
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Edited by
Jens Koehrsen and Andreas Heuser
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1 Beyond established boundaries

FBOs as developmental entrepreneurs

Jens Koehrsen and Andreas Heuser

Current discourses in development studies signal an almost provoking "religious turn" in development policy. The high impact of religious agency in the context of global development work shines through in a programmatic statement, launched at the "Evidence Summit", held in mid-2015 in Washington, DC. The timing of this multiparty conference, as well as the list of convenors and the range of participating organisations is revealing. High-profile representatives of the World Bank and important national development institutions, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the UK Department for International Development, convened with representatives of religious institutions and faith-based development organisations (FBOs) during the passage period that prepared for a new agenda of sustainable development coined by the United Nations (UN) as *Agenda 2030*. They jointly published a policy paper that combines the key-terms in recent UN development strategies, namely, poverty eradication and sustainability. This common policy statement on "Religion and Sustainable Development: Building Partnerships to End Extreme Poverty", heralded the systematic inclusion of FBOs at large in development cooperation. The initial sentence in their "key findings and recommendations for action" states: "The question is no longer whether religion matters for development. . . . The question now is: how to systematically include the potentials of religious organizations for development, and according to what principles and criteria?" (Joint Learning Initiative on Faith & Local Communities 2015, p. 3).

The statement climaxes the new role of religion and FBOs in developmental geopolitics. In broad terms it testifies a re-narration of ideas that remained mostly undisputed in development theory and practice thus far. Over and above, development discourse was shaped by modernisation theory with its implicit assumptions about the negative impact of religion for development. By contrast, the statement cited above emphasises religious agency in international governance of development. The former approaches, which marginalised religion and faith-based institutions as hindrance to development, seem to be replaced by positions supporting the transformative potentials of religion (cf. Heist and Cnaan 2016; Heuser and Koehrsen 2020; Mtata 2013). While FBOs were formerly linked to "tabooed" themes in development studies, they are now identified as decisive

agents of development initiatives in what some observers have recently termed the "religious turn" in development cooperation (Garling 2013; cf. Jahnel 2015).

This volume engages with the vital role credited to FBOs in current discourses on development. FBOs are social organisations with a development focus, based on values intrinsic to a specific religion. They usually relate to generic religious traditions of charity and dignity that inspire their particular theological social ethics. Yet, far from identifying FBOs as salvific porters of social visionary and praxis, this volume sketches both potentials and limits of FBOs in actual fields of development. Although few FBOs can claim an entangled history with development politics on global levels, they emerged as potent actors in the field of multilateral development policy on a broader scale from the 1990s. Against the backdrop of FBOs' increasing integration into international development circles, there is a need for empirically based, interdisciplinary research on these organisations (see also Carrette 2017; Carrette and Miall 2017). This volume provides an interdisciplinary analysis of FBOs in current development discourses.

The collection of case studies in this volume highlights the particularities of FBOs, their development concepts and activities in diverse geographical and political contexts. At the United Nations, depending on the survey, between well over half and up to three quarters of all FBOs have a Christian faith-background (cf. Beinlich and Braungart 2019; Berger 2003; Haynes 2013; Lehmann 2016, p. 35). This volume places a specific emphasis on Protestant FBOs. Forming a central strand of Christianity, Protestant FBOs represent the lion's share of Christian FBOs and constitute some of the most powerful among them. The focus on Protestant FBOs reflects not just the enduring but also the intensified developmental significance of these organisations. The surge of Protestant FBOs is a trend line in the present arena of development politics. With protestant newcomers appearing in FBO sectors at an almost constant rate, this trend line mirrors both the ongoing diversification of Protestant churches on a global scale and their growing share in global Christianity. It also reflects the economic potential of many Protestant churches that have developed into more affluent social actors than ever before (Barnett and Gross Stein 2012). The volume thus echoes the heavy weight of Protestant FBOs on the global scale of development cooperation.

Nevertheless, Protestant FBOs are not a homogenous block of development organisations. Although sharing a "family resemblance" due to common origins in the Reformation and post-Reformation era (Graf 2006), they are highly diverse: Protestantism constitutes a heterogeneous universe of manifold Protestant traditions which are often classified into evangelical-conservative, mainline, and non-orthodox strands. These strands have evolved their own development discourses and FBOs, potentially leading to substantial differences in faith-based development. This volume undertakes in-depth case studies on a variety of Protestant FBOs. We explore FBOs anchored in mainline Protestantism, such as Mission 21 from Switzerland and development wings of the Anglican Church and the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. These are balanced by case studies on FBOs representing strands of evangelical Protestantism, commonly perceived as conservative in socio-political terms, such as World Vision and Micah Challenge. Moreover, this

volume also features a case study on non-orthodox Protestantism by exploring the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) in Guyana. As such, the sample illustrates the plurality of Protestant FBOs, thereby answering to the call "to work more consistently through the complexity of individual cases" (Jones and Petersen 2011, p. 1301). The case study approach provides surprising insights on differences and overlaps of their development approaches, as will be discussed in the following sections.

Studying the heterogeneous universe of Protestant FBOs, this volume reveals their ability to act as *boundary agents*: FBOs move between different discursive fields such as national and international development discourses, their specific religious constituencies, and theological discourses. By combining influxes from these different contexts, FBOs generate unique perspectives on development: anchored historically in a range of protestant traditions, they express alternative views on development. Thereby, FBOs have the capacity to become *developmental entrepreneurs*, shaping development discourses with their genuine concepts. The case study approach illustrates a comparative sighting of what may be termed (Protestant) theologies of development. In order to analyse heterogeneous types of FBOs, their development concepts and activities, this volume draws upon interdisciplinary research. It is the outcome of a research project in which scholars from anthropology, economics, political sciences/international relations, sociology, and theology have worked together for two years. The contributions have been produced in the context of the fellow programme "Religion and Development in the Global South" of the Centre for Religion, Economy and Politics between 2015 and 2017. The Centre is run by several Swiss universities, while this particular fellow research programme was located at the University of Basel's Faculty of Theology. The Swiss University Conference, Swiss National Science Foundation, Foundation for Basic Research in Human Sciences, and the Voluntary Academic Society Basel (Freiwillige Akademische Gesellschaft Basel) have financially supported this undertaking.

The studies apply different methodologies such as narrative and ethnographic interviews, participant observations, archival and web research, and content analysis. In the context of the fellow programme, the contributors have taken the challenge to actively engage with other academic disciplines. The close exchange between the researchers from various disciplines in numerous meetings and feedback processes has contributed to the exploration of the institutional plurality and outreach of FBOs as well as to venturing into different discursive fields of development at local, national, and international levels. Such close interdisciplinary collaboration points to a productive way of studying FBOs and creating awareness for their manifold dimensions (e.g. theological, political, social, legal). The research collaboration focused on the internal (re)organisation of development discourses of FBOs and their search for appropriate alignments with developmental geopolitics. As a result, this volume characterises the selected Protestant FBOs as boundary organisations, navigating diverse discourses and settings.

This introductory chapter is structured as follows: the next section briefly outlines the emergence of FBOs on the international development scene, placing an

emphasis on historical conjunctures that pushed FBOs into the universe of developmental geopolitics. Based on the results from this volume's empirical case studies, the following section draws conclusions regarding the embeddedness of FBOs in different discursive fields and their potential to bridge these fields. The last two sections summarise the case studies and present avenues for future research.

FBOs and developmental geopolitics: historical developments

The breakthrough of FBOs in global arenas of development happened from the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s. Until then, FBOs were profiled in developmental arenas as part of the large sector of autonomous, non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This was the legacy of post – Second World War political taxation. Since its foundation FBOs were relating to the United Nations (Boehle 2010a, p. 278). However, their religious background – more precisely their Roman Catholic background (Lehmann 2016) – was not recognised as an identity marker. Rather, these FBOs were coined as "non-governmental organisations". The term first appeared in the 1950s in resolutions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the major UN policy sections (Lehmann 2016). A quite unspecific referent in its original usage, "NGOs" referred to all kinds of intermediary organisations operating within the range of UN structures, including business enterprises (Stockmann 2016, p. 545). This did not change much until the 1990s. Like any other NGO, FBOs were located in civil society to represent a participatory model of social organisation mostly on the grassroots level. In the international architecture of development politics, NGOs gained importance gradually – and along with them, so did FBOs, albeit implicitly. Yet, they were catapulted into global governance systems particularly from the 1980s onwards. One causative factor of their emergence was the obvious incapability of state-organised development. This had led to the formation and relevance of civil society as the "third sector" between state governance and economic systems. A novel architecture supported a more strategic cooperation in global partnerships between states, multilateral organisations, and civil society (Korten 1990). This also created a "new opportunity structure" for religious actors, opening new avenues for their participation in international politics and development (Baumgart-Ochse 2019, p. 5). The recent discovery of NGOs was soon after categorised as the "NGOisation" of developmental geopolitics (Messner 1996). In this terrain of reconstruction, FBOs also became discernible as specific agents in development theory and praxis.

The growing awareness of FBOs in the tapestry of international development policy found momentum in two phases: the first phase that roughly stretches over the 1990s climaxed with the adoption of UN *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs) in 2000; the second phase relates to the transition period that led to the implementation of *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs) in 2015.

The first phase saw a multisited effort to revisit the impact of "religion" in dynamics of social change and development. A paradigmatic shift in strategising

development was taking shape. Previous policies were inclined to linear, material growth-based visions of development, and implicitly "religion" was either categorised as negligible or as a hindrance factor to development (Senghaas 1985; Menzel and Senghaas 1986). By consequence, in development circles, "little [was] known about the role of spirituality in the development process, and little or no guidance [was] given to development practitioners as to how to address spiritual issues, resulting in less effective and even damaging development efforts" (Beek 2000, p. 38; brackets by authors). The ignorance about the social transformative potentials of religion diminished through coincidental proceedings in developmental geopolitics.

The most remarkable process was a joint initiative by the World Bank – headed by its former president James D. Wolfensohn – and religious organisations – spearheaded by the then Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey. It resulted in the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) from 1998. Between 1998 and 2005 a vivid consultation process paid new attention to religion in development scenarios. Numerous FBOs were pushing the thematic cluster of religion and development (Haynes 2013; Rees 2011), accompanied by the World Bank department on Development Dialogue on Value and Ethics – founded in 2000 – the Bretton-Woods institutions of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) together with major national and international development agencies, and alongside various global religious players such as the World Council of Churches (WCC). These fresh impulses coincided with the implementation of UN *Millennium Development Goals*. Drawn up over the course of the 1990s as a joint endeavour in global development governance, the MDG formulae potentially envisaged the incorporation of religiously motivated actors in development activities. By such a radical turn in the agenda of development policy, the MDGs sought, amongst others, to cut poverty levels in half by 2015, and to consolidate development programmes especially around rural and grassroots as well as human rights – based projects. This vision was already profoundly established as the preferential option in the development work of FBOs for some time (Bornstein 2002). FBOs did not only support the adoption of this "longest standing paradigm that has ever emerged in developmental thinking" thus far, but lauded the MDGs (ACT Executive Committee 2013, p. 2; Boehle 2010a). Meanwhile, numerous publications from multidisciplinary angles indicated a widely shared interest in the connection between religion and development: FBOs became slowly more identifiable as social actors in their own right (Haynes 2007; Clarke 2008; Ter Haar and Wolfensohn 2011; Mtata 2013; Marshall 2001; Clarke 2013).

This prepared the ground for the second phase in the discovery of FBOs as genuine partners in international development politics around 2015. The symbolic date stands for the implementation of a 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Agreed by 193 countries, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were envisaged by the international community as a decisive step into a "Great Global Transformation" (Nuscheler 2012, p. 390). In a move towards sustainable modes of production, consumption, and resource use, the SDGs form a set of 17 development goals, diversified into 169 targets. The agenda's preamble refers back to the

ambitious MDG commitment to ending poverty: "Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development" (United Nations 2015, p. 1). Yet, the SDGs span an expanded range of issues. The "great transformation" anchors sustainability in conjunction with social and ecological justice, taking into account issues ranging from human rights and gender inequality to climate change.

The 2030 Agenda is characterised by a multistakeholder, participatory, and value-oriented approach to sustainable development. In this process a "newfound enthusiasm" on FBOs was stirred (Occhipinti 2015, p. 333). Attention is given to the organisational strengths of FBOs, their access to global and local networks coupled with management experiences of small-scale and large-scale projects. Additionally, their normative and spiritual expertise that becomes manifest in the fields of education, public welfare, and in conflict mediation is considered a constitutive element in a value-oriented agenda of sustainability (Boehle 2010b). The FBO orientation on basic needs and advocacy in the field of poverty eradication and ecology underscore the central goals of sustainable development. FBOs assume prestige as facilitators of public discourses on development and are seen as vehicles for trust-building relationships at the grassroots level. In the case of Christian FBOs, the social and moral capital can rely on long-standing, historic relationships between local partners in both northern and southern hemispheres. In the case of Muslim FBOs, research highlights their capacity for reaching otherwise unreachable populations at the grassroots level (Petersen 2012a, p. 137). Put together, FBOs currently attract the attention of national and international development cooperation. Roughly over the past two decades FBOs have helped in condensing novel concepts of development and in reviewing development agendas. Although still in the initial stages of realising the Agenda 2030, FBOs render coherence to ideas of sustainable development, intensifying grassroots levels of efficiency. Rainer Tetzlaff estimates that within this new global architecture of sustainability and poverty, FBOs can even "offer alternative paths of survival" (Tetzlaff 2015, p. 39).

Yet, a more sceptical note on the impact of FBOs on development structures cannot be overlooked. This may still be true in view of the "data-poor" humanitarian sector as such (Barnett and Gross Stein 2012, p. 9). Due to the limited empirical data, the FBO impact on development processes is almost impossible to establish at this stage. However, FBOs are widely considered to bring about "a more people-centred, transformative and sustainable development" (Jones and Petersen 2011, p. 1299). Furthermore, intending to improve the effectiveness of their developmental work, numerous FBOs are currently revising organisational structures along the principles of commercial firms. FBOs are becoming increasingly aware of the competitiveness in the development market (Hopgood and Vinjamuri 2012): if they fail to raise revenues, minimise costs, protect their reputation, and hire specialised staff, they cannot meet their development objectives. Alongside the supposedly strong personal dedication of FBO staff, and a motivated constituency, all such aspects point at FBOs as capable development

actors. But, so far, empirical evidence thereof remains a desideratum in development studies (Stockmann 2016, pp. 471–481; Ware *et al*. 2016, p. 331). Additionally, FBOs are frequently confronted with the allegation of conducting proselytism and, in the case of Muslim FBOs, are sometimes even alleged of being linked to terror organisations (Petersen 2012a, pp. 135–136; Petersen 2012b, pp. 771–774). Moreover, in development circles the "newfound enthusiasm" for FBOs is coupled with a Janus-faced challenge: On the one side, political development agency is confronted with improving their "religious literacy"; the legacy of an implicit negligence of religion in modernisation approaches to development is still enduring. On the other side, numerous FBOs are challenged to improve their "development literacy" (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit/German Association for International Cooperation (GIZ) 2015, p. 22f.). The case studies collected in this volume can help filling this lacuna. By and large they are stretching these two main phases around the formulation of MDGs and SDGs in which FBOs appeared on grand scale in development geopolitics.

Crossing boundaries: findings from the case studies

This volume explores how FBOs relate to the discursive fields in which they move: religious discourses of their specific Protestant constituencies, development discourses of international bodies, state agencies, and secular NGOs, as well as transnational theological discourses. Each of the FBOs investigated in this volume moves in a particular constellation of discourses that to some extent influences its development notions and activities. For instance, national political cultures in countries such as Guyana or Rwanda create specific contexts for the development activities of local FBOs, shaping their approaches to development, as will be discussed in the case studies by Kloß and Schliesser. Similarly, major sea-changes in transnational theological discourses on development are likely to affect the development approaches of those FBOs that are connected to these discourses, as will be shown in the case studies by Hoffmann and Freeman. However, FBOs are no passive recipients of their social environment: they may also try to shape prevalent development notions through activities directed towards its religious constituencies (see Freeman's study of the Micah Challenge Campaign in this volume) or international communities (see Haynes' study of World Vision in this volume).

Defining FBOs is challenging. We suggest that FBOs can best be described by their boundary-crossing character: they move beyond established lines. The following elaborations on the findings from the case studies in this volume are structured in terms of the boundary-crossing character of FBOs: They cross the boundaries between secular and religious organisations (subsection 1), denominational lines (subsection 2), and different development contexts and discourses (subsections 3–4). Therefore, they become boundary agents that mediate between different discourses (subsection 5). By combining influxes from different contexts, they generate unique perspectives on development and have the capacity to

become developmental entrepreneurs (subsection 6). The following sections will discuss these characteristics of FBOs based on the case studies in this volume.

Unique organisations

FBOs are neither traditional religious organisations nor simply NGOs with a religious labelling. They constitute a unique type of organisation that combines characteristics of NGOs and religious organisations. The contributions to this volume show that FBOs share some elements with NGOs, while simultaneously cultivating characteristics that mark their faith-background and distinguish them from other NGOs in development work. There are opposing views on the particularities of FBOs in comparison to NGOs (Clarke and Ware 2015): On the one extreme are assessments that perceive FBOs as genuinely distinctive from NGOs, given that their worldviews and guiding values strongly differ from that of NGOs (cf. James 2009). On the other extreme, scholars speak of a false and arbitrary division between FBOs and NGOs, pointing towards their similarities in development practices and their shared origins in civil society (cf. Green *et al*. 2012; Carrette 2017; Ware *et al*. 2016, pp. 322–324). Hence, Ware *et al.* claim that "the dichotomy between FBOs and secular NGOs is rather artificial" (Ware *et al*. 2016, p. 322). The contributions in this volume find evidence for both positions, indicating that FBOs differ in some respects from NGOs while showing similarities in others.

FBOs share similar development goals and practices with NGOs, often strongly engaging in the provision of health services and education (Berger 2003; Green *et al*. 2012; Heist and Cnaan 2016; Lunn 2009; Marshall 2001; Ware *et al*. 2016). Against the backdrop of rising environmental concern, their activities also increasingly tackle climate change and environmental degradation (Glaab 2017; Glaab *et al*. 2019; Koehrsen 2018, 2020). Paralleling secular NGOs, the FBOs in this volume conduct projects on poverty alleviation, health, gender equality, education, peace etc. Their development activities match with the goals fixed in the international development agendas of the MDGs and SDGs. Moreover, in order to plan, organise, and conduct their projects, they frequently collaborate with secular NGOs and FBOs from various faith-backgrounds (see also Boehle 2010b). In particular, large FBOs often partner with organisations not committed to Christian faith and values. For instance, World Vision works with Islamic Relief and many UN agencies (see Haynes 2019 in this volume).

However, in many other aspects FBOs do differ from secular NGOs: their foundational philosophies, moral and cosmological orientations, and motivations often draw upon their specific faith-basis (see also Berger 2003; Clarke 2006; Jennings and Clarke 2008, p. 272). Moreover, FBOs are embedded in religious networks and receive their funding from religiously motivated donors (Berger 2003; Kirmani 2012; Ware *et al*. 2016). For instance, the FBO Mission 21 in this volume outlines in its mission statement that the "Gospel of Jesus Christ" and the "vision of the Kingdom of God" guide the organisation in its activities. Mission 21 works closely with local churches in the global south and forms part of

a worldwide community of churches and missions organisations; in addition it is linked to the ecumenical movement of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Reformed Church in Switzerland (see Hoffmann 2019 in this volume). Other organisations form an integral part of single churches: the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, investigated in this volume, is strongly linked to the Seventh Day Adventist Church (see Kloß 2019 in this volume). Being related to religious networks and discourses, the FBOs in this volume subscribe to specific notions of development, distinct from secular concepts of development. Examples for these notions are "spiritual development", "holistic development", "transformational development", and "integral mission". FBOs evolve their own "theologies" of development. Thus, there is no systematic "theology of development" in sight. However, the development concepts of Christian FBOs outlined in this volume share a holistic vision of human wellbeing which prominently feature spiritual wellbeing and individual self-transformation (see, for instance, Kloß 2019 in this volume).

Another potential difference between FBOs and "secular" NGOs concerns the presumed tendency to proselytism. Proselytism consists in active efforts to convert others to a particular religion, confession, or ideology (Lynch and Schwarz 2016). FBOs are frequently subject to the allegation of proselytism. The prime motivation of FBOs, the argument goes, is to exert a religious hegemony by instrumentalizing development discourses and practises of charity. Historic episodes known primarily from Imperial mission politics in colonial India have nurtured the accusation of proselytism. The motif of distributing food against the promise to convert has layered down in accounts about the so-called "rice Christians" (Bauman 2008, pp. 71–100). Such practices remained exceptional and have been substantially delegitimised by contemporary mission societies (Becker 2015, pp. 338–342). As an expression of a rather marginal and controversial evangelistic praxis, the proselytism formula however still overshadows contemporary FBO praxis in actual development studies.

The allegation of proselytism has facilitated the "othering" of Christian FBOs in opposition to non-religious (or other religious) NGOs. In particular, Muslim FBOs (Petersen 2012a) and evangelical FBOs (Berger 2003, p. 17; Clarke 2006; Heist and Cnaan 2016; Lunn 2009, pp. 944–946) are frequently suspected of using development work as an instrument for gaining new followers. For instance, Pelkmans (2009) observes that evangelical groups in Kyrgyzstan use their development activity for proselytising aims: they adopt a development language to gain access to new missionary fields and disguise their conversion efforts by dressing them in the welcomed rhetoric of humanitarian development. Moreover, the evangelical FBO sector seems to be sensitised in special ways to donor policies. Evangelical donors supporting FBOs may tend to have an interest in proselytism and, accordingly, evaluate the organisation's legitimacy based on its effectiveness in spreading the given faith (Lister 2003). However, religious donors are not the only stakeholder group of evangelical FBOs. Other important stakeholders, such as governmental agencies, international institutions, secular donors and collaboration partners, have different interests and are likely to repudiate religious

proselytism. Moving between these different settings, evangelical FBOs form their own critical agendas and do not necessarily follow their religious constituencies. Many evangelical NGOs, including the two evangelical organisations in this volume (World Vision and Micah Challenge), disavow proselytism. They agree to national ethical statements renouncing proselytism (Harriss 2014) and/or affirm the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross (Thaut 2009).

This is to say that the generalizing criticism of FBO proselytism has to be critically reviewed. Just in view of Christian FBOs, the general assumption of proselytism neglects and denies its internal diversity (Lynch and Schwarz 2016; Thaut 2009). Although Christian FBOs will not expressly outrule the option of individuals to convert by their free choice, religious proselytism concerns only a share of the more evangelical FBO spectrum. The majority of Christian FBOs reject strategic proselytism and tend to identify with standards of secular humanitarianism (Thaut 2009). Although linked to a religious tradition, the primary mission of most FBOs is neither to enlarge the sphere of influence of a certain religion nor to disseminate specific religious doctrines. Thus, proselytism does not constitute a characteristic that could clearly distinguish FBOs from non-religious NGOs. Moreover, any effort to draw a sharp line between religious and secular FBOs on grounds of proselytism overlooks the normative bias in secular humanitarianism (Barnett and Gross Stein 2012) and does not reflect on the "role of religion in ostensibly non-religious organisations" (Jones and Petersen 2011, p. 1298). Turning the other way round, attributing the problem of proselytism solely to FBOs masks the prevalent "donor proselytism" (Lynch and Schwarz 2016) of secular (and religious) organisations spreading, for instance, concepts of liberal capitalism, efficiency, and sustainability (Fountain 2015). If proselytism is regarded as illegitimate, then this also concerns secular development agents.

In a similar vein, allegations of gender conservatism are sometimes voiced against FBOs. Among Christian FBOs, features of gender conservativism can be found in some evangelical FBOs while, arguably, FBOs with a historic background in mainline Christianity are engaging for gender equality (Agadjanian 2005). Therefore, gender conservatism cannot be upheld as a general characteristic of FBOs.

In total, FBOs cannot easily be attributed to one of the two categories "religious organisations" and "secular NGOs" (Clarke and Ware 2015, pp. 40f., 45f.): they form a category of their own that moves beyond the boundaries of religious/secular organisations – institutional in-betweens, located "between religious organisations and secular organisations" (Torry 2005, p. 117). FBOs involve elements from both worlds and constitute "a unique hybrid of religious beliefs and sociopolitical activism" (Berger 2003, p. 16). The hybridity metaphor leaves space for interpretation. Although it does not direct towards definitional clarity, it works with an assumption of FBO-distinctiveness in terrains of development. On the one side, it dispenses from drawing precise lines between religious and secular spheres; on the other side, it relates to the special symbolic resources available to FBOs for development work. The particular religious traditions of FBOs and their theological justification of "social engagement at large" gain attention.

Moreover, there is a certain terminological range of how to define these organisations. FBOs are also labelled as "spiritual NGOs", arguably to avoid interpretive reductions to monotheistic interpretations of "faith". In this vein, the acronym RNGOs, or "religious NGOs", is the preferred terminology in contexts of the United Nations. In addition, FBOs are sometimes qualified as specific "faith-based development organisations", specifying the development wings of larger religious bodies such as churches. All these notions stress the religious dimension of these organisations, comprising particular worldviews and ethics. The contributions published here prioritise the term "faith-based organisations". It is from this vantage point of genuine religious worldviews and ethics that FBOs are motivated to create favourable conditions for a "good life". Following Julia Berger's definition of what she prefers to call "religious NGOs" represented at the UN, we consider FBOs as "formal organisations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operate on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level" (Berger 2003, p. 16).

Internal diversity: beyond classical lines of separation

Categorising FBOs as a unique type of organisation says little about their extensive internal diversity and the different types of FBOs (James 2009; Kirmani 2012). The enormous variety is due to their structures as well as their respective religious backgrounds. FBOs differ in their organisational and management cultures, in their access to budgets, and in their radius and focus of activity, amongst others. Some FBOs are resource-rich international organisations operating within transnational networks; others are small locally active FBOs, dedicated to one-purpose projects. The diffuse scenery is still more complex given the existence of global north and global south FBOs adapting to contextual policy requirements (Nuscheler 2012, p. 387).

It is challenging to provide insightful internal classifications of FBOs. Categorising FBOs based on their denominational background (e.g. evangelical vs. mainline Protestant) or their organisational type (e.g. churches vs. religious NGOs) barely allows for drawing conclusions on the intensity that their faith-background plays in their development agendas and practices.

This volume studies three organisational types of FBOs: development sections of churches, missionary organisations, and autonomous faith-based development organisations. Although missionary organisations and churches are traditionally related closer to the religious field and act according to its logics (e.g. seeking to spread their religious message), they are sometimes also strongly committed to development programmes (see also Öhlmann *et al*. 2016). The case study by Schliesser in this volume shows how Christian churches in Rwanda engage in improvements in health, poverty alleviation, education, and, in particular, conflict resolution. Hoffman's contribution underlines the historic involvement of missionary organisations related to mainline Protestantism in education and other

welfare activities. Missionary organisations and churches have historically played a crucial role in providing welfare services (e.g. education, health services) in many countries of the global south as well as the global north such as the USA (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011; Heist and Cnaan 2016). Their approaches to development do not necessarily differ from religious NGOs. As such, classifying FBOs into churches, missionary organisations, and religious NGOs does not lead to clear categories, which would enable researchers to distinguish their development approaches.

Another way of categorising FBOs draws upon their denominational backgrounds. The selection in this volume comprises case studies of FBOs mainly from a Christian tradition. Within Christianity there is a diversity of FBOs, including, among others, Catholic (e.g. Catholic Relief Services, Caritas International, Misereor), Orthodox (e.g. International Orthodox Christian Charities), and Protestant FBOs. Our focus is on Protestant Christianity, including FBOs related to evangelical, mainline, and "non-orthodox" (Seventh Day Adventists Church) forms of Protestantism. Often lines are drawn between mainline and evangelical Protestantism, while attention has traditionally been focussed on mainline Protestantism (Clarke 2006). Both expressions of Protestantism are based on different theological traditions that have informed their endeavours in development work, resulting in dissimilar histories of involvement. While mainline Protestantism has a long history of engagement in development work and its FBOs are often related to the ecumenical movement, evangelicals with their traditional emphasis on personal development and salvation have engaged in this topic to a lesser extent. Therefore, one may assume that an FBO being either mainline Protestant or evangelical will determine its development agendas and activities: FBOs from a mainline Protestant background will have a higher propensity to engage with secular topics and focus on structural inequalities, whereas FBOs with an evangelical background stress individual development and avoid structural inequalities. However, this volume sheds a critical light on this assumption and provides an alternative perspective: while mainline Protestants engage in theological programmes, evangelical FBOs focus on structural topics. The cases of Mission 21 (see Hoffmann 2019 in this volume) and Micah Challenge (see Freeman 2019 in this volume) illustrate these tendencies. Although Mission 21 as a mainstream Protestant FBO has a long tradition of collaborating with secular development partners, it has recently extended its theological programmes and religious focus. By contrast, Micah Challenge is an evangelical FBO that places an emphasis on advocacy work. Its activities reflect a broader transformation of the development approaches within the evangelical Lausanne Movement, more precisely the evangelical "left", increasingly emphasising the socio-political responsibility of evangelical Christians at large.

These insights indicate that boundaries between evangelical and mainline FBOs are blurring and that both types of FBOs are coming closer to each other in terms of their development agendas. Consequently, the development approaches of evangelical and mainline FBOs cannot easily be distinguished based upon their denominational background: FBOs with an evangelical background may focus on

topics that appeared originally to be dominated by mainline FBOs, while mainline FBOs expand their spiritual development work.

In total, categorising FBOs according to their organisational forms (e.g. churches vs. religious NGOs) and denominational backgrounds barely allows for raising conclusions about the way in which their faith-background influences their development agendas and activities. More insights are gained from classifications that specifically focus on FBOs and group them by their "religiousness" (cf. Clarke 2008; Sider and Unruh 2004). For instance, Sider and Unruh (2004) suggest a classification ranging from faith-permeated FBOs to quasi-secular organisations. This categorization provides information about the degree of attachment to their religious circles. It, therefore, defines the extent to which the discourses of their religious constituencies may shape the development agendas of the given FBOs, as will be further discussed below.

Flexibility and accommodation

FBOs are sometimes stereotyped as stuck in their religious discourses, being solitary and divisive (cf. Kirmani 2012). While Heist and Cnaan (2016, p. 12f.) find that there is very limited data on the collaboration of FBOs, the contributions in this volume show that FBOs are highly collaborative organisations and have a strong ability to adapt to different (non-religious) contexts.

Each of the FBOs discussed here relates to a specific religious constituency and has its specific religious identity, involving particular theological concepts. However, this does not imply that these organisations remain stuck in their theological discourses and religious contexts: in order to fund, organise, and conduct development work, FBOs go beyond their religious networks and move in non-religious contexts that are sometimes even hostile towards religion (see also Clarke 2008, pp. 4–5; Glaab 2017; James 2009): here, they find it difficult to be heard if they stick to their religious arguments. As such, it is impossible for them to carry their Christian identity through in different contexts: "To survive they must adapt" (James 2009, p. 10).

We are surveying activities and trajectories of FBOs within complex discursive fields, characterised by diverse regional, national, and international development discourses. These fields are inhabited by numerous stakeholders with occasionally conflicting interests and demands: religious constituents, donors, international development organisations, nation-states, regional governments, and recipients of development activities. As FBOs strongly depend on their socio-cultural environment, they have to respond to these discourses and demands.

The FBOs that have been studied in this volume demonstrate a strong ability to adapt to different contexts and sometimes pragmatically deal with heterogeneous expectations. In particular, this becomes manifest in their use of language. FBOs use varying discourse styles with governments, secular NGOs, religious donors, and churches. In each context, they have to follow the given communication standards and must know what type of reasoning convinces the communication partner(s) (e.g. what appeals to secular donors and what appeals to

churches?). This is, for instance, illustrated by World Vision which reserves a Protestant vocabulary for its religious constituency: using this vocabulary helps to maintain its relationships with its evangelical donor communities. However, in international development circles, World Vision abstains from employing religious language (see Haynes 2019 in this volume).

Another example of FBOs' strong ability to adapt to non-religious contexts is their development agendas. FBOs design their agendas in interaction with their sociocultural environment. International development agendas that have been fixed in the MDGs and SDGs form reference points for the FBOs in this volume: focussing on topics such as poverty alleviation, education, conflict resolution, and women's empowerment, the FBOs relate to the international development goals. As such, the FBOs studied in this volume refer to the SDGs. For instance, World Vision works on six SDGs (see Haynes 2019 in this volume): good health and wellbeing (SDG 3), quality education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11), peace and justice, strong institutions (SDG 16), and partnerships for the goals (SDG 17). While it is of little surprise that large FBOs which engage at the level of the UN are committed to the SDGs, the contributions in this volume find that even smaller FBOs engage with the international development agenda. For instance, the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda (Église Presbytérienne au Rwanda) conducts projects related to various SDGs, as for instance, peace and justice (SG 16), quality education (SDG 4), and good health (SDG 3) (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume). Moreover, evangelical FBOs that have been stereotyped as focusing on charity and individual life improvement also move actively into the direction of the MDGs and SDGs and address structural development issues. For instance, the evangelical FBO Micah Challenge actively campaigns for political advocacy work among evangelicals to promote the MDGs (see Freeman 2019 in this volume).

FBOs relate to international development agendas, but still make their own choices in how they approach development and what development goals they prioritise. Setting these priorities also depends on the regional context in which they move. As such, in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, FBOs place an emphasis on reconciliation (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume), while FBOs operating in the Guyanese context of ethno-religious competition regard their development activities as a way of counteracting the influence of FBOs related to other ethno-religious group (see Kloß 2019 in this volume).

In total, this volume highlights the flexibility of FBOs. In contrast to expectations that FBOs are stuck in their religious discourses, we find flexibility and a high ability to adapt their practices, processes and communications to different contexts (see also Koehrsen 2017b). Nevertheless, moving simultaneously in heterogeneous contexts, they evolve strategies that go beyond simple accommodation, as will be shown in the following section.

Coping with heterogeneous discourses

The involvement in heterogeneous contexts does not only require FBOs to be flexible, but also to evolve strategies for handling the occasionally conflicting

demands. Apart from flexible adaptation these strategies also include active ventures to transform these contexts, reducing the tensions between their conflicting demands.

Being embedded in different discursive fields is not a particularity unique to FBOs. FBOs share this characteristic with other NGOs which also deal with diverse and sometimes conflicting discourses and demands. However, FBOs differ from other types of NGOs in that they also relate to theological discourses and have a religious constituency. Institutional memberships in umbrella organisations and associations, donor relationships, and denominational affiliations create stable institutional connections between FBOs and the particular religious discursive field. Being related to a wider faith community provides them with an extensive social network and access to financial and organisational resources, as is frequently highlighted (cf. Berger 2003; Ware *et al*. 2016). Berger, for instance, stresses that FBOs can mobilise vast networks of believers and religious organisations and, therefore, have an extensive local reach (Berger 2003). While academic contributions usually highlight the potentials of affiliations with religious networks, they disregard the challenges that these may create for these organisations. Connections to religious networks make the development work of FBOs all the more complex by adding extra demands and views, given that FBOs are accountable to their religious stakeholders. As their financial influx and legitimacy often depends on the engagement with these stakeholders and their discourses, FBOs have to underpin their faith dimension by linking their development notions and activities to these discourses (James 2009; James and Crooks 2009). For instance, religious donors may require FBOs to clarify their faith identity (cf. James 2009, pp. 10–11). This creates difficulties for FBOs in situations in which other types of stakeholders view parading the faith dimension as inappropriate. As such, the "religious" extra-demands may conflict with the expectations of international or national development discourses (e.g. secular donor institutions) or even constrain effective development activities (see also Bradley 2005; Clarke 2008, pp. 24–32). For instance, in the case of Micah Challenge, the evangelical constituency places a strong emphasis on personal development and salvation (see Freeman 2019 in this volume). This emphasis hinders effective advocacy work. However, Micah Challenge has to draw upon this constituency to pursue its goals.

Nevertheless, the strength of the connection to religious discursive fields differs between FBOs. Drawing upon Sider and Unruh's (2004) classification of FBOs, these organisations can be grouped by their "religiousness" and degree of involvement with religious discursive fields (see also Petersen 2012a). While faith-permeated organisations are strongly embedded in the religious discursive field of the given constituency, in the case of quasi-secular organisations there are little or no connections at all to a religious discursive field. In the first case, the given FBOs mostly move in their religious discursive fields, strongly shaping their development concepts, and barely participate in national or international development discourses. In contrast, in the latter case of FBOs as quasi-secular organisations, the impact of religious discourses on the development concepts of these organisations is low or absent.

The FBOs that have been studied in this volume have maintained their connections to the religious discursive fields. At the same time, they are not embedded solely in these discourses, as they move simultaneously in other discourses. They constitute a type of FBO that balances its membership in different discursive fields. This concerns many, if not most, FBOs engaging in development work at a national or international scale.

The simultaneous participation in heterogeneous discursive fields can create tensions, as development concepts and expectations may differ between religious constituencies (e.g. spiritual development and poverty mitigation) and international development discourses (e.g. emphasis on sustainability). The case studies in this volume point towards different strategies of FBOs in handling their participation in heterogeneous discourses.

World Vision carefully balances potential tensions by flexibly adapting its use of language to each context, using more religious concepts for its religious donor constituency and abstaining from them in the field of international development (see Haynes 2019 in this volume). This is what Jeremy Carrette calls the "chameleon politics" of religion given that religion appears and disappears in the strategic processes of the UN (Carrette 2017). World Vision's strategy lends itself to FBOs that strongly participate in international development discourses and therefore must adjust to its logics while seeking to maintain their relationship to their religious constituency.

Micah Challenge, in contrast, chooses an entrepreneurial strategy (see Freeman 2019 in this volume): it endeavours to transform the religious discourse. Aspiring to establish advocacy work among its constituency, it seeks to bring the religious discourse of its constituency closer to the theological discourse on integral development and the international development discourse. If this undertaking is successful, it will decrease tensions between the discursive fields and place FBOs that move between them in a more comfortable situation. This strategy requires vast social networks and long-term efforts in persuading the given religious constituencies. At the same time, it is uncertain and potentially hazardous, as it runs the risk of failing due to inertia of the religious discourses or even breaking with the religious constituency.

In national contexts where "religion" is negatively connoted, FBOs may choose to deny affiliation with any religious discourse. For example, the Save Abee Foundation in Guyana neglects a religious affiliation and suggests that its Christian competitors have links to religion (see Kloß 2019 in this volume). Hence, neglecting and/or attributing connections to religious discourses may form a competitive strategy of FBOs in national development discourses marked by a negative perception of religion. Finally, other strategies include distancing from specific discourses. FBOs can appeal more strongly to their religious constituency and its discourses and distance themselves from national or international development discourses. Or they may, as described above, leave their religious background and the discourses related to it behind.

As the contributions in this volume show, FBOs develop strategies to handle their simultaneous participation in heterogeneous contexts. These strategies

comprise balancing, adaptation, distancing, entrepreneurship, and denial. Depending on the heterogeneity of the discursive fields to which FBOs connect, there will be more or less pressure to develop such coping strategies. Often, FBOs may experience none or only marginal tensions. This is, for instance, shown by the case study on Rwanda where local religious organisations connect with their religious development concepts and resources to national development goals (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume).

Whenever FBOs move between heterogeneous discourses, they are not only likely to evolve abilities over time to manage the differences between them, but also to create a nexus that connects these discourses.

Boundary agents

Ware, Ware, and Clarke (Ware *et al*. 2016) point to the boundary-keeping role of FBOs. Nevertheless, their position in between the boundaries of different discursive fields also converts FBOs into *boundary agents*. They cross boundaries, balance different discourses, and intermediate with their activities and concepts between the heterogeneous discursive fields (cf. Boehle 2010a; Guston 1999). This becomes evident in their development notions which combine secular and religious elements. For instance, the holistic development concept of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda brings religious and secular dimensions of development together, stressing the spiritual as well as the social, economic, intellectual, cultural, and ecological dimensions of life (see Schliesser 2019 in this volume). Members of FBOs in Guyana regard a pure focus on materiality as short-sighted (see Kloß 2019 in this volume). For this reason, they prefer "holistic development" which combines the material aspects of development with the idea of spiritual development ("spiritual wealth") as personal development. The latter contrasts material wealth, as it is conceptualised as a form of wealth that people can keep with them after death.

FBOs combine influxes from religious and secular discourses to their specific notions of development and feed these notions back in to the discourses. Thereby, their development notions become devices for connecting different discourses and stakeholder demands (cf. Koehrsen 2017a; Star and Griesemer 1989). Through their development concepts, they can create a nexus between religious constituencies and theology discourses, as well as international and national development discourses combining "religious literacy" and "development literacy". FBOs provide an intellectual and practical space for exchanges between religious and secular actors and concepts.

Developmental entrepreneurship

We consider FBOs as *developmental entrepreneurs*. FBOs should not be regarded as passive recipients of their socio-cultural environment. The need to cope with conflicting expectations does not exclude agency, but rather creates incentives and opportunities to actively shape discourses. Being embedded in different discursive

fields, FBOs do not only strategically adapt themselves to these discourses, they also actively participate in them and seek to shape prevalent development concepts. They do so based on their development priorities and notions. Thereby, and in the sense of *developmental entrepreneurship*, they bring alternative approaches into ongoing development debates (see Tetzlaff 2015).

This becomes particularly evident in the cases of Micah Challenge and World Vision which endeavour to influence development discourses (see Freeman 2019 and Haynes 2019 in this volume). These organisations feed their concepts and priorities of development back into the discourses in which they move and shape these discourses. For instance, by pledging US $3 billion to the programme on Global Strategy for Women's and Children's Health, World Vision contributes to the relative relevance of this development field and will have a stake in the projects related to this programme (see Haynes 2019 in this volume). Moreover, by organising side-events at the UN, World Vision promotes child-focussed goals in development work among government officials and UN entities. Micah Challenge, in contrast, seeks to shape the discourses of its evangelical constituency by promoting advocacy work together with a new evangelical theology (see Freeman).

FBOs also contribute to critical reflection in ongoing development debates. In particular, FBOs' connections to religious worldviews and discourses allow them to take a critical distance and act as watchdogs in international development debates. FBOs' religious values constitute normative standards on the basis of which they critically assess existing concepts of development and develop alternative ways of thinking about development (see also James 2009, p. 8; Deneulin and Rakodi 2011, p. 46). Thereby, they can provide "emancipation from current conventional development models" (Lunn 2009, p. 948). For instance, from the late 1960s, FBOs related to the WCC criticised the reduction of development to material wellbeing and effectively promoted more encompassing concepts (see Hoffmann 2019 in this volume; Marshall 2001): these take into account the human dimension of development ("human development"), considering social justice and the general quality of human life. Given their potential to bring in critical reflection and actively shape development discourses, FBOs can become developmental entrepreneurs that advance alternative perspectives on development. This becomes evident in the specific notions of development that the FBOs in this volume employ (e.g. "spiritual development", "holistic development") and which include spiritual dimensions of life usually disregarded by secular development actors.

Outline of the volume

The following paragraphs summarise the case studies ordered along their national or international focus: while the three case studies of the Christian FBOs, Mission 21 (Hoffmann), Micah Challenge (Freeman), and World Vision (Haynes), specifically address their involvement in international development discourses, two case studies on Rwanda (Schliesser) and Guyana (Kloß) highlight the impact of national discourses on FBOs' development notions and activities.

Claudia Hoffmann's case study focusses on Basel's Mission 21. This organisation is strongly related to mainline Protestantism and has its roots in a mission agency (Basel Mission), founded in 1815 in Basel, Switzerland. From a development perspective, its beginnings as a missionary agency in the early 19th century bear some characteristics of a religious development organisation which facilitated its collaboration with secular organisations such as the state-run Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) from the mid-20th century. Hoffmann's contribution explores the ways in which Mission 21 has changed its approach to development and mission over time.

While the organisation's concept of mission widely remained stable over the course of time, its approach to development has been subject to significant transformations. Hoffmann situates these transformations within the context of the WCC changing debates around mission and development. Since the 1970s ecumenical development debates within the WCC have placed an emphasis on "human development" and the JPIC-trilogy "justice, peace, and the integrity of creation", rejecting the predominant, economically focussed development approaches of that time. As Mission 21 forms part of these changing discourses, these have implications for the organisation which increasingly stressed the importance of "justice" and "peace" in its communications. Moreover, while Mission 21 originally separated development and missionary activities and followed a technical development approach, it started to integrate both development and mission, and substituted the technical notion of development with a holistic concept of development. The changing focus in the development work also becomes evident in the rising theological focus: "For Mission 21 the classical development projects to reduce poverty and end hunger are "nice to have", but their centrepiece is the theological and cultural exchange" (Hoffmann 2019 in this volume). Instead of becoming more secular in the face of rising collaboration with state-run agencies, the FBO has even managed to extend the theological dimension of its development activities.

The case of Mission 21 shows how development notions within an FBO change over time and how these changes relate to the discursive contexts in which the FBO is moving (e.g. the WCC). Moreover, it illustrates how FBOs resist tendencies to turn into "secular" agencies of development by increasingly integrating the religious dimension within their development activities.

Similar to Hoffmann's study, *Dena Freeman* observes transformations within the discursive field of FBOs. However, in Freeman's contribution, the transformations refer to the evangelical field and are, partly, of a purposive nature. Freeman focusses on the evangelical campaign Micah Challenge and explores its endeavours to disseminate a new theology among its evangelical constituency that facilitates evangelical advocacy work.

Studying the evolution of evangelical development discourses, Freeman describes a gradual process of change towards a new theology of development: while evangelical Protestantism is originally marked by a strong focus on personal development and salvation, theologians such as René Padilla and Samuel Escobar sought to extend the traditional evangelical theology by bringing in the

social dimension, integrating personal and social development. Inspired by Latin American theology of liberation, the new theology conceptualises structural inequalities as structural sin and redemption as a social affair. This approach came to be known as "transformational development" and "integral mission" within evangelical Christian circles. The Lausanne Conference in 1974 was "a key moment" in the discussion about integral mission: the Lausanne Covenant defines socio-political involvement as a duty of Christians. However, this aspect remained highly debated within evangelical Christianity. The discursive shift implied transformations in evangelical development work: similar to the aforementioned case of Mission 21, evangelical FBOs started to conceptualise their development work as a form of religious practice. Moreover, they increasingly focussed on small-scale projects with local churches. As the idea of transformational development became widespread in the following years among the evangelical constituency in the UK and Australia, some evangelical FBOs started to push for further changes and sought to establish political advocacy work as a feature of evangelical engagement. In 2001, Micah Network was founded as a network organisation of several evangelical FBOs with the aim of promoting the idea of integral mission in the evangelical world. Pursuing the promotion of evangelical advocacy work, from 2004 until 2015, Micah launched a transnational campaign that sought encouraging evangelicals to influence governments to fulfil the MDGs. This campaign was called Micah Challenge and aimed "to transform the church and to get it and its members to engage in popular advocacy and campaigning as part of the living out of their faith" (Freeman 2019). Yet, the analysis is also about the limits of such transformation endeavours. Although national campaigns were established in 41 countries, the overall campaign faced strong difficulties to mobilise national evangelical communities which related back to the premillennial dispensationalist theology of many evangelicals. Micah employed different strategies to overcome these difficulties by establishing new theological arguments, highlighting, for instance, the biblical nature of justice and the difference between politics and advocacy work. Nevertheless, the campaign concluded with mitigated results: its impact on the evangelical community was small and it led to little evangelical advocacy work as it did not manage to overcome barriers among religious constituencies regarding advocacy.

The study on Micah Challenge presents an intriguing case of purposive innovation within a religious tradition, exploring the potentials and limitations of steered transformations to render its own religious constituency more "development-friendly". However, the firmly established focus on personal salvation has, so far, impeded a comprehensive transformation. Therefore, the case illustrates the potential discrepancies between FBOs and their religious constituencies: within the evangelical field, the theological discourse of FBOs appears to differ significantly from the discourse of its constituencies. While both seek to influence each other, they remain based on partly separated theologies. The case also indicates that FBOs committed to work with their religious constituency remain, to some extent, relegated to the theological discourses of their constituencies.

Interestingly, Freeman and Hoffmann observe similar transformations among evangelical and mainline Protestant FBOs, as the religious dimension becomes increasingly integrated into their development activities, switching from a material approach towards a holistic concept of development. In both cases, these changes relate to transformations in the theological discourses of their communities.

Paralleling the aforementioned cases, *Jeffrey Haynes* focusses on a Christian FBO involved in international development circles. In this case, however, the organisation is deeply involved in the world of international development, venturing to shape international and national development agendas. Haynes analyses the activities of World Vision, a large FBO with an evangelical background at the UN. World Vision developed from a small Christian-focussed FBO to a global player in the world of international development with an annual budget of approximately US $1 billion. Today, the UN constitutes a key environment for this organisation to lobby its development concerns to international and national decision makers and the wider public. Its development concerns largely relate to the development outcomes for children and women – regardless of their faith – in the global south. Haynes studies the ways in which World Vision seeks to promote these concerns at the UN and sheds light on four of its strategies: (1) engagement with the SGDs (and MDGs) as a door-opener for cross-sectoral collaboration, (2) sponsoring of large UN programmes, (3) flexible adaptation of its vocabulary, and (4) co-organisation of side-events.

World Vision strongly engages with the SDGs. As described previously, the SDGs (and MDGs) facilitate the integration of FBOs into the world of international development, enabling cross-sectoral collaboration with NGOs, governmental, and international bodies such as the UN and its subunits. As the SDGs (and MDGs) provide a joint development agenda for various types of development actors (e.g. religious and non-religious NGOs, nation-states), engagement with them facilitates collaboration on the basis of shared goals in order to strategically build up partnerships and pool resources for higher development impacts. World Vision places an emphasis on 6 of the 17 SDGs, primarily relating to the domains of health, education, gender equality, sustainable communities, peace, and partnerships. To promote these goals, it uses vast funds to sponsor extensive UN programmes that fall into its development concerns: for instance, it has pledged US $3 billion between 2016 and 2020 to the programme, Global Strategy for Women's and Children's Health. Investing vast sums into UN programmes, World Vision focusses a significant proportion of its financial resources on the UN to influence and accompany its development work. In the context of the UN, World Vision has built up strong partnerships with an extensive variety of governmental and non-governmental organisations that pursue similar development goals. Its multilingualism and ability to adapt to different social environments contribute to its capacity of building up networks with diverse types of development actors. Moving between the rather "secular" world of the UN and its Christian constituency, World Vision has learned to adapt to different contexts: it flexibly adjusts its language style to the given constituency, using a more Christian-based discourse style for its religious constituency and a secular discourse style

when interacting with states and international bodies. Finally, an important strategy for World Vision to influence development discourses at the UN is the co-organisation of side-events which are activities organised outside the formal UN programme. Hosting side-events together with national representatives at the UN (e.g. Canada, Paraguay) and other NGOs, World Vision seeks to inform the development views and policies of government officials and UN entities. The events aim to underline the importance of child-focussed goals in development work, by, for instance, giving a voice to children from the global south. Haynes concludes that, by engaging in the United Nations, World Vision has the potential to positively influence international development outcomes.

By exploring the strategies of World Vision, this case illustrates the strong stance that FBOs – in this case, an FBO of evangelical origin – may take in international development discourses: FBOs may not only seek to influence the discourses of their specific religious constituencies or home countries, but also the very international development agendas which will shape the development activities of nation-states, NGOs, and regional authorities.

In contrast to the aforementioned studies that place emphasis on FBOs' embeddedness in international development discourses, the following two studies by Kloß and Schliesser focus on the activities of FBOs in specific national contexts.

Sinah Kloß' contribution analyses the development concepts of two FBOs from different faith backgrounds in Guyana: the Save Abee Foundation (SAF) and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). While ADRA is a transnational Christian FBO and forms part of the Seventh Day Adventists Church, SAF is a small NGO with a Hindu background that operates mostly in the rural areas of Guyana and was founded by a Guyanese Indian living today in the USA.

As activists of both organisations draw no clear lines between the "spiritual" and "secular" spheres of life, they perceive development in a holistic way. Although partly conceptualising it from a material angle – for instance, by regarding growth in the availability of material products as central indicator of "development" – and placing an emphasis in their activities on the improvement of physical infrastructures, health, and education, activists from both FBOs highlight the importance of spiritual development. Studying these organisations and their socio-cultural context through anthropological field work, Kloß places a specific focus on the way in which ethno-religious groups negotiate status through development activities. The organisations operate in a post-colonial context shaped by strong ethno-religious power struggles between "Indians" (often conceived of as Hindu or Muslim) and "Africans" (often conceived of as Christian) who compete over social status and the access to resources (e.g. funding for industries, political power). This competition shapes national development discourses and activities: while development work is often perceived as a strategy of influencing power-relations between the ethno-religious groups, faith-based organisations, in particular, are suspected of proselytism. For instance, the founder of SAF and other Hindu informants regard charitable work of Hindus as a necessary means to counteract the perceived Christian missionary activities, cloaked in the costume of charity. Furthermore, the "giving" and "taking" of development aid has strong connotations for local actors.

As being labelled as "giver" or "receiver" of charitable work conveys unequal status to actors, the "giving" and "taking" of different ethno-religious groups informs the Guyanese fabric of ethno-religious hierarchies. For instance, fearing being labelled as "impoverished others" and "receivers" of development aid, communities in need may reject development aid of NGOs. In contrast, those operating in development NGOs (such as some of Kloß' informants from SAF), may proudly portray themselves as "givers". Therefore, in the specific context of Guyana, the development activities of FBOs are enmeshed in the complex status negotiations between ethno-religious groups: "Both organisations compete for status and negotiate power relations in the Guyanese community through practices of giving, taking, or rejecting" (Kloß 2019). Development becomes a means of contesting the power of the other ethno-religious groups, claiming status by "giving" and allowing members of their own group to "reject" charity from the "other". Thereby, Kloß' chapter highlights the ways in which national cultural discourses and power dynamics shape FBOs' approaches to development.

Christine Schliesser's contribution explores the involvement of Christian churches in conflict resolution in the context of Rwanda. Having experienced a devastating genocide perpetrated by parts of its own population, the country's government strives for reconciliation. Schliesser raises the question of how religious organisations contribute to reconciliation and thereby to the development of the country. To address this question, she explores the reconciliation activities of the Anglican Church, the Presbyterian Church, and a Pentecostal Church by means of semi-structured interviews.

The general development activities of the organisations in the study relate to international development goals such as the SDGs as their activities focus on health, poverty alleviation, and education. Furthermore, they draw upon the broader concept of holistic development, which seeks to address "all dimensions of life" and integrates material and spiritual development. However, operating within a country that is marked by strong reconciliation efforts, the churches perceive reconciliation as a crucial feature of development: "Development in Rwanda, as it is viewed by the churches, cannot be separated from reconciliation" (Schliesser 2019). Therefore, the Christian churches in this study launch their own reconciliation activities. These efforts comprise, among others, theological training camps for pastors to lead reconciliation programmes, the preaching of forgiveness, projects to build relationships between perpetrators and victims, and radio shows. For instance, by facilitating micro loans to perpetrators and victims, the Presbyterian Church encourages the creation of joint businesses. Interestingly, all of the three churches in the study run activities that bring perpetrators and victims on a regular basis together, thereby pursuing the creation of stable social ties between them.

Comparing the FBOs' activities with those of the government, Schliesser finds some differences: although there is a strong partnership between churches and government in reconciliation and developmental activities, FBOs have their own approach to reconciliation work. They follow a bottom-up approach, in contrast to the top-down approach of the government. Moreover, churches can contribute

to reconciliation with specific resources that are not equally available to the government: they build strong social ties, provide emotional support, and bring in their specific religious dimensions through the Christian message of forgiveness, healing, and love. In sum, by stressing reconciliation, the religious organisations in the study relate their development activities to the specific national context of Rwanda, but they do so with their own abilities and concepts.

Paralleling Kloß' contribution, Schliesser addresses how FBOs deal with divisions between "ethnic" groups. Stressing the importance of reconciliation as a prerequisite for development, Schliesser's study illustrates how religious groups seek to build peace and overcome ethnic divisions. By contrast, in Kloß' study, the ongoing power struggles between ethno-religious groups thwart the development work of FBOs and drag their activities into the very fabric of these struggles: the FBOs themselves become part of the ongoing ethno-religious competition, participating in the reproduction of these divisions. Though the religious groups studied by Schliesser endeavour to create new bridges, similar dynamics to that of Kloß' study cannot be fully excluded: the expansion of heterogeneous Christian denominations might in the end involve the creation of new – faith-based – boundaries in Rwanda, substituting the old ethnic ones. Therefore, both studies refer to the twofold ability of FBOs to bridge as well as (re)produce divides. Whether and to what extent they bridge or (re)produce divides appears to depend, inter alia, on the national context: with active reconciliation policies in place, Rwanda enforces ethnic reconciliation, while perhaps opening space for the creation of new divides. The absence of similar policies in Guyana paired with active efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs to consolidate divides and the almost unquestioned everydayness of these divides creates a fertile ground for the reproduction of these boundaries by FBOs.

Outlook

FBOs have become a relevant player and in some regions even key players in international development (see also Heist and Cnaan 2016). They constitute a unique type of organisation that combines characteristics of NGOs and religious organisations and move between different discursive fields and contexts. Their ability to act effectively in heterogeneous contexts and flexibly adapt to these contexts allows FBOs to mediate between them. Therefore, FBOs are boundary agents: they can create discursive spaces for the exchange between different types of actors, particularly religious and non-religious actors, on development.

As FBOs are simultaneously enmeshed in heterogeneous contexts involving different discourses, they are sometimes confronted with conflicting demands and tensions. Handling these tensions is challenging. FBOs respond with different strategies to the multiple demands. These strategies may also involve active efforts to transform existing discourses and views on development. As such, their relationship with the heterogeneous contexts in which they move is reciprocal: on the one hand, FBOs are influenced by the contexts in which they move; on the other hand, they undertake ventures to proactively shape them and have an impact on development discourses.

Moving within different contexts enables FBOs to generate alternative perspectives on development: the simultaneous involvement in religious and development discourses informs their development concepts. Based on these perspectives, they provide new impulses and critical reflections to ongoing development debates.

As FBOs are increasingly important players in international development, there is a need for more research on these organisations. Based on the insights of the case studies in this volume, research may address the complex relationship with the heterogeneous discursive fields in which they move. Aside from assessing how they handle the tensions resulting from their participation in these fields, studies could explore the specific capacities that result from their embeddedness in different fields for development work and where these capacities can provide advantages (e.g. advocacy work). Another instructive path of research could be to compare FBOs from different faith traditions. While this volume places an emphasis on Protestant FBOs, more research is needed on FBOs from other faith backgrounds. Comparing Protestant FBOs with other FBOs, it may turn out that the particularities that have been highlighted here – such as the involvement in heterogeneous contexts and flexibility – are especially pronounced among Protestant (or Christian) FBOs, whereas FBOs from other faith traditions show other particularities and capacities for development work. For instance, it is unclear whether Christian FBOs are more inclined to form boundary agents than other FBOs, as it is easier for them to connect to international development discourses due to their higher acceptance in these circles. Therefore, studies could explore how FBOs from non-Christian faith backgrounds connect to different discourses and what development notions they evolve in this interplay. Thereby, studies may determine whether these FBOs face other challenges when simultaneously engaging with the discourses of their religious constituencies and those of international development and whether they need to evolve alternative strategies to handle them, different to those of the Protestant FBOs examined in this volume.

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