Survival of altruistic gatekeepers: Kickbacks in medical markets

Amann, Erwin and Felder, Stefan. (2021) Survival of altruistic gatekeepers: Kickbacks in medical markets. German Economic Review, 21. p. 25.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/80768/

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Patients often rely on the advice of their general practitioner (GP) to decide which treatment best fits their needs. Hospitals, in turn, might influence GPs' referral decision through kickbacks. We present a model with a monopolistic hospital and competitive GPs who vary in the degree of altruism towards their heterogeneous patients and show that an equilibrium without crowding out exists that separates GPs into referrers and care providers. Naïve patients visit purely selfish (referring) GPs, while rational patients sort themselves between the two groups of GPs. Finally, we investigate the scope for regulation, including an optimal coinsurance rate.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Health Economics (Felder)
UniBasel Contributors:Felder, Stefan
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Identification Number:
Last Modified:09 Feb 2021 07:46
Deposited On:26 Jan 2021 11:02

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