Dynamic Expert Incentives in Teams

Wong, Tsz-Ning and Yang, Lily Ling. (2021) Dynamic Expert Incentives in Teams. Games and Economic Behavior, 125. pp. 27-47.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/79531/

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We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery to a decision maker. We show that dynamic revelation of information causes the experts' incentives to acquire information to evolve over time. This leads to novel collaboration dynamics and, in particular, the introduction of another expert can have a "motivating" effect on the existing expert in spite of the incentive to free ride. We further set up the planner's problem and discuss when the (constrained) social optimum can be achieved.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Wong, Tsz Ning
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:29 Dec 2020 12:04
Deposited On:29 Dec 2020 12:04

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