Value Bounds and Best Response Violations in Discriminatory Share Auctions

Häfner, Samuel. (2015) Value Bounds and Best Response Violations in Discriminatory Share Auctions. WWZ Working Papers, 2015 (14).

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/77454/

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This paper analyzes a discriminatory share auction in which bidders submit nonincreasing step functions with a bounded number of steps, the type space consists of private non-increasing marginal valuation functions, and the number of participants is random. I show that the interim utility can be written as a simple functional of the distribution of the allocated quantity. This allows me to derive equilibrium existence and to give a characterization of the equilibrium bid schedules in terms of the individual bidders’ optimality conditions. The characterization facilitates the formulation of bounds on the estimates of marginal valuations between the submitted quantity points and permits a simple estimator of the fraction of best response violations among the submitted bids. Proofs of concept for the bounds and the estimator are given by using a novel data set from meat import quota auctions in Switzerland.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Häfner, Samuel
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:36
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2015/14
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:16 Jun 2020 13:49
Deposited On:16 Jun 2020 13:44

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