Wong, Tsz-Ning and Yang, Lily Ling. (2018) When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion. Economics Letters, 163 (C). pp. 186-189.
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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/79532/
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Abstract
We study a persuasion game between a decision maker and an expert. Before communication, the expert searches for an evidence about the state of nature. Higher effort leads to a higher probability of discovery. We show that, contrary to everyday experiences, monitoring of effort is always suboptimal if the expert's bias is large, yet sometimes optimal if the expert's bias is small.
| Faculties and Departments: | 06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke) |
|---|---|
| UniBasel Contributors: | Wong, Tsz Ning |
| Item Type: | Article, refereed |
| Article Subtype: | Research Article |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| e-ISSN: | 1873-7374 |
| Note: | Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article |
| Identification Number: | |
| Last Modified: | 29 Dec 2020 12:05 |
| Deposited On: | 29 Dec 2020 12:05 |
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