the Russophile Koumoundouros and to Russia herself, described as a good protector of Hellenism's interests. See “Ἐ ἀγαθῆ προστατῆς” [The good protector], *Krētē*, no. 2, March 13, 1869. For further information about the newspaper see Eleftherios Kariatoglou, “Krētē,” in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974*, 2: 630-631; Mager, *Istoria*, 1: 117-118.

4.3 The Greek Ottoman press

Despite the press restrictions, the promulgation of *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* gave a severe impulse to the development of the Greek Ottoman press throughout the second half of the 19th century.²⁷⁴ The editorial activity of the Greek community was marked throughout the 19th century until 1908 by the publication of numerous newspapers and magazines (especially in Istanbul) while at the same time the Greek Patriarchate edited its own newspapers.²⁷⁵

According to Laidi Marks „the Orthodox Christians published 36 [newspapers] (...), all of them being private, except the bilingual Cretan Newspaper which was edited in Crete by Mohammed Ali and the Othomaniko Minitora, which was the Greek counterpart of the official Ottoman paper Takvim-i Vekai.“²⁷⁶ Constantinople should not be regarded as the only place where Greek Ottoman editorial activities took place. Newspapers and magazines were edited in other urban centers of the Ottoman realm as well, which were marked by the intense presence of the Greek ethnic element, like Smyrna and Salonica.

4.3.1 *Neologos* [Messenger]

Neologos, which was published between 1867 and 1897, was one of the most influential newspapers of the Greek Ottoman community. Under the editorship of Stavros Voutyras, an advocator of *Megali Idea*, the Constantinopolitan newspaper promoted the ethnocentric activities of the *Greek Philological Syllogos of Constantinople* but also strongly advocated the reformative efforts of the Ottoman

²⁷⁴Antōnopoulos, *Oi Ellēnes*, 27.

²⁷⁵The longest-standing newspaper of the Patriarchate was the *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* [Ecclesiastical Truth]. During the period being examined here there were also a number of short-lived Greek Ottoman journalistic initiatives, such as the karamanli *Zebur* published by Anestēs Eftychiadēs, the newspaper *Eptalofos* (Seven Hills) released in 1866, as well as the satirical paper *Diogenis* published by Theodōros Kasapēs in 1869. The latter was also put in print in both Turkish and French with the names *Dijoyen* and *La Diogene* respectively. In the same year, yet another newspaper was published called *Theatēs* (Observer), this one under the leadership of French teacher Nikolaos Destounianēs. See *ibid.*, 32-33. According to Antōnopoulos, 35 different magazines appeared in Istanbul starting from 1840 until the end of the 19th century. Four of those publications were of the period being studied here: *Nea Eptalofos* (New Seven Hilled (City) (1865-1870); *Mouseion* (Museum) (1868-1873); *Pelekis* (Axe) (1868) and *Filologikon Deltion* (Philological Note) (1869-1871). *Ibid.* 37-9.

²⁷⁶Marina Laidi Marks, „Oi Ellēnikes Efēmerides tēs Othōmanikēs Aftokratorias, 1830-1862” [The Greek Newspapers of the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1862], in *O Ellēnikos Typos 1784 ōs Sēmera*, 442.

Government as well as the westernization process of the Ottoman Empire in general.²⁷⁷ The Constantinopolitan newspaper favored the peaceful coexistence of the different ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire, though in a decentralized state and on a constitutional basis, where the Greek ethnic element would have a leading position among the other nationalities. Finally, with regards to the role of the foreign Powers and their interventionism in the Ottoman affairs *Neologos* kept a neutral stance in general. However, the paper was more critical of Russia's policies, as the tsarist regime was broadly conceived as the instigator of turbulences in Southeast Europe.

4.3.2 *Armonia* [Harmony]

Armonia, appeared in the Ottoman Empire between 1864 and 1868 and was edited by Michael Chourmouzēs²⁷⁸. Most of its editorial policy revolved around the criticism of the clergy while it functioned as a means of pressure against the Patriarch Sofronios III.²⁷⁹ In particular, Sofronios's stance on the issue of the *National Regulations* (an attempt of the Ottoman state to integrate the Great Church into the Ottoman state machinery) was perceived as a threat for the interests of the Greek Orthodox lay element, which was actually opposing the participation of the Ottoman State in the ecclesiastical tax collections.²⁸⁰

Armonia's interest in the Cretan issue was mainly expressed through the publication of diplomatic dispatches related to the issue. European accusations of Greek russophilia were strictly rejected by the paper while it kept a rather suspicious editorial stance towards the Russian empire's aims in the Balkan. In general terms, however, *Armonia* did not favor any ethnic separatist movements by

²⁷⁷See Charis Exertzoglou, "Neologos," in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974*, 3: 300-302.

²⁷⁸Michael Chourmouzēs, a Greek intellectual who had taken part in the Greek War of Independence. He was born in Constantinople and spent good period of his life, 1830 – 1860, writing theatrical pieces (comedies). In 1851 he was elected into the Greek parliament. A few years later, in 1856, he returned to Constantinople in order to become the editor of *Armonia*. He also worked for *Neologos*.

See Dēmētrios Spathēs "Chourmouzēs (1804-1882)" [Chourmouzēs (1804-1882)], in *Satira kai Politikē stēn Neōterē Ellada. Apo ton Solōmo ōs ton Seferē* [Satire and Politics in Modern Greece. From Solomos to Seferis], ed. Dimitris Stamelos (Athēna: Etaireia Spoudōn Neoellēnikou Politismou & Genikēs Paideias, 1991). 71-97.

²⁷⁹The Ecumenical Patriarch Sofronios was a fervent advocator of the implementation of the *National Regulations* [Ethnikoi Kanonismoi] which dealt with the structural reformation of the millet. Dimitris Stamatopoulos, "Armonia," in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974*, 1: 285-286.

²⁸⁰Ibid.

constantly pursuing the peaceful coexistence of the ethnic-religious groups living in the Ottoman Empire.

4.3.3 *Kōnstantinoupolis* [Constantinople]

Kōnstantinoupolis was launched in 1867 by Dēmētrios Nikolaidēs and later on the editorship of the paper passed to Athanasios Nikolaidēs until 1914. In an announcement²⁸¹ of the paper on 16 June 1869 it was stated that the magazine *Eptalofos* [The Seven Hilled (City)] was being rebranded into *Kōnstantinoupolis* by bearing also the eye-catching subtitle “Newspaper of the people of the East”. Unfortunately not all the issues of *Eptalofos* are available in the Library of the Greek Parliament, where one can find only the editions from mid- 1869 onwards, which do not contain any relative information with regard to our subject.

Similarly to *Neologos*, *Kōnstantinoupolis* advocated the peaceful symbiosis of the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire in the name of the common interest for the *Vaterland*. Furthermore, besides attacking the Russian expansionism, *Kōnstantinoupolis* did not omit to refer to the special mission of Hellenism in the East. Specifically, with regards to the Greek ethnic element, it was argued by the paper that the Greek community should not be merely regarded as a separate ethnicity but rather as an “ideal principle”²⁸² which contained an ecumenical civilizing content.

4.4 The Ottoman oppositional press

The period from 1860s onwards was an exciting one not only for the late Ottoman political history but also for the Ottoman press landscape too, as tectonic developments had taken place in both fields of Ottoman life. With regards to the evolution of the press in the Ottoman Empire it should be noted here that only four newspapers appeared in the first 30 years of the Ottoman press’ history, while in the

²⁸¹“Ἐ Apostolē tou Typou en Anatolē” [The Press’ Mission in the East], *Kōnstantinoupolis*, no. 580, June 16, 1869.

²⁸²“Οἱ Λαοὶ τῆς Ανατολῆς ὑπο Ἱστορικῆν, Ἐθνογραφικῆν καὶ Πολιτικῆν Ἐποψίν” [The People of the East from a Historical, Ethnographic and Political viewpoint], *Kōnstantinoupolis*, no. 582, June 18, 1869.

following years and especially during the period between 1867 and 1878 113 new publications were registered.²⁸³

Even if the official *Takvîm-i Vakayi'* was the only available newspaper in the Ottoman Empire until 1840, the emergence of an Ottoman intelligentsia was accompanied by the advent of a proto-journalism in the Empire. Regarding the functionality of early Ottoman press it is evident that during the first half of the 19th century the role of the first Ottoman newspapers was “to keep administrative employees of the state up to date with information, news and instructions. Not only were these newspapers instruments of the modernization process but also a medium for its legitimization.”²⁸⁴ According to Herzog the relationship between the state and the press within the Ottoman context can be divided into three phases: The first two periods, 1830-1840 and 1840-1860 respectively, were primarily marked by the presence of an official press financed or at least backed by the state, though without playing any major role as opinion maker in Ottoman society.²⁸⁵

However, the 1860s constituted a turning point in the history of Ottoman journalism, as it was marked by the emergence of a professional,²⁸⁶ innovatory and to a great extent independent journalism which was based on private initiatives. Besides this, the Ottoman press's contribution to the emergence of public opinion is clearly highlighted by Herzog who argues this period was marked by a “transition from a representative to a civil public opinion of the partial Muslim bureaucratic bourgeoisie.”²⁸⁷ In sum it may be argued that the newspapers edited from the 1860s onwards played a crucial political as well as social role in the 19th Ottoman century

²⁸³ Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın* [The Press in Turkey from the Ottoman times until nowadays], 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 34. A brief overview of official and private Ottoman newspapers of the period is presented in the Greek Ottoman newspaper *Kōnstantinoupolis*. See “O Othōmanikos Typos” [The Ottoman Press], *Kōnstantinoupolis*, no. 583, June 19, 1869.

²⁸⁴ “das Personal des Staatsapparates mit Daten, Nachrichten und Anweisungen zu benachrichtigen, die im Rahmen des Modernisierungsprozesses nicht nur Instrumente und Organe dieses Prozesses dienten sondern auch als Sprachrohr dessen Legitimation.” Christoph Herzog, „Die Entwicklung des Türkisch-Muslimischen Presse im Osmanischen Reich bis ca. 1875“ [The development of the Turkish-Islamic press in the Ottoman Empire approximately until 1875], in *Aneignung und Selbstbehauptung. Antworten auf die Europäische Expansion*, ed. Dietmar Rothermund (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1999), 22f.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁸⁶ According to Çiçek this professionalism of the Young Ottoman intelligentsia was based on the fact that “through their education and other contacts with the Western world they were introduced to a new cultural habitus (...).” Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 30.

²⁸⁷ “Übergang von repräsentativen zur bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit der muslimisch-bürokratischen Teilbourgeoisie.” Herzog, “Die Entwicklung,” 20.

bycontributing also to the establishment of an activist journalism which tried to become the voice of the Ottoman commoners [ahâlî].²⁸⁸

Similarly to other western authoritarian systems in the 18th and 19th centuries, the “official” Ottoman newspapers, “(...) were charged with giving the populace an “accurate” picture of government activities and with counteracting misconceptions which might be derived from sources which were for one reason or another outside the immediate control of the authorities.”²⁸⁹ The shift from a neutral press which acted under the auspices and financial assistance of the government, to a press which predominantly functioned as watchdog of the governmental activities, gave reason for concern among the Ottoman statesmen. Moreover, the press was defined in the 1860s by its high politicization, a phenomenon which gained more impetus due to the fact that the majority of the journalists had already served as middle-ranking bureaucrats²⁹⁰.

For the purposes of the present work seven newspapers have been examined and studied and most of them are classified into the oppositional press.²⁹¹ The examination of the Young Ottoman press as a platform of thoughts is not an easy task at all, as the Young Ottoman intellectuals had different ideological backgrounds. The Young Ottomans were all divergent personalities who met with a common goal, namely to present to the Ottoman society a different narrative for the fate and fortunes of the Empire. However, the examination of the Cretan case enables us to narrow the scope of the newspapers’ study by laying focus on specific issues like the criticism on

²⁸⁸Gül Karagöz-Kızılcıca, „News Publishing as a Reflection of Public Opinion: The Idea of News during the Ottoman Financial Crises,“ in *The Press in the Middle East and North Africa 1850-1950. Politics, Social History and Culture*, eds. Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 36.

²⁸⁹Fred Seaton Siebert, Theodore Peterson, Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of what the Press Should be and Do* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 19.

²⁹⁰Namık Kemal as well as Ziya Bey served at the translation office, namely the “Ottoman Empire’s window opening to the West.” Mehmed Kaplan, *Namık Kemal, Hayatı ve Eserleri*[Namık Kemal, his life and works] (İstanbul: İstanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1948), 40, quoted in Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 42.

²⁹¹Other contemporary official, semi-official and private newspapers or journals which were published during the period under examination are the following: *Mecmua-i Fünun* (ed. Munif Paşa, 1862-1864), *Ütarit* (ed. Ayetullah Bey and Musul’lu Sami 1867), *İstanbul* (ed. Mehmet Arif 1867), *Ceride-i Askeriye* (1864-1922), *Ceride-i Bahriye*(N/A-1922), *Mecmua-i Mârif* (ed. Filip Efendi 1867-1877), *Bâsiret* (ed. Ali Efendi 1869-1874), *Hadika* (ed. Asir Efendi 1869-1873, Mümeyyiz (ed. Sitki Effendi 1869), *Muhib* (ed. Şakir Efendi 1868), *Vakayi-i Zabtiye* (ed. Bab’ı Zabtiye Vukuat Odası 1869), *Terakki* (ed. Filip and Ali Raşit 1868-1878). *Kevkeb-i Şarkî* (ed. Aleksan Sarrafyan 1869). See Fuat Süreyya Oral, *Türk Basın Tarihi 1728-1922, 1831-1922*[History of Turkish Press 1728-1922, 1831-1922](Ankara: Yeni Adım Matbaası, 1967), 1: 100-111.

the government, the position of the minorities within Ottoman society and their demands for equality, the treatment of the Eastern Question and European interventionism in Ottoman affairs.

4.4.1 *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis* [Daily Newspaper]

Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis (the successor of *Cerîde-i Havâdis*²⁹²) should be considered as the state's semi-official paper as it was launched under the Sultan's auspices and received state financial and other aid.²⁹³ This paper, which appeared between 1864 and 1918 under the editorship of Alfred Churchill, besides initiating the publication of translations and serials, it managed to introduce a simplified journalistic language as well as to provide to its readership an open window to the developments outside the Ottoman realm.²⁹⁴ From 1860 onwards the paper was published more as an announcement newspaper (*ilan gazetesi*) and according to Koloğlu this last period of the paper's edition was marked also by a rapid fall in its sales.

Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis followed the developments on Crete very closely by offering a valuable insight into the military developments on the battlefield through detailed reports. The paper used to publish official documents, summaries of parliamentarian discussions as well as quoting articles from the foreign press. Additionally, thanks to its network of correspondents throughout the vast Ottoman realm the reader was able to get informed about the developments in different parts of the Empire. The news concerning the Cretan revolt was mainly presented in the columns entitled *havâdis-i dâhiliyye* [domestic news] and *havâdis-i hâriciyye* [foreign news].

²⁹²*Cerîde-i Havâdis* run by William Churchill (1797-1846), known as one of the most prominent members of the English community. Aside from his journalistic activities he also occupied himself with commerce. In 1846 *Cerîde-i Havâdis* was taken over by Alfred Churchill who renamed the newspaper *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*.

²⁹³Iskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat Idareleri*, 12.

²⁹⁴Mardin, *TheGenesis*, 258.

4.4.2 *Muhbir* [Reporter] & *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* [Description of Opinions]

After being forced to leave the Ottoman Empire Mustafa Fazil Paşa driven by patriotism sent a letter to the Sultan which was republished by *Muhbir* on 2 February 1867 and two days later by *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* as well. The points that were contained in Mustafa Fazil Paşa's letter could be summed up as follows:²⁹⁵

- Emphasis on freedom. As far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned, the “(...) departure from the independent character which was native to the earliest Turks (...)”²⁹⁶ had led to moral decay.
- Need for reformative measures in the administrative apparatus of the state.
- Accentuation of the non-regulatory role of religion in relation to the rights of the people.
- Adoption of new methods of administration by replacing the old ones which contributed to the decadence of the State.
- Introduction of a representative system grounded on a constitutional basis, where the peripheral regions of the Empire would actively take part in the shaping of its fortunes by sending free elected representatives to the *Millet Meclisi* in order to discuss the ordinary people's needs.

In sum, it may be argued that the editorial policies both of *Muhbir* and *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, which are going to be discussed below, were reflecting the content of Mustafa Fazil Paşa's letter to Sultan Abdülaziz.

Muhbir

Muhbir, published by Filip Efendi, was first launched in January 1867 and its lifecycle lasted a few months until May 1867. One of the newspaper's main goals was the adoption of a language closer to that of the common people. Besides that, under Suavi's editorship *Muhbir* introduced and made the audience familiar to a range of

²⁹⁵Nuri Inuğur, *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi* [History of Press and Publishing] (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1982), 215.

²⁹⁶Mardin, *The Genesis*, 278.

political and sociological termini such as revolution, political participation, social state, economy and justice.²⁹⁷ Besides its educative nature, such an initiative must have also contributed to the shaping of the social cognitions of the readers with regard to important issues, which touched upon their everyday life.

Quite a lot of *Muhbir*'s articles pay attention to the Cretan crisis providing the reader with useful information about developments on the island especially with respect to the military preparations and the consequences that the tumult had had on the local Muslim population by putting a special emphasis on the grievances committed by the Cretan insurgents against the local Muslim element. Within this context *Muhbir* initiated a fundraising (see 6.4) for the relief of the Muslim Ottomans on the island, an initiative which demonstrated the activist journalism inaugurated by the Young Ottomans. Ultimately, the Cretan revolt gave an impetus to Suavi's criticism of the government's politics in the case of Crete.

On 8 March 1867 *Muhbir* was closed down for a month due to the publication of an article about the Governor of Egypt, Hidiv Ismail Paşa.²⁹⁸ After having reassumed its publication in London on 31 August 1867 the paper positioned itself as mouthpiece of the Young Ottomans until early November 1868. Besides criticizing the governmental policy conduct with regards to the lending practices of the Empire, Ali Suavi continued his criticism of the Ottoman statesmen by urging for the introduction of a representative administration system. Furthermore, the English edition of *Muhbir* gradually became the mouthpiece of the Urquhartites, who were known for their pro-Turkish sentiments.²⁹⁹

Meanwhile Mustafa Fazil Paşa was back in Istanbul and in good terms with the Ottoman political elite. Such a development eroded the inner cohesion of the oppositional group and without doubt influenced the way the Young Ottomans articulated their oppositional stance towards the Ottoman government. Besides that, it could be argued that Suavi's presence in *Muhbir* did not manage to effectively pursue the ideals of the expatriated oppositional intellectuals such as the constitutional changes in the Ottoman State, the restriction of European interference in the

²⁹⁷Oral, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 103.

²⁹⁸Inuğur, *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi*, 209.

²⁹⁹Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 98-99.

Ottoman internal affairs as well as the implementation of a wide reform program on the basis of a synthesis with the Islam.³⁰⁰

Tasvîr-i Efkâr

Tasvîr-i Efkâr was launched in 1862 by Ibrahim Şinasi, a protégé of Reşid Paşa, and appeared twice a week while it enjoyed the financial support of Jean Pietri, the owner of *Currier d' Orient*, of Prince Mustafa Fazil Paşa of Egypt as well as support of Prince Murad.³⁰¹ It was the first newspaper which put an emphasis on the importance of public opinion.³⁰² Due to its quite respectable circulation figures³⁰³ *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* became a real channel of knowledge for its audience as it dealt with a wide scope of issues. For example, the defense of the Muslims' rights within the Ottoman society or the need for introduction of a representative constitutional government system. Furthermore, the newspaper's criticism of the Ottoman statesmen revolved around their policy conduct on the Cretan Question and the Principalities' issue as well as their attitude towards the European opportunistic policies.³⁰⁴ Finally, after being involved in a plot against Ali Paşa Şinasi was forced to flee from the Ottoman Empire and the newspaper's editorship passed to Namık Kemal³⁰⁵ until the time he also fled to Europe. It should be noticed here that the presence of the latter in the newspaper changed the orientation of the newspaper which became a more political minded one.

Mardin points out with regards to *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* that it "(...) was also far ahead of other Turkish newspapers and periodicals of the time in the quality of its educational articles, i.e., those devoted to the illustration of the methods used in the new branches of knowledge that had come into their own in Europe in the nineteenth century."³⁰⁶ It

³⁰⁰Mardin, *The Genesis*, 47.

³⁰¹*İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. 2011 ed., s.v., "Tasvîr-i Efkâr."

³⁰²Koloğlu points out that "(...) the first step was taken toward the shaping of a framework that in present terms could be considered organizations of a modern civil society." ["(...) bugünkü deyimle *modern sivil toplum örgütleri* denebilecek yapıların belirmesi yolunda ilk adımı gerçekleştirdi"]. See Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı toplumunda kamuoyunun evrimi" [The development of public opinion in the Ottoman society], in *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Gülen Eren (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 7: 331.

³⁰³The circulation of the paper was estimated at 10,000 copies (according to Ebüziyyâ Mehmed Tevfik) and 20,000-24,000 copies. See *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Tasvîr-i Efkâr."

³⁰⁴Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*, 33-34.

³⁰⁵Mardin, *The Genesis*, 12. Namık Kemal was the author of approximately 500 unsigned articles in papers such as *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, *Muhbir*, *Hürriyet*, *İbret*, *Basiret*, *Hadika*, *İttihad*, *Sadakat* and *Vakit*. Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğlu and İsmail Kara, *Namık Kemal. Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri. Bütün makaleleri* (Ankara: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 1: 15.

³⁰⁶Mardin, *The Genesis*, 261.

must be said here, that at the beginning of their publication both *Muhbir* and *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* were not highly critical of the government's policies on the Cretan issue. Only after Namık Kemal became its editor, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* gradually provided its readership with analysis on matters related to foreign policy. In general, it may be assumed that the Young Ottoman poet opposed the European interventionism interference in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire³⁰⁷ as well as the racist behaviors encapsulated in the notion of ethnic nationalism as it happened in the case of the songs which were sung by Constantinopolitan Greeks during the Cretan conflict.³⁰⁸

4.4.3 *Hürriyet* [Freedom]

Hürriyet was the second Ottoman newspaper to be edited abroad. The paper started life on 29 June 1868 in London under the editorship of Namık Kemal at the suggestion of Mustafa Fazıl Paşa.³⁰⁹ It appeared once a week and its publication lasted until 22 June 1870.³¹⁰ Until 13 September 1869 the paper was edited by Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa, who were also the two main columnists. Except some articles which carried the signature of Ziya Bey and Ali Suavi, most of the newspaper's articles were published unsigned. As it was stated on the frontpage of the newspaper, the main merit of its editorial policy was the promotion of *Ottomanism*.³¹¹ Namık Kemal was a fervent supporter of constitutionalism which he had already emphasized in the first article of the newspaper under the title "Hubb-ül vatan min-el-îmân".

One of the major differences between *Hürriyet* and the other Ottoman newspapers was the language that was used. Thus, while *Muhbir* was considered to be the common people's daily newspaper, *Hürriyet* was mainly addressed to the upper social classes.³¹² The newspaper dealt with different issues such as the introduction of a

³⁰⁷See "Şark Mes'alesine dâir bir lâyhadır" [A report on the Eastern Question], *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, no. 465, Zi-l-ka'de 4, 1283/March 10, 1867.

³⁰⁸"Bir Mülâhaza" [A thought], *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 22 Cemâzi-yel-evvel 1283/October 1, 1866 quoted in Mardin, *The Genesis*, 27; see also *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Tasvîr-i Efkâr."

³⁰⁹Similar to *Muhbir*, which was distributed in the Ottoman Empire via Yorgi İstefanlis, *Hürriyet* reached its readership in the realm thanks to a more complicated network. French bookseller Coq, also part of this network, displayed the newspaper in the front window of his shop in order for it to be easily accessible to the people. Czygan, "From London back to Istanbul," 65-66.

³¹⁰*İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 1998 ed., s.v. "Hürriyet."

³¹¹Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*, 36.

³¹²Oral, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 97: "gazetesinin vazifesi, edebiyat marifetleri göstermek değil, halkı aydınlatmaktır" [the newspaper's duty is not to demonstrate literary skill but to enlighten the people].

representative parliamentary system based on Islamic principles, the political responsibility of the Vezirs, financial reform as a prerequisite for preventing disadvantageous lending policies, and the need for maintenance of the principles of Sharia as well as the issue of copying western institutions as part of the Empire's modernization process.³¹³ The disagreement, however, that arose among the Young Ottomans with regards to the extent with which they should exercise criticism on the Ottoman government led to the suspension of Rifat's financial aid to that Young Ottomans' journalistic effort.³¹⁴

In general terms, the articles of *Hürriyet* were held to be critical of the Grand Vizier Ali Paşa as well as of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Paşa while the paper was also serving the interests of the two Egyptian brothers, Mustafa Fazil Paşa and Khedive Ismail who tried to gain advantage of *Hürriyet's* impact on the Ottoman political life by pursuing their own selfish political goals as well. The end of *Hürriyet's* edition seemed inevitable as its leading figure, Namık Kemal, disagreed with the propaganda of the newspaper against Ali by cutting his ties with the newspaper in the end of 1870 when he also returned to Istanbul. Ziya Paşa continued editing *Hürriyet* on his own first in London and later on in Switzerland until its 100th edition in April 1870.

4.4.4 *Ibret* [Admonition]

Another newspaper edited by Namık Kemal was *Ibret* which occurred between 1870 and 1873. It appeared five times a week while its circulation is estimated at between 12,000 and 25,000 copies.³¹⁵ *Ibret* too, did not remain uninfluenced by the strict censorship of the 1860s, as its function was suspended for four months in 1872 due to Kemal's article entitled "Garaz, marazdır" in the 19th issue of the newspaper. Thus, besides Namık Kemal other columnists too, like Ebüziyya Tevfik and Mustafa Nuri, targeted absolutism as well as the Porte's policy on different issues and especially in its relations to the foreign Powers. One of the Ottoman officers for example who the

³¹³ *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 1998 ed., s.v. "Hürriyet."

³¹⁴ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 48.

³¹⁵ *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, 2000 ed., s.v. "Ibret."

paper pointed a finger at was Mahmud Nedim Paşa, whose submissiveness to Russia led him to be given the nickname “Nedimoff”.

Similarly to the other private newspapers, *Ibret*, besides dealing with everyday issues like the living conditions of the Ottoman subjects by opposing the government with regards to its lending policies, played an important role in the channeling of the Young Ottoman’s ideals into the public opinion such as the “(...) emphasis on self-improvement through the adoption of selected features of Western life (...).”³¹⁶

4.5 “Terminological reflection” of the Cretan movement in Greek and Ottoman press

As it is already noted in the chapter on the use of the press as a historical source, newspapers provide us the opportunity to trace hidden meanings or ideologies which are being mediated to the public through the careful and selected language use. Thus, during the study of the Greek and Ottoman newspapers and the way they covered the Cretan events, my attention was attracted especially by different features of the articles such as the language and more specifically the lexicological choices of the columnists. Given that the use of specific political terms within the context of linguistic manipulation should be regarded “(...) the conscious use of language in a devious way to control the others”³¹⁷, it becomes obvious that the vocabulary and the wordings of the political press with regard to the Cretan issue gain even more in importance.

The potential effects³¹⁸ and the manipulative power of the media’s written language are commonly acknowledged if one considers the fact that “the hidden power of mediadiscourse and the capacity of (...) other power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news reporting and other media activities.”³¹⁹

³¹⁶Mardin, *The Genesis*, 61.

³¹⁷*Ibid.*, 113.

³¹⁸The press' manipulative power in the case of the Cretan events is evident in the way Muslim Cretans reacted to the coverage of developments on the island by the Athenian press. According to one account, on the day when the dissemination of inaccurate news reports about the Cretan Issue were detected, the Muslim element was on the offensive toward local Christians as well as the diplomatic corps of the Greek consulate. Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970), 141.

³¹⁹Norman Fairclough, *Language and power* (New York: Longman, 1996), 54.

Additionally, “mass media discourse is interesting because the nature of the power relations enacted in it is often not clear, and there are reasons for seeing it as involving hidden relations of power.”³²⁰ On this ground, the existence of two different kinds of power, namely the influential and instrumental one, which defines the language-power relationship, leads us to the conclusion that the newspapers under examination exercised influential power in order either to manipulate public opinion or to put pressure on the political elites.³²¹

Furthermore, taking into account that “(...) ideologies are predominantly acquired and confirmed through various types of discourse or communication, such as socializing talk in the family, everyday conversations, laws, textbooks, government publications, scholarly discourse, (...) and news reports,”³²² it can be easily understood that paying attention to the use of terms would help us to understand the general ideological framework of the conflict as it was reflected through the news articles. The descriptive linguistic³²³ approach with regard to the Cretan conflict becomes more important, if we consider that the journalistic language applied in the articles revealed resemblances with the political language used in the diplomatic dispatches.

Thus, considering that “words manifest the underlying semantic concepts used in the definition of the situation”³²⁴ focus will be laid here on the usage of words which were deployed for the description of the events and which occurred most frequently in articles. Special attention will be paid to the first months of the conflict until October 1866 when the crisis on the island developed into an armed conflict between the Christians and the Ottoman army. The reason for choosing that specific period of time is to examine the way the situation was portrayed in the press before biased reporting had taken place as result of the impact of the events’ dramatic turn, the blood shedding and the international pressure.

³²⁰Ibid., 49.

³²¹Influential power “inclines people either to behave in certain ways or makes people adopt opinions/attitudes without exerting obvious force on them” while instrumental power “is explicit power, which is imposed by the state, by the laws and conventions of this state and by the institutions and organizations we work for.” Gunta Rozina and Indra Karapetjana, “The Use of Language in Political Rhetoric: Linguistic Manipulation,” *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 19 (2009): 113-114.

³²²Teun A. van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* (London and New York: Routledge 1991), 6.

³²³According to Rozina and Karapetjana a descriptive linguistic approach “views ideology as an object that has a material social existence in language, text and discourse.” Rozina and Karapetjana, “The Use of Language,” 112.

³²⁴A. van Dijk, *Racism and the Press*, 53.

In general, it can be assumed that the Ottoman press described the Cretans' protest movement in a negative way by portraying it as a phenomenon which disturbed the order and tranquility in that Ottoman province. The Greek press, on the contrary, tried to present the Cretan conflict not only as an armed struggle against Ottoman rule but mainly as a source of inspiration for the rest of the unredeemed Greeks. Additionally, Greek newspapers aimed at mobilizing the sympathy of the Europeans by taking advantage of European philhellenism. In this sense, the Athenian newspapers tended to present the movement as a struggle against the dynastic oppression of the Christian subjects by a Muslim ruler. In order to achieve that, they often used prejudices and stereotypes with regard to the rhetoric of the Cretan conflict, by identifying the Cretans' struggle as a religious war between the civilized Christian West and the barbarian Muslim Orient.

It may be argued that the ambiguous use of words for the description of the Cretan events often resulted in a terminological confusion with regards to the conception of the conflict's impact on public opinion as well as of the cognitive-ideological dimensions of these terms. In order to understand the weight and impact of the words and terms used in the Greek and Ottoman press on the public, it might be useful to put ourselves in the place of the ordinary people and everyday readers of the papers. The ethnic reflexes of the readers of an Athenian paper for example might have been strongly influenced by the analytical, vivid, and emotional way the Cretan conflict was presented on a daily basis on the frontpages of the newspapers. Therefore, as expected the public sentiment could be rapidly radicalized due to the fact that the contents in most of the Athenian newspapers were ideologically coloured mainly through the frequent use of hyperboles and metaphors.

On the other side, the reader of the Ottoman press would probably be informed about the Cretan conflict in a total different way than the reader of the Greek newspapers did. A better understanding of the situation on the island and the conflict's impact was almost impossible by reading the official governmental papers as they systematically underplayed the issue and were mostly restricted to a mere description of the military events. Only those who had access to the Young Ottoman press were able to have to some extent a spherical overview of the Cretan conflict and to contextualize accordingly the issue by assessing critically the pieces of the Ottoman intellectuals. In any case both the governmental and private Ottoman press portrayed the Cretan

conflict in a negative way by putting the blame on the Cretans something that without doubt should have had an influence on the Ottoman readership.

Therefore, I will try to present in the following two subchapters of the thesis the difference of the word choices made by the Greek and Ottoman newspapers in their news coverage of the Cretan events. From the findings, it will become evident to the reader that the way both the Athenian and Constantinopolitan papers perceived the conflict was not only vastly different but also reflected encoded ideological concepts. Moreover, the word choice made by the Greek and Ottoman journalists was not only limited in displaying the events on the battlefield but rather it encompassed their worldviews as well as the ideological orientation of the newspaper they were working for.

4.5.1 Lexicological choices of the Athenian and Constantinopolitan newspapers

As expected, the Cretan events attracted the attention of the Greek speaking press, especially of the Athenian press. Several articles on the course of the events dominated the pages of the dailies in Athens while they attributed to the Cretan struggle a unique role in the manifestation of the Greek Kingdom's national image. Within this framework, I tend to argue that the term *revolution* (*epanastasē* in Greek), which was widely used by the Greek press, is not as vague and ambiguous as it may be interpreted, as it was closely interconnected with the realization of *Megali Idea*. Hence, the use of *revolution* in the Greek press language is rather loaded with a strong notion of patriotism and nationalism than with a sense of a temporary act of resistance of the Christians against the local power. Moreover, I believe that the use of the terms *revolution* or *revolutionaries* served the efforts of the press to present the Cretans as victims of Ottoman cruelty. Thereby the Greek newspapers managed to effectively manipulate the “persuasion-reception dimension of communication”³²⁵ in favor of the Cretans by legitimizing them accordingly to proceed into violent acts in order to defend their rights against Ottoman rule.

³²⁵Teun A. van Dijk, “Ideological Discourse Analysis,” accessed February 12, 2016, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f918/c60f05a64b0f0b5251e85aac538a8775df15.pdf>.

The fact that the Cretans were invariably described by the Athenian newspapers as “(...) brave forerunners of the national unity (...)”³²⁶ or “brave warriors of Hellenism”³²⁷ reveals the impact of Greek irredentism on the Athenian press as well. A further point concerning the contextualization of the term *revolution* was the identification of the Cretan struggle with the Greek War of Independence of 1821.³²⁸ According to the Athenian paper *Elpis*, the Cretan events of 1866 were “(...) the second act of the big drama of 1821 which was interrupted by the iron hand of the European diplomacy of 1832 (...).”³²⁹

We should keep in mind that the Athenian press had to fulfill a manifold task during the Cretan crisis, namely to influence the Greek public opinion in favor of the Cretan struggle, to find balances within a fluid and fragile political landscape and finally to mobilize the Greeks living abroad. Thus, the use of the term “revolution” in the Athenian press should be interpreted within a broader framework which was defined ideologically by the impact of the *megaloidetic* notions, the resistance against the authoritarian Ottoman rule as well as by the Christian struggle against the barbarian Islamic orient, as it was stated quite often and characteristically in the Greek editorials in the form of hyperbole or exaggeration.³³⁰

The Athenian press systematically reinforced the stereotype that the Christian Cretans were the defenders of the Western civilized world’s rights and not the disturbers of a given social order within the Ottoman polity or even a potential threat to the European interests in Southeastern Europe. Following this editorial policy the Athenian newspapers aimed firstly at gaining advantage of the European philhellenic public opinion, and secondly, at diverting any European suspicions of Greece pursuing *megaloidetic* policies in the case of Crete.

³²⁶“N/A,” *Aiōn*, no. 2179, November 3, 1866. From the very beginning of the uprising, up until October 1866, *Aiōn* avoided using the term “revolutionaries” in its news coverage. To the contrary, the paper referred to persons and situations by using words like “Christians”, “Cretans”, “ours”, “the guerilla war”. The first time the term “revolutionaries” is encountered, is in the 1st October 1866 editorial of the paper.

³²⁷“Krētika” [The Cretan affairs], *Aiōn*, no. 2184, November 14, 1866.

³²⁸“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1375, October 18, 1866.

³²⁹“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1569, September 6, 1866.

³³⁰The following words spoken by John Andrew, an American, during a charitable act for the relief of the islanders, demonstrate the stereotypical fringes in which the Cretan struggle was encapsulated, creating a dipole Christianity vs. Islam. “Because the last great battle between Christianity and Mohammedanism was fought on Crete between the Venetians and the Ottomans[...] and because this fight displays the diachronic struggle of the Christians against the infidels, of the Bible against the Koran, of the Christian marriage against the polygamy (...)” “Filellēnismos en Amerikē” [Philhellenism in America], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1174, February 2, 1867.

As far as the Greek Ottoman press is concerned, the Cretan problem was not treated in every detail and it was mostly placed within a more general political context. Despite the fact that the articles published in the Constantinopolitan press were most of the times translated and republished from foreign newspapers they were full of underlying meanings with regard to the Cretan issue.

Neologos for example besides fully supporting the implementation of the *Principle of Nationalities*, laid simultaneously special focus on the internal reformation and modernization of the Empire. Puzzling together the articles of that leading Greek Ottoman newspaper, one comes to the conclusion that the Cretan conflict was regarded mainly as an outcome of the local Ottoman maladministration as well as of the failure of the central government to instill the sense of urgency and responsibility with regards to the implementation of the reforms to the local peripheral authorities. Despite its partially ethnocentric editorial stance, *Neologos* besides opposing³³¹ the secession of Crete from the Ottoman Empire did not favor any European intervention in internal issues of the Ottoman Empire.³³²

A final remark on the way *Neologos* treated the Cretan conflict is that its stance towards sensible issues with ethnic dimensions was not influenced by biasness or stereotypes like in the case of the Athenian press. On the contrary, the newspaper emphatically accentuated the notion of commonness as well as of a conscious belonging to the Ottoman polity without however omitting to defend the ethnic minorities' rights in a reframed Ottoman context. This was, for example, clearly demonstrated in an article of *Neologos*, where the issue of the Ottoman Empire's integrity was discussed.³³³ Without any use of specific style or words, it was argued in the article that the Cretan's complaints were primarily an outcome of the indigenous weaknesses of the Ottoman administrative and judicial apparatus and that such acute internal problems could be solved only under the precondition that the modernization of the Empire could be successfully carried out.

³³¹“Efcherēs lysis tou krētikou zētēmatos” [The easy solution to the Cretan issue], *Neologos*, no. 274, October 14, 1867. *Neologos*' editorial stance toward the Porte's policies concerning the Cretan conflict is clearly demonstrated in an article of the 5th January 1868 issue, in which reference was made to Ali Paşa's good demeanour as well as to the moderate methods he deployed in order to pacify the island. Furthermore, *Neologos* went on to praise Omer Paşa's military skills. See “1867 'B,” *Neologos*, no. 308, January 5, 1868.

³³²“Ē epemvasis” [The intervention], *Neologos*, no. 279, October 26, 1867.

³³³“Ti mallon symferei;” [What is more advantageous?], *Neologos*, no. 257, June 10, 1867.

4.5.2 Ottoman press: Vocabulary in the service of politics

As it was pointed above the language and the vocabulary employed by the press has a lot to say about a specific situation or about the editorial policy of a newspaper with regards to the perception of a minority's struggle. Given that the words and text units used in the Ottoman articles concerning the Cretan conflict resembled the language of political documents, it can be argued that the Ottoman journalists approached the Cretan events from the same angle as the political elite did. However we have to bear in mind that the majority of the Young Ottoman journalists had served in high bureaucratic posts³³⁴ of the Ottoman administration before embarking on their journalistic activities. That meant that their professional background justifies to some extent the use of a variety and multiplicity of political terms as they were familiar with such vocabulary.

Thus, the Ottoman papers offered us a lexicological plurality which reveals a hierarchical structure of the events' importance as well as ideological frameworks with regards to the events' interpretation. In general, it may be argued that the Ottoman press underplayed and de-emphasized the importance of the Cretan crisis by describing it systematically as an isolated act and outcome of foreign interventionism, which disturbed the peace on the island. The same attitude was encountered in the Ottoman diplomatic language as well. In one of his letters dated October 18th 1866 and addressed to the Ottoman ambassadors in London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Saint Petersburg and Florence the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Paşa, referred to the Cretan events as “merely insurgent activities” which were caused by a few Christian Cretans who fell victims to the plans of foreign agents against the peaceful majority of the island.³³⁵

Within the same context, the Ottoman papers treated the Cretan events by exclusively assigning the unrests on the island to the Christian Cretans and by stigmatizing them as disturbers of order. Thus, the Ottoman State was presented as acting against the rebels in order to defend its territory as well as in favor of security and social peace

³³⁴As it is well known, Namık Kemal served at the Translation office [Tercüme Odası] and İbrahim Şinasi Efendi was appointed to the Education Committee [Meclis-i Mârif] in 1855 after he completed his studies in public finance and literature in Paris. Mardin, *The Genesis*, 252f.

³³⁵Υψελῆ Πυλῆ-Υπουργεῖο τῶν Ἐκσῶτερικῶν. *Diplōmatika Eggrafa* 9-10.

[âsâyiş]³³⁶ which were guaranteed by the “army’s lash of discipline and order”³³⁷ [askeriniñ tâziyâne-i te’dîb ve tertîbiñden]. We should note here that the use of the words *te’dîb* [discipline], *tertîb* [order] and *tâziyâne* [lash] demonstrated a strong notion of hegemony. Furthermore, the above mentioned wordings and expressions should be conceived in the expansive pedagogical definition of “punishment” [Züchtigung] and “punitive rebuke”³³⁸ [strafender Zurechtweisung] rather than in the narrow context of forceful restoration of the order.

Given that the Ottoman newspapers attributed causality to the local Christian element of the island, it is expected that the common reader of *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, *Muhbîr* or *Hürriyet* in Istanbul, in Izmir and in other Ottoman urban centers would inevitably get the impression that Cretan Christians’ movement was of a secessionist nature as well as that it was instigated and organized by foreign powers and especially of Russia. Hence, within the context of the Ottoman newspaper’s lexicological selectivity, the demands of the Cretans were often described as *türrehât* [a piece of nonsense] or even *münâsebetsizlik* [absurdity].³³⁹

As it was mentioned in the 2nd chapter only *Rûznâme-i Âyine-i Vatan* put an emphasis on the examination of the islander’s demands. Therefore, in its attempt to portray the Cretan struggle as a secessionist movement that was supported by a foreign power and constituted a playground for foreign fortune hunters, the Ottoman newspaper published letters of Garibaldi volunteers. These letters offer without doubt a useful insight into the Cretan struggle by illuminating the weaknesses of its organization,

³³⁶Âsâyiş< tranquility, quiet, ease. See James Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2001), 85. “Yine Girid mes'elesi tazelandı” [The Cretan Issue reignited once again], *Hürriyet*, no. 24, Şa'bân 21, 1285/December 7, 1868.

³³⁷“Havâdis-i dâhiliyye” [Domestic news], *Rûznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 816, Ramazân 11, 1284/January 17, 1867.

³³⁸Maurus Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung über die osmanische Reformpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert* [The Things of Order: A Comparative Study of 19th-Century Ottoman Reform Politics] (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005), 246.

³³⁹“İşbu bin sekiz yüz altmış altı senesi ihtilâlîñ muharrikleri daha elli sekiz senesi ihtilâlî ru'sâsîña uymuşlar ya'nî bunlar da bir arz-ı hâl yapıb (Giridiñ esbâb-i şikâyet-i cedîdesi) dedikleri münâsebetsizlikleri sırayla derc ederek taqdîm etmişlerdir.” [The instigators of the revolt in 1866 acted similarly to those of the 1857 revolt; they too made a written petition including all their inopportune actions, one after the other, as the reasons for Crete's most recent grievances and they presented it.] “Türkestan ve Avrupa” [Turkey and Europe], *Rûznâme-i Âyine-i Vatan*, no. 29, Rebî-ül-evvel 3, 1284/July 5, 1867.

Russia's role in its development as well Greece's direct intervention (mainly through the Central Committee in Athens) in the conflict.³⁴⁰

Even if the vast majority of the Ottoman papers underplayed the importance of the Cretan crisis, *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* referred already on 24 September 1866 to the Cretan events by characterizing them as *Girid mes'elesi*, an expression which implied the weight of their importance as well.³⁴¹ According to Reinkowski, the use of the term *mes'ele* by the bureaucratic elite with regard to a problem implied "(...) not any more manageable, long-lasting difficulties"³⁴² Thus, contrary to the Ottoman official policy which aimed at downgrading the Cretan events as well as at the portrayal of the uprising as a local revolt disconnected from the Eastern Question, the deployment of the term *mes'ele* demonstrated "(...) a problem of imperial political nature with potential threatening consequences in terms of foreign policy."³⁴³

Contrary to the lexicological choices of the Athenian and Constantinopolitan newspapers, the Ottoman press drew a variety of terms for the purposes of the news coverage as well as of the construction of specific ideological frameworks. As it has been showed up by Reinkowski, the interrelated terms of prosperity and security had had a core position in the state ideology during the *Tanzimat*. Thus, securing the law and order was an important precondition for social peace and prosperity accordingly.³⁴⁴ This hierarchic relationship of state values and priorities was reflected in the terminology applied by the contemporary Ottoman newspapers as well, as they were mainly oriented to a law and order interpretation and conception of the Cretan struggle.

³⁴⁰“Girid’de bulunmuş olan Ğaribaldi gnlulerini metkubları” [Letters from the Garibaldi rebels in Crete], *Ruznâme-i Âyine-i Vatan*, no. 42, Rebî-l-evvel 15, 1284/July 17, 1867;“N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Âyine-i Vatan*, no. 44, Rebî-l-evvel 16, 1284/July 18, 1867.

³⁴¹„Girid mes'elesi dâirdir“ [About the Cretan issue], *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, no. 428, Cemâzi-yel-evvel 14, 1283/ October 24, 1866.

³⁴²[kaum mehr handhabbaren, langanhaltenden Schwierigkeiten]. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, 261.

³⁴³“(...) ein Problem reichspolitischen Characters mit potentiell bedrohlichen auenpolitischen Konsequenzen.” Ibid. We encounter the term“*Girid meselesi*” in Fuad Paa’s answer to the French *Chargé d' Affairs to the Porte* dated August 29th 1867.

³⁴⁴Maurus Reinkowski, “The State’s Security and the Subjects’ Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century),” in: *Legitimizing the order: The Ottoman rhetoric of state power*, eds. Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), 200.

Despite the fact that the Cretans' demands stemmed mainly from their *adem-i hoşnudi*³⁴⁵ [dissatisfaction] with the Ottoman maladministration, their complaints were described by the Ottoman press as unreasonable due to the fact that they did not correspond to the *hukuk-i hükûmet* [governmental Law] and *kanûn-i devlet* [State Law] and accordingly were not consistent with the *meşrûiyyet dâiresine* [legal position]. Moreover, the Ottoman press characterized the Cretan's attitudes as "blasphemous" due to the fact that Crete would be an exception³⁴⁶ to the equal treatment of Ottoman subjects if the demands of the islanders were satisfied.³⁴⁷

The use of the term *meşrûiyyet* with regards to the behavior of the Ottoman subjects (in our case of the non-Muslims) seems to me equal to the application of "(...) the state's law and prerogatives, be they religiously legitimized or otherwise."³⁴⁸ Moreover, the use of such a term with regard to the maintaining of law and order (especially in the context of traditional societies like the Ottoman one) was religiously loaded and derived from the nature of law in patrimonial systems, where sacred and secular law merged into each other. Finally, like in the case of obedience, the deployment of *meşrûiyyet* implied "(...) a religious obligation, defined and imposed by Holy Law and grounded in revelation."³⁴⁹

Moving beyond the realms of *meşrûiyyet* constituted a sin for the Ottoman subjects, even for the non-Muslims due to the fact that the political authority of the Sultan's regime relied upon a sacred tradition which consciously or unconsciously led or at least should lead to the obedience of its subjects. Similarly, religious connotations in relation to the concept of legality were also made in Ali Paşa's *lâyiha* to Sultan Abdülaziz, which dealt with the legitimacy of the State to undertake the appropriate

³⁴⁵Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*, 3: 128.

³⁴⁶"Bu istid'âları ise bütün memâlik-i Devlet-i 'Âliyye ahâlîsı hakkında cârî olan tekâlifden kendilerini müsteşnâ tutmak garazdan 'ibârettir." [These petitions, however, aim at having themselves excluded from taxes that are inflicted on all the populations of the Ottoman Empire.], "Girid'den tahirât-i mahsûsa fi 29 Zi-l-hicce" [Private correspondence from Crete on the 29th Zi-l-hicce], *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, no. 389, Muharrem 6, 1283/ May 5, 1866].

³⁴⁷Ibid.

³⁴⁸Reinkowski, "The States Security and the Subjects' Prosperity", 201. For the term's meaning see Develioglu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe*, 631.

³⁴⁹Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 91, quoted in Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, 237.

actions for the full protection of the *Saltanat-ı Seniyyelerinin hukuk-i meşrûasını* [Sultanate's legal right] and the *islâh-i hâl-i ahâlî* [people's prosperity].³⁵⁰

Besides this, another interesting point concerning the lexicological choices of the Ottoman journalists was the historical and mainly philosophic depth of the terms chosen to describe the Cretan's resistance against the Ottoman regime. The frustration which followed the failure of the *Tanzimat* in areas like Crete led to sentiments of dissatisfaction among the Christians who in turn challenged the established“(…) divinely-mandated social order or challenged the authority of the divinely-appointed ruler.”³⁵¹ Therefore, with respect to this, Reid assumed that “the Ottoman ruling elite understood the rebel as a representative of evil and corrupting forces in the carnal world and explained the suppression of revolts as the effort to expunge satanic influences in the world.”³⁵² Furthermore, the fact that the Young Ottoman journalists used specific political terms for the news coverage demonstrated the central place in their thought of concepts like order and security.

In that regard, *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* for example made frequent use of the term *eşkiyâ*³⁵³ [wretches, rebels, brigands]³⁵⁴ degrading thereby the movement as well as its main actors to the level of disturbers of the order as well as of lawless violent groups whose action was not fueled by any ideological leitmotifs at all. Furthermore, the newspaper preferred the use of the term *isyân* rather than that of *ihtilâl*, therewith aiming at the accentuation of the foreign powers' negative role in the events. Similarly, the frequent use of the terms *isyân/hareket-i isyâniyye*, *eşkiyâ'* instead of *ihtilâl* is also encountered in Ali Paşa's *lâyihâ* to the Sultan.³⁵⁵

As far as the term *ihtilâl* is concerned, Rehban argues that the word “was the common terminus of the Turkish language in the 18th century for insurrections, riots and

³⁵⁰Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*, 3: 132.

³⁵¹Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, 176.

³⁵²Ibid.

³⁵³“Cum'a günü Malakasa'da bir heyli eşkiyâ' görünerek oradaki asâkir-i şâhâne ile muhârebeye tutuşdukları haber alındığından derhâl oraya iki üç tâbur-u asker şevk olundu.” [As soon as it became known that the number of rebels who had been noticed in Malakasa on Friday engaged in battle with the Ottoman troops that were there at the time, another 2-3 battalions were immediately sent to the location.] “Eyalât” [Provinces], *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, no. 425, Cemâzi-yel-evvel 22, 1283/October 2, 1866.

³⁵⁴Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 122

³⁵⁵Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*, 3: 127-142. Similar vocabulary was used in the diplomatic correspondence between the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Paşa and the Ambassadors of the Porte in London, Paris and Petersburg. See “N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 898, Muharrem 16, 1285/May 9, 1868.

disturbances. *Ihtilaal* being the verbal noun of *ihtilaala* which means “loose, dissolved, being in order”, was applied only in the Turkish language by meaning “Revolution.” In the 19th century Arabic press the noun was applied for disturbances and insurrections. It follows from the context that *ihtilaal* was used with the meaning of “Disruption of the order.”³⁵⁶ Another term which journalists and diplomats tended to use frequently whenever they referred to disturbances was that of *isyân*.³⁵⁷ *Fesâd*³⁵⁸ (or its derivative *meşedet*) meaning again sedition, intrigue, riot or disorder also had a focal place in the journalistic and diplomatic language. According to Reinkowski the word *fesâdis* used in the Ottoman language „first and foremost for the situation of a general riot, however it is quite often ascribed quite often to a malicious causer.“³⁵⁹

Finally, like in the case of the oppositional press, the semi-official *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis* too, portrayed the rebellious Christians Cretans to the Ottoman public as a group of thieves and an immoral mob.³⁶⁰ In the same article the protesters were defined as *bed-hâhan* [malicious] and *fesede*³⁶¹ while the Revolutionary Committee of the Cretans was described as a *haydûd cemiyeti*³⁶² [gangster’s society] as part of the paper’s editorial policy to delegitimize the islanders’ struggle.³⁶³

³⁵⁶[...] war der im 18. Jahrhundert im Türkischen gängige Begriff für Revolten, Tumulte und Unruhen. *Ihtilaal*, das Verbalsubstantiv zu *ihtilaala* „locker, aufgelöst, in Ordnung sein“ ist, wurde nur im türkischen Sprachgebrauch mit der Bedeutung „Revolution“ verwendet. In der arabischen Presse des 19. Jhs. wurde das Nomen für Tumulte und Aufstände verwendet. Aus dem Kontext geht hervor dass *ihtilaal* mit der Konnotation „Zerrütung der Ordnung“ gebraucht wurde.“] See Helga Rebhan, *Geschichte und Funktion einiger politischer Termini im Arabischen des 19. Jahrhunderts (1798-1882)* [History and function of some political termini in nineteenth-century Arabic (1798-1882)] (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz 1986), 117f.

³⁵⁷Ibid., 118.

³⁵⁸*Fesâd*<1. Any state or act that is not good; badness, wrong-doing; fraud. 2. Sedition, intrigue, riot; disorder. See Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 1383.

³⁵⁹„zuerst einmal für den Zustand des allgemeinen Aufruhrs, wird jedoch häufig einem böswilligen Verursacher zugeschrieben.“ See Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, 242.

³⁶⁰“N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 547, Receb 28, 1283/December 6, 1866. *Bâgi*< 1. rebellious, a rebel 2. A sinner. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 331.

³⁶¹*Fesede*< pl. of *fâsid* meaning corrupt, illegal. Ibid. 1360..

³⁶²*Haydûd*< 1. a brigand, a bandit. 2. An organized band of robbers”. See Ibid., 815; Develioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe*, 347.

³⁶³“N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 547, Receb 28, 1283/December 6, 1866.

The Cretan struggle amidst the conflicting ideologies

5 *Megali Idea*: The emergence and utopia of Greek irredentism

Once the role of the press in the presentation of events and the dissemination of ideological schemas has been examined, we shall then, in this chapter, proceed to the principal subject of this work, being a discussion on the key ideological movements during the Cretan Crisis. Due to the fact that up to this point in time, the Cretan Issue of the 19th century has been looked at as a series of war conflicts that were part of the Greek state's efforts for independence, very little focus has been placed on the study of individual events from a particular ideological standpoint. As stated in the introduction, the events of 1866-1869 have the potential to serve as a platform from which one can dive into the examination of conflicting ideological currents within the framework of an armed conflict. To that end, in the first part of this chapter focus will be put on the growth and evolution of the Greek nationalist notion. Reference will also be made to the means of promotion of *Megali Idea* which in one way or another are interrelated with the course of events under examination. The second part of the chapter revolves around the various standpoints from which Greek nationalism was observed by both the Athenian and the Constantinopolitan Greek speaking press. Finally, so as to remain within the framework of the Cretan conflict, a special reference will be made to the role private actors played, such as the example of the Central Committee of Athens.

The Athenian newspaper *Elpis*, in an article published on 14 February 1868, correlated the essence of *Megali Idea* with nationalism by arguing that the former was a western product which should be conceived on the ground of the Declaration des Droits de l'homme.³⁶⁴ In addition, the author of the article argues that the issue concerning the unification of the Greek people in order to form a nation state should be looked at through the prism of the Eastern Question, since the latter was closely related to

³⁶⁴“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1443, February 14, 1868.

the territorial distribution of the Ottoman realm to its “legal inheritors of the East.”³⁶⁵ According to the same article, the implementation of the *Megali Idea* would enable the territorial expansion of the Greek Kingdom and consequently the foundation of a Christian state which would in turn become the leader of a federation of Eastern states.³⁶⁶

Keeping this in mind it should be underlined that *Megali Idea* did not arise suddenly in the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence as an ideological-political vehicle for the unification of all Greeks under the umbrella of the small state. Neither should it be thought of as a static and amalgamated ideological concept, since it had been influenced by both liberal and militant nationalism as well as containing elements of cultural hegemony.

One has to go back to the end of 18th century in order to trace the beginnings of nationalism in the Balkan Peninsula and of Greek nationalist thought in particular. Seeds of *Megali Idea* can be found in the writings and deeds of Greek intellectuals as early as 18th century. They continuously urged the various linguistic minorities to “become members of the Greek nation by adopting its language and culture, for aesthetic as well as practical reasons.”³⁶⁷ In particular, these practical reasons were linked to a primary need for education and refinement of the masses in order to escape from the retrogression caused during the centuries of the Ottoman rule. Thus, the communities were defined firstly by virtue of linguistic criteria. Later on, the creation of independent states “added the decisive factor which politicized the facts and myths of cultural ethnography and transformed cultural debates into power politics and eventually violent conflict.”³⁶⁸

There is no doubt that liberal nationalism held a primary place in the political thought of the first thinkers of Greek nationalism. Therefore, values like equality, democracy, individual rights and liberal constitutionalism were crucial in the political writings and thoughts of Koraēs, one of the first pioneers of Greek nationalism. The aforementioned values were thought to deliver successfully the creative energies

³⁶⁵Ibid.

³⁶⁶Ibid.

³⁶⁷Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’,” 156.

³⁶⁸Ibid., 159.

of each individual, possessed over a specific place and weight.³⁶⁹ It could also be argued that the Enlightenment had an impact on the ideas of Greek nationalism's pioneers which reflected on their struggle against the Ottoman rule in order to deliberate the individual's creative forces within a framework of equality and protection of the individual rights.

Even though Karpatis recognizes "European military and political interventions"³⁷⁰ as the main driving force which accelerated the evolution of nationalism in Southeastern Europe during the 19th century, one could say that this process was a natural product brought on by the cultivation of ethnic consciousness that had already taken place in the late 18th and early 19th century within the Orthodox community. This ethnic consciousness, which was based primarily on the linguistic differentiation of the Balkan populations, would eventually transmit the "concepts of Enlightenment and Rationalism" to the minorities living in the Ottoman Empire, something that "undermined the foundation of the classical Ottoman intellectual order."³⁷¹

5.1 The birth and the content of *Megali Idea*

The first official reference of the term *Megali Idea* is attributed to Iōannēs Kōlletēs, the leader of the Greek "French"³⁷² party and a heterochthonous. The term was first mentioned in a speech he gave at the Greek National Assembly on January 14th, 1844³⁷³, in the context of a discussion concerning the issue of heterochthons

³⁶⁹ According to Koraēs "the overthrow of despotism and its replacement with political autonomy was (...) a necessary prerequisite for the attainment of the goals of personal liberty and self development." Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Adamantios Korais and the dilemmas of liberal nationalism," in *Adamantios Korais and the European Enlightenment*, ed. Paschalis Kitromilides (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2010), 219. Further, Kitromilides notices that "Kedurie extolled the importance of Korais' text as a precocious example of the process of transmission of western ideas into non-western contexts, a process that set in motion the worldwide expansion of western ideas and values." See *Ibid.*, 215.

³⁷⁰ Kemal Karpatis, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History. Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002), 471.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 453.

³⁷² The foundation of the French, Russian and English Parties in the aftermath of the Greek Independence War was nothing more than the manifestation of the Great Powers' participation in the formation of the Greek State as each of these early Greek parties served actually the interests of the respective Protecting Power.

³⁷³ Kitromilides argues that the term *Megali Idea* was first mentioned in a work by the Greek poet Soutsos in 1844. See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "On the intellectual content of Greek nationalism:

and autochthons, making it devoid of any interpretations associated with territorial expansionism or militant nationalism. On the contrary, it referred to the cultural unification of Greeks within a frame of construction of national consciousness.³⁷⁴

Dēmaras who studied the speech of the Greek statesman, noticed that Kōlletēs, who incidentally was opposed to the autochthonous' arguments, focused mainly on the unity of the Greek nation within the borders of the Greek Kingdom as well as abroad. Another point he drew his attention to was the cultural hegemony of Greece in the East as a transmitter of values from the West to the East.³⁷⁵ That cultural hegemony of Greece had a very strong connection to the ecumenical character of Greek romanticism which nurtured the belief that Constantinople was the real and only national center of Hellenism, even though Athens was the capital of the Kingdom.

Therefore, in that first phase of Greek nationalism's periodization the vision of the contemporary political thinkers and philosophers was encapsulated in the creation of a Greek/Eastern Imperium on the basis of Koraēs' vision. In that sense, the ideas of the Enlightenment in Europe, the French Revolution along with the decay of the Ottoman institutions and the emergence of a strong and influential middle class paved the way for the beginning of political history in the region.

Papariopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," in *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, eds. David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 2-3. Kremmydas states, however, that Georg Ludwig von Maurer (1790-1872) had already indirectly made reference to the essence of the Great Idea in 1835. In his book *Das Griechische Volk in Öffentlicher, Kirchlicher, und Privatrechtlicher Beziehung: vor und nach dem Freiheitskampf bis zum 31. Juli 1834*. 2 Vols. (Heidelberg: Akademische Buchhandlung Mohr, 1835) he brings up Hellenism and her mission to transmit knowledge to the East, initiating thereby the Greek *mission civilisatrice*, which was a focal point in the writings of contemporary Greek intellectuals as it will be shown below. See Vasilēs Kremmydas, *Ē Megalē Idea. Metamorfōseis enos ethnikou ideologēmatos* [The Great Idea. Transformations of a National Ideology] (Athēna: Typōthētō, 2009), 15-16.

³⁷⁴Kremmydas describes the notion of 1840s *Megali Idea* as "an ideological message empty of secessionist content." Ibid., 35. Something else worth highlighting here is that the 1850s was a time during which classic historiographical works appeared in an attempt to promote coherence of the Greek nation, uninterrupted, from classical times until that point in time as well as to create a scientific bedrock for the irredentist content of *Megali Idea*. Kōlletēs mentioned the *Great Idea* in his speech as follows: "Greece, by her geographical location, is the center of Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her left, she is destined through her own downfall to enlighten the East. Our forefathers executed this task, the second is assigned to us. In the spirit of our oath and this great idea we saw always the delegates of the nation assembling to decide not for the fate of Greece but for the entire Greek race." John A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 509-510, quoted in Theodore George Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism 1866-1897* (New York: Columbia Press, 1984), 16.

³⁷⁵Kōnstantinos Th. Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismo* s[Greek Romanticism] (Athēna, Ermēs 2004], 405-406.

However, almost a decade after the official appearance of *Megali Idea* in the Greek political arena, it is remarkable that the liberal content of Greek nationalism had already been replaced by militant characteristics. One of the effects of that change was the decision made by the Greek political elite to take part in the Crimean War on the side of Russia. Thus, entering the second phase of the evolution of Greek nationalism, the politics of the Greek state were defined by territorial expansion aiming at the annexation of areas of the Ottoman Empire inhabited overwhelmingly by Greek speaking populations. This second phase of Greek nationalism was defined by the shift of the national center from Constantinople to Athens and the radicalization of ideology by obtaining characteristics of territorial expansionism. Therefore the Cretan crisis should be placed at the end of that second phase marking the beginning of a compromising relation between the two centers and the emergence of *Greek Ottomanism* being marked by the events of 1875-78.³⁷⁶

It could be argued that these phases of *Megali Idea* were brought about due to the geographical split of Hellenism, as the largest part of its population was still resided outside the borders of the small Greek Kingdom. The above described periodization of Greek nationalism, once again, reveals the dynamic character of ideology during the 19th century in Southeastern Europe. The nature of *Megali Idea*, as well as the separate components of which it was comprised, not only continuously adapted to the ever changing internal social conditions of the small state but also became a useful tool in the hands of its political elite.

5.2 *Megali Idea*: A useful tool

Concerning the functionality of *Megali Idea*, a strong consensus has been reached among its historians and researchers, who do not regard it only as a political agenda strictly followed by the economical and legislative elite of the 19th century. On the contrary, their assessment of the *Great Idea* is that it was an effective tool, not only in

³⁷⁶Skopetea, *To "Prototypos" "Vasileio"*, 271.

regard to the internal affairs of the Greek Kingdom³⁷⁷ but also in the hands of the Great Powers, who had deployed it “as a provisional excuse to inculcate the Greek people, as a whole, whenever the Eastern Question escalated,”³⁷⁸ an example of which is the Crimean War.

Considering the context in which the term *Megali Idea* had been mentioned for the first time, one could say that its ideological conception was part of a nation-building process which, at the time, functioned as an important element for the consolidation of a sense of national identity. Consequently, the citation of *Megali Idea* in the discussions about the autochthons and heterochthons were consumed by intentions of “defending the civil rights of the immigrant Greeks from outside the Greek Kingdom (heterochthones), against the attempts of the “internal” (autochthones) Greeks to monopolize the civil service”³⁷⁹ which in turn proves that it was necessary for the disparities within the Greek Genos to be bridged.

Therefore the concept of *Great Idea* could be rightly conceived as a useful tool in the long and difficult process of “the cultivation of a homogenizing national identity.”³⁸⁰ Along with cementing the existing gaps within Hellenism of the 19th century, *Megali Idea* was aiming at the ideological legitimization of the Greek state as the new national center of Hellenism as well.³⁸¹ Further, besides its contribution to the “political socialization of the Orthodox people of the East in the cultural system of Neohellenic nationalism”³⁸² Kitromilides points out the decisive role of *Megali Idea* in the internal development of the newly founded Greek State and especially in sectors like education, the military and administration.

Finally, Nicolopoulos moving on the same line of argumentation, namely the instrumentalization of *Megali Idea* by the state, argues that the “official panhellenism measured up to its Russian model as an instrument of social control during the formative period of the modern Greek state. The bulk of social protest was channeled

³⁷⁷Ibid., 261. See also Aleksēs Politēs, *Romantika chronia. Ideologies kai Nootropies stēn Ellada tou 1830-1880* [Romanticism Years. Ideologies and Attitudes in Greece between 1830-1880], 3rd ed. (Athēna: E.M.N.E.-Mnēmōn, 2008), 62-66.

³⁷⁸Skopetea, *To “Prortypo “Vasileio,”* 268.

³⁷⁹Roumen Daskalov, “Bulgarian-Greek Dis/Entanglements,” in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, eds. Roumen Daskalov and Tschavdar Marinov *National Ideologies and Language Policies* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 1: 200.

³⁸⁰Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities,’” 161.

³⁸¹Kitromilides, “To Ellēniko kratos,” 150.

³⁸²Ibid., 154.

to the self-defeating super-patriotic fringe on the Right, in a monotonous repetition of the Hetairia pattern: rebellious elements, both patrician and plebeian, converged in a series of irredentist societies, tolerated and co-opted by the state when weak, allowed to exhaust themselves in private guerilla wars against the Ottoman empire when they appeared powerful.”³⁸³

5.2.1 *Megali Idea*-Means of promotion

An interesting addition to the discussion of *Megali Idea* would be to focus on two channels used to direct the ideology towards the Greek populations residing outside the borders of the Greek Kingdom who had played a distinct role in the Cretan events. Without a doubt their common functional denominator was an attempt to forge a sense of national unity in spite of the extremely difficult practical but also fundamental issues that needed to be overcome.

One such major institution for the promotion of the nationalist cause (according to Kitromilidis the most important one) was the University of Athens, whose decisive role was the dissemination of European culture to the East using the Greek language and Greek education as a transmitter. The aim was the “incorporation of the Greek-speaking Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire into the value system of Greek nationalism.”³⁸⁴ Therefore, it was believed that the university would create the proper preconditions for the cultural and political hegemony of Greece in the East.³⁸⁵

Within the context of education, reference should be made also to the new conditions in the Ottoman educational system that were taking shape due to the Tanzimat reform and acknowledged “the right of every officially recognized religious community

³⁸³John Nicolopoulos, “From Agathangelos to the Megale Idea: Russia and the emergence of Modern Greek nationalism,” in *Balkan Studies* 26, no. 1 (1985): 43f. There were also Greek newspapers criticizing the instrumentalization of Greek irredentism. One such paper was *Kleiō*, the Greek newspaper of the diaspora which heavily criticized the irredentist politics of King Otto and concluded that such policies were but a veneer for what they were really aiming at, i.e the Constitution's encroachment by the Crown and the Greek government. See Giōrgos Charōnitēs, “Ē Kleiō tēs Tergestēs. Mia politikē efēmerida tēs diasporas” [The Kleiō of Triest. A Political Newspaper of the Diaspora] (M.A. Thesis, Panteion University 2007), 95.

³⁸⁴Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’,” 167; For more on the ideological characteristics of the mission of “The laboratory of Patriotism”, as Deschamps described the University of Athens in his book *La Grece d' aujourd' hui* (Paris 1982), see Kōstas Lappas, *Panepistēmio kai foitētes stēn Ellada kata ton 19o aiōna* (University and Students in Greece during the 19th Century) (Athēna: Kentro Neoellēnikōn Erevnōn E.I.E, 2004) 103; 128-131.

³⁸⁵Kremmydas, *Ē Megalē Idea*, 77; Kitromilides, “The Greek State as National Center,” 152.

[cemâat] to establish their own schools (...).”³⁸⁶ Thus, according to the reformed educational system the religious heads of each community had the right to appoint teachers of their own choosing which drastically paved the way for the promotion of the nationalist ideas among the non-Muslim populations. As the local Ottoman authorities were often suspicious of the Greek teachers’ role in the nationalization of the Christian element, in times of turbulence on the island, the Greek teaching craft was the first to be targeted through expulsion from the island.

The second major institution, which along with the Athenian University, contributed to the promotion of nationalist notions in Ottoman areas inhabited by Greek speaking populations, were the diplomatic networks of the Greek independent state. It may be argued that they acted without a doubt as “Trojan Horses” in the Ottoman realm exercising power and influencing the local populations.³⁸⁷

The case of Aleksandros Rangavēs, a Greek diplomat who played a crucial role in the 1860s, can help to better understand the importance of the aforementioned diplomatic networks and their contribution to the promotion of the *Great Idea* during the Cretan crisis.³⁸⁸ More specifically, the experienced diplomat decided at the beginning of 1860 arbitrarily and without the concession of the Greek government to organize an invasion of Turkey.³⁸⁹ This example of Rangavēs reinforces the argument that Greek diplomats who were sent abroad to represent the Greek interests not only were instilled with nationalist ideas but also acted in an autonomous and sometimes dangerous way.

³⁸⁶Selçuk Akşın Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839-1908* (Leiden: Brill 2001), 42.

³⁸⁷Alexander Kitroeff, “The Transformation of Homeland-Diaspora Relations: the Greek case in the 19th-20th centuries,” in *Proceedings of the First International Congress on the Hellenic Diaspora. From Antiquity to Modern Times. Montreal 17-22. iv. 1998; Athens, 26-30. iv. 1988*, eds. John M. Fossey and Jacques Moring, vol. 2, *From 1453 to Modern Times* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1991), 238.

³⁸⁸Rangavēs occupied important posts during his diplomatic career. He served as minister of Foreign Affairs between 1856 and 1859 and was appointed ambassador to Washington, D.C. and Paris during the Cretan conflict. In 1867 as Greek ambassador in Washington he focused on gaining American support for the purposes of the Cretan struggle. Rangavēs was also tasked with the reestablishment of Greek-Ottoman diplomatic relations after having taken part in the Paris Peace Conference for the resolution of the Cretan Crisis and it was he who finally took diplomatic and political initiatives in the context of the Nationality Issue of 1869. His ideas were also published in the magazine *Le Spectateur de l’Orient* for which he regularly wrote articles. In one of these articles he mentioned the need for the establishment of a Christian Orthodox Empire dominated by the Greek speaking element which would take the place of the Ottoman Empire, guaranteeing in such the territorial security of Europe. For a detailed biographical account of Rangavēs see Chaidō Barkoula, “Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs (1830-1880): Alytrōtismos kai Diplōmatia” [Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs (1830-1880): Irredentism and Diplomacy] (PhD diss., Ethniko kai Kapodistriako Panepistēmio Athēnōn, 2008).

³⁸⁹Tatsios, *The Cretan Problem*, 65.

A few years later, amidst the turbulence in Crete, Rangavēs was appointed ambassador to Washington, D.C. in order to carry out an important mission in favor of the Cretan struggle, namely to ensure military equipment as well as material and diplomatic support for the Cretan cause. His mission was not without hindrance since a major obstacle he faced was the Monroe Doctrine which shaped the American foreign policy at the time by not favoring the United States' interference in European affairs. The Greek Government's decision to appoint Rangavēs to the United States worried the Ottoman political elite to such an extent that the Porte proceeded to send an ambassador to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean for the first time. Consequently, in the framework of an informal Greek-Ottoman conflict whilst attempting to gain advantages in the diplomatic field, one of Blacque's, the Ottoman ambassador in the U.S., achievements was to gain influence over the American newspaper *Herald* and the public opinion respectively, whose support Rangavēs was also aiming for.³⁹⁰

5.3 The Cretans inspired by the Italian Unification struggle

Along with the discussion of the means of promotion of *Megali Idea*, as they were mentioned above, I would like to make at this point a reference to the impact that the struggle for the Italian Unification had on the development of the *Megali Idea* and particular on the Cretan cause. As mentioned in previous chapters the events on the island gradually lost their regional character and acquired a pivotal position in the arena of international politics of the period, especially due to the internationalisation of the Cretan case. Even though the ideology of *Megali Idea* suffered a decline in its legitimacy due to Greece's participation in the Crimean War, the Cretan issue is a strong reminder of the interconnection between national movements throughout Europe during that time. This interconnection was not restricted to mutual ideological and moral backing among the European people but it also branched out in exchanging material and human resources. Therefore it could be argued that the impetus of *Megali*

³⁹⁰Efthymios Soulogiannēs, *Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs 1809-1892. Ē zōē kai to ergo tou* [Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs 1809-1892. His life and his Deeds] (Athēna: Arsenidēs, 1995), 74-75.

Idea was fueled by other national movements as well, such as the Risorgimento in Italy.

Few years prior to the Cretan revolt, the impact of Piedmont as well as of the Italian Unification struggle, started to become visible in the internal political life of the Greek Kingdom. In 1859 there were already Greek politicians like Lombardos who frantically supported a close cooperation between Italy and Greece aiming at the “the creation of Greek-Italian committees”³⁹¹ which would pave the way for the overthrow of the Turkish rule in South-East Europe. Further, Lombardos' stance was also echoed in the Greek press. Particularly, Levidēs, the editor of the Athenian paper *Elpida*, relayed his ideas by accentuating the need “for the creation of a Greek Italian axis which would be the basis for a broader alliance in Western Europe and in the Balkans.”³⁹² Moreover, the motto of the Italian Unification struggle, “Italia farà da se”, made its mark on the conduct of public debate regarding the policy that the Greek Kingdom should pursue in order to liberate unredeemed Greek populations. Accordingly, the belief that Greece should proceed independently in finding a solution to the Eastern Question within a network of Balkan alliances caught on among Greek politicians irrespectively of their ideological orientation.³⁹³

The close connection between the Cretan and the Italian causes becomes evident not only in the frequent references of the Greek press regarding the Italian struggle but is much more apparent in the direct participation of Italian revolutionaries in the Cretan struggle, which is often mentioned in the contemporary Greek and Ottoman press.³⁹⁴ The effect the Italian cause had on the Cretan struggle is also mirrored in the references made in the official statements of the Cretan revolutionary organs to the Risorgimento. Such references can be considered part of the Greek side's strategy to legitimize the Cretan struggle and its goals in an international context.³⁹⁵

³⁹¹ Antonis Liakos, *Ē Italikē Ēnpoiēsē kai ē Megalē Idea, 1859-1862* [Italian Unification and the Megali Idea, 1859-1862] (Athēna: Themelio, 1985), 121.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 125-127.

³⁹⁴ “Rikiotis Garibaldi” (Riccioti Garibaldi), *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1197, March 10, 1867; “Epistoli Garibaldou” [Garibaldi’s letter], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1669, February 15, 1869.

³⁹⁵ “Diakēryksis ek Krētēs” [A declaration from Crete], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1465, April 15, 1868. Furthermore, according to Liakos Greek Press organized fundraising in order to support the Italian struggle. See Liakos, *Ē Italikē Ēnpoiēsē*, 111.

Finally, the link between *Megali Idea* and *Risorgimento* is not only clear in the common ideological origins of both countries' contemporary national movements but also on a political level in general. This is manifested in King Otto's attempt to come to an agreement with Garibaldi and the King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele, as early as 1861, in order to instigate a general revolution of the Greeks, Serbs and Montenegrins against the Ottomans. However, this attempt came to fruition in the summer of 1862 when an agreement for mutual assistance was signed. However the agreement was never put into practice since Garibaldi was arrested in August 1862 and King Otto was expelled two months later.³⁹⁶

5.4 *Megali Idea* in the Athenian and Constantinopolitan press

After having examined the historical aspects of *Megali Idea* such as its origins and evolution during the 19th century, focus will now turn to the manner in which the content of that ideological concept is enshrined in the coverage of the Cretan crisis and the meaning the press attributed to it as a national vision. In studying articles published in the newspapers of the time it becomes obvious that despite the patriotic character of the news coverage language, references to *Megali Idea* are not as frequent as one would expect from the intense interest of the press on the issue.

That cultural Darwinism as a strong aspect of the Greek ethnic nationalism was based on the “sense of collective uniqueness and centrality”³⁹⁷ of the Greek ethnē which was reinforced by the existence of a conquered homeland, the common myths and a heritage from the classical antiquity. Further, this sense of the distinct nationality and superiority nurtured the Greek nation’s *mission civilisatrice* in the “barbarian” East aiming at the deliberation of the unredeemed brethren as well as at the dissemination of western values.

³⁹⁶Gerasimos Zōras, “Ἐ Ἰταλικῆ Παλιγgenesia kai o apoēchos tēs stēn Ellēnikῆ logotechnia (Me aformē tēn 150pentaetērida tēs idrysēs tou Italikou kratous)” [The Italian Risorgimento and its echo in the Greek literature (on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the Italian State’s foundation), *Epistēmōnikῆ Epetēris tēs Filosofikēs Scholēs tou Panepistēmiu Athēnōn*42 (2010-2011): 153-6.

³⁹⁷Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Blackwell, 1987), 47.

Within that context, *Megali Idea's* essence was defined by ethnic territorialism until the end of the Crimean War when it began to gradually be replaced by ethnocentrism which was based primarily on the distinctive character of Greek culture as well as the cultural renewal of the East, the old homeland. However this does not mean that Greek *Megaloideatic* aspirations were totally deprived of the wish for territorial restoration. According to Smith the defensive nature of ethnicism against the “Others” is justified by the fact that it “is more a collective movement, whose activities and efforts are aimed at resisting perceived threats from outside and corrosion within, (...) and at reintegrating a community’s members and strata which have become dangerously divided by conflicting pressures.”³⁹⁸ Thereupon the Smithian interpretation of nationalism fits *Megali Idea's* content well, as it was the Greeks' ethnic identity that led them to raise territorial claims in a region that embodied the collective memory of the *Genos*. A memory intertwined with their sacred homeland where shared myths, common traditions and ethnic symbolisms lived on.

This cultural and territorial restoration and the way it should have been implemented became dominant in public debate. More specifically the Greek press' stance toward the dilemma expressed in terms of internal reorganization (the so-called “Little idea”) or military preparations, was not unanimous. *Avgē* for instance, favored war preparations in the Greek Kingdom ignoring the need for internal development as a prerequisite for an expansive policy aiming at territorial restoration. In an article published on the 12th of July, 1866 entitled “Hellenism's Need” the newspaper urged the political elite to undertake the appropriate initiatives so that revolutionary activities in Thessaly and Epirus could spread, something that would eventually cause an upheaval in Montenegro and Macedonia respectively.³⁹⁹

Later on, however, *Avgē* changed its editorial policy by acknowledging the Greek Kingdom as a point of reference for the Greeks of diaspora as well as Eastern populations who would eventually contribute to the internal development of the state.

³⁹⁸Ibid., 50. See also “Ἐθνικῆ πολιτικῆ ἀποτυχία ἐνεκα τῆς διαίρεσός” [The national policy failed due to the partition], *Avgē*, no 1823, December 3, 1866.

³⁹⁹“Μία ἀναγκὴ τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ, II,” [A necessity for Hellenism, II], *Avgē*, no. 1720, July 12, 1866. With respect to the Greek press' urge for the instigation of upheavals at the northern boundaries of Greece see also “Δεὸν νὰ ἐπεκταθῆ ἡ ἐπαναστάσις τῆς Θεσσαλίας” [It is needed that the Revolution in Thessaly must be spread], *Avgē*, no. 1893, March 18, 1867.

In turn these newcomers, would act as conveyors of Greek culture in the East.⁴⁰⁰ Similarly to that subsequent editorial policy of *Avgē*, *Ethnegersia* focused on the internal development of the Kingdom as well. The paper argued that Greece lost the support of the Greek Ottomans the very moment that the newly founded state favored an expansionary policy revolving around the reconstitution of the Greek Empire with Constantinople at its center. Therefore, it was believed that internal development of the young Kingdom would enable the transformation of Greek cultural superiority into political hegemony.⁴⁰¹

5.4.1 The Greek *mission civilisatrice* in the East and its perception in the Athenian press

Even though the Athenian press in its entirety supported the Cretan cause, there was quite a remarkable part of it which recognized and highlighted the civilizing content of *Megali Idea* as well as the special mission⁴⁰² that Hellenism had to accomplish in the East. Thus, it could be argued that the Cretan struggle was regarded as part of that mission as well.

Megali Idea's cultural dimension was also mirrored in the thoughts of the American ambassador in Athens. According to Tuckermann Great Idea meant “(...) that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East – that is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be theirs, (...).”⁴⁰³ Moreover, in the context of Greek nationalist notions and their civilizing mission, Noutsos noticed that the fruition of *Megali Idea* was closely connected to the prosperity of Greek diaspora and especially the Greek element in the Ottoman Empire. Noutsos' assumption was based on the fact that the Greeks residing in the Ottoman

⁴⁰⁰ *Avgē's* columnist contended that the Voulgarēs government prevented hundreds of *gekides* (people living in Northern Albania) from entering the Greek Kingdom for work, a development which would assist economical growth, as the authorization of their Turkish passports at the Greek consulates would be too costly. See “Ἐ προδοσία ἢ ἔ αὐετῆρια” [Either Treason or Stupidity], *Avgē*, no. 2301, November 22, 1868.

⁴⁰¹ “Ἐκσῶτερικῆ πολ. Ἐπιθεῶρῆσις” [Foreign policy review], *Ethnegersia*, no. 9, October 19, 1866.

⁴⁰² *Ethnofylaks*, the Athenian newspaper which molded the revolutionary activities in Epirus and Thesally also spoke about Greece's “divine mission” in the East. According to the paper, Greece was the hub for the necessary groundwork for an Eastern Renaissance. See “Ἐ πρῶτοβουλία ἐν τῇ Ἀνατολῇ” [The Initiative in the East], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1423, February 2, 1868. “Ἐ νεὰ φάσις,” *Ethnofylaks*.

⁴⁰³ Charles K. Tuckerman, *The Greeks of To-day* (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1872), 120.

realm were considered to be conduits of western capitalism and western ideas to the East.⁴⁰⁴

Interestingly, in its attempt to legitimize the mission of the Greek nation, a major part of the Greek press questioned the ethnic identity of the ethnicities composing the Ottoman polity. In an article published in *Avgi*, shortly after the break out of the Cretan movement, it was argued that due to the Slavs not having a national history and unity, their fate was “to get drunk by the vehement and civilizing power of Hellenism.”⁴⁰⁵ The writer of the article went on to say that only the Hellenic element was in a position to regenerate the East, which had already reaped the benefits from the presence of Greeks there.⁴⁰⁶ In opposition with *Avgē*, the Athenian *Elpis* stated that the Albanians were the only ethnic community that could be successfully incorporated to the Greek ethnic element, thereby questioning the theory that sustained that the potential of the Ottoman Slavic populations to “submit” to the culture of Hellenism.⁴⁰⁷

Aiōn, another historical Athenian newspaper, took on a Hegelian approach towards the Orient and the Greek Mission, similar to that of *Elpis*, by republishing an article by the French philosopher, Théodoré Jouffroy, titled “On the Greek Mission of Human Evolution” on the 8th of December, 1866. The article was written shortly after the Greek War of Independence and focused mainly on Eastern barbarism and retrogression as well as Greece's deep-rooted role in the Christian world of Europe. Since the beginnings of the 1860s, *Aiōn* had already begun to stress the importance of Athens as a cultural center the East, coinciding with the foundation of the Athens University which was similar to European universities.⁴⁰⁸ The University of Athens was accredited with the role of being the injector of Western *Gedankengut*⁴⁰⁹ into the East.

Thus, it becomes obvious that this alternative content of the Greek irredentism was encapsulated within the mission of civilizing of the East. Hellenism was conceived not

⁴⁰⁴Panagiotis Noutsos, “Gia tēn koinōnikē kai politikē leitourgia tōn “dianooumenōn” sto plaisio tou artisystatou ellēnikou kratous [On the political and social function of the intellectuals in the context of the newly founded Greek state], in *O Ellēnismos ston 19o aiōna. Ideologikes kai aisthētikes anazētēseis* [Hellenism in the 19th century. Ideological and aesthetic concerns], eds. Pantelēs Voutourēs and Giōrgios Geōrgēs (Athēna: Kastaniōtēs, 2006), 31.

⁴⁰⁵“Ti genēsetai;” [What is going to happen?], *Avgē*, no. 1748, August 23, 1866.

⁴⁰⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁷“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1430, November 15, 1867.

⁴⁰⁸“Ἐ Ellēnikē Anatolē en etei 1860” [The Greek East in 1860], *Aiōn*, no. 1948, December 17, 1860.

⁴⁰⁹Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismos*, 350.

only by the political elites, but also by the contemporary intellectuals and therefore by the journalist world as the cultural medium in order to canalize western ideas into the backward East. Even Kōlletēs, the “father” of *Megali Idea* was talking about the civilizing mission of Greece in the East.

Finally, that manichaeistic approach and the demonizing of the East as a part of the world that should be civilized was not only reflected in the Greek press but also in leading figures of the Cretan struggle. Markos Renierēs, the President of the Central Committee in Athens was a fervent supporter of the West and his actions were closely connected to the course of the Cretan cause. In an essay of his under the title “What is Greece?” he stressed Greece's historical role in the social refinement of the East. Actually the antibyzantinist⁴¹⁰ Renierēs was acknowledging that this special mission of Greece in the East could be accomplished only through the incorporation of western institutions as media “of the western cultural hegemony”⁴¹¹ and then to inject them into the East. However, an important prerequisite for doing that was the internal development of Greece.

According to Renierēs, the mission of the ancient Hellenism was to westernize the East through the separation of the human individuality from the eastern pantheism.⁴¹² Therefore, at the core of his ideas was the individuum as well as the respect to its rights⁴¹³, respectively. Ultimately, the president of the central revolutionary organ of the Cretan struggle could be perceived as the reincarnation of the internal dilemma which dominated the concept of *Megali Idea* in the course of the 19th century, namely the choice between modernization or expansive *megaloideatism*.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁰Renierēs himself was an anti-byzantine and an adherent of western modernization which was the inspiration for the Greek Enlightenment in the last quarter of the 18th century up and until the foundation of the Greek State.

⁴¹¹Markos Renierēs and Panagiōtis Gennēmatas, *Ti einai ē Ellas*; [What is Greece?] (Athēna: Roes, 1998), 32.

⁴¹²*Ibid.*, 58.

⁴¹³*Elpis* also focused on human rights. *Megali Idea*, according to the paper, coincided with the declaration *des Droits de l' home* while Islam was synonymous with retrogression and the Koran was considered an enemy of Human Rights. See “N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1443, February 14, 1868.

⁴¹⁴Renierēs and Gennēmatas, *Ti einai ē Ellas*; 26.

5.4.2 Greek Ottoman press: The case of *Neologos* and *Armonia*

An apt conclusion to this overview on the approach of the Greek press towards the ideological concept of *Megali Idea* might be a reference to the stance of Greek Ottoman newspapers. In particular, while delving into the press articles a dispute between two historical Constantinopolitan newspapers, *Neologos* and *Armonia* stood out as a characteristic example of the views those newspapers held in the period under discussion. That dispute is an opportunity to decode the way some of the major Constantinopolitan newspapers, which represented powerful factions of the Greek Ottoman community, conceived and interpreted the substance of *Megali Idea* and even more specifically the *mission civilisatrice* of Hellenism mentioned above.

The reason for this journalistic quarrel between the two newspapers, which however came along with very obvious political connotations, was the issue of the introduction of Greek as language of instruction in the Ottoman educational system. *Neologos*⁴¹⁵, which represented the ethnocentric part of the Greek community, was accused by *Armonia* of not promoting the value of equality among the different nationalities living in the Ottoman Empire, thusly demonstrating an aggressive expansionism.⁴¹⁶

According to *Neologos*, the idea of introducing the Greek language to secondary schools and higher Ottoman education relied upon the following two arguments: Firstly, the relation between the Greek language and other European languages could contribute to the “equaling of secondary and higher Ottoman education with the corresponding European educational system,” and secondly, among all the spoken languages of the East, Greek was considered to be the most complete so as to be taught in the two upper levels of Ottoman education.⁴¹⁷

Furthermore, in order for *Neologos* to reinforce its reasoning on the subject concerning language, claimed that in comparison to the other ethnic communities residing in the Ottoman Empire only the Greeks possessed a “national culture” which gave them the

⁴¹⁵Koloğlu describes *Neologos* as a radical paper which was supporting the revival of Byzantine Empire. Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*, 28.

⁴¹⁶“Oi en Anatolē Ellēnes” [The Greeks in the East], *Neologos*, no. 301, December 16, 1867.

⁴¹⁷*Ibid.*; “Oi en Anatolē Ellēnes” [The Greeks in the East], *Neologos*, no. 292, November 25, 1867. *Neologos* had already concerned itself with the topic of language in an article titled “Again about reforms” on April 26, 1867, in which it discussed the weakened condition of the Ottoman State. It is in this article that the opinion of some is mentioned, in brief, that Ottoman decadence was also due to the language as it did not contribute to the moral and intellectual development of the Ottomans. “Kai pali peri metarrythmiseōn” [Again about reforms], *Neologos*, no. 219, April 26, 1867.

right, and only them, to take on a civilizing mission of the East.⁴¹⁸ In conclusion, the newspaper highlighted the cultural uniqueness and superiority of the Greeks over the other non-Muslim people of the Ottoman Empire by stating that the Greek community is esteemed a *primus inter pares*.⁴¹⁹

On the other hand *Armonia* accused *Neologos* of cultural expansionism and the reasoning behind that was that the latter viewed the propagation of the Greek language as a hegemonic communication medium of the Ottoman Empire and as a vehicle for the assimilation of other orthodox communities. According to *Armonia* such an approach would eventually lead to other ethnic communities rallying against Hellenism.⁴²⁰

The subject of language was something that concerned the Ottoman side as well, as according to Mardin, the Young Ottoman Ali Suavi “supported the proposal of an orientalist friend of his by the name of Charles Willis that Ottoman schools should adopt Turkish as a single language of instruction.”⁴²¹ As a result the language issue, which contributed to the birth and propagation of nationalist notions among the non-Muslims of the Empire as early as the 18th century, became a controversial issue of public debate during the Cretan conflict. By deduction one could link this to the attempts made by the ethnic communities to dominate over one another but now under the influence of *Ottomanism*.

Neologos' ethnocentrism with regard to its approach of *Megali Idea*, becomes apparent in another article about the Greeks living in the Orient. In short, the author of that article claimed that the progress or retrogression of the ethnic groups living in the East went hand in hand with their espousal of the European culture which of course stemmed from Greek culture. In addition, readers of the aforementioned article will find a list of Ottoman cities where, according to the newspaper, the Greek element showed signs of especially elevated intellectual activity even before 1789. *Neologos*

⁴¹⁸“Oι en Anatolē Ellēnes,” *Neologos*, no. 301, December 16, 1867.

⁴¹⁹Ibid.

⁴²⁰“N/A,” *Armonia*, no. 630, December 20, 1867. Alongside *Armonia*, *Kōnstantinoupolis*, another Greek Ottoman paper, recognized the existence of different ethnic minorities within the Ottoman realm which were obligated to coexist peacefully for the common good of the *Vaterland*. The paper, however, also emphasized that Hellenism should not only be considered a separate ethnicity but should also be seen as an “ideal principle” driven by an ecumenical civilizing vision. See “Oι laoi tēs Anatolēs” [The people of the East], *Kōnstantinoupolis*, no. 582, June 18, 1869.

⁴²¹Mardin, *The Genesis*, 371.

viewed these cities as means of conveyance of a cultural value system from the urban regions of the Empire to the rural areas.⁴²² The importance of these urban centers as a means of transmitting ideological currents to a broader range of social class had already been acknowledged as early as the 18th century when the Greek Ottoman middle class, comprised mainly of merchants, contributed to the “Hellenization” of other Balkan ethnic communities.

While having a clearer picture of how the notion of *Megali Idea* was approached by the Greek Ottoman press, we can conclude that the perception of each and every newspaper edited in Constantinople followed its own political, communal and/or other agenda. It is worth stating however that the Greek Ottoman newspapers in their entirety supported the reformative efforts of the Porte. Still, in some cases, like that of *Neologos*, the approval of the principle of equality came with ethnocentric connotations intending to elevate the Greek ethnic element to a state of *primus inter pares* within the Ottoman ethnic-religious mosaic. According to the opinions expressed in the newspaper, the striving for equality which the Ottoman polity proclaimed could only be achieved via the implementation of the principle of nationalities.⁴²³

5.5 *Megali Idea*: A “private issue”? The Central Committee in Athens and Greek foreign policy

Besides the Crimean War, the Cretan movement of 1866 proved to be the second most serious challenge for Greek nationalists since the foundation of the Greek Kingdom. Even though scholars on *Megali Idea* have systematically focused on the examination of the irredentist notion from the viewpoint of the political elites and the state, little attention has been paid to the role of the private authorities/actors.

During the study of the Cretan movement one of the main questions which come to mind deals with the carriers of the notion of *Megali Idea*. There is no doubt, that the question of “who” and “how” becomes more emphatic in periods of political

⁴²²“Οι εν Ανατολῇ Ἑλλῆνες,” *Neologos*, no. 286, November 11, 1867.

⁴²³“Ἐ αρχῆ τῶν ἐθνικότητῶν καὶ ἔ Τουρκία” [The nationality principle and Turkey], *Neologos*, no. 228, May 6, 1867.

turbulence. Thus, the Cretan crisis of 1866 provides us an excellent opportunity to pay attention to the private factor, as a decisive carrier of the nationalist ideology and determinant of the Greek policy with regard to ethnic issues. Private actors played a crucial role in pursuing of Greek irredentism in the second half of the 19th century and undertook efforts which they believed could bridge possible gaps in competence of the Greek state.⁴²⁴

In this context, my objective in this part of the work is to shed light on the function of a non-state private actor, namely of the Central Committee at Athens⁴²⁵ [Kentrikē Epitropē yper tōn Krētōn] as an important key-player which was charged to some extent with governmental responsibilities and powers with regard to the Cretan issue. Special focus will be also laid on the Committee's role in the political developments which led finally to the rupture of the diplomatic relations between the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire in 1868.

Private initiatives in favor of or the contribution of non-state actors to the dissemination of nationalist notion throughout the 19th century was not something uncommon in the Greek state. The emergence of the so-called "syllogomania"⁴²⁶ owed its existence to the steadily increasing private initiative with respect to the foundation of clubs, associations and committees not only in the Greek Kingdom but in the Ottoman Empire as well. Most of them served the diffusion of Greek literary culture in regions with remarkable Greek demographic presence, having therewith literary as well as political-ideological goals.⁴²⁷ Such an interaction between civil society and government was also encapsulated in the foundation of the Central Committee. A point of decisive importance in the function of the Central Committee

⁴²⁴Ioannis Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität 1870-1912. Staat und private Akteure vor dem Hintergrund der „Megali Idea“* [The nationalization of Greek identity 1870-1912. State and private actors considering the "Megali Idea"] (München: Oldenburg Verlag, 2002), 269.

⁴²⁵For the purposes of the present work, the term Central Committee is used when referring to the Central Committee of Athens.

⁴²⁶„Die Gründung von Vereinen, Gesellschaften und Komitees war im 19. Jahrhundert ein im gesamten griechischsprachigen Raum weit verbreitetes Phänomen. Viele von ihnen verfolgten eine primär literarische bzw. kulturell geprägte Zielsetzung (...) und wirkten in dieser Weise auf die Ausbreitung des griechischen Nationalbewußtseins.“ [The founding of associations, societies and committees was a widespread phenomenon in all Greek-speaking regions during the 19th century. Many of them primarily had a literary, or rather, had a cultural goal (...) and in this way impacted the dissemination of Greek national consciousness.] Ibid., 71, note 135.

⁴²⁷For more details on the phenomenon of the *syllogomania* and the function of the GPSC see subchapter nr. 7.2.2.

was that it was strongly engaged in the decision-making processes during the Cretan conflict and quite often functioned as a state within a state.

As it has been mentioned in the historical overview, the Greek state had officially taken aloof from the developments on the island already in the beginning of the crisis by discouraging the Christians from taking action against the Ottoman state. Parallel with the Greek state's official policy of non-interventionism into the Cretan affairs we became witnesses of a rapid emergence of private actors' initiatives. These initiatives resulted in the foundation of non-governmental institutions which carried out multilayered tasks, though, almost always under the full or partial supervision of the Greek government.

The study of the Cretan events of 1866 leads us to the conclusion that Central Committee decisively participated in the Cretan issue by even substituting sometimes the state's monopoly in the conduct of foreign policy. That informal "institutional" role of the Committee which was reflected in its function as an autonomous decision-making organ was acknowledged by the Athenian press as well.

The Central Committee assumed actually an umbrella function for the subcommittees established in different urban centers with large Greek populations like Constantinople⁴²⁸, London, Manchester and Liverpool.⁴²⁹ Additionally, it was in close cooperation with *Filikē Etaireia* in Athens which was presided by the Archbishop of Athens Theofilos. To the main objectives of the aforementioned association belonged also the instigation of the populations living in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia in a general war against the Porte.⁴³⁰

Committees, like the Central Committee at Athens, not only acted auxiliary to the state's foreign policy conduct but they also functioned as party organs and means of political pressure in the internal political arena as well. Thus, it may be argued that the

⁴²⁸ A collaboration of the committees and the russophile Koumountouros' government is evident in Vassiadēs' report to the Constantinopolitan Committee in which it is mentioned that Botsarēs, Minister of War on the Koumountouros cabinet, suggested the extension of the Committee's activities to Istanbul by recruiting members from other regions such as Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia. Stefanos Makrymichalos, "Anekdotia eggrafa ek tou archeiou Skouloudē schetika me tēn Krētikē Epanastasē 1866-1869. Symvolē eis tēn neōteran krētikēn istorian" [Unpublished documents from Skouloudēs' archive concerning the Cretan Revolution 1866-1869. A contribution to late Cretan history], *Krētika Chronika* 12 (1958): 27.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

raison d'être and function of such committees were nurtured by „the public opinion’s urge for nationalist action, on whose ground private acteurs could establish themselves as so to say official representatives of the Greek national interests.“⁴³¹

Greek governments were sometimes “forced” to cooperate with such private actors in the decision-making policy. This happened because the committees often acted in a dangerous “paradiplomatic” way without paying any attention at the fragile boundaries between domestic, national and international state interests. This paralysis of the state’s monopoly in the decision-making process affected the Cretan cause by putting the interests of the Cretan Christian element in danger.

The Central Committee was founded on 29 July 1866. It was composed primarily of 23 and later on, of only seven members, all of them being prominent figures of the Greek society and advocates of *Megali Idea* as well.⁴³² Interestingly, the Committee was founded at suggestion of the Russophile Koumoundouros and functioned actually under his auspices. It is more than obvious, that the vast majority of the Committee’s members were politically and ideologically affiliated with Koumoundouros⁴³³ as they belonged to the wing of the Unionists who fervently supported Crete’s secession to Greece.

The Committee was not only devoted to humanitarian tasks but it also acted as a strong oppositional pole against moderate political voices as well. There is also no doubt that the Committee played an important role in the orientation of the Greek foreign policy with regard to the Cretan events as its members took sometimes political initiatives even without consensus of Koumoundouros. Thus, despite its patriotic orientation the Central Committee became subject of criticism. The author of a pamphlet which was published anonymously targeted the Committee by arguing that it was comprised of “lawyers, bankers, doctors and so-named economists”⁴³⁴ who were totally ignorant of the Cretan reality as well as of the island’s topography. As

⁴³¹ “dem nationalistischen Aktionsdrang der Öffentlichkeit, aufgrund derer sich private Akteure als quasi offizielle Vertreter griechischer nationaler Interessen etablieren konnten.” Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung*, 83.

⁴³² These members were L. Melas, G. Skouze, D. S. Mavrokordatos, I. Skaltsounēs, Ch. Christopoulos, A. F. Papadakēs and M. Renierēs. See Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 308.

⁴³³ A detail which undoubtedly points to the close relationship between Koumoundouros and the Committee’s members is the fact that Renierēs used the same cryptology as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Koumoundouros’ governorship. Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 392

⁴³⁴ *Ta sfalmata tōn en Elladi epi tēs Krētikēs Epanastasēs tou 1866-67-68* [The Greek faults in the Cretan cause 1866-67-68] (N/A: N/A, N/A), 27.

result they were totally incompetent to take the fortunes of the island in their hands. The Committee's members were further accused of following risky policies with regard to a national issue whose fate was sacrificed on the altar of narrow partisan and adventurous ideologies. Besides these "anonymous" accusations, leading figures of the Cretan movement were also suspicious of the Committee's engagement in the Cretan issue. In a note of 2nd October 1868, Zybrakakēs, a prominent Cretan chieftain, denounced the Central Committee by stating that its function was proved harmful for the Cretan interests.

Committee's first engagement in the Greek politics goes back in the beginning of 1866, when it embarked (under the supervision as well as at suggestion of Koumoundouros) on negotiations with the Rumanian government for the formation of a Balkan alliance against the Porte.⁴³⁵ Further, the influence and involvement of the Committee in the Cretan developments is manifested once more in the insurgents' visit to Athens, where they met with Dēmētrios Kallergēs⁴³⁶ and Markos Renierēs⁴³⁷, two prominent Cretan figures, in order to get advices related to organizational issues of the movement.

It should be underlined that Koumoundouros and the Committee's members did not always agree on policy matters in relation to the Cretan struggle. As expected, sooner or later, there was disagreement between the two parties. The reason for this internal crisis in the Committee was the cooptation of Mavrokordatos (a member of Committee) for the role of political leader in the Cretan movement. According to Koumoundouros such a decision would entail a lot of risk due to the fact that the concentration of power in a single person would make the new Governor more vulnerable to the Ottoman policy.⁴³⁸ Therefore, Koumoundouros favored a more decentralized hierarchy of the movement as well as the existence of more than one

⁴³⁵Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 47.

⁴³⁶Dēmētrios Kallergēs was a Cretan-born high-ranking military official. He warned the Cretans not to get involved in an armed conflict against the Porte and, in general, kept a more moderate stance in whatever concerned the Cretan issue in comparison to Renierēs who was a fanatic supporter of *Megali Idea*.

⁴³⁷Markos Renierēs was born in Trier in 1815 and was Greek Ambassador in Constantinople during 1860. In 1862 he resigned from the post and in collaboration with K. Paparrigopoulos, A. Rizo Rangavēs, N. Dragoumēs and G.A.Vasileiou launched the magazine *Spectateur de l'Orient*. Main concern of the magazine's edition was to make the European public opinion familiar with the objectives of the Greek policy. Moreover, Renierēs was member and later president of the Central Committee. <http://ha.nbg.gr/editions/editions5/pdf/chronologio.pdf> last accessed February 12, 2009.

⁴³⁸Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 231-3.

decision and action centers, which would strategically contribute to the success of the Cretan cause.⁴³⁹

After having been suggested by the Grand Vizier to accept a semi-independent status of Crete under the protection of the Powers, the Cretan Christians decided to send a commission to Athens in order to discuss Ali Paşa's proposals with the Committee. This fueled a new disagreement among the Committee's members. Skaltsounēs, one of the founding members of the Committee, referred in his memoirs to the aforementioned disagreement by noticing that it led to the formation of different wings among the members. On the one hand, Renierēs, Melas, Papadakēs and Skouzes formed the radical wing by opposing Grand Vizier's suggestions and on the other hand, Mavrokordatos and Skaltsounēs represented the moderate fraction by accepting the proposal for a semi-independent Crete as they believed that it was the best way for the conflict's resolution and a milestone for the island's secession to Greece in middle-term perspective.⁴⁴⁰ The above described split within the Committee was the main reason for Skaltsounēs' resignation from the Committee. Ultimately, in his resignation letter of 28th October 1867, Skaltsounēs strongly disputed the advisory capacity of the Committee with regard to the Cretan affairs.

The last year of the Cretan conflict was marked by the reluctant diplomatic stance of the European powers as well as by Russia's diplomatic retreat from the issue and accordingly by the weakening of the Cretans' moral. With respect to the latter and the discussion among the Cretan insurgents to favor the solution of a semi-independent state under the auspices of Great Britain raised concerns among the Unionists in Greece due to the fact that in case of such a solution the aspirations of the radicals for a union of the island with the motherland would be eventually evaporated.

In an attempt to stir up the public opinion against Voulgarēs' government, Renierēs suggested the Cretans in May 1868 to elect and send to Athens a delegation of deputies in order to take part in the Greek parliament's session.⁴⁴¹ Voulgarēs reacted immediately to that initiative of Renierēs, as it was believed that such a development

⁴³⁹The Athenian *Avgē* did not agree with Koumoundouros' approach to the issue and supported the proposal for a single authority in the movement. "Sōsate tēn Krētēn" [Save Crete], *Avgē*, no. 1961, July 3, 1867.

⁴⁴⁰Iōannēs Skaltsounēs, *Apomnēmonevmata anaferomena eis tēn anagennēsīn tēs Krētēs* [Memoires referring to the resurrection of Crete] (Chania: Ē proodos, 1900), 15.

⁴⁴¹Makrymichalos, "Anekdotā eggrafa," 94.

on behalf of the insurgents would undermine the neutral stance of the government in the Cretan issue. Within this context, Voulgarēs threatened with suspension of the Committee’s financing.⁴⁴² Being, however, under pressure, the Greek Prime Minister was forced to accept the Committee’s proposal in November 1868.

By the end of 1868 the Cretan insurgents intended to officially propose to Great Britain the solution of hegemony for the resolution of the conflict. This development alarmed the Committee which was ready to employ all means in order to avoid such a compromise, either by bribing the Cretan chieftains of the Western departments or by physically eliminating prominent advocates of the Hegemony solution. The solution of Hegemony was unacceptable even for Sakopoulos, the Greek consul on the island, who argued that only Koumoundouros and the Committee were responsible for the Cretans’ fates.⁴⁴³

The decision of the Greek government to send armed volunteers to Crete under the leadership of Petropoulakēs met also the reaction of the islanders who were opposed to the appointment of the Cretan chieftain as they believed that the official participation of armed Greeks in the Cretan struggle would further deteriorate the situation on the island. The volunteers’ enrollment and departure was taking place in a quite provocative and explicit way, as the corps paraded in front of the Ottoman embassy in Athens. This development caused the reaction of the Fotiadis, the Ottoman ambassador to Athens, who immediately contacted Fuad Paşa by suggesting the immediate rupture of the diplomatic relations with the Greek Kingdom.⁴⁴⁴ Thus, the first point of the Ottoman ultimatum which was delivered to the Greek government on 11 December 1868 referred to the “immediate dissolution of all organized irregular bands of volunteers and prevention of the formation of new ones.”⁴⁴⁵

Finally, it should be mentioned here, that the Unionists encountered the Porte’s decision to break off the diplomatic relations with great satisfaction, as it was believed that such a development would probably lead in one way or another to the intervention of the Great Powers on favor of Crete and to subsequent territorial gains for Greece and the Cretans.

⁴⁴²Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 3:156.

⁴⁴³Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 3: 207.

⁴⁴⁴Ibid., 430-441.

⁴⁴⁵Tatsios, *The Cretan problem*, 105.

5.5.1 The Central Committee in the press

Without doubt the Greek press contributed to the conceptualization of the Greek irredentism in the function and mission of the private committees. The Athenian newspapers systematically propagated (intentionally or not) the committees' function and acted as mouthpiece of their activities. As result, the press published on a regular footing the announcements of the Committee thereby acknowledging its decisive contribution to the Cretan struggle by. In general, it could be argued, that Athenian newspapers functioned as an informal communication channel between the Committee, the Greek political parties, the consular corps and the public opinion within or without the borders of the Greek Kingdom.

The Athenian *Elpis* for example regarded the closer and truthful cooperation between the Central Committee and the Greek government as a self-evident precondition for the formation of a common front against the Ottomans, due to the fact that Greece was officially bound to international conventions and agreements that prevented her from participating in the Cretan movement.⁴⁴⁶ Despite the fact that *Avgē* not fully backed the phenomenon of the mushrooming growth of committees in different regions of Hellenism, the Athenian paperacknowledged the importance of the Central Committee for the purposes of the Cretan struggle. *Avgē* argued that it was needed a central coordination of all these private initiatives in order the purposes of the national cause to be effectively served.⁴⁴⁷

Nonetheless, the Central Committee as well as its subdivision in Syros became also subject of criticism with regard to the way they made use of the raised funds.⁴⁴⁸ In comparison to the Athenian press, the Constantinopolitan *Neologos* sharply criticized the function and the role of the Committees. In a translated article which was republished by the newspaper on 12 April 1867, it was pointed out that “the Relief Committees at Athens and Syros gained advantage of involving the Greek government into the Cretan issue and of convincing the latter for the Russian intention to contribute to the island’s unification with Greece.”⁴⁴⁹ At this point, it should be also

⁴⁴⁶“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1416, August 1, 1867.

⁴⁴⁷“Ἐ synchronis tōn idiōtikōn energeiōn” [The confusion of private initiatives], *Avgē*, no. 1838, December 27, 1866.

⁴⁴⁸Tsirintanēs, *Ἐ politikē*, 2: 516.

⁴⁴⁹“Τα τῆς Κρήτης καὶ τοῦ Ανατολικοῦ Ζήτημα” [The developments on Crete and the Eastern Question], *Neologos*, no. n/a, April 12, 1867.

stressed that even newspapers which were affiliated to anglophile Voulgarēs, appeared reluctant in criticizing the responsibilities of the Central Committee in the Cretan conflict. A reasonable explanation for their stance may be the fear of being accused of betraying national interests or of provoking the reaction of the public opinion.

6 Facets of *Ottomanism*

The aim of the present chapter is to examine the notion of *Ottomanism* not only in the way it was featured in the Ottoman press but also through its reflections on the Ottoman policies concerning the Cretan issue. The press material selected for the purposes of the present work mainly revolves around the Young Ottoman press, even though *Ottomanism* was primarily a state-driven, state-building process. This, however, does not obstruct any attempts to illustrate how the Ottoman statesmen and the intelligentsia perceived the salvation of the Empire under the pressure of the Cretan developments.

It is, admittedly, a difficult task to highlight the civic nationalist policies brought forth during a period of armed struggle when the polarization of the masses and political ideas were at their zenith. However, it is reasonable to classify the Porte's initiatives for the pacification of Crete as *Ottomanist* policies that were aimed at preventing the expansion of separatist movements in other parts of the realm by introducing a range of reformative measures.⁴⁵⁰

Osmanlılık is clearly a concept that expressed the need to maintain the integrity and cohesion of the Empire against the wave of nationalism within the non-Muslim communities. For this reason *Ottomanism* can be better understood as a state policy intending to mold patriotic ideals (or compatriotic ideals) in a fragmented Ottoman multiethnic mosaic. The spirit of the concept becomes particularly evident when examining the attempts of the ruling political elite to create a collective identity for the residents of the Ottoman realm as “a significant step on the road to a purely secular concept of state and citizenship.”⁴⁵¹ The new status of the relationship between the subjects of the realm and the state was based on compatriotic ideals expressed through the word *vatandaş* (compatriot), which had an important place not only in the political rhetoric of the time but also in journalistic language and the vernacular of the people.

⁴⁵⁰Somel argues that the spirit of *Ottomanist* policies during the period of the *Tanzimat* was grounded in political pragmatism, namely, the prevention of the separatist movements in the Ottoman realm. Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmancılık Düşünçesi (1839-1913)” [Ottomanist thought in the age of Ottoman reforms (1839-1913)], in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, 8th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 92.

⁴⁵¹Roderic H. Davison “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century,” *The American Historical Review* 59, no 4 (1954): 852. When referring to (com)patriotism it must be stated that the term *vatandaş* (compatriot) was initially used in the ıslahat firmeni. See Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmancılık,” 96.

When the Cretan conflict broke out, the Ottoman political elite was still preoccupied with saving the Empire. The implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms, which had already begun by the late 18th century and were solidified with the promulgation of the “Ottoman modernity’s Magna Carta”⁴⁵² of 1839 (Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhâne) and the reform edict of 1856 (Islâhat Fermanı), became an inextricable part of *Ottomanism* as they were thought of as a panacea for any menace threatening the Empire's integrity.

It is my opinion that the broad administrative reforms proposed by the Porte in order to resolve the Cretan crisis were not only part of the process to pacify the islanders but were also an indicator of *Ottomanism's* delayed actualization in the periphery of the Empire. Moreover, the Grand Vizier Ali Paşa's personal involvement in establishing the reformative measures in Crete strongly demonstrated the Porte's determination to import the spirit of *Ottomanism* to Crete. Of course the Ottoman political elite had no intention of losing the island and also wanted to prevent any European interventions.

Speaking of reforms, one should keep in mind that *Ottomanism* primarily served as a state-building nationalism which intended to “to render the boundaries of the nation and governance unit congruent by transforming a multinational state into a national one.”⁴⁵³ There is no doubt that such a process was not only a development of the 1860s but rather an ongoing process, which was officially initiated with the reform edict of 1839 and reached a turning point with the declaration of *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* in 1856. Both of these edicts gradually reinforced the direct rule of the center and lessened the local elites’ power, respectively.⁴⁵⁴ In sum, the core idea of the reforms was to create an Ottoman citizen along the lines of the security of life, honor, and property. Davison, thus, describes the adoption of the doctrine of equality and specifically the structural turn in the way the non-Muslims were to be regarded and treated as “one of the most significant aspects of Ottoman history.”⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵²“Osmanlı modernitesinin “Magna Carta’sı.” Ibid., 93.

⁴⁵³Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 62.

⁴⁵⁴According to Somel the evolution of *Ottomanism* throughout the 19th century should be divided into four chronological phases as follows: 1) 1830-1875, a period defined by the Porte’s centralist policies 2) 1868-1878, a decade marked by the presence of the Young Ottomans and the introduction of constitutionalism which followed 3) the Young Turks' efforts to promote the ottomanist notion in opposition with Hamidian absolutism and finally 4) *Ottomanism* of the 2nd constitutional period. Somel, “Osmanli Reform Çağında Osmancılık,” 88.

⁴⁵⁵Davison, “Turkish Attitudes,” 846.

In spite of the enthusiastic and inspirational announcements concerning the reformative measures, most of the promised changes remained unfulfilled for several reasons. One of those reasons being the divergence of a society steadily evolving on the one hand and on the other a monolithic, traditionalist and bureaucratic mechanism that hindered the implementation of the reforms. Furthermore, the integrative efforts of the political elite in order to create an ideal supranational fatherland were combated by the traditional hierarchy of the *millet*s who strove to maintain their advantageous position of power. Thus, efforts to westernize all levels of the administrative and bureaucratic mechanism as well as attempts on behalf of the Ottoman statesmen to instill patriotic loyalty into the non-Muslim subjects of the realm were ineffective. This highlights the premise that a united national consciousness and patriotism were ideals incompatible with loyalty to a dynasty in a multinational state.

Regarding the Cretan case two aspects of the crisis were centered upon, which are considered not only to be part of the Ottoman strategy for the resolution of the conflict but also a dimension of the Ottoman state-building policy.

The first of these two aspects has to do with the Ottoman policies at a local level and the introduction of a broad reformative plan, while the second pertains to the *Nationality Law*, passed only shortly after the end of the Cretan insurrection, threatening the Greek residents of the Ottoman Empire with deportation. Whether or not these policies were inclusive, it is a fact that these two facets of the issue were an expression of a desire the Ottoman political elite had to shape the ideal of compatriotism among the populations living in the realm and to secure the unification of the Empire resisting any centrifugal nationalist dynamics.

Alongside the Porte's initiatives to control any ethnic centrifugal developments an oppositional group emerged and was made up of intellectuals with bureaucratic experience. The Young Ottomans, being against the "super-Westernization"⁴⁵⁶ policies of the Porte, criticized the Ottoman political elite in their journalistic articles mainly by writing in opposition to Ali and Fuad Paşa and their policies in various fields of internal Ottoman affairs.

There is no doubt, the political elite and the intellectual alliance perceived the Empire's salvation differently. Consequently, this affected how the Young Ottomans criticized

⁴⁵⁶Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 23.

the Porte's conduct concerning the Cretan Question. Nevertheless, even though their views and ideological propensities were different, the Young Ottomans imputed the actions of the Ottoman statesmen to the interventions of the West in the internal affairs of the Empire. Making use of their newspapers as a means to express their distrust of the Porte, leading figures of the opposition group such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa analyzed the Cretan issue within the broader context of the Eastern Question not only to condemn the Porte's reluctant stance but also to point out the issue of the European Powers' colonial attitudes.

More specifically, when reading the articles of Namık Kemal, one may see him as one of the most radical Young Ottomans regarding the Cretan issue, as he proposed the Sultan declare war against the Greek Kingdom on the grounds that the Greeks acted in violation of the *hukuk-i ümem*[international law] and the spirit of the Paris Treaty.⁴⁵⁷ The Young Ottoman poet also emphasized that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) was a critical juncture for the genesis of the Eastern Question, thereby acknowledging it, primarily, as a religious issue and not only as a political one:

“With the article, which Russia allowed to be included in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca the Christian Ottoman citizens were put under her protection. The Muslims are a considerable part of the Ottoman Empire's population and the state mechanism is rooted in Islamic ground. On the other hand, the western countries that appeared to act at the detriment of the Ottoman state are grounded in Christianity.”⁴⁵⁸

The fact that the implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms were met with a backlash, not only from the various Muslim groups of Ottoman society, but also from the non-

⁴⁵⁷“N/A,” *Hürriyyet*, no. 27, Ramazân 14, 1285/December 28, 1868: “Bunlardan başka Yunan erâziliñden sefâret-i seniyyeye vuku' bulan hakaretlerinden dolayı daha Yunan devleti iktizâ' eden tarzîyeyi vermezse, Devlet-i Âliyye i'lân-i harbe haklidir.” [Furthermore, if the Greek state refuses to apologise, as is her obligation, for the insults spewed out against the Ottoman delegation, then the Ottoman Empire has the right to declare war.]

⁴⁵⁸ „Rusya'nın, Kaynarca Anlaşması'na koydurduğu madde ile Osmanlı tebaası olan Hristiyanları himaye altına almıştır. Osmanlı Devleti'nin nüfusunu önemli bir kısmı Musluman'dır ve devlet sistemi İslami esaslara dayanır. Buna karşılık Osmanlı Devletinin aleyhine gelişme gösteren Batılı devletler Hristiyanlık esasına dayanırlar.” Musa Gümüç, “Namık Kemâl'e göre “Şark Meselesi” ve Osmanlı Devleti'ni Çöküşe Götüren Sorunlar” [“The Eastern Question” according to Namık Kemâl and the issues that brought on the downfall of the Ottoman Empire], *International Journal of History* 2, (2010): 149.

Muslim⁴⁵⁹ communities (especially from their conservative leaders) may be an indication that the Young Ottoman's anti-governmental rhetoric had also impacted other segments of Ottoman society. In other words, the Young Ottomans should not be viewed as an impromptu association of conservative intellectuals but rather as an expression of the discontent that sprang from Europe's growing interventionism and the reluctance of the ruling class toward it. In this sense the Cretan case and the concessions of the Porte to the revolutionaries provided the Young Ottomans with an excellent opportunity to stir up the displeasure of the people, targeting the image of the political leading figures accordingly.

6.1 Ali Paşa takes the situation in his own hands

Despite the Porte's systematic efforts to understate the consequences of the Cretan conflict, the Grand Vizier's mission (October 1867 - February 1868) on the island demonstrates the importance of the issue in the political agenda of the Ottoman government.⁴⁶⁰ His mission becomes even more prominent if one takes into consideration that Ali Paşa “was the most conservative Muslim of the four [leading statesmen of the Tanzimat] and cautious in moving ahead with reform measures” and that it was the Cretan question that he made the proposition to the Porte for a “speedier application of the policy of equality.”⁴⁶¹

With regard to Ali Paşa's mission in itself, it is my opinion that the people who accompanied him during his stay on the island show the Grand Vizier's firm intentions to discard the old and corrupted traditional elements by bridging the gap between the Christian islanders and *Rum milleti*. His efforts to pursue the notion of *Ottomanism* by appointing Greek Ottomans in key positions was a decisive development for the

⁴⁵⁹Roderic H. Davison, *Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi (1774-1923)*, trans. Mehmet Moralı (İstanbul: Alkım, 2004), 177.

⁴⁶⁰ Concerning conflict resolution in late Ottoman history, it is clear that missions of high ranking officials to areas experiencing turbulence in order to restore the peace were part of the Porte's common practices. Similar to the Cretan Case is the crisis of Mount Lebanon where such a mission can also be examined. Farah states that the mission, besides its investigatory nature, also served as proactive measure in order to eliminate “grounds for outside interference” Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 137.

⁴⁶¹Davison, “Turkish Attitudes,” 851; See also Davison, *Osmanli Turk Tarihi*, 172-173.

Ottoman administration on the island as well as for the manner in which the center perceived that important peripheral region.

According to Charles Mismar, the editor of the Turkish semi-official newspaper *La Turquie*, the people who accompanied the Grand Vizier in Crete were the following:

“Cabouly-Pacha, minister des travaux publics, connu pour sa collection numismatique, Réouf-Pacha, general de division, grand écuyer du sultan, Carathéodory-Effendi, aujourd’hui prince de Samos, après avoir traverse le ministère des affaires étrangères et représenté la Turquie au congrés de Berlin, Kostaki Adossidis et Sawas Effendis, devenus plus tard pachas et gouverneurs de l’île de Crète, Mahmoud-Bey, secrétaire pour la langue turque, plusieurs aides-de-camp et un venerable Hodja, Medjid Effendi, ami particulier du Grand-Vizir et précepteur d’un de ses fils.”⁴⁶²

Resembling Sakib Efendi’s mission on Mount Lebanon in 1841, Ali Paşa used the *Tanzimat* language in order to arouse sentiments of compatriotism and equality among the local population. The general amnesty granted to the insurgents and the liberation of all the captives of war were symbolic maneuvers of great importance on behalf of the Porte in hopes of promptly leading the island to its pacification so as to proceed with the reorganization of Crete’s administration.

In addition, the ideological and political significance of Ali Paşa’s presence on the island as well as the motives behind his mission were clearly expressed in his testament addressed to the Sultan Abdülaziz, in which he emphasized the need to immediately put into effect the ideals of *Ottomanism*. Even if the Ottoman statesman

⁴⁶²Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du Monde Musulman*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Libraire Hachette et C^{er} 1892), 25f. As expected Savvas and Adosidis Paşas, both Greek Ottomans, who accompanied Ali Paşa to Crete, were finally appointed as governors of the administrative units of Sfakia and Lasithi respectively. The significance of the Porte’s decision to appoint Greek Ottomans to major administrative posts on the island is also visible in an incident which was revealed in a diplomatic dispatch between the Greek consul on the island and the Greek Foreign Minister. In this dispatch the Greek Consul makes it known that Sava Paşa took the initiative to celebrate Holy Mass in the village Kaina during Ali Paşa’s stay in Crete, showing the villagers that he too was one of them. It was a profound statement, with Sava Paşa’s goal being to convince the Christians about the regime’s good intentions as well as to instill a sense of safety to the local population. Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis 1866-1869. Ektheseis tōn en Krētē proksenōn tēs Ellados,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970), 135. The declaration, however, of the Provisional Government on 29 January 1868, wherein the Constantinopolitan Christian administrative officers were accused of being enemies of the fatherland, emphatically demonstrates the level of suspicion the local element had for the planned changes. *Ibid.*, 147.

believed that one of the main reasons the insurrection had taken place, was the desire of the Christian element to undermine⁴⁶³ the economic predominance of the Muslim Cretans, he intended to introduce an egalitarian system of administration to the island. Summarizing the contents of his testament, it mainly revolves around “recommendations regarding the necessity of balanced budget, progressive taxation, civil service reform, privatization, and conflict resolution in a multiethnic society (...).”⁴⁶⁴

Commenting on Ali Paşa’s mission, even Stilmann, the American consul on the island known to be a philhellene with pro-Cretan views during the struggle, said that “the manner and views of the Grand Vizier impressed me with profound respect and sympathy- his proffers seemed to me reasonable, and likely to assure to the Cretans a substantial liberty and reform.”⁴⁶⁵ He went on to say that “the Cretans had better accept A’ali Pasha’s propositions, but our Minister at Constantinople wrote me to urge their rejection with all my influence, as the certain condition of independence.”⁴⁶⁶

Statements such as the above, especially from diplomats who harshly criticized the Porte's conduct in the Cretan issue, demonstrate how the foreign diplomats on the island viewed Ali's initiative to introduce the Organic Statute. It was not only the foreign diplomats who reacted positively to Ali's reformative measures though. Another consequence of the Grand Vizier's proposals that needs to be taken into consideration is the discord induced among the Cretans which led a segment of the insurgents to have a positive opinion and to accept the reorganized administrative status of the island.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶³Türkgeldi, *Mesail-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*, 3: 130.

⁴⁶⁴ Fuat Andic and Suphan Andic, *The Last of the Ottoman Grandees. The Life and the Political Testament of Ali Pasa* (Istanbul: The Isis Press 1996), x.

⁴⁶⁵ Stillman, *The Cretan Insurrection*, 143.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁴⁶⁷ Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 535-545; 559-560.

6.2 The *Organic Statute* of Crete: The path to salvation is paved with good intentions

Like in the case of the Vilâyetnâme, the *Organic Statute*⁴⁶⁸ of Crete is considered to be “a living portrayal of his [Ali Paşa] opinion on how to administer justly a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society and how to resolve conflicts.”⁴⁶⁹ Therefore, one could say that through the introduction of reforms the Porte aimed at an “administrative redistricting that inhibits the secessionists’ potential for collective action (...).”⁴⁷⁰ However, the decision to introduce an *Organic Statute* once again showed the total absence of reformative initiatives in the years before the crisis of 1866. The spirit of *Ottomanism* which was lacking on the island concerned Ali Paşa to such an extent that he “wrote for the Sublime Porte a remarkable memorandum recommending a speedier application of the policy of equality.”⁴⁷¹

Texts such as the *Règlement Organic* for Mount Lebanon and the Vilâyetnâme of 1864 are undoubtedly the basis upon which this new Charta for Crete was drafted. The main development in local affairs brought about by this law was the implementation of the representation principle in the administrative mechanism of the island.⁴⁷² Additionally, an important detail concerning the formulation of the *Organic Statute* is that it was drawn up under the supervision of the Greek Ottoman neo-Phanariot Alexandros Karatheodoris. It was the Porte's desire to reorganize the administration of a turbulent region by acknowledging the advice of a Christian who was also an experienced administrative official. With this in mind, Anton Prokesch, the Austrian ambassador in Istanbul, argued that the *règlement organique* had taken a more liberal direction compared to the *Vilayet Law*, without at all questioning the Porte's sovereignty however.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁸The *Organic Statute* was composed of the following four parts: The *règlement organique* (14 articles), *règlement judiciaire* (78 articles), *règlement administrative* (44 articles) and the *règlement concernant l'organisation du conseil-général* (33 articles). The text is to be found in Gregoire Aristarchi Bey, *Législation ottoman, ou revue des lois, règlements, ordonnances, traités, capitulations et autres documents officiels de l' Empire ottoman* (Constantinople: Bureau du Journal Thraky, 1874), 2: 169-203. For a Greek version of the *Organic Statute* see also Eleftherios Prevelakēs and Vasilikē Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis 1866-1869,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970) 389-420.

⁴⁶⁹Andic, *The Last of the Ottoman Grandees*, 25-26.

⁴⁷⁰Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 79.

⁴⁷¹Davison, “Turkish Attitudes,” 851.

⁴⁷²Kalliatakē-Mertikopoulou, *Ellēnikos alytrōtismos*, 136.

⁴⁷³*Ibid.*, 133.

On the other hand, the Greek historian Kalliatakē draws the conclusion that the *Organic Statute* is the perfect example of the center's direct governance of the island. Unlike in Lebanon where the governor was of Christian faith and also an army and police commander, responsible for the appointment of administrative officials below him, the Vali of Crete and the high-ranking officials of the administrative departments of the island were appointed directly by the Porte.⁴⁷⁴ These weak points of the newly introduced reforms led to further turmoil on the island in the years to come, which ultimately engendered the *Pact of Halepa* in 1878 thus procuring broad autonomy for the Cretans.

Furthermore, there were some sections of the new administrative law that eventually questioned the good intentions of the commission who were vested with responsibility to draw up the final regulation (under the Grand Vizier's supervision), which was announced on February 3rd 1868. Two articles of focal importance were described by Davison as a kind of "travesty on popular election."⁴⁷⁵ One concerning the disproportionate representation of the minorities in the new institutions, the Greek Orthodox community in particular and another which considered literacy as one of the eligibility criteria for the membership in the lists of the "elected."⁴⁷⁶

In order to better assess the nature of the newly introduced administrative measures one could review the opinions of contemporaries who experienced the developments from a different standpoint. With regard to the electoral process in the lower administrative levels such as the *müdürlüks* (Directorates), James Lewis Farley, an Irish banker and diplomat with personal experience in the Middle East, argued that "ostensibly the award of popular suffrage, is only too often the recompense of successful bribery or intrigue."⁴⁷⁷ Similarly, the problematic nature of the new election system was illustratively described by Farley as following:

"For instance, a few of the most influential men of a kasa, nominate one of their party for the mudirlik; a mansard or memorial is got up in his favour, to which the bulk of the population is forced to subscribe, and this memorial, backed by sundry douceurs, procures

⁴⁷⁴Ibid., 141.

⁴⁷⁵Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Gordian Press, 1975), 149.

⁴⁷⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷Lewis Farley, *Egypt, Cyprus and Asiatic Turkey* (London: Trübner & Co, 1878), 95.

the appointment. In plain language, the place is sold; and the amount paid necessarily constitutes a tax, to be got back in some shape or form from the local population.”⁴⁷⁸

Apart from the evident colonial⁴⁷⁹ tones in his choice of words, Farley goes on to concern himself with the institution of *meclis*. He describes the function of the local council as a one man show due to the fact that “its [Meclis] *fiat* is not decisive, as the mudir may on his own responsibility refuse to execute its decisions.”⁴⁸⁰ Deriving from the above quote he did not believe in any regeneration of the Ottoman Empire since “the entire body politic is rotten from the head to the extremities.”⁴⁸¹

In spite of certain dubious articles, the *Organic Statute* recognized the legal status of the local Christian element and laid the foundations for the principle of representation by emphasizing the significance of *vox populi*. Moreover, the provisions of the *Organic Statute* clearly intended to improve on the administrative mechanism, attempting to reverse the injustices of the years prior to the events of 1866. These injustices stemmed primarily from the mentality of the state functionaries according to which “the first aim of a governor of a province is to undo everything that has been done by his predecessor, and the second is to amass a fortune as speedily as possible. He knows that his tenure of office may be short, and, having neither patriotism nor honour, he goes in for plunder.”⁴⁸²

Keeping in mind that Ali Paşa was the most conservative among the *Tanzimat* men, it seems contradictory that the man who came to radically reform the administrative mechanism of the island, was simultaneously convinced that the Ottoman Turks were the people most appropriate to govern the Empire and that the governance of the Ottoman polity should be based on the principles of Islam.⁴⁸³ Another point with inconsistencies regarding the political views of Ali Paşa, is that while the reform edict for Crete was drafted by an Orthodox Greek and aimed at implementing the principle of equality, the Grand Vizier advocated that “the implementation of a parliamentary

⁴⁷⁸Ibid., 95-6.

⁴⁷⁹ Regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire Farley states that “the grand conception is to create an “Asiatic Britain” greater than the one that has stood out so proudly and conspicuously in the history of centuries. Ibid., 211.

⁴⁸⁰Ibid., 97.

⁴⁸¹Ibid., 90.

⁴⁸²Ibid., 93.

⁴⁸³Davison, *Osmanlı Turk Tarihi*, 173.

system of governance in the Ottoman Empire would ultimately lead to its dissolution.”⁴⁸⁴

So as to better understand the role of the Young Ottomans in the Cretan issue, the following question must be answered: was the principle of equality expressed in *Osmanlılık* also an ideal reflected in the thought of the Young Ottomans? Furthermore, looking at how the parliamentary and liberal thoughts of the Young Ottomans manifested in relation to the Cretan issue, can help answer if the intellectuals in exile preferred to instrumentalize the Cretan crisis as a method of opposition to the Ottoman statesmen.

While the political elite directed their efforts toward a representative administration on a local level that would eventually ease the tensions on the island, the newly emerged opposition of the Young Ottomans expressed different opinions regarding the representation of the Ottoman subjects in the administrative mechanism. One of them, Ali Suavi, “preached a kind of constitutionalism, though he was reported to include only Muslims in his argument that state affairs should be based on the Koranic doctrine of the public taking of council.”⁴⁸⁵ Ali Suavi’s objections to the reformative measures proposed by Ali Paşa were mainly expressed via his newspaper *Muhbir* where he characterized them as an act of disrespect toward the Muslims of the island as well as an asset in the hands of the Europeans.⁴⁸⁶ Furthermore, he considered the changes to the *Organic Statute* to be harmful not only to the well-tempered operations of the administrative mechanism but also to intercommunal relations on the island.

The principle of equality was one of the major concerns of the reform edicts of 1839 and 1856. Nonetheless, the *Islâhat Fermani*⁴⁸⁷ of 1856 was construed as “a manifestation of the anti-Islamic and anti-traditional *Tanzimat* reforms”⁴⁸⁸ by the Muslim community, similar to Suavi's understanding of it. According to the majority of the Young Ottomans, the aforementioned edicts were considered to be the outcome

⁴⁸⁴“Osmanlı çapında bir parlamenter rejim uygulaması nihai kertede imparatorluğun dağılmasına yol açabilirdi.” Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmancılık,” 103.

⁴⁸⁵Davison, *Reform*, 193-4.

⁴⁸⁶Mehmet Volkan Şenarslan, „Muhbir gazetesi’ne göre 1866 Girit İsyanı“ [The Cretan Rebellion according to Muhbir] (Master’s Thesis, T.C. Sakarya University, 2011), 49.

⁴⁸⁷The Young Ottomans labeled the reform edict a “Privileges Edict” [imtiyaz fermanı]. See Arda Odabaşı, “Tanzimatçılığa Karşı Yeni Osmanlılar” [The Young Ottomans opposite the reformative program of the Tanzimat], *Bilim ve Utopya* 132 (2005): 18.

⁴⁸⁸Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 113.

of pressure exerted on the Porte by the European Powers. Therefore, as expected, they were not in favor of the policies of the Bâb-ı Âli or appeasing the Christians whenever they decided to rise up against the local authorities, as they firmly believed that such methods would result in the establishment of inequality among the Ottoman subjects.⁴⁸⁹ Thus, the Cretan case was the perfect platform for the Young Ottomans to criticize the Ottoman Statesmen and Ali Paşa in particular.

On the other hand, Namık Kemal, the leading figure of the Young Ottomans, fervently promoted the notion of *Osmanlılık*, while he did not hesitate to recognize the insufficiency of the local administration as one of the main reasons for separatist actions on the part of the non-Muslim populations. However, he rejected granting “special privileges to any particular group”⁴⁹⁰ and urged for the implementation of the principle of equality for all Ottoman subjects. Interestingly enough, the Young Ottoman poet believed that the spirit of Şeriat encompassed the principle of equality and that the reform edicts had nothing new to offer. Similarly to Ali Suavi, Namık Kemal’s criticism of the non-Muslims mainly focused on the special status that they enjoyed under the protection of Europe, something that nurtured his anti-European rhetoric and argumentation.

The Young Ottomans believed that the battle against corruption in the Ottoman administration, the establishment of fair taxation and the reinforcement of the principle of representation were prerequisites for the implementation of the *usul-ü meşveret* [the way of consultation] which would consequently lead to the inclusion of the non-Muslims in Ottoman reality.⁴⁹¹ With regard to both the latter and the representation of the non-Muslim minorities in the state mechanism, Namık Kemal argued that “the number of non-Muslim employees in state offices was limited not because they were subject to systematic discrimination but because there were not many non-Muslims accustomed to the habits, customs and even the language of the Turks and hence eligible for official positions.”⁴⁹²

Contrary to the Ottoman statesmen, the Young Ottomans maintained that the implementation of the principle of equality in the employment process would lead to

⁴⁸⁹Davison, *Osmanlı Turk Tarihi*, 189.

⁴⁹⁰Davison, *Reform*, 195.

⁴⁹¹Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 31.

⁴⁹²*Ibid.*, 263, note 23.

the disintegration of the Empire more rapidly. In general however, the Young Ottomans urged for a parliamentary system that would enable the Muslim as well as the non-Muslim citizens of the Empire to regulate the deeds of the Ottoman statesmen and be a part of the decision-making process. Moreover, the implementation of the *usul-ü meşveret* would eventually reduce the interdependency between the non-Muslim subjects and foreign states.

Another issue with which the Young Turks were preoccupied in their newspaper coverage was European interventionism in Ottoman affairs, as in their opinion, it was closely related to the Eastern Question. Unlike the Ottoman officials who sometimes failed to recognize nationalism as one of the main driving forces behind the upheavals of the 19th century, Namık Kemal acknowledged France's⁴⁹³ decisive role in utilizing nationalism against the Empire by referencing Belgrade, Montenegro, Syria and Crete where the Napoleonic regime was thought to have played a major role. More specifically, with regard to Crete, he stressed that the perpetuation of the Cretan crisis was the result of the opportunist Russo-French approach.⁴⁹⁴ There were times however when he would interpret uprisings such as the one on Crete as mere internal issues and would state that the “Cretan insurrection is an internal problem of the Ottoman Empire, that it by no means concerns Greece.”⁴⁹⁵

In short, the Young Ottoman's lack of trust towards the Porte's decision to make concessions to the Cretan Christians was rooted in increasing European interventionism into the Empire's affairs. Concerning the equality of the Ottoman citizens, another prominent figure of the Young Ottomans, Ziya Paşa, wondered, referring to everyday life in the Ottoman Empire, whether Christians and Muslims were equals in the eyes of the law. His aim being to imply that European interventionism favored the Christian element of the Ottoman Empire which inevitably

⁴⁹³“...Napolyon bir kerre şark üzerinde icrâ-yi müdahale ve i'mâl-i nüfuzâ alıştıktan sonra karışmak için mesele bulamadıkça icadına kıyâm ederek bir taraftan en evvel kendince her şeyden müsâid gördüğü Katolik fırkalarını ve diğer taraftan Avrupa'yi bir heyecân-ı dâ'imî halinde bırakmağa vâsıta eylediği kavmiyet fikirlerini bu yolda alet etmeğe başladı.” [Once Napoleon got used to practicing his interventionism and influence in the East and since he did not have a reason to get involved, he created one. He began to instrumentalize nationalist ideas so as to keep both the French parties, which he thought of as the most appropriate, and Europe in a constant state of unrest.] Namık Kemal “Şark meselesi II,” *Külliyat-ı Kemâl Makalat-ı Sıyasîye ve Edebiye*, I. Tertib, 3 (İstanbul: Selanik Matbaası, 1327), 14, quoted in Gümüş, “Namık Kemâl'e göre,” 154-155.

⁴⁹⁴Ibid., 158.

⁴⁹⁵Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 82.

resulted in tension and inequality among the Ottoman subjects.⁴⁹⁶ In general, the Young Ottomans tried to instrumentalize the Cretan Question and to fit it in a broader context of criticism against the Bâb-i Âli without examining the situation or the developments on the island in detail. They mainly expressed their criticism toward the Porte through their journalistic activities and their literary works, an example of which is *Zafernâme*⁴⁹⁷.

Zafernâme is thought of as Ziya's opus magnum, a famous satire which targets the Ottoman statesmen, mainly the Grand Vizier Ali Paşa, for their conduct in the Cretan issue with the use of extremely pointed language.⁴⁹⁸ The *Book of Victory* [*Zafernâme*], 1869-1870, was written on the occasion of the Grand Vizier's mission to the island in order to put an end to the turmoil. Ziya Paşa accuses Ali Paşa of trying to restore the peace on the island by making new concessions to the Christian Cretans since he is unable to suppress the rebellion through military means. Similarly, by granting rights to the minorities, the submissive stance of the political elite against centrifugal tendencies in the periphery of the Empire, which was unfolding at the time at the expense of the local Muslim element, is also the subject of criticism in this satire.⁴⁹⁹

It should be stressed here that Ziya Paşa was not actually opposed to the aims of the *Tanzimat* reforms in order to modernize the Empire. However, like the rest of the Young Ottoman opposition, he openly criticized the absence of the *Şeriat* spirit in the implementation of the reform program. Even though he defended the notion of *Osmanlılık* as the only way for the Ottoman Empire to survive, it seems that there was an ambivalence in his argumentation, when the discussion came to the issue of equality. For that he considered the new generation of the Ottoman statesmen to be responsible and foremost Ali Paşa who granted equal rights to the minorities, often by

⁴⁹⁶ Davison, *Osmanlı Türk Tarihi*, 190, note 52; Odabaşı, "Tanzimatçılığa Karşı," 19.

⁴⁹⁷ A detailed account of the poem with additional commentary is given by Fikret Şahoğlu, ed., *Ziya Bey, Zafername* [Ziya Bey, Book of Victory] (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, 1968).

⁴⁹⁸ Şahoğlu, *Ziya Bey*, 20; 23. In his satire, Ziya Paşa also made a special reference to the reforms that the Porte intended to introduce. See *Ibid.*, 66.

⁴⁹⁹ „Ten thousand Muslim households, obeying his command,
Abandoned hearth and homestead and fled their native land.
That there should float our banner -with this condition grand –
To Servia the fortress of Belgrade did he hand:

Thus perfectly he preserved the Empire's integrity!“ Elias John Wilkinson Gibb, *A history of Ottoman poetry* (London: Luzac & CO, 1907), 5:104.

discriminating against the hegemonic position of the Muslims in the Empire.⁵⁰⁰ In his article “The question of equality” Ziya Paşa asks for equal rights for both Christians and Muslims as he thinks that his coreligionists are mistreated in comparison to the minorities in several aspects of the everyday life (military service, justice). Therefore, summarizing his thoughts, Ziya Paşa argues: “But it should be well-understood that expressing these thoughts does not mean that Christians should not be granted their rights but in no way should they be appointed to administrative and bureaucratic positions and be offended by this. Our wish is that the state guarantees not only the privileges of its Christian subjects but that it secures equal rights for all Ottomansubjects. This includes the desire that unfortunate Muslims maintain their rightful natural privileges.”⁵⁰¹

Looking at the Greek press and its attitude towards the Ottoman initiatives, one could say that the Athenian newspapers were very suspicious of Ali Paşa’s mission on Crete.⁵⁰² *Aiōn* contended that even if a Christian governor was to be appointed to Crete, he would serve the interests of the Porte instead of satisfying his coreligionists’ needs.⁵⁰³ The Greek press essentially viewed the reformative measures proposed by the Porte as overdue⁵⁰⁴ and as a stillborn attempt to pacify the island as well as to satisfy the European Powers and public opinion. *Aiōn* republished an article of the *Levant Herald* on September 25th 1867, wherein doubts were raised about the

⁵⁰⁰ „If but the help of God assist in his purpose dear
Full soon will these gypsies sit on the couch of the Grand Vezir;
It is but the Jews alone that form the exception here
For the Greeks and Armenians both doth he make Bey and Mushir;
The equality of rights to perfection brought hath he.“ Ibid. 105-106.

⁵⁰¹ „Ammâ şurası iyice anaşılmalıdır ki, bizim bu mütalaaları îrâd etmekten maksadımız Hıristiyânlar hukuk-i meşrualarına nâil olmaları ve asla mansıb ve me’mûriyyette kullanılmaları, hakaret görsünler demek değildir. Belki muradımız, madem ki devlet yalnız tebaa-i Hıristiyânın imtiyâzını teâhüd etmeyip, bil-cümle tebaanın hukuk-i müsâvâtını resmen i’lân eyledi. Şu kimsesiz Müslimânları dâhî hakkı olan imtiyâzât-ı tabîiyyesine mazhar etmesini arzudan ibarettir.“ „Mes’ele-i müsâvât“ [The question of equality], *Hürriyyet* no. 15, Cemâzi-yel-âhîr 18, 1285/October 5, 1868.

⁵⁰² Based once again on Farley’s Book, one could say that the previously mentioned distrust on behalf of the Greek press as per the Porte’s good intentions was justified. According to Farley, “Turkish rulers do not want reform, and they would not introduce anything worthy of the name even if they could. Men nurtured in the enervating atmosphere of harems, of intrigue and corruption have no appreciation for just laws and wise administration, nor have they any desire to rule over a contented and prosperous people.” Farley, *Egypt, Cyprus and Asiatic Turkey*, 204.

⁵⁰³ „Ta enestōta” [The present situation], *Aiōn*, no. 2272, September 4, 1867.

⁵⁰⁴ Interestingly enough, in his correspondence with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 12th, 1868, Iōannēs Barouksakēs, the Greek vice consul on the island, underlined that, if the administrative reforms included in the Porte’s *Organic Regulation* for the pacification of the island had been implemented at the beginning of the crisis (summer 1866), it would have been easier for the local Christian element to accept them. Prevelakēs and Plagianou-Bekiarē, “Ē Krētikē Epanastasis 1866-1869,” *Mnēmeia tēs Ellēnikēs Istorias* 6, no. 2 (1970): 139.

effectiveness of the Porte's proposals to the Cretans. These doubts were based on the fact that the proposed measures were decided upon under pressure and they were in no case a result of the Ottoman policymakers' innate desire for reforms.⁵⁰⁵ Furthermore, according to the writer of the article, the Porte's concessions to the Christians would inevitably lead other ethnic minorities living in the Ottoman realm to make similar claims regarding their status.⁵⁰⁶

Despite their hard stance on the issue of granting more privileges to the Christians, the Young Ottomans avoided getting trapped between the distinctive religious and ethnic lines that defined the Ottoman societal mosaic. This stance was also encoded in the *Muhbir*'s private initiative, when it called all the Ottoman citizens irrespective of religion and ethnicity to financially contribute to the relief of the conflict's victims: "Regardless of race and religion, let us, as the Ottomans we are, help these people in need."⁵⁰⁷ Again, in another one of its articles, the newspaper mentions the notions of patriotism and peaceful coexistence highlighting as such the respect to religious rights of non-Muslims as a crucial factor for deterrence of European interventionism in the Empire's internal affairs:

"We hope that this time around Russia's insidious plan will not turn out to be fruitful, as the conviction that the various ethnic communities residing within the Ottoman Empire are enemies, due to their religious diversity, is false. If the Muslim goes to the mosque, the Christian to church and the Jew to Mount Sinai to obtain what is necessary for the afterlife according to the belief system of each nation, extending one's hand to the other upon exiting a place of worship can be seen as a privilege gained through common efforts."⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁵"Ē apostolē tou Alē" [Ali's mission], *Aiōn*, no. 2278, September 9, 1867.

⁵⁰⁶Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷"cinse ve mezhebe bakmayarak cümlemiz ki hep osmanlı sayılırız, o bîçâresizlere yardım edelim."
"N/A," *Muhbir*, no. 29, Şevvâl 28, 1283/March 5, 1867.

⁵⁰⁸"Ümîd ederiz ki Rûsyaniñ bu def'a tuttuğu zemîn-i hîle umadıđı mahsûli vermez çünkı Devlet-i Osmâniyye idaresinde bulunan millî-i muhtelefeyi ihtilâf-ı mezheb sebebiyle birbirine düşmandir zan etmek yanlış mutâli' dir. Eđerçi Müslimân câmi'a ve Hristiyân kilîsaya ve Yahûdî Sinâ gidip her kavm i'tikadınca istihsâl-ı zuhr-u âhîret ederlerse de herkes maâbîdiñden dıřarı çıktıktâ el ele verib dünyâca kazanacakları menâfi'-i müşterekeñ düşünülür." "Mile-i muhtelife-i Osmâniyye'niñ ahvâl-ı hâzırasına müteallik ba'zı levâihdir" [A few thoughts on the situation of the various Ottoman ethnicities], *Muhbir*, no. 32, Zi-l-ka'de 3, 1283/March 9, 1867.

Remaining in the same article, special emphasis was also put on the interdependency between the Muslim and non-Muslim element in Ottoman society, particularly in the economy sector. Thus, in his attempt to efficiently illustrate the strong bonds between the different ethnic groups living in the Ottoman realm, the writer of the article noticed the following:

“because even though the Muslim population is the majority, being 20 million, amongst the various nationalities situated in the Ottoman Empire, any privileges Islam has are dependent on the Christian ethnic groups as a considerable part of the industry and commerce is in their hands”⁵⁰⁹

6.3 The threat of Greeks being deported and the *Nationality Law* of 1869

The final phase of the Cretan conflict coincided with the adoption of the *Nationality Law*, which should be interpreted within the context of the Porte’s efforts to limit European interventionism in the Empire’s internal affairs. Without abandoning the general context of the Cretan Question, the *Nationality Law of 1869* deserves, in my view, special attention, as it stemmed from and was partly forced by the developments on the island. In this sense, Davison rightly categorized it under the measures that were taken against the spread of nationalism.⁵¹⁰ However, at this point, a point worth noticing is that “only after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1876, the concept of the Ottoman citizenship became a constitutional principle.”⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁹ „zîrâ Memâlik-i Osmâniyye’de mütevattîñ olan akvâm-ı mütenevvianîñ en çoğu yigirmi milyon a’dâdîñdan bulunan Müslimânlar ise de, sanâyi’ ve ticâret aksariyle Hristiyân kavmleriñde olduğundan İslâmların menâfi’-i onlara merbûttur.” Ibid.

⁵¹⁰Roderic Davison, “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response,” in *Nationalism in a Non-National State*, ed. by William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 25-56; See also Mutaz M. Qafisheh, *The International Law Foundations of Palestinian Nationality. A Legal Examination of Nationality in Palestine under Britain’s Rule* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 38.

⁵¹¹Çağdaş Lara Çelebi, *Ottomanism and Inter-Communal Relations. Sanjak of Kayseri in the Decade of 1870-1880* (Berlin: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011), 73.

The Ottoman *Nationality Law* was without doubt part of the Empire's secularization⁵¹² and westernization process and clearly reflected the will of the leading *Tanzimat* men to encounter an ever increasing European interventionism. Hence, besides the *Press Law* (1865) and the *Land Law* (1867) whereby the Ottoman political elite intended to "assimilate foreigners to the legal status of Ottoman subjects wherever they could"⁵¹³, the *Nationality Law* came to put together the puzzle's pieces concerning the Porte's initiatives for the weakening of the capitulations.

There is certainly truth in the argument that *Tâbîyyet-i Osmâniyye Kanûnnâmesi*⁵¹⁴[Ottoman Citizenship Law]and the issue of citizenship were associated with the state-building efforts of the Ottoman political elites who did, however, continue their reformative efforts towards egalitarianism. This assumption inevitably leads to the discussion about the typology and nature of the nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, namely whether it was of civic or ethnic nature, or in other words, exclusive or inclusive. It should be highlighted, that the Law in discussion here was implemented almost two decades after the promulgation of the *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* and the abolishment of the religious criteria as demarcating features of someone's belonging to a collectivity, something traditionally manifested in the *millet* institution.

As regards the different types of citizenship Brubacker stressed the divergence of the two models of citizenship applied in Germany and France and stated that contrary to the German model the French one was "liberal 'state-centered', 'secular,' and 'assimilationist'"⁵¹⁵, as it was based on a combination of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*

⁵¹²Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 852. One can find a chronological list of the measures introduced during the Ottoman secularization process (from 1839 and onwards) see Dora, Glidwell Nadolski "Ottoman and Secular Civil Law," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8, no. 4 (1977): 538-9.

⁵¹³ Davison, *Reform*, 262.

⁵¹⁴ According to the Greek historian Anagnostopoulou, the issue of Greek citizenship was paramount in the political agendas of both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom. What made the matter significant was that the Rums returning to Greece had the right to receive Greek citizenship which enabled them to reap the benefits of the capitulatory rights extended to the Europeans living in the Ottoman Empire. An initial agreement for the settlement of the issue between the two states was made in Kanlıca on 27 May 1855. In the aftermath of the adoption of the *Nationality Law*, the Rums who had already acquired the Greek citizenship, after a 3-year stay in Greece, were regarded and treated as Ottoman subjects on Ottoman soil and as Greek citizens in the Greek Kingdom respectively. Greek Ottoman subjects having dual citizenship was an enabling factor for the formation of a strong Greek Orthodox middle class whose members, like other foreigners, enjoyed the entirety of the capitulatory rights. See Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia*, 308-311.

⁵¹⁵ Constantin Iordachi "The Ottoman Empire. Syncretic Nationalism and Citizenship in the Balkan," in *What is a Nation? Europe 1789-1914*, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 124.

legislation.⁵¹⁶ Coming to the Ottomans, even though the multicultural structure of the *Millet*-system was based on the encapsulation of religious diversity, the state driven advocacy of nationhood, which was of an inclusive nature, was forged within political and not ethno-cultural lines, thereby contributing to the promotion of patriotism among the different minorities of the Empire.

More specifically, at the end of 1860s when the Cretan conflict was about to conclude, it was still unclear whether the concept of citizenship was considered to be more advantageous in comparison to the concept of the nationality. In other words, it was still questionable whether the Ottoman statesmen managed to prevent the spread of centrifugal ethnic nationalism by imposing an inclusive supranational patriotism which would in turn strengthen the sense of common belonging among the Ottoman subjects. However, the first, references to the concept of citizen/citizenship were already made in the reform edict of *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, whereby there was “theoretically established a new and direct relationship between the individual and the state based on rights and obligations that stemmed from the individual’s status as citizen of the Ottoman state.”⁵¹⁷ In general, the Ottoman population policy that was put into effect in the 2nd half of the 19th century was of an inclusive nature and sprang from the spirit of the Nationality Law. However, in its initial phase the propulsion of its implementation was also economic, as a foreigner could easily⁵¹⁸ obtain the Ottoman citizenship in order to avoid taxation.

In order to avoid any misinterpretations, it should not be overlooked that at the time the *Nationality Law* was adopted, the Ottoman state did not have any culturally assimilatory objectives as it was aiming primarily at the political unification of culturally different civic associations. In this sense, the Ottoman political elites were seeking to create their own *Staatsidee* in order to maintain control over the different nationalities of the Empire as well as to forge a sense of supranational compatriotism. It may be argued, that the efforts of the Ottoman statesmen to instill the notion of state

⁵¹⁶ According to Iordachi “the law codified the heterogeneous body of Ottoman subjects in terms of rights and duties of a generic Ottoman citizenship. It conferred Ottoman citizenship *jure sanguinis* to a child born of an Ottoman man. In line with traditional inclusive Ottoman demographic policy, the law also encompassed a strong inclusive *jus soli* component, by conferring on all individuals born on Ottoman territory of foreign parent the right to Ottoman citizenship.” Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, “*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of National and State in the Post-Ottoman Era,” in *Christian and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *The Central Lands* (New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), 1:163.

⁵¹⁸ Iordachi “The Ottoman Empire,” 127.

patriotism in the Ottoman subjects, were not grounded on a sincere recognition of the diversity that defined different parts of the Ottoman population, but they were primarily a result of the acute circumstances which the Empire experienced at that time due to the rise of nationalism.

Despite the fact that the *Nationality Law* “would not be applied retrospectively, and would not be used to punish Greeks in the empire after the tension over the Cretan affair,”⁵¹⁹ the argument that the Cretan crisis gave the final blow for the adoption of the *Nationality Law* which would target the protégé⁵²⁰ status of Ottoman subjects, is further reinforced by an incident which is illustratively described by Davison as following:

“when the Greek consul at Izmir failed to provide the list, claiming lack of instructions and a large number of nationals under his care, the Porte complained that “it is precisely this consulate which is prodigal in issuing certificates of protection” to Ottoman subjects.”⁵²¹

In that respect Kitromilides argues that the “Greek consulates in the Ottoman Empire were charged with many functions (...). In the early years of the Greek state, the 1830s and 1840s, one important function of the consulates and vice-consulates was the dispensation of official Greek citizenship to local Greeks who could prove or claim some form of participation in the Greek War of Independence” resulting in the formation of a “nuclei of Greek citizenship in the major cities of the Ottoman Empire.”⁵²² In addition he stresses that such acts on behalf of the Greek diplomatic authorities were reinforced and implemented in remote areas of the Empire, such as Cyprus in the 1850s and 1860s, contributing to the diffusion of nationalist ideas among the local non-Muslim populations.⁵²³

Furthermore, the diplomatic and political parameters of the promulgation of the *Tâbîyyet-i Osmâniyye Kanûnnâmesi* are once more accentuated by Iordachi who rightly argues that

⁵¹⁹Davison, *Reform*, 262-3.

⁵²⁰Namely, being under the protective umbrella of foreign states and therefore potential participants in revolutionary acts.

⁵²¹Davison, “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem,” 43.

⁵²²Kitromilides, “Imagined Communities,” 170.

⁵²³Ibid.

“the main aim of the law was to delimit clearly the Ottoman citizenry, to formally assure the loyalty of Ottoman subjects and to strictly control their emigration. This concern was in direct relation to the overlapping citizenship policy of the newly established Balkan states, such as Greece which unilaterally granted state citizenship to numerous Greek-speaking Orthodox inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. In order to counter this policy, the Ottoman law unequivocally stipulated that all inhabitants of the Ottoman territory were considered Ottoman subjects unless expressly proven otherwise.”⁵²⁴

Finally, the utility of the *Nationality Law* as a means of diplomatic and political pressure was once again observed in 1897, when the Cretan Question reached its peak and the Greek Orthodox subjects living in the Ottoman Empire faced the threat of expulsion yet again. Taking advantage of the diplomatic crisis between the two states, the Porte forced the Greek subjects to acquire the Ottoman citizenship in order to deprive them of the tax rights which they enjoyed under their special status.⁵²⁵ This fact clearly demonstrates the important role of the Greek diplomatic agencies in the Ottoman Empire, as they were supposed to be an effective mechanism for the diffusion of the nationalist ideas among the Greek speaking populations. Consequently, this development endangered the inclusive state-building policy included in the notion of *Ottomanism* due to the fact that the Greek subjects became more and more dependent on the Greek state’s diplomatic presence in the Ottoman realm.⁵²⁶

Contrary to the Ottoman press, the Athenian newspapers did not remain on the sidelines of the debate on the Porte’s initiative to pass the *Nationality Law*. According to *Ethnofylaks* the primary goal of Bâb-i Âli was to denaturalize thousands of Orthodox subjects living in the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, it was pointed out in the same article, the *Nationality Law* would have an impact on the Greek embassy’s

⁵²⁴Iordachi “The Ottoman Empire,” 131.

⁵²⁵Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia*, 315. Within the same context, in 1860, the Porte required “that Ottoman subjects naturalized as foreign subjects leave the empire within three months after selling their goods.” Davison, *Reform*, 263, note 120.

⁵²⁶For a more detailed overview of the initiatives undertaken by Rangavēs in order to settle the dispute over the *Ottoman Nationality Law* see Efthymios Soulogiannēs, *Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs 1809-1892. Ē zōē kai to ergo tou* [*Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs 1809-1892. His life and his works*] (Athēna: Arsenidēs, 1995), 90-91.

jurisdiction over the Christian subjects by making the presence of Greek diplomatic agencies in the Ottoman realm unnecessary.⁵²⁷

Specifically, the 9th article of the Law led to further tensions between Athens and the Porte as “all residents in the Ottoman dominion had to be considered Ottoman nationals and would be treated as such until their different nationality was legally established.”⁵²⁸ In actuality this meant that the fate of the Greek Orthodox people living in the Ottoman Empire was exclusively dependent on the Porte’s will. Similar to *Ethnofylaks*, *Aiōn* pointed out that Porte had taken advantage of the Cretan crisis in order to pass the Ottoman *Nationality Law* the content of which contradicted the spirit of the capitulations.⁵²⁹ Commenting on the same issue *Avgē* stated that the Law was merely a subterfuge of the European diplomats as the Greek Kingdom would be deprived of a significant part of its national revenues (ca. 900,000 *talira*⁵³⁰) and circumstantially of 1/10 of its influence in the Ottoman Empire (ca. 300,000 Greek citizens).⁵³¹

In conclusion, we could say that the Porte’s decision to pass the *Tâbiyyet-i Osmâniyye Kanûn-nâmesi* expressed the desires of the Ottoman statesmen to lay the legal foundations that would enable the consolidation of solidarity and fraternity among the ethnically and religiously diverse subjects of the Empire. Whether or not this legal step was of an inclusive or exclusive nature, was of lesser importance for the legislator and the Ottoman Statesmen, as the matter of citizenship was acknowledged to be predominant “binding classes and strata into a common community of theoretical equals and insiders,”⁵³² as was the case in Western Europe.

⁵²⁷“To mega zētēma tēs ithageneias” [The important issue of citizenship], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1712, April 24, 1869.

⁵²⁸Gianluca Paolo Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab world: Kin, Religion and Nation-State* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 74.

⁵²⁹“To peri tēs Ellēn.ethnikotētos zētēma” [The Greek citizenship Issue], *Aiōn*, no. 2426, February 24, 1869.

⁵³⁰Talira=5-drachma notes.

⁵³¹“Jus retortionis indirectum,” *Avgē*, no. 2349, February 1, 1869.

⁵³²Smith *The Ethnic Originsof Nations*, 136.

6.4 *Muhbir*'s "Girid îanesi" campaign: Creating a sense of a (Muslim) community

Charity and philanthropic activities in the Ottoman Empire and in the Muslim world in general, is not an unknown subject of study. However, scholars on Ottoman 19th century have paid little attention to the link between private organized philanthropic activities and the formation of a sense of community or the creation of a patriotic public sphere. The main concern of the present subchapter is the presentation of such philanthropic activity which was grounded on a private initiative. In my opinion, the case becomes even more important, if we consider that the pioneers of that private fundraising were simultaneously the main actors of the new Ottoman press in the 1860s.

In particular, Ali Suavi's initiative inspired me to focus on voluntary philanthropic activities within the context of the Cretan conflict as I believe that such acts were ideologically loaded and should be regarded as an important step towards fostering a sense of community membership and forging a new collective identity. This becomes obvious when one takes a closer look at the language and the style of the newspaper articles referring to that philanthropic initiative. It would be no literary exaggeration to argue that the newspapers that were involved in that patriotic action, namely *Muhbir* and *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, perceived Ottoman subjects as citizen-soldiers, who were called to fulfill their duty and assist their compatriots respectively.

Given that "this collection definitely displeased Âli Paşa,"⁵³³ *Muhbir*'s initiative requires even more attention, as it took place in the context of strict press restrictions. Significant to the censorship conditions is the fact that almost a month after the campaign had been inaugurated, the newspaper was closed down for one month and Suavi was sent into exile to the Black Sea.⁵³⁴ As it was mentioned in the presentation of the Ottoman oppositional press (4.4.2), *Muhbir* was highly critical of the Ottoman government's policy conduct on the Cretan issue, something that was also mirrored in

⁵³³Mardin, *The Genesis*, 26.

⁵³⁴The termination of operations of *Muhbir* was officially announced on 3 Zi-l-ka'de 1283/9 March 1867.

Ali Suavi's articles, who accused the political elite of following a "(...) ambivalent and ineffectual policy (...)." ⁵³⁵

Presenting the deeds of the Greeks as acts directed not only against the Cretan Muslims but primarily against "Ottomans of every ethnic group and of every religion" ⁵³⁶ *Muhbir* tried to motivate the stronger mobilization of the Ottoman subjects for the purposes of the campaign. At the same time, the philanthropic initiative was presented as a complementary activity ⁵³⁷ to the government's efforts to settle the Cretan issue. In addition to that, *Muhbir*'s initiative should not be approached without taking into account Ali Suavi's well known activist patriotism. Even if he is portrayed as having contradictory opinion on issues like the introduction of a representative government, it can be claimed that his stance towards issues concerning solidarity under the Ottoman Muslims was stable throughout his career. Thus, his fervent patriotism, his strong love for the *vatan*, "his self-identification with the underprivileged" ⁵³⁸ as well as his outrage for the separatist movements by non-Muslims led him to make the following appeal-statement: "Proclaim everywhere that the Ottoman Empire cannot disintegrate merely as the result of Greek and Russian hullabaloo." ⁵³⁹ Thus, it becomes clear that the philanthropic campaign under discussion was not only an emotionally loaded spontaneous act of patriotism but more importantly it was based on the ideological background one of the most eccentric Young Ottoman figures in the 1860s.

A similar press initiative took place some years later during the Hamidian era during the Greco-Turkish war when "(...) a fund-raising campaign for war orphans and the families of wounded soldiers (Evlad-ı Şüheda ve Mahulin-ı Güzzat-ı Şahane İnanesi)" ⁵⁴⁰ was arranged in order to forge a strong patriotic sentiment as well as a

⁵³⁵"(...) kararsız ve güçsüz bir politika (...)." ⁵³⁵

<http://yordam.manas.kg/ekitap/pdf/Manasdergi/sbd/sbd14/sbd-14-21.pdf>, last accessed January 28, 2013), 259.

⁵³⁶"(...) her cins ve her mezhebde olan Osmânlılara" N/A," *Muhbir*, no. 29, Şevval 28, 1283/March 5, 1867.

⁵³⁷"Orada [Crete] bulunan Osmânlıları Hükûmet-i seniyye kuvvetleştirdiği misli siz daha muhtâclarına iâne ile kuvvetlendiriniz." [Just as the government of the Empire aids the Ottomans on Crete, so do you support those who are in need.] Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 369-70.

⁵³⁹ *Muhbir*, 27 January 1868, quoted in *ibid.*, 370.

⁵⁴⁰ Nadir Özbek, "Philanthropic activity, Ottoman patriotism, and the Hamidian regime, 1876-1909," *Int. J. Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 71.

cohesive notion of solidarity among the different – and particularly Muslim segments of the Ottoman society.

A further aspect of *Muhbir*'s philanthropic campaign with great utility for the present work is the interconnection between the emerging press, the patriotic public sphere as well as a dynamic Ottoman civil society existing already in the pre-Hamidian era. Similarly to the Athenian newspapers, the Ottoman oppositional as well as semi-official press (in particular *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*), though in not such dramatic tones, systematically covered the developments on the island with reports on the devastation of whole villages, the flight of the Muslim Cretans into the fortresses seeking for more safety, the increasing numbers of victims as well as the elimination of the properties of the Muslim population living in the countryside. As expected, such reports were likely to result in the creation of a strong patriotic sentiment among the Muslims of the realm.

With respect to the tradition of the concept of philanthropy in the 19th Ottoman century, Özbek informs us that the Ottoman government tried to hinder for-profit lotteries almost a decade before Suavi's fund-raising campaign, and finally achieved to prohibit all forms of lotteries.⁵⁴¹ Striking is also the fact that among those who were against such kind of fund-raising efforts were also prominent figures of the Ottoman intelligentsia and journalism such as Ebüziyya Tevfik, who argued for example that lottery "(...) was an open form of gambling, a social disease that caused numerous harms to the social body."⁵⁴²

Coming back to the issue of the fundraising, one of the main concerns of the campaign's initiators was not only to make clear the details of the fund-collection, but also to assure the people of the transparency of the latter thereby enabling the public to gain a sense of common purpose. Consequently, it may be argued, that Suavi's focus on the transparency also aimed at avoiding accusations of initiating political action against the government.⁵⁴³ Within this context the donation amounts as well as their

⁵⁴¹Ibid.,64.

⁵⁴²Ibid., 65.

⁵⁴³For more details on the process of fund collection and distribution see "N/A,"*Muhbir*, no. 29, Şevval 28, 1283/March 5, 1867.

distribution were to be published in the newspaper something that would lead everyone to contribute more than expected.⁵⁴⁴

Additionally, there were thoughts for the better organization of the philanthropic effort: “it was said that the committee that would mediate for the collection of the donations and the appropriate distribution thereof to those [people] in need should be an Ottoman company otherwise the matter should be entrusted to a body of benevolent state officials, money changers and others.”⁵⁴⁵ With respect to the funds collection in discussion, *Muhbir* announced that 5,000 copies of the newspaper would be printed and went on to invite the Ottoman subjects to purchase them so as to contribute to the relief of their Muslim brethren in Crete.⁵⁴⁶

According to Özbek, the term *iâne*, which we come across in almost all the articles related to the campaign, encapsulated “a broad spectrum of social and political activities – public assistance, indigence and disaster-relief efforts, and patriotic campaigns for public projects – whose initiators may be the local government, the palace, any other social agent, or a combination of these.”⁵⁴⁷ Indeed, the driving force for *Muhbir*'s philanthropic effort for the relief of the suffering Muslim was grounded in “national endeavour and patriotism”⁵⁴⁸.

Furthermore, on the occasion of the Cretan events *teâvün* [mutual assistance] was regarded as *muktezâ-yi diyanetimiz*⁵⁴⁹ [our religious necessity] as charity in Islam, the giving of alms was regarded as “a duty imposed by God”⁵⁵⁰ as it is stated in Sura 9:60 (“repentance”). On these grounds, the inevitable sanctification of the campaign and its

⁵⁴⁴“Sekiz imzâ' ila matbaamıza gönderilen varakadır” [Document signed by seven individuals which was then sent to the printing-house], *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 591, Şevval 8, 1283/February 13, 1867].

⁵⁴⁵“(…) bu iâneniñ cem'ine ve o biçârelere yolla tevzi' ve tavsîlina vasâtat edecek cem'iyet şirket-i Osmâniyye idâresi olsun ve-yâhûd devletçe hamîyyet-kâr me'mûrîñ ve sarrâfân ve sâireden mürekkeb bir cem'iyete havale buyurulsun denilmiştir.” Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶“N/A,” *Muhbir*, no. 29, Şevval 28, 1283/March 5, 1867. Among the people who indirectly donated for the patriotic purpose by buying the issues of *Muhbir* were: 1) Yâver-i harb hazret-i Şehr-yâr Saâdetlü Cemîl Paşa hazretleri, 2) Meclis-i Vâlâ a'zâsı kerâmeden Saâdetlü Ziyâ Beg Efendi Hazretleri, 3) Haste-hâne-i mezbûr [Külleli] müdürü izzetlü Kaymakam Azîz Beg, 4) Rûsûmât a'zâsından izzetlü Muhtâr Beg, 4) Mu'teberân-i mülteziminden Edirneli Hüsni Beg. See *ibid*.

⁵⁴⁷Özbek, “Philanthropic,” 64.

⁵⁴⁸“gayret-i milliye ve mahabbet-i vataniyyesi” “N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 589, Şevval 6, 1283/February 11, 1867.

⁵⁴⁹“Sekiz imzâ' ila matbaamıza gönderilen varakadır,” *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 591, Şevval 8, 1283/February 13, 1867.

⁵⁵⁰Baron, Beth, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. “Philanthropy among middle Eastern Americans and their Historical Traditions of Giving,” last accessed February 2, 2013 http://www.philanthropy.org/documents/fg_philanthropyamongmiddleeasternamericans_000.pdf.

association to the religiosity or piety of the subjects as well as the implicit expression of a balance between good and evil deeds should be regarded as a common feature in the monotheistic religions. Moreover “personal involvement, at least for the duration of the charitable act, served as a kind of social leveler between the high-ranking giver and the needy poor.”⁵⁵¹

For the members of Islamic society, the participation in donations or charities meant bringing the people involved in charitable acts closer to God and removing the evil deed/sins by performing good deeds. This especially counted for people like the Cretan Muslims who were described as “(...) common people that work mentally and physically for the sake of the religion, of the state, of the homeland and of the country and are plagued from everywhere being sunk in a storm (...).”⁵⁵² Within this framework, the donations, which were seen as a glorious task[hizmet-i müftehir], were to be distributed only among needy Cretan Muslims[ahâlî-yi Islâm fukarâsi] while the most vulnerable population groups of the local society [alîl ve mecrûhler ve yardımcı olmayan bicâre kadınlara] were given priority in receiving financial aid.⁵⁵³ Thus, the newspaper articles referring to the fundraising campaign contribute to the apprehension of the interconnection between religion, patriotism and the press as a platform of the dynamic Ottoman public sphere.

The existence of the aforementioned patriotic ideological mainstream during the Cretan conflict becomes even clearer when we look at the published lists with the names of the donors/donation amounts by the *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*. In my opinion the publication of such lists aimed not only at the motivation of the ordinary people to join this effort but also at the demonstration of the emergence of a participatory public sphere along the lines of a strong patriotic sentiment and mobilization. This public sphere was primarily composed – as it is shown in the tables below - of middle ranking public servants, military officials as well as of ordinary everyday people (mainly local prominent figures, artisans and traders).

⁵⁵¹Miriam Frenkel and Yaaalov Lev, eds., *Charity and Giving in Monotheistic Religions* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 3.

⁵⁵²“(...) dîn ve devlet ve vatan ve memleketi uğuruñda cân ve bâşla çalışıb az her cihet musâb ve müstağrak-ı deryâ-yı ıztırâb olan ahâlî (...).”“N/A,” *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 598, Şevval 18, 1283/February 23, 1867.

⁵⁵³“N/A,” *Muhbir*, no. 29, Şevval 28, 1283/March 5, 1867.

The fact that the *Muhbir*'s initiative raised concerns to the Grand Vizier as well as the absence of high-ranking official in the lists (as it happened in similar campaigns during the Hamidian era⁵⁵⁴) probably demonstrates the tensions embedded in the way the Young Ottomans and the Ottoman political elite approached the notion of *Ottomanism*. Indeed, the emergence of the notion of strong Muslim patriotism that functioned as counter-ideology to the intense Westernization policies of the *Tanzimat* statesmen reinforced the ideological cleavages between a part of the Young Ottomans and the political elites who pursued the doctrine of *Ottomanism*. Another explanation for the absence of high-ranking officials from the lists may be the reluctance of the political elite to accept the role of the emerging opposition press as a catalyst for the construction of a patriotic public space without the supervision of the palace. Such a list composed of middle-ranking civil and military servants was published by *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis* on 22 Şevval 1283/27 February, 1867:

Name and rank of the donors ⁵⁵⁵	Sum of Donation (in guruş)
Arabistan Ordu-yi Hümâyûn Müşîr-i esbak Devletlü Hacı Reşid Paşa Hazretleri [His Highness former Marshal of the Imperial Army in the Arab provinces Illustrious]	500
Ser-kurenâ-yi Hazret-i Şehr- yârî sâbık atûfetlü AliBegEfendi Hazretleri [His Highness gracious Ali Beg Efendi, chief intermediary of the former Sultan]	400
Dîvân-ı zabtiyye müfettişi fazîletlü Vehbi EfendiHazretleri [His Highness virtuous supervisor of the Gendarmerie Commission]	250
Duhân gümrükçüsü esbak saâdetlü Hakki Beg Efendi [The prosperous former Tobacco tax collector Hakki Beg Efendi]	100
Tophâne-i âmire muhâsebecisi muâvını izzetlü EminEfendi [The honorable vice-accountant of the Imperial	50

⁵⁵⁴Özbek concludes that in a fund-raising campaign during the Hamidian era “(...) Abdülhamid II himself was the major contributor, almost 6 percent of all funds raised coming from the Privy Purse.” Özbek, “Philanthropic”, 72.

⁵⁵⁵“Dâhiliyye” [Domestic News], *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 601.Şevval 22, 1283/February 27, 1867.

Armory Emin Efendi]	
KonyaVâlîsi-yi esbak Râğîb Paşa'niñ mahdûmi izzetlü GalibBeğ [Galib Beğ, the honorable son of the former Konya governor, RâğîbPaşa]	100
Rikâb-ı Hümâyûñ kapıcı bâşlılarıñdan rif'atlı Hacı Hürşîd Efendi [His Eminence Hacı Hürşîd, one of the chief gatekeepers of the Imperial riding stirrups]	100
Nizâmîye ruznâmcecişi izzetlü Ahmad Efendi [The honorable Ahmad Efendi, military Treasury office]	100
Talîa vapur-u Hümâyûnuñ ikinci süvârisi rif'atlı Mahmûd Efendi [His Eminence, Mahmûd Efendi, second cavalryman of the Government boat]	100
Sâbık teleğrâf müfettişi rif'atlı Ömer Efendi [His Eminence, Ömer Efendi, former Telegraph inspector]	100
Top-hâne-yi Âmireyoklamaodası hulefâsıñdan fütüvvetlü Mustafâ ÂsafEfendi, [Mustafâ Âsaf Efendi, the generous officer of the Inspection office of the Imperial Armory]	100
Erkân-ı Harb Yüzbâşlarıñdan fütüvvetlü Muhammed Cemâl Efendi [The generous Captain of the General Staff, Muhammed Cemâl Efendi]	100
Devletlü necâbetlü Nûrad-dîn Efendi Hazretleriniñ Kîlarcısı Alî Ağâ [Alî Ağâ, the housekeeper of His Excellency noble Nûr ad-dîn Efendi]	100
Tebdîl-i Hümâyûñ Hamlacısı Alî Ağâ [Alî Ağâ, oarsman of the Imperial Boat (that the Sultan used when he went out undercover)]	100
Postahâne-i ÂmireSer-tatârı rif'atlı Hâcı Abd- ülRahmanAğâ [His Eminence, Hâcı Abd-ül Rahman Ağâ, chief- courier of the Imperial Postal Office]	100
Dâhiliyye hulefâsıñdan rif'atlı Osmân Beğ Efendi [His Eminence, Osmân Beğ Efendi, secretary of the Interior Ministry]	50
Mektûbî-iHâriciyyeEvrâkOdası hulefâsıñdan Ahmed Cemâl Efendi [Ahmed Cemâl Efendi, one of the successors of the Records Office's secretaries]	100
Mısr çarşısıñda penbe tüccârı RâifAğâ [Râif Ağâ, cotton trader in the Egyptian market]	100
MerhûmIlhâmı PaşaKâtıbı Zihnî Efendi [Zihnî Efendi, the secretary of the deceased]	50

Ilhâmî Paşa]	
Esbak tebdîl eskisi Hüseyin Ağâ [Hüseyin Ağâ, former veteran government spy]	50
Berber Mustafâ Efendi [The barber Mustafâ Efendi]	30
Toğramacı Hâcî Osmân Ağâ [The joiner Hâcî Osmân Ağâ]	30
'Arabacı bâşı Süleymân Ağâ [Süleymân Ağâ, the chief of the transporters by horse cart]	20
Sucu Mehmed Ağâ [Mehmed Ağâ, the water seller]	20
Yorğancı Mustafâ Efendi [Mustafâ Efendi the upholsterer]	20

In addition, the *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis* makes a special reference concerning the contributions of the westerners [latin milleti] living in Istanbul to the fund-raising campaign for the aid of the long-suffering Muslim population in Crete. It is this deliberate reference which in my opinion was aiming at the portrayal of a unified Ottoman population versus any localized and isolated separatist movements but was also making an attempt to indirectly legitimize, for European eyes, the Ottoman government's conduct in the Cretan issue.⁵⁵⁶

In comparison to the “patriarchal patriotism”⁵⁵⁷ which defined the empire-wide state campaign for the relief of the war victims from the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, *Muhbir*'s campaign could be described as the first private press initiative in Ottoman history which tried to awaken strong patriotic sentiments among the Muslims and to lay accordingly the ground for the evolution of Muslim patriotism. This was mainly achieved through the building of a unifying channel of communication and contact between the common people and the bureaucratic elite for the purpose of an ethnic issue. The next table aims at delineating the wide voluntary participation of ordinary people like artisans and simple workers with low income in the donation campaign of the *Muhbir*. As it can be seen from the list below the donors of benevolence were of Muslim faith in their entirety.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁶“Dâhiliyye,” *Ruznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, no. 601, Şevval 22, 1284/February 27, 1867.

⁵⁵⁷Özbek, “Philanthropic”, 74.

⁵⁵⁸“Girid' de musâb olan ahâlî-yi müslimeye iâne olarak ashâb hamîyyet tarafîndan cem'iyyet-i mahsûsa ma'arifet ile bu kere daha toplanılan iâne-i nakdiyyeniñ bir vech zîr müfredâtûnı mübîn defteridir” [Transparent register in which the financial aid that was collected is presented extensively as below,

Name and rank/occupation of the donors	Sum of the donation (in guruş)
Misk yâğcı Hâcı Alî Efendi [Hâcı Alî Efendi, merchant of misk oil]	100
Giridî Râif Efendi [The Cretan Râif Efendi]	315
Iskele hâcesi Şeyh Sâlim Efendi [Şeyh Sâlim Efendi, the hoca of the seaport]	61
Asma altında tüccârdan Hâcı Bekir Efendi [Hâcı Bekir Efendi, merchant under the grapevines]	92
Asma altıında tüccârdan Ahmed Şükrü Efendi [Ahmed Şükrü efendi, merchant under the grapevines]	42
Asma altıında tüccârdan Mağribî Hâcı HasanAğâ [Magrebian Hâcı HasanAğâ, merchant under the grapevines]	105
Asma altıında tüccârdan Bağdâdî Şeyh Hasan Efendi [Şeyh Hasan Efendi from Bagdad, merchant under the grapevines]	105
Asma altıında tüccârdan Top-hâneli İbrâhim Efendi [Top-hâneli İbrâhim Efendi, merchant under the grapevines]	20
Asma altında mukîm Melek Efendi [Melek Efendi who lives under the grapevines]	10
Asma altıında Giridî tüccârdan Yetîm Ağâ [YetîmAğâ, Cretan merchant under the grapevines]	42
Tüccâr-ı hayriyyeden Mustafâ Yâzıncı-zâde MehmedEfendi [Mehmed Efendi, the son of the beneficial merchant Mustafâ Yâzıncı]	210
Duhâncılar Kehyâsı Hâcı Mehmed Latîf Efendi [Hâcı Mehmed Latîf Efendi, head of the Tobacco merchants's guild]	210
Duhân tüccârından Kemâhlı MehmedEfendi [Kemâhlı MehmedEfendi, tobacco merchant]	250
Duhân tüccârından Selâniklı HasanEfendi [Selâniklı HasanEfendi, tobacco merchant]	155
Duhân tüccârından Selâniklı Receb Ağâ [Selâniklı RecebAğâ, tobacco merchant]	155
Duhân tüccârından Keredli Hâcı İbrâhim Efendi	210

here through a special association of patriots in support of the suffering Muslims in Crete], *Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, no. 614, Zi-l-ka'de 11, 1283/March 17, 1867.

[Keredli Hâcî İbrâhim Efendi, tobacco merchant]	
Duhân tüccârîndan Hâcî MehmedEmînEfendi [Hâcî Mehmed EmînEfendi, tobacco merchant]	210
Mûmâ-ileyhiñ birâderi Ahmed Efendi [Ahmed Efendi, the son of the aforementioned]	100
Mûmâ-ileyhiñ vâlideleri hânımlar [The mothers of the aforementioned]	250
Hüsni Efendi zâde Râcab Efendi [Râcab Efendi the son of Hüsni Efendi]	100
Duhân tüccârîndan Dramalı Kâmil Efendi [Kâmil Efendi from Drama, tobacco merchant]	105
Duhân tüccârîndan Kâsım Pâşalı Hacı Halîl Efendi [Kâsım Pâşalı Hacı Halîl Efendi, tobacco merchant]	105
Fabrika memûru Timûr Ağâ [Timûr Ağâ, factory worker]	105

In sum, it may be argued that the reasons for the rise of a strong Islamic notion along with the devotion to the rescue of the fatherland being reflected not only in the emergence of a dynamic private press but also in the participation of common people in patriotic acts like fundraisings, should be primarily found in the special circumstances of tension and violence which marked the period under investigation. Nonetheless, the emergence of an Islamic patriotism strongly opposed to the civic character of the state driven *Ottomanism*, which was based on the principle of equality within the multiethnic and multi-confessional Ottoman society. Finally, the fact that *Muhbir*'s philanthropic campaign was of an exclusionary nature, as it was exclusively concentrated on the relief only of the Muslim Cretans, may lead us to the conclusion that seeds of *Pan-islamism* were already apparent in the period of the late 1860s and gained an impetus through the Cretan movement, resembling thereby with the Hamidian ideology which “was exclusionary from a social and psychological point of view with respect to non-Muslims.”⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁹Julia Phillips Cohen, “Between Civic and Islamic Ottomanism: Jewish Imperial Citizenship in the Hamidian Era” last accessed February 2, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/1935634/Between_Civic_and_Islamic_Ottomanism_Jewish_Imperial_Citizenship_in_the_Hamidian_Era.

7 *Greek Ottomanism*

After having examined the ideological elements of both the *Great Idea* and *Ottomanism*, it seems necessary to also look into an ideological current which emerged in the second half of the 19th century, that being *Greek Ottomanism*. In order to delve into the ideological roots of *Greek Ottomanism*, light must be shed on certain pre-revolutionary as well post-revolutionary aspects of Hellenic reality. A few questions which could effectively contribute to this endeavor can be summed up as follows:

- What position did the two national cores, Athens and Constantinople, hold in the minds of the theoretical pioneers of the Greek Revolution and how did they envision the course Hellenism would take? What was her fate?
- To what extent was the Hellenic nation-building process influenced by European interventionism which was under the veil of neoclassicism, the ideological mainstream at the time?
- And finally, how did Greek Ottoman society develop after the foundation of the independent Greek Kingdom?

Regarding *Greek Ottomanism*, the Greek historian Skopetea notices that during the final decades of the 19th century the Greek element was no longer the culturally and politically dominant ethnicity among the among the various religious and ethnic minorities of the Ottoman mosaic. The spread of nationalism gave birth to other ethnic minorities which were undoubtedly in the shadow of the dominant Greek culture until the 1840s. According to Skopetea the *Greek Ottomanist* notion of the Constantinopolitan society's upper strata, as it was expressed in the aftermath of the Crimean War, did not bear any resemblances to Rēgas' vision of a multiethnic symbiosis the region, as the concept of the Greek enlightener was grounded on the cultural hegemony of the Greek ethnic element. In the 1860s, however, the precondition for the maintenance of the Greek dominance among the other ethnic groups was the Rums' incorporation into the Ottoman bureaucratic mechanism coupled with the maintenance of the Ottoman sovereignty.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁶⁰Skopetea, *To "Prototipo Vasileio,"* 315.

Before delving into the various facets of the issue it must be underlined that the notion of *Greek Ottomanism* was not part of public discourse during the period under discussion and to my knowledge the term was rarely employed in diplomatic exchanges as well as in the press. However the Athenian *Aiōn* mentioned *Greek Ottomanism* in an article concerning the Ottoman Empire which argued that “the salvation of this state in duration and power depends upon being Greek Ottoman or Ottoman Greek, in pursuit of equality and justice for all races and religions.”⁵⁶¹

Elpis' references to the Greeks residing in the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, vividly demonstrated the divergence gradually being fortified within the *Genos*, a factor which nurtured the parallel existence of two different ethnic centers within the Greek nation. This becomes evident in article published in *Elpis* in which it is argued that the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were no longer the pioneers of the prerevolutionary era and were finally characterized as Turks of the Christian faith.⁵⁶² These two examples, derived from two historical Athenian newspapers, explicitly demonstrate the Athenian press' contradictory perception of the Greek Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire as well as the integration of the Greek element in the Ottoman reality. While *Aiōn* regarded the implementation of the letter of *Ottomanism* as the only way to the salvation of the Empire, *Elpis* on the other hand, thought of the Ottoman Greeks as having already been amalgamated and without ethnocentric aspirations.

7.1 One nation, two ethnic cores:

Athens and Constantinople

The Cretan movement coincided with a structural change or, to put it better, with a re-definition of *Megali Idea*'s content. The Greek Kingdom's failure alongside Russia in the Crimean War, isolating her from the Great Powers, as well as the miserable economic and political situation of the state forced the Greek political elite to redefine the main goals and priorities of its policy with regard to its national interests.

⁵⁶¹ *Aiōn*, July 20, 1860 quoted in *ibid.*, 313.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, 315-316.

Furthermore, due to the fashion in which the *Great Idea* was perceived during the aftermath of the Crimean War as well as the reconstruction of the country in almost all sectors being the main focus of the political elite, the Cretan insurrection proved a unique opportunity for Athens to ascertain its role as the new ethnic center in Hellenism.

To my mind the ideological background of *Greek Ottomanism* is interrelated with the existence of two national centers within the Hellenic entity. The formation of an independent but weak Greek State in the 1830s paired with the fact that the majority of the Greeks resided inside the Ottoman borders inevitably led to a fateful dichotomy of Hellenism. Consequently, the coexistence of these two national centers on opposite shores of the Aegean Sea frequently meant divergent ethnic policies aimed at different addressees.

In this chapter I will attempt to touch upon this subject of the concurrent presence of two ethnic centers within Hellenism so as to be able to better understand the ideological concept of *Greek Ottomanism* which according to the Greek historian Skopetea was a Greek Ottoman condominium that would prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire parallel with the fully incorporation of the Greek Orthodox element into the state mechanism.⁵⁶³

At this point it is necessary to emphasize that by the time the Cretan revolt had broken out the Greek Orthodox people residing in the Ottoman Empire had already lost their dominance among the other non-Muslim minorities (Armenians & Jews) in contrast to the prerevolutionary period (1780-1820) and a short while after the Greek War of Independence. Thus, the prevailing conditions in the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s did not favor the notion of *Greek Ottomanism* and its interpretation in terms of a revival of Greek cultural hegemony as Rēgas Feraios, the ideological forerunner of the Greek War of Independence, had envisioned it in the 1800s.

In the framework of this discussion concerning the two distinct ethnic centers my intent is to firstly define the geographical space of *kath'imas Anatoli* [Our East] which will enable the reader to better fathom the region in which the national centers were situated and secondly, as I deem it equally valuable, examine the ideological and

⁵⁶³Ibid., 315.

political significance behind choosing to declare Athens the capital city of the Greek Kingdom, its symbolic as well as ideological gravity in comparison to Constantinople, which was considered, still, the heart of Hellenism in the 1860s. Finally, I will focus on certain aspects of the Greek Orthodox community during the time of the events taking place on the island of Crete and I will shed some light on their economic and educational activities as well as on the controversial forces and interest parties within the shifting Constantinopolitan community.

7.1.1 Hellenic national space and *I kath'imas Anatoli* [Our East]

Before beginning to establish a broader framework of discussion of the two distinct ethnic poles within Hellenism, it would be beneficial to give an overview of the geographical space in which the Hellenic element was present, that being the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor and Northern Africa. The Greek national space [ethnikos chōros] was not restricted to the narrow borders of the Greek Kingdom but it extended far beyond them, including a broad geographical area that stretched over the European and Asiatic parts of the Ottoman Empire.

“The evocative, albeit archaic, Greek expression *I kath'imas Anatoli* is used to describe the large Greek presence that existed in the Near and Middle East until the third decade of the 20th century. It literally means ‘Our East’ but is best rendered in English as the Greek East.”⁵⁶⁴

One could assume that even if the Greek populations of the European part of the Empire sector had been in close contact with other ethnic elements such as the Slavs, Bulgarians and Albanians in the regions of Epirus, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, Eastern Rumelia as well as on certain Aegean islands like Crete for example, the Greek element in those regions of diverse populace would have had a more solid

⁵⁶⁴Richard, Clogg, *I Kath'imas Anatoli: Studies in Ottoman Greek History* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), 7. Specifically, the regions which geographically made up the *Kath'imas Anatoli* included all those Greek-speaking populations who had been left outside the borders of the Greek Kingdom after the conclusion of the Greek War of Independence. Those populations were mainly gathered in Northern Epirus, Eastern Rumelia, Northern Macedonia, Eastern Thrace, Ionia Pontus, Minor Asia and Cyprus. See Iōannēs Chasiotēs K., Introduction to *Oi Ellēnes stē Diaspora. 15^{os}-21^{os} ai.* [Greeks in the Diaspora. 15th-21st c.], eds. Ioannēs Chasiōtēs K., Olga Katsiardē-Hering and Olga Abatzē (Athēna: Voulē tōn Ellēnōn, 2006), 16.

and indigenous characteristics. On the other hand, the most homogenous Greek speaking populations living in the Asiatic part of the Ottoman Empire were settled mainly in Western and Central Minor Asia (especially Smyrna and Cappadocia) as well as in the broader geographical region of Pontus. Other than that, Greek communities also resided on the isles of Greece (Aegean and Ionian islands) as well as in Southern Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Egypt (Alexandria), where the Greek speaking people made up the majority of the local population.⁵⁶⁵

Constantinople, nevertheless, was still thought of as the ethnic center of all the aforementioned Greek populations living even after the Greek Kingdom had been established. The proclamation of Athens as the capital of the Greek Kingdom meant the creation of a new ethnic pole within the body of Hellenism. This process was actualized under the impact of strong philhellenic sentiments in the West and coincided first and foremost with the political aspirations of the three main European Powers (Britain, France and Prussia).

According to Kitromilides the break of the emotional bonds between Athens and Constantinople as well as the turmoil caused to the inner cohesion of Hellenism due to the emergence of a second ethnic core was clearly reflected in the following developments:⁵⁶⁶

1. In the choice of Athens as the capital city of the Greek Kingdom shortly after its establishment,
2. in the schism within the Greek speaking Orthodox world through the foundation of the Greek Autocephalous Orthodox Church⁵⁶⁷, and

⁵⁶⁵Kitromilides, "To Ellēniko kratos," 144-147. See also Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismos*, 337f.

⁵⁶⁶Kitromilides, "To Ellēniko kratos", 143-157.

⁵⁶⁷The schism within the Greek Orthodox world and the creation of an autocephalous church (23.7/4.8. 1833) occurred during the Bavaro-cracy (a term used to describe the period of time the Greek Kingdom was ruled by Bavarian families), shortly after the assassination of Kapodistrias in 1831. The main goal of the Bavarians was to transform the Church into a national, state-controlled institution. These policies were mainly implemented by Maurer and ideologically backed by the prominent figures of the Greek enlightenment Adamantios Koraēs and Theoklētōs Farmakidēs. In his book under the title *Das griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher und privatrechtlicher Beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31. Juli 1834*, (3 Vols., Heidelberg: In der Akademischen Buchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1835) G. L. v Maurer praised the founding of an autocephalous Church as it was thought to be interlocked with the Greek War of Independence. As far as Maurer's policy is concerned, Nikolaou points out that "in reality the issue of the autocephaly was, in his opinion, determined by the revolt of the Greek people, as the Greeks did not only garner their political freedoms but their religious freedom too." [in der Wirklichkeit aber sei die Frage des Autokephalons seiner Meinung nach mit der Erhebung des Griechischen Volkes mitentschieden worden. Denn die Griechen hätten nicht nur die politische, sondern auch und vor allem die religiöse Freiheit erkämpft.] Theodor Nikolaou, „Maurers Einfluß auf

3. in the foundation of the Greek university which provided the state's bureaucratic mechanism with staff and functioned as an agent of nationalism.

In particular, the division of the Greek *Genos* into two ethnic cores becomes evident in the policies and ideologies of their representatives during the first few decades of the 19th century. The policies of Athens with regard to the unredeemed Greek element was characterized mostly by an expansionist, sometimes purposeless and unsystematic irredentism that was shaped under the influence of messianic beliefs revolving around the revival of ancient Byzantine glory. On the other hand the Patriarchate, the traditional and most important pillar of the Greek Orthodox *Millet*, pursued an ecumenical *Weltanschauung*, thereby functioning as a legitimizing factor of the Ottoman rule irrespective of the increasing centrifugal nationalist trends.

These contradictory policies were undoubtedly capable of putting not only the Greek state but Hellenism in its entirety at risk. There are several examples throughout the 19th century which demonstrate the discord between the two ethnic centers. One of them, though not directly related to the Cretan case, concerns the Macedonian Question and the emergence of Bulgarian nationalism during the patriarchy of Joachim III (1878-1884). In regard to this, Kardaras outlines the different policies followed by Athens and Constantinople in the Macedonian issue as following:

“[...] the main objective of the Greek state's policy was the coalescence of the state and the nation. In order to achieve this goal the Greek state sought to expand its borders to the regions of the Ottoman Empire wherever the Greek element was present in excess. Contrastingly, the Patriarchate and the Greek element in Constantinople, were already infused with the ecumenical ideals of the Byzantine era as early as the pre-revolutionary period. In accordance with that, Hellenism would become the heir of the Ottoman Empire by transforming it into an “Ottoman state of the Greek nation” after becoming the dominant power within it.”⁵⁶⁸

die griechische Kirchenpolitik“ [Maurer's impact on Greece's church policy], in *Bayerns Philhellenismus (Symposium an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 22. Und 23. November)*, eds. Gerhard Grimm and Theodor Nikolaou (München: Institut für Orthodoxe Theologie, 1991), 1:53.

⁵⁶⁸ (...) ο βασικός στόχος της πολιτικής του ελληνικού κράτους ήταν να ταφτίσει το κράτος με το έθνος. Για την υλοποίησή του στόχου αυτού επεδίωκε την επεκτασή των συνόρων του μέχρι τα σύμμετρα εκείνα της

In sum, the lack of ideological cohesion between the two ethnic poles can be attributed to Constantinople's religious, economic and cultural superiority over Athens that had nothing more to demonstrate than its glorious past and the intention of the new established state to identify the nation with the state. Moreover, the establishment of Athens as an opposite pole to Constantinople, was the outcome of a process that did not correspond to the indigenous and real needs of Hellenism. Therefore, Athens was actually not in the position to effectively promote the aspirations and imaginations of the Greek *Genos*.

7.1.2 Athens and Constantinople: Reflections of a nation-building schizophrenia

As it was made clear above, in order to fully comprehend the chasm within Hellenism and in particular between its two ethnic centers during the period being discussed, the exploration of both Constantinople and Athens in the subconscious of the Greek *Genos* is necessary. Therefore, we must go back to the theoretical origins of the Greek Independence War and in order to examine the place of the two cities in the thoughts of Rēgas and Koraēs, the most prominent ideological forerunners of the Greek Enlightenment. Furthermore, special reference will be made to the notion of *Athenaism* and the centrality of Athens within the ideological political framework of Hellenism.

7.1.2.1 Athens and Constantinople in the thought of Rēgas and Koraēs

Even though the works and endeavours of Rēgas (1715-1798) and Koraēs (1748-1833)

Othōmanikēs Aftokratorias, sta opoia yperterouse to ellēniko stoicheio. Antitheta to Patriarcheio kai to ellēniko stoicheio tēs Kōnstantinoupolēs, ēdē apo tous proepanastatikous chronous, diapneontan apo to oikoumeniko ideōdes tou Byzantiou. Symfōna me afto o Ellēnismos, afou prōta ginotan ē kyriarchē dynamē mesa stēn Othōmanikē Aftokratoria, telika tha apovaine ousiastikos klēronomos tēs, metamorfōnontas tēn se “Othōmaniko kratos tou ellēnikou ethnous.” Chrēstos Kardaras, *To Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio kai o alytrōtos ellēnismo tēs Makedonias Thrakēs-Ēpeirou. Meta to synedrio tou Verolinou (1868)* [The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the unredeemed Greek populations of Macedonia, Thrace-Epirus. In the aftermath of the Berlin Congress (1878)] (Athēna: Epikairōtēta, 1996), 14.

belong to the prerevolutionary period, almost half a century prior to the events of 1866, evaluating their views on Athens and Constantinople can contribute to our better appreciation of the significance of these two cities, particularly of Athens, in a period also known as the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment. This is a time during which the foundations were laid for the transformation of Greek nationalism into militant expansionist ideology thereby creating an essential component of *Megali Idea*.

During the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century the wheels began to turn for the establishment of a Hellenic nation. It was a process very well interrelated with the economic activities of the Greek-speaking element, especially that of their craft industry. This led to the formation of an influential middle class⁵⁶⁹ which channeled and promoted the expansion of this process while imparting democratic ideals influenced by the French Revolution.⁵⁷⁰

Unlike the adherents of mainstream classicism, who bestowed to Athens a central role in the rebirth of the Greek Nation, mostly due to the city's glorious past, Rēgas did not think of her as highly. This becomes apparent when looking at Rēgas' famous Charta⁵⁷¹ in which Athens had no place at all in the nation-building process of Hellenism. On the contrary, “the major political, and cultural center of the map is Constantinople, the Byzantine and Ottoman capital (...)”⁵⁷² as an illustrated sketch of the “Queen of Bosphorous” is to be found on the first sheet of the map.⁵⁷³

A striking fact concerning the cognitive as well as symbolic messages of the map,

⁵⁶⁹Giannēs Kordatos, *O Rēgas Feraios kai ē epochē tou*[*Rēgas Feraios and its time*] (Athēna: Typois Konstantinoupoleōs, 1931), 9-12.

⁵⁷⁰Dēmētrēs Martos, *Athēna. Prōtevousa tou neou Ellēnikou kratous.Politikē, Ideologika kai Chōros* (Athens. Capital City of the New Greek State. Politics, Ideology and Space) (Athēna: Gordios, 2005), 94.

⁵⁷¹Regarding Rēgas' Charta one must point out that it was an historical, political and physical map addressed to the unredeemed Greeks. The Charta was made up of twelve large sheets that were engraved and printed in Vienna. Furthermore, the Charta “(...) encompassed the region south of Danube, the Aegean Islands and the Western part of Minor Asia registering thereby a perception of the Greek past as well as a vision for the Greek future. The perception for the Greek past laid emphasis on the glory of the ancient Hellenism by depicting its wide expansion in the Greek East”Paschalis Kitromilides *Rēgas Velestinlēs.Theōria kai praksē*[*Rēgas Velestinlēs.Theory and practice*] (Athēna: Voulē tōn Ellēnōn, 1998), 47. See also Giōrgos Laios, “Oi chartes tou Rēga” [Rēga's maps], *Deltion tēs Istorikēs kai Ethnologikēs Etaireias tēs Ellados* 14, (1960): 231-312.

⁵⁷²George Tolia, “*Antiquarianism, Patriotism and Empire. Transfer of the Cartography of the Travels of Anarchasis the Younger, 1788-1811,*” *e-perimetron* 3, no. 3 (2008):109.

⁵⁷³Kitromilides, *Rēgas Velestinlēs*, 48.

which at the same time reflects Rēgas' political and cultural visions of the nation-building centers of Hellenism shortly before the Greek War of Independence, is the point/region where the imaginary diagonals of the Charta meet each other, namely Pella (the seat of Phillip II and Alexander the Great). Rēgas aimed to indirectly reveal another historical, if not triumphant, dimension of the Greek nation-building process other than the aforementioned importance of the socioeconomic forces concentrated in Thessaly, (Central) Macedonia and Ionia.⁵⁷⁴ Finally, Martos argues that the Charta can also be perceived as a bridge between two ideological mainstreams, namely that of neoclassicism and that represented by traditional powers of Hellenism which were active within the context of the Ottoman polity.⁵⁷⁵

Koraēs, “the most prominent intellectual figure of the Greek national revival in the first decades of the nineteenth century,”⁵⁷⁶ on the other hand, approached the nation-building factors apparent within Hellenism at the end of the 18th century in a totally different way. From his point of view the definition of the national space took on neoclassicist characteristics and hinged on criteria which had more historic and symbolic in nature. Hence, influenced by the French Enlightenment and contrasting Rēgas, who focused on the institutional, economic and social networks in order to define the geography of the nation building powers, Koraēs placed the rebuilt nation on a geographical axis encompassing Athens, the Archipelago and Smyrna which in his mind represented antiquity.⁵⁷⁷

It would be interesting to evaluate the aforementioned differentiations in the thoughts of Rēgas and Koraēs by simultaneously taking into consideration the role of “model Kingdom” which was ascribed by the Great powers to the Greek state. Subsequently, this role was embodied in the civilizing mission of *Megali Idea* as well:

“while they both appreciate the significance of classic values, such as democracy, egalitarianism, justice, state and government, they differ as to that Korais believes they were sustained and reaffirmed in Western Europe and needed to be “re-transmitted” to Greece via a

⁵⁷⁴Tolias, “*Antiquarianism, Patriotism and Empire*,” 114.

⁵⁷⁵Martos, *Athēna*, 100-102.

⁵⁷⁶George, S. Chaconas, *Adamantios Korais. A study in Greek Nationalism* (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 11.

⁵⁷⁷Martos, *Athēna*, 104-105.

process of enlightenment and education, whereas Rigas believes that they lived on in the moral sense and in the homes of the Rayas as experiences and that they are the platform upon which their (the Rayas) revolt will be based(...).”⁵⁷⁸

7.1.2.2 Philhellenism and the instrumentalisation of *Athenaism* for the enervation of *Megali Idea*

Following the brief overview on the thoughts of the main theoretical pioneers of the Greek Revolution, an appropriate next step would be to examine the interventions of the Great Powers, whether direct or indirect, during the post-revolutionary era in Greece which contributed to the schism. This was primarily due to their ignorance of the contemporary socioeconomic dynamics and of the hegemonic powers within the Greek Kingdom and secondarily due to the promotion of the new ideological product of neoclassicism or the so called *Athenaism*.

Athenaism was reflected first and foremost in the choice of Athens as the capital city of the Greek Kingdom becoming in this way the counter pole of the Hellenism’s ethnarchical center, Constantinople. With respect to this, the Athenian newspaper *Athina* argued in 1861 that “the capital of Greece, Athens, is the focal point and center of light and culture of two...concentric nations, the nation of liberated Greece, and the larger nation of greater Hellenism, which is still under foreign rule.”⁵⁷⁹

It is useful however to illuminate the criteria according to which a small city such as Athens was given the role of Hellenism’s new national center, thereby undertaking the task to forge a new identity for the Greek nation. According to a few recently published works which touch upon the issue, these criteria quite emphatically reveal the syncretic character of that decision as well as being defined by reasons with historical, sentimental and political undertones. The fact that in 1834 Athens was the fourth biggest town in the small newly founded Kingdom, counting almost seven thousand inhabitants without any serious infrastructure and surely of lesser socioeconomic

⁵⁷⁸Ibid., 106.

⁵⁷⁹Skopetea, *To “Prototylo Vasileio,”* 291 quoted in Eleni Bastea, *The creation of modern Athens. Planning the myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 147.

importance than other Greek cities like Hermoupolis or Navplio⁵⁸⁰, strongly indicates that the choice for its proclamation as a capital city was above all a political decision.

The catalytic presence of the Great Powers not only during the Greek Independence War but also in the aftermath of the revolution demonstrated their clear objective to intervene in the nation-building process which until the Greek War of Independence was carried out by leading segments of the Greek populations residing in other region-centers of Hellenism such as Macedonia, Thessaly, Western Minor Asia and of course Constantinople.⁵⁸¹ Furthermore, the foreign intervention was justified by need for a rational reconstruction of the newly founded Kingdom and its definite cutting off from the Ottoman past.

The political interpretation of the choice made in 1834 to declare Athens the capital city of the Greek Kingdom has not attracted much interest from historians until quite recently. Only in the last two decades have two interesting works come to light which have provided us with useful information on the role of civic architecture in the process of forming a Greek nation. Bastea's work focused mainly on the planning and procedures implemented in the Greek Kingdom signaling the transition from the Ottoman past to the new era but without examining the political background of that choice in depth. Martos however offers us a well-documented study, based on press research and parliamentary proceedings of the period and argues that the meaning behind the choice of Athens as the capital city was twofold.

With regard to the civic architecture engineered in the case of Athens Bastea believes that it aimed primarily at creating "a controlled, centralized and homogenous national space that counterbalanced the tradition of localized loyalty and attachment to a particular region."⁵⁸² It is noteworthy, however, that the choice of Athens as the capital city of the Greek Kingdom inevitably led to the weakening of other Greek cities with strong commercial activities but also created a potential attraction pole for Greeks living outside the borders of the young state.

Furthermore, according to Bastea:

⁵⁸⁰Martos, *Athēna*, 336.

⁵⁸¹As stated above, the importance of these cities was mainly due to their prosperity as commercial centers and hubs of a thriving craft industry.

⁵⁸²Bastea, *The creation of modern Athens*, 5.

“The new buildings were not merely aiming at fulfilling the needs of a minor, agrarian state. They were to shine as beacons of culture to all Greeks of the diaspora, announcing the birth of New Athens, and enticing them to immigrate to Greece.”⁵⁸³

Choosing Athens to be the capital was most certainly a product of neoclassicism and did not correspond to the prevailing social and economic circumstances of the first half of the 19th century. Bastea notices with regard to the development of Athens that

“Though it hardly had an auspicious birth, the plan for New Athens signaled the anticipation of a brighter future. It reflected not the realities, but rather the aspirations of the time. In the process of its implementation the new plan came to symbolize and even embody the country’s national identity, an identity based on the ancient glorious past and the European present”⁵⁸⁴

The disagreements that arose in the body of Hellenism regarding the role of Athens as well as the reactions of the local people and the intellectuals to the interventions of the Europeans were not only reflected in the thoughts of several prominent Greek intellectual figures but in the contemporary press as well. One characteristic example is that of Alexantros Rizos Rangavis who saw Athens as only a temporary capital city.⁵⁸⁵ Another is the Athenian journal *Pandora* which assigned Athens the role of transmitter of the western culture to the East. According to *Pandora* the glorious title “Queen of Cities” could have been and should have been held by Athens given her splendid classical past. The journal went on to indicate that Constantinople’s reputation was only by virtue of Hagia Sophia which in itself bore sentimental links for the Hellenism inside as well as outside of the Greek Kingdoms’ borders.⁵⁸⁶

One of the reasons due to which Athens failed to become a strong ethnic center prior to the period under examination was the demographic factor as the demographic

⁵⁸³Ibid., 147.

⁵⁸⁴Ibid., 84.

⁵⁸⁵“when he went to Constantinople in 1839 he imagined, half-jokingly, how each public building would be used when the capital of the Empire became Greek.” Ibid., 119. In addition the political godfather of *Megali Idea* distinctively stated that “Constantinople must become the capital city of the Kingdom of Greece. It is the city where the throne of our ancient Imperators and the seat of our religion are as well as the city that all of us should look at.” Parysatis Papadopoulou-Symeōnidou, *Ē epilogē tēs Athēnas ōs prōtevousas tēs Ellados 1833-1834* [The choice of Athens as capital city of Greece 1833-1834] (Thessaloniki: Afoi Kiriakidē, 1996), 50, quoted in Martos, *Athēna*, 343.

⁵⁸⁶Bastea, *The creation of modern Athens*, 119.

development of the independent Greek State remained relatively unchanged throughout the 19th century. This meant that Athens was not able to and finally did not manage to become an attractive demographic,⁵⁸⁷ socioeconomic and ideological pole for the unredeemed Greeks residing outside the Greek borders and particularly in the Ottoman realm.⁵⁸⁸ According to Martos, that was the main reason for the Greeks not entering the Greek State so as to remain closely connected to their region of settlement with which they were also emotionally bounded.⁵⁸⁹

It is in fact true that quite a remarkable part of the Ottoman Greeks had already settled in the biggest urban centers of the Ottoman Empire such as Constantinople, Smyrna, and Thessaloniki and were devoted to a complex set of economic activities. In addition, the Greek Kingdom could hardly play the role of a strong and attractive pole for the Greeks living abroad mainly due to its political instability as well as to the prevailing militarist nationalism which did not offer any healthy preconditions⁵⁹⁰ for consistent economic development.⁵⁹¹ Another eye catching fact is that a respectable number of Greek citizens embarked on a new migration wave to the Ottoman Empire and especially to Constantinople starting in the 1850s and onwards. To my opinion this development implicitly pointed to the affirmation of Constantinople as the traditional center of Hellenism and to the concurrent devaluation of Athens as the promoted metropolitan center of Hellenism.

Finally, remaining within the framework of the conflicting relationship between the two national centers of the Greek *Genos*, there are two more points that need to be highlighted. The first one being the Greek University, which was briefly touched on in the chapter concerning *Megali Idea* and the second being the issue of the autochthones

⁵⁸⁷The population of the Kingdom remained around 1 million people (1/6 of the whole Greek population) between the years 1830 and 1855. Martos, *Athēna*, 50.

⁵⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 48-51.

⁵⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 50.

⁵⁹⁰The ever growing uncertainty concerning economic activities intensified due to the fact that “among other things foreign investors must have been discouraged by the phenomenon of banditry, poor administration, the unclear state of property ownership and from 1850 and on the threat of war on the horizon” [Ausländische Anleger dürften außerdem das Räuberwesen, die schlechte Verwaltung, die ungeklärten Bodensitzverhältnisse und die seit 1850 sich abzeichnende Kriegsgefahr abgeschreckt haben.] Herring, *Die politischen Parteien*, 294.

⁵⁹¹In his article about the Greeks residing in the Ottoman Empire Aleksandrēs points out that the liberal and western-thinking middle class of Neo-Phanariotes, who had gained momentum during the Tanzimat reforms, were in favor of the preservation of an Ottoman Empire that would finally lead to socio-political and economic prosperity while at the same time opposing a nationalist separatist movement. Aleksēs Aleksandrēs, “Oi Ellēnes stēn ypēresia tēs Othōmanikēs Aftokratorias. 1850-1922” [Greeks in the service of the Ottoman Empire. 1850-1922], *Deltion tēs Ellēnikēs kai Ethnologikēs Etaireias* 2 (1980): 373.

(natives)/heterochthones (i.e. not born in the Greek Kingdom), both of which I believe are correlated to the Greek nation-building process and more specifically to the forging of a unified Greek national identity.

7.1.3 The Athenian University as a laboratory of ideology

One of the major institutions that undoubtedly contributed to the *Athenization* of the Greek State, which was supposed to play the role of a model kingdom in the East, was that of the University of Athens⁵⁹² (1834-1837). Its mission revolved around forging an ethnic identity and providing the administrative mechanism with sufficient staff.⁵⁹³ Lappas described the twofold mission of the Athenian University as follows:

“(…) the reconstruction and the modernization of the Greek state on the one hand and on the other the intellectual rebirth of the country and its reunion with the ancient Greek culture, the symbol of which was classical Athens.”⁵⁹⁴

The Greek University's true mission was the transmission of Western ideas into the East and this was underlined by Maurer in 1835 and repeated more emphatically some decades later by Schinas, the chancellor of the University, but also by Komnos in 1867.⁵⁹⁵ In 1863, another Greek politician, Epameinōndas Delēgeōrgēs, stated that “(…) the university did not only contribute to the spread of the Greek literary culture in the East but it also politically nurtured the Greek youth’s aspirations (…).”⁵⁹⁶ For

⁵⁹²The University of Athens was renamed National University only after the expulsion of King Otto and the end of Bavarocracy.

⁵⁹³Europe's role in reinforcing new institutions in post-revolutionary Greece was very clearly made noticeable in a disagreement that arose between Georg Ludwig von Maurer and Friedrich Thiersch with regard to the way public education in the Greek Kingdom needed to be reconstructed. On the one hand, Maurer, arrogant and ill-disposed toward the chaos dominating the Greek public education system, and the insufficient intelligentsia proposed a without-restriction and *a priori* implementation of the German educational model, with only the minimum input from the local element. On the other hand, Thiersch being more conciliatory and having a better overview of Greek affairs proposed a more moderate reconstruction of the Greek educational system by adapting the German model to the Greek environment. There is however no doubt that both shared a common point in their proposals, namely, the adoption of the German model of education as a basis for the reconstruction of Greek public education. Kōstas Lappas, *Panepistēmio kai Foitētes stēn Ellada kata ton 19^o aiōna* [University and Students in Greece during the 19th century] (Athēna: Ethniko Idryma Erevnōn, 2004), 44-45.

⁵⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 62.

⁵⁹⁵Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismos*, 349f.

⁵⁹⁶ Epameinōndas Delēgeōrgēs, *Tois foitētais tou Ethnikou Panepistēmiou* [To the students of the National University] (Athēna: n/a, 1863), 3, quoted in Chrēstos Lazos, “Enopla foitētika sōmata (1862-

all the above reasons one could say that the description of the Greek University as an “ideological laboratory” is justified amidst a turbulent era, with the national issues monopolizing the political agenda in Athens.

Apart from the financial assistance to the University, donated by several Greek communities residing in the Ottoman Empire, a substantial number of students (337 between 1837 – 1873) from Asia Minor had also studied at the institution indicating the close relations of the Athenian University with unredeemed Hellenism.⁵⁹⁷ Besides this the strong bonds between the independent Greek state and the Ottoman Greeks were sculpted also by the fact that thirteen professors worked at the University from 1837 to 1879 were from Constantinople.⁵⁹⁸ At the same time, teachers holding Greek citizenship who had received their education at the National University of Greece and had teaching positions in the Ottoman Greek schools became one of the biggest concerns for the Ottoman authorities, as it was believed that they had been imbued with the ideals of *Megali Idea* which they bore as educators. With respect to this, Vassiadis informs us that “after the outbreak of the Crimean War, teachers with Greek nationality were expelled from the Empire. Apparently they were allowed to return, for in 1859 Greek diplomats in Crete protested strongly when the Ottoman authorities, acting through the local Greek Orthodox Church, again forbade citizens of Greece to teach in local schools.”⁵⁹⁹

It was not only the student bodies, but the academic personal as well, which took part dynamically in the political developments of the Greek Kingdom, expressed mainly through political activism and editing activities in the aftermath of the expulsion of King Otto (1861). In particular, the new generation of teaching staff, which succeeded the so called “enlighteners” and more moderate professors, contributed to the radicalization of the student body as well.⁶⁰⁰ In this context, the students began to

1897). Ἐ περιπτῶσῃ τῆς “panepistēmiakēs falaggas” [Armed student corps (1862-1897). The case of the “University Phallanx”], in *Actes du colloque international. Université: Idéologie et culture. Dimensions historique et perspectives*, ed. IAEN/GGNG, (Athēna: Genikē Grammateia Neas Genias, 1989), 1:249.

⁵⁹⁷Lappas, *Panepistēmio kai Foitētes*, 311-316.

⁵⁹⁸Ibid., 148.

⁵⁹⁹George Vassiadis, *The Syllagos movement of Constantinople and Ottoman Greek education 1861-1923* (Athēna: Kentro Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn, 2007), 34.

⁶⁰⁰Lappas, *Panepistēmio kai Foitētes*, 548. Stefanos Koumanoudēs (1818-1899) was yet another prominent figure of the Greek enlightenment in the newly founded Greek Kingdom, who “had an aversion to the intellectual circles of Constantinople just like the city itself that symbolized what he rejected.” Sofia Matthaiou, “St. A. Koumanoudēs –AA. R. Rangavēs. Mia syngkritikē proseggisē” [St. A. Koumanoudēs –AA. R. Rangavēs. A comparative approach], *Mnēmōn* 28, (2006-2007): 184.

organize and in June 1869, shortly before the epilogue of the Cretan crisis, they began to publish a newspaper named *Foitētēs*⁶⁰¹ [Student], which can be considered a by-product of the impression the Cretan made on the Greek Kingdom's public opinion. The newspaper was issued once a week, the majority of the writers were law students, its tone was clearly political and dealt with issues of national interest.⁶⁰²

As it was shown above, the University took on a more conservative role, especially after the expulsion of King Otto and the approval of the new constitution in 1864 which completed the transition to a Crowned Democracy. This wave of conservatism led to a more active participation of the students, and generally speaking of the University, for the expansionist policy of the Greek state. To this effect, the Cretan events sparked the interest of the young students who in turn attempted to assist their unredeemed brethren in multiple ways. Either through the organization of relief committees responsible for raising funds or through reports to the King criticizing the government's disloyalty as well as taking part in large demonstrations.⁶⁰³ Finally, they requested to be granted the right of possessing a weapon from the Chancellor of the University and sought to be part of military operations in the framework of the reconstruction and revival of the University Phalanx.⁶⁰⁴ In this context we should not understate the crucial role and the attempts of Alexandros Rēzos Rangavēs, the University Chancellor, to resurrect the University Phalanx at the time the Cretan revolt broke out.⁶⁰⁵

7.1.4 The *heterochthon* issue

Even though the Cretan revolt broke out almost twenty years after the issue of the *heterochthones* arose and might not be directly related to the Cretan insurrection of

⁶⁰¹The newspaper was published for a short time between June and October 1869. Its publisher was Panagiotopoulos, a law student, who was succeeded by Sakelariou in August 1869. Lappas, *Panepistēmio kai Foitētes*, 552.

⁶⁰²*Ibid.*, 553.

⁶⁰³Voulgarēs' policies concerning the Cretan Issue resulted in a reaction from students, who organized demonstrations on 23 October 1868.

⁶⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 559-60. Pertaining to the University or Student Phalanx, which was founded in 1862 and reestablished in 1873, it was mainly composed of students and to a lesser extent of professors and lecturers. More information on the university phalanx is to be found in the work of Lazos. See Chrēstos Lazos, *Istoria tēs panepistimakēs ē foitētikēs falaggas* [The History of University or Student Phalanx] (Athēna: Chrysē Tomē, 1980).

⁶⁰⁵“Οι προσκοποι τēs Ανατολēs” [The scouts of the East], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1123, November 17, 1866.

1866, it is in my opinion closely interwoven with the sociopolitical dimensions and social cleavages created due to the existence of the two distinct ethnic poles within the body of Hellenism. Moreover, taking into account the fact that some editors of Greek newspapers were born in Constantinople, a short reference to the *heterochthon* issue in the present study seems justified.

More specifically, the *heterochthon* issue arose shortly after the end of the Greek War of Independence and implicitly touched upon the cultivation of a national identity that would result in the bridging of the numerous social cleavages within the Greek society. Therefore, while the political elites of the Greek Kingdom praised Constantinople's position within Hellenism, the broad masses of the local population in Greece were ill-disposed towards the Constantinopolitans and especially the Phanariotes who migrated to Greece in the aftermath of the Greek Revolution.⁶⁰⁶ This fact fueled the discussion about the *heterochthon* issue which monopolized the public debate in the newly founded state.

Especially with the arrival of the unredeemed brethren in Greece the issue immediately became the bone of contention amongst the vast majority of the press and the public, which nurtured strong anti-Bavarian sentiments. Petropoulos notices the stance of the Greek newspapers which was that the “Press was constantly making unfavorable references to a vague category which it called *newcomers* [neēlydes].”⁶⁰⁷ This hostility towards *Bavarocracy* became even more intense due to the fact that the *newcomers* (especially from Constantinople and the Danubian principalities) “outclassed most autochthons in their command of skills required to administer a Western-Type state and because the more recent arrivals among them remained free from identification with any of the parties, the Crown by policy had given them

⁶⁰⁶Besides being the “godfather” of *Megali Idea*, Greek Prime Minister Kōlettēs was himself too a heterochthone. Along with other prominent Greek political figures like Mavrokordatos, Trikoupēs and others, he tried to dilute the extreme measures pertaining to the exclusion of the heterochthones from Greek society. According to Petmezas, Kōlettēs, who had also served as minister of public education between 1845 and 1847 “offered employment to some of the unemployed heterochthones and Phanariotes scions in the only source of high public authority (and salaries) which was left open to them: the newly founded University of Athens.” Socrates Petmezas, “From privileged outcasts to power players: The ‘Romantic’ redefinition of the Hellenic nation in the mid-nineteenth century,” in *The Making of Modern Greece: Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Uses of the Past*, eds. Roderic Beaton and David Ricks (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 127.

⁶⁰⁷John A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 487. The term *Neēlydes* was used to describe all Greek nationals arriving in Greece in the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence and who usurped political and public posts.

preference in staffing the government bureaucracy.”⁶⁰⁸

It is worth mentioning, finally, that historic newspapers such as *Elpis* and *Aiōn*, which were in circulation during the time being examined here, were sympathetic to the heterochthones and against the devisive tendencies within the Greek community. The stance of both these papers was to an extent due to the fact that the publisher of the former was a Constantinopolitan while the publisher of *Aiōn* used to be an active participant in the Greek War of Independence in 1821.⁶⁰⁹ The principal argument of the autochthones was that the Greeks outside the borders, who had not taken part in the struggle for Greek Independence, were aiming at gaining equal rights to them while the heterochthone press supported the unity of the Greek people. More often than not the autochthone press was inclined to oversimplify the situation and described the heterochthones as lackeys of the Bavarians and specifically the Phanariotes as turkophiles.

7.2 The “Renaissance” of Constantinople in the second half of the 19th century and the Greek national consciousness

In this chapter we will look at the activities of Constantinopolitan laymen⁶¹⁰ in the financial and educational sectors which will give us an overview of the different ideological and political trends among the Ottoman Greeks. Furthermore, the Phanariotes and the emerging bourgeoisie were legitimately considered part of the elite network of the *Rum milleti*, meaning that an insight into their activities at the juncture of the Cretan movement would be of great importance, since it will enable us to trace the prevailing ideological trends within the community in the transition period of the 1860s.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ For a more comprehensive overview on the debate in the Greek press over the issue see the work of Iōannēs Dēmakēs, *Ē politeiakē metavolē tou 1843 kai to zētēma tōn aftochthonōn kai eterochthonōn* [The state modification of 1843 and the issue of the autochthones and heterochthones] (Athēna: Themelio, 1991).

⁶¹⁰ As there was no official census in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1881, we need to rely on population data provided by travelers or other sources in order to learn more about the demographic presence of the Greek element in the Constantinople. With respect to this, Exertzoglou tends to adopt the estimations of the Greek Associations (Syllogoi) according to which “a number between 200-220,000 appears to be close to reality.” Charis Exertzoglou, “Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850-1881,” (PhD diss., King College, University of London, 1986), 80.

Examining the Greek element in the Ottoman Empire, Kasaba believes that it was part of a civil society⁶¹¹ contributing to its development in an essential way since the end of the 18th century. This belief of his stemmed from the economic prosperity of the Greek ethnic element, which was the result of the Greeks' intensive mercantile activities in the region. He also refers to the existence of a Greek Ottoman "non-state arena with autonomous means of wealth and mobilization"⁶¹² which provided financial security for the members of the upper class of the Greek community⁶¹³ while simultaneously weakening nationalist aspirations of the Greek Kingdom expressed in the ideals of *Megali Idea*.⁶¹⁴

Our first point of interest here concerns the financial activities of the Ottoman Greeks and in particular the interdependent relations between the Constantinopolitan Greek banking-community and the Ottoman State. The second issue we will focus on is the enterprises of the Greek Ottoman middle class (comprised of intellectuals, traders, ship-owners, merchants) in the field of education and their contribution toward the conveyance Greek literary culture. While examining the endeavors of the Greek Ottoman element in education it will become clear how their actions contributed in an essential way to the dynamic construction of a national consciousness among the Greek populations living in the Ottoman Empire. An insight into the participation of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie in the *millet's* educational policy will not only illuminate the increasing importance of the lay element in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox community but it will also stress the emergence of a social group with more ethnocentric characteristics.

7.2.1 Banking activities of the Greek Ottomans

Even though Greek scholars, such as Exertzoglou have already explored the subject of

⁶¹¹As far as the term *civil society* is concerned, Kasaba adopts Stepan's definition of the term, according to which civil society presupposes the a) the existence of an environment in which the forces present can take form and express themselves, b) the construction of a self-image by the subjects constituting a civil society which can manifest itself on a political, cultural and social level and finally c) the ability of the people who form civil society to have access to sources of power. Reşat Kasaba, "Economic Foundations of a Civil Society: Greek in the trade of Western Anatolia, 1840-1876," in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism. Politics, economy and the society in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999), 77-78.

⁶¹²*Ibid.*, 85.

⁶¹³Besides being the "Mekka" of the banking sector in the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople was also the center of commerce for Europe, Russia and Persia.

⁶¹⁴*Ibid.*, 84-5.

Greek Ottoman banking ventures,⁶¹⁵ not much is known about the sociopolitical dimensions of the matter which undoubtedly played an essential role in the construction of an ethnocentric identity among the Greek populations residing in the Ottoman Empire during the late Ottoman period.

The predominant ethnic element of the Ottoman banking community was made up of the Greeks at least until the *Banque Impériale Ottomane* was established, during the mid-1860s, a turning point in Ottoman economic history which actually paved the way for Westerners to strengthen their position in the local banking activities. According to Exertzoglou “the main aspect of Greek banking in Constantinople was not the financing of trade (...) but the financing of the Ottoman Treasury (...).”⁶¹⁶ Among the most well-known money lenders of the period many Greeks are present, to name a few: G. Zarifēs⁶¹⁷, Zafiropoulos, the Bros Baltazzis, S. Rallis, Ch. Zōgrafos, D. Glavanys, S. Mavrokordatos, B. Tubini, Z. Stephanovik-Skylitzis and Tz. Psycharēs. Their banking activities for the most part revolved around financing the Ottoman Public Debt.⁶¹⁸

The Cretan revolt coincided with a period during which Greek capitalist endeavors in the Ottoman Empire were prosperous. Exertzoglou accurately observes that it was at the beginning of period when the “Greek capital developed a business profile whose main feature was investment diversification with entrepreneurs getting involved in

⁶¹⁵With respect to the positions that the Ottoman Greeks occupied in the Ottoman bureaucratic mechanism during the *Tanzimat* era see Aleksandrēs, “Oι Ellēnes stēn ypēresia”, 365-404 and Ilber Ortaylı, “Greeks in the Ottoman Administration During the Tanzimat Period” in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism. Politics, economy and the society in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi, 161-168 (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999). Two typical examples of Ottoman Greek high-ranking diplomats serving as ambassadors of the Porte in Athens are Kostaki Mousouros and Iōannēs Fotiadēs. Both were involved in diplomatic crises of the Porte and the Greek State in 1848 and 1868 respectively.

⁶¹⁶Charis Exertzoglou, “The Development of a Greek Bourgeoisie,” 92.

⁶¹⁷The entanglement of prominent Ottoman Greeks with high-ranking Ottoman officials is once again evident in an article in *Neologos* which makes an invitation from Zarifis to Grand Vizier Ali Paşa, Fuad Paşa, Midhat and Kavouli Paşas as well as the Minister of Finance for a private dinner public. “N/A,” *Neologos*, no. 334, March 2, 1868. Further, Geyikdagi informs us that “(...) in 1869, the Ottoman government gave a concession to Konstantin Karapanos, a Greek Ottoman businessman, to build and operate a horse-drawn tramway line. The Ottoman Bank and its affiliated company, the Societe Generale de l’Empire Ottoman as well as three notable Galata bankers Avram Camondo, Hristaki Zografos and Yorgi Zarifi were among the founders of the Societe de Tramways de Constantinople.” Necla V. Geyikdagi, *Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire. International Trade and Relations* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 117.

⁶¹⁸ For further details on these prominent Ottoman Greeks see Mihail-Dimitri, Sturdza, *Dictionnaire Historique et Gènealogique de Grandes Familles de Grèce d’ Albanie et de Constantinople*. Paris: M.-D. Sturdza, 1983.

almost every sector of the ottoman economy.”⁶¹⁹ A report published in the Greek press concerning Mustafa Paşa’s mission on Crete emphatically demonstrated the aforementioned interdependent relations of the Greek bankers with the Ottoman political elite. On October 21th, 1866, the Athenian newspaper *Mellon* commented on the Greek Ottoman bankers who had lent money to the Sultan so that he could overcome the difficulties of the extremely high costs⁶²⁰ of the Empire’s military operations in Crete as well as to cope with settlement of the loan interests.⁶²¹ According to the article a loan of up to £600,000 was required for Mustafa Paşa’s mission on Crete. *Société Générale de l’Empire Ottoman’s*⁶²² contributions came up to £300,000 and as for the remaining £300,000 this was covered by the *Ottoman Bank* (£100,000) and Count Abraham Camondo (£100,000) plus £100,000 contributed by wealthy Greek Ottomans like Christaki Vitlos (£60,000) and G. Zarifēs (£40,000).⁶²³

Another interesting case revealing the Greek Ottoman bankers’ reluctance to engage in any acts of ethnocentric nature against the Ottoman interests is that of Greek banker G. Zarifēs who “refused to undertake the public subscription of the 1867 Greek loan to the Ottoman Empire on the grounds that the loan was destined to cover military expenditures.”⁶²⁴ The unwillingness of the Constantinopolitan Greek Ottomans to contribute to specific financial activities (such as Greek loan subscriptions for military preparations) can be justified as they feared putting their good relations with the Porte in jeopardy.

From the abovementioned one can easily understand the reasons why Constantinopolitan bankers did not seek to obtain Greek citizenship that could have provided them with security in their financial activities. In addition, they restrained from actively taking part in the Cretan conflict that might have induced the

⁶¹⁹Exertzoglou, “The Development of a Greek Bourgeoisie,” 90.

⁶²⁰Up until October 1868 the Ottoman treasury was set back by up to an approximate £15,000,000 due to the Cretan crisis.

⁶²¹“Diefkrinisis” [Clarification], *Mellon*, no. n/a, October 21, 1866.

⁶²²The Société Générale de l’Empire Ottoman was founded in 1864 by a collaboration of local and foreign investors and with the participation of Greek bankers such as G. Zarifēs, Stephanovik-Skilitis, Cammondo, Zafeiropoulos, E. Valtatzēs, A. Rallēs. Charis Exertzoglou, *Prosarmostikotēta kai politikē omogeneiakōn kefalaiōn. Ellēnes trapezites stēn Kōnstantinoupolē. To katastēma “Zarifēs Zafeiropoulos” 1871-1881* [Adaptability and policy of the Expatriate Capital. Greek bankers in Constantinople. The House of “Zariphi Zaphiropoulos” 1871-1881] (Athēna: Idryma Erevnas kai Paideias tēs Emporikēs Trapezas tēs Elladas, 1989), 19.

⁶²³ “Diefkrinisis,” *Mellon*, no. n/a, October 21, 1866. The same happened in 1877 in the case of a £800,000 loan which was required to cover military costs. Exertzoglou, *Prosarmostikotēta kai politikē*, 76.

⁶²⁴Charis Exertzoglou, “The Development of a Greek Bourgeoisie,” 101, note 4.

disintegration of the good relations between the Constantinopolitan Greek funds and the Porte, while at the same time they continued to follow a friendly policy toward the Ottoman state and kept a low political profile.⁶²⁵ This however does not mean they remained passive in other affairs of the *millet*, for example in the field of education which in actuality allowed them more space to act along different policy lines than those of the Patriarchate as we will see in the following part of the work.

7.2.1.1 *Greek Ottomanism* mirrored in the case of Geōrgios Zarifēs

After the brief overview of the banking activities of the Constantinopolitan bourgeoisie during the Cretan uprising, I would at this point like to make a special reference to the case of Geōrgios Zarifēs (1807-1884), the powerful Greek banker, who in my opinion is a noteworthy example of the impact *Greek Ottomanism* had on the laymen of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community. One could also say that the post-revolutionary ailments and the divisive tendencies of the Hellenism were intertwined with his life and it is this that adds to the significance of his case.

Zarifēs was born in Constantinople in 1807 and after the consummation of his studies he settled in post-revolutionary Greece. However, he was compelled to abandon the country in 1843, as he, a foreigner, had not been able to establish himself professionally in the country. He too was a victim of the tension between natives and foreigners and the disputes that broke out due to it. He then went on to reside in Constantinople where he proceeded to become one of the most powerful bankers in Galata with great influence on the local banking circles as well as on the Ottoman state administration. Proof that Zarifēs was held in very high regard in the upper echelons of the Ottoman administrative machine was the decision to announce a public holiday for the offices of Porte and other governmental regions on the day of Greek businessman's funeral, in order for the employees to attend.⁶²⁶ In fact, as it is mentioned in his grandson's memoirs, Geōrgios Zarifēs had an intimate friendship with Abdülhamid the crown prince at the time, as he was able to help improve the dire financial situation the prince had been in.⁶²⁷ Their close relationship

⁶²⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁶²⁶ "N/A," *Neologos*, no. 4484, March 30, 1884.

⁶²⁷ See Geōrgios L. Zarifēs, *Oi anamnēseis mou. Enas kosmos pou efyge* [My memories. A world that has gone] (Athēna: Trochalia, 2002), 158-161

continued well after Abdūlahmid rose to the throne and Zarifēs went on to become the Sultan's personal banker.

The settlement of Ottoman debt in 1881 was largely due to a plan Zarifēs had devised in 1879 which “led to the establishment of the Direction of the Six Revenues.”⁶²⁸ The Greek businessman also made significant contributions to the education of the minority as he financially aided the GPSC and funded the construction of educational institutes. A special commendation should be made though for his financial support of the pro-educational fraternity “Agapate Allēlous” [Love one another], which was founded by Patriarch Joachim the third with the intention of sending teachers to the villages of Thrace and Macedonia.⁶²⁹

Stamatopoulos mentions Zarifēs and Zōgrafos as members of the Greek upper-middle class who were in favour of a Greco-Ottoman alliance opposing the *panslavist* threat.⁶³⁰ An outstanding example of these tendencies is when Zarifēs proposed the foundation of a Greco-Ottoman empire to the British ambassador in 1878, following in the footsteps of the Austro-Hungarian paradigm and the ecumenical Empire model.⁶³¹ It was during the time that Greco-Bulgarian antagonism was at its peak, especially after the end of the Eastern Crisis and the Russo-Ottoman war which was sealed by the Treaty of San Stefano (3.3.1878) and the Treaty of Berlin (11.8.1878) which partially amended the previous one by limiting the benefits toward the Slavist factor. The reasoning behind this was to be able to tackle the threat of *Panslavism*, which for Greeks both inside and outside the borders of the miniature Greek state constituted a serious threat to their survival.

The case of Geōrgios Zarifēs proves that the more prosperous members of the Greek Constantinopolitan bourgeoisie in Istanbul, were determined to first and foremost safeguard their own financial interests which were inextricably linked to the endurance of the Ottoman Empire. It is due to this determination that extreme initiatives were taken, relative to the circumstances of course, such as Zarifēs' suggestion to establish a Greco-Ottoman Empire. This adherence to the Greco-

⁶²⁸Exertzoglou, “The Development of a Greek Bourgeoisie,” 93.

⁶²⁹Zarifēs, *Oi anamnēseis mou*, 74.

⁶³⁰Stamatopoulos, *Metarrythmisē kai ekkosmikefsē*, 380.

⁶³¹*Ibid.*, 381.

Ottoman state model did not in any way restrict the development of a sound ethnic and even at times an ethnocentric civic-mindedness reflected mainly acts of a cultural and educational nature.

7.2.2 National consciousness and the *Greek Philological Syllogos of Constantinople* (GPSC)

During the *Tanzimat* period the opportune conditions were formed in order for the laymen of the various ethnic-religious communities to challenge the traditional religious hierarchies. Therefore, the rise of an influential middle and upper class within the Greek Orthodox community should also be viewed from a different angle, meaning that their activities should be examined within the framework of the *Rum milleti*.

It is through their efforts to gain social dominance among the various groups of the *Rum milleti* that the Constantinopolitan middle class devoted itself to the promotion of education and the construction of a national identity amid the unredeemed Greek Ottoman subjects, as it was this class that was most vulnerable to the nationalist echoes of Greek irredentism. The *Greek Philological Syllogos of Constantinople*⁶³² (GPSC) can of course be attributed to those efforts. Thus, one should look through the prism of the Syllogomania-phenomenon, or in other words the establishment of *Syllogoi* (associations) which were charged with responsibilities related to educational and cultural issues of the Greek Orthodox *millet* in order to comprehend the function of GPSC. Moreover, the approach of the GPSC should take place in relation with the emergence of a national consciousness among specific strata of the Greek Orthodox society in the Ottoman Empire.

In my opinion GPSC proved a characteristic example of a crash test between two dynamic developments within the *Rum milleti*: The first one was reflected in the ecumenical ideal pursued by the Patriarchate and the second one was defined by the increasing ethnocentric trends within the lay element, whose role in the internal affairs of the *millet* gained gradually in importance. However, the critical stance of the

⁶³²The Greek word *Syllogos* is translated to English as Association. In the educational context of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community the word was primarily used as “the designation of corporate bodies that professed predominantly literary or philanthropic aims”. Vassiadis, *The Syllogos movement*, 17. Hence, the *Greek Philological Syllogos of Constantinople* will be abbreviated as GPSC or simply as Syllogos.

Patriarchate towards any nationalist separatist movement as well as the flowering economic activities of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie may lead us to the conclusion, that private initiatives being undertaken in the educational field too, would have been also marked by the promotion of the *Ottomanist* ideal rather than that of ethnocentrism.

At this point I will maintain that the notion of *Greek Ottomanism* was not advocated by the entirety of the Constantinopolitan bourgeoisie, even though it was thought of as a warrantee for their interests. As it will be revealed below, the *Tanzimat* reforms created a basis upon which prominent members of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie challenged the traditional hegemony of Patriarchate and sought to spread more ethnocentric messages among the Greek speaking masses. This was accomplished by founding *syllogoi*, with the GPSC being the most prominent of them all. Its foundation however, as well as its very composition highlighted a characteristic microcosm of the conflicting ideological trends within the *Rum milleti*.

The inception of the GPSC initiated a massive wave of newly established associations⁶³³(*Sylogos* movement) not only within the Ottoman Empire but in the Greek Kingdom as well. Their objective was the dissemination of Greek literary culture and science to the East.⁶³⁴ The function of such private educational associations expressed a less aggressive facet of *Megali Idea*⁶³⁵and should be examined as such. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the patriotic and sometimes even nationalist orientation of GPSC members like Ieroklēs Vassiadēs⁶³⁶ for example.

Regarding the operations and mission of the GPSC a purely educational and cultural direction is evident in the first article of its revised original ordinance:

“The cultivation in general of letters, through the written or oral

⁶³³On the phenomenon of *sylogomania* see also Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismos*, 399-402.

⁶³⁴Haris Exertzoglou, *Ethnikē taftotēta stēn Kōnstantinoupolē ton 19^o aiōna. O Ellēnikos filologikos syllogos Kōnstantinoupolēs* [National identity in Constantinople in the 19th century. The Greek Philological Society of Constantinople 1861-1922] (Athēna: Nefelē, 1996), 20-21. It should also be said that the Greek State did not remain passive when the opportunity to get involved in the educational matters of the Millet presented itself. Thus, in 1872, the Greek Kingdom offered financial aid to the Constantinopolitans with the sum of 15,000 drachmas for the restoration of the GPSC offices which were damaged in a fire.

⁶³⁵Dēmaras, *Ellēnikos Rōmantismos*, 399-402.

⁶³⁶Odysseas Andreadēs, “Kōnstantinos Ēroklēs Vassiadēs” [Kōnstantinos Ēroklēs Vassiadēs], *Ēpeirōtika Chronika* (1927): 1-17. Vassiadēs conveys his nationalist aspirations once again in a speech given on the occasion of the deposition of King Otto in which he “championed British support of Greece and alluded to the ethnic unity of the free and Ottoman Greek populations.” Vassiadēs, *The Sylogos movement*, 35.

communication of philological and scientific matters, through the publication of a periodical, through the creation of a library and reading room, through public lectures, through the establishment of literary and scientific competitions, and through every other means furthering the aim of the *sylogos*.”⁶³⁷

An interesting point here would be the pinpointing of the analogies between the *Sylogos* as part of the *Sylogomania*-phenomenon and the role of the Greek Kingdom as appointed to it by the European neoclassicists. The correlation being that both, the *Sylogos* and the Greek Kingdom, had taken on a civilizing mission. In the case of the Greek Kingdom, viewed from the neoclassicist perspective, the main focus was an *Athenocentric* transmission of Western values to the (Greek) East so as to influence and define the nation-building process within Hellenism. On the other hand, the associations founded throughout the Ottoman provinces with a substantial Greek demographic presence concealed the ethnocentric nature of their *mission civilisatrice* in terms of spreading secular education among the masses, without challenging the Ottoman rule however.⁶³⁸

The founding members of the *Sylogos* were Greeks from all walks of life, representatives of the Constantinopolitan community such as merchants, bankers, teachers, doctors, intellectuals as well as high-ranking officials. Among the most prominent members were Karatheodori Paşa, Kōnstantinos Karatheodōrēs, Stefanos Karatheodōrēs Savvas Ioannis Paşa and Vassiadēs Ieroklēs.⁶³⁹ Among the foreign (honorary) members of the *Sylogos* were distinguished Ottoman and Russian political figures such as Ethem, Fuad and Ali Paşa and General Ignatiev.⁶⁴⁰ Further, we also find representatives of the local Constantinopolitan press elite such as Vasileios D. Kallifron, publisher of *Anatolikos Astēr*, and Stavros Voutyras, publisher of the influential *Neologos*.⁶⁴¹ The composition of the GPSC demonstrates the spirit of *Ottomanism* which was based on the peaceful coexistence of all the Ottoman subjects regardless of ethnic origin, religion or social class. But, was the multicultural spirit of

⁶³⁷Ibid., 58.

⁶³⁸“(…) until the rise of Turkish nationalism under the Young Turks and the period of nationalistic frenzy following the end of World War I, the Sublime Porte does not seem to have accepted the view that the *sylogos* movement represented a threat to the integrity of the Empire.” Ibid., 232.

⁶³⁹Exertzoglou, *Ethnikē taftotēta*, 20.

⁶⁴⁰Vassiadis assumes that they became members long before the Cretan crisis broke out. See Vassiadis, *The Sylogos movement*, 57.

⁶⁴¹Ibid., 49.

the association's composition reflected in the activities of its members as political entities?

7.2.2.1 The GPSC as a veil for nationalist acts?

After having taken a closer look at the Cretan events it becomes clear that several members of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community had participated in one way or another in the Cretan conflict. However it cannot be proven whether or not such activities were a product of pure personal choice or whether they were instigated by a veiled unofficial policy of the *Sylogos*. However I do contend that the actions of certain GPSC leading members contradicted Exertzoglou's assumption, according to which the members of the association did not support the revolutionary predisposition of the unredeemed brethren.⁶⁴²

As it was mentioned above, Ēroklēs Vassiadēs, one of the leading figures of the GPSC, was in close contact with the Committee of the Cretan Struggle [Epitropē Krētikou Agōnos] in Constantinople as in 1866 he had already travelled to Athens as the Constantinopolitan representative of the Committee of the Cretan Struggle. In a letter which he sent to the Committee for the Cretan Struggle on November 30th, 1866 he proposed that the Constantinopolitan, Heperotic and Central Committees buy American military equipment (500 pieces each) which was supposed to be more effective for the purposes of the struggle.⁶⁴³

Another prominent member of the *Sylogos* was Aleksandros Rizos Rangavēs, a person who played a crucial political and diplomatic role in the course of the Cretan crisis. An interesting point in his memoirs is his reference to Vassiadēs and Vafiadēs with whom he had visited the headquarters of the GPSC.⁶⁴⁴ Without doubt the presence of a Greek diplomat known for his ethnocentric, if not nationalist, ideology within the circles of GPSC demonstrates not only the existence of different ideological orientations within the association but also the Greek Kingdom's efforts to gain influence on the operations of the *Sylogos* in order to pursue its *megaloidetic* aspirations.

⁶⁴²Exertzoglou, *Ethnikē taftotēta*, 45.

⁶⁴³Makrymichalos, "Anekdotā eggrafa," 15-16. A. Vafiadēs, another leading figure of the GPSC, who supported revolutionary movements and had a leading role in the Constantinopolitan Committee. See Ibid. 48, note 88.

⁶⁴⁴Aleksandros Rangavēs, *Apomnēmonevmata* [Memoires] (Athēna: Pyrsos, 1930), 3: 432-33; 466-67.

As for the involvement of the Greek Kingdom in the *millet*'s affairs concerning education, the relations between Constantinople and Athens deteriorated the very moment the applied educational policy of the Greek Foreign Ministry regarding the unredeemed brethren changed. The ecumenical orientation of the Greek educational policy, which up to that point was supported by the Patriarchal institution, was gradually being replaced for a new one based on the private initiatives of the laymen. That fact was thought to be an added danger that would affect the stability of the Patriarchate and Ottoman government's relationship.⁶⁴⁵ In view of this, Anagnostopoulou correctly states that the *Syllogos* gradually "took over to carry out the mission of the University of Athens and to substitute its function – that one of the "linkage between the Nation and the Genos."⁶⁴⁶

7.3 The Patriarchate and the events of 1866

Despite having covered several aspects of the Cretan crisis, the Greek Ottoman newspapers but chiefly the Athenian newspapers systematically avoided any references to the engagement of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in the developments on the island. Given that the ecumenical ideal of the Patriarchate opposed the rising ethnocentrism and within the context of our discussion concerning the two ethnic poles of the Greek *Genos*, my intention here is to shed some light on the role of the Patriarchate in the Cretan crisis. Highlighting the antinomy between Orthodoxy and nationalism Kitromilides points out that Orthodox Church's diachronic concern was to prevent the "(...) transition from the ecumenical community of Balkan Orthodoxy and the religiously defined millets to a still inchoate, inarticulate and uncertain world of modern linguistic nations."⁶⁴⁷

Unlike in Cyprus where the head of the church identified itself with the nationalist cause of the Greek Orthodox people of the island against the foreign rulers (Ottoman

⁶⁴⁵Giannēs Spetas, "Thesmikes kai leitourgikes opseis tēs ekpaidefsēs tōn ellēnorthodoksōn koinotētōn sto Othōmaniko kratōs: Apo tēn enarkēsē tōn metarrythmiseōn tou Tanzimat eōs tēn epanastasē tōn Neotourkōn" [Institutional and functional aspects of the Greek Orthodox communities' educational activities within the Ottoman state. From the Tanzimat period to the Young Turks' Revolution] (PhD diss, University of Thessaloniki, 2003), 207.

⁶⁴⁶Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia*, 295.

⁶⁴⁷Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities," 151.

and British)⁶⁴⁸, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate condemned any separatist movements on behalf of the Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. This is justified by the fact that the policy of the Patriarchate, which remained the main pillar of the *millet* and was a guarantor of its Ottomanity, was defined by a pan-orthodox ecumenism and functioned as a counterweight to the emerging nationalism among the non-Muslim subjects.

Coming back to Crete of the mid-1860s, as previously mentioned, one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Cretan conflict was the monastery issue (1863-1865) which had to do with the distribution of the monastery funds and properties for the common wealth and especially for the construction of schools. According to *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, the monitoring of monastery lands was appointed to the National Unsegregated Permanent Council [Mikto Diarkes Ethniko Symvoulío] which was part of the reformation of the *millet* and the majority was held by the secularists. The stance however of the upper classes of the Cretan Church, assisted also by the Patriarchate, led to the formation of two opposing fronts. The two conflicting parties were comprised of the laymen, the *prokritoi* (kocabasis, in Ottoman), the chieftains and the intellectuals on the one side and the church with the Elders (*dēmogerontia*, in Greek) of Heraklion on the other side. As for the Church of Crete this was under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and was represented by the Metropolitan of Crete Dionysios Charitōnidēs (1858-1868) who also served as Patriarch from 23 January 1887 to 13 August 1891. Therefore, the emerging issue of the monasteries in Cretan society during the second half of the 19th century, could, on a smaller scale, be the expression of the local Church's stance and that of the Patriarchate in general on internal matters of the *millet*, which gave prominence to the dawning conflict among the laymen and the clergy in the context of a gradual transition to a more secular nature of the ethno-religious communities of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate's first political intervention in the matter of the Cretan crisis was during a meeting with a commission of eighteen Christian Cretans who had arrived in Constantinople to discuss the future administrative system of Crete. The Patriarch, Gregorios VI, condemned the revolutionary activity of the Cretan people and appealed to cease the revolt. The second time Gregorios VI intervened in the issue

⁶⁴⁸Theodore Papadopoulos, "Orthodox Church and Civil Authority," *Journal of Contemporary History* 2, no. 4 (October 1967): 208-209.

was in January 1869 when via a patriarchal and synodical encyclical he urged for any anti-regime activities to be suspended while making suggestions to the Cretan people to devote themselves to the reconstruction of the social and communal life of the island and to obey the local authorities.⁶⁴⁹

The important fact here is that the Cretan events coincided with the elections for the new Patriarch in 1867. As expected the election of the Patriarch became the perfect pretext to stir up dissension among the various power groups within the *millet*. The Greek state being worried about the increasing threat of *Panslavism* in Southeastern Europe decided at that time to back the candidacy of Patriarch Gregorios VI through its embassy at Constantinople because of the fact that a possible election of Gregorios VI was equivalent to conciliatory solution of the Bulgarian issue.⁶⁵⁰ This was yet another reason for Russia's full support of Gregorios VI during his candidacy and fully justifies the good relationships between the Patriarch and the Count Ignatiev.

With regard to the link between the Greek Orthodox lay aristocracy and the patriarchal institution, it is useful to mention here that in the case of the patriarchal elections of 1867 Geōrgios Zarifēs and Christakēs Zōgrafos, two of the most prominent Greek Ottoman bankers, supported the candidateship of Joachim who enjoyed the support of fractions within the Greek Orthodox community known for their anti-Russian feelings. A victory of Joachim's fraction in the patriarchal election would mean the intensification of the separatist movements of the Bulgarians as well as the rapid emergence of *Panslavism*. Therefore, the consensus between the two ethnic centers of Hellenism with regard to the election of the new Patriarch was undoubtedly defined by the threat of *Panslavist* separatism.

In addition, the Ottoman government did not remain passive during the important patriarchal elections of 1867. Stamatopoulos enlightens us by stating that Ali Paşa also supported the election of Gregorios VI, for the advancement of his own interests of course, as he wanted to maintain the communication channels open with St. Petersburg, especially after the outbreak of the Cretan revolt. Moreover, Gregorios VI

⁶⁴⁹Christos Chamchougias, "O Oikoumenikos Patriarchēs Kōnstantinoupoleōs Grēgorios ST o Fortouniadēs en mesō ethnikōn kai ethnofyletikōn antagōnismōn" [The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Gregorios VIth Fourtouniadies amidst national and national-racial rivalries], (PhD diss., Aristotelio University of Thessaloniki, 2006), 399.

⁶⁵⁰Stamatopoulos, *Metarrythmisē kai ekkosmikefsē*, 288.

had the Ottoman support as well due to his good relationship with Russia.⁶⁵¹ The new Patriarch tactically took advantage of the Cretan movement as he believed it to be an efficient means of pressure on the Ottoman government so as to achieve any possible alterations with regard to the reformative measures of the *millet's* structure. This policy, however, would inevitably lead to the alienation of the Greek State from the emerging lay element as well as from the neo-Phanariotes.⁶⁵²

In sum, as it has been shown above, the Cretan movement coincided with two issues of tectonic importance with regard to the structure of the *millet*, namely its reformation and the Bulgarian ecclesiastical nationalism. In these developments the Cretan issue had a crucial place, since it was deployed mainly as a means of pressure on the Ottoman side in order the different power groups within the *millet* to gain advantage against each other. However, both issues revealed also an internal schism within the body of the Orthodox *millet*.

On the one hand, the one wing which was composed of the reformative group of the *millet* (Aleksandros Karatheodōrēs, Christaki Zōgrafos, the families of Aristarchi and Mousouros) was backed by the Greek government. This group was also considered to be the most radical one as it identified the Bulgarian issue with the notion of *Panslavism*. As result, it emphasized the need for cooperation between Greeks and Ottomans against the Russian threat.⁶⁵³ On the other hand, the other wing was composed of Patriarch Gregorios and some Neo-Phanariotes around him, who believed that there was no room for a rapprochement between the Greeks and the Ottomans by accusing the Ottomans of trying to create tension between the Greek and Bulgarian element within the Orthodox *millet*.⁶⁵⁴ Leaning on the promotion of the model of Panorthodox Oecumenism the wing around Patriarch Gregorios favored a more compromising solution in the Bulgarian issue by putting an emphasis on educational policies as a vital precondition for the Greek ethnic element in the Ottoman Empire to achieve a cultural hegemony among the other ethnic groups. Finally, interesting enough is the identification of the Constantinopolitan press with the one or another wing. As far as the stance of the Constantinopolitan newspapers is

⁶⁵¹Ibid., 281.

⁶⁵²Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, “Othōmanikes metarrythmiseis kai Oikoumenoiko Patriarcheio: O politikos antagōnismos gia tēn efarmogē tōn Genikōn Kanonismōn (1858-1878)” [Ottoman reforms and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The political antagonism for the implementation of the General Regulations (1858-1878)] (PhD diss., University of Thessaloniki, 1998), 245.

⁶⁵³Ibid., 269.

⁶⁵⁴Ibid.

concerned, *Kōnstantinoupolis*, *Anatolikos Astēr* and *Vyzantis* represented the wing of Greogorios while *Neologos* was affiliated to the most radical fraction with regard to the Bulgarian issue. In the context of the growing Bulgarian national movement, *Neologos*, first published in August 1866, in favor of reinforcing the secular element when dealing with religious topics, had a fluctuating stance on the issue of Bulgarian nationalism. While in the beginning the paper was in favor of an agreement and peaceful coexistence⁶⁵⁵ of all the nations in the Empire, especially the Christian nations in the framework of the Ottoman fatherland, it never on the other hand ceased to consider Bulgarian nationalism as the principal political issue that had to be addressed through common action of both the Greek State and the Ottoman Empire as was suggested in an article on 27 July 1877.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵⁵ “1867. B,” *Neologos*, no. 308, January 5, 1868.

⁶⁵⁶ “N/A,” *Neologos*, no. 2539, July 27, 1877.

8 *Panslavism*, Russian *messianism* and Russophobia mirrored in the Greek and Ottoman press

The following quote belongs to Mr. Whittall, the British consul in Izmir around 1860, and shows how closely Greek nationalist aspirations and Russian interventionism, which had resurged in the aftermath of the Crimean War, in the Balkan region were interconnected:

“The Greeks dream of nothing but a Greek empire, to be created by the help of Russia. They despise the Russians as slaves and savages, but they hope to make use of them, and then to throw them off.”⁶⁵⁷

Without abandoning the historical context of the Cretan events of 1866, the present chapter puts more emphasis on highlighting some of the aspects of *Panslavism*'s political program along with its display in the Greek, Greek Ottoman and Ottoman press respectively. The main concern of this chapter's second part revolves around the historic-political facets of the Cretan crisis wherein Russia's role in the crisis becomes clear. In this context, special attention will be paid to specific aspects of the conflict such as the activities of Russian agents on the island, the failed efforts for a Greco-Serbian alliance as well as Russia's diplomatic defeat in the Paris conference. Finally, opinion articles extracted from Greek and Greek Ottoman newspapers will be comparatively presented in the third part of the chapter, wherein the reader will be able to track the stance of the press towards the *panslavist* ideology which was regarded as one of the most important threats for the realization of the Greek irredentist aspirations.

One of the main threats that *Megali Idea* and the Greek nationalists in particular had to cope with in the course of the second half of the 19th century was that of Russian nationalism which was on the rise. That meant that the defenders of pan-hellenistic aspirations not only had to go up against the dogma for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and its integrity, as it was manifested in the aftermath of the Crimean War, but now also had to face the threat of a rapidly emerging and aggressive Russian nationalism.

⁶⁵⁷Denton, *Christians of Turkey*,77.

The emergence of *Panslavism* and the instrumentalisation of the Slavic people for the purposes of the Russian foreign policy found their expression in several facets of 19th century Balkan history such as in the case of the promulgation of the Bulgarian Exarchate which had taken place only shortly after the end of the Cretan crisis. Nevertheless, one could say that the awakening of *panslavist* sentiments was supported to some extent by the Ottoman political elite as well. The weakening of the monopoly of the mighty Greek Orthodox community as part of the politics of the Ottoman statesmen was displayed in Fuâd Paşa's political statement by advising "(...) to isolate the Greeks as much as possible from other Christians" and "to withdraw the Bulgarians from the domination of the Greek Church."⁶⁵⁸

Without doubt the phase of the Cretan Question under examination marks a critical juncture not only in the relations of Russia with her western counterparts but also in the symbiosis of the Orthodox Balkan people as well. Moreover, the Cretan crisis along with the Polish revolt (1863-1864) and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 constituted one of the major challenges that the Russian foreign policy faced in the aftermath of the lost Crimean War.

As the Crimean War (1853-1856) came to its end, the *panslavist* doctrine gradually began to replace *Panorthodoxism*, meaning that the Cretan insurrection broke out whilst *panslavist* notions began to flourish. Two events that facilitated the conceptualization and manifestation of *Panslavism's* identity are worth mentioning: On the one hand the Russian Ethnographic Exhibit and the Moscow Slav Congress which both took place in 1867 and demarcated the impetus of the *panslavist* notions and on the other hand the concentrated endeavors of the Russian elite exercised their influence on the South Slavs including those residing in the Ottoman Empire.

In sum it could be said that both the Greek and Ottoman press approached the *Panslavist* ideology incorporated in the Russia's foreign policy from different angles, as it will be shown below. While most Greek speaking newspapers treated *Panslavism*, the counterpart of *Megali Idea*, acknowledging its political aims regarding the Slavic people, the Ottoman press contrastively perceived Russian nationalism and its aggressive nature as a pivotal factor of destabilization in the Ottoman Empire and

⁶⁵⁸William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927, with an Appendix, 1927-1936* (Cambridge England: The University Press, 1936), 345, quoted in Theodore Tatsios, *The Megali Idea*, 41.

alsoas one of the main reasons for the agitation of the Christian Orthodox people of the Empire.

8.1 The rise of *Panslavism*

Even if Russian interest in the Balkan Slavs - loaded not only with religious but also with ethnic connotations - was steadily increased during the reign of Peter the Great, it was not until the reign of Catherine the Great that the Russian foreign policy in the Balkan acquired more specific characteristics and paid more attention to the element of religion rather than that of ethnicity.

The *panslavist* notions first emerged in the dawn of the 19th century and only after the local intelligentsia had taken initiatives to study the language and history of the other Slavic people.⁶⁵⁹ Thus, *Panslavism* which was regarded as the “ideological heir of Russian Slavophilism”⁶⁶⁰ was put into effect as a state ideology only in the second half of the 19th century. Unlike *Slavophilism* which was a system of ideas, the notion of *Panslavism* was a rather effective tool in the hands of the Russian foreign policy makers. However the uniqueness and distinction of the Slavic culture in comparison to the Romano-Germanic culture was one of the main principles of *Panslavism* which was inspired by the *Slavophiles*. The lack of enthusiasm of the *Slavophiles* concerning Russia’s foreign affairs could be considered the result of Tsar Nicholas’ I “fanatical championship of legitimate monarchy in the Concert of Europe (...).”⁶⁶¹ This was the main reason for the existence of two different and often contradictory to each other policies in St. Petersburg, something that resulted into a conflicting symbiosis between Gorchakov and Ignatiev.

The dilemma that *Panslavism* was faced with in the aftermath of the Crimean War was whether the political goals aiming at a *Panslavic* unity should first be subordinated to the need of a cultural unification of all Slavic people, as Ivan Aksakov suggested, or whether Russia should set forth a political program aiming at the emancipation of the Slavic people by taking advantage of the favorable political developments

⁶⁵⁹Michael Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1985), 5.

⁶⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 32.

⁶⁶¹*Ibid.*, 39.

in Europe.⁶⁶² However, during the course of the Cretan Question the *panslavist* movement began to obtain more radical characteristics under the influence of Danilevskii and Fadiev who defined the political aims of *Panslavism* in a more concrete way compared to theoretical *Panslavists* such as Aksakov, Hilferding, Lamanskii. These radical ideas of both Danilevskii and Fadiev favoured the use of force, as it was considered a more effective way of settling the issues of the non-Russian Slavs in the attempt for Slavic political unification.

The discussion on Russia's role in the post-Crimean period became the focal point of *Panslavists* once again, the majority of whom expressed the opinion that the West posed the main obstacles in the fulfillment of Russia's historical mission.⁶⁶³ The only way to avoid it was Russia to present herself as the protector of the non-Russian Slavs and offer them protection as well as the opportunity for representation in the political vacuum which would come into existence in the aftermath of the Ottoman and Austrian Empires' fall. Given that, Danilevskii, one of the most eminent ideologists of *Panslavism*, dreamed of a Panlavic Union comprised of eight geographical-administrative units, with their total population amounting to approximately 125 million people. He also included the Hellenic Kingdom and the district of Constantinople with their non-slavic populations⁶⁶⁴ to these units, which according to the Russian *panslavists* "had to share the destiny of their more numerous Slavic neighbors."⁶⁶⁵ Within this context, it seems that the notion of Greek nationalism, expressed through the concept of *Megali Idea*, did not represent a vivid danger to the *panslavist* aspirations at all. This becomes obvious from the fact that Fadiev did not take *Megali Idea* too seriously at all, as he perceived it merely as a product of the Greek intelligentsia that was condemned to failure.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶²Ibid., 253.

⁶⁶³The main concern of Russian policy in the Balkans was that Serbia and the Balkan Slavs not fall under Western influence. In accordance with this, the fears of the slavophil intellectual elite regarding the weakened Russian influence in Serbia in the early 1860s are illustrated in the renamed "Epistle from Moscow to the Serbs," signed by eleven fervent Slavophiles and described by Petrovich as "a significant link between Slavophilism and Panslavism." See Ibid., 97-8

⁶⁶⁴Ibid., 270.

⁶⁶⁵Ibid. 273.

⁶⁶⁶Ibid., 275.

8.2 Russian *messianism* and the expectation of the Russian emancipator

The partially reluctant stance of the Athenian press towards Russia's expansionism as well as her interventionism in Ottoman affairs on behalf of the Orthodox people, might have relied upon a diachronically wide spread notion of Russian *messianism* in the Greek world based "on the claim that Russia was the true heir of the sole protector of Orthodox Christendom."⁶⁶⁷ Especially, since the aftermath of the fall of Constantinople "Eastern Christendom came to look upon Holy Russia as the only free center of Orthodoxy as well as the most powerful one."⁶⁶⁸ Therefore the instrumentalization of the Christian Orthodox religion was inevitably well embedded in the Russian foreign policy since mid- 18th century and continuing to be effective until to mid-19th century. As a result, in an age when the impending destabilization of the Ottoman Empire was more than evident, nationalism emerged as a unique opportunity to reinforce the subjugated peoples' inclination for self-determination as "prophetic and apocalyptic imagery"⁶⁶⁹ had an immense mobilizing capacity among the rural masses.⁶⁷⁰

Even though "the disillusionment that followed the end of the Russo-Turkish Wars near the close of the eighteenth century seems to have marked the end of the affair with traditional messianism,"⁶⁷¹ one could say that the expectation of the Russian "emancipator" lived on in the subconscious of the unredeemed orthodox people for decades to come. The fertile ground of the Cretan crisis fueled these expectations once again, as Russian diplomatic agents spread promises and filled hearts with hope for the Tsarist regime's support in case of a revolt.⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁷Ibid., 5.

⁶⁶⁸Ibid., 8.

⁶⁶⁹Marios Hatzopoulos, "Oracular Prophecy and the Politics of Toppling Ottoman Rule in South-East Europe," *The Historical Review* VIII (2011): 98.

⁶⁷⁰The *Vision of Agathangelos* which was written in 1271 is another piece of oracular prophecy which should be studied in relation to major political events dealing with the attempts of the Greek nation for deliberation. *Agathangelos* published in Greece until the end of the 1830s served as an effective means through which "messianists could place their hopes in any monarch capable of posing a potential or actual treat to Ottoman integrity." Hatzopoulos, "Oracular," 101. With regard to Agathangelos see also John Nicolopoulos, "From Agathangelos to the Megale Idea: Russia and the Emergence of Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies* 26, no. 1 (1985), 41-56.

⁶⁷¹Hatzopoulos, "Oracular," 105.

⁶⁷²As early as March 1866, Dendrinis, the Russian consul in Crete, visited I. Mētsotakēs the Russian vice-consul on the island who reassured Dendrinis that in case of a revolt Russia will back the Cretans up. See Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 119.

Without doubt, studying works of literature referencing the Cretan revolt more thoroughly could eventually highlight whether elements of oracular prophecy had penetrated patriotic poetry of that time and accordingly influenced the “popular reception of the call for insurrection.”⁶⁷³ For the purposes of the present chapter it would be useful to underline that the events of 1866 attracted the interest of Greek romantic poets such as Paraschos, Valaōritēs a.o. who produced a respectable volume of poetic works. It is not evident, however, whether seeds of Russian *messianism* were existent in these works. Notwithstanding this, Athanasopoulou who examined the majority of poetry, especially that of Paraschos and Valaōritēs which was written in that period and that dealt with the political developments on the island, claims that their poems reflected a strong anti-western way of thinking expressed, through the criticism of France’s apathy in the Cretan issue.⁶⁷⁴

Moreover, an indirect Russian *messianism* is also apparent in the main Greek historiographical works⁶⁷⁵ in which the perception of Russia’s differs from time to time as “every national historiography which is a product of an intersection between international developments in the discipline and the political and social realities of the particular society (...).”⁶⁷⁶ On the whole, however, the Greek historians of the 19th century acknowledged Russia’s intention to liberate her unredeemed coreligionist brethren in faith and blood from the Ottoman yoke in her “holy” mission.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷³Hatzopoulos. “Oracular,” 111.

⁶⁷⁴ Afroditē Athanasopoulou, “O apoēchos tou Krētikou Agōna stēn poiēsē tōn Ellēnōn Romantikōn” [The Cretan Struggle echoed in Greek Romantic Poetry], in *O Romantismos stēn Ellada* [Romanticism in Greece], ed. Maria Stafanopoulou (Athēna: Scholē Mōraitē, 2001), 4.

⁶⁷⁵The preoccupation of Greek Historiography with Russian policy in the Balkans had already begun in 18th century, when the Russians (under the reign of Catherine II) called upon the Greeks to rise up against the Ottomans in the name of “faith”, “the homeland” and “freedom”. Kōnstantinos Sathas, *Tourkokratoumenē Ellas. Istorikon dokimion peri ton pros apotinaksin tou Othōmanikou zygoi epanastaseōn tou Ellēnikou Ethnous(1453-1821)* [Greece under the Turkish rule. A historical survey on the Revolutions of the Greek Nation for the break of the Ottoman Yoke] (Athēna: Ek tēs typografias tōn teknōn tou Andreou Koromēla, 1869), 477-503.

⁶⁷⁶Antonis Liakos, “Modern Greek Historiography (1974-2000). The Era of Tradition from Dictatorship to Democracy,” last accessed May 12, 2016, http://www.culturahistorica.es/liakos/modern_greek_historiography.pdf. See also Nikolaos Rotzokos, *Ethnafypnisē kai ethnogenesē. Orlōfika kai Ellēnikē istoriografia* [Nation’s Awakening and Nation’s Birth. The Orloff incident in the Greek historiography] (Athēna: Vivliorama, 2007), 20.

⁶⁷⁷For a more detailed study of Russia’s depiction in classical *oeuvres* of the Greek historiography such as those of Vakalopoulos, Sathas and Papparigopoulos see *Ibid.*, 84-120; 155-170.

8.3 The conflicting approaches of Gorchakov and Ignatiev in Russian foreign affairs

Despite the fact that Russian foreign policy in the 19th century was primarily a matter of the Tsar's rule, there was no institutional consensus concerning the orientation of the Empire's foreign policy. This difference of opinion primarily revolved around the two main architects of imperial Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century, the Imperial Chancellor prince Alexander Mikhailovic Gorchakov and the Count Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev. The latter had served as Director of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1861 and 1864 as well as Russian Ambassador in Constantinople during the Cretan Revolt (1864-1877). Contrary to Gorchakov, who "believed in Europe"⁶⁷⁸ and did not have much sympathy for nationalism, Ignatiev was a fervent supporter of *Panslavism*.⁶⁷⁹

Furthermore, it should be taken into account that Ignatiev's actions were not always in consensus with the official Russian policy as he acted independently to some extent. This might also lay Gorchakov's incapability to restrain "(...) those of his subordinates who continually excited the Balkan Christians to profit from a policy which the Russian government had no intention of carrying out at that time."⁶⁸⁰ Further, the Greek historian Donta points out in her article on Ignatiev's memoirs that "the hesitancy and the apathy of Gorchakov (...) was the real reason of a policy which excited the enmity of Greece towards Russia since it contributed to the final failure of the Cretan revolution."⁶⁸¹

A better understanding of Ignatiev's realpolitik thoughts with regard to Russia's foreign policy in the Balkans is presented in his memoirs. There, it becomes apparent, that the Balkan people would serve as instruments for the establishment of Russia's presence in Southeast Europe. Additionally, Ignatiev mentioned in his *panslavist* program which was sent to Gorchakov in 1866, that "it is in keeping with Russian interests to energize the destructive action of the Christian populations

⁶⁷⁸Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev," *The Slavonic review* X, no. 29 (1931): 388.

⁶⁷⁹Hans Kohn, *Pan-slavism. Its History and Ideology*, 2nded. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 126.

⁶⁸⁰Bourne, "Great Britain," 78.

⁶⁸¹ Domna Dontas, "Ta apomnēmonevmata tou Stratēgou Ignatief kai ē Krētikē Epanastasē tou 1866-1869" [The Memoirs of General Ignatiev and the Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869], *Pepragmena tou B' Diethnous Krētologikou Synedriou* 4 (1969): 176.

(...).”⁶⁸²In general, the three pillars of Ignatiev’s policy could be summed up as following.⁶⁸³

- A. The revision or even the annulment - if possible - of the Treaty of Paris,
- B. The command over the Straits (due to their immense geostrategic importance) and last but not least
- C. The Slavic unity in the context of *Panslavism*.

During Ignatiev's stay in Constantinople as a Russian ambassador he mostly followed an aggressive and sometimes even a warlike policy, more so compared to the official Russian foreign policy. However, despite his radical political ideas, he did not aim at “(...) the liberation of the non-Russian Slavs but to their subordination to Russian policy.”⁶⁸⁴His principal objective was “a confederation of free Balkan states under a Russian protectorate.”⁶⁸⁵ In his *panslavist* program - as it was mentioned above - Ignatiev was concerned more with Austria’s role regarding the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs. On the Ottoman front however, as it will be shown below, the Russian diplomat took initiatives as well, by focusing on the formation of a Balkan alliance against the Ottoman Empire, consisting mainly of Greece and Serbia.

In relation to the Cretan revolt, Ignatiev’s Balkan policy was defined by his intention to “utilize the general turbulence of the Eastern peoples by drawing them closer together, by smoothing over their mutual misunderstandings and quarrels, and by preparing a defensive-offensive alliance between Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and the Bulgars.”⁶⁸⁶ Within that context, the outbreak of the Cretan upheaval was seen as a propitious political event for the fruition of his goals, despite maintaining that “he himself did his best to stop the outbreak and instructed the Russian Consul-General at Kanea to disabuse the Cretans of any idea that Russia would come to their help, (...) in his memoirs.”⁶⁸⁷

Finally, even though Ignatiev’s goals in the Balkans were clear-cut and pronounced, he was also very careful not to harm the delicate balances among the Christian people living in the Ottoman realm. This kind of policy is reflected f.i. in Ignatiev’s negative

⁶⁸²Onou, “The Memoirs,” 397.

⁶⁸³B. H. Sumner, “Ignatyev at Constantinople, 1864-1874. I,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 11, (1932-33): 342-344; Onou, “The Memoirs,” 387-90.

⁶⁸⁴Petrovich, *The Emergence*, 261.

⁶⁸⁵Onou, “The Memoirs,” 396.

⁶⁸⁶Petrovich, *The Emergence*, 262.

⁶⁸⁷Sumner, “Ignatyev,” 346.

response to the French proposal of January 1867 which aimed at uniting Epirus, Thessaly and Crete with Greece by arguing that it would disturb “(...) the balance between Greek and Slav in the Balkans, unless the Slavs received some corresponding compensation, such as Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Old Serbia to Serbia.”⁶⁸⁸

8.4 Increasing anti-Slavic sentiments among Greek nationalists and the common dream of Constantinople

In regard to how the Greek world perceived *panslavist* policies, one could highlight that the emergence of Bulgarian nationalism in the 1870's as it was expressed mainly through the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate⁶⁸⁹, was one of the main reasons that led to anti-Slavic sentiments among the Greeks which did not leave Greco-Slavic relations unaffected as well. More specifically, the emergence of strong anti-Slavic or to put it more accurately, of anti-Russian ideas in Greek intellectual circles reached its peak in the aftermath of the Crimean War, especially due its impact on the Greek Kingdom. The noted Greek historian, Skopetea, however, ascribes that increasing anti-Russism to the “reflection of western Russophobia”⁶⁹⁰ in Greece that was developing already in the post-revolutionary period (1830s), when Kapodistrias (the first Greek governor and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia) was supported politically by the Russian Party. In that context, opposing political ideas expressed by the other parties of that period could be interpreted within the framework of an emerging anti-Russism.⁶⁹¹ Strong sentiments of anti-Russism were also expressed by Greek prominent political figures like Epameinōndas Delēgeōrgēs who was known for his *megaloideatic* rhetoric. In an article published in the Athenian newspaper *Panellinion* in 1854 he claimed that Greece was the only heir of the Ottoman Empire and that Greece should not have any sympathy for Russia since her only aspiration was Constantinople.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁸Ibid., 347-48.

⁶⁸⁹Despite its religious leitmotifs, the issue of the foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate constituted a major political threat in the eyes of the Greek nationalists for the implementation of the *Megali Idea*'s objectives.

⁶⁹⁰Skopetea, *To “Protypo Vasileio,”* 326.

⁶⁹¹Ibid., 326, note 1.

⁶⁹²Ibid., 328, note 5.

Regarding the stance of Greek intellectuals there was no unanimity in the way they approached the explosive bipolar of *Panslavism* and *Megali Idea*. Kalevras,⁶⁹³ for example, praised Russia's policies and her diachronic protective stance towards Greece in a dithyrambic way. In a 40-page survey of his, strong emphasis was put on the attempt of the Roman Catholic Church to dichotomize the Christian flock living in the Ottoman Empire and to eliminate it through its religious propagandistic activities. Kalevras, propelled by a strong sense of Russophilia along with a fervent anti-Westernism, strongly supported Russian interventionism in the affairs of the Balkan Slavs as he firmly believed that Russia was the only mighty power which was able to protect the Slavs from catholic and protestant proselytizing activities. Finally, he argued that in case the Slavic people were to convert, that would inevitably mean the emergence of new nationalities which would be hostile towards Hellenism in the Ottoman Empire, something that would approximate the relations between Poland and Russia.⁶⁹⁴

On the other side we encounter a classical anti-Russian work of the 19th century which was written by Kōnstantinos Dosios, a Greek lawyer and politician, and was published anonymously in 1854. Dosios accused Russia of pure expansionism and supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire which was the precondition for Greece to expand herself.⁶⁹⁵ Additionally, in order to strengthen his arguments against Russia, Dosios referred to the Russian three-part plan which was sent to the Great Powers in January 1824, and foresaw the foundation of three autonomous Greek states on the grounds of the Danube principalities' administration status. Moreover, he regarded the introduction of a wide-ranged reform program as a remedy for the Ottoman Empire's salvation, in order to also be able to cope with the Russian threat. However, the modernization of the Empire would not marginalize the danger of its integrity, due to the fact that the ethnic minorities living in the Ottoman realm would inevitably give prominence to their right for self-determination.

⁶⁹³Panagiōtēs Kalevras was a former member of Filikē Etaireia [Society of Friends], the association that had taken on the responsibility of organizing the Greek War of Independence.

⁶⁹⁴Panagiōtēs Kalevras, *Ē Rōssofovia kai o Panslavismos ē ē poltikē poreia tēs Dyseōs kai Rōssias ōs pros tēn Ellada kai tēs Ellados ōs pros eaftēn mechri sēmeron* [Russophobia and Panslavism or the political conduct of the West and of Russia towards Greece and that of Greece towards them until today] (Athēna: Ē Karteria, 1860), 15.

⁶⁹⁵ Kōnstantinos Dosios, *Ellēnismos ē Rōssismos. Ētoi ē metakxy Agglias kai Rōssias aporrētos kai ebisteftikē diapragmateia peri tou Anatolikou zētēmatos* [Hellenism or Russism: The secret and confidential survey of the Eastern Question between England and Russia] (Athēna: Typografeio S. K. Vlastou, 1854), 1.

Dosios claimed that Russia intentionally presented the Greeks as sympathetic towards her by deploying different means such as diplomacy or press, in order to alienate them from the West.⁶⁹⁶ He firmly believed that Russia's diachronic goal was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire with the successive foundation of weaker states which would enable her intervention in their internal affairs. Remaining within the context of Dosios' anti-Russian rhetoric, he believed that Russia's intention in the Crimean War was the prevalence of her religious and political superiority over the Great Church something that would inevitably lead to the end of Hellenism.⁶⁹⁷

Unlike the majority of the Greek intelligentsia, Dosios, regarded the Greek Kingdom as the epicenter of Hellenism and assumed that the Eastern Question was actually fueled by the rivalry between Russia and the West, while the Ottoman Empire was playing the role of a buffer state in this conflict. Interestingly enough, he proposed the replacement of the Islamic Empire with that of a powerful Christian polity in order to eliminate any footholds for Russian interventionism in the Ottoman and Christian affairs respectively.⁶⁹⁸ It should be mentioned finally that the revival and restoration of the Byzantine Empire held a pivotal position in his vision for the future, as he believed that the foundation of small independent states or a confederation of states would not contribute at all to the solution of the Eastern Question neither would it wane Russian expansionism.⁶⁹⁹

Finally, another anti-Slavic and one of the most renowned figures of Greek journalism, Vlasios Gavriēlidēs, published a booklet entitled "Greece and Pan Slavism" at the age of 21 in which he condemned Russian messianism⁷⁰⁰ among the unredeemed Greek populations and claimed that Russia exploited the Greeks and their *megaloidetaic* aspirations for the purposes of her foreign policy. In his book Gavriēlidēs aimed primarily to highlight the animosity of Russia's Balkan policy towards the Greek aspirations. Thus, in order to express this profound concern of him, he laid special emphasis on the basic pillars which constituted Russia's conquests, namely "a. her material might b. the Greeks of East and c. the Slavic races."⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁶Ibid., κε.

⁶⁹⁷Ibid., μδ.

⁶⁹⁸Ibid., ξε.

⁶⁹⁹Ibid., ζζ.

⁷⁰⁰Vlasēs Gavriēlidēs, *Ē Ellas kai o Pan Slavismos* [Greece and Pan Slavism] (Athēna: Typografeio "Koraēs", 1869), 16

⁷⁰¹Ibid., 72.

8.5 Russia's presence in the Cretan crisis. Russia's role in the preparatory and first phase of the Cretan revolt

The accusations of the Western press against Russia regarding her decisive role in the instigation of the revolt were well-founded and justified. In a letter written by Geōrgios Stefanidēs referring the reasons of the revolt, it becomes apparent that Greece officially disagreed with the thoughts of the Christian Cretans to protest against the Ottoman authorities with regard to the local Monastery issue. At the time, Russia seemed to be a panacea in the eyes of the Christian Cretans as it is to be expected. Iōannēs Mētsotakēs, the Russian vice-consul on the island, took advantage of the situation and actuated the Christians to continue their protest and to attach political characteristics to their movement. At the same time he accentuated how Russia would support their efforts in any case.⁷⁰²

Mētsotakēs' role in the preparatory phase of the Cretan crisis becomes apparent through his participation in the secret society of the eastern Cretan provinces as well as through his financial support of the group charged with the election of plenipotentiaries from the provinces of Rethymnon and Heraklion.⁷⁰³ The main concern of that secret society, founded in Heraklion, was the establishment of a network comprised of Cretan émigrés who would play a decisive intermediary role between the revolutionaries and Athens as well as in the preparation of the revolution. In his attempt to underplay Russia's role in the developments, Dendrinós sent instructions to the notables of the Eastern Cretan provinces to advise them on their movement by stating that it should be unarmed, peaceful and patriotic in character.⁷⁰⁴

According to Tsirintanēs there were grounded suspicions that the Christian petition addressed to the Sultan - separately from the one handed to the three Great Powers - was a product of the intervention made by Dendrinós, Russia's consul on the island.⁷⁰⁵ According to the available diplomatic sources one could draw the conclusion

⁷⁰²Stefanidēs et al., *Archeio Dēmosthenē G. Stefanidē*, 1: 293. À propos the period discussed here, Russian policies in the Balkans were not only restricted to Crete but also branched out to Greece, where she attempted to instigate an upheaval with the embroilment of the youth. Novikov, the Russian ambassador in Athens tried to mobilize Greek youth not only by making references for the revival of the Byzantine Empire but also by exploiting the fact that Koumountouros, a russophile, was a member of the opposition. See Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 414.

⁷⁰³Vlavogilakēs, *Ekklēsia kai agōnes*, 131; Detorakēs, *Istoria tēs Krētēs*, 362.

⁷⁰⁴Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 1: 116.

⁷⁰⁵ According to Tsirintanēs, the memorandum written by Renierēs can be thought of as the most important document of the Cretan struggle, mainly due to its argumentation. Furthermore, it was also

that the representatives of the three Cretan provinces acted under the influence of and in accordance with the Russian diplomats, who suggested the Christians send their petitions to the Consuls of the Great Powers in order to stir up the Eastern Question.

It is a fact though, that the Russian diplomatofficially pretended to prevent the breakout of a war on Crete. However, in the background, they systematically nurtured the hopes of the unredeemed Greek Ottoman subjects throughout the crisis by letting them believe that Russia would support their demands for independence. Specifically, the main objective of Russia's foreign policy regarding to the Cretan issue was the establishment of an autonomous administrative status on the island unless the unification of Crete and Greece could not be achieved in the end. It was however necessary on the one hand for the island's administration to be replaced without the direct intervention of Russia in the armed conflict and on the other, it was important that the formation of a western power's alliance be prevented unlike the case of 1856.⁷⁰⁶

In the aftermath of the armed conflict on Crete, Russia adopted a more reluctant stance concerning the Cretan cause as the memories from the disastrous Crimean War were still fresh in the minds of her political elite. Taking advantage of the new geopolitical situation in Europe, Russia focused on approaching France diplomatically from the autumn of 1866 until the end of 1867 in order to achieve her goals in the Balkans. Thereby, as early as August 1866 Russia began to examine in which way France and England would react to her initiatives by referencing the commitments of the 1830 London Protocol and its binding effects on the three Great Powers' relations with Crete. As a result, on 20th August 1866, the Tsarist regime tried to convince England and France to act as one towards the Porte.⁷⁰⁷ Their negative response (8.9.1866)

the basis for the memorandum the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Delēgeōrgēs sent to the Great Powers on 2/14 August 1866 Ibid., 182.

⁷⁰⁶Dietrich Beyrau, *Russische Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches 1866-1870/71* [Russian policy towards the East and the emergence of the German Empire] (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1974), 66.

⁷⁰⁷Geōrgios Papantōnakēs, *Ē diplōmatikē istoria tēs Krētikēs Epanastaseōs tou 1866* [Diplomatic history of the Cretan Revolution of 1866] (Athēna: Typois "Sfendonēs", 1926), 20. "In derselben Note vom 28. November 1866 schlug GORČAKOV für den Fall eines allgemeinen Aufstandes der Balkanvölker die Anerkennung des Prinzips der Nicht-einmischung auf dem Balkan durch Frankreich und Russland vor. (...). Hierin ging IGNAT'EV von der Wahrscheinlichkeit eines allgemeinen Aufstandes im Balkan aus." [In the same note of 28th of November 1866 GORČAKOV suggested that France and Russia recognize the principal of non-intervention in the Balkans in the case of a general uprising of the people. On this matter IGNAT'EV believed in the possibility of a generalized uprising of the people in the Balkans.] Beyrau, *Russische Orientpolitik*, 65.

was based on the argument that such a common initiative on behalf of the Great Powers at that point of the crisis would be considered premature.

Russia's objectives concerning the fate of Crete became more explicit after France's foreign policy on the Cretan issue changed course. This becomes apparent in a letter sent to the Russian ambassador in Paris from Gorchakov, dated 16/28 November 1866, in which a clear reference is made to Crete's allocation to Greece for the very first time.⁷⁰⁸ Russia's next diplomatic attempt was (to send) a joint note with France, Italy and Prussia to the Porte requesting a referendum be held on Crete under the supervision of the foreign consuls on the island, which was also in accordance with the desires of the General Assembly. This initiative, however, on Russia's part found no support from both England and Austria and was subsequently rejected by the Ottoman Government as well.

Finally, in April 1867, Russia makes her next major diplomatic move, in agreement with France, in a proposal requesting the appointment of an inquiry commission comprised of Europeans which would be charged with the assessment of the situation on the island. Only Italy and Prussia finally admitted to being part of that diplomatic initiative while England remained neutral, as she traditionally did. In response to the diplomatic pressure and in order to avert any European intervention in her internal affairs, the Porte decided to send the Grand Vizier Ali Paşa to Crete immediately so that he could assess the situation in person and propose a new administrative status. In short, after these failed diplomatic interventions, especially that of the joint note from five European powers to the Porte on June 3/15, 1867 Russia began to gradually withdraw from the Cretan question.

8.5.1 The Greco-Serbian alliance: A mission failed on the red lines of the Pan-Ideologies

The Balkan Alliance, initiated in the 1860's, under the auspices of Russia and with the participation of almost all the ethnicities in the Balkans (Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians) was a major historical turn of 19th century Balkan history as the common factor which brought those ethnicities together in order to form the

⁷⁰⁸Papantōnakēs, *Ē diplōmatikē istoria*, 27.

alliance was their desire to be liberated from the Ottoman rule. So as to comprehend the importance and the historical dimensions of the agreement it is necessary to point out that the signature of the Greco-Serbian treaty led the Greek Prime Minister, Koumoundouros to dissuade the Cretans from attempting to reach an agreement with the Grand Vizier Ali Paşa on the ground of an independent principality of Crete.⁷⁰⁹

The origins, however, of this ambitious plan of the Balkan people to overthrow the Ottoman rule one can trace back to the negotiations held behind closed doors in 1861. The first steps towards a Greco-Serbian alliance were made on 20th November 1861 when both countries came to an agreement concerning territorial gains,⁷¹⁰ even though no convention was signed in the end. At that time, one of the main figures of the negotiations was the Greek intellectual Renierēs who served as president of the General Assembly [Kentrikē Epitropē] a few years later, during the Cretan crisis.

The next phase towards the formation of a common Balkan front against the Porte began with the outbreak of the Cretan revolt. The strong desire to act in unity against the Porte resulted in several interstate agreements from 1865 to 1868. As result, on 26th May 1865, a year before the Cretans decision to make their demands known to the Porte, a Serbo-Romanian treaty was signed, although it was never put into practice. A year later, on 23rd September 1866, another agreement to align⁷¹¹ was signed, this time between Serbians and Montenegrins, while in April 1867 Serbians and Bulgarians made an alliance as well. Moreover, alongside the aforementioned initiatives of the Slavic ethnic groups the Greek state, within the context of taking action against the Porte, conducted negotiations with Egypt, Romania and Montenegro.

Yet, more specifically with regard to the foundation for the negotiations between Greece and Serbia, these had already been laid down in May 1866 as a result of Koumoundouros' initiative, who at that time was the leader of the Greek opposition.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁹Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 470.

⁷¹⁰“(…) in a case of a victory Greece would in principle have Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and the islands of the archipelago while Serbia would obtain northern Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro (…).” Leften Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1964), 86.

⁷¹¹Ibid., 101.

⁷¹² It has to be noted that Koumoundouros had made his intentions known to both Prime Minister Voulgarēs and Foreign Minister Delēgeōrgēs as well as to King George since September 1866. Their reaction, however, to Koumoundouros' intentions was negative, as it was thought that it would not be in the interest of Greece to link the Cretan case with the Eastern Question. Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 387.

Both sides finally reached an agreement on principles comprised of 12 points.⁷¹³ Some months later, after Koumoundouros's electoral victory, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Charilaos Trikoupēs in a letter of his, dated 11th January 1867, to Delēgiannēs, the Greek ambassador at the Porte, stressed the necessity of a Greco-Serbian alliance which had to be joined by Montenegro and Romania as well.⁷¹⁴

On 1 February 1867 Trikoupēs resumed negotiations with Serbia, which had been interrupted in 1861, in order to form the Balkan alliance. A crucial point in the negotiations was the territorial gains the allies would have in the case of an Ottoman defeat. In particular, the geographical region of Macedonia which was called into question, proved to be the most challenging point of negotiation as it was an important part of *megaloidetic* and *panslavist* aspirations.⁷¹⁵ In the case of the alliance's victory Thessaly, Epirus, Thrace, Macedonia and the Aegean Islands would be turned over to Greece in accordance with the agreement made in 1861 between Garashanin⁷¹⁶, Petronievitch and Renierēs. Serbia's borders, on the other hand, would further expand through the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina as well as north Albania. However, a few years later, in August 1867, the Serbians urged for additional modifications regarding territorial gains, especially in respect to the region of Macedonia. To be more exact, they arose further demands on northern Macedonia, also known as "Old Serbia", which covered the geographical area between Drin and Iskir.⁷¹⁷

In spite of the extra territorial demands of the Serbians, the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty was finally signed on 14 August 1867 in the Austrian Vöslau and ratified by King George a month later.⁷¹⁸ Nevertheless, the agreement was never put into effect and remained a dead letter, mainly due to the continuous change of the diplomatic circumstances as well as the inefficient military preparations of both signatories so as

⁷¹³Ibid., 385-386.

⁷¹⁴Ibid., 396-397.

⁷¹⁵Ibid., 409-413.

⁷¹⁶Garashanin's vision for the Balkans was manifested in his desire for the unity of all Yugoslav people, who, according to him, were all Serbians residing in the Ottoman Empire and Austria. See Radoš Ljušić, "Iljia Garašanin on Serbia's Statehood," *Balkanica* 39 (2008):171-72. It has not been documented, however, whether or not the Greek government was at the time aware of Garashanin's expansionist and ambitious panserbian plans and that he thought of Constantinople as the "the pearl of the Slavic East" envisioning her to be the future capital of his desired Slavic state. See Ljušić, "Iljia Garašanin," 172, note 85.

⁷¹⁷According to the agreement of 1861 between Garashanin, Petronievitch and Renierēs "the "Kingdom of Serbia" was meant to include the Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Upper Albania (or Old Serbia) and Montenegro provided that the latter "does not staunchly hold onto being a separate and independent principality." Ibid., 173; See also Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 2: 413.

⁷¹⁸Ibid., 452. According to Stavrianos the treaty was signed on August 26th, 1867.

to effectively challenge the Ottoman military machine. Furthermore, the gradual withdrawal of Russia from the developments on Crete delegitimized the perspectives for the implementation of the agreement. Besides that, the Serbians, did not seem motivated enough to put the treaty into effect since the “Ottoman Muslim population living within the walls of the six fortresses was to withdraw with the Ottoman garrisons, and the fortresses of Soko and Užice were to be demolished.”⁷¹⁹ Last but not least, we should also add to the aforementioned hesitations of the Serbs to participate in the alliance, their justified fears of losing Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria in case of an upheaval in the Balkans.

8.5.2 Another diplomatic defeat for Russia: The Paris Conference of 1869

The Cretan conflict reached its culmination during the final months of 1868 with an ultimatum that was handed over to the Greek government by the Turkish ambassador in Athens which drastically restricted Russia’s ability for diplomatic maneuvers. According to the ultimatum of 8th December 1868 the Turkish side demanded “(...) the dispersion of volunteer bands, (...) the prevention of the formation of new ones; (...) the disarming of the blockade runners, or at least the closing to them of Greek ports; (...) the protection of the Cretan refugees in Greece who wished to return home; (...) the punishment of Greeks who had committed aggressions against Turkish subjects; and (...) a general undertaking that Greece’s policy would conform to her own obligations and to the law of nations.”⁷²⁰ These terms were to be accepted within a few days or else there would be a breach of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The breach of the diplomatic relations can be considered *fait accompli* especially if one were to keep the Porte’s determination to stand behind the ultimatum in mind. In the days shortly before the conference Russia attempted to gain Sir Henry Elliot and Bourée’s support, though unsuccessfully, in order to alter⁷²¹ some of the measures the

⁷¹⁹Ljušić, “Iljia Garašanin,” 133.

⁷²⁰Maureen M. Robson, “Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question, 1868-69,” *Historical Journal* 3, no. 1 (1960): 42.

⁷²¹Finally, a 3-week deferment for the implementation of the measures was achieved. The term concerning the expulsion of the Greeks from Ottoman territory was modified in favor of the Greek side, as “all *bona fide* Greek subjects were to be allowed to remain in the empire while they conducted themselves peaceably.” *Ibid.*, 46.

Porte was threatening to take against Greece. Notwithstanding, both ambassadors of the two Great Powers „insisted upon that Athens should first accept the ultimatum and that they would ostantatiously avoid every common action with IGNAT’EV.“⁷²²

In short, Russia’s attempts to intervene in favour of the Cretans before the conference and to yield profit from the opportune political circumstances in Europe like the election of the philhellene W. Gladstone as Prime Minister in England (December 1868) and the impending Franco-Prussian war remained unfruitful. Thus, in order to avoid the disastrous consequences of the imminent Greco-Turkish war, Ignatiev suggested an international conference be summoned.⁷²³ He “asked Bismarck to propose the convening of a six-power conference under the provisions of the twenty-third protocol of the treaty of 1856.”⁷²⁴ The two issues that dominated the conference’s political agenda revolved around its composition and content.

Regarding the conference’s constitution, Russia did not want the participants to only be restricted to the signatories of 1856. Russia’s point of view was justified nonetheless, as she feared being isolated during the conference as it seemed more likely that France would side with England. Therefore, on 20 December 1868, Bismarck proposed that apart from England, France and Russia, “neutral powers” also attend the conference, namely Austria, Prussia and Italy. If that were to occur Russia could possibly count on the support of Prussia and France.⁷²⁵ As expected, the strongest reactions to Bismarck’s proposal came from Great Britain. Lyons believed that the Eastern Question could possibly be revived if more countries were to take part in the proceedings of the conference. Additionally, with respect to the status of the disputants the “Greek delegate should attend the conference *à titre consultative*”.⁷²⁶

Russia attempted to play all the resources she had in her favour and went on to argue the purpose and content of the conference. As it has previously been underlined, Russia's main objective was firstly to rekindle the Eastern Question in her own interest and secondly to achieve any possible modifications to the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty. Her wishes however were condemned to remain unfulfilled

⁷²² „(...) bestanden (...) darauf, daß zunächst Athen das Ultimatum anzunehmen habe, und sie entzogen sich ostentativ jeder gemeinschaftlichen Aktion mit IGNAT’EV.“ Beyrau, *Russische Orientpolitik*, 129.

⁷²³ *Ibid.*, 131.

⁷²⁴ Douglas Dakin, *The unification of Greece 1770-1923* (London: Ernest Benn limited, 1972), 119.

⁷²⁵ Tsirintanēs, *Ē politikē*, 3: 563.

⁷²⁶ Dakin, *The unification*, 119.

as the preconditions that had been agreed upon for the convening of the conference clearly stated that its aim was to settle the Cretan dispute in accordance with the Protocol of 14th April 1856.⁷²⁷ Ergo, the nature of the conference was strictly defined as mediatory, specifically “to examine the case in dispute, say which party appears to be right, and propose the basis of a reconciliation.”⁷²⁸

Russia’s main concern was the Porte’s determination to participate in the conference only if its agenda were to be strictly delineated. In this sense “the Porte was only prepared to co-operate in a conference which would be confined to the subject-matter of the ultimatum, and in which there would be no discussion either of the territorial limits or of the administration of the Turkish Empire.”⁷²⁹ This meant that although the Cretan Question was the main reason for the rupture of Turkish-Greek diplomatic relations it was not at all scheduled to be part of the negotiations. As for Russia’s stance “GORČAKOV’S proposals connoted that the Great Powers were expected to condemn the Porte for its threats of violence and also anticipated guarantees for future peace via the eradication of the reasons for the conflict, i.e. the dispute over Crete.”⁷³⁰ Finally, on January 20, 1869, an agreement was signed in which Greece was obliged to accept all the terms of the Turkish ultimatum. If by any chance Greece were not to come to this agreement the consequences of such a decision would be the withdrawal of all plenipotentiaries from the Greek government. After the resignation of Voulgarēs ministry, which caused a political crisis in Greece, a new cabinet was formed that finally accepted the outcome of the Conference on 7th February 1869.

To sum up, the Paris conference was undoubtedly a diplomatic victory for Clarendon and England as any discussion of the Cretan Question was avoided. Moreover, it did not alter the status of the English-Ottoman relations and there was no “specific statement concerning obligations in international law”⁷³¹ which would eventually constitute a precedent for the English case of *Alabama* in her dispute with

⁷²⁷Robson, “Lord Clarendon,” 49.

⁷²⁸Ibid.

⁷²⁹Ibid., 50.

⁷³⁰“GORČAKOV’S Vorschläge implizierten, daß die Großmächte die Pforte für die Gewaltandrohung zu verurteilen hätten, daß Garantien für einen zukünftigen Frieden und die Beseitigung der Ursachen des Konfliktes, nämlich des Streits um Kreta, angestrebt werden sollten.”Beyrau, *Russische Orientpolitik*, 132.

⁷³¹Robson, “Lord Clarendon,” 53.

the United States which entailed “the same charges of negligence as had been brought against Greece by Turkey.”⁷³²

8.6 The reflection of *Panslavism* in the press

The research of Greek and Ottoman press reveals how intensely interested the journalistic world was in the role Russia played in the Cretan conflict. The issues that mostly attracted the attention of the contemporaneous newspapers within the framework of the Cretan conflict dealt with Western *Russophobia* and the conflicting relationship between *Panslavism* and *Megali Idea* as well as Russia’s contribution to the instigation of tumult in Southeastern Europe.

Both the Greek and Ottoman press’s evaluation of Russia was diverse as it stood between an apologetic and polemic rhetoric. On the one hand, the majority of the Athenian newspapers openly defended Russia’s intervention in the conflict by attacking the ideologically biased European *Russophobia*.⁷³³ In addition to the rise of anti-Russism in Europe the Cretan conflict also helped nurture this apologetic stance of the press. On the other hand, the Ottoman newspapers had shared opinions on the Russian expansionism which were manifested in the constant reconstruction of a reality defined by the *panslavist* aggressiveness against the peaceful Ottoman polity. However, the Ottoman oppositional press’s contribution to the reproduction of anti-Russian sentiments should not be seen as autonomous, as it demonstrated a lot of similarities to the rhetoric of the political elite. Thus, it may be said that the threat of *Panslavism* to some extent provided an opportunity to subdue the ideological differences between the Ottoman political elite and the Young Ottoman oppositional press.

With the emergence of the Cretan conflict the question of *panslavism* entered also the arena of the Constantinopolitan public sphere. As a highly conflictual event, side

⁷³²Ibid., 51.

⁷³³Interestingly, some Greek newspapers republished articles written by European journalists who were in ideological opposition to Russian nationalism and who emphasised the cultural diversity of the West (Catholic world) and the East (Orthodox Russia). For more on the transformation of the East-West “conflict” from a political/diplomatic disagreement to a cultural one see Anta Ntialla, *Ē Rōssia apenanti sta Valkania. Ideologia kai politikē sto deftero miso tou 19^{ou} aiōna* [Russia’s perception of the Balkans. Ideology and politics in the second half of the 19th century] (Athēna: Aleksandreia, 2009), 79-88.

aspects of the Cretan issue like that of Russia's role in the crisis received media coverage. The issue of *panslavism* attracted the attention of the Greek-speaking Constantinopolitan newspapers for one more reason that was mentioned above, namely the emerging Bulgarian nationalism and the related founding of an autonomous Bulgarian Church which would further challenge the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Ottoman polity.

However, despite the fact that the Greek Ottoman press sought out to keep a moderate stance in its treatment of Russia's conduct regarding the Cretan Question, russophobic sentiments were also apparent in the main Constantinopolitan newspapers. This *Russophobia* expressed in the Greek minority press might be propelled by a more concrete reason, namely the fear of Russia's aspirations over Constantinople as these were clearly articulated in Ignatiev's ideas with regard to Constantinople as capital city of a Balkan Confederation. According to Ignatiev, Istanbul "was to be declared a free city with an international garrison which would include a Russian detachment. The Free City of Constantinople, which was to include outlying districts as well, was to be a monarchy governed by some member of the Russian Imperial family."⁷³⁴

8.6.1 The Russian factor in the Athenian and Constantinopolitan press

As it was pointed out above, the Athenian newspapers had a somewhat moderate and at times an even pro-Russian attitude as to the events taking place on Crete. Two historic Greek newspapers, the Athenian *Elpis* and the Constantinopolitan *Neologos*, provide a characteristic example of the different ideological contexts within which Greek press in both Athens and Constantinople approached the matter of Russia's role in the Cretan issue.

On 4th October 1866 the editor of *Elpis* published an article on anti-Russian sentiments being expressed by various European governments. He stated that this *Russophobia* clearly demonstrated how and to what extent the Great Powers were ignorant of the actual nature of the Eastern Question. Dismissing Europe's accusations of Russian interventionism in Ottoman and Greek affairs, he attempted to soften any biases

⁷³⁴Petrovich, *The Emergence*, 263.

against Russia by making certain radical proposals with regard to the marginalization of the Russian threat in Southeastern Europe.

Therefore, the Europeans needed to:

- A. strengthen the Ottoman Empire by turning it into a meaningful counterpart of the Tsarist Empire, or
- B. to establish a new Christian Empire in the place of the Ottoman Empire, or
- C. to create a common European front against Russia.⁷³⁵

Elpis' editorial policy, however, was not always defined by a pro-Russian or at least neutral to the Tsarist regime stance as it was articulated above. A proof for the press' ideological fluidity at these turbulent times was that a decade before the Cretan crisis and short before the outbreak of the Crimean War, *Elpis* accused *Panslavism* of being the most dangerous enemy of Hellenism. That is why the newspaper made the case that Greece had to seek out an alliance with Great Britain so as to counterbalance the momentum of Russian expansionism.

On the other hand the Constantinopolitan *Neologos* was critical of Russian interventionism in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Under the impact of the rising Bulgarian nationalism, the newspaper approached the Cretan issue mainly by translating of foreign press's articles as well as by publishing diplomatic dispatches of the English parliament related to the Cretan conflict.

Neologos' anti-western sentiments came forth when an article published anonymously in the Turkish newspaper *Turkey* argued that the Slavs and the Greeks were the only ethnicities residing in the Ottoman Empire who were requesting Russia's protection.⁷³⁶ In the same article *Neologos* explained that the non-Orthodox Christians had cultivated relationships with western diplomatic agencies, whose intervention they regularly asked for, justifying Russia's intervention in favor of the Orthodox element in the Ottoman Empire.⁷³⁷ According to the newspaper, the Greek element was the only

⁷³⁵“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1373, October 4, 1866.

⁷³⁶“Oι εν Toyrkia Christianoi (Apantēsis eis tēn “Tourkian”) [The Christians of Turkey (Reply to “Turkey”)], *Neologos*, no. 311, January 13, 1868.

⁷³⁷Ibid.

protective armor against *Panslavism* which was spreading within the Ottoman realm under the cover of the Bulgarian issue.⁷³⁸

Continuing the study of the Constantinopolitan *Neologos*, one must not overlook the fact that the reproduction of western russophobic opinions through the republication of such partial articles belonging to foreign newspapers was part of its strategy to attack Slavic nationalism, which was on the rise. An example of that strategy was the publication of a speech given by the French politician and historian, Louis Adolphe Thiers, on 5th April 1867. The historian of the French Revolution mentioned the risk of discord between the Greeks and the Slavs in the occurrence of political autonomy being granted to both. In calling the principle of self-determination into question, Thiers justified his opinion by arguing that Russia would try to gain an advantage from such a situation in order to overthrow the Ottoman rule.⁷³⁹ For *Neologos* *Pan-Slavism* and *Pan-Germanism* constitute the main ideological threats for European balance.⁷⁴⁰

Despite being clearly opposed to *Panslavism*, *Neologos* sought to underplay the European russophobic sentiments by drawing parallels between Russian and British policies abroad. With that in mind, the Constantinopolitan newspaper interpreted Russia's suppressive actions towards the Polish hopes for autonomy not in the least differently from England's conduct in India or Ireland.⁷⁴¹

Reversing the accusations of the westerners against Russia's interventionism in favor of her coreligionists in the Ottoman realm, *Neologos* argued that the West deployed the same practices in the East. This development resulted in the creation of a privileged class of Ottoman citizens who were of catholic faith, known as *latin rayasi*, who enjoyed the same privileges as the foreign subjects living in the Empire stemming from the capitulations.⁷⁴² For *Neologos* Russia was not the only Power which

⁷³⁸Ibid.

⁷³⁹“Το Ανατολικο Ζήτημα” [The Eastern Question], *Neologos*, no. n/a, April 5, 1867.

⁷⁴⁰“Ἐ Ρῶσσια ἐν Ανατολῇ” [Russia in the East], *Neologos*, no. n/a, May 3, 1867.

⁷⁴¹“Ἐ Ρῶσσια καὶ τὸ Ανατολικο ζήτημα” [Russia and the Eastern Question], *Neologos*, no. 231, June 3, 1867. On contrasting the Cretan issue with that of Ireland, the drawing of parallels and the detection of analogies, commonplace for *Neologos*, Çiçek states that the Urquaharites, known for their turkophile sentiments, also used it as an argument that attempted to justify the conduct of the Ottoman government in the Cretan issue. Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 98.

⁷⁴²“Ἐ Ρῶσσια καὶ τὸ Ανατολικο ζήτημα” [Russia and the Eastern Question], *Neologos*, no. 231, June 3, 1867.

systematically tried to intervene in Ottoman affairs. Similar attempts had already been made by France in the case of Lebanon, a few years before the Cretan conflict.⁷⁴³

Similarly to *Neologos*, *Armonia*,⁷⁴⁴ another Greek Ottoman newspaper, argued that Russia was systematically exploiting her religious bonds with the Greek element in order to serve her purpose in the Balkans.⁷⁴⁵ Like *Neologos*, *Armonia* too hosted translated articles or letters in their editorials written by foreigners which strengthened the newspapers' line towards Russia.⁷⁴⁶

In October 1867, a survey titled "Greek Russism" was published in *Armonia*, in which the author accused French proselytism (exercised by Capuchins, Dominicans, Lazarists, Jesuits etc.) of being the main reason for the fragmentation and denationalization of the Christian element of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴⁷ According to the author of the survey such proselytising activities took place mainly under the auspices of France and resulted in an increasing Russian intervention in favor of the Orthodox Christians. A few months later, in January 1868, *Armonia* republished an article of the Hungarian revolutionary István Türr⁷⁴⁸ wherein it was argued that Russia would not be able to attract the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire, as the Slavic people residing in realm were not defined by linguistic, religious or national affinities.⁷⁴⁹

Coming back to the Athenian press, most of the newspapers edited in the capital city of the Greek Kingdom viewed Russia's presence in the region in a positive light. *Ethnofylaks* for example praised Russian philhellenism which was mainly expressed through donations raised in Russia as well as through articles expressing positive views towards the Greeks. Finally, the newspaper's pro-Russian inclination was

⁷⁴³Ibid.

⁷⁴⁴*Armonia*, like the most newspapers, mentioned Russia's role in the Cretan Question on a regular basis, mainly through the publication of diplomatic and parliamentary dispatches of the active participants.

⁷⁴⁵“Ἐ Κρήτῃ καὶ τὸν Ἀνατολικὸν Ζήτημα” [Crete and the Eastern Question], *Armonia*, no. 430, January 18, 1867.

⁷⁴⁶See for example the article written by a French under the title “Greek Russism”. “Ὁ γραικικὸς ρώσισμος” [Greek Russism]. *Armonia*, no. 566, October 3, 1867; “Ὁ γραικικὸς ρώσισμος” [Greek Russism], *Armonia*, no. 567, October 4, 1867.

⁷⁴⁷“Ὁ γραικικὸς ρώσισμος,” *Armonia*, no. 566, October 3, 1867.

⁷⁴⁸He was also oft referred as “General Türr”.

⁷⁴⁹“Τὸ ζήτημα τῶν ἐθνικότητων” [The Question of the Nationalities], *Armonia*, no. 654, January 23, 1868.

also coupled with harsh criticism of European interventionism in Greek ethnic affairs and particularly in the Cretan Question.⁷⁵⁰

At the same time, anti-westernism, the other side of pro-Russism's coin, was encountered quite often in the Athenian press during the course of the Cretan conflict. Within this context, the *Mellon* in a front page article under the title "Westernism, Hellenism, Russism" saw Russian interventionism as the result of the Great Powers' lack of interest in the Christian populations living in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁵¹ In the second part of the article, which was published on 30th September 1866, *Mellon*, not only referred to the existence of main ethnological differences between Russia and Greece, but also touched upon the common visions of the two nations by commenting on the issue of Constantinople which was of great relevance in the subconscious of both nations. In fact, as it was highlighted earlier in this chapter, Russia thought of herself as the successor of the Byzantine Empire as well as the guardian of the Christian faith, especially after the Fall of Constantinople. According to the *Weltanschauung* of the *Panslavists*, Constantinople should have been the capital of the Russian Empire along with Moscow.⁷⁵² Similarly, that aspiration was nurtured by the adherents of *Megali Idea* as well, who too strove for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire and the reconquest of Constantinople as the future capital city of Hellenism.⁷⁵³

Aiōn, another historic long-running newspaper of Athens and fervent supporter of the Anglophile Greek politician Voulgarēs during the Cretan insurrection, approached *Panslavism* in the most interesting of ways almost six years before the outbreak of the Cretan crisis. A few years after the end of the Crimean War the newspaper paid special attention to *Panslavism* by publishing a series of articles under the title "Panslavism and Greece."⁷⁵⁴ In order to highlight the political dimensions of a rising Bulgarian ecclesiastical nationalism, *Aiōn* drew parallels to the schism within the Greek Orthodox world which was caused by the creation of the Greek Autocephalus Church.

⁷⁵⁰"Filellēnismos Rōssias" [Russia's Philhellenism], *Ethnofylaks*, no. 1211, March 31, 1867.

⁷⁵¹"Dytikismos, Ellēnismos, Rōssismos" [Westernism, Hellenism, Russism], *Mellon*, no. 290, September 27, 1866.

⁷⁵²"The Fall of the city which had been the capital of the universal empire and of the true church for eleven centuries appeared to the Russians as God's punishment upon the Byzantine church for having been ready, at the Council of Florence, to accept union with Rome and to bow before the Latin infidels." Kohn, *Pan-Slavism*, 127.

⁷⁵³"Dytikismos, Ellēnismos, Rōssismos" [Westernism, Hellenism, Russism], *Mellon*, no. 291, September 30, 1866.

⁷⁵⁴"O Panslavismos kai ē Ellas" [Panslavism and Greece], *Aiōn*, no. 1908, August 5, 1860; "O Panslavismos kai ē Ellas" [Panslavism and Greece], *Aiōn*, no. 1910, August 12, 1860 and "O Panslavismos kai ē Ellas" [Panslavism and Greece], *Aiōn*, no. 1911, August 17, 1860.

This was yet another case in which the West was attacked, as it was believed that the aforementioned schismatic movement within the Orthodox Christian flock was mainly a product of religious propaganda campaigns conducted by the Roman Catholic Church and the French diplomatic corps in Constantinople. In relation to that issue, the French diplomatic agents especially were thought to promote Jesuitism at the expense of the Eastern nationalities' unity.⁷⁵⁵

Proof of Constantinople's importance in the Greek subconscious was *Aiōn*'s reference of 1860 to the city as the capital of a resurrected Byzantine Empire. Commenting on a potential contiguity of a Greek and a Slavic State, *Aiōn* argued that that could only be mutually tolerable, if the border was geographically defined by the Balkan mountain range (gr. Emus).⁷⁵⁶ Interestingly enough, the fact that the Athenian newspaper acknowledged the right of self-determination to the Slavs (Bulgarians in our case), could be interpreted as an indirect legitimization of *Panslavism*'s political objectives. Therefore, *Panslavism* did not pose a threat to the vision of *Megali Idea* in actuality, as the allotment of the Ottoman lands was to be secured on the basis of the principle self-determination.⁷⁵⁷

Contrary to its earlier hypothesis made in 1852, namely that *Panslavism* was a "sleepless enemy of Hellenism"⁷⁵⁸ *Elpis* believed that the increasing *Russophobia* in the West could finally damage the Greek nation's interests without ascribing expansionist objectives to the Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, in an article of 16th May 1867 which was published after King George's engagement to Princess Olga, *Elpis* tried to present British *russophobia* as groundless and rendered it illusory. According to the article Great Britain no longer had reasons to be worried about Russia and France's access to India, as this development had already taken place due to the fact that Russia's continuous conquests in Asia enabled her to gain access

⁷⁵⁵“Ο Πανσλαβισμός και ἡ Ἑλλάς” [Panslavism and Greece], *Aiōn*, no. 1910, August 12, 1860.

⁷⁵⁶“Ο Πανσλαβισμός και ἡ Ἑλλάς” [Panslavism and Greece], *Aiōn*, no. 1911, August 17, 1860.

⁷⁵⁷Ibid. After the expulsion of Roman Catholic King Otto, *Aiōn* was of the opinion that the marriage of King George with Princess Olga, an event of remarkable socio-political dimensions, would in effect contribute to the “restoration” of the Orthodox faith in state hierarchy. The paper went on to argue that Greece was once again in a position to develop closer relations with Russia. “Οἱ γαμοὶ τοῦ Βασιλεῶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων” [The Marriage of the Greeks' King], *Aiōn*, no. 2286, October 23, 1867.

⁷⁵⁸“N/A,” *Elpis*, April 19, 1852, quoted in Skopetea, *To “Προτύπο Βασιλεῖο,”* 239. In the same article it was suggested that Greece should appeal for British support as per George Canning's assumption, according to which the Greeks were the only ethnicity in the East able to cope with Russia's plans.

to India and the opening of Suez Canal paved accordingly the way for France to reach the Indian Ocean.⁷⁵⁹

Likewise, most Greek papers, including *Elpis*, contributed to the reproduction of an imaginary vision for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople as its capital as they believed that the revival of the Byzantine rule in the region would eventually marginalize Russian expansionist ambitions. *Elpis'* attack on western *russophobia* was further justified by the fact that the Tsarist Empire and the Greek Kingdom shared a common goal which included the expulsion of the Ottomans from European soil. *Elpis* commented that the Western Powers and especially Great Britain deployed *russophobia* as a pretext aiming at the exploitation of the Ottoman Empire as long as its integrity was maintained and secured. France on the other hand, did not favor the emergence of a strong territorial and maritime Christian Orthodox power in Southeastern Europe, since the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire allowed her to continue the propaganda activities in the Ottoman territory unbothered.

On 15th November 1867 *Elpis* published some critical comments on an article which was written anonymously by a Greek intellectual, according to which the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire's integrity would gradually lead to the assimilation of the Slavic populations living in the Ottoman realm by the Greek element. Accordingly, this would enable Hellenism to become the successor of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁶⁰ Contrary to the reasoning of the anonymous article writer, *Elpis* disputed Hellenism's assimilatory abilities and therefore the Greek element's hegemonic position among the other ethnicities living in the Ottoman realm. According to the Athenian newspaper the marginalization of the Greek element in the Ottoman Empire was grounded mainly on the intensification of the relations between the West and the Ottoman Empire as well as on the new power balances in the aftermath of the Crimean War and the spread of nationalism among the ethno-religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁶¹

In sum, despite the fact that *Panslavism* was depicted as a threat to Hellenism's interests in a remarkable part of the press (especially the Athenian press), it may be said that the Greek newspapers perceived Russian interventionism as being legitimate

⁷⁵⁹“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1405, May 16, 1867.

⁷⁶⁰“N/A,” *Elpis*, no. 1430, November 15, 1867.

⁷⁶¹*Ibid.* *Elpis* strongly believed in the formation of an alliance against the Ottomans comprised of the Balkan Slavs of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. As these ethnicities were traditionally hostile towards Hellenism, participating in an alliance against the Ottoman Empire was thought to be preferable to their forced assimilation by the Greek element.

in terms of a counterbalance to Western support (especially British) for the maintenance of the Ottoman integrity. The present chapter's examination of the Athenian newspaper's argumentation regarding the Russian factor reveals a strong desire for the revival of the Byzantine Empire coupled with an intense anti-western rhetoric. Therefore, besides the remarkable structural as well as chronological parallels of *Megali Idea* and *Panslavism* in their evolutionary process,⁷⁶² both pan-ideologies were defined by equally anti-Western sentiments.⁷⁶³ Thus, one could say that the stance of the Athenian press conformed to the *panslavist* theory of the cultural division between East and West.⁷⁶⁴ Such anti-western ideas were also identified in the study of the Constantinopolitan press which focused on the recurrent efforts of the Western Catholic world to split the Eastern Orthodox one. This fact leads us to the conclusion that a respectable part of Greek speaking intelligentsia and journalism (consciously or not) adopted the *panslavistic* approach of Europe's division "(...) into two incompatible "worlds"- the Romano-Germanic and the Greco-Slavic."⁷⁶⁵

8.6.2 *Panslavism* in the Ottoman press

It can be said that contrary to the Greek press' diversity in its approach towards *Panslavism*, the Ottoman oppositional press was unified in the way it treated Russian interventionism. Therefore, I will attempt to provide a snapshot of the Ottoman intellectuals' viewpoint as well as that of the political elite in regard to the *panslavist* ideology.

While examining the Ottoman press during the period of the Cretan conflict it becomes apparent that the Ottoman intellectuals focused their criticism on the Great Powers⁷⁶⁶ and particularly on the Russian interventionist policy. Russia was

⁷⁶²The resemblance of *Megali Idea* in its early stages to *slavophilism* is noteworthy at this point while on the other hand the gradual transformation of romantic *Panhellenism* into a Greek militant nationalism during the second half of the 19th century had its similarities to aggressive *Panslavism*.

⁷⁶³Russian anti-westernism mainly pertained to Austria, as it was she who was considered responsible for the oppression of the Slavs. Petrovich, *The Emergence*, 245.

⁷⁶⁴Ivan Aksakov, a fervent supporter of *Panslavism*, did not think of the Ottoman Empire as the main enemy of Russia's historical mission in the Balkans but the West and Austria in particular.

⁷⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 67. The term "worlds" here should be looked at in terms of cultural systems based mainly on religion (in our case on Orthodox Christianity).

⁷⁶⁶Namık Kemal often urged for the protection of the *vaterland* by any means, he called for resistance against European plans aiming at the partition of Ottoman lands conquered by the sword and blood of

openly accused of instigating the revolutionary temper of the Ottoman Christians aiming at the destabilization of the Empire.⁷⁶⁷ However, the Russian threat did not lead to a common front formed by the Ottoman political elite and the intellectuals. On the contrary, the political elite was suspicious of the ex-bureaucrats as it was believed that they posed a threat if by any chance the Ottoman statesmen were to surrender to the pressure of the European states. In that case “this consent would be magnified out of proportion in the eyes of the Muslim public.”⁷⁶⁸ Çiçek assumes however, that the consensus between the Ottoman political and intellectual elites, especially during the first period of the crisis, was a result of opportunism, as the Porte “carefully avoided providing any pretext under which an internal opposition could be constructed.”⁷⁶⁹

Namık Kemal, the prominent Ottoman intellectual, devoted special attention to the political issues closely connected the fate of the Empire and more specifically to the Russian threat against the integrity of the Ottoman realm. Thus, similar to the rhetoric of the Ottoman political elite, Namık Kemal too, believed that the conflicting interests of the major Great Powers (Great Britain-France vs. Russia) would finally prevent the secession of Crete to Greece and maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire which was also encapsulated and guaranteed in the letter of the Paris Treaty.

In one of his articles in *İbret* newspaper entitled “The present politics” he recognized *Panslavism* as a means of Russia’s territorial expansion but he doubted about the effectiveness and the final success of such a policy.⁷⁷⁰ However, this moderate stance on behalf of the Young Ottomans with regard to the Porte’s conduct in the Cretan issue gradually altered, especially in the aftermath of their exile in Europe.

Namık Kemal acknowledged the strategic importance of the island for Russia and was aware of the Russian expansionism in Central Asia and Caucasus but most importantly in the Balkan peninsula. That is why he approached the Russian threat from the angle

his ancestors. “Âdil ve hak üzerine te'sîs ederek bunun gibi bâtil isti'dâlara top –u tufengiñ lisânından cevab vermek lâzîm gelir.” [Based on what is just, replies to empty requests such as this can only be given with the power of arms]. “Girid’den tahrîrât” [Correspondence from Crete], *Hürriyyet*, no. 20, Receb 23, 1285/November 9, 1868.

⁷⁶⁷Namık Kemal, “N/A,” *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, Şevval 7, 1283/January 31, 1867, quoted in Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 77.

⁷⁶⁸Ibid., 84-85.

⁷⁶⁹Ibid., 77.

⁷⁷⁰Ismail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz, *Namık Kemal. Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin meseleleri. Bütün makaleleri* [Namık Kemal. Matters of Ottoman modernization. All articles], (İstanbul: Dergâh yayınları, 2005), 1: 344.

of the Eastern Question as he firmly believed that final goal not only of Russia but also some of the European Great powers was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁷¹ Thus, besides overlooking the maltreatment of the Christian subjects under the Ottoman rule, the prominent Ottoman intellectual claimed in one of his articles in *İbret* (23th October 1871) under the title “Şark meselesi,” that the agitations in Montenegro, in the Principalities, in Syria as well as in Serbia and Crete had taken place mainly due to the Russian diplomatic agents’ activities but also due to protestant propaganda.⁷⁷² Even though the Ottoman poet recognized the weight and importance of the Paris Treaty⁷⁷³ for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, he ascribed the Cretan crisis to the diplomatic submissiveness of the Ottoman statesmen to the Great powers. He argued that the Union of Crete with Greece served the interests of Napoleon as the latter wanted to form an alliance with Russia against Prussia.⁷⁷⁴

In another of his articles in *İbret* published shortly after the end of the conflict, the Ottoman intellectual perceived the notion of *Panslavism* [*İslav ittihadı*] as an instrument for the realization of Russia’s expansionist objectives.⁷⁷⁵ Additionally, in the same article he insisted on saying that if Russia were to embark on a war against Europe it would be quite difficult for her to carry out her *panslavist* plans as there was no homogeneity among the populations living in the Tsarist Empire.⁷⁷⁶

Ali Suavi, the most eccentric of the Young Ottomans, also concerned himself with the Russian threat, staying within the context of his critique of the Ottoman political elite. Besides his journaling, Ali Suavi, also wrote books and brochures about *Panslavism*.⁷⁷⁷ In his survey, “A propos de l’ Herzégovine”, in particular, he often

⁷⁷¹“Memâlik-i Osmâniyye’niñ yeñi mukasemesi” [The new partitioning of the Ottoman domain], *Hürriyyet*, no. 20, November 9, 1868.

⁷⁷²“İşte Karadağ ve Memleketeyn ve Sırbistan ve Suriye ve Girit hadiselerinin zuhuruna sebab-i hakiki hep bu tahriklerin Rusya diplomatlarıyla Cizvit papazları tarafından öteden beri Rumeli’ye ekilmekte olan tohumlara perveriş vermesinden başka bir şey değildi.” [And here in lies the true reason for the events in Montenegro, the Danubian principalities, Serbia, Syria and Crete, it is nothing but all these instigations that nurtured the seeds planted some time ago by the Russian diplomats and the Jesuit missionaries in Roumeli] Kara and Yılmaz, *Namık Kemal*, 1: 152. See also Namık Kemal „N/A“, *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, Şevval 7, 1283/January 31, 1867, quoted in Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans*, 77.

⁷⁷³“Yunan mes’alesi” [The Greek Question], *Hürriyyet*, no. 27, December 28, 1868.

⁷⁷⁴Kara and Yılmaz, *Namık Kemal*. 1: 153.

⁷⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 344.

⁷⁷⁶According to his estimations approximately 25 million non-slavic populations were residing in the Russian Empire. See *ibid.*

⁷⁷⁷Works with which Ali Suavi occupied himself in his critique of Russia are the *Defter-i Amal-i Âli Paşa* (Paris, 1873), *Hive Fi Muharrem* 1290 (Paris 1873) and the *A propos de L’Herzégovine* (Paris, 1876).

mentions *Panslavism* as an ideological platform from which the Tsarist regime instigated upheavals on Ottoman territory and he also points out that this ideology was forced on to the Slavic populations, insinuating that *panslavic* ties among the Slavs and the Tsarist regime are nothing but a political tool.⁷⁷⁸

A similar argumentation on the Russian issue can be found in the diplomatic language used by the Ottoman statesmen who were aware of Russia's imperial ideology's goals in the Balkan and tried to avert its impact on the internal coherence of the Empire.⁷⁷⁹ An example of this is in a note sent by Ali Paşa to the Ottoman ambassador in St. Petersburg in order to be passed on to the Russian government, implying the existence of undercover opportunism behind Russia's interest in the fate of the Christians residing outside her borders.⁷⁸⁰ Interestingly enough, Ali Paşa seems to legitimize Russia's right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, though only in the case when the treatment of the orthodox element by the Ottoman state prevents their "(...) material and spiritual progress as well as their freedom of religion and doctrines (...)." ⁷⁸¹ Ali Paşa's words besides constituting an indirect declaration of the Ottoman polity's right to undertake a "protective" role towards the Muslims residing outside the realm's borders, could be also regarded as preliminary to the *panislamist* policies followed by Ottoman Empire in the 1870s. Finally, the Grand Vizier drew parallels to the Russian policy conduct with regard to her coreligionists living abroad, by saying that "(...) we [the Ottomans] too, feel the same great feeling about the Muslims living in every corner of this world."⁷⁸²

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the threat of *Panslavism* was exaggerated in the eyes of the Ottoman political and intellectual elite. At the same time though the Ottomans were aware that Russia was diplomatically isolated as well as militarily

⁷⁷⁸Aaron S. Johnson, "A Revolutionary Young Ottoman: Ali Suavi (1839-1878)" (PhD diss., McGill University Montreal, 2012), 125.

⁷⁷⁹A relevant example as such was Midhat Paşa's governorship of the Danube province between 1864 and 1868.

⁷⁸⁰Russia's opportunistic stance was also pointed out in a French article translated and republished by the Ottoman newspaper *Muhbir*. In the article it was said that "when Russia made suggestions to the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Greeks because it was to her own advantage, no one was in reality deceived." ["Rüsyâ Rumlar için ba'az ba'az Devlet-i Âliyye'ye şeyler teklifât eyilmiş ise de kendi çıkar için olduğundan buna hiç kimse aldanmamışdır."] "Hulâsa-i politika" [Political résumé], *Muhbir*, no. 44, Muharrem 10, 1284/May 28, 1867.

⁷⁸¹"(...) terakkiyât-i maddiyye ve ma'neviyyelerine ve serbestî-i din u mezheblerine (...)," *Türkgeldi, Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye*, 3: 19.

⁷⁸²"(...) biz de bu dünyanın her tarafındaki müslümanlar hakkında aynı hissiyâtı perverde etmekteyiz." *Ibid.*

and economically diminished. The Ottoman politicians attempted to keep a balance by pitting one great European power against the other while playing a sort of blame game aimed at the Russians during the Cretan crisis. Especially through utilizing that last tactic, they were not only able to gain precious time in order to organize their next moves on the battle field as well as on the diplomatic one but they also made attempts to revitalize European reflexes in opposition to the threat from the East as a counterbalance for the Philhellenic sentiments that had in the meantime become stronger. There is no doubt that the Ottoman perception of *Panslavism* differed to that of the Greeks as it has been made clear in this chapter; and while it is a fact that after the Crimean war the only geographical arena in which Russia was able to exercise her expansionist aspirations was central Asia, one could say that in South-East Europe tsarist policies were determined by opportunism. Therefore, Russian involvement in the Cretan Revolution of 1866 can be marked as yet another opportunistic strand of the tsarist *panslavist* policies during the second half of the 19th century.

9 In lieu of epilogue

At first glance the Cretan movement of 1866 seems to move on the typical (for the prevailing conditions of the Ottoman 19th century) axis of activist protest movement on the one hand and state response on the other. Most scholars studying the Ottoman 19th century tend to approach the conflict exclusively in terms of an irredentist nationalist movement on the basis of the nation-building processes in South-Eastern Europe. Placing the Cretan case in a broader framework however, the present work set out to examine how the Cretan conflict was portrayed in the Greek and Ottoman press of the period as well as how ideological concepts were reflected in the news coverage.

By utilizing Greek and Ottoman contemporary newspapers there is an attempt to explore an ideologically transitional period for both the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire as well as decode the way the contemporary press perceived the manifold dimensions of the political crisis. Despite the prevailing press censorship in both countries, it is key to examine the press' functionality as a means for the dissemination of ideologies and to present the way dominant ideological currents like *Megali Idea*, *Ottomanism*, *Greek Ottomanism* and *Panslavism* interacted, clashed and fed off each other.

Without a doubt the impact of the aforementioned ideologies was evident not only in the political field but also on the battle ground during the course of the Cretan conflict. The unofficial participation of the Greek state in the Cretan issue, the open recruitment of volunteers from Athens (as an act of solidarity of the Greek people for the Cretan struggle), the initiative of the private Muslim newspaper, *Muhbir*, to raise funds for the relief of the Cretan Muslims, the reform of Cretan administration and the adoption of the *Nationality Law* are only some of many facets of the Cretan crisis which can undoubtedly be interpreted as ideological concepts applied to real politics that eventually determined the fate of the movement.

The impact of the press on public opinions of the time becomes apparent when examining the reactions of the political elite (especially the Ottoman elite) toward various editorial policies. In order to avoid making any generalizations and taking into consideration that literates were not the only newspaper consumers, as the coffee-

house culture was widespread in both countries, it is paramount to bear in mind that the press constructed ideological contexts as well. This demonstrates that the printed press was capable of functioning as a means of indoctrination in a period characterized for its polarity. Thus, while in the process of comparing how the developments in Crete were depicted in both Greek and Ottoman newspapers the opportunity to examine the diversity of opinions on the predominant ideologies also arose.

Acknowledging the press' potential to influence the minds and attitudes of the people, at least to some extent, the different strategies employed by the newspapers in dealing with events have too been examined here. The extensive use of hyperbole, negative phrasing, comparisons, presuppositions etc. by both Greek and Ottoman newspapers not only contributed to the awakening of the public spirit (and sometimes to the incitement of public opinion) but also assisted the dissemination of the dominant ideologies by creating specific frameworks for the interpretation of events.

As far as the Ottoman press is concerned, one could say that the Young Ottoman oppositional newspapers, which were focused on extensively, systematically tried to turn the Ottoman public opinion against state propaganda with regard to ethnic and other issues. Upon viewing the Cretan case, however, certain rhetorical and lexicological resemblances between the Young Ottoman language and the style of the ruling political elite stand out. This fact, despite their ideological differences, certainly reveals a commonality in the perception of both the press and political elite concerning the threat to the integrity of the Empire.

Given that the content of the newspaper articles convey a particular ideological point of view, the historical press that was used for the purposes of the present work helps demystify the internal ideological dynamics in play within the Greek and Ottoman societies in general, and more importantly within particular segments of the latter. The headings, the choice of words, the expressions and even the limited interest in the news coverage helped to better understand how ideological mainstreams were described, expressed and disseminated by the contemporary press. Moreover, looking at the presentation of the Cretan conflict of 1866 in the newspaper pages of the time as a snapshot of the confrontational Ottoman 19th century, one can say that it also, in a

way, condenses the momentum of the developments during an era of strong nationalist sentiment.

In general, even if the Cretan movement fulfilled the basic preconditions (distinct community, territory and discontent) for its classification as a secessionist movement, there has been an attempt to focus on the social background of the conflict by illuminating the reasons that intensified the Cretans' discontent against the Ottoman authorities. However, the social background of the movement did not prevent the Cretans' protest movement from gaining momentum of a secessionist nature in the course of the events.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the secessionist goals of the Cretan movement remained to a large extent unrealized. There are several reasons due to which the Cretan movement failed and which could be referenced, but only two noteworthy parameters of the movement are in my opinion the most vital. The first one being the revolutionaries' political administration, which was based in Athens, a city striving to become the ethnic core of Hellenism, parallel to Constantinople, and secondly the Christian Cretans, who still formed a remarkable part of the Greek Orthodox community, whose spiritual leadership, based in Constantinople, remained apathetic in the face of the developments on the island during the two and a half years of the crisis. The dynamic, though antithetic, ideological movements in Hellenism can be observed within these two parameters.

As it was stated in the introduction of the work and demonstrated accordingly in the examination of specific aspects of the crisis, ideologies should not only be thought of as a set of abstract beliefs but, on the contrary, as structures which impact political decision-making and social attitudes. Since the present work set out to examine the press' role as a means of dissemination of competing ideological currents, in this concluding part of the work attention should center on in the interwoven relationship between the ideological current of *Greek Ottomanism* and that of *Ottomanism*.

As noted previously, the majority of the Athenian newspapers supported the Cretan cause whereas the Constantinopolitan press was more reluctant when dealing with the developments on the island. Therefore, one could say that the Greek Ottoman press, a part of the elite network of the *Rum millet*, covered sensitive issues such as separatist

movements in the community in a more complex way. Taking into consideration the social background of the columnists of the leading Constantinopolitan newspaper, *Neologos*, could assist in the apprehension of the manner in which the Cretan conflict was presented on the pages of the newspaper but most importantly to gain a better perception of the competing ideological wings within Ottoman Hellenism.

Among *Neologos*'s columnists we encounter Iroklēs Vasiadēs for example, founder of the ethnocentric orientated GPSC, as well as members of the emerging bourgeoisie such as doctors and bankers.⁷⁸³ In addition, the family of Stefanovik-Skilitsis consisting of traders and bankers, was the most important sponsor of the newspaper. The coexistence of prominent Constantinopolitan journalists like Vretos and Tantalidēs⁷⁸⁴ with contemporary leading intellectual and political figures like Namik Kemal and Murat V in the lodge "Proodos" during the 1860s without doubt shows the intertwined relations between the contemporary Muslim intelligentsia and the emerging lay element in the Greek orthodox community.

The oxymoron with *Neologos* is that it can be regarded as a product of the Ottoman transitional period of the second half of the 19th century, as it expressed totally different views on important issues, something that undoubtedly reflected the dominant but different ideological trends within the *millet*. While the newspaper was fervently supportive towards the reformative endeavors of the Ottoman political elite, it simultaneously approached issues concerning the threat of *Panslavism* from a clearly ethnocentric perspective.⁷⁸⁵ At the same time, however, there is no doubt, that the newspaper supported the Greek Ottoman symbiosis as well as the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate in general.

In particular, the newspaper's support of a representative system of government which was also in accordance with one of the Young Ottomans' primary demands, undeniably demonstrates the press' role in the construction of a specific ideological framework, which would function as a counter-balancing force against the spread of ethnic nationalism. This ideological framework to some extent embodied prevailing attitudes of the *millet*'s core elites demonstrating thereby the prominence of the reciprocal

⁷⁸³ Antōnopoulos, *Oi Ellēnes*, 63.

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 96-97.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

relation between the press and key-factors of the Greek Orthodox community in Constantinople.

According to *Neologos* the introduction of a new system of government, namely constitutional monarchy, would not only guarantee isonomy and equality among the Ottoman subjects but it would also minimize any pretense for European interventionism. The consensus however between the Ottoman oppositional and minority press on the aforementioned issue was not necessarily grounded on the same reasons. In an attempt to decode *Neologos*' viewpoint on the aforementioned issue, an underlying predilection was discovered which was expressed in the wish for creating the appropriate preconditions for the predominance of the Greek ethnic element.

Even though *Neologos* had an *ottomanist* viewpoint, the common denominator between its veiled ethnocentric sentiments and the *megaloidetic* editorial policies of most Athenian newspapers was the accentuation of the Greek ethnic element's civilizing mission in the East. *Neologos*' emphasis on the *Genos*' *mission civilisatrice* can be explained by the fact, that the newspaper mainly represented the emerging powerful bourgeoisie of the *Rum milleti*, which in turn favored the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a precondition for the Ottoman Greek element to acquire a hegemonic position in the Empire and in the East in general.⁷⁸⁶ It is my belief that *Neologos*' support of the Ottoman efforts for modernization reflects the spirit of *Greek Ottomanism* which was apparent in the circles of the *Rum milleti* when the Cretan crisis broke out. In the matter of *Greek Ottomanism*, Anagnostopoulou assumes that it did not comprise a single and homogenous ideology but rather a melting top of different ideological trends within the Greek Orthodox community.⁷⁸⁷

With regard to this, the new reality taking shape directly after the adoption of the *National Regulations* gave other segments of the Greek Orthodox community the opportunity to acquire important positions in the administrative affairs of the *millet*. As

⁷⁸⁶According to *Neologos* the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire could reach a leading position among the Ottoman people only through the introduction of reforms which would lead accordingly to the transformation of the Empire into a "democratically structured, modern and progressed state." Ibid., 157.

⁷⁸⁷Sia Anagnostopoulou, "The 'Nation' of the Rum Sings of Its Sultan: The Many Faces of Ottomanism," in *Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean*, eds. Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis (Athens: Alpha Bank, 2010), 82-83.

a result, along with the Patriarchate and the class of the neo-Phanariotes, the Greek Orthodox bourgeoisie can be considered a third power group in the administration of the Greek Orthodox community. Nonetheless, just like in the case of the neo-Phanariotes whose “activities within the framework of the millet for the advancement of the Rum version of Ottoman patriotism were different,”⁷⁸⁸ the rising bourgeoisie was not defined by a uniform ideological stance toward issues with ethnic dimensions, as in the Cretan case. In any case, the lay element of the Constantinopolitan Greek Orthodox community functioned as a legitimizing factor of the Ottoman rule during the Cretan crisis as well as of the Empire’s hegemonic ideology which was articulated in the notion of *Ottomanism*.

Coming to the Russian factor, the ideological current of *Panslavism* not only posed a threat for the Empire’s integrity but it also challenged both cores of Hellenism. On the one hand, it questioned the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate with an increasing religious nationalism among the Slavic populations of the Empire, and, on the other hand, it contested the irredentist *megaloideatic* aspirations of the Greek Kingdom in the Balkans. Thus, the revival of the *panslavist* policies which Ignatiev (the influential Russian ambassador at the Porte) strove for, determined a new reality in the late 1860s which coincided with the Cretans’ struggle.

There is no doubt however, that the *panslavist* policies of the tsarist regime inevitably sharpened the ethnocentric reflexes even of members of the Constantinopolitan bourgeoisie who promoted an Ottoman state patriotism as a counterbalance to the spread of separatist nationalism. This may also explain the use of strong ethnocentric rhetoric by *Neologos* in its coverage of issues like the Bulgarian exarchate, more so than in the case of the Cretan conflict.

Therefore, Göçek’s argument regarding the contributions of the newspapers⁷⁸⁹, as a vital part of the revolution in communication, to the rise of nationalism among the non-Muslim communities, may be only partially right, as it has been shown in the case of the Greek Ottoman press. It has been demonstrated that the preservation of the

⁷⁸⁸Ibid., 89.

⁷⁸⁹Fatma, Göçek, “The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms”, in Fatma Müge Göçek ed. *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*, ed. Fatma Göçek (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 19.

Empire when the Cretan crisis broke out was one of the main, if not the only, concern of the different power groups within the *Rum millet*. Accordingly, the integrity of the Ottoman polity would secure the framework within which the Patriarchate, the neo-Phanariotes as well as the lay element would be able to defend their position against each other. Moreover, it could be argued that the abovementioned power groups derived their legitimacy within the context of the reformed *millet* from their devotion to the state-driven Ottoman patriotism.

Again, the aforementioned elites and power groups of the *millet* perceived *Ottomanism* as a means for the realization of the cultural version of Greek irredentism. That meant that the Greek element would acquire a leading position among the remaining ethnic-religious groups living in the Empire. Hence, it could be said that the impact of *Ottomanism* on the *millet*'s perspective unfolded in two ways: Firstly, it contributed to the secularization of the *millet*'s institutions through the incorporation of the lay element into the administrative and bureaucratic mechanism which resulted in the ideological fragmentation of the new rising strata (merchants, bankers, neo-Phanariotes). Secondly, as a result of their existence depending on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, the traditional as well as the newly emerged power groups within the Greek-Orthodox community became fervent supporters of the principles of *Ottomanism* and enemies of ethnic separatism. In the period being examined it is unlikely that the main pillars of the Greek Orthodox *millet* felt forced to prove their loyalty to the Sultanistic regime but it does seem as if their stance was defined, to a respectable extent, by a sense of common belonging which was shaped by contemporary political developments.

Coming to the press and its status in both the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, it undoubtedly constituted part of the elite power networks in both countries. Especially in the case of the Athenian press, where the political elite had access to the media, the articulation of ideological constructs was more explicit on the pages of contemporary newspapers. Additionally, the fact that leading figures of the press kept close ties with the political elite and simultaneously formed part of the intelligentsia, can lead to the conclusion that the press undoubtedly played a manifold, as well as reciprocal role, not only between the different power groups but also between the political elites and the masses.

In particular, with regard to the press' role as mediator between the political and intellectual elite and the masses, one could say that it was the medium through which ideological messages were propagated to the people, creating ideological frameworks not only of popular support and ethnic mobilization but also of the legitimacy of prevailing ideologies. Thus, the fashion in which reality was defined and presented by the media was mirrored not only in the reactions of the Ottoman high officials, for example, but also in the spontaneous reactions of the masses within the context of the news coverage of the events in Crete. Moreover, the rhetoric, the style and the selection of the topics as well as the size and placement of the articles contributed to the press' role in the Cretan conflict as an important social network whose function was to "build and reinforce the identities of individuals and provide them with a political consciousness that allows them to get ideologically closer to a given political issue."⁷⁹⁰

The findings from the press study conducted clarify that the Cretan movement did not have the full support of the *millet* elite, at least to the extent one might expect. This stance on behalf of the spiritual elite as well as of the rising power groups was mirrored in the press' approach to the events. Therefore, given that the success of collective movements is highly dependent on the "right cognitive-cultural framing structures to make movement concerns understandable and attractive to potential constituencies,"⁷⁹¹ it could be argued that the *Ottomanist* notion along with the emergence of *Greek Ottomanism* as its by-product, led to an ideological erosion of the Greek Orthodox community's cohesion, which was reflected in isolated ethnic separatist initiatives by subgroups within the *millet*.

In particular, with respect to the spiritual elite of the *millet*, it must be said, that the Patriarchate was the major advocator of an ecumenical ideology within the Ottoman polity during the second half of the 19th century as well as a warrantor of the *millet*'s

⁷⁹⁰Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in *Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23.

⁷⁹¹Helmut Anheier, "Movement Development and Organization Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925-1930," in *Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 53.

patriotic loyalty. Further, in the age of nationalism, the Patriarchate still remained the defender of the Ottoman legacy by striving to prevent the schism of its Christian *ecumene* which provided “the connecting link between linguistically and ethnically distinct populations, completing the work of controlling the periphery from the centre.”⁷⁹² In this sense, every separatist movement that emerged within the *millet*, like in the Cretan case, was deprived of the *millet*’s spiritual aegis.

In addition, the unimplemented Ottoman reformatory efforts in Crete resulted in the island’s regression (in comparison to other peripheries of the realm), along with impediments in the propagation of the notion of state patriotism within the Greek Orthodox *millet*, which also may have contributed to the loosening of the ties between the center and the periphery on a national level as well as on an intra-community level. Within this context, the Cretan conflict could also be regarded as an example of disparate support of nationalism within an ethnic community, whose members, however, shared similar values and a common national identity. This fragmentation, however, in the cohesion of the *Rum milleti* may also be interpreted as a result of the successful integration of the *millet*’s elites into Ottoman reality through the process of secularization in the Ottoman Empire.

It must be underlined that the Athenian press, under the influence of its *megaloidetic* aspirations, indirectly attempted to boost the aforementioned fragmentation of the Greek Orthodox community in the Ottoman Empire. From its very beginning the Cretan conflict was seen as fertile ground for the reproduction of the dominant ideological concept of the *Megali Idea*. As it has been pointed out however, the ideologically constructed contexts of the press did not necessarily correspond to the official state policies. This assumption is further reinforced by Skopetea’s words according to which the Greek journalists acted as “private diplomats”⁷⁹³ who instead of promoting or criticizing a specific policy, often tried to fill in the gap left due to the lack of an organised foreign policy.

A further eye-catching fact in the news coverage of the Cretan conflict by the Athenian press was the absence of references to Constantinople as a major pillar of outer

⁷⁹²Dimitris Stamatopoulos, “Ecumenical Ideology in the Orthodox Millet (19th-20th Century),” in *Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean*, eds., Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis (Athens: Alpha Bank, 2010), 202.

⁷⁹³Skopetea, *To “Protypo Vasileio,”* 284.

Hellenism. After having referred to Constantinople's important position within the Hellenic world in the late 1860s, a conclusion can be reached, namely, that the Athenian press, by de-emphasizing the role of the *millet's* leadership in the Cretan, aimed at achieving the following: The construction of an ideological frame defined exclusively by the notion of *Megali Idea* and/or introducing the Greek elite of the *Rum Milleti* as having been completely Ottomanized and thereby indirectly depriving them of any claims to play a role on an ethnarchical level.

One could say that this very standpoint of the Greek press, and of the Greek political elite, concerning the Greek speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire reflects their perception of these people as something of an imagined community. At no point did the Greek-language press of the time see these populations as Ottoman citizens, from the point of view of the actual subjects in other words, either deliberately or unintentionally, but rather viewed them through the prism of a liberated state struggling to unite areas with unbound fellow nationals. This concept, on the side of the Greek state, relevant to the unredeemed populations constitutes a one-dimensional imagined perception of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire which disregards the mentality of an ecumenical community also apparent within the Greek Orthodox *Millet*. The notion of common belonging began to take on state-like characteristics in the minds of the representatives of outer Hellenism and gained more impetus by the end of the second half of the 19th century and as the Ottoman Empire's dismemberment dawned upon the Great Powers' altar of antagonisms.

The idea of establishing a Greek Ottoman Empire modeled after the Austro-Hungarian Empire, expressed by Zarifēs, the influential banker, can also be included in this framework as was discussed in sub-chapter 7.2.1.1. Sentiments, however, for a Greek-Turkish union, albeit limited, were not only expressed by expatriate Greeks but also by Greek politicians. Two indicative cases are those of George Typaldos Iakōvatos (1813-1882) and the case of Dragoumēs with Souliōtēs.

The Crimean War and, even more so, the failed Cretan Rebellion a decade later, reignited conversations in the political sphere concerning the actualization of *Megali Idea*. It is within this context that the actions and beliefs of Typaldos should be examined. Typical of his ideology is that as early as 1867 this Greek politician

acknowledged the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the mental center of Hellenism which acted as the umbilical cord of the newly founded Greek Kingdom as well as a guarantor for the preservation of the ethnic and religious identity of the Greek people.⁷⁹⁴ More specifically on the issue of religious communalism in the Balkans, Typaldos was against the Greek Autocephaly, as in his opinion it would have broadened the fracture in the ecumenical ideology of the Patriarchate and would also have amplified nationalism in the Balkans.

Furthermore, citing the Cretan Revolution, Typaldos believed Russia to be responsible for the propagation of nationalist conscience in the Balkans and also thought of *Panslavism* as the foremost danger to the cohesion of Hellenism.⁷⁹⁵ In conclusion, Typaldos being pragmatic in his approach to Greco-Ottoman relations, criticised the *megaloidetic* expansionist policies of the Greeks and was a fervent proponent of a Hellenic cultural ascendancy in the East by way of preserving the Ottoman Empire and promoting a harmonious cohabitation of all the national elements within.⁷⁹⁶

A few years later, at the threshold of the 20th century, in 1908, Iōnas Dragoumēs⁷⁹⁷ and Athanasios Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs (1878-1945) decided to establish the “Society of Constantinople”, a secret society aiming mainly to intercept the Slavic element while pushing for a multi ethnic model of symbiosis in the Ottoman Empire. The juncture at which the organization was founded was by no means an arbitrary event as it coincided with the Young Turk Revolution and with the restoration of the Ottoman constitution. Via the “Society of Constantinople” both Greeks aimed for the establishment of an Eastern Confederation, but Dragoumēs especially “maintained that the Greeks would offer their culture as the catalyst in a union of people and would become the heart of a state to include Balkan and Anatolian elements.”⁷⁹⁸ Albeit an exponent of Greek romanticism, Dragoumēs, based also on the political circumstances

⁷⁹⁴Theodōra Ē. Zafeiratou, “Georgios Typaldos Iakōvatos. O “anthrōpos,” o politikos [Georgios Typaldos Iakōvatos. the “man”, the politician]”, (PhD diss., Ionian University, 2013), 171.

⁷⁹⁵Ibid., 176 – 177.

⁷⁹⁶Ibid., 190.

⁷⁹⁷On the life and politics of Dragoumēs see John Mazis, *A Man for All Seasons: The Uncompromising Life of Ion Dragoumis* (Athens: Isis Press, 2014).

⁷⁹⁸Thanos Veremis “The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the “Society of Constantinople,” in *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism. Politics, economy and the society in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1999), 184.

of the time, chose Greek *Ottomanism* as the most effective vehicle to serve Greek interests. This initiative, however, was doomed since the Tanzimat reforms promoting egalitarianism took away from this potentiality of the Greek element, or in other words detracted from the transmutation of financial robustness into cultural and political dominance. Finally, another hindrance for the realisation of this vision was that separate national identities had already been formed in the Balkans due to the onslaught of nationalism bringing about irreparable damage to the ecumenical dimension of the endeavour.

Despite the different starting points, the common denominator in all these versions of the *Greco-Ottoman* vision was the actualisation of yet “another” *Megali Idea* for Hellenism which would come into fruition by giving prominence to the supremacy of the Greek element. One could therefore say that this *Greco-Ottoman* notion was but a moderate version of *Megali Idea*. The Cretan Rebellion of 1866 and the echo of defeat, on the one hand temporarily disillusioned the romantics as they realised that the fulfillment of *Megali Idea* through military means was difficult at that specific moment in time and on the other hand propelled the notion of *Greek Ottomanism* as an alternative for the actualization of *Megali Idea*. It was this actualization that could now only come via the financial and political reinforcement of the Greek element within the Ottoman Empire.

Further research

The examination of the Cretan conflict through the lenses of contemporary newspapers has offered the opportunity to explore perspectives which were not visible at first. In this sense the present study can also be seen as a snapshot on the manner in which ethnic mobilization took place within a polyglot ethnic Empire but most importantly within an ethnic group. Despite the remarkable amount of studies on nationalism in the Ottoman 19th century it is deemed necessary that research on intra-group dynamics by employing sources like newspapers, personal archives, political speeches, memoranda, diaries or even surveillance reports be conducted. Such research would enable the illumination of hidden aspects of ideological and political developments within ethnic groups, which despite sharing common features of ethnic identity such as language,

religion etc. were marked by a disparate propagation of nationalist sentiment among their members.

As the literature on ethnic nationalism tends to overlook failed secessionist movements as potential case studies, cases like the Cretan insurrection pose an excellent opportunity for a thorough examination of different parameters which contribute to the emergence of secessionist movements. The examination of the press' function as a vital factor for the dissemination of ideological frameworks and the formation of public opinion leaves plenty of room for future research of other parameters which compose a strong or weak nationalist movement.

Finally, in addition to these parameters, one could also include the interaction between different networks on an intra-group or an intrastate level which undoubtedly influenced the course of collective movements in a decisive way. Investigating different networks within a social movement of ethnic dimensions could further enable the conceptualization of mobilization processes within ethnic lines as well as aid the accumulation of knowledge concerning the contribution of social and political ties to the formation of political consciousness among the members of an ethnic group.

Appendix

Table of the examined newspapers edited between 1866 and 1869

<u>Title of the Newspaper</u>	<u>Period of Publication</u>	<u>Editor</u>	<u>Editorial Policy</u>
GREEK PRESS			
<i>Elpis</i> [Hope]	7.10.1836- 17.11.1837 & 9.9.1843- 17.9.1848	Kōnstantinos Levidēs (editor)	Supported Russophile Koumoundouros; tolerant of Russian policy; its stance toward the Great Powers depended on developments.
<i>Aiōn</i> [Century]	25.9.1838- 31.5.1868	Iōannēs Filēmōn (director- editor)	Defended the principle of nationalities; criticized <i>Panslavism</i> ; supported Voulgarēs' policies in the Cretan issue;
<i>Paliggenesia</i> ⁷⁹⁹ [Ressurrection]	20.10.1862- 31.12.1899	Iōannēs Aggelopoulos & Kōnstantinos Aggelopoulos (directors)	Intense interest in the Cretan issue; pro-Russian but not <i>a priori</i> anti-British; supported Koumoundouros; favored the cooperation of Western Powers so as to promote the national cause; urged for military preparations of the Greek Kingdom; strictly against the solution of an autonomy in the Cretan Issue
<i>Avgē</i> [Dawn]	1.5.1857 - 10.10.1862; 6.3.1864- 31.12.1876	Fillipos Louēs (editor)	Intense interest in the Cretan issue, Russophile, strongly patriotic and <i>megaloidetic</i> editorial policy;

⁷⁹⁹Mager, *Istoria*, 1: 95.

			besides its Russophile sentiments the newspaper regarded France as the only reliable Foreign Power for the success of the Greek national cause; denounced the one-sided alliances; supported the formation of a Balkan alliance against the Ottomans
<i>Krētē</i> [Crete]	7.10.1869- 13.1.1876	Kōnstantinos Ksanthēs	Critical of the Voulgarēs and Koumoundouros administrations, suspicious of Russian policy regarding Greek affairs ⁸⁰⁰
<i>Ethnegersia</i> [Nation's Rising]	24.9.1866- 19.7.1867	G. Kariofyllēs	Extremely critical of Voulgarēs as well as of Westerners' russophobic sentiments; extreme rivalry with other Athenian newspapers like <i>Aiōn</i> , <i>Nea Genia</i>
<i>Ethnofylaks</i> [Nation's Guard]	26.4.1862- 1881	Chrēstos Doukas (director)	Loyal to Voulgarēs; critical of Koumoundouros's political decisions regarding the Cretan issue; against Cretan autonomy; emphasis on the civilizing character of Greek nationalism
<i>Mellon</i> [Future]	1.10.1863- 29.12.1877	G. Glēnēs (1863-1969) and D. Papathanasiou (1869-1873) (editors)	Fervently supported Voulgarēs; propagated the need for military preparations of the Greek Kingdom, ⁸⁰¹ critical of European interventionism in the Cretan issue ⁸⁰²

⁸⁰⁰Ibid., 118.

⁸⁰¹Ibid., 112-114.

⁸⁰²Ibid., 113.

GREEK OTTOMAN PRESS			
<i>Neologos</i> [Messenger]	8.3.1867 - 9.4.1897	Stavros Voutyras, Iōannēs Vrettos, Geōrgios Vafiadēs (editors)	Openly supported the need for peaceful coexistence of the ethnic communities living in the Ottoman Empire; emphasis on the leading position of the Greek-orthodox element among the other ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire; critical of Russia's policy
<i>Kōnstantinoupolis</i> [Constantinople]	1867- 1914	Dēmētrios & Athanasios Nikolaidēs	Pursued Ottoman patriotism on the grounds of a peaceful coexistence of the non-Muslim minorities; anti-Russian tones; accentuation of Hellenism's ecumenical civilizing content
<i>Anatolikos Astēr</i> [Eastern Stern]	1861- 1891	Vasileios Kallifrōn, Iōannēs Filalēthēs, Kōnstantinos Fōtiadēs (editors)	No references on the Cretan issue; mouthpiece of the reformative Phanariote circles as well as of the Patriarch Sofronios; one of its main aims was the strengthening of the Greek Ottoman subjects' religious sentiment ⁸⁰³
<i>Armonia</i> [Harmony]	1864- 1868	Michaēl Chourmouzēs (owner & editor), later on by Al. Akselos	Frequent republication of articles from the foreign press and diplomatic dispatches concerning the Cretan issue; rejection of western accusations

⁸⁰³Dimitris Stamatopoulos, "Anatolikos Astēr," in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974*, 1: 208-209.

			of Greek russophilia; Anticlerical; mouthpiece of Konstantinos Karatheodōrēs ⁸⁰⁴ who was opposed to the collection of ecclesiastical taxes by the Ottoman State
<i>Omonoia</i> [Concord] (in 1867 renamed into <i>Omonoia kai Neologos</i> ; in 1870 adopted its first name again)	1862-1870 & 1865-1870	Iōannēs Vrettos (director), Dēmētrios Katselidēs & Georgios Polychroniadēs (editors)	Rare references to the Cretan issue; aimed at restricting the influence of the other two Constantinopolitan Greek papers, namely of <i>Tēlegrafos of Bosphore & Vyzantis</i> but mainly of the <i>Anatolikos Astēr</i> which were believed to belong to the reformative circles of the Greek speaking community. ⁸⁰⁵
<i>Amaltheia</i> [Abundance]	1838-1922	Kōnstantinos Rodēs (founder)	Few references on the Cretan issue
<i>Tēlegrafos tou Vosporou ke Vyzantis</i> [Telegraph of Bosphorus and Vizantis]	1857-1871	Dēmētrios Ksenēs (director)	Neutral stance in the Cretan issue, ⁸⁰⁶ frequent publication of diplomatic dispatches

⁸⁰⁴Karatheodoris was “(...) the personal physician to the Sultan Abdul Mecid and supporter of the Tanzimat reformers (...)” Dimitris Stamatopoulos, “Holy Canons or General Regulations? The Ecumenical Patriarchate vis-à-vis the Challenge of Secularization in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Innovation in the Orthodox Christian Tradition? The Question of Change in the Greek Orthodox Thought and Practice*, eds. Trine Stauning Willert and Lina Molokotos-Liederman (London and New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 147.

⁸⁰⁵Dimitris Stamatopoulos, “Omonoia/Omonoia kai Neologos,” in *Engyklopaideia tou Ellēnikou Typou 1784-1974*, 1: 376-378.

⁸⁰⁶The paper characterized the Porte’s reaction to the violation of the international Law on the part of Greece as moderate. „N/A,” *Tēlegrafos tou Vosporou kai Vyzantis*, no. 1241, December 18, 1868.

OTTOMAN PRESS			
<i>Ruznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis</i> [Daily Newspaper] (successor of <i>Cerîde-i Havâdis</i>)	1864-1918	Alfred Churchill	Official pro-government newspaper, frequent (almost on daily basis) reports on military developments during the Cretan crisis
<i>Muhbir</i> [Correspondent]	12.1866-11.1868	Philip Efendi (licence holder) Ali Suavi (editor-in-chief)	Opposed the Porte's policies in the Cretan issue as well as its economic and debt policy.
<i>Tasvîr-i Efkâr</i> [Tablet of opinions]	6.1862-5.1910	Şinâsi and Namık Kemal (1862-1868); Recâizade Mahmud Ekrem and Kayazâde Reşad (1868-)	Emphasis on issues like language, internal reforms and foreign policy; critical of Bâb-ı Âli's policy in the Cretan conflict.
<i>Hürriyet</i> [Freedom]	1868-1870	Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey (Paşa), Ârif	Criticism of the <i>Tanzimat</i> and on <i>Islahat fermanı</i> ; supported the implementation of a parliamentary System.
<i>İbret</i> [Admonition]	16.6.1870-1873	Aleksan Sarafyan (1869-1871), Iskender Bey (1871-1872), Ahmed Midhat Efendi (1872-1873)	Critical of governmental politics in different issues; focused on providing information about political, economic and societal issues and international news.

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Aiōn. “O Panslavismos kai ē Ellas” [Panslavism and Greece]. No. 1911, August 17, 1860.

Aiōn. “Ē Ellēnikē Anatolē en etei 1860” [The Greek East in 1860]. No. 1948, December 17, 1860.

Aiōn. “Ektheseis tōn en Vrysaīs kai allachou Apokoronou syblokōn” [Reports on the battles in Vryses and elsewhere in Apokoronas]. No. 2159, September 12, 1866.

Aiōn. “Borei ē Tourkia n’ antheksē kata tēs Krētēs;” [Can Turkey withstand the Cretan revolt?]. No. 2160, September 15, 1866.

Aiōn. “Krētika” [Cretan affairs]. No. 2161, September 19, 1866.

Aiōn. “N/A.” No. 2164, September 29, 1866.

Aiōn. “N/A.” No. 2179, November 3, 1866.

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- Aiōn*. “Peri tēs apostolēs tēs Elladas epī tēs anaptykseōs tēs anthrōpotētas” [On the Greek mission on human evolution]. No. 2193, December 8, 1866.
- Aiōn*. “To Arkadi” [The Arkadi]. No. 2219, March 2, 1867.
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