Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme

Hao, Hong and Wong, Tsz-Ning. (2020) Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 32 (3). pp. 460-493.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/79530/

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Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Wong, Tsz Ning
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:29 Dec 2020 12:02
Deposited On:29 Dec 2020 12:02

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