

**China in Africa:
Perspectives on development and emergence**

Dissertation
zur Erlangung der Würde einer Doktorin der Philosophie

vorgelegt der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät
der Universität Basel

von
Jin Ding
aus
China

Basel, 2020

Buchbinderei Bommer

Originaldokument gespeichert auf dem Dokumentenserver der Universität Basel
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Basel, 24 February 2020
The Dean, Prof. Dr. Ralph Ubl

Genehmigt von der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät der Universität Basel, auf Antrag von Prof. Dr. Manfred Max Bergman und Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Klaus Michael Leisinger.

Basel, den 24. Februar 2020
Der Dekan Prof. Dr. Ralph Ubl

To Grandfather

Abstract

Over the past few decades, the Chinese government has supported various initiatives to expand China's global business footprint. A key strategy in this regard has been intensifying involvement in the African continent. By now, China has become Africa's largest trading partner, something which has elicited extensive debates in academia and the international community alike. Concerns regarding the relationship between China and Africa and China's role in African development have been especially prominent. Critics regard China as an irresponsible global power, a neocolonial force, that exploits African resources in pursuance of a hidden geopolitical agenda (e.g., Bradley, 2016; Rui, Zhang, & Shipman, 2016; Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu 2016; Ghosal, 2016). But is this really the case? The purpose of this dissertation is to examine this more systematically by studying Chinese involvement in Africa from a variety of perspectives.

To capture these perspectives, this dissertation consists of three studies, which focus on Chinese involvement in Africa from a mainstream academic perspective, a Chinese political perspective, and an applied perspective. It draws from a variety of data including mainstream academic publications, government-owned Chinese newspapers, and government and corporate reports on Chinese projects in Africa and uses a combination of methods, including Content Configuration Analysis (CCA), Hermeneutic Content Analysis (HCA), and Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), to analyze these perspectives.

The analyses reveal contrasting positions on China in Africa. While mainstream Eurocentric academic studies tend to portray Africa as child-like and dependent and China and its involvement in Africa within the confines of limited historical stereotypes, this dissertation provides an alternative account of African and Chinese identities. Based on the Chinese political and applied perspectives, Africa is presented as a continent with enormous development potential that is able to enhance its economic and political power by cooperating with foreign actors such as China. In a similar vein, China follows and proactively adapts its own distinctive development approach through its global expansion policies. Specifically, China is seen adapting the Beijing Consensus to local contexts to foster African socio-economic development. It does

so, in particular by collaborating with African institutions to address developmental areas the West has hesitated to contribute to. In this way, China sets itself apart from Western approaches and positions itself as a viable alternative global economic and political partner. By examining these contrasting perspectives, this research provides a more nuanced understanding of China, Africa, and China in Africa and invites academics specifically and the international community more generally to rethink old concepts in order to adopt a more context-relevant and culture-sensitive approach to understanding these emerging global dynamics.

Keywords: China, Africa, West, development, neocolonialism, Beijing Consensus, Washington Consensus, Belt and Road Initiative, business and society.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my most sincere appreciation to my first supervisor, Professor Manfred Max Bergman, who has offered tremendous support during my doctoral study. Apart from offering me an opportunity to pursue a PhD in Switzerland, he acts as a great mentor and patient teacher who persistently offered me professional guidance and critical feedback. His experience and profession as a forward-looking scholar in many ways helped to shape this dissertation. His trust and encouragement inspired me to overcome difficulties and achieve progress during my challenging PhD study. Many of his insights and approaches to conduct researches have theoretically and methodologically influenced my current studies and will have long-lasting effects on my future academic career.

Special thanks also go to Professor Klaus Michael Leisinger. I am grateful to him for supervising this dissertation. His foresighted ideas and great inputs contribute to the orientation of the SCORE (Sustainable Corporate Responsibility) project which serves as the umbrella of my studies.

I would like to appreciate the Center for African Studies Basel and Graduate School of Social Sciences (G3S). Many thanks to Dr. Veit Arlt and Dr. Julia Büchele. Without their excellent and efficient coordination and administration work, I cannot conduct my studies smoothly in Basel. My appreciation also goes to Professor Elísio Macamo, for his comments on my progress on the workshops of the Center for African Studies. I am deeply thankful to China Scholarship Council, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Chinese Embassy in Switzerland, for the administration of the scholarship and facilitation for my studies and life in Switzerland.

I am indebted to My colleagues in the Social Research and Methodology Group. I owe a debt of gratitude to Zinette Bergman, who offered constructive comments, creative insights, and warm encouragement when I was writing the dissertation. In the past three and a half years, she has been an important teacher and friend who generously transferred skills of interpreting analysis results and writing academically. I am grateful to Dr. Lena Berger, Christoph Ratz, and Laura Lämmli, whom I collaborated three working papers with. Specifically, Lena provided critical comments, valuable suggestions, and methodological and writing assistance in the first and

second year of my doctoral study. Christoph assisted me in a particular aspect of analysis and documentation. Laura was specialized in data management. The collaborative works form the basis of this dissertation. Yael Teschemacher, Christoph Hänggi, Jacqueline Staub, and Charlotte Akers provided much needed company over the past years when I intensively worked on the dissertation. I also thank Martha Vogel and Tamara Lang for their excellent administration, which made the collaboration within the group more efficiently and harmoniously. I learned and benefited a lot from working with these intelligent and helpful colleagues.

I also benefited from various opportunities of researching and writing assistance the university provides. Many thanks to Stephan Meyer, who conducted proofreading to improve linguistic quality of the dissertation. In addition, Cornelia Eitel provided training and consultation in terms of research tools such as Zotero and Turnitin.

Looking back into my previous studies in China, my special thanks go to Professor Xiwen Liu, Professor Zhenming Qian, and Professor Maosheng Lai. They helped me find my interest in research and offered me diverse opportunities to conduct research projects.

Finally, I want to express my gratefulness to my parents. They always support my choices and allow me to pursue dreams and goals in different phases of my life. I appreciate years of friendships between my friends and me, no matter how far we are from each other. Thanks for all the supports, comments, suggestions, and encouragement I have got during my PhD journey in Basel. All of the kindness and the great people have a special place in my heart.

Basel, 20 January 2020, Jin Ding

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1. Introduction

1.1 Historical context: The Chinese dragon renews its global footprint

China is now the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading partner of many countries, including Africa (People's Daily, 2018). Recent decades have witnessed China's dramatic domestic economic performance and its ambition to increase its global influence through foreign policies, such as going out (“走出去战略”) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From a recent historical viewpoint, this development may seem novel; however, from a longer historical perspective, it is not unprecedented. On the contrary, China's current global expansion is rooted in its history, which reflects changes in its policies and its resulting economic position in the world. More specifically, in ancient times, China experienced an economic boom, which was followed by decline owing to internal problems and external invasions, and is now again on the rise, driven by its focus on economic growth.

Changes in China's development and position as a global power since the 10th Century can – for present purposes – be divided into three phases: economic prosperity and a trade boom in imperial China, isolation and decline from the 15th Century, and reawakening of economic and social development and going global since the independence of the People's Republic of China.

The first phase dates back to the Song Dynasty (960 – 1279) when China was one of the most prominent world economies (Chen & Wang, 2012). At that time, it was home to the most advanced technology, the center of a burgeoning maritime trade route, and fostering growing urbanization in large, well-planned cities. Specific technological examples include the inventions of movable-type printing, which revolutionized educational development during the Song Dynasty (Chen & Wang, 2012; Zhao, 2014), the magnetic compass, the manufacturing of steel, the cultivation of rice, and large-scale irrigation all of which contributed to the development of the maritime trade, manufacturing, and agriculture in the Northern Song (960 – 1127) and Southern Song eras (1127 – 1279) (Huang, 2017; Wright, 2007; You, 1986). Establishing itself

as a dominant contributor to the world's maritime trade, Chinese exports included tea, silks, porcelain, and iron (Gao et al., 2016). These reached more than 100 countries, covering West and East Asia, Africa, and Europe (Zhao, 1993 cf. Dai, n.d.; Gao et al., 2016; Chen & Wang, 2012). Imperial Chinese cities developed fast, particularly in the Southern Song era. Hangzhou, the economic center of China at that time, had a population of more than 100 million (Wei & Li, 2002; Columbia University, n.d.). According to Marco Polo, who traveled across Europe and Asia to China in the 13th Century, Hangzhou was "the finest and most splendid city in the world" (Fu, 2009, p. 741; Wei, 2012). As is to be expected, China's economic prosperity and business exchange between its trade partners also affected social development in these countries. Technologies such as papermaking and woodblock printing were introduced to the Middle East and Europe in the 13th Century (Park, 2014). While there are debates over the influence of Chinese printing technology, some Chinese and Western scholars suggest that there was "slow but massive infiltration" into European printing technologies, education, and ultimately, the Renaissance (Needham, 1954, p. 231; Liu, 2015; Sheng, 2010).

China's decline in the second phase was due to its domestic development policies and colonialism. While there was a boom in trade during the Song Dynasty, imperial China made agriculture a developmental priority throughout history. Support for trade was followed by a shift to isolationist policies by the late Ming Dynasty (1430s) (Xu, 1995; Liu, 2012), which forbade maritime trade and largely restricted openness to the outside world (ibid). As a consequence, China missed the opportunity to advance, to increase specialized productivity, and to exploit foreign markets, which contributed to marginal GDP growth during these years (Guan & Li, 2008; Chen & Wang, 2012). Meanwhile, the industrial revolution in the West meant that it developed rapidly, surpassing Chinese wealth (Zhao, 2014). From the beginning of the First Opium War (middle of the 19th century), China gradually became a semi-European colony, a global trend for Europe during this time. For almost a century, China was subordinated by and inferior to states such as Britain, America, France, Germany, and Japan. The early 20th Century saw a shift from European-dominated colonizers to occupation by the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War (Oren, 1990). The culmination of these years of occupation left China's economy severely diminished and lagging far behind the global average (China Center for Modernization Research, 2005).

At the start of the third phase, China commenced its economic recovery and development. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party came to power and established the independent People's Republic of China. Since then, China has labeled itself as a leading member of the third world. It secured political allies in Africa and Asia where countries shared similar colonial histories and where communist regimes were also in power (Chen, 2015). At the same time, China pursued its own, unique socialist agenda. In the 1980s, China implemented systematic national economic reforms, focusing on domestic economic recovery in conjunction with a global policy of maintaining "low profile diplomacy [and] hiding its brightness" ("韬光养晦") (China Daily, 2018a, para. 5; Yan, 2014). This low profile domestic-oriented policy was adjusted in the late 1990s, when China proposed its going out strategy and commenced extensive global investment (Alden, 2013). This definitively launched the third phase in which China renewed its international influence.

The transition into the third phase was facilitated by decades of expanding China's business footprint to all continents, varying from Western countries to emerging economies in South Asia and Africa. A contemporary example is the BRI, which covers 65 countries and 63% of the world's population and demonstrates China's ambition to return to the center of the world stage as a global economic and political powerhouse (Fallon, 2015; Djankov & Miner, 2016). However, this has not always been a linear trajectory. In recent years, China has been confronted with slowed domestic growth, over-capacity, increasing investment demands, and resource shortages (Long & Li, 2012). To ease constraints on its domestic development and sustain its local economy, China urgently needs access to raw materials and investment destinations in broader markets. The African continent aligns well with China's needs. To support its domestic production and consumption, China imports energy and raw materials from Africa amounting to 66% of the total imports in 2012 (Busse, Erdogan & Muhlen, 2016). In 2017, Angola was Chinese second biggest oil supplier after Russia, and contributed to 13.98% of China's annual oil imports (General Administration of Customs, People's Republic of China, 2018). While the West has retreated from the African resource sector (due to economic sanctions and Africa's disappointing credit records), China has used the opportunity to increase its investment. More specifically, China secured 40% of Sudanese annual oil output through the acquisition of a stake previously held by Western owners (Alden, 2005). In this sense, China integrated its economic growth with the exploitation of African

natural resources. Given its dominance in trade with Africa, China also seized on these benefits. These recent developments raise important questions, which form that basis of this dissertation, namely: How should China's future involvement in Africa look so that it harmonizes with goals of sustainable development and maintains a balance between environmental, social, and economic development in Africa? And what are the longer term identities that China and Africa aim to develop on the global stage?

1.2 Mounting criticism of China's renewed participation in the global political and economic domains

Mainstream academics and Western politicians have responded with mounting criticisms of the Chinese extraction of African resources and the unequal distribution of benefits between China and Africa (e.g., Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Huang & Chen, 2016; Rui, Zhang, & Shipman, 2016; Mohan & Lampert, 2012). In the eyes of some Western politicians, Africa is unable to manage its own development and depends on foreign assistance; thus, the West has the responsibility to supervise Africa and lift it out of poverty. During a visit to Nigeria in 2002, for example, Tony Blair, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom, claimed that Western countries should take up African issues, because the continent itself lacks responsible agencies:

"When an African child dies every three seconds, the developed world has a clear duty to act – no responsible leader can turn their back on Africa." (CNN, 2002, para. 12)

At the G8 Summit in 2007, he again emphasized that African development should be a priority:

"We need each G8 to be bolder on Africa than the last," Blair said. "If we give up, we will lose the chance in this continent, rich as it is though its people are often poor, for our values to take root." (Reuters, 2007, para. 6)

According to Blair, Africa is inferior to the West, and the West has a mission to manage development in Africa to secure the dominance of its values on the continent.

While Western politicians like Blair emphasize the supposed responsibility of the West for development in Africa, some mainstream academics criticize China for what they call its market and resource-driven neo-colonial involvement in Africa. As a latecomer in Africa, China is censured for using investments to pursue economic and geopolitical agendas, and thereby contributing to African underdevelopment. In their academic publication, Jackson & Horwitz (2017) illustrate the range of criticisms expressed by others:

Cheah et al. (2015) however, suggest that contemporary motives of China's 'going-out' policy are primarily market and resource driven and may be insensitive to and flout employee and property rights. From this perspective rather than past forms of politically motivated imperialist goals, these economic motives have been considered as 'neo-colonial' or a new form of 'colonialism' perpetuating underdevelopment in developing countries (Corkin & Naidu, 2008). (Jackson & Horwitz, 2017, p. 6)

Combined, these representations paint a picture of the West as protector of Africa, defending it from Chinese resource-driven exploitation that solely benefits the Chinese. This contrasts with the self-representations of the West as instructing and helping Africa to develop. In fact, portrayed as repeating the old colonial strategy that the West has now abandoned, China is presented as pursuing a new round of colonialism in Africa.

1.3 Overall question and aims of the study: Towards reassessing Chinese involvement in Africa

These depictions and criticisms of the Chinese going out policy that reanimates aspects of the Song Dynasty tradition raises fundamental questions related to Chinese identity and Chinese involvement in the world, especially in Africa. These fundamental questions in turn raises numerous smaller and subquestions such as: What is an accurate account of Chinese business involvement in Africa? To what extent are these criticisms accurate and to what extent are they biased or misrepresentations? To what extent is such Chinese involvement really a form of

neo-colonialism as some critics claim? And to what extent does the involvement of Chinese businesses also benefit society in Africa?

This dissertation cannot offer a comprehensive answer to the big question about Chinese identity in the world, nor can it address all the smaller related questions above. It does, however, attempt to make a small contribution to examining and understanding some of these emerging dynamics. Specifically, we focus on the following questions:

- How does mainstream scholarship conceptualize Chinese involvement in Africa?
- Does China follow a Western or distinctive Chinese approach when engaging in Africa? And, how is this approach similar to or different from China's domestic approach?
- How do Chinese policies manifest themselves in Africa? And, what is China's actual involvement in Africa?

To address these issues and to offer a nuanced account of China's role in the world and Africa in particular, we followed a multiperspectival mixed-methods approach consisting of three interlinked studies. These studies draw on collaboration within the Social Research and Methodology Group of the University of Basel. The group is involved in research on the nexus between business and society in the three most promising and influential countries, such as India, China, and the USA (see acknowledgements for further details). Research conducted within the group is collaborative and focuses on the corporate responsibilities defined by diverse stakeholders and contributing to sustainability and Agenda 2030 in different cultural and contextual settings. To reflect the various aspects of this research collaboration, the pronoun *we* is used throughout. The present project differs from the other projects within the group in three points: (1) it focuses on how China engages abroad, namely, in Africa; (2) it is multiperspectival in that it describes contextual and cultural characteristics of China and Africa based on studies from different viewpoints; (3) it combines three separate studies which adopt multiple methods.

The three studies in this dissertation focus on academic discourse, the perspective of the Chinese government, and Chinese projects respectively. They give a more detailed and nuanced view on China's involvement in Africa than the ones provided

by the critics cited above (see pp. 4-5). They also form the basis for an exploration of the identities ascribed to China on the world stage and to China in its relationship to Africa respectively.

1.4 Overview of the three studies and the dissertation

As mentioned, the dissertation explores Chinese involvement in Africa from different perspectives and aims to understand the identities of China and Africa based on investigations of Chinese relations to Africa. It comprises five parts consisting of the three empirical studies and framed by the present introduction and a conclusion.

The introduction sketches the context, introduces the main goals and research questions, and outlines the combination of methods that make up the dissertation.

Study 1 explores Chinese involvement in Africa from an academic perspective. It investigates how current mainstream scholarship represents China's involvement in Africa and how this involvement differs or converges with Western involvement in Africa. Table 1 provides an overview of the purpose, guiding questions, and research questions of each study. Specifically, in Study 1, we analyzed academic literature using Content Configuration Analysis to explore the characteristics ascribed to Africa and China, the relationships between China and Africa, and the dominant representations of China in Africa. We also explore the similarities and differences between China in Africa and the West in Africa. Based on this, we examine the points of reference to which academics refer to evaluate the presentation of China in Africa. The focus of the first study on academic discourse, calls for a complementary perspective, which is why the second study focuses on a political point of view, more specifically on the perspective of the Chinese government.

Table 1. Summary of the purpose, guiding questions, and research questions of the three empirical studies

Study 1	
Purpose	Explore how China in Africa is similar to and different from the West in Africa in the current academic literature.
Guiding questions	How does mainstream scholarship conceptualize Chinese involvement in Africa?
Research questions	1) What characteristics are ascribed to Africa and China? 2) How are the relationships between China and Africa depicted? 3) What are dominant roles assigned to China in its engagement in Africa?
Study 2	
Purpose	Investigate how, from a Chinese government perspective, the development approach China pursues in Africa is similar to or different from China's domestic approach.
Guiding questions	Does China follow the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus when engaging in Africa? How is the approach similar to or different from China's domestic approach?
Research questions	1) What are the relationships between development outcomes China created domestically and in Africa? 2) Who are major contributors to development in China and Africa? 3) How do diverse actions of the contributors lead to different development outcomes in China and Africa?
Study 3	
Purpose	Investigate the range and types of Chinese involvement in projects in Sub-Saharan African countries to explore China's contribution to African development.
Guiding questions	How do Chinese policies manifest themselves in Africa? What is China's actual involvement in Africa?
Research questions	1) What is the geographic range of Chinese projects in Africa? 2) What sectors do Chinese projects belong to? 3) What types of involvement do Chinese projects cover? 4) What are the contributions and problems of Chinese involvement?

Study 2 discusses Chinese involvement in Africa from a Chinese political perspective. It examines similarities and differences between the development approach China pursues domestically and the development approach China pursues in Africa. To examine these similarities and differences, we focus on two popular development models, namely the Western Washington Consensus and the Chinese Beijing Consensus. By analyzing Chinese state-owned newspapers using Hermeneutic Content Analysis, we explore the Chinese development approach. For this we focus on the relationships between development outcomes, major contributors to development, and the interrelation between contributors' actions and development outcomes. Conducting a comparative study, we are able to find the similarities and differences between the development approaches China pursues domestically and in Africa. Based on this, we will be able to conclude the extent to which China follows the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus when engaging in Africa. While the second study offers some insight into the Chinese government's visions and development ideology, it raises the question what the adaptation of the Beijing Consensus looks like in practice. Therefore, the third study examined actual Chinese projects in Africa.

Study 3 explores Chinese involvement in Africa from an applied perspective. Namely, it investigates the range and types of Chinese involvement of projects in Sub-Saharan African countries to explore China's contribution to African development. To do so, we analyzed Chinese projects in 48 Sub-Saharan African countries with a focus on geographic scope, sectors, types of involvement, as well as contributions and problems associated with the projects. This study therefore helps us to better understand how China's global strategies and African policies are practiced in Africa. Based on this exploration, we pursue a further understanding of the importance of Africa in China's global footprint and how China positions itself in Africa and the globe.

The **Conclusion** brings together the findings from the three empirical studies into an overall conclusion. It highlights the main findings and limitations of the dissertation, and based on these, proposes relevant policy recommendations and orientations for future research.

Consisting of five parts with three studies as the core, this dissertation contributes to a complex, balanced, and nuanced understanding of how China is involved and established itself in Africa. In particular, in line with the goals of the larger project

which examines the relationships between business and society in multicontextual and multicultural settings, this research will focus on the involvement and contribution of Chinese corporations in African society by systematically analyzing different sets of data from different perspectives. Next we will introduce the methods used in the three studies.

1.5 Overview of the methods in the three studies

The central overlap between the present study on China and the other projects on the relations between business and society consists in the methods and selection of data sources. Specifically, Hermeneutic Content Analysis (HCA; Bergman, 2010) is a mixed approach combining qualitative and quantitative analysis. The first of the two components of HCA, Content Configuration Analysis (CCA; see more details in the following sections) is generally used for qualitative analysis based on textual materials. The second component, Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), is the following step. It is a quantitative analysis based on CCA. We mainly analyze newspapers, academic articles, and institutional reports to systematically explore actions, contributions, and problems of different stakeholders, such as government, society, academics, and corporations who serve as major participants in the various agendas related to sustainability.

In the three empirical studies that make up this dissertation, we adopted mixed methods to analyze different data sets to match the different research questions.

1.5.1 Methods of Study 1: An academic perspective on China in Africa

To address the question, how mainstream scholarship conceptualizes Chinese involvement in Africa, we conducted a literature analysis of academic publications.

Data source: The data we analyzed were academic publications, including scholarly articles, books, and book chapters relating directly to China in Africa (see Appendix A).

Sampling criteria: Articles, books, and book chapters were sampled based on four criteria: (1) they focused on China's engagement in Africa; (2) they were published in English; (3) by reputable academic outlets; and (4) from January 2012 to December 2017.

Analysis methods and steps: The data was analyzed by using Content Configuration Analysis (CCA; Bergman, 2011; Bergman, Bergman, & Gravett, 2011). CCA is a systematic and qualitative method of analysis suitable for non-numeric data such as academic papers, book chapters, documents, newspaper articles, and written responses (Bergman, Bergman, & Gravett, 2011; Bergman, Bergman, & Berger, 2017). Based on flexibility, CCA can be adapted to most qualitative studies in the social sciences, including sociology, psychology, urban studies, sustainability research, education studies, and business studies (Bergman et al., 2019).

We applied CCA to perform a two-step analysis. In the first step, we conducted an exploratory analysis of a subset of 18 peer-reviewed journal articles with a high impact factor. The analysis focused on four thematic areas, namely characteristics attributed to China and Africa respectively; characteristics attributed to the relationships between Africa and China; types of involvement of China in Africa; and reported consequences of China's involvement in Africa. We first identified all the quotes in the academic papers that were relevant to these four areas and then we sorted and classified these quotes thematically. This yielded preliminary typologies for the four thematic areas. In the second step, we refined these initial typologies by adding additional peer-reviewed journal articles. The analysis was terminated upon saturation, i.e., once newly sampled texts no more led to the refinement of the emergent taxonomy. In total, we analyzed 30 texts and identified 3099 instances relevant to the four thematic areas of which 1042 related to characteristics of China (702) and Africa (340) respectively; 283 related to the relationships between China and Africa; 1293 related to the types of involvement of China in Africa, and 481 related to the consequences of Chinese involvement in Africa.

1.5.2 *Methods of Study 2: A Chinese political perspective on China in Africa*

To determine whether China follows the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus when engaging in Africa and to ascertain how its development approach in Africa converges with or differs from its domestic approach, we conducted a media analysis of Chinese state-owned newspaper articles.

Data source: In China, state-owned media are political levers that guide public opinion and focus on development ideologies, agendas, projects, and cooperation between different actors, as well as the latest outcomes valued by the government (Bandurski, 2015). This is evident in the announcement of a new policy for the state media by President Xi Jinping, according to which “[a]ll the work by the party’s media must reflect the party’s will, safeguard the party’s authority, [and] closely align themselves with the party leadership in thought, politics, and actions” (Xu & Albert, 2017, para. 3). Therefore, state-owned newspapers can be expected to be a good reflection of the perspective of the Chinese government. Specifically, the data were collected from the four largest Chinese state-owned newspapers namely *China Daily*, *Xinhua*, *People’s Daily*, and *Guangming*.

Sampling criteria: Sampling was guided by four inclusion criteria: articles had to (1) explicitly deal with issues relating to corporate social responsibility, corporate responsibility, or corporate sustainability; (2) be published in English; (3) by state owned newspaper; and (4) from January to December 2015. The dates were determined by the fact that 2015 was the most recent full year available at commencement of the study. More interestingly, the Johannesburg Summit of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum took place in South Africa in December of 2015 (China Daily, 2015a), after which a series of action plans to stimulate China-Africa cooperation were announced. English was chosen for its international accessibility as the global *lingua franca*. Largely similar to domestic newspapers written in Chinese, China’s English newspapers also address potential development partners and are a way for China to establish themselves in countries with whom it may pursue strategically cooperative relationships. We focused on the involvement of Chinese corporations since this is one of the major ways in which China is currently engaging in Africa. We analyzed corporate actions and development outcomes reported in

Chinese newspaper articles on China and Africa. Based on these criteria, 90 articles relevant for China and 50 articles relevant for Africa were identified (see Appendix B).

Analysis methods and steps: The articles were analyzed by using Hermeneutic Content Analysis (HCA; Bergman, 2010) which is a mixed methods approach consisting of three steps. To start with, we used CCA to explore the dimensionality of the outcomes and actions evident in the newspaper articles on China and Africa respectively. Based on an exploratory analysis of these articles, we developed a typology of 8 outcome categories and 13 action categories associated with the dominant actors. In the second step, we applied MDS to explore the relationships between these action and outcome categories. MDS is a quantitative method that visualizes the relationship between different objects based on the co-occurrence of units of analysis (Van Eck & Waltman, 2009). We used MDS to generate graphical representations of the co-occurrence of outcomes and actions in the newspaper articles on China and Africa respectively. In the third step of HCA, we conducted a recontextualizing qualitative analysis to enhance our interpretation of the structures discovered with MDS (Bergman, 2010). More specifically, we returned to the results of the CCA and the newspaper articles to confirm and further elaborate the patterns discovered in the second step of HCA.

When analyzing the data, we combined emic and etic perspectives. Following an emic logic, each step of HCA was performed on the newspaper articles on China and Africa separately in order to account for the characteristics of the individual contexts. The resulting country-profiles were then systematically compared and contrasted to conceptualize corporate involvement in the two contexts, thereby applying an etic perspective. This analytic strategy allowed us to identify similarities and differences in the overall landscape of corporate involvement as well as in the underlying understanding of the interrelations between different components of this involvement.

1.5.3 Methods of Study 3: An applied perspective on China in Africa

To determine how Chinese policies are concretely applied in Africa, we conducted an exploratory investigation to identify the existing projects China established in 48 Sub-

Saharan African (SSA) countries. Our aim was to map the landscape of Chinese projects distributed in different countries and across different sectors.

Data source: Data were collected from official platforms and publications, including online news websites, reports, and accounts of programs by Chinese and African governments, international organizations, as well as mainstream Chinese, African, and Western media (see Appendix C).

Sampling criteria: We sampled projects based on four criteria: (1) projects had to be completed within the period January 2010 to December 2018 or, if incomplete by 2018, they had to have been under construction since 2010; (2) projects had to be mainly financed or constructed by China; (3) the account of the project had to be in English or Mandarin; (4) projects were selected following a principle of one country-one sector-one project. Based on these criteria, our sample consisted of 236 projects, covering 46¹ SSA countries and six main sectors.

Analysis methods and steps: We applied an exploratory analysis to identify the types of involvement based on the projects. We identified four types of involvement, namely: aid, loans, business investment, and partnerships. Based on the three key components - country, sector, and type of involvement - we compiled a table (see Appendix D) to provide an overview of Chinese projects distributed in Africa. To better understand the table and Chinese establishment in Africa, we explore three aspects in the following steps, namely: country/region preference; project characteristics; and contributions and problems China brings. Specifically, we analyze reasons behind China's preference across different SSA countries and identified six main factors. In the second step, we explore leadership and main characteristics related to different types of involvement based on the table. Finally, to better understand Chinese establishment in Africa, we select Ethiopia as a case to introduce and discuss Chinese projects with a focus on benefits and problems they bring in more detail.

This introduction set out the frame for the three studies to follow. It provided some historical context on China's involvement in the world and sketched some criticisms of current Chinese involvement in Africa. It also situated the present dissertation on

¹ 48 Sub-Saharan African countries were examined, but Swaziland and Burkina Faso were excluded as there were no Chinese projects because of the relationship of these two countries with Taiwan.

the involvement of Chinese corporations in Africa within a larger project on the relationships between business and society and the relevance of this relationship to sustainable development. It introduced the three guiding questions as well as the methods with which the dissertation aims to address them. The next three chapters present the three empirical studies in greater detail. Together they pave the way to an overall discussion and outlook in the conclusion relating to Chinese involvement in Africa.

2. Study 1: Chinese involvement in Africa from an academic perspective²

In 2009, China became Africa's largest trading partner, with a trade volume of 91 billion US Dollars (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2011). This trend increased steadily and by 2013, approximately 3 000 Chinese corporations operated in Africa across most sectors (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China et al., 2015) and 2 282 Chinese investment projects were implemented or planned in the same year (Shen, 2015). During the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2015, Beijing announced an additional financial package worth 60 billion US Dollars for Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2015) and projections estimate that trade volume between Africa and China will reach 400 billion US Dollars by 2020 (China Daily, 2015a).

The exponential growth of investment and influence of China in Africa has initiated controversial discussions in mainstream academia, which are characterized by a plethora of inconsistencies and contradiction. The following two excerpts on the economic relationships between China and Africa are illustrative of this:

For critics, China is simply the latest in a long line of capricious, self-interested “benefactors”, whose presence undermines the domestic and export potential of local produces, distorts the local market, transfers little of substance to the local political economy in terms of knowledge or skills transfers, offers little in the way of meaningful employment and is restrictive — even abusive — in enclave silos protected by Chinese security service personnel, thereby limiting transparency and accountability. (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016, p. 24)

For instance, Jefferis (2012) claims that China's economic presence in Africa [...] should be seen as an economic relationship which brings development to both, China and Africa. In this case, China's presence in Africa is beneficial to both China and Africa. (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 258)

² This study draws on collaboration in the Social Research and Methodology Group, University of Basel with my colleagues Prof. Manfred Max Bergman, Dr. Lena Berger, and Christoph Ratz.

One interpretation of such inconsistencies may be based on how different observers and commentators hold divergent perspectives of the relations between China and Africa. According to Takaki (1993), we see others and evaluate their actions according to our own socio-historical trajectory. Grounded in culture and context, interpretations of past events and present acts are based on the idea of difference (de Sousa Santos, 2002; William, 2009; Petersoo, 2007; Karner, 2011). Nations, their institutions, and their representatives are constructed as relatively homogeneous based on a shared territory, history, culture, heritage, and language. By contrast, other nations are often judged based on perceived differences relating to nationhood, institutions, and representatives (Wilson & Peters, 2005; William, 2009). The way we construct difference is closely tied to what we regard as possible and desirable (Cruz, 2000), which form the basis from which we evaluate others. Applied to Africa and China, this means that different imaginaries of Africa and of China lead to diverging interpretations of China's role on the African continent.

Conflicting perspectives on Africa and is not a novel phenomenon but rather a central theme of the continent's history. Over the past centuries, these perspectives on Africa, its institutions, and its representatives have diverged considerably (e.g., Sachs et al., 2004; Alemazung, 2010; Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholtz, 2002; Viriri & Mungwini, 2010). Prominent perspectives include the colonial gaze (e.g., Viriri & Mungwini, 2010; Comaroff, 1989), the development view (e.g., Van de Walle, 2005; Sachs et al., 2004), and neocolonial interpretations (e.g., Nkrumah, 1965; Alemazung, 2010). Each of these provide a particular set of understandings and expectations of Africa, its partners, and the type of relations that partners have and foster. Before China became a dominant actor in Africa, the significant other consisted mainly of the so-called developed countries, notably North America and Western Europe. The people, problems, and desirable futures of Africa tended to be viewed from what we label here as a Western perspective since it is based on Western norms and standards. In this regard, the increasing presence of China as a non-Western significant other in Africa may be understood as the beginning of a new era.

In this Chapter, we explore the representation of this new era in the mainstream academic discourse, specifically how mainstream academic discourse constructs Chinese engagement in Africa. The chapter consists of 6 sections. Section 2.1 provides an introduction of how the Western involvement in Africa has been

portrayed thus far. Here, we clarify three perspectives to understand the West in Africa by examining the characteristics of the West and Africa, relationships between the West and Africa, and the roles assigned to the West in Africa. In comparison to the understanding of the West in Africa, we then propose three questions in line with these characteristics. Section 2.2 explores the images of China and Africa in the academic discourses, followed by Section 2.3 in which we discuss the relationships between China and Africa. Based on Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, Section 2.4 explores the role China plays in Africa. Namely, the different perceptions of China and Africa and how China-Africa relationships are lead to different roles for African development. Section 2.5 outlines the special characteristics of China in Africa, which cannot be explained by a Western perspective. The concluding section summarizes the major findings of the chapter and presents the evaluation model that academia uses to understand China in Africa based on a comparison between the West in Africa as well as China in Africa. We also discuss the limitations associated with this approach to highlight the necessity to go beyond Western-based notions of development in Africa.

2.1 Perspectives of understanding the West in Africa in academic discourses

Since colonial times, there have been multiple perspectives on the relations of the West to African people and places competing against each other, each characterized by a particular understanding of Africa, and always in line with specific understandings of the West. In the following, we briefly outline the most dominant perspectives.

2.1.1 Colonial perspectives

The European explorers and, later, the settlers and colonialists saw in Africans the “negative other” of Europeans (Viriri & Mungwini, 2010). Africans were regarded as different from, and usually inferior to Europeans along racial, cultural, religious, intellectual, and historic lines. Mengara’s (2001, p. 6 cf. Viriri & Mungwini, 2010, p. 33)

list of common beliefs among European scholars provides an account of the colonialists:

[According to European thinkers, Africans]

- had no history, therefore, they could not claim to know themselves and had to be told who they were by Europeans;
- were cultural children shaped by sexual lust, immorality and degeneration;
- could not rule themselves because of their primitive irresponsibility; therefore, they needed enlightened masters to show them the ways of superior civilization and deliver them from ignorance;
- could not claim ownership of Africa, or even of their lands since they were incapable of cultivating and managing them;
- had no right to human justice, being sub-humans as they were;
- had no religion and therefore needed the light of Christianity if they were to be freed from their chaotic state of nature and from animism.

This perception of Africans as child-like and inferior motivated two types of colonial reactions. The first consisted of a civilizing mission by way of instruction. The civilized people of Europe regarded it as their duty to protect, save, and civilize Africans (de Sousa Santos, 2002; Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholtz, 2002; Viriri & Mungwini, 2010). To this end, they initiated assimilation and civilizing projects, which included educating and converting indigenous people as well as establishing administrative, religious, healthcare, and economic systems (de Sousa Santos, 2002; Alemazung, 2010; Comaroff, 1989). The second type of reaction, either as a consequence of the first or independently thereof, related to the subjugation of Africans and the exploitation of natural and human resources in the interests of European economic and geopolitical goals (Viriri & Mungwinni, 2010). In the eyes of the Europeans, their superiority legitimized them to partition, control, and exploit the African continent and its people.

2.1.2 Development perspective

Colonial perspectives were replaced by the decolonization and independence of African nations from the mid-20th Century onwards. The dominant perspective of the second half of the 20th Century positioned African countries on a development trajectory, trailing to different degrees but aspiring to become like so-called First World, developed, and industrialized, later post-industrialized, nations. Third world, underdeveloped, or less developed countries were labels used as part of this discourse (Obeng-Odoom, 2013). Africa was seen as lagging behind a variety of social, political, and economic development parameters, including economic growth, rule of law, governance, life expectancy, quality of life, skills, and so on (see the Human Development Index for a prominent understanding of development; United Nations Development Programme, 2016). The continent was associated with a broad range of interlinked and mutually reinforcing development problems including poverty, inequality, violence, malnutrition, disease, economic stagnation, corruption, and a lack of skills and education. The description of Onimode (1988, p. 2) is illustrative of this perspective:

Fundamentally, the African crisis is one of underdevelopment, the central problematic of the African continent and the Third World generally. This makes the crisis basically structural and historical. But though underdevelopment is largely an economic phenomenon, the African crisis is also accentuated by serious social and political problems as well as an intellectual crisis. The intensification of the contradiction of underdevelopment are visible in the food crisis, deplorable mass poverty, decimating disease, pervasive illiteracy, technological backwardness, prostrate external dependence and mounting foreign debts. The social trauma is exhibited in the sharpening social division arising from widening distributional inequalities, ethno-religious primordiality, rising crime and cultural degradation. Correspondingly, Africa's political contour is disturbed, with widespread and growing repression, resulting in a massive refugee problem, coups and countercoups, apartheid oppression and external subversion. Then, too, there is the intellectual crisis, which results not merely from the lingering colonial mentality and foreign intellectual domination,

but from the dominant bourgeois scholarship's fundamental irrelevance to African social reality, especially in the imported social services.

African nations were diagnosed as lacking the capacity and resources to cope with this plethora of problems by themselves (Alemazung, 2010; Van de Walle, 2005).

The perception of Africa as a developing continent was closely tied to developing nations' self-perception as development experts and engines of global socioeconomic development. To address the development problems of the African continent, scholars, economists, and politicians from developed countries provided a range of development strategies and programs. Between 1960 and 1973, these strategies promoted pro-democratic and pro-Western governments, associated with comprehensive political planning and conditional aid programs (United Nations, 2011). In line with Western ideas, planning and the coordinated allocation of resources were regarded as the foundational automatism to achieve structural transformation of African economies toward development (ibid). In the 1980s, a paradigm shift took place and the neoliberal approach to development became the new state of the art. It conceptualized social development as a trickle-down consequence of economic growth, created through free markets that would be facilitated and protected by international political frameworks (Hurt, 2015). Accordingly, most initiatives undertaken in 1980s and 1990s, such as the structural adjustment programs launched by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, focused on the democratization and market liberalization of African countries (Engelberg & Tull, 2008; Alemazung, 2010).

2.1.3 Neocolonial perspective

An alternative perspective on post-colonial Africa conceptualized its nations as neo-colonies. Theories of neocolonialism and neo-paternalism argued that the end of colonialism changed the formal relationship between European colonizers and African colonies but the underlying power structures remained unchanged (Alemazung, 2010; Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholu, 2002; de Sousa Santos, 2002). The colonial power in the form of military and political oppression was replaced by an indirect form of power, grounded in the subtle maintenance of dependence and the

thus arising underdevelopment of African states. According to this perspective, neocolonial powers systematically used financial and other assistance programs to promote favorable yet dependent African regimes (Alemazung, 2010). The leaders and systems they put in place ensured that African countries were governed in the interest of Western economic and geopolitical goals (ibid). As a consequence, African nations were tied to an inferior position on a fictitious, Eurocentric development trajectory. In this sense, development assistance or development “cooperation” represented instruments to steer governments and to create and maintain dependencies for African nations and favorable political and economic conditions for colonial powers. The following is a representative voice for this perspective:

Foreign aid is a bribe given to poor countries by rich nations to enable the latter access to resources, and markets cheaply. It is also a bribe to poor nations to prevent the migration of poor people to rich nations. It is a bribe to poor nations meant to address rich nation’s interests. We all know what bribes (aid) do to our police force (government), the police get fatter but the crime and traffic offense related to highway accidents rates go up (underdevelopment of people). To the robber who bribes a policeman to ensure he/she is not caught — bribery is a good thing that promotes the looting industry! BUT if one were to ask the citizenry whose relatives perish on highways and their property get looted by thugs — a future without bribery is what they will go for. (Shikwati, 2008 cf. ibid, p. 71)

This understanding of African countries as neo-colonies engendered different initiatives, such as the Pan-African movement advocated by Nkrumah (1965), M’buyinga (1982), and others. This movement aimed to overcome neocolonial exploitation through the unity of African people:

It is necessary to secure a world realignment so that those who are at the moment in the helpless victims of a system will be able in the future to exert a counter pressure. [...] No one would suggest that if all the peoples of Africa combined to establish their unity their decision could be revoked by the forces of neo-colonialism. On the contrary, faced with a new situation, those who practice neo-colonialism would adjust themselves to this new balance of world forces in exactly the same way as the capitalist world has in the past adjusted

itself to any other change in the balance of power. (Nkrumah, 1965, pp. 258-259)

Throughout the second part of the 20th Century, the development and neocolonial perspectives coexisted, and they remained powerful discursive frames of Africa and its people throughout the 21st Century. The formulation and implementation of the Millennium Development Goals as a development strategy, and the critical reflections of these as neocolonial (e.g., Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2018) is an illustrative example in this regard. Some authors have argued that these perspectives represent a continuation of the colonial, civilizing mission and subjugation of Africa (e.g., Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholz, 2002; Alemazung, 2010; de Sousa Santos, 2002). The development perspective and the civilizing missions have a common focus on a gradient in development, which implies a teacher vs. student relationship. The neocolonial perspective and the subjugation share the emphasis of power difference, leading to a helper vs. helped, or worse, ruler vs. subordinate, relationship.

In sum, the perspectives on Africa, its institutions, and the relationship with Western countries have diverged considerably over the centuries. Prominent perspectives included a colonial gaze, development views, and neocolonial conceptions. Specifically, the colonial gaze represented a subordinated West-Africa relationship characterized by the establishment of a modernized economic, religious, and political systems following Western models. In comparison, development and neocolonial perspectives implied a strings-attached interrelation led by the West through the introduction of ideologies and political and financial leverage.

These perspectives are similar in that they characterize the West and Africa on unequal terms (see Table 2). More specifically, the African continent, its geographical location, and collection of people have been subjects of much reflection, predominantly by Europe and later North America. The continent was portrayed as underdeveloped, child-like, and dependent on Western financial assistance. In contrast, the West perceived themselves as the development experts and dominant contributors to the world's economy. Africa was objectified and portrayed in relation to European and Western needs and ideologies, commonly in a contrarian way in the sense that Africa 'is not' (yet) European. The resulting opposition and corresponding inferiority were at the heart of what was regarded as possible and desirable for Africa – if it would only democratize, adopt Western norms and values, and open its

markets to ostensibly global interests. Based on this unbalanced relationships, the West was represented as neocolonial powers who exploited African resources on the one hand. On the other hand, they were portrayed as development instructors who guided and taught Africa to develop.

Table 2. Summary of the similar positions on the West in Africa based on the three perspectives

Characteristics of the West & Africa	The West: development experts; dominant contributors to the world’s economy. Africa: inferior; underdeveloped; child-like and dependent.
Relationship between the West and Africa	Unequal.
Current dominant roles assigned to the West who are engaging in Africa	The West as Neocolonial power. The West as development instructors.

However, China’s increasing presence on the continent has challenged the dominance of Western actors in Africa (Zhao, 2014). Over the past 10 years, China has become African biggest trading partner, with a trade volume of 204.2 billion US Dollars in 2018 (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2019) and more than 3 400 corporations operate in Africa, leading to one million Chinese migrating to Africa to pursue business and employment (Shen, 2015; Park, 2016; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China et al., 2018).

The recent, massive Chinese engagement in Africa not only disturbs power relations between Western and African nations and stakeholders, but it introduces interesting contradictions and conflicts among academia, which have for centuries written about all things of Africa. As already mentioned, this discussion is fraught with disagreement. Specifically, some hold favorable opinions on China in Africa, reflected in a recognition of China’s contribution to infrastructural development and substantial investment into Africa (Wang, 2007; Mourao, 2017; Lekorwe et al., 2016; Fioramonti & Kimunguyi, 2011). In contrast, most studies tend toward criticism. For example,

China is criticized for exploiting Africa's natural resources (Ghosal, 2016; Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2018; Ayodele & Sotola, 2014) and for pursuing hidden geopolitical agendas (Kilama, 2016; Alozie & Thomas, 2016; Blanchard & Flint, 2017).

To explore how Chinese involvement in Africa is conceptualized by mainstream scholarship in comparison to the mainstream model of the West in Africa, we next examine the following questions:

- What are the characteristics of China and Africa?
- What are the relationships between China and Africa?
- What are the dominant roles assigned to China when engaging in Africa?

To answer these questions, we analyzed 30 scholarly articles, book, and book chapters addressing China in Africa published between 2012 and 2017. The data were analyzed using a qualitative method known as Content Configuration Analysis (CCA; Bergman, 2011; Bergman, Bergman, & Gravett, 2011). Following the above lines of inquiry, we conducted an exploratory analysis focused on four thematic areas to identify (a) characteristics attributed to China and Africa, (b) the relationships between China and Africa, (c) the types of involvement of China in Africa, and (d) the reported consequences of China's involvement in Africa. These thematic areas, furthermore, serve as the structure for the remainder of the chapter.

2.2 Characterizations of Africa and China

Based on an analysis of the data, we developed a typology of the characteristics academic literature attributed to China and Africa respectively. These characteristics are presented in Table 3.

2.2.1 Characterizations of Africa

The characteristics associated with Africa in the academic papers dealing with China in Africa can be divided into two broad domains relating on the one hand to development and on the other to politics.

Table 3. Characterizations of Africa and China

Africa	China
<p><i>Development</i> Underdeveloped Economically retarded Considerable economic potential</p>	<p><i>Politics</i> Strong state Acting strategically, often with hidden agendas Policy of non-interference</p>
<p><i>Politics</i> Failing states and weak governments Dependent and powerless Emerging political power</p>	<p><i>Economics</i> Economically strong Economic restructuring Cheap goods Skilled and hard-working labor</p>
	<p><i>Norms</i> Disrespecting laws Deficient governance and lack of transparency Different from or contrarian to the West</p>

Characteristics of development contrasts Africa as underdeveloped and economic retarded with the considerable economic potential of the continents’ new markets and abundant resources. Examples of underdevelopment and economic limitations include poor infrastructure (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016), shortage of skilled labor (Jackson & Horwitz, 2017), poverty (Adem, 2016), elevated

unemployment rates (Bradley, 2016), low productivity (Xu et al., 2016, p. 83), and lack of funding (Rui, Zhang, & Shipman, 2016). The considerable development potential was connected to low labor costs (Ghosal, 2016), availability of raw materials (Chen, 2015), underserved local markets (Shen, 2015), and access to global markets (Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014).

Political characteristics emphasized weak governments and failing states, dependency and powerlessness, and the emergence of new variants of political power. Examples of failing states and weak governments included weak institutions (Busse, Erdogan, & Mühlen, 2016), failing democracies (Mohan & Lampert, 2012), political instability (Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014), regulatory weaknesses (Mourao, 2017), corruption and human rights abuses (Chen, 2015), and abuse of political power for personal gain (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016). Characteristics of dependency and powerlessness included references to a lack of agency or dependency on external assistance. Finally, Africa as an emerging political power described African countries' growing influence on the international political stage.

Overall, descriptions of Africa in articles on China in Africa mimicked the understanding of Africa from the development and neocolonial perspectives, outlined earlier. Africa is primarily constructed as a continent characterized by development and governance problems. However, these descriptions were also contrasted with more optimistic positions. Here, references to Africa's economic potential and increasing political power globally were indicative of an alternative frame of reference.

2.2.2 Characterizations of China

In comparison to Africa, China was attributed with a significantly wider range of characteristics relating broadly to politics, economics, and norms. Political characteristics emphasized China's strong state, strategic actions, which included hidden agendas, and its policy of non-interference. Examples of the first two related to state-led capitalism (Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014), coordination between state actors and state-owned or private corporations (Ghosal, 2016), links between "China's domestic policy and investment behaviors" (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza,

2016), and strategic employment of native employees (Mohan & Lampert, 2012). We found a significant interdependence between characteristics associated with a strong state and those associated with strategic actions and hidden agendas, since they were frequently mentioned in tandem. While there were different manifestations of this intersection between state power and strategy, a common thread uniting these was the role the Chinese government played in guiding the economy and corporate action locally, as well as setting the parameters for China's engagement in Africa as Chinese stakeholders pursued economic, developmental, and geopolitical agendas in line with national objectives. Here are two examples:

Despite the achievements in raising domestic production in agriculture, food security was again becoming an area of great concern for China. The "going out" strategy thus encourages Chinese firms, including agricultural parastatals and state-owned companies, to invest abroad to increase global food supply, contributing to global markets, and thus ultimately improving Chinese food security capacities (Alden, 2013; Morton, 2012). (Xu et al., 2016, pp. 84-85)

Critics also emphasize the concentration of investment in oil, gas, and mining to meet the ever-growing demand for resources to fuel the startling expansion of China's domestic economy. Furthermore, China's growing involvement in Africa has been routinely cast as dependent on deals made at high political levels, profiting the African elites while satisfying China's ambition for enlarged geopolitical influence. (Shen, 2015, p. 84)

Non-interference related to China's practice of not interfering with its trade partners' internal affairs (e.g., Chen, 2015), its so-called 'no-strings attached partnerships' (e.g., Adem, 2016).

Economic characteristics associated with China touched on economic strength, economic restructuring, cheap goods, and skilled and hard-working. Highly interrelated, these characteristics described China's rapidly growing economy (Chen, 2015), its increased demand for raw materials (Adem, 2016), economic rebalancing (Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014), reorientation towards new markets (Ghosal, 2016), a globalizing outlook and strategy (Jackson & Horwitz, 2017), low-cost products (Busse, Erdogan, & Mühlen, 2016), projects costing less and being delivered quicker

(Rui, Zhang, & Shipman, 2016), skill development and professionalism (Mohan & Lampert, 2012), and technology transfer (Xu et al., 2016).

Finally, characteristics related to norms were presented in relation to what are considered common rules and norms of behavior. Here, China was described as disrespecting laws, marked by bad governance and a lack of transparency, and being different from the West. Examples included mentions of promoting international crimes (Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014), importing banned goods (Mohan & Lampert, 2012), corruption (Chen, 2015), nepotism (Jackson & Horwitz, 2017), conflating “commerce and aid” (Xu et al., 2016, p. 89), infrastructure funding where traditional donors offer little assistance (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016), and the China model (Adem, 2016). When describing China, Western models and modes of acting represented central points of reference. The literature included direct comparisons between China and the West such as when China ostensibly engaged in a different form of health aid (Lin et al., 2016) or offered an alternative cooperation model to the West (Adem, 2016). Despite some exceptions, Chinese practices and modes of behavior tended to be described as diverging from Western norms and standards, the latter often presented as the international status quo.

Comparing characteristics associated with Africa and China revealed three significant findings: First, contrasting differences between descriptions of what China “is” and Africa “is not” were present. In particular, the picture of China as a nation with a strong state and a strong economy were contrasted with Africa as a continent with failing states, corrupt institutions, weak economies, and high degrees of dependency. These contrasts were similar to the relationship attributed to Africa and the West as discussed earlier. Second, complimentary characteristics emphasized what China “has” and what Africa “needs”, and how Africa “has” what China “needs”. This was especially evident in the economic sphere, where China’s economic and political power, associated with cheap goods and skilled and hardworking labor, was presented as complementary to Africa’s need and potential to develop economically. Accordingly, we found both similarities and differences in how China and Africa and the West and Africa were characterized. Finally, Western norms and standards such as development, democracy, liberalism, and good governance were a central frame of reference for characterizing and passing judgment on both, Africa and China. To

further explore the mainstream academic understanding of China in Africa in the academic discourse, we next analyzed the descriptions of these varying relationships.

2.3 Relationships between Africa and China

We conducted a CCA analysis of how the academic discourse portrayed the relationships between Africa and China, which revealed two types relating to even and uneven relations. An overview of these are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Relations between China and Africa

Even	Uneven
Fair and balanced Relations	China exerting power over Africa
Mutual benefit	Unequal relations and unequal distribution of benefits
	China exploiting Africa
	Dubious relations between leaders

Uneven relations consisted of relationships where power and benefits were unequally distributed. This unequal distribution almost always favored China and entailed how China exerted power over Africa, especially through exploitation, and how this unequal relationships distributed benefits to China. Here are two exemplars:

The present Sino-Africa arrangement, Haroz [2011] argues, gives the Chinese the upper hand over Africa’s mineral resources and its people: China takes about 70% of all timber from Africa, with the continental logging industry dominated by a handful of Chinese companies which pay local labourers less than a dollar a day. (Kailemia, 2017, p. 2089)

The Chinese government insists that states cannot have relations with both China and Taiwan at the same time. A state should either engage China or risk being neglected by the Chinese if it engages Taiwan. Recent years have seen Taiwan losing out in Africa because of the manner with which China treats states that recognize Taiwan. African states have bowed to this Chinese pressure in order to gain loans, aid, technological expertise, and infrastructure development. (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 268)

Even relations contrasted the above by emphasizing fair and balanced relationships categorized by mutual benefit. Although much less prevalent than their negative counterparts, these relationships portrayed Africa and China as equal partners. Here, two examples:

In terms of public diplomacy policy planning, China officials also advocated its African policy by emphasizing sincerity, friendship, and mutuality. Specifically, in terms of mutuality, the Chinese government encourages cooperation, communication, and mutual learning. These elements are the cornerstones of lasting relationships. (Wu & Yang, 2017, p. 355)

Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, said in 2012: “We [Africans] are particularly pleased that in our relationship with China we are equals and that agreements entered into are for mutual gain.” More recently, Xi Jinping, China’s President told African leaders: “China and Africa share mutual needs and complementarities and face a rare opportunity in pursuing development through cooperation.” (Adem, 2016, p. 8)

One type of relationship concerned dubious relations between leaders could not be allocated clearly to either even or uneven relations. Dubious relations between leaders denoted nontransparent negotiations and agreements between Chinese and African leaders. While these negotiations may on a macro-level imply an even distribution of power, the implementation of such agreements tended to disadvantage the African public and consequently led to uneven outcomes. Examples are “(il)liberal bargains between domestic and Chinese political elite” (Mohan & Lampert, 2012, p. 94), Chinese support of “autocratic and dictatorial regimes” (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 267), and unfair or illicit exemptions given to Chinese businesses (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016).

Overall, our analysis revealed that the relationships between China and Africa portrayed in the academic discourse were characterized by a sharp dichotomy. The power dynamics associated with the uneven relationship between China and Africa shared similarities with the socio-historical relations between Africa and the West characterized by colonial subjugation and neocolonial perspectives. However, two significant differences stand out. First, relationships emphasizing a gradient in knowledge common within colonial civilization projects and the development perspective, were not present. Also new, were relationships portraying Africa and China on equal terms. So while some overlap between China in Africa and the West in Africa exists, we also observed the emergence of new types of relations and interactions that transcended the so-called Western approach. To examine what these relationships mean in more detail, the next step of our analysis combined these relationships with the various characteristics assigned to China and Africa as identified in the previous analysis.

2.4 Dominant roles assigned to China when engaging in Africa

To systematize the dominant perspectives of China in Africa as portrayed in the academic discourse, we integrated the findings from the previous two analyses and examined the ways in which they interrelated. Based on this analysis, we found that China's engagement in Africa were defined according to two perspectives, which portrayed China either as a new neocolonial power or as a development partner (see Figure 1 below for an overview).




Figure 1. Perspectives on China in Africa

The academic perspective, which represented China as a new neocolonial power emphasized the unbalanced relationship between China and Africa and focused on the negative outcomes of these interactions. From this point of view, Africa was described as lacking agency and power, especially in relation to the institutional and political background that was perceived as the prerequisite for strong governance. China, in contrast, was portrayed as a strong political and economic power that acted strategically, and ignored universal – Western, standards, norms, or laws, in pursuance of its goals. This resulted in an antagonistic and highly unequal relationship in which China dominated and exploited the African continent to secure its own economic and political agendas. According to this perspective, China’s involvement in Africa in a variety of areas including loans and credits, trade and commerce, manufacturing, resource extraction, and infrastructure development aimed primarily to secure its own benefits. Consequently, Chinese presence on the

continent was portrayed as either negative or not observably positive for African development. Here, two examples:

The main driving force of China's ties with African states has been the desire to exploit Africa's natural resources and this has been done at the expense of African states. China has been accused of extracting Africa's natural capital without any significant benefits to Africa and it has also been accused of contributing to the weakening of Africa's manufacturing base because of its cheap and substandard products. Accordingly, China is viewed as a contributor to Africa's deindustrialization and consequently, poverty and underdevelopment. (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 258)

The widespread portrait of China's state-business relations in Africa is of state-directed, collusive behavior. This is said to be most evident in Chinese SOEs acquiring the critical resources needed to sustain China's economic growth and in Chinese manufacturers taking advantage of lower cost labor to supply burgeoning consumer demand. [...] China's "soft loans" (i.e., weak on the conditionalities often associated with Western donor development assistance) are accused of allowing profligate African states to build up unsustainable levels of debt, retain weak financial, economic, and political governance and, in some instances, continue infringements of human and civil rights. (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016, pp. 24-25)

A striking component of this perspective was how it paralleled the neocolonial perspective. The difference being that now, it is China and not the West, who acted as the neocolonial force, using development assistance or economic and political power to manipulate African governments to secure access to markets and resources. Here are two examples of how China's involvement in Africa were explicitly described in colonial and neocolonial terms:

China's proactive involvement in Africa evokes the unpleasant memories of an earlier scramble in the late 19th century when almost the entire African continent was conquered, occupied, and eventually colonized by western imperial powers. (Chen, 2015, p. 512)

Cheah et al. (2015) however, suggest that contemporary motives of China's 'going-out' policy are primarily market and resource driven and may be

insensitive to and flout employee and property rights. From this perspective rather than past forms of politically motivated imperialist goals, these economic motives have been considered as 'neo-colonial' or a new form of 'colonialism' perpetuating underdevelopment in developing countries (Corkin & Naidu, 2008). (Jackson & Horwitz, 2017, p. 6)

The second perspective portrayed the opposite end of the continuum. Here China was viewed as a development partner, who actively fostered Africa *with* Africa. From this point of view, Africa was still underdeveloped and economically retarded, but also emerging as a political power with significant economic potential. China was described as an economic power, which offered an alternative developmental approach to the West, and applied its knowledge and expertise to develop fair and balanced relationships geared toward achieving common goals and mutual benefit. Accordingly, China was portrayed as an active collaborator who leveraged Africa's potential through investment, trade and commerce, manufacturing, resource extraction, agriculture, employment, infrastructure, and education. Contributions by China in general, and Chinese corporations in particular, were ostensibly welcomed by African countries and thus cemented this positive relationship. Here are two examples:

It can be argued that the expanded economic and trade relations between China and Africa have promoted, in varying degrees, the economic development of Africa. The rich natural resources in Africa have been more fully utilized and, in a broader sense, the world has rediscovered the prospects of Africa's market and the potential of Africa's economic development. [...] Furthermore, for two consecutive years (2012 and 2013), half of the world's 10 fastest growing states were in Africa. The natural endowments of Africa (which has been called the world's cornucopia) are being transformed into productivity, with markets surging and foreign direct investment steadily increasing. (Zhang, 2015, pp. 10-11)

Our findings confirm that China is amassing goodwill in Africa. It is doing so with its investments in infrastructure and other commitments that impact local economies (Foster et al., 2007). Ordinary Africans are aware of, and welcome, both the extent and importance of China's role in their local economies. (Alozie & Thomas, 2016, p. 14)

In sum, China in Africa tended to be portrayed in relation to perspectives on Africa and the West in two ways. First, China and Africa was characterized and evaluated based on Western norms and standards, such as degree of development, democracy, good governance, and liberalism. These norms are applied as a yardstick against which China and Africa was measured. In this sense, the academic texts tend to present China in Africa through Western eyes. Second, former and current relations between Africa and the West, in particular the development and neocolonial relations, was projected onto China in Africa. China was portrayed either as a new neocolonial power or as an alternative and more promising development partner. There was, furthermore, significant ways in which China and Africa relations challenged or transcended the norms, concepts, and vocabulary academia have habitually depended on when writing about all things of Africa. In the final section below, we highlight some of these.

2.5 The non-Western character of China's engagement in Africa

One way to trace the profound changes China's presence introduced on the African continent, is by examining the mismatch between characteristics defining the relation between China in Africa and Western-based concepts. To illustrate this, we briefly outline three such discrepancies.

The first related to China's financial engagement. Here, we identified several inconsistencies and uncertainties in the academic texts we analyzed, specifically in how terms such as aid, loan, credit, and investment were applied to describe China's financial involvement. Instead of a clear distinction – common in the Western literature, lines of demarcation were vague and terms were often used interchangeably. The attempt of Davies, Drapper, and Edinger (2014, p. 183) to explain such differences provides an illustrative example:

China's financial assistance, in the form of "soft" or long-term loans, often acts a [sic!] springboard for its investment and trade activities. Its official finance to Africa consists of grants, zero-interest loans, debt relief, and concessional loans, as well as preferential export credits, commercial loans from Chinese

banks, and market-rate export buyer's credits (Bräutigam, 2011a). According to Bräutigam (2011a), China links "aid" to investment to address three issues—a growing backlog of unpaid loans, consolidation of former aid projects, and experience for China's new corporations.

The second discrepancy related to the distinction between economic and social development especially as they related to the different development models outlined above. Distinguishing between social and economic development were fundamental to a Western understanding, particularly of the Western development initiatives implemented during the early 1980s. When describing development in relation to China in Africa, however, this line of demarcation becomes obfuscated. This is because Chinese initiatives often combined social and economic development in a way that made a meaningful separation difficult or nonsensical. Illustrative examples included large-scale infrastructure projects, which integrated social and economic development.

The lack of differentiation was, furthermore extended to the realm of politics and economics. From a Western understanding, politics and economics must be clearly separated, at least from an academic perspective, in that the state provides a stable regulatory framework and businesses act as economic players. Texts that deal with China in Africa, did not separate politics and economics since the Chinese government plays a central role in the economy beyond providing a legislative framework. The government actively frames, guides, manages, polices, rewards, and sanctions the behavior of its enterprises.

These discrepancies are instructive to illustrate the limitations of Western terminology, logic, and conceptualizations. Western-based perspectives on China, Africa, and their relations may fail to account for or misrepresent essential characteristics of China in Africa. This is because Chinese involvement in Africa, defined by substantial financial packages utilizes aid, investment, and loans, facilitates the explicit integration of economic and social development as a way to promote close cooperation between politics and business.

Beyond these discrepancies and despite the limitations imposed by Western terminology and logic, we could nonetheless identify how the relationship between China and Africa and the West and Africa diverged along three central criteria: First,

Chinese initiatives tended to deviate from the Western model by following a Chinese development approach. In contrast to the market-driven, politics-centered, and pseudo-benevolent Western development approach, the so-called Chinese model emphasizes the interdependence of social and economic development. This model was portrayed as flexible and pragmatic with regard to governance mechanisms. Second, and as a consequence of the first, China and Africa relations were not conceptualized in terms of a gradient in knowledge or a student vs. teacher relationship, instead we identified the emergence of a new discursive strand emphasizing development as a common project. Although not yet the dominant perspective, it underlined how China and Africa actively cooperates to achieve mutually beneficial goals. Finally, the development partnership was portrayed as yielding development success in a comparatively short period of time. Overall, China was presented as a promising, non-moralizing alternative to the West. While criticism towards Western initiatives and expertise were often implicit, at times, Western practices, standards, and the related political order were explicitly questioned. Two illustrative examples are:

Although Africa is not the only region where China's leaders affirm that their economic diplomacy is based on a "win-win" formula for all sides, it is mainly Africans who have seemingly embraced China's rhetoric with a deep sense of inner response. This was, for instance, what South Africa's President Zuma said: "We certainly are convinced that China's intention is different [from] that of Europe, which to date continues to intend to influence African countries for [its] own sole benefit." (Adem, 2016, p. 12)

The declaration [Pretoria Declaration] also pledged to abide by the five principles of Sino-African relations, declared at the Headquarters of the Organization of African Unity in 1996: sincere friendship; equality and sovereignty; common development on the basis of mutual benefit; increased consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and cooperation in the establishment of a new international political and economic order. (Bradley, 2016, p. 882)

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we explored the perspectives on China in Africa according to mainstream academic discourses by analyzing scholarly articles using Content Configuration Analysis. Three main findings stand out. First, while having abundant resources, Africa was portrayed as an underdeveloped continent dependent on foreign assistance and restricted by weak institutions. In contrast, China was perceived as a strong economic and political power who disrespects international rules and standards and tends to pursue hidden agendas. Second, academic debates on the relationship between China and Africa was fraught with contradictions. Specifically, China was on the one hand regarded as a new neocolonial power who exerts power over and exploits Africa, on the other hand China was positioned as a development partner who pursues a fair and balanced relationship with Africa through win-win bilateral cooperation. Third, Chinese involvement in Africa consisted of a intermingling of aid, loans, and investment which intersperses politics and businesses and integrates economic and social development. This approach, while still underrepresented in the literature, stands in stark contrast to accepted Western notions of development initiatives and are indicative of the emergence of dynamics and interactions which are difficult to account for using a Western-logic.

Nevertheless, the predominance of oppositional relations between China and Africa and the various roles they were said to occupy mimicked the concepts and roles traditionally associated with how the West perceive Africa and themselves. In this way, the relations between China and Africa were interpreted within the models of current and former relations between Africa and the West, particularly the development and neocolonial perspectives. Therefore, our results showed that previous understandings of Africa and the West represent central frames of references for the evaluation of Chinese political and economic engagement in Africa. Academic papers tended to view China in Africa from a Western perspective and China's engagement in Africa were evaluated using Western norms and standards.

Two major shortcomings define the boundaries of such an approach: First, it fails to account for the contextual and cultural differences initiated by China's approach. By using a Western perspective, the discourse on China in Africa became restricted to a particular socio-historical logic. This constrains the potential for fully comprehending

the interactions between these two non-Western entities. Consequently, attributions characterizing China, Africa, and their relations tended to reflect Western assumptions and expectations, rather than describe the nature of Chinese and African interactions, intentions, practices, and goals. In this sense, the unfavorable images of China in Africa, specifically of China's engagement as inconsistent with "international" – i.e., Western-framed norms, standards, or laws may be understood as a manifestation of a Western reading of non-Western interactions.

Second, by assigning expectations associated with a traditional Western development role to China, the discourse inadvertently assigns antagonistic positions to China and the West. Academic discourse presented China as either equivalent to the West, i.e., as an alternative or additional neocolonial power, or as superior to the West, i.e., as a more promising development partner. In doing so, they implicitly described China as taking over or challenging traditional Western positions. China became either a competitor in the pursuit of power over Africa or a competitor in terms of development expertise. The bigger picture underlying discussions on China in Africa was thusly marked by a competition for stewardship over Africa. The lesser problem with this is that, once more, the discourse objectifies Africa with African needs and interest becoming secondary – a pawn between world powers. More importantly, the discourse creates an atmosphere of constant conflict in which the imagined scope of possible and desirable action was limited to defensive and offensive moves. This narrow view may not only negatively affect international relations between China and the West, but may ultimately be detrimental to African development.

Western-based perspectives on China and Africa as reflected in current academic discourse revealed little sensitivity for contextual and cultural differences and geopolitical change. A more nuanced understanding of China in Africa, regardless of current and future successes and failures of this relationship, will require a different approach with alternative conceptual and theoretical vocabulary. While hints of this was present in academic debates, the dominant discourse would need to be refocused significantly in order to integrate this in a meaningful way. To systematize in more detail what such an alternative, non-Western approach could look like, we turn next to an analysis of China in Africa from a Chinese government perspective.

3. Study 2: Chinese involvement in Africa from a Chinese political perspective³

Given China's growing presence on the African continent, it is increasingly positioned as an alternative partner of and investor in African countries (Zhao, 2014). However, as the previous chapter illustrated, China's rise in Africa and the introduction of the Chinese development model have prompted various critical debates. These debates regard China on the one hand, as a rapidly growing economy and a country with domestic development experience that offers Africa new opportunities (Wu & Yang, 2017; Adem, 2016; Zhang, 2015). On the other hand, China is criticized for pursuing hidden geopolitical agendas, violating international standards, disturbing ongoing programs, and threatening achieved success (Bradley, 2016; Shen, 2015; Rui, Zhang, & Shipman, 2016; Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Ghosal, 2016; Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014). Omitted from these Western-dominated discourses is a Chinese perspective to authenticate a Chinese vision for Africa. Consequently, China's engagement in Africa is frequently misevaluated, contributing to ill-informed actions and reactions, blocked negotiations, and a lack of coordination and collaboration. These come at a disadvantage for all involved, particularly for people in Africa, who desperately need coordinated development.

The aim of this chapter is to examine what such a Chinese vision for Africa might entail. Specifically we analyze here the Chinese government's perspective on the development China brings to Africa to clarify in more detail what the visions, ideologies, collaborative agendas, and achievements related to development in Africa are. To better understand the Chinese model and how it connects to Africa, we investigate China's development approach along two different lines of inquiry relating to domestic policies on the one hand and Africa-related variations thereof on the other. In the first section, the Chinese model of development is outlined by contrasting it with the more established Western approach. This contrast enables us to examine the essential questions characterizing the academic debates: What is the approach that China uses in Africa? Does China adopt a neo-liberal Western

³ This study draws on collaboration in the Social Research and Methodology Group, University of Basel with my colleagues Prof. Manfred Max Bergman, Dr. Lena Berger, and Laura Lämmli.

approach in its dealings with its African partners or does China replicate its own domestic approach when engaging in Africa?

To answer these questions, we conducted a systematic comparison of the similarities and differences between the Western and Chinese approaches to development, as well as an analysis of how development outcomes in the domestic Chinese setting compared to development outcomes China pursues in Africa. Significantly, we do this from a Chinese perspective by analyzing Chinese newspaper articles that belong to state-owned newspapers. Given the difficulty of gaining access to high-level politicians, we used these newspapers outlets as a proxy for the Chinese government's perspective. We conducted a mixed methods analysis using Hermeneutic Content Analysis (HCA) and Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) to develop typologies of development actions and outcomes in China and Africa respectively. In section 3.1, we first outline the main characteristics of the predominant Western and Chinese approaches to development. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 contain the empirical findings of our analysis. Specifically, in section 3.2, we present domestic development in China and in section 3.3, the Chinese approach to development in Africa. The final empirical section brings these together with a direct comparison of the results from sections 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, this chapter concludes with a reflection on the differences between the Western and Chinese models of development and the implications of development for Africa into the future.

3.1 Comparing Western and Chinese development approaches

Centuries of Western political and economic involvement in Africa increased the hegemony of modern Western actors as moral and normative powers on the continent and enshrined Western principles, rules, and values (de Sousa Santos, 2002). In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus embodied these. Promoted by the West in response to debt crises in African and Latin-American, the Washington Consensus became the most popular model to foster their development (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). However, decades of practice in which growth was insignificant and below expectations proved that the Washington Consensus failed to meet this goal (Owusu, 2003). While the African and Latin-American continents were suffering from

lower growth rates and struggling to develop, China embarked on its own domestic economic reform (Ramo, 2004). This model, later known as the Beijing Consensus, captured the so-called Chinese alternative to development. Its implementation in China achieved dramatic domestic growth resulting in China becoming the world's second largest economy and emerging as an influential international power (The World Bank, 2019a). One aspect of this reform was to encourage Chinese corporations to invest abroad using the homegrown Chinese development model (Adem, 2016). Given China's domestic success, the Beijing Consensus has become an attractive approach to countries who are exploring alternative development trajectories (Chen, 2015). Before we turn to this in more detail, however, let us first examine the Washington Consensus in more detail.

3.1.1 The Washington Consensus: Limitations of a neoliberal approach

In 1989, World Bank economist John Williamson developed the Washington Consensus, which became the de facto economic policy of the World Bank, the IMF, and the US Treasury Department (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). For decades, these and other institutions used it as a guideline to accelerate economic and social development in developing countries (Williamson, 2009). The core of the consensus consisted of 10 principles (see Table 5):

Table 5. Overview of the principles of the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus.

Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2006) ⁴	Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004; see also Turin, 2010)
(1) “Fiscal discipline” (2) Reorientation of public expenditures towards pro-growth issues (3) “Tax reform” (4) “Financial liberalization” (5) “Unified and competitive exchange rates” (6) “Trade liberalization” (7) “Openness to [foreign direct investment]” (8) Privatization (9) Deregulation (10) Securing property rights	(1) Innovation (2) “Pursuit of dynamic goals”, especially quality of life (3) “Self-determination”

As these principles suggest, the Washington Consensus development strategy was based on the assumption that economic development is separate from and a prerequisite to social development (Ocampo, 2004). In line with neoliberal ideals, the Washington Consensus promoted macroeconomic stabilization, free markets, and economic opening to foreign direct investment (Williamson, 2009; Gore, 2000). Social development, in turn, was conceived of as a spin-off, automatically created by economic development – the so-called “invisible hand of the market” (Stiglitz, 2008a, P. 8; Ocampo, 2004). Accordingly, the economic and political reforms proposed in the Washington Consensus aimed to install systems that promoted privatization and the allocation of roles, which enabled free markets conducive to economic growth (Naim, 2000). Within this framework, government intervention in the economy was restricted to setting the legal boundaries, which enabled and protected the market (Stiglitz, 2008a). Resources were, furthermore, allocated to stimulate pro-growth

⁴ The Washington Consensus was later extended to include 20 principles (see Rodrik, 2006). The additional 10 principles include: “corporate governance”, “anti-corruption”, “flexible labor market”, “WTO agreements”, “financial codes and standards”, “‘prudent’ capital-account opening”, “non-intermediate exchange rate regimes”, “independent central banks/inflation targeting”, “social safety nets”, and “targeted poverty reduction”.

services such as health, education, and infrastructure (Williamson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008b; McCord, Sachs, & Woo, 2005) and the scope of public enterprises and private markets were expanded (Bilgin et al., 2010).

In return for financial assistance in the form of loans, credits, or aid the World Bank, IMF, and their associated organizations required so-called developing countries to adopt structural adjustment programs in line with the Washington Consensus (Babb, 2013; Hurt, 2015; Sykes, 2014). Consequently, these policies shaped reforms in more than 36 Sub-Saharan African countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Owusu, 2003; Rodrik, 2006; Heidhues & Obare, 2011).

Despite large-scale implementation, development outcomes remained below expectations. Figure 2 illustrates this using two development indices – GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI).




Figure 2. The GDP per capita and Human Development Index of the World, Sub-Sahara Africa, and China from 1980 to 2015. (Source: The World Bank; United Nations Development Program, 2016)

These distributions, which shows development trajectories for Sub-Saharan Africa, the world, and China between 1980 to 2015, clearly illustrates the marginal gains for Sub-Saharan Africa as both economic and social development remained far below the world average. Due to this poor performance, some authors concluded that the Washington Consensus was “ill-suited” (Rodrik, 2006, p. 974) and ought to be abandoned (Rodrik, 2006) since it did not “provide the answer” to the problems of the

continent (Stiglitz, 2008b, p. 41). According to Woo (2004) the Washington Consensus failed to adequately acknowledge the role of the state in providing public goods, overestimated countries' ability to self-help, underestimated the role of science and technological innovation, and did not sufficiently account for geography and ecology.

Despite these and other criticisms, the Washington Consensus remained influential. As Sundaram, Schwank, and Arnim (2011, p. 28) noted: "While the Washington Consensus has been challenged, if not discredited in academic and even policy circles, revised versions have continued to be the conventional wisdom for economic analysis and policymaking in developing countries, especially in Africa."

3.1.2 The Beijing Consensus as a potential alternative for development in Africa

While development on the African continent was unexpectedly slow, Asian countries, especially China, achieved dramatic social and economic progress. Between 1978 and 2012, China's economy grew at an average rate of 9.4% per year (Hirst, 2015). Since opening up economically, China has achieved significant social development translating into substantial improvement its people's quality of life. China's GDP per capita (see Figure 2), initially well below that of Sub-Saharan Africa, grew significantly, reaching parity with the world average in 2015. Similarly, China's HDI drastically improved and reached world average within 35 years. Specifically regarding social development, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty reduced from 61% in 1990 to 4% in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). Malnutrition fell from 23.9% in 1990-92 to 10.6% in 2012-14 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China & United Nations System in China, 2015).

The driving force behind this success was a set of development strategies, which Ramo (2004) in analogy to the Washington Consensus termed the Beijing Consensus (see Table 5). It consisted of three principles related to innovation, pursuit of quality of life, and self-determination. Innovation was the central determinant driving development in China (Ramo, 2004). In addition to advancing technology, innovation promoted policies and reforms, which creatively changed and addressed

difficult problems (Ramo, 2004; Leonard, 2006). Rather than focusing exclusively on GDP growth, China pursued a balanced development characterized by sustainability and equality (Ramo, 2004). Here, economic growth was coordinated with social development and focused on quality instead of speed (Yu & Wu, 2014). Social development in turn emphasized improvement in quality of life, rather than GDP per capital – the Western criterion of social progress (Turin, 2010). The third and final principle encouraged countries to experiment and try different solutions in order to identify the approach best suited to their particular problems and conditions (Tiberghien, 2012). Initiatives were, therefore, not universal or pre-defined but instead developed and adjusted based on context, need, and progress.

The Beijing Consensus diverged from the Washington Consensus along four dimensions. Table 6 summarizes these. In terms of how development was conceptualized, the Beijing Consensus framed social and economic development as inextricable. No temporal or hierarchical order was imposed instead these served as simultaneous goals (Turin, 2010). In contrast, the Washington Consensus focused on economic growth, and regarded social development as spin-off effects automatically generated from an economic boom (Stiglitz, 2008a, P. 8; Ocampo, 2004).

Table 6. Summary of the main differences between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus

Differences	The Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004; Turin, 2010)	The Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008b)
Understanding of development	Economic and social development are equally important.	Economic development is in the center and it will automatically create social progress.
Development actors	Government is important development contributor	Government's role should be limited, and market's role should be enlarged.
Central determinant of development	Innovation and technology.	Privatization.
Flexibility	Yes.	No.

In terms of development actors, the Beijing Consensus recognized the government's active role in development via investments, managing strategic industries, guiding business involvement, and awarding contracts (Turin, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2013). Government and corporations were partners who collaborated to achieve common economic and social goals rather than acting as separate entities (Ramo, 2004). The Washington Consensus in contrast denied and limited the government's role in leading and managing corporate behavior (Williamson, 2009). Instead, it emphasized the roles of the market in determining the allocation of resources and determining the boundaries of success (Williamson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2003).

With regard to the central determinants of development, the Beijing Consensus highlighted the importance of advancing technologies and innovation in economic and social reforms (Ramo, 2004). It is opposed to the Washington Consensus, which ignored or limited the government's function in making technology policy and contributing to research funds (Stiglitz, 2003). The Washington Consensus depended on private entities to provide services including technology without consideration of market failure and insufficient investments (Williamson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2003).

Finally, the Beijing Consensus adopted a highly pragmatic and goal-oriented approach (Ramo, 2004; Turin, 2010). It was flexible and left room for context-specific

adaptation (Zhao, 2010; Li, Brødsgaard, & Jacobsen, 2010). Imposing its will on many African countries, the Washington Consensus was regarded as a universal model which enabled little independence and ownership for recipient countries (Turin 2010; Heidhues & Obare, 2011).

In short, the Beijing Consensus was a government-led and flexible approach, focused on economic and social development and driven by innovation and technology. In contrast, the Washington Consensus was a market-oriented and strings-attached approach, focused on economic development, dependent on the rise of private enterprises. Due to these divergences, the Beijing Consensus was regarded as a “rejection of the Washington Consensus” (Hasmath, 2014, p. 4), presenting an “alternative ideology” (The Economist, 2009, para. 2), which “turn[ed] traditional ideas [...] on their heads” (Ramo, 2004, p. 4).

The “tangible economic and political benefits” (Hasmath, 2014, p. 14) of the Beijing Consensus and the way it helped redefine China’s role within the global world order have made it highly attractive to developing nations around the globe (Hasmath, 2014; Ramo, 2004). In the African context, the Beijing Consensus, i.e., China’s approach in aid, investment, and foreign policies, has become a viable and promising alternative development model to the Western development ideologies (Bradley, 2016; Chen, 2015; Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016). Many African countries who were disappointed with the minor achievements of the structural adjustment programs and who remained in desperate need of quick development success, showed interest in Chinese development strategies:

The reasoning involved here is, first, that the socio-cultural ideologies and socio-economic condition in China are/were broadly similar to those in many African countries. It follows that what worked in China should or would also work in Africa. In other words, the “China’s model” is more relevant to the African condition than the neo-liberal model. As Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia put it: "Chinese transformation disproved the pessimistic attitude that 'if you are poor once, you are likely to be poor forever'." The second, and related, reason why China is regarded as a model has more to do with China’s continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty in a relatively short period of time. [...] (Adem, 2016, p. 9)

A number of African leaders hoped that working with the Chinese and following the principles of the Beijing Consensus could replicate China's development wonder (Chen, 2015; Alozie & Thomas, 2016). Consequently, many African countries welcomed or even invited Chinese corporations to operate in their countries (Tang, Ma, & Dong, 2015; Madrid-Morales & Wasserman, 2017; Fioramonti & Kimunguyi, 2011) and the presence of Chinese corporations on the continent grew rapidly. In 2013, around 3 000 Chinese corporations operated in Africa (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China et al., 2015), 2 282 Chinese investment projects were implemented or were planned to be implemented in the same year (Shen, 2015), and more than one million Chinese have immigrated to Africa for business purposes (Kuo, 2017; Shen, 2015; Park, 2016).

The increasing presence of China and the introduction of their development model has created significant expectations that a new era of development would finally become a reality (Adem, 2016). However, as discussed in the beginning of the chapter, critics have raised various concerns with the way China operates in Africa. Instead of contributing to African development, China is said to be acting as a new neocolonial power, using privileged positions to exert power over African leaders and extract resources and therewith recolonize the continent (e.g., Huang & Chen, 2016; Davies, Draper, & Edinger, 2014; Kailemia, 2017; Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Mohan & Lampert, 2012; Haroz, 2011).

The linchpin of both hope and concerns is whether China will bring their domestic development experience and approach to Africa to enable Africa to replicate China's success. These diverse hopes and worries center around three main scenarios. When in Africa, Chinese corporations either:

- Follow the principles of the already established Washington Consensus (i.e., domestically they pursue the Beijing Consensus, but abroad they follow the Washington Consensus),
- implement the Beijing Consensus following the Chinese exemplar, or
- adapt the Beijing Consensus to the Africa context.

To explore the approach China adopts in Africa, and how the approach is similar to or different from that in China, the next analysis addressed the following questions:

- What are the relationships between development outcomes China created domestically and in Africa?
- Who are the major contributors to development in China and Africa?
- How do the diverse actions of these contributors lead to different development outcomes in China and Africa?

These questions provided the guiding framework to explore the relationships between different types of development, actors, and central driving forces behind development and form the key components with which the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus could be distinguished from one another (return to the differences in Table 6).

We examined these questions from a Chinese government perspective. In China, Chinese state-owned media are considered the political levers that guide public opinion (Bandurski, 2015). These outlets communicate the governments' focus on development ideologies, agendas, projects, cooperation between different actors, and the latest outcome priorities to external actors (ibid). Therefore, they can be expected to be a good indicator of the main tenets of the Chinese government's perspective. Specifically, the data were collected from the four largest Chinese state-owned newspapers namely *China Daily*, *Xinhua*, *People's Daily*, and *Guangming*.

Sampling was guided by three inclusion criteria. Articles had to: (1) be published in 2015, (2) be English-speaking, and (3) deal explicitly with issues relating to corporate social responsibility, corporate responsibility, or corporate sustainability. We focused on the involvement of Chinese corporations, as this is one of the major ways in which China is currently engaging in Africa to analyze corporate actions and development outcomes reported in Chinese newspaper articles on China and Africa.

Based on these criteria, 90 articles relevant for China and 50 articles relevant for Africa were identified. Articles were analyzed using Hermeneutic Content Analysis (HCA; Bergman, 2010) which combines Content Configuration Analysis (CCA; Bergman, 2011; Bergman, Bergman, & Gravett, 2011) and Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). In the first step, we used CCA to explore the dimensionality of outcomes and actions evident in the newspaper articles on China and Africa respectively. Based on an exploratory analysis of these articles, we developed a typology of 8 outcome categories and 13 action categories associated with the dominant actors. In the

second step, we applied MDS to explore the relationships between these action categories and outcome categories. MDS is a quantitative technique to visualize the relationships between objects based on their co-occurrence within units of analysis (Berger et al., 2014). We used MDS to generate graphical representations of the co-occurrence of outcomes and actions in the newspaper articles on China and Africa respectively. Co-occurrence was computed using an Association Strength Index (Van Eck & Waltman, 2009). The MDS solutions were computed using the R package *smacof* (De Leeuw & Mair, 2009) and the statistical software SPSS and applying a non-metric model and a major approach to ties (Berger et al., 2014). The MDS map of the articles on China includes 20 action and outcome dimensions and has a Stress value of 0.18 (compared to 0.30 of comparable random data; Spence, 1982). The MDS map of the articles relating to Africa includes 17 action and outcome dimensions and has a Stress value of 0.20⁵ (compared to 0.28 of comparable random data; Spence, 1982). In the third step of HCA, we conducted a recontextualizing qualitative analysis to enhance our interpretation of the structures discovered with MDS (Bergman, 2010). More specifically, we returned to the results of the CCA and the newspaper articles to confirm and further elaborate the patterns discovered in the second step of HCA.

3.2 China's approach to domestic development

3.2.1 Development outcomes and their relations

We conducted a Content Configuration Analysis (CCA) of newspaper articles to: first, explore what the categories of Chinese domestic development actions and outcomes were, second, to classify them into dimensions, and finally, to determine how these dimensions related to each other. Specifically, the outcome categories were

⁵ This model was generated in a two-step process. First, we computed an MDS map of 16 outcome and action dimensions, i.e., excluding the dimension capital flow. The model had a Stress value of 0.18. Second, we kept the coordinates of the 16 dimensions fixed and fit the remaining dimension, i.e., capital flow, into the map. The reason for this two-step approach lies in the significant model instability caused by the dimension capital flow if included ab initio. Using the two-step approach, we were able to generate a stable model without excluding the important dimension of capital flow. We did extensive tests and comparisons of different models to ensure that the modeling process does not lead to a misrepresentation of structures.

thematically synthesized into three outcome dimensions: economic, social, and environmental (See Figure 3). Chinese newspapers generally tended to report in a promising manner on these development outcomes. This was a typical characteristic of the data, since the Chinese media generally reported positively on Chinese goals, progress, and achievements in the economy, society, and the environment. In the following section, we examine each of these in more detail.




Figure 3. Domestic Chinese development domains portrayed in Chinese newspaper articles

Economic development included outcomes related to corporate benefits as well as business and economic development. In characterizing China’s economic development, the newspapers focused on corporate growth, industrial development, and GDP growth. Examples included an increase in company revenue (People’s Daily, 13⁶), a boom in emerging and service industries (Xinhua, 97), and dramatic economic growth (Xinhua, 34). According to the newspapers, China has turned away from the outdated consumption-driven development focused primarily on economic-development in favor of more sustainable and inclusive development. Here, an example:

The Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility Report Press Conference, [...] helps to create a favorable situation where the government, the [sic.] industry,

⁶ The number is the ID of the newspaper articles we used when coding the data.

the [sic.] business, and society interact with each other to promote the fulfillment of social responsibilities, thereby encouraging sustainable economic, social, and environmental development. (People's Daily, 125, para. 3)

Social development, subdivided into individual social benefits and public social benefits. Public social benefits denoted general and specific areas such as agricultural efficiency, poverty reduction, a growing middle class, and an increase in quality of life. Examples from the data included references to bringing joy to children (China Daily, 136), which connected to individual-level social benefits, and lifting “hundreds of millions of people out of poverty” (People's Daily, 116, para. 2) and “China's development and stability” (People's Daily, 166, para. 7), which connected to public social benefits. Infrastructure development and job creation were at the intersection of these two developments and served as a bridge between social development and economic development. In line with the goal of sustainable and inclusive development mentioned above, Chinese newspapers highlighted social development and economic development as simultaneous goals, rather than social development as a mere spin-off effect of economic growth. As the following example shows, both need to be developed synchronously:

Last year the company invested 30 million yuan (\$4.79 million) in setting up a fully operational nitrogen oxide project to promote simultaneous economic and social development. It had also undertaken several energy saving and recycling projects. (China Daily, 208, para. 3)

In a similar vein, a key constituent of Chinese sustainable development was environmental development, which focused on the importance of and progress to address climate change, spur green growth, and increase ecological protection. Examples of environmental development described by newspapers included “sustainable forest management” in response to climate change (Xinhua, 5, para. 11), green development (Xinhua, 96), and ecological benefits (Xinhua, 51). Sustainable environmental development was presented as consisting of a harmonious relationship between humans and the environment. This emphasized transitioning human economic activities and the satisfaction of daily human needs, such as production and consumption, to environmentally friendly approaches. In our analysis

of Chinese newspapers, we found that environmental development was portrayed as being as important as economic and social development. Here, an example:

"We are glad to showcase the company's advanced papermaking technologies and environmentally friendly skills during the expo. We also want to turn the vision of harmonious development between people and the earth into real action by publicizing the protection of the environment and its resources among consumers," Zhai [Zhai Jingli, deputy CEO of APP-China] said. "Paper is an integral part of Chinese traditional culture, and we will stick to our sustainable development strategy to keep the culture alive across generations," she added. (China Daily, 205, para. 10)

Our analysis showed that domestic sustainable development in China consisted of three equally significant and interrelated domains related to the environmental, social, and economic spheres. None of the three development domains ranked above the other and were presented as integrated and equally important. In the next section, we examine some of major contributors to development based on the action dimensions we identified in our data.

3.2.2 The contributors to Chinese domestic development

The dual involvement of the government and corporate agents in Chinese development dominated the newspaper articles. Corporations and government were regarded as the most important actors and contributors to both the market and society. Although the analysis focused on corporate involvement, it was noted that the Chinese government was portrayed as an active development actor. Newspaper articles assigned the following actions to the government and corporations: making rules and legislation, operations, "going out" and expanding business, protecting the environment, and pursuing social activities. Figure 4 gives an overview of the actors and action dimensions. It shows that the government was solely responsible for making rules and legislation, while corporations were solely responsible for operations. In comparison, actions collaboratively implemented by the government and corporations included "going out" and expanding business, protecting the environment, and pursuing social activities.




Figure 4. Action dimensions associated with contributors portrayed in Chinese newspaper articles

In the newspapers, the government’s legal role was defined as being the rule maker and market regulator. Here, the government’s responsibility pertained to making laws, regulations, and standards to regulate corporate behavior. This legislative function targeted corporate operations, and aimed to improve business in line with the government’s sustainable development goals. Operations, in contrast, related to diversifying products and services, corporate strategies, adopting advanced technologies, and operating in an environmentally friendly manner. Government, for example, restricted gas emission, which prompted corporations to promote green production and use clean energy (Xinhua, 57; people’s Daily 3). In a similar vein, the articles described how the government enacted laws to secure food safety and to encourage corporations to focus on the quality of their products and services (Xinhua, 70). Therefore, the legislative function enabled government to regulate and help improve corporate action.

Government’s non-legal role extended into the space where government and corporate roles overlap and intertwined when they actively worked in partnership. As figure 4 shows, this overlap covers “going out” and expanding business, protecting environment, and pursuing social activities. A government-led public-private collaborative mechanism was presented as the basis of all three of these dimensions. Such public-private collaboration was evident in the examples of “going out” and

expanding business. China promoted globalization through investment and business expansion overseas. Specifically, the Chinese government set “going global” goals, developed strategies, and provided capital flow to firms in order to support the process of extending the global footprint of corporations. Here is an example:

She [Head of China and Renminbi Business Development at HSBC] says all those efforts and progress would gradually lead to a convergence of the onshore and offshore renminbi markets, which is one of the ultimate goals of the renminbi internationalization agenda that the Chinese government has been pushing forward. (China Daily, 147, para. 8)

The government-oriented public-private partnership also included dimensions related to protecting the environment and pursuing social activities. Protecting the environment involved green initiatives, philanthropic projects, and partnership schemes between the government and corporations. In newspapers, the government reportedly proposed the guidelines to orient corporate behavior. Exemplary in this regard were initiatives involving clean production, green growth, and tree planting. Philanthropic programs connected to the environmental actions implemented by corporations themselves, such as Apple’s forest program covering one million acres of land (Xinhua, 5), while social activities, were likewise presented as the government first-and-foremost devising policies and providing subsidies. These aimed to address social problems and guide corporate engagement in education, infrastructure, and the welfare of employees and communities.

The newspaper reports presented the Chinese government as a development designer and tutor who oriented development by proposing systematic sets of development goals and policies for corporations to follow. This represented a coherent and targeted approach, which transcended and integrated multiple dimensions. For example, Made in China 2025, which focused on upgrading domestic industries and reducing low-end manufacturing would also decrease pollution and benefit the environment (People’s Daily, 116) and the policy on “going out” and expanding business consequently also stimulated environmental protection.

In sum, newspapers ascribed two roles to the Chinese government to lead and manage corporate performance: a primarily legal role, which consisted of making

rules and regulations, and a non-legal extension thereof, which entailed initiating goals and policies. By occupying these two spaces, the Chinese government played an important role in designing development trajectories and supervising the role of corporations within it. While this analysis hinted at some of the action dimensions associated with corporations, we focus next on a detailed analysis of specific corporate actions, which contribute to development.

As we illustrated in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, there are specific categories attached to each outcome and action dimension. In table 7, we summarize these dimensions to provide an overview of the range of categories we used to analyze the interrelations between actions and outcomes using MDS.

Table 7. Summary of action and outcome categories attached different dimensions

Outcome dimensions	Outcome categories
Economic development	Corporate benefits
	Development of business and economy
Interaction of economic and social development	Infrastructure
	Jobs and workers
Social development	Social development at micro- level
	Social development at meso- level
	Social development at macro- level
Environmental development	Environment and climate
Action dimensions	Action categories
Operating corporations	Products & services
	Corporate strategy
	Operate environmentally friendly
	Innovation and technology
“Going out” and expanding business	Going global
	Capital flow
	Further business
Pursuing social activities	Being socially responsible
	Further education
	Social development
	Build and operate infrastructure
Protecting environment,	Environment (philanthropic)
Making rules and legislation	Agendas and laws

3.2.3 How do development actors excise diverse actions to promote different developments?

We conducted an MDS analysis to systematize the interrelations between actions and outcomes. For this, we used the typology of actions and outcomes illustrated in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 and listed in Table 7. These were mapped to reflect the co-occurrence of outcomes and actions in newspaper articles on domestic development in China. To enhance the interpretation of the structures discovered with MDS, a recontextualizing qualitative analysis was conducted. This required a return to the results of CCA and newspaper articles to confirm and further elaborate patterns identified in the MDS map. Figure 5 contains the MDS map. In it, the distance between points indicates their relationship in the articles: the closer two points in the graph, the more often they co-occur in the articles and hence the more they must be interpreted in relation to each other. In contrast, the further away two points are from each other, the less articles make connections between them.




Figure 5. MDS map showing the relationship between actions and outcomes in the Chinese newspaper articles on China.

An analysis of the configuration in Figure 5 revealed four clusters denoted by the gray ovals. These cluster related to social development, economic development, environmental management, and organizational determinants. Organizational determinants, located in the center of the map are surrounded by and intertwined with the other three clusters, which among themselves share little connection to each other. This means social development, economic development, and environmental management were integral parts of doing business. Corporations were the knot where different dimensions of development came together. More specifically, corporations integrated and managed their profession and different resources such as products and services, strategies, technologies, and jobs to support economic, social, and environmental development. We will discuss how corporations contributed to the three development clusters in detail.

In the MDS map, the cluster of organizational determinants has more inter-links with the clusters of environmental management and economic development than the cluster of social development. This indicates that the resources corporations were reported to manage tended to be needed more to secure environmental and economic development. In the cluster of environmental management, corporations were presented as adopting technologies, building infrastructure, and operating in an environmentally friendly manner to reduce pollution and climate change. The main reported drivers of environmental outcomes were technological development and the upgrading of infrastructure. As the following examples show, corporations were depicted as developing, providing, and using innovative technologies to green their operations and products and to transform existing infrastructures and build new environmentally friendly facilities:

IBM is supporting China's drive to reduce fossil fuels with weather-forecasting technologies and big-data analytics that predict the availability of renewable energy. This will help utility companies minimize energy waste and improve grid stability. (People's Daily, 3, para. 15)

Apple is building a 40-megawatt solar power project in southwestern Sichuan Province. The project, the first of its kind the company has launched outside the United States, will add 80 million kilowatt hours of clean energy to the grid annually. (Xinhua, 57, para. 8)

The cluster of economic development connected to setting laws and agendas, expanding business overseas, and ensuring availability of financial resources, achieved the development of business and the economy. This suggests that the government's function as a legislative body and development designer was more prominent in influencing business development and economic growth, in comparison to social and environmental developments. Furthermore, while not located in the same cluster, the inter-links between innovation and technology with the economic cluster indicate that innovation and technology further facilitated the development of business and the economy. Here are two examples:

Sun Hongbin, director of the Jilin National High-tech Industrial Development Zone, said innovation played a key role in the economic restructuring and

industrial upgrading of Jilin city. The development zone will seek innovation-driven growth as required by the president and encourage the public to engage in innovation and entrepreneurship, Sun said. (China Daily, 169, para. 19)

"Big data is going to transform traditional industry. "Manufacturers will grasp the specific needs of their customers using big data, which will reduce the cost of production and increase efficiency significantly," said Ma [Jack Ma, executive chairman of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd]. (China Daily, 137, para. 6)

The cluster of social development shares the least links with other clusters. It focuses on the general development of Chinese people on micro-, meso-, and macro levels. Social development centered mainly on the philanthropic role of corporations to implement social activities such as education and other social initiatives targeting employees and communities. Connected to operational dimensions, this denoted how corporations used their expertise, particularly products and services, to benefit society. Here an example:

Last year, working with China Mobile Communications Corp. the two companies set up a 4G network base in Tongguan, the first of its kind in a remote Chinese village, and gave every resident a free monthly package for 20 months. (China Daily, 148, para. 14)

The relation between corporate determinants and the three development dimensions are bi-directional. This indicates that corporate development was interdependent and embedded in economic, social, and environmental development. On the one hand, corporations contributed to development through their operation and management of different resources. On the other hand, corporations depended on and benefited from development in the three areas in terms of business opportunities, availability of qualified workers and raw materials, customers, and public recognition and acceptance. An illustrative example is the e-commerce giant Alibaba who contributed to modernizing rural China by providing internet access and e-commerce services while at the same time benefiting from the growth potential of the urbanization of rural China:

“Entrepreneurs need to have social responsibility, which is in [sic!] itself offers opportunities. Where there are difficulties and complaints, there are business opportunities,” said Ma [CEO of Alibaba]. “Thanks to the Internet, many rural areas where transportation is difficult are able to enjoy door-to-door delivery of daily necessities. Moreover, through the Internet, many villages are able to sell their agricultural products to more places. The urbanization of rural areas is going to offer a lot of business opportunities for Alibaba.” (China Daily, 137, para. 13)

In sum, the MDS analysis revealed that corporations used their expertise and diverse resources to manage and promote development. Innovation and technology served as important driving forces of development, particularly environmental and economic development. In comparison, social development was more philanthropic in that corporations exerted their professional capacities to benefit society. Corporations, however, were dependent on and tended to benefit from the achievements of development. In this sense, Corporations pursued an agenda of shared development in collaboration with the state and society. Overall, in a pursuit of these mutual benefits, corporations took advantage of a variety of expertise particularly innovation and advanced technologies as well as products and services to coordinate development.

The analysis with an integration of CCA and MDS showed that the Chinese development approach in China was driven by a careful balance and integration of the economy, society, and the environment. The government who fostered diverse sets of corporate expertise furthermore guided this integration. The thus resulting public-private collaboration mechanism, led and managed by government, enabled corporations to become the major contributors to development as they utilized their expertise, particularly innovation and advanced technologies and products and services, to stimulate a balanced and inclusive development of the economy, society, and the environment. To contrast this with the development approach China pursues in Africa, the next section applies the same logic and methods to the African context.

3.3 The Chinese approach to development in Africa

To examine the extent to which the Chinese development approach in Africa resembles the Washington consensus, the domestic Chinese approach to development, or yet another model, we analyzed newspaper articles related to the African context. Here, the primary focus were on reports of Chinese development. To facilitate a comparison with the findings from section 3.2, we again used a combination of CCA and MDS to establish how Chinese newspapers depicted the Chinese government's approach to development. Mirroring the analyses in section 3.2, the analysis in section 3.3 centers on (3.3.1) development domains and their relationships, (3.3.2) the contributors to development, and (3.3.3) the interrelations between development actions and outcomes.

3.3.1 Development outcomes and their relations

The CCA analysis of newspaper articles on Chinese involvement in Africa showed a strong resemblance between the domestic Chinese action and outcome dimensions. Not only were the outcomes and domains similar, but the relationships among them were also comparable. Specifically we found significant similarities between development outcomes related to a sustainable and harmonious development of the economy, society, and the environment. Examples were reports on sustainable growth in Namibia (China Daily, 156), inclusive growth related to the economy and society in South Africa (China Daily, 121), and the “harmonious relations between development and the environment” pursued by the Chinese government and Chinese people in Africa (China Daily, 124, para. 17).

A slight difference consisted of a stronger emphasis on the priority of social development. According to the newspapers, when doing business in Africa, social development was seen as the core of inclusive development. This included addressing social problems such as poverty, inequality, employment, income, and social welfare. This is evident in the following two examples:

The China-Africa Development Fund has vowed to help bring Africa out of poverty and generate more economic opportunities for the continent, but put

the onus on Chinese companies to help them accomplish these goals. "To further help Africa reduce poverty, Chinese corporations need to come up with increasing investment in Africa and foster better corporate social responsibility practices," says Chi Jianxin, chairman of the China-Africa Development Fund. (China Daily, 155, para. 1)

"We also need to support new innovative technology coming to our country and transfer those technologies to our people. I believe that these elements will enable us to reach a inclusive growth," said Davies [South Africa's Trade and Industry Minister]. (China Daily, 121, para. 5)

The examples emphasized the importance of social development to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. It differed from statements in newspapers related to China in that economic growth was achieved through a comprehensive consideration of social and environmental progress.

Overall, we identified similar findings related to development outcomes, namely, that the development in Africa presented in newspapers consisted of a sustainable and inclusive economic, social, and environmental development. However, our analysis furthermore revealed an additional prioritization of social development.

3.3.2 The contributors to African development

The similarity between China's domestic and its African approaches to development extends also, to how different actors are said to contribute to development. Here, once again the government's leadership in the public-private collaboration was a prominent feature in that the government reportedly guided corporate behavior as well as development. However, the expected active participation of African agencies slightly changed the pattern of collaboration.

The first difference related to the inclusion of a new set of actors. In articles on China, the Chinese government served as the development designer and legislative body who had both legal and non-legal functions to lead and regulate corporate involvement. In contrast, articles on Africa described African governments as additional development partners who collaborated with both Chinese corporations as

well as the Chinese government. Specifically, African governments acted as agenda initiators and legislative bodies. They primarily set agendas, made rules and legislation, and determined standards that affected and regulated corporate activities. Three examples illustrate the interrelation between Chinese corporations and African governments:

“The media in Zimbabwe is over regulated and it is very difficult for the industry to survive under such conditions. The threshold for entry of foreign investors into the media industry should be changed. I do not have the figures, but I understand the laws are very strict on foreign investment in the media and this serves as a disincentive,” he [head of mass communication at Harare Polytechnic] said. (Xinhua, 17, para. 16)

“In this era of climate change, Ethiopia’s determination to follow a different path is appreciable and ZTE is committed to supporting this effort in every way possible,” he [Deputy CEO of ZTE Ethiopia] said. (Xinhua, 6, para. 6)

Huawei Botswana Managing Director Gao Wenli said Huawei is a responsible corporate citizen, a private company that strictly abides by standard industry practices and local customs, and ICT thought and innovation leader, and a supporter of national ICT initiatives and local industries. (Xinhua, 24, para. 7)

Another difference related to Africa’s active participation concerned the role of the Chinese government. According to articles on China, the Chinese government acted primarily as the manager of corporations – it guided, supported, and regulated corporate activities. In articles on Africa, however, the Chinese government served as a facilitator who designed going out strategies, provided finance, and maintained friendly Chinese-African relationships to support Chinese corporations in Africa. Here are two examples:

[The] Chinese Vice-Minister of Finance Liu Jianhua said there is huge room for cooperation, given that Chinese businesses are investing abroad and African countries are attracting foreign capital, technology and development experience. She said China is willing to help Africa build infrastructure networks and achieve industrialization by scaling up financial, technological and human resources support to Africa. (China Daily, 160, para. 2)

Numerous infrastructural projects being financed by [the] Chinese government as well as those undertaken by Chinese firms will help boost Kenya's economic development, officials said. (Xinhua, 39, para. 1)

The analysis showed that while the roles of the Chinese government were restricted in Africa, it still facilitated the provision of resources for which the Chinese corporations lacked capacities.

Overall, the CCA analysis of articles on Chinese involvement in Africa pointed to some convergence between the domestic Chinese approach and the Chinese approach adopted to development in Africa. In Africa, economic, social, and environmental development were also holistic, sustainable, and harmonious and the government still served as an active development actor who guided and facilitated corporations. However, in some instances, the development approach in Africa diverged from local Chinese practices. One example concerned the prioritization of social development as an integral component of inclusive growth; another pertained to public-private cooperation, which included the active participation of African governments as agenda setters and initiators for fostering business opportunities.

3.3.3 How do development actors excise diverse actions to promote different developments?

Similar to the analysis of the Chinese domestic approach, the next step in our analysis entailed systematizing the interrelations between these various dimensions. Here, we once again used MDS to analyze the interrelation between actions and outcomes (see Figure 6). We mapped the co-occurrence of ten action categories and seven outcome categories. As in 3.2.3, we conducted a recontextualizing qualitative analysis to enhance the interpretation of the structures discovered with MDS. Figure 6 provides the MDS result.




Figure 6. MDS map showing the relationship between actions and outcomes in the Chinese newspaper articles on Africa

In the above figure, two dimensions stand out – ‘expanding and going global’ and ‘innovation and technology’. Both are located in the center of the map and both are interconnected with many other categories including furthering business, development of business and economy, products and services, capital flow, jobs and workers, corporate benefits, and social development. Their centrality in the map indicates that Chinese corporations coming to Africa and the technologies they bring were central pillars of social and economic development. Next, we will discuss how Chinese technologies and other corporate resources contribute to the three clusters

relating to socio-economic development, social development, and infrastructure in more detail.

The biggest cluster in Figure 6 pertains to socio-economic development. Social development on the macro-level connects to issues such as poverty reduction (China Daily, 155) and improving people's livelihood (China Daily, 160). This intertwines closely with economic development, especially the availability of jobs. Within this cluster, Chinese corporations contributed various ingredients such as capital flow, technologies, products and services, and job opportunities needed to spur development. Excerpts from the newspaper articles illustrated that innovation and technology – i.e. skills training and technical know-how transfer, were depicted as the central driving forces to facilitate local social development as well as corporate business:

CGGC has a clear focus on infrastructure projects in Africa and CGGC-UN Power will put more effort into marketing energy products and technical know-how to complement the group's business in Africa and benefit local society, Lu [company's general manager] says. (China Daily, 123, para. 10)

Our staff will gain more knowledge as they will be acquiring new technologies we need to improve our outreach services, he [James Sano, WASAC [Rwanda's Water Sanitation Corporation] Director General] added. (Xinhua, 42, para. 5)

According to articles on Africa, the transfer of skills and technologies were the greatest contributions made by Chinese corporations. This contributed on multiple levels to African governments, corporations, workers, and youth who were in need of skills to find jobs. A similar pattern was found with regard to the role of technology in the clusters of social development and infrastructure. Two examples illustrate how skills and technology transfer fostered the development of society and infrastructure:

“Huawei is committed to long-term investment in South Africa's ICT sector, and strives to build a better connected South Africa with its advanced technologies and professional services.” Said Li [Huawei executive board director]. “As a leading global ICT solutions provider, Huawei will continue to share its global experience with the South African government, strive to

become its advisor on ICT planning and development, and increase investment while developing local talent.” (People’s Daily, 110, para. 2)

“For the past 10 years since Huawei operated in Botswana, it has provided a solid contribution in ICT [informational and communication technology] development, provided solution and new technology [two actions] as now Botswana is experiencing better communication and reduced digital communication cost,” he [Deputy Director of Huawei Botswana Ramasala Ntwaetsile] said. (Xinhua, 79, para. 4)

According to newspapers, the role of technology in contributing to development in Africa was more prominent than in the Chinese case. In addition to technical transfer, other resources brought by Chinese actors also benefited local development. In the infrastructure cluster, which concerns the construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure, financial means was another important determinant. Here, Chinese corporations acted as constructors who brought necessary knowhow, technologies, as well as financial means to build extensive projects such as railways, power stations, hospitals, roads, ICT infrastructure, and numerous schools. This is reflected in the following excerpt, which shows China’s financial support for African infrastructural development:

Kenyan officials told Xinhua the loans from China for flagship projects such as the Nairobi super highway, Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) construction and the Nairobi Greenfield International Airport as well as other Projects have set the benchmark for Kenya’s future economic takeoff. (Xinhua, 39, para. 2)

This was extended to other social development programs related to education and social initiatives such as building hospital and schools (China Daily, 152) and providing AIDS prevention training (China Daily, 155). These depicted micro- and meso-levels of fostering Africa’s development. Articles, for example, described the educational engagement of Chinese corporations and the Chinese government that contributed to social development:

The Chinese government provides scholarship[s] to about 80 students in Botswana every year and so far it has benefited over 500 students. (Xinhua, 79, para. 7)

Recently, Huawei became the device sponsor for the e-library initiative launched by the South African Department of Basic Education, providing tablets for 61 e-libraries across the country to help develop local literacy. (People's Daily, 110, para. 4)

The findings from the MDS map were in line with our previous CCA findings. Both methods revealed the differences that distinguished the development focus of Chinese corporations in African settings from the domestic Chinese setting. One difference was the focus in the African setting on social development, which differed from the domestic sphere, where Chinese corporations adopted a broader scope. In China, they were development managers who balanced economic, social, and environmental development, in Africa they still approached all three holistically, but prioritized social development to ensure inclusive development. Moreover, the inter-links between corporate benefits and developments were not as significant in the African setting when compared to the links in the domestic Chinese setting. This suggests that corporations tended to benefit less from local development initiatives. Namely, Chinese corporations brought the resources Africa needed to help jump-start development. However, they did not depend on local growth for their own success. Therefore, newspapers described Chinese actors as development partners of African countries (Xinhua, 39).

In sum, the MDS analysis showed that Chinese corporations transferred technologies and skills in facilitation of finance and other social initiatives to foster society-focused development in Africa. Chinese corporations tended to be independent from local development in that they served instead as development partners who provided development opportunities to Africa. This entailed a focus on transferring technologies and skills, which enabled social progress in Africa. Based on the comparison between China and Africa, two significant differences stand out. First, the importance of social development was more prominent in newspapers on Africa. Second, the role of technology characterized by skills and technology transfer was more significant in promoting development in Africa.

The combined CCA and MDS analysis revealed that China was described as pursuing a development approach in Africa that was society-focused, government facilitated, and technology driven. In collaboration with African agencies and facilitated by the Chinese government, Chinese corporations focused on technical knowhow and skills transfer to spur society-centered development. To summarize the analysis results of each section, Table 8 provides an overview of the main findings of the comparison between China and Africa as presented in the Chinese newspapers. Noteworthy here is that the similarities are more significant than the differences.

Table 8. Summary of the main findings drawn from each sections

Analysis steps	Findings of analysis on Chinese newspapers with a focus on domestic	Findings of analysis on Chinese newspapers with a focus on Africa
CCA on outcome dimensions	<p>Section 3.2.1:</p> <p>Development in China consisted of three equally significant and interrelated domains, environmental, social, and economic. None of the three development domains was ranked above the other; instead they were portrayed as simultaneous.</p>	<p>Section 3.3.1:</p> <p>Similarity: Development in Africa consisted of a sustainable and inclusive economic, social, and environmental development.</p> <p>Difference: Social development was highlighted as focus of the inclusive development.</p>
CCA on Action dimensions associated with development actors	<p>Section 3.2.2:</p> <p>With a combination of legal and non-legal roles, Chinese government actively acted as development designer and corporate supervisor to manage corporate actions and contribute to development.</p>	<p>Section 3.3.2:</p> <p>Similarity: Government still served as active development contributor who guided and facilitated corporations.</p> <p>Difference: Chinese government's legal role was restricted, instead, African agencies acted as rule makers and agenda initiators that Chinese corporations and government collaborate with.</p>
MDS on the interrelations between actions and outcomes	<p>Section 3.2.3:</p> <p>Development was major concern of doing business. Chinese corporations took advantage of a variety of expertise particularly innovation and advanced technologies as well as products and services to coordinate development.</p>	<p>Section 3.3.3:</p> <p>Similarity: Technology served as key driving force of development.</p> <p>Difference: Chinese corporations brought technologies and infrastructures in facilitation of finance to foster development. The role of technology was more prominent in Africa and focused on skills and technical knowhow transfer.</p>

3.4 Conclusion

Before we conclude with an interpretation of the findings, we would first like to situate this discussion within the limitations of our data. In this chapter, we analyzed the state-owned newspapers as a proxy for the Chinese governments' perspective on development, both domestically and in Africa. While there is reason to believe that state-owned news outlets function as the government mouthpiece and therefore aligns with the government's actual position, our analysis and the conclusions we draw base on it are nevertheless not able to account for the truthfulness of what is presented in the media. This means that we cannot claim that this is the actual position of the government although it does reflect to some degree dimensions thereof. Despite the limitations of our data, this systematic analysis of this proxy government perspective revealed striking differences between a Chinese perspective and a Western one. We briefly highlight some of these.

This chapter began by considering the viability of an alternative model of development to the neoliberal Washington Consensus, namely the Beijing Consensus (Adem, 2016). The three distinctive features of this alternative model were an active government role in development, the same importance of social and economic development, and innovation and technology as central pillars to development (Ramo, 2004; Turin, 2010). This sets the Beijing Consensus apart from the Washington Consensus, which has been influential in institutions that have played a crucial role in development, namely the World Bank, the IMF, and the US Treasury Department (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). Contrary to the Beijing Consensus, the Washington Consensus prioritizes economic development as the primary driver of overall development (Stiglitz, 2008a; Ocampo, 2004). The government's role is restricted and instead, the invisible hand of private market determines distribution of different resources (Williamson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008a). However, the failure of the Washington consensus to deliver the promised development, compared to China's impressive development trajectory (Rodrik, 2006), suggests that the approach enshrined in the Beijing Consensus deserves more serious consideration.

We attempted to systematize elements of the Chinese government's position on development and the features of the Beijing model in the domestic Chinese with an

analysis of state-owned newspapers. A combination of CCA and MDS of these newspapers highlighted three aspects of the domestic Chinese development approach reported in the media. First, there was balance between economic, social and environmental development. Second, development was government led. Finally, development was fostered by corporate expertise in providing innovation and technologies and products and services.

Moving from development in the domestic Chinese setting to development abroad prompted the question: How does Chinese development involvement in Africa relate to the principles set out in the Washington and Beijing Consensus respectively. Again, a combination of CCA and MDS of newspapers highlighted three aspects of the Chinese approach to development in Africa mentioned in the media: First, development was characterized by a focus on society in combination with the economy and the environment. Second, development was guided and facilitated by both Chinese and African governments. Finally, development was spurred by skills and technology transfer and facilitated further by financial support from China.

Bringing the above findings together highlights how the Chinese approach to development in the domestic and the African settings converge in the media: First, in both instances, development was portrayed as a sustainable development of society, economy, and environment. The importance of emphasizing social development was significant. Secondly, the government played an important role in guiding and supporting corporate performance and in contributing to development. Third, technology served as a central driving force behind the ability of Chinese corporations to foster development.

Two important difference also stood out: First, according to newspapers on China, the Chinese government acted as the designer of development trajectories and the manager of corporate involvement by guiding and regulating corporate actions. In comparison, in newspapers on Africa, the Chinese government's role was restricted to collaborating with African governments who in turn served as the rule makers facilitating and guiding the engagement of Chinese corporations. The active participation of African agencies and a promising China-Africa cooperation indicated that agendas and projects in Africa tended to be more clearly associated with Africa's needs and increasingly in collaboration with African businesses. Second,

newspapers on Africa revealed a stronger emphasis on social development and a more prominent role of technology transfer and infrastructural development as the basis for driving development. Therefore, the newspapers suggested that China's observation and consideration of Africa's actual conditions when establishing themselves in Africa made a noteworthy difference. Specifically, in the way that China adjusted its involvement to meet needs for technical knowhow and skills, which empowered local people and addressed social problems such as unemployment, infrastructural deficit, and poverty.

Overall, in comparing the similarities and differences outlined in the Chinese newspapers, it becomes evident that to contribute to development in Africa China tended to follow the Beijing Consensus rather than the Washington Consensus. Although the differences highlighted above seem to suggest that, the Beijing Consensus is adjusted to fit local characteristics in both contexts. This also highlighted the important role of African counterparts in creating and sustaining development.

While context-sensitive initiatives enabled by Chinese resources have the potential to help jump-starting development on the African continent, Chinese corporations cannot do it alone. The media was careful to highlight how African countries, eager to learn from and work with the Chinese, need to play an active role to ensure that the development outcomes they desire are actualized. In accordance with the third principle of the Beijing Consensus, i.e., self-determination, they must become co-designers of their development path since they are the experts on their specific needs, contexts, and culture. In a broader sense, the outcome of development endeavors depends not on China and Africa alone, but also on the global context within which such development take place. This chapter examined alternative development paths that deserve serious consideration by agents who shape the global context, especially critics from international organizations and countries. This concerns especially Western, but also other non-African sceptics who have not yet given adequate thought to these alternative development models. At the heart of all three, Chinese engagement, African leadership, and international openness, lies the need for a mutual understanding of and for each other's needs, goals, and imaginaries.

In sum, from a Chinese government perspective, Chinese involvement in Africa shows China's goodwill to Africa, and focuses on the social and economic development wonder that China brings to the continent. China's announced role as a facilitator for African development is pronounced in the Chinese media and challenges the critical Western-centric academic perspectives. The contrasts and divergences here encourage us to explore further the policies and evidence of development China creates for African countries. To do this, the next chapter will examine Chinese projects in Africa in more detail.

4. Study 3: Chinese involvement in Africa from an applied perspective

4.1 China's African policies

Decades of trade involvement, has made China the dominant foreign player in Africa (Zhao, 2014). Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serves as the guiding framework for cooperation with its African partners, exemplify this. In 2018, 37 African countries signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to align their interests along infrastructure, energy, finance, agriculture, industrialization, environmental protection, and public welfare during the Beijing Summit of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). These MoUs serve not only as the basis for future projects and initiatives to enhance China-Africa partnerships, but also as a framework to closely align with the Chinese policies, which guide and regulate Chinese involvement and influence over China-Africa relationships.

From a historical perspective, China's policy approach towards Africa can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase (1950s – 1990s), was guided by political interest and focused predominantly on aid. Throughout this early stage of China-Africa cooperation, particularly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China's assistance played an important role in consolidating political ties with key African allies. During the 1950s and 1960s, half of Chinese foreign aid flowed to 36 African countries, which by the mid-1970s amounted to 2.5 billion USD (Li, 2006). In return, African countries supported the PRC's legitimacy claims over Taiwan in the United Nations, contributing one third of the votes in 1971 (Harauer & Morris, 2014). The provision of aid helped to secure political unity between China and its African allies during this phase and served as the primary platform of China's going out (“走出去”) strategy and China-Africa relationships until 1999.

The second phase (1990s – 2000s), shifted the focus away from political motivations toward securing economic interests. Driven by China's rapidly growing economy, this phase was characterized by the exploitation of foreign natural resources. China's first Africa Policy released in 2006 formally reoriented its position from aiding political

allies to establishing “a new type of strategic partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2006, para. 10). It proposed all-round China-Africa cooperation covering areas of politics, trade, education, culture, science, health, peace, and security (ibid). Following the principle of “sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development”, the policy aimed to double existing aid, while simultaneously promoting Chinese investment and bilateral trade (ibid, para. 9). In the second phase, Africa’s importance especially as an ideal investment destination and economic partner gained significance, although the full potential of their cooperation was not fully exploited. Surpassing Japan in the year 2010, China has become the world’s second largest economy (Long & Li, 2012). In line with its development demands, China began to pursue multiple goals to secure a sustainable economy and increase its “peaceful rise as a global power” (Huang, 2007, p. 831; Chen & Wu, 2009). This entailed transitioning from its “keeping a low profile and hiding its brightness” policy (“韬光养晦”) to a set of comparatively aggressive policies (China Daily, 2018a, para. 5; Yan, 2014). Particularly, in responding to America’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy targeting the Asian-Pacific region, China increasingly turned its attention to Eurasia and Africa (Zhou & Esteban, 2018, p. 492). In the third phase of China in Africa (2010 – onwards), China strengthened cooperation with Africa and established an unprecedented presence on the continent. Specifically, the Chinese involvement covered a wide-range of countries and foci areas in line with newly released domestic and foreign policies such as industrial policies, the BRI, the second Africa policy, and China’s latest foreign aid policy.

According to the 13th five-year plan, China aims to complete its industrialization phase by 2020 (Beijing Review, 2016). It involves among other ambitions, to restructure its economy and upgrade domestic industries guided by the Made in China 2025 strategy (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2016; Bräutigam & Tang, 2014). More specifically, the general goal of the 13th five-year plan (2016 – 2020) is to “build a moderately prosperous society in all respects” with a focus on a pursuit of “innovation-driven, balanced, green, open, and inclusive” development and the establishment of a more “beautiful, healthy, and safe” country (Beijing Review, 2016, para. 17-21; Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2016). The central philosophy characterized by an industrial focus and the overarching orientation of green growth are consistent with the Made in China 2025 strategy, which aims to “modernize China’s industrial capability” (Institute for Security

and Development Policy, 2018, p. 1). Proposed by the Premier Li Keqiang in 2015, the Made in China 2025 emphasizes an upgrade in Chinese industries, especially manufacturing, with a focus on innovation and quality (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015). More specifically, it proposes that China should transfer from a “low-cost manufacturer” to a “direct added-value competitor” and pursue green development (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2018, p. 1). This policy seeks to address how Chinese corporations, particularly traditional manufacturers, have gradually lost advantage due to increasing labor cost, heavy pollution, and low-end value. To adjust and encourage innovation in the domestic market, Chinese manufacturers, especially private corporations, have relocated production and pursued lower cost opportunities abroad. It is estimated that “100 million labor-intensive” jobs in manufacturing will be freed up and some of these will be moved to Africa (Lin, 2011, p. 2). Mckinsey’s investigation on 1 000 Chinese firms operating in 8 African countries showed that approximately a third of these firms engaged in the manufacturing sector, contributing 12% of Africa’s annual industrial capacity (Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017). This increasing Chinese private investment means Africa is becoming the largest destination for export of Chinese manufacturing and has huge potential to become the world’s next manufacturing hub (Zhang et al., 2018).

The BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), regarded as the core of China’s global strategy, involves Africa as a key partner in securing China’s core national interests (Rolland, 2015). This is complemented by China’s second Africa policy, which provides the general guideline for China in Africa relationships and principles of cooperation. Traditionally regarded as the fundamental constituent of Chinese foreign policy, China’s foreign aid policy further facilitates the promotion of the BRI and cooperation in Africa. Covering more than 65 countries and 63% of the world’s population, the BRI consists of two visions: The New Silk Road Economic Belt which links China to Europe by passing through Central Asia and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road stretching from China’s southern coastline to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and then Europe (Fallon, 2015; Djankov & Miner, 2016). Serving as China’s central foreign policy, the initiative aims to spur global trade by developing infrastructure to reinforce regional connectivity (Rolland, 2015; Wang, 2015). To implement the initiative, Beijing put forward five guiding pillars, including: “policy coordination, connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-people ties” (China

Daily, 2018b, para. 7). Located in the ancient⁷ and naturally extended Maritime Silk Road in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, Africa is regarded as a key component of China's BRI (Rolland, 2015). To support the initiative that is potentially restricted by financial constraints of the participants, in 2014, China led the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with an initial investment of 100 billion US Dollars (The Department of Finance, Canada, 2018). Particularly, Beijing promised to provide a financial package worth 60 billion US Dollars to support Africa's infrastructural development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2015). To break geographical isolation of landlocked African countries and connect them to global markets, China designed a systematic framework for the African section of the BRI. Specifically, China plans to construct rail connection to bridge East and West Africa as well as South and West Africa in order to establish regional economic corridors and create seamless businesses and trade (Breuer, 2017). In this sense, the BRI aims to secure China's dominance as the biggest trading partner of African countries by facilitating Chinese investment and infrastructure projects in Africa through substantial financial support.

In addition to infrastructure and investment projects, China also launched broader cooperation with its African partners in line with the second Africa policy and the BRI. In 2015, China released the second Africa policy paper, which emphasized the establishment and development of "comprehensive strategic and cooperative China-Africa partnership" and "consolidating and bolstering the community of shared future between China and Africa" (China Daily, 2015b, para. 4). This illustrates well how China values the importance of African countries by defining China-Africa relationship as an "all-dimensional, wide-ranging, and multi-layered" partnership in comparison to "a new strategic partnership" of the first version (University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2015, para. 11). Furthermore, China increasingly pays more attention to Africa's development with a proposal of a series of detailed cooperative initiatives, which transcends China's own interests. Specifically, through the second Africa policy and the BRI, China initiated ten action plans to ground the China-Africa cooperation via industrialization, infrastructure, finance, energy, investment, trade, poverty reduction, agricultural modernization, public welfare, as well as security (China Daily, 2015b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2018a).

⁷ The establishment of the ancient Silk Road dates back to 2nd Century BC, when China exported silk to Central Asia, Western Asia, Africa, and Europe (Chen & Wang, 2012).

Following the policies and action plans, China and Africa are developing cooperation on energy, special economic zones (SEZs), trade, and new areas such as e-commerce, tourism, e-payment, and internet content services (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

In this new phase of China in Africa, China has been adjusting its aid policy in line with its second Africa policy and the BRI to emphasize Africa's importance in a multipolar world. Following the new principle including "mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefit, and win-win", China offers a variety of aid projects in diversified areas and forms to Africa, beyond the purely monetary donation and materials donation that took place before 1990s (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2014, para. 2). More specifically, China and Chinese corporations provide aid to recipient countries in the form of infrastructure projects, donation of goods and materials, "dispatching medical teams and volunteers", "offering emergency humanitarian aid" and "reducing or exempting the debts of the recipient countries" (ibid, para. 11). As such, China has been engaging with development assistance in the region, particularly agricultural technical assistance, public facility, and welfare improvement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2018b). In this respect, and based on pragmatism associated with African realities, the straightforward Chinese aid aims to contribute to Africa's socio-economic development more generally (Adem, 2016).

China's African policies, while targeting different areas related to infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, public health, finance, and education, are regarded as guidelines for the formation of strategic China-Africa relationships and cooperation. The central question of this chapter is to better understand how these ambitious policies translate into practice. Specifically, what is China's actual involvement in Africa? In the following sections, we explore this by examining Chinese engagement based on the projects China funds or builds in Sub-Saharan African countries. Section 4.2 provides discussions on Chinese projects across different countries, sectors, and types of involvement respectively. To better understand Chinese projects and their roles for African development, we select Ethiopia as a case to discuss Chinese involvement in more detail in Section 4.3. The final section summarizes the main findings and implications of this study.

4.2 China's projects in Sub-Saharan Africa

To develop an overview of Chinese engagement in Africa, we conducted an exploratory investigation into the existing projects China established in 48 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries from 2010 to 2018. Following a principle of one-country, one-sector, one-project, we collected 236 projects across six sectors covering almost all the SSA countries. A table covering 46 countries in the Appendix D lists the projects completed or under construction across different sectors and types of involvement in SSA. It is structured using three dimensions namely, countries, sectors, and types of involvement. In the following sections, we introduce each dimension in more detail.

4.2.1 China's involvement across different countries

The allocation of Chinese projects as represented in Appendix D tends to be balanced across SSA countries, since they involve numerous nations covering East, West, and Southern Africa. However, there still exists priority and exclusion criteria defining China's choices. Table 9 shows China's preference over different regions and countries and the factors affecting them. As the table illustrates, China tends to be more involved in countries in East, Southern, and West Africa because of geostrategy, resources, and partnerships. In comparison, challenges such as China's One China Policy, security, and country size restricts China's engagement in countries such as Swaziland, Burkina Faso, São Tomé, Somalia, Central African Republic, Cabo Verde, and Seychelles.

Table 9. China’s region/country preference related to Chinese projects in SSA

	Countries/regions	Affecting factors
More involved	East Africa (11)	Geostrategy; investment climate
	Southern Africa (4)	Resources; advanced partners
	West Africa (6)	Resources; new partners
Less involved	Swaziland; Burkina Faso; São Tomé	One China Policy
	Somalia; Central African Republic	Security
	Cabo Verde; Seychelles	Size

Generally, China follows the principle from the 461 Framework for China-Africa cooperation proposed by the Premier Li Keqiang in 2014, which emphasizes that China’s involvement in Africa should focus on specific countries and projects (Yang & Gao, 2017). These selected countries and projects contribute to the larger China-Africa cooperation landscape by serving as the central, strategic nodes to connect consequent projects and collaboration in other countries (Wei, 2016). In East Africa where the world’s fastest growing economies are located, for example, China tends to be more interested in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, Malawi, Madagascar, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Located on the western coast of the India Ocean, East African countries are important to China’s geostrategy since they function as the gateways to linking other landlocked African countries to the world market on the one hand, while also being a core component of China’s ancient Maritime Silk Road on the other hand (Xinhua Silk Road, 2017; Yang & Gao, 2017). Countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania, furthermore, have comparatively promising economies characterized by increasing industry, consumption, and agricultural and infrastructural development, which makes them attractive investment opportunities (Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 2018). In this sense, the East African countries are strategic partners of China’s BRI by serving as key pivots in global trade and considerable constituents of China’s maritime security strategy (University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2017). By helping to spur development in these countries, China fosters the

connectivity to and future development of other parts of the continent, increases business opportunities and boosting trade by opening factories and establishing SEZs, and strengthening overall cooperation to fight against security threats and terrorism in this region.

In comparison to the geographical importance of East Africa, Southern African countries such as South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Angola have historically been China's political allies, the so-called reliable partners with whom, according to the former President Jiang Zeming, China established all-round friendships (Zhang, 2013). In the 1950s, China supported Africa's anti-colonial movements, particularly by providing military and monetary support to Southern African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Euka, 2011; Kobo, 2013). Through these investments, China established itself as a political partner, which formed the basis for the early stages of China-Southern Africa cooperation. These interactions deepened further, due in part to increasing domestic consumption in China, which spurred China's motivation to access the abundant resources including mines, oil, natural gas, energy, and agricultural potential of these countries. This transfer of interests is especially evident in the projects initiated in these countries, which related to the establishment of diverse power plants, joint ventures in the oil and mining industries, as well as agricultural production initiatives. Specifically, China prioritized investment, trade, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation South Africa and Angola, given that most of the mining and oil blocks are located here (Ehizuelen, 2017). South Africa, for example, is currently China's largest trading partner and the top Chinese FDI recipient in Africa followed by Angola (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China et al., 2018). In 2012, China involved South Africa in the BRICs and selected Angola as the first echelons of their China-Africa 2016 industrial cooperation initiative (Wacker, 2014; Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2017). In addition to resources, geographical location is another key determinant of Chinese involvement. In this regard, South Africa and Angola are regarded as gateways to the continent, especially central Africa (Scholvin & Draper, 2012; Bassens et al., 2012). From a geopolitical perspective, Southern Africa provides China extended access to Atlantic, enhancing the ancient Maritime Silk Road trade route (Ehizuelen, 2017).

As the above illustrates, China utilized expansive strategic initiatives to establish itself as the dominant actor in East and Southern Africa, before turning attention and enthusiasm to West Africa. In contrast to Southern Africa with which China has historical ties, West Africa is a francophone region since most states have a French colonial past. China's newly designed cooperation with West African countries such as Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea is inspired by mixed determinants including natural resources, geographical advantages, and political interests. Specifically, benefiting from abundant oil and protected market, Nigeria has been Chinese third largest African trading partner, receiving 2.8 billion US Dollars in FDI during 2017 (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China et al., 2018). Serving as the trading center of China's Maritime Silk Road in West Africa, Nigeria has attracted large-scale, trans-regional transport projects, such as the Lagos-Calabar Coast Railway as well as China-led SEZs, such as the Ogun Gungdong Free Trade Zone, which aims to facilitate Nigeria's growing economic strength by introducing the Chinese business model in the region (Rogers, 2016; Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). In addition to economic motivation, political determinants further define these collaborations. In this way, China advances its BRI in the region by reinforcing its relationship with West Africa even though some of the countries are wavering between China and Taiwan and China has to compete with France to be an alternative partner (The Maritime Executive, 2018). Senegal, for example, who previously had political ties with Taiwan prior to 2005, has recently become a strategic focus of China's BRI (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2005). Chinese President Xi began strengthening cooperation with Senegal through a set of investment projects related to infrastructure, energy, SEZs, and agriculture (Xinhua, 2019a; ChinaAfrica, 2018). Regarding Senegal and Nigeria as models of China-West Africa cooperation within the framework of the BRI, China is on the way to expand its business footprint and secure political interests in West Africa.

Although China shows strong interests in a range of countries located in East, Southern, and West Africa, it is less involved in countries such as Swaziland, Burkina Faso, as São Tomé, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Cabo Verde, and the Seychelles. Three challenges lead this trend, namely the One China Policy, security, and country size. Specifically, China defines its investment and development assistance according to the political positions of African countries. The key

determinant here is that African partners respect the One China Policy (Johnston, Morgan, & Wang, 2015; Renard, 2011). São Tomé who has more Chinese projects than Burkina Faso and Swaziland, for example, resumed diplomatic relations with China after it severed political ties with Taiwan in 2016, two years before Burkina Faso followed suit (China Daily, 2016; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). In comparison, Swaziland, currently the only political ally of Taiwan in Africa, has no collaborative projects with China (Reuters, 2018a). The case is illustrative in that countries who are willing to cut ties with Taiwan are able to qualify for Chinese investment and vice versa. This indicates China's emphasis on winning support for its sovereignty something, which is regarded as the foundation of China-Africa cooperation and takes priority over economic interests. Taking advantage of its economic and political muscles, Beijing has supplanted Taipei in increasing and securing its presence and influence on the continent (Samy, 2010; Ayodele & Sotola, 2014).

Second, security serves as another basic criterion for Chinese corporations when making investment decisions. Particularly in terms of energy cooperation, infrastructure construction, and production – all highly dependent on raw materials and labor. Here, security is the key determinant that affects the implementation of projects as it affects the personal safety of both Chinese businesses and migrants (Qiang, 2016; Wang, 2018). In this sense, security issues are a cornerstone of China-Africa cooperation. This is also a bone of contention between China and the West especially in relation to China's non-intervention policy, which China regards as the core principle in response to African internal affairs (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Wang, 2018). Somalia and the Central African Republic, for example, receive less investment projects because of domestic instability, years of civil wars, and terrorist attacks (Wang, 2018). These countries are defined by warlordism and anarchy, and the conflicts between armed groups have spread to and threatened neighbouring stable regions (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2018b; World Vision, 2018). As a result, China closed its embassy in Somalia and dealt with its foreign affairs through its Kenyan embassy until 2014 (Tiezzi, 2014).

As a third factor, country size also affects Chinese involvement. Characterized by small island countries with limited population and GDP, Cabo Verde and the Seychelles were not considered as ideal investment destinations for Chinese

corporations and consequently were not important for China's initial Africa strategies. However, after decades of involvement, China has established itself as a strategic partner for many large African countries, and it is now beginning to expand its footprint to small countries as well. Particularly, Chinese President Xi recently announced that all African partners should be treated equally within its BRI framework and consequently energy cooperation with the Seychelles and Cabo Verde are being strengthened (Belt and Road Portal, 2018; Macauhub, 2018). The recent involvement of small countries and the extended participants of the BRI indicates that China has transferred its great power diplomacy to an enlarged cooperation with different African countries. In short, in terms of the factors, which restrict China's involvement in Africa, country size is a criterion which is changing as China expands across the continent. Security matters, however, remain relevant to Chinese corporate investment and migration. Finally, the One China Policy serves as China's baseline for conducting foreign affairs. It resolutely defends and vigorously promotes this issue through its economic and political leverage.

Overall, Chinese involvement is determined by a diversity of issues, including political positions, security, economic potential, geographical advantage, and historical relationships. Among these various elements, sovereignty issue with a focus on Taiwan tends to be more important than economic interests. In this regard, the political positions of African countries towards the PRC and Taiwan serve as the prerequisite of China's involvement. This is followed by maintaining reliable security. In comparison, economic and geographical conditions are secondary determinants of Chinese preference over the continent. In this way, priority given to specific countries reflects China's geoeconomic and geopolitical pursuits in Africa, particularly the security of investment opportunities, energy, maritime interests, and political legitimacy. Next, we explore the various sectors Chinese projects are involved in.

4.2.2 China's involvement across different sectors

Chinese involvement covers a broad array of areas and relates to diverse sectors. Figure 7 shows the sectors Chinese projects are involved in, which connect to a combination of infrastructure, commodities, and services. The three orientations

divide into six specific sectors including transportation, agriculture, natural resources and energy, manufacturing, public services, and financial services. If we begin by looking at the left circle first, we find that infrastructure is associated with transportation, natural resources and energy, public services, and agriculture since China-built infrastructure in SSA include transport projects, power plants, as well as public and agricultural facilities, which contribute to national and regional interconnectivity of SSA. Specifically, China established itself as the largest constructor of rail and electricity networks in Africa (Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017). Examples include the Benguela Railway, which links Angola’s western port in Lobito and its eastern town Luau and the Felou Hydropower Project, which provides electricity to Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Guinea (Railway Gazette, 2016; African Union, n.d.).




Figure 7. Different sectors that Chinese projects are associated with

Commodities, serving as an important driving force for Chinese involvement, are connected to the manufacturing, natural resources and energy, and agriculture sectors. This includes, for example, output-focused and trade-oriented agricultural

businesses, raw materials, and manufacturing projects. More specifically, corporations come to Africa to develop specialized factories and multi-functional industrial parks, contributing to the security of China's dominance as African biggest trading partner (People's Daily, 2018). The Dong Ao Clothing Factory in Tanzania and the China-Uganda Agricultural Industrial Park (see Appendix D), for example, focus on production and export and are representative of the commodity-driven involvement of Chinese corporations.

Acting as a third key constituent of Chinese involvement, services consist of public and financial services and the agriculture sector. These involve technical training, public health, education, and banking that Chinese institutions and corporations specialize in. Characterized by a provision of technology, capital, and healthcare, these services respond to the needs of African society and are therefore more relevant to the social development of recipient countries. Examples of projects include, Chinese medical teams with a 56-year history in 43 African countries and Chinese agricultural training provided to local farmers and agricultural professionals in Senegal, Namibia, and Cote d'Ivoire (The State Council Information Office, China, 2018).

Overall, China's involvement across different sectors represent a diverse forms, positioned as a combination of infrastructure, commodities, and services with a focus on social and economic spheres. In the following section, we will discuss the types of Chinese involvement and the associated actors in detail.

4.2.3 China's engagement across different types of involvement

Table 10 represents the types of Chinese involvement and their main characteristics. There are four types of involvement, including aid, loans, business investment, and partnership. China's establishment in SSA has been guided by the agendas, initiatives, and activities of corporations and the Chinese government. The government leads involvement, especially related to aid, which is characterized by a top down management model and contracts-attached loans, while corporations dominate investment projects driven by new markets. As emphasized in the BRI and the second Africa policy which was discussed in the previous section, China

strengthens cooperation with African institutions in a wide-range of areas, aiming for a win-win China-Africa relationship.

Table 10. Types of Chinese involvement in SSA

Types of involvement	Leadership	Characteristic
Aid	Chinese government	Top down
Loans	Chinese government	Contracts-attached
Business investment	Chinese corporations	Market-driven
Partnership	Chinese and African institutions	Win-win

Aid. In general, aid and loans are managed by the Chinese government and serve as China’s political leverage in Africa (Ursu & van den Berg, 2018; Were, 2018). Namely, at a cost of massive expense and corporate involvement, Chinese aid is a diplomatic approach that aims to secure a long-lasting relationship with African states (Adem, 2016). The aided projects granted as gifts to African governments, follow a top down model (Will, 2012; Menary, 2015). Table 11 is a summary of the China-Zambia Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center and China-Gabon Friendship Stadium based on the table in the Appendix D. Taking the Zambian project as an example, the 6 million US Dollars China-Zambia Agriculture Technology Demonstration Center was developed by Jilin Province and contracted to Jilin Agricultural University and the Jilin Food Group Limited Company (Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). After completion, it was handed to the Zambian government by the Chinese central government as part of the bilateral cooperation between China and Zambia (ibid). The top down model adopted to manage aided projects reflects China’s approach to involve corporate participation in official foreign aid to deal with the China-Africa relationship.

Table 11. Excerpts of the table in Appendix D with a focus on aid

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source

Zambia	Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Jilin Province is responsible for the center and awarded the contracts to Jilin Agricultural University, and the Jilin Food Group Limited Company; handed over to Zambia as part of bilateral cooperation.</i>	http://zm2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanews/201106/20110607608477.shtml

Gabon	China-Gabon Friendship Stadium	Public services	Aid <i>Financed by Chinese government and built by Chinese state-owned company; completed construction in less two years.</i>	http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2016-06/17/content_38690880.htm

Loans. Characterized by the export of capital, Chinese loans are a key determinant that facilitates China’s increasing involvement. According to the BRI, China established financial institutions with massive funds to support development projects, particularly the development of infrastructure projects (China Daily, 2018b). Over 80% of the China-financed projects in Africa are supported by the Chinese government and its policy banks, resulting in the Chinese government becoming the primary financier (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2018). Based on the table in the Appendix D (see Table 12 showing four excerpts), Chinese finance tends to be limited to construction and operation contracts awarded to Chinese corporations in African countries. Angola’s Benguela Railway in Table 12, for example, was funded by Chinese Export-Import Bank with a loan of 1.83 billion US Dollars, and contracted to the China Railway 20th Bureau Group Corporation (China Railway Construction Corporation Limited, 2017). Supported by Chinese policy-led banks, Chinese loans, to a large extent strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese corporations in African infrastructure markets and insure their privilege as the principle constructors on the continent.

Table 12. Excerpts of the table in Appendix D with a focus on loans

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Angola	Benguela Railway	Transportation	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided loans and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0919/c90000-9501781.html

Benin
	Adjarala Hydroelectric Project	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>Financed by China Exim Bank, Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build this.</i>	http://eng.sinohydro.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=21&id=607

Chad	1,344-km railway linking domestic Chad and stretching to Sudan and Cameroon	Transportation	Loans <i>Signed agreement between China, Chad, and Sudan; China Exim Bank will provide \$ 2 billion; Chinese state-owned company will build this.</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/chad-china-rail-idUSLDE72D2CJ20110314

Congo, Rep	National Road No. 1	Transportation	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided concessional loans and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.egis-group.com/action/realisations/national-road-no-1-congo

...

Business investment. Chinese investment, however, is also market-driven and dominated by small- and medium-sized businesses who pursue resource complementarity. Specifically, as discussed in the previous section, Chinese corporations attracted to new markets and lower cost, have started to resettle their investment projects in Africa and establish industrial towns across the continent. Two examples are the China-Congo Trade City and the Mbini Industrial City in Equatorial Guinea in Table 13, which are typical private investment projects owned by the Chinese. Chinese investment, combining aid and loans, constitute a finance-dominated Chinese involvement that targets the financial deficit of African countries, and represent a distinct Chinese approach to manage relationships with African elites and promote their increasing presence in Africa.

Table 13. Excerpts of the table in Appendix D with a focus on investment

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source

Congo, DR	China-Congo trade city	Manufacturing	Investment & partnership <i>Chinese corporations cooperatively invest a trade city 12 km away from the capital with 5 billion CNY (signed contract).</i>	http://nb.zjol.com.cn/system/2014/04/28/019994584.shtml

Equatorial Guinea	Mbini Industrial City	Manufacturing	Investment & Partnership <i>Chinese company responsible for infrastructure construction of the industrial park; Chinese businesses invest and settle in the park.</i>	http://www.africanreview.com/construction-amining/buildings/equatorial-guinea-agrees-raft-of-chinese-investment

Partnership. As the most prominent type of the Chinese involvement and valued by China's African policies, partnership serves as the catalyst for the successful implementation of the China-built projects in SSA. Diversity of partnerships lie on inter-governmental and inter-corporate cooperation as well as public-private partnership inspired by mutual complementarity, particularly the exchange of natural resources, capital, contracts, business opportunities, and technologies. Based on sharing technical advantages and exchanging diverse resources, China's involvement facilitated by partnerships is expected to lead to mutual benefits and the so-called win-win cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2018c; Chen, 2015).

Overall, with an integration of capital and partnerships, the four types of involvement represent the major approaches China adopts to implement its political and economic strategies and agendas in Africa. Covering a broad array of countries and a variety of sectors and types of involvement, the hundreds of Chinese projects in SSA provide a tremendous picture of Chinese engagement over the past decade. To better understand Chinese projects across diverse sectors and types of involvement and examine Chinese contribution to African development, we will use Ethiopia as an example to showcase Chinese involvement in more detail.

4.3 Country case – Ethiopia

Located in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, a traditional farming country, is growing as a geographically important economic power and regional manufacturing hub in East Africa (Yang & Gao, 2017). Reaching a GDP of 80.5 billion US Dollars in 2017 and maintaining an average yearly growth rate of 10% over the recent decade (2006 – 2016), Ethiopia has become a member of the fastest-growing economies in Africa and the world (The World Bank, 2019b). While Ethiopia is landlocked, it is in proximity to Djibouti, a maritime pivot for international shipping linking Africa to Europe and Asia (Mohapatra, 2016). The geographical significance of the Horn of Africa makes countries such as Ethiopia increasingly important to foreign players who pursue maritime and trade interests, i.e., China. Sharing similar interests in terms of economic transformation with a focus on industrialization, Ethiopia is becoming one

of the most crucial strategic partners of China's BRI in Africa (Foster & Morella, 2011). As China increasingly dominates development and investment projects in Ethiopia, it collaborates with the country in solving many challenges, for example, underdeveloped infrastructure, financial and technical deficits, poverty, diseases, and unemployment.

Table 14 shows the China-built projects across different sectors and types of involvement in Ethiopia. The table illustrates how the projects China finances and builds vary from railway, agricultural facilities, dams, industrial parks, hospitals, and banking. Covering a wide-range of domains, the projects China engages in relates to sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, natural resources and energy, manufacturing, public services, and financial services. In terms of the types of Chinese involvement, China finances projects with a combination of loans, aid, and business investment and collaborates with Ethiopian institutions at different levels. By managing loans, aid, and partnerships with Ethiopia, the Chinese government facilitates corporate involvement of Chinese businesses. To better understand what Chinese involvement and different dimensions particularly different partnerships entail, we will introduce two projects related to business and infrastructure, which are managed by corporations and governments respectively.

Table 14. An excerpt of the table in Appendix D with a focus on Ethiopia

	Project Name	Sector	Type of Involvement	Source
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa -Djibouti Railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned companies were contracted to build and operate the project</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136865306.htm
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>China dispatched experts to train local farmers.</i>	http://english.agri.gov.cn/news/dqnf/201601/t20160111_164522.htm
	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided one third of loans and the rest were covered by Ethiopian government; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/dam-rising-in-ethiopia-stirs-hope-and-tension.html
	Eastern Industry Zone	Manufacturing	Investment & Partnership <i>Invested and owned by a Chinese private company; Ethiopian government provided preferential policies.</i>	http://www.eiz.com/about.php?lg=en
	Tirunesh-Beijing Ethio-China Friendship Hospital	Public services	Aid <i>China donated a hospital and uses it as the base for its medical team.</i>	http://www.chinafrica.com/Africa/201709/t20170928_800105786.html
	Ethiopia-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Dashen Bank (local bank) to open an electronic banking service for Union Card users.</i>	https://www.2merkato.com/news/banking-and-finance/477-ethiopian-bank-launches-services-for-union-card

4.3.1 *Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ)*

4.3.1.1 Investment climate of Ethiopia

Ethiopia's economic vitality and effective political environment – as reflected by its cheap youth-dominated human resources and industry-focused policies make Ethiopia one of the most popular investment destination for Chinese investors. More specifically, as the world's second most populous country with more than 100 million residents dominated by a young generation, the country serves as a labor hub attracting labor-intensive industries as well as foreign investment driven by lower costs (Export.gov, 2018). Specifically, in Ethiopia's textile industry, monthly salary ranges from 35 to 40 US Dollars, far below China's average of 630 US Dollars per month (Dijkstra, 2015; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). Motivated by a reduction in costs, more than 379 Chinese manufacturing-dominated projects have relocated to Ethiopia, contributing to "Made in Ethiopia" as a new fashion replacing "Made in China" (Berg, Hedrich, & Russo, 2015; China Daily, 2017). The Ethiopian government has furthermore made a set of development plans to promote its industrialization. Based on the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) released in 2010, the government announced its membership to the lower-medium-income nation club as well as Africa's manufacturing hub whose economy depends on the export-oriented industries by 2025 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ethiopia, 2010; Environmental Protection Authority, 2012). To implement the general goals of the GTP, the Ethiopia Industrial Development Strategic Plan (2013 – 2025) was made public, emphasizing the importance of creating an enabling environment for foreign investment and encouraging technology transfer to promote the country's industrialization (FDRE Ministry of Industry, 2013). In doing so, the Ethiopian government plans to invest 1.3 billion US Dollars per year to development infrastructure, and to introduce China's special economic zones (SEZs) model (Foster & Morella, 2011). Thus, Ethiopia has reduced labor cost, shared interests in industrial development, and supportive policy environment stimulate increasing and broader cooperation on manufacturing between China and Ethiopia. The Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ) is an example of the cooperation and serves to a showcase of China's manufacturing involvement in Ethiopia.

4.3.1.2 Chinese industrial development model adopted in Ethiopia – EIZ

The establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in African nations was proposed in the 2000 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, when an agreement related to sharing experience of attracting foreign investment and developing light industries was made between China and Africa (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). In Ethiopia, the Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ) is the first China-built SEZs as well as the country's first industrial park (Staritz, Plank, & Morris, 2016). As an experiment of relocating Chinese SEZs and Chinese experience in transitioning to Ethiopia, the EIZ did not proceed as smoothly as initially expected. In 2007, with a premier investment of 146 million US Dollars, two Chinese private manufacturers from Jiangsu Province – Yonggang Group and Qiyuan Group were authorized a tender to build a 500-square-kilometers industrial zone which is located in an industrial town named Dukem, 30 kilometers south of the capital city Addis Ababa (Zhang et al., 2018; China Daily, 2018c). The original goal of the EIZ was to attract 80 manufacturing projects and to create 20 000 jobs for local residents over five years (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2015; Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). However, restricted by financial constraints resulting from the sharply increased costs of infrastructure development and the global financial crisis in 2008, Yonggang, who had no previous experience in Ethiopia, withdrew its investment (Bräutigam, 2011b; Ei-Rashidy, 2016). Consequently, the project was suspended until 2010, when Qiyuan, the only owner and developer, secured financial support from Chinese local government to relaunch the project (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014). Eventually, with a mixed finance of 200 million US Dollars, the EIZ was successfully established, shrinking the scale by downsizing to 2.3 square kilometers (Dadi et al., 2016; Eastern Industrial Zone, n.d.). Characterized as “China Town” in Ethiopia, the EIZ is positioned as a multi-functional zone with a combination of industrial and commercial areas used for production, processing, and trade as well as living areas catering to accommodation and entertainment demands of employees (ibid). So far, the industrial and commercial areas of the first phase were fully reserved, and a second phase has been under construction, occupying an additional 1.67 square kilometers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017; Xinhua, 2018a). The future scope of the EIZ is to successively extend the scale and function and collaborate with the nearby industrial towns to form a 100-square-kilometers special

economic zone and have 500 resident companies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017).

As above illustrated, the success of the EIZ depends on the partnerships between the Chinese developer, the Chinese government, and the Ethiopian government. These actors need to work together to bring these projects into reality. In the next section, we examine this collaborative process in more detail.

4.3.1.3 Collaboration between different participants relate to the EIZ

Unlike other China-built SEZs operated and managed at a governmental level abroad, the EIZ is managed completely by a Chinese private entity, Qiyuan (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). However, the characteristics as reflected in the collective convenience and policy protection provided by the bilateral governments distinguish the EIZ from individual foreign investment projects in Ethiopia (Zeng, 2015). Namely, the successful implementation of the EIZ depends on a broad cooperation between different actors including Chinese corporations (the developer and investors), the Ethiopian government, and the Chinese government. Figure 8 shows the three participants and their interrelations. Two types of interrelations stand out in the figure, namely, the interrelation between Chinese corporations and the Ethiopian government, and interrelation between Chinese corporations and the Chinese government.




Figure 8. Interrelations between different participants related to the EIZ

First, we look at the interrelations between Chinese corporations and the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian government supports the zone via financial and policy support, while the Chinese corporation, as the developer, is in charge of the establishment and operation of the zone. More specifically, according to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Qiyuan signed with the Ethiopian Investment Commission, Ethiopia as the host country provides preferential policies to support Qiyuan's liability (Gizaw, 2015; Ethiopian Embassy in Brussels, 2019). Table 15 summarizes the detailed roles of the participants. In terms of the role of the Ethiopian government, it fulfills the commitment related to building connecting infrastructure outside the EIZ such as railways and highways, as well as covering 30% of the cost related to infrastructure inside the EIZ (Zhang et al., 2018). To facilitate Qiyuan's job and other resident corporations' production, the government promised to offer a 99-year land utilization based on a concession rate and a 7-year income tax holiday for the developer and investors who focus on the export market (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). As reflected in the incentive policies, Ethiopia places high value on export-oriented investment projects, which bring investors of the EIZ 10% more foreign currency retention than the outsiders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017). Similar to the administration model of Suzhou Industrial Park, a one-stop institution that provides a set of simplified and efficient services for the needs of

products exports was established by the Ethiopian government inside the EIZ (The Worldfolio, 2016). In short, Ethiopian government structures financial, concessional, and institutional measures to support the relocation of Chinese corporations. In a similar vein, Chinese corporations serve as integral constituents of the country’s industrialization. According to the MoU, Qiyuan as the developer and owner, is responsible for infrastructure construction, operation, and marketing of the EIZ (see Table 15). The EIZ in return is in line with and supports Ethiopia’s home grown industrial development strategies and plans such as the Growth and Transformation Plan and Ethiopia Industrial Development Strategic Plan (2013 – 2025), which focuses on establishing Ethiopia as a manufacturing hub in Africa (Zhang et al., 2018). Sharing common goals such as developing export-oriented industries, the EIZ is highly acknowledged as one priority of Ethiopia’s newly initiated Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018; Ei-Rashidy, 2016).

Table 15. Roles of different participants related to the EIZ

Qiyuan	Ethiopian government	Chinese government
Develop infrastructure; Attract investment; Manage different relationships.	Commitment: taking charge of the outside infrastructure and 30% of the cost of the inside infrastructure; Incentives: tax holiday; cheap lands; 20% foreign currency retention; Administration: one-stop shop services related to export procedure on customs, commodity inspection, taxes, etc.	Policy guidance: the BRI; Diverse support to developers and investors: finance, consultation, credit insurance, various capital compensation, logistics, etc.

(Sources: Zhang et al., 2018; Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2017; The Worldfolio, 2016; Ding, 2018)

Regarding the interrelations between Chinese corporations and the Chinese government, development of the EIZ is enabled access to diversified supports from the Chinese government. In return, the EIZ benefits Chinese private investors who

play an important role in China's commercial pursuit in Africa. Specifically, in 2010, the Export-Import Bank of China provided stopgap funds to Qiyuan to ease its financial constraints and to assist in resuming the construction of the EIZ (Zhang et al., 2018). In addition, local governments, Jiangsu provincial government and Suzhou government, specifically offered the additional funds and credit as insurance to developers similar to Qiyuan who operates an industrial zone overseas (Finance Department & Commerce Department of Jiangsu Province, 2011; Suzhou Government, 2012). To facilitate the investment and operation of Chinese small manufacturers settled in the EIZ, the Chinese central government and provincial governments provide a variety of supportive measures including finance, investment prospect assessment, and compensation covering the expenditure of facilities, training, and services (see Table 15) (Ding, 2018). In the way, Chinese governments pave the way for Chinese corporations to relocate to Ethiopia, likewise, Chinese corporations act as supporters to implement China's African strategies on the ground. More specifically, the Chinese EIZ serves as a platform for Chinese small businesses "going out" in groups and transferring skills and development experience overseas, increasing China's influence in the region (ibid). In this sense, the EIZ is regarded as the foundation of China-Ethiopia cooperation in the economic sphere and an important constituent of the establishment of the "economic belt" in Ethiopia within the framework of China's BRI (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018).

Overall, the EIZ fulfills the strategies and interests of both China and Ethiopia, and thus is supported by and benefits from both governments. Chinese corporations take the leadership to coordinate different resources and relationships and act as a key determinant of the win-win cooperation between China and Ethiopia.

4.3.1.4 Progress related to the manufacturing-dominated EIZ

So far, 83 corporations have relocated to the EIZ, contributing a total investment of 200 million US Dollars (Zhang et al., 2018; Eastern Industrial Zone, n.d.). Among them, 56 corporations have started production and operation, and the output value reached 730 million US Dollars in 2017 (YIDAIYILU.Gov, 2018). Dominated by Chinese investors with only a few local and Western businesses relocating to the EIZ,

a close Chinese network has been built and managed by the developer, who plans to create more convenience and security for Chinese small and medium-sized companies investing in Ethiopia (Jiangsu Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export Firms, 2016). Positioned as Ethiopia's manufacturing base targeting export markets, the EIZ is specialized in textile and clothing, machinery and electrical equipment, construction materials (e.g., cement, metal, and ceramics), and services (Zhang et al., 2018). Huajian, for example, has established itself as the largest shoe making corporation in Ethiopia since it opened the first factory in the EIZ in 2012 (Xinhua, 2018b). Producing shoes for the brands such as Guess, Calvin Klein, and Nina, Huajian focuses on export markets including the United States and Europe with a label of "Made in Ethiopia" (United Nations, 2018; Jobson, 2013). So far, Huajian's growth in Ethiopia has been dramatic. The daily production capacity has been improved from 1 000 pairs of shoes to 8 000 pairs in four years, contributing to an export value of 80 million US Dollars in 2016 (The Economist, 2012; China Economic Net, 2017). The success of Huajian and the EIZ attracts Ethiopia's attention to Chinese experience and investment, and increases its expectation towards the Chinese model and engagement. In the next section, we will discuss the benefits and potential problems the EIZ brings.

4.3.1.5 Benefits and problems the EIZ brings to Ethiopia

As a milestone for successful experiment of Chinese industrial development model in Ethiopia, the EIZ and the Chinese investment it assembled played a crucial role for the growth and transformation of the country. First, in the economic sphere, the EIZ contributes to an increase in Chinese FDI and China-Ethiopia trade. China's outward FDI flowing to Ethiopia has increased dramatically since 2010 when the EIZ was officially resumed. The FDI jumped from 283 million US Dollars in 2010 to 1.97 billion US Dollars in 2017, a nearly 7-fold increase in a span of eight years (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China et al., 2018). Furthermore, a significant change in the trade performance with China can also be observed. Specifically, between 2007 and 2016, Ethiopia's export to China has grown steadily at an annual rate of 28.2%, consequently, China became Ethiopia's second largest export destination (CCTV, 2017). In 2017, the products Ethiopia exported to China reached

a value of 245 million US Dollars, accounting for 8.6% of its total exports (Xinhua, 2018c). The structure of exports has transferred from primarily raw materials to a diversity of agricultural products, textile and clothing, leather products, minerals, construction materials, and electrical and machinery equipment (Xu, Dieter, & Wang, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017). Over the past nine years, the EIZ and later established SEZs witnessed and contributed the significant changes, which means Ethiopia has been transferring from a traditional farming country to an export-led manufacturing center of Africa.

Second, in the social sphere, the EIZ provides jobs and skills training to local residents. Since the EIZ opened in 2010, the zone has created 13 000 jobs, directly contributing to a reduction in Ethiopian unemployment rate (Dadi et al., 2016). Huajian, for example, was reported to employ more than 3 200 local staff in 2014 and plans to create 50 000 jobs for locals by 2022 (Fana Broadcasting, 2014; Xinhua, 2017). In addition to creating employment opportunities, Chinese corporations in the EIZ transfer skills and technologies to local workers and regard skills training as one of their main commitments. According to Tadesse (2016, p. 19) who conducted an interview survey of 300 employees working in the EIZ, "96% of them responded they got appropriate training before they started the job and on the job training also". As the role model of corporate residents in the EIZ, Huajian has sent 500 local employees to its factories in China for half a year to two years training (Bräutigam, Weis, & Tang, 2018; Xinhua, 2018b). With the provision of jobs and new skills and technologies, the EIZ eases Ethiopia's social problems on one hand, and on the other hand serves as an incubator for local manufacturers, who will in the future become the core force of the country's industrialization.

Third, in the legislative and administrative sphere, the EIZ inspires Ethiopia to improve laws and governance of its SEZs. Before the EIZ settled in Ethiopia, the country had little experience on how to attract foreign investment and create an enabling environment for foreign investors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017). In contrast, the poor infrastructures and the gap in relevant laws and regulations that secured the rights and property of foreign investors made them hesitant about entering the Ethiopian market (Xu et al., 2018). However, the predicament has changed since the establishment of the EIZ. Its success inspired the Ethiopian government to establish more special industrial zones or parks

following the Chinese model and to develop an effective management system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2017). More specifically, two institutions, the Ethiopian Investment Commission and the Industrial Parks Development Corporation, were established to take charge of the management of the 14 newly built or planned SEZs (Reuters, 2018b). The management mechanism is characterized by one-stop shop services built on the Suzhou industrial Park model, which is promoted by Suzhou city where Qiyuan comes from (Xu et al., 2018). Furthermore, considering the obstacles of regulating more SEZs without legislation, the Ethiopian government released the Industrial Park Proclamation in 2015, which defines the rights and obligations of the developers and resident investors of the SEZs (Zhang et al., 2018; Embassy of Ethiopia, 2016). By implementing a series of administrative, legislative, and economic reforms, Ethiopia is now well equipped to have the most SEZs in Africa and is on the way to replicate China's industrial wonder by sustaining a consecutive growth. However, there exists potential obstacles that the country might meet or has met in the process of promoting the SEZs-focused development.

To start with, Ethiopia lacks ownership and independence of its industrialization. As discussed above, the ownership of the EIZ is taken up by the Chinese, in comparison, foreign and local businesses are less involved. Particularly, Ethiopia has failed to foster the competitiveness of local corporations, leaving the domestic involvement at a low-level (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). Consequently, the development of Ethiopia is becoming increasingly dependent on Chinese investment, which means the country is vulnerable to China's growth and strategies. Second, local employees are treated unequally compared to the Chinese. Specifically, local workers are paid lower wages (Ding, 2018). Furthermore, Chinese take decision-making and managerial positions such as directors, senior managers, accountants, technicians, and quality inspectors (Ding, 2018; Kailemaia, 2017; Mohan & Lampert, 2012). In contrast, local workers have less promotion opportunities and are restricted to low-tech work (ibid). Third, transportation especially fast-speed railways that connect the EIZ and more SEZs under construction to the Djibouti port, the major channel for Ethiopia to get entry into the world market, is in a desperate need of development (Foster & Morella, 2011; Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). China is engaging actively to connect the landlocked country to the neighbouring nations and international trade

routes. In the next section, we will look at one of the connecting transport Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway China recently built.

4.3.2 Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

4.3.2.1 Challenges related to infrastructure development in Ethiopia

Inspired by China's success in developing and improving infrastructure networks to stimulate its trade and industries, Ethiopia is on the way to build modernized and integrated infrastructure and services (Assefa et al., 2016; China Daily, 2018c). The major challenges for the infrastructure network across Ethiopia relate to the geographical conditions as well as finance. Ethiopia will need an annual budget of 5.2 billion US Dollars to develop its infrastructure, however, the government is struggling with financial constraints (Foster & Morella, 2011). More than 40% of Ethiopia's infrastructure expenditure is from external financiers especially China, who is becoming the nation's largest creditor with a contribution of more than 25% of external funds (The World Bank, 2018; Cabestan, 2012). In terms of geographical restriction, isolation and capital-concentrated distribution of agricultural and commercial activities are two major factors that the Ethiopian transportation development needs to adapt to (Foster & Morella, 2011). Specifically, Ethiopia as a land-locked country, imports and exports approximately 95% of its goods via the Djibouti port (Limi et al., 2019). In addition, as a traditional agricultural country dominated by a wide-range of rural areas, the capital city Addis Ababa serves as the economic and populous center surrounded by industrial towns and secondary towns (World Bank Blog, 2017). Therefore, the priority is to develop a road and rail transport network following a model of hub (Addis Ababa) - spoke (surrounding secondary towns) and to create connection with the Djibouti port (Vandercasteelen et al., 2018; Foster & Morella, 2011). The recently operated Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway is an example of the projects China funded and built based on Ethiopia's conditions and demands.

4.3.2.2 Chinese infrastructure development in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway

In the 20th Century, the original rail line linking Ethiopia and its major external Djibouti port was initially constructed by French actors, however, it was suspended in 2000 due to a series of problems such as bad governance, short of maintenance, and insufficient commercial orientation (ICA, 2007; Mohapatra, 2016; Tarrosy & Voros, 2018). In collaboration with China, the railway was resumed by the Ethiopian government in 2007, with a target of establishing rail connection to industrial zones, warehousing, and logistics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2017). Following a strategic design, the 756-km Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway connects the capital Addis Ababa with the Doraleh port in the Red Sea (Mohapatra, 2016). It is estimated to serve 30% of the population in Ethiopia with a 685-km national line passing through its main industrial towns (Mohapatra, 2016; Vhumbune, 2016). Cooperatively funded by the Export-Import Bank of China who provided 70% of the total 3.4 billion US Dollars loans and the Ethiopian government who covered the remaining 30%, the rail project was completed by two Chinese corporations, the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) in 2016 (Xinhua, 2018d). Serving as the first modern electrified line using Chinese technological standards in both Ethiopia and Africa, the successful relaunch of the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway is owed to the partnerships between Ethiopia and China (Xinhua, 2018d; Global Time, 2019). In the next section, we will explore the interrelations between different participants and their roles.

4.3.2.3 Collaboration between different participants involved in the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

Figure 9 shows the interrelations between different participants. Similar to the players involved in the EIZ project, the Chinese government, Chinese corporations, and the Ethiopian government are the major actors of the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway. Generally speaking, three differences between the two projects stand out. First, ownership is different. Unlike the EIZ, which is a privately-owned Chinese project, the

rail project belongs to the Ethiopian government and serves the Ethiopian public and trade. This connects to the second difference, namely, Ethiopian institutions act as coordinators to manage and supervise the project, while the EIZ is completely in charge of a Chinese private entity. The third difference lies on the involvement of the Chinese government. China funded the project, making the railway in nature a China-backed infrastructure. In this sense, the Chinese government has involved itself as a creditor of the project. The three differences suggest that the interrelationships between the actors and their roles for the rail project are distinct.




Figure 9. Interrelation between different participants related to the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

First, the interrelation between the Ethiopian government and Chinese corporations consists of authorizers and contractors. Table 16 summarizes the roles of participants in more detail. To effectively manage railway projects in the country, the Ethiopian government established an institution named the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) (Xinhua, 2018d). As the owner of the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway, its central role is the authorization of contracts (see Table 16). Specifically, it granted the CREC an engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) contract to build a 320-km rail line starting from Addis Ababa to Mieso in 2011, and contracted the

CCECC to build the remaining 436-km line connecting Mieso to the Port of Doraleh in 2012 (Xinhua, 2018d; Mohapatra, 2016). After the two corporations completed the construction task, the ERC awarded them an operation and maintenance contract for a duration of six years (China Daily, 2019a; Tarrosy & Voros, 2019). With regard to the role of corporations, the tasks assigned to the CREC and the CCECC consist of construction and operation (see Table 16). The construction stage was characterized by the export of technologies and products. Namely, the railway project was undertaken using the Chinese electrified railway standard (China Daily, 2019b; Sun, 2017). As a consequence, locomotives, train carriages, and equipment were imported from China, to make sure the same standard is maintained (Sun, 2017). The major task of the operation phase lies on technical training. This is regarded as development assistance to Ethiopia and included in the agreement made with the ERC. Specifically, the CREC and the CCECC were committed to train 600 local workers with a focus on systematizing standards and rules relating to the management and operation of the railway (CGTN, 2018; Tarrosy & Voros, 2019). Namely, by 2023, the CREC and the CCECC are expected to hand over the operation and maintenance to well trained local staff (Railway Gazette, 2016; Tarrosy & Voros, 2019).

Table 16. Roles of different participants related to the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

Ethiopian government	Chinese corporations	Chinese government
Award contracts; Cover 30% of the project fund; Manage different relationships; Repay loans.	Construct the railway; Operate the railway; Provide training.	Policy guidance: the BRI; Provide 70% of the project fund (loan).

(Sources: Xinhua, 2018d; China Daily, 2019a; Tarrosy & Voros, 2019; CGTN, 2018; Railway Gazette, 2016)

Second, we continue with the interrelation between the Chinese government and Chinese corporations. The Chinese government supported the rail project with the

provision of 70% of the loan credited from the BRI (see Table 16), while Chinese corporations fulfill their roles for the BRI as the policy performers and dominant players in Africa (Railway Gazette, 2016). Specifically, supported by the BRI which aims to establish regional trade and economic corridors through infrastructure connectivity, the finance provided by the Chinese policy bank must be tied to specific projects undertaken by Chinese corporations (Cassel et al., 2010). Namely, the capital helps Chinese corporations to secure contracts and become dominant constructors in Ethiopian infrastructure market. In return, the involvement of Chinese corporations serve China's strategies particularly the BRI to build a transport network for the economic belt composed of the SEZs China developed in Ethiopia (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018). Furthermore, it reinforces China's economic position as Ethiopia's largest trading partner with an increasing influence in the country.

Third, the interrelation between the Ethiopian government and the Chinese government pertains to that of borrower and lender. More specifically, China supports infrastructure development in Ethiopian with its expertise in train construction and substantial finance, which Western countries and banks hesitate to offer because of the long-term return and internal democratic and social problems (Alozie & Thomas, 2016; Wang, 2007; Mourao, 2017). According to the agreement between China and Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government will need to repay the loans in 30 years (Reuters, 2018c; Tarrosy & Voros, 2019). However, the relationship between China and Ethiopia is not restricted to merely construction and repayment of loans. Cooperation between China and Ethiopia focus on establishing a national and regional train network, something, which both parties will benefit from, the so-called win-win pursuit. In the short term, the railway facilitates Ethiopia's trade and industrial development through a more connected and convenient transportation corridor along its industrial centers. In the long term, Ethiopia will need the rail project to boost its economy and ease social development problems such as unemployment, something we turn to in more detail later.

Overall, the railway help to fulfill Ethiopia's developmental demands and is in line with China's BRI, thus, it is a flagship project for Ethiopia-China cooperation (Xinhua, 2018d). The Ethiopian government takes the leadership to manage different resources and relationships to proceed with the project, while Chinese corporations are the actual performers putting the win-win cooperation into practice by working

closely with the Chinese government. Now, we finally turn to the operational dynamics of the project to better understand the longest electrified trans-region railway China ever built in Africa.

4.3.2.4 Progress related to the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

The Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway started operation in January 2018 (Xinhua, 2019b). The electrified railway attracts more than 1 000 passages per day and is expected to “carry millions of tons of cargo per year” (Muller, 2019, para. 5; China Daily, 2019a). As a regional railway, it takes 12 hours from Addis Ababa to the Djibouti port at an average speed of 90 km per hour and a maximum speed of 120 km per hour, largely saving the time spent on the road (China Daily, 2019a). To put this into perspective, the old-fashioned diesel locomotives previously operational on this route travelled completed the same route anywhere between three to seven days (Vhumbunu, 2016). Another major achievement has been providing affordable access to local citizens. The introduction of this new route was accompanied by a 50% reduction in train tickets (Tarrosy & Voros, 2019). This means that taking the railway from Addis Ababa to Dire Dawa, an industrial town located 450 km far away from the capital, only costs 11 US Dollars, compared to 12-14 US Dollars by bus and 70 US Dollars by air (China Daily, 2019a). With the advantages of shortening trips, reducing traffic congestion, and saving money, the Addis Ababa -Djibouti Railway is on its way to serve local and regional trade and public movement to fulfill its commercial and social roles.

4.3.2.5 Benefits and concerns related to the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway

The benefits the rail project brings are reflected in two aspects. First, the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway contributes to the regional trade corridor through transport connectivity. Connecting Ethiopia’s industrial towns to the world market through the Djibouti port, the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway is included in Ethiopia’s 4744-km trade route, which consists of eight rail lines stretching to neighbouring countries

including Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan (Mohapatra, 2016; Assefa et al., 2016). Furthermore, the rail project matches well to China's BRI strategies to build rail connections between East and South Africa with a focus on improving transport along China's economic belt with SEZs and private-owned factories at its core. Specifically, the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway will be connected to Kenya's Mombasa Nairobi Railway and its extended lines to form regional connectivity across six East African countries including Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Breuer, 2017). The Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway is strategically important to both Ethiopia and China, and contributes to the establishment of the land-locked country Ethiopia as the transportation and manufacturing hub in East Africa and more broadly, Africa.

Second, the rail project creates employment and training opportunities for local residents. For the African authorities, expectations towards China lies not only in the connectivity provided by the infrastructure projects China built, but also in the employment opportunities and advance technologies the projects contribute. As stated by Kamissa Camara, a policy adviser of Malian president, "We want a strategic relationship. Not just 'you build us a bridge and we'll give you money'" (Financial Times, 2018, para. 4). According to the general director in the Ethiopia-Djibouti Standard Gauge Railway Share Company who is in charge of operating and maintaining the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway, the company has so far employed over 1 000 locals, 200 workers from Djibouti, and 700 Chinese staff (China Daily, 2019a). In three years, the company is estimated to employ up to 3 000 locals (Global Times, 2019). As discussed above, the specialized Chinese workers have been employed to train the local workers to operate the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway during the six-year extended contract (CGTN, 2018). So far, as reported by the Chinese media, 60 local staffs have been trained with technical knowledge and skills, and in the near future these trainees will become drivers and operators of the Ethiopia-Djibouti trains (China Daily, 2019a).

Overall, providing Ethiopia quick access to Africa's maritime trade route, serving Ethiopia and China's strategies to build regional economic corridors, and solving the historical maintenance problem, the China funded Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway will improve Ethiopia's influence as a regional economic hub and China's strategic BRI

partner in East Africa. However, the 3.4 billion US Dollars loan, which seems beyond Ethiopia's affordability is becoming a debated topic in the international community.

With a 12.3 billion US Dollars loan from the Chinese policy bank, Ethiopia has been the second biggest borrower of China's loans recently (Bräutigam & Hwang, 2016). Particularly, the loans used for the Addis Ababa - Djibouti Railway amount to 3% of the nation's GDP in 2017. According to the agreement made with China, the Ethiopian government will need to repay the money in 10 years (Tarrosy & Voros, 2019). However, it failed to start commercial operation from mid-2016 according to the original plan due to construction delays and power outages (Fowler, 2019; Chen, 2019). This most likely means that Ethiopia will have difficulties repaying their loan on time. While China agreed to extend the debt payment period to 30 years, it is still unknown whether the Ethiopian government is able to secure profits from the project on the one hand or what will happen if Ethiopia defaults on the loans on the other hand (Muller, 2019; Reuters, 2018c). For Ethiopia and other recipient countries in Africa, easy access to billions of dollars from China in comparison to Western countries to ease their financial constraints has enabled them to develop their homegrown agendas to boost growth; however, excessively binding domestic development with external capital will lead to passivity in bilateral political and economic affairs (Dahir, 2018).

Chinese involvement, as discussed above, is characterized by an integration of the economic belt and development belt. Namely, China on the one hand creates different platforms for corporations to go out and invest overseas, on the other hand, it helps to establish infrastructure networks to connect regional economic corridors. The BRI promoted in Africa, is consistent with African homegrown strategic plans. Thusly, it shares common goals and interests that serve as the foundation for so-called win-win cooperation and mutual benefits. With a development package of capital, development models, as well as skills and technologies included in almost every project undertaken in Africa, China is establishing itself as the most important development partner who knows what Africa needs with a wide-range of involvement across the continent (see Appendix D to check more countries and projects).

4.4 Conclusion

China's establishment in Africa is in line with domestic and foreign policies and strategies that are adapted to socio-economic development demands and increasing international influence as a global economic and maritime power. Specifically, as represented in the policies, the China-Africa relationship changed from political allies to a new strategic partnership, which is currently transforming into comprehensive strategic partners. In line with the changing relationship, the focus of China-Africa cooperation transferred from aid to investment and trade, and finally switched to all-dimensional cooperation related to a wide-range of areas. The changes of China-Africa interrelation are dependent on dynamic political and economic interests of China at different times. Namely, China's initial pursuit in Africa relied on the One China principle during 1950s to 1990s, after which China dramatically increased investment and consumption during 1990s to 2010s, and followed by a global power with peaceful rise in a multipolar world since 2010s. Guided by the policies especially policies made after 2010, China increasingly strengthens involvement and cooperation with Africa as evident in the 236 projects investigated in Sub-Saharan Africa. Covering 46 SSA countries. Chinese engagement is associated with a broad array of domains related to infrastructure, commodities, and services, and different types of involvement with an integration of aid, loans, business investment, and partnership. While Chinese projects are distributed across a wide-range of countries, they are limited to specific regional priorities, which are closely bounded to Chinese political and economic interests characterized by political legitimacy, security, resources, geostrategy, and historical ties. Overall, China's African policies and strategies and the resulting allocation of different resources in Africa reveal China's positions towards itself and the increasing importance of Africa as a key constituent of its global strategy. Chinese involvement, with the support of political and economic advantage is in nature centered by how Chinese corporations pursue "going out" performance in African countries.

While China strategically establishes itself as the dominant player in Africa, the unprecedented involvement brings immense development opportunities to the continent. Focusing on business and society, the pragmatic Chinese involvement, particularly substantial finance, railways and power plants, labor-intensive

manufacturing, as well as skills training and technology transfer, tackles Africa's socio-economic problems such as financial and technical constraints, lack of regional connectivity, and unemployment that restrict its development. In this sense, Chinese commitment in Africa in many ways stimulates the visions of the African Union centered on the Agenda 2063, which aims to build "integrated high speed train network", "free trade area", and grand dams across the continent (African Union, 2014, p. 1). As China increasingly dominates economic cooperation with Africa, it is establishing itself as Africa's most important partner that pursues a win-win cooperation and mutual benefits. Particularly, the BRI with a focus on infrastructure and trade development, has the potential to increase Africa's integration and international influence as the most promising emerging economies.

However, unequally distributed resources, a prerequisite of Chinese investment, and unaffordable debt constitute underlying challenges that Africa faces. Specifically, in terms of the distribution of resources, some countries tend to benefit more from Chinese involvement while others benefit less. By utilizing economic and political leverage, a more advanced China tends to take a lead in the relationship and agendas setting with Africa, i.e., binding infrastructure contracts with loans (Cassel et al., 2010). The major purpose of the allocation of diverse resources in this regard lies in enhancing the competitiveness and dominance of Chinese corporations in Africa. Furthermore, Africa tends to be overly dependent on external investment and aid, particularly billions dollars of debts credited from China as discussed in the Ethiopian case. This makes it more vulnerable to external intervention (Levitt, 1989) and restricts its development to the growth of foreign investors and financiers, i.e., China. In case of a potential debt crisis and to capitalize on the development opportunities China brings, African countries will need to react strategically and reinforce governance. Particularly, a sustainable credit mechanism based on its domestic needs and budget is needed, replacing the risky model of resources in exchange of loans (Alves, 2013). For example, African countries will need to combine the repayment of loans with efforts to maintain its development progress and seek opportunities of national and international cooperation. More specifically, they need to create an enabling investment environment with a focus on security, make preferential policies to attract external investors, and increase the involvement of local businesses and cooperation with neighbouring countries in terms of sharing debts and risks (Alden, Wu, & Sidiropoulos, 2017).

In sum, China is involved itself intensively in Africa through its BRI. Combining its involvement with its global strategy, China is pursuing to be a global economic and political power. However, China's tremendous involvement covering a diversity of areas and focusing on socio-economic development, distinguishes itself from the traditional donors. Its promotion of a win-win cooperation based on mutual complementarities and needs suggests an alternative approach to deal with the relationship with African countries.

We have presented three studies which provide different perspectives to illustrate Chinese involvement and its roles in Africa. The findings of the three studies contribute to divergent understandings and views related to China, Africa, and Chinese involvement in Africa. We will combine and discuss the main findings and implications based on the studies in the following chapter.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

The present research project addressed the bigger question about China's evolving global identity by focusing on its involvement in African development. Specifically, it sought to address the questions: How do mainstream scholarship conceptualize Chinese involvement in Africa? To what extent does China follow a Western or distinctive Chinese approach when engaging in Africa? And, how do Chinese policies manifest in Africa? Bringing together three perspectives on China's involvement in Africa – namely how China in Africa is portrayed from a mainstream academic, a Chinese political, and an applied perspective – the project reflects emergent and alternative positions towards China, towards Africa, and towards Chinese engagement in Africa over time.

Decades ago, Western actors still dominated what some of them considered a *civilizing mission* aimed at modernizing African political and economic systems (de Sousa Santos, 2002; Oren, 1990). More specifically, the World Bank enforced the Washington Consensus in developing countries in Africa, Latin-America, and Asia, thereby securing Western influence and trade interest in these countries (Owusu, 2003; Heidhues & Obare, 2011). The Washington Consensus focused on macroeconomic development and valued the roles of the market in distributing resources and picking winners (Williamson, 2009; Naim, 2000). In contrast, it undervalued the importance of social development and the government's contribution to development (Stiglitz, 2008a). Countries who implemented the Washington Consensus were required to open their markets and reduce tariffs to facilitate trade with the West (Naim, 2000; Broad, 2004). The neoliberal approach, however, failed to foster any of the expected growth in Africa. For decades, African countries struggled to develop until the dominance of the West in Africa became challenged by China with its reappearance and increasing presence on the continent (Zhao, 2014).

Essentially, it is the distinct political and economic system that China offers that make it a viable alternative approach to development. Based on its own domestic development, the Chinese alternative is captured by the Beijing Consensus. On the contrary to the Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus highlights the simultaneous importance of economic and social development (Ramo, 2004; Turin,

2010). It promotes a close public-private partnership typified by the leadership of the Chinese government (Turin, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2013). When promoted in Africa, this alternative Chinese approach promises cooperation between China and Africa, which is strikingly different to past cooperation between the West and Africa. Based on Chinese financial support and on initiatives such as the BRI, Chinese business involvement has adapted to the African context and focuses on socio-economic development. This alternative has gained considerable popularity and is intensively discussed in academic circles, the media, and the international community (Chen, 2015; Alozie & Thomas, 2016). We analyzed mainstream academic articles, Chinese newspapers, and Chinese projects in Africa to gain a more nuanced understanding of the distinctive Chinese approach and contribution to African development.

5.1 Summary of the main findings of the dissertation

Study 1 explored the representation of Chinese involvement in Africa from a mainstream academic perspective by analyzing academic publications using Content Configuration Analysis (CCA). Based on our analysis, three main findings stand out:

First, mainstream academic texts tended to use Western criteria such as Eurocentric norms, rules, and standards to evaluate China and Africa respectively, as well as China's engagement in Africa. More specifically, the West was presented as the civilized, modernized, and wealthy role model. Africa was portrayed in oppositional terms as non-democratic, child-like, and poor and characterized as suffering from development and governance problems. In contrast, China was portrayed as experiencing dramatic economic growth, with a powerful government, advanced technologies and skills. However, taking Western standards as the point of reference, China was criticized for disrespecting laws and lacking transparency and democracy.

Second, academic discourse presented Chinese involvement in Africa and the relationship between China and Africa as similar to the historical involvement of the West in Africa. Specifically, the dominant characterization pertained to China recolonizing Africa. China was presented as instrumentalizing political and economic leverage – such as development assistance – to exploit African resources and exert

power over African leaders. Consequently, China was regarded as a neocolonial power in Africa. A small, emerging sub-strand in the academic articles mentioned how China supported African development. According to this perspective, China was portrayed as a partner who provided resources such as finance and infrastructure to facilitate development in Africa.

Finally, based on the above we conclude that academics tend to adopt a Western perspective to evaluate China and Africa respectively, as well as Chinese involvement in Africa. Academic Eurocentrism is evident in the fact that the accounts of Chinese involvement in Africa prioritize similarities to Western involvement and downplays differences. However, mainstream academic discourse underrepresents non-Western perspectives, especially Chinese ones. Therefore, in the next study, we explored China's involvement in Africa from a Chinese perspective.

Study 2 analyzed Chinese involvement in Africa from a Chinese political perspective as expressed in state-owned Chinese media. This offered an alternative perspective to the mainstream academic one. Specifically, we studied the development approach China pursued in Africa and how it is similar too or different from China's domestic approach to development. Again, we highlight three findings:

The first relates to three similarities between the approach China adopted domestically and in Africa connecting to the relationship between the development of the economy, society, and the environment; the active role of government; and the role of technology in development. Specifically, Chinese newspapers portrayed the development of the economy, society, and the environment in both contexts as balanced and equally important. Accordingly, social and economic development were simultaneous priorities. As one of the dominant contributors to development, government actors played an important role in guiding and facilitating the involvement of Chinese corporations. Finally, within the public-private collaborative mechanism, Chinese corporations regarded innovation and technology as central driving forces to foster development. These similarities illustrated the extent to which the development approach China overlapped in both domestic and African as they aligned with the Beijing Consensus.

Second, there are also three differences between the development approach adopted domestically and in Africa. In Africa, China placed a stronger emphasis on social development; the roles of government actors differed; and technology transfer

and infrastructural development were more prominent. Specifically, Chinese newspapers emphasized the social progress and related human capital development of Africans to a greater extent than in China. When operating abroad, the legal role of the Chinese government was more restricted than in China and the government therefore focused on providing assistance to Chinese corporations, such as managing strategies, finance, and friendly China-Africa relationship to facilitate corporations. Alongside the Chinese government, African government and institutions also played an important role as development contributors. They collaborated with the Chinese government and corporations in providing rules, standards, initiatives, and agendas to which Chinese actors must adhere. The collaboration between the Chinese and African governments made it possible for Chinese corporations to focus on skills and technology transfer and infrastructural development in Africa and to contribute to socio-economic development. According to the Chinese newspapers, this made technology and infrastructure more prominent in Africa compared to China.

Third, based on these similarities and differences, we conclude that, beyond adapting the Beijing Consensus to the African context and local needs, the development approach China follows in Africa aligns well with the Beijing Consensus. From the Chinese government perspective, China was generally portrayed as a development partner who released visions and policies and who initiated collaborative agendas to foster African socio-economic growth. To gain a more nuanced understanding of this adapted Beijing Consensus in practice, the next study examined China's actual involvement in Africa.

Study 3 adopted an applied perspective to investigate Chinese projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. We identified three findings.

First, Chinese projects covered a wide range of countries from East to West, and Southern Africa. Chinese involvement focused on high speed electrified trains, trade-oriented special economic zones, large power plants, and people-centered development assistance. These projects tended to facilitate Africa's socio-economic visions. Specifically, through finance, connecting facilities, transferring technologies and skills, promoting trade, and providing healthcare, education, and job opportunities, Chinese involvement was in line with and contributed to home grown African development initiatives such as Agenda 2063.

Second, China's involvement was guided and supported by the Chinese government, which regarded Africa as a key constituent in China's global strategy. Particularly, located on the ancient silk road and serving as maritime pivot connecting Asia and Europe, Africa was positioned as an important partner in China's BRI. Different from Western initiatives in which development assistance came with strings attached, the BRI led Chinese corporations to engage in the areas to which the West hesitated to contribute. Specifically, the high cost infrastructure financed by Chinese policy banks, and the unprecedented opportunities as reflected in enormous projects varying in a broad domains, made China an attractive alternative partner in Africa.

Third, intensive Chinese involvement brought challenges to both China and Africa. Specifically, Chinese involvement was determined by China's political and economic interests. These include its One China policy, security concerns, constraints in natural resources, and Chinese geostrategy. Accordingly, countries with abundant resources and geographic advantages tended to benefit more from Chinese involvement, while countries that disrespected the One China policy and struggled with security tended to benefit less. In addition, China tended to tether its financial support to infrastructure contracts carried out by Chinese corporations. This means that Chinese capital investment in Africa secured the dominance of Chinese corporations in the African infrastructure market, which limited the involvement of local corporations and other international institutions. The considerable number of loans to finance these projects led to debt concerns and increased the financial burden on African countries. Overly dependent on foreign financial support, Africa was vulnerable to the growth of its external investors. Handling the debt problem of African countries has become a considerable challenge for both China, Africa, and the international community.

Integrated ***summary of the three studies***. Overall, adopting different perspectives, the three studies provide both convergent and divergent findings. They represent different understandings of the identities of Africa and China. While the academic perspective is biased towards Western views on China and Africa, the political and applied perspectives offer perspectives, which contribute to an alternative understanding of the identities of Africa and China in Africa. Table 17 provides an overview of the perspectives on Africa and on China in Africa based on the three studies. From a Western-dominated mainstream academic perspective in Study 1,

Africa was portrayed as weak and with irresponsible governments that were prone to bad governance; as dependent on foreign assistance; and as underdeveloped with many social and economic problems. In contrast, in the non-Western perspectives presented in Studies 2 and 3, China regarded Africa as an important and strategic partner with whom China engaged in multiple dimensions of win-win cooperation and vice versa. From a Western perspective, China was regarded as a competitor to the traditional donors, was positioned as a colonizing power in Africa, which exploited African resources, was considered to be exerting political pressure on African leaders and was portrayed as pursuing hidden geopolitical agendas. However, from a Chinese political perspective and an applied perspective, China followed an alternative development approach that was addressing problems that the West and its Washington Consensus were unable to solve. With its intensified involvement, China provided unprecedented development opportunities to Africa, targeting areas that the West has not contributed towards by providing substantial finance, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technical and skills transfer. In this regard, China played an important role in contributing to Africa's socio-economic development.

Table 17. Summary of main conclusions of three perspectives

Three perspectives	Africa	China in Africa
Study 1: Academic perspective	Irresponsible agency, dependent and child-like, underdeveloped.	China in Africa is similar to the West in Africa; China is recolonizing Africa.
Study 2: Chinese political perspective	Active participation in development by African governments and African corporations.	China pursues a distinct development approach in line with its domestic Beijing Consensus to foster development in Africa.
Study 3: Applied perspective	Strategically important partner of China's BRI.	China engages in the areas to which the West hesitates to contribute; China promotes socio-economic development in Africa.

Overall, this dissertation thus contributes novel understandings of the identities of contemporary China and Africa. The findings drawn from Chinese political and the applied perspectives diverge from the findings of the Western-centric academic perspective. Contrary to the Western portrayals, China does not follow a Western model when operating in Africa. Instead, it pursues a distinct development approach and collaborates with African partners in diverse development areas in which the West is insufficiently involved. In this sense, from a Chinese and current perspective, China acts as a renewed global power who pursues win-win cooperation and mutual development with its partners. In contrast to the Western positioning of Africa as a child who cannot manage itself, the Chinese perspective on Africa is that of an emerging power and important partner of China's BRI. Based on these findings, our research ascribes alternative identities to China and Africa that differ from the prevalent Western views. These new Chinese and African identities – especially the facilitating roles of China in Africa and across the globe as well as Africa's role in China's BRI – reveal the changing positions of China and Africa on the world stage. Compared to the traditional donors, China has renewed itself as a distinct and alternative global power who pursues a different development involvement in Africa and globally. This representation of China and China in Africa helps us to better understand China's development visions, such as the BRI in Africa, which might facilitate reciprocal understanding, multilateral cooperation, and mutual benefits among different parties.

Limitations. While the dissertation includes diverse research perspectives that each applies systematic analyses, it is constrained by some limitations related to data and to the specific perspectives that are taken.

The first limitation concerns the data sourced. We used existing accessible sources to sample data; no additional data was collected through interviews and surveys. For example, in Study 1, we collected data from academic publications, such as academic articles, book chapters and books. This sample included publications with various levels of access. While some (such as open access academic articles) were fully open access, others (such as academic papers that charged fees) required subscription by an individual or institution. Accordingly, our data did not cover academic papers in progress, political and institutional reports, and non-academic publications. In a similar vein, for Study 2 and 3, we collected data from Chinese

newspapers and diverse online sources (e.g. mainstream media from China, Africa, and the West; reports and news released by government and international institutions, etc.). This means that our data did not cover small media and non-institutional sources such as personal social networks. Given limited resources, this is an affordable data collection method. Collecting data in both China and Africa would have been very expensive and difficult. For example, collecting data by interviewing senior Chinese government officials to understand China's development approach would not have been feasible. Therefore, data from Chinese state-owned newspapers was considered a sufficient reflection of the visions, ideologies, agendas, and achievements valued by the Chinese government. Thus, while we did not conduct face-to-face investigations, we collected data in an affordable and efficient way, benefiting from the special Chinese context where Chinese mainstream media supports and promotes the government's policies and agendas.

The second limitation is connected to the first. Our focus was on representations, that is how the data at our disposal portray China, Africa, and China in Africa. We could not control for the quality of the data. For example, in Study 1, we examined how China, Africa, and Chinese involvement in Africa were presented in academic papers. And in Study 2, we discussed and compared China's development approach in China and Africa by analyzing the development actions and outcomes identified in newspaper articles. To avoid confusion, we used words such as "portray," "position," or "represent" to emphasize that we systematically studied China in Africa from different perspectives as they are represented in different discourses.

While we illustrate the limitations of this research, it contributes to current theories and studies related to Chinese involvement in Africa by providing diverging understandings, research perspectives, and methods. Furthermore, this research has implications for research and policy and makes recommendations concerning challenges associated with relations between China and Africa. The next section will focus on the contributions of the research.

5.2 Contributions of the dissertation

This research is part of a larger project on the relationships between business and society in multicontextual and multicultural settings. The focus on China adds a distinctive contribution to this overall project. It sheds light on the specificities of China and its involvement in Africa and the roles that Chinese corporations play in Africa's socio-economic development. Chinese corporations contribute to Africa's social and economic development by constructing infrastructure, investing in labor-intensive manufacturing, transferring skills and technology, and by providing health and education assistance. This involvement is led by Chinese governmental policies rather than corporate strategies or corporate responsibilities developed by corporations themselves. This study thereby reveals a distinct Chinese foreign development model characterized by a close relationship between government and corporations. Specifically, Chinese corporations dominate China's involvement in Africa in a broad array of countries and sectors and they do so under the policy guidance and financial support of the Chinese government. As with the Beijing consensus within China itself, the Chinese government also promotes global strategies such as the BRI overseas, and Chinese corporations act as followers and performers to conduct diverse infrastructure and manufacturing projects in different contexts. This harmonious collaborative relationship between politics and business means that studies related to China contributes complementary perspectives to studies involving other agents, especially ones in Western settings.

With regard to contributions to current theories, this research provides different and contrasting understandings of China, Africa, and Chinese involvement in Africa in comparison to current mainstream literature. Namely, by adopting a Chinese perspective and a perspective of actual involvement, this research presents an alternative identity of China and Africa to the Western-centered academic views. The findings indicate that the relationship between China and Africa as well as the roles they play in the globe are changing quickly. However, current mainstream theories are dominated by outdated Eurocentric perceptions, which tend to follow a narrow and condescending historical perspective. Therefore, this research contributes to contemporary studies by introducing non-Western perspectives that take contextual and cultural factors into account when doing research. The findings and adoption of

non-Western perspectives and a Chinese perspective in particular, are expected to provide references to future studies and inspire academics to focus more on changing international relations, a renewed China, and a rising Africa.

In terms of contributions to studies of China in Africa, this research provides a mixed methods approach to systematically study Chinese involvement and its development model pursued in Africa. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this research illustrates how these methods can be integrated and strategically applied to enhance our knowledge on the contextual and cultural characteristics of Chinese involvement in Africa and the roles of China in African development, and based on this to contribute to our understanding of an alternative identify of China and Africa.

Finally, this research provides policy implication and recommendation. Specifically, while China contributes to African development and renews its influence as a global political and economic power, there remains concerns and potential challenges that restricts the development of both China and Africa. This dissertation presents problems related to the Chinese involvement in Africa and will provide policy recommendations in response to current challenges (see more detail in Section 5.4). These challenges on the one hand, show that China's BRI in Africa is intensifying and ongoing; on the other hand, the challenges imply that more attention and negotiation from multilateral parties are needed to proceed with the BRI in the direction expected by the diverse stakeholders and in a ways that create mutual benefits for these stakeholders. These findings related to the BRI in Africa and to multilateral cooperation on issues, such as finance and debt, provide references for future studies in this field. In the following sections, we will discuss the academic and policy implications and provide recommendations for researchers and policy makers to address challenges relating to Chinese involvement in Africa.

5.3 Academic implications and recommendations

As far as academic positions towards China, Africa, and Chinese involvement in Africa is concerned, two implications follow.

First, academics tend to adopt a dated socio-historical perspective when evaluating Africa. Relying on such a neo-colonial gaze, these academics regard Africa as inferior and subordinate to the West. Academics still understand the relations between Africa and the West in terms of an unequal relationship. Namely, Africa is portrayed as underdeveloped, dependent, and child-like compared to a modernized and wealthy West who acts as a teacher and donor on the continent. Thus, although times have changed, current academic publications tend to disregard the ways in which Africa has changed as well as the ways in which the relationship between Africa and the West has altered. This dated historical perspective is also adopted when these academics portray Africa in relation to China. While a few academic papers see Africa's potential as an emerging power, especially in multilateral events, the still dominant academic view follows the dated Western thinking affected by colonial history. In this way, this dissertation showed the persistent prejudice rooted in such dated historical thinking.

Based on this finding, we recommend that academics turn their attention to the changing international relations and to a rising Africa, which has the potential to play a positive role in international affairs. Rather than follow a historical model to evaluate Africa, academics may adopt alternative perspectives to study Africa's importance, function, and needs in multilateral cooperation between the West, China, and other emerging economies. Particularly, the involvement of BRICS countries in Africa in the recent decade and their cooperation models may provide important points of reference for academics to rethink the changing identity and role of Africa as a rising political power in a multi-polar world.

Second, similar to the Western-centric views on Africa and Africa's relationship with the West, the dissertation also indicates that academics regard China as a follower of and competitor to the West. Academics portray China on the one hand as a neo-colonial power exploiting Africa; on the other hand, as a development partner who introduced distinctive development ideologies to Africa. These two representations suggest that China is replicating Western involvement and challenging Western territory. While academics grant that some characteristics of the Chinese involvement in Africa differ from the Western model, the dominant perspective towards China and China in Africa follows Western criteria. This constraint is due to a failure to understand China in a way that is context and culture sensitive.

This dissertation showed how Western-dominated views on China and on the Chinese engagement in Africa lack cultural and contextual reflection. Accordingly, we recommend that academics consider contextual and cultural characteristics and establish mutual understanding of cultures, development approaches, and governance in different contexts. Specifically, academic discussion from an underrepresented Chinese perspective needs to be increased in current research related to China in Africa. Studying Chinese government reports and state-owned media and collaborating with Chinese scholars may contribute to a better understanding of the different identities and approaches regarding the Chinese and Western involvement in Africa. Particularly, studies focusing on China's development visions, its "going out" strategies, and its global footprint will potentially produce distinct perspectives on China and its roles in global development and international relations.

As discussed above, it is recommended that researchers track trends in Chinese and African development as well as global trends and that they strive to understand Chinese involvement in Africa from multicontextual and multicultural perspectives. In line with this recommendation, the next section of this conclusion focuses on current trends in the latest policies. Based on these recent trends we provide suggestions that connect the studies in this dissertation to a broader global perspective.

5.4 Policy implications and recommendations

As discussed in Section 5.1, three challenges define Chinese involvement in Africa. First, China's involvement in Africa is complicated by the unequal distribution of resources and benefits across African countries. There are many dimensions to this problem and how China may deal with it. Some of the dimensions include political and economic interests such as the One China Policy, security, natural resources, historical ties, and geostrategy. As far as political interests are concerned, a current precondition stipulated by China is that African partners accept the One China Policy. This means that China only deals with countries who have no relationship with Taiwan, thereby excluding others from the benefits of collaboration (Samy, 2010). Furthermore, African countries with abundant resources and access to maritime trade

routes or to trade gateways to Africa, tend to acquire more resources from China. In contrast, African countries who are involved in conflicts and internal wars as well as countries that lack raw materials tend to benefit less. A possible long-term consequence of this is that Chinese involvement will enlarge the already significant gap between rich African countries and poorer ones.

The unequal distribution of benefits that exists across African countries also exists between China and Africa. When investing in Africa, China tends to bind its financial support to infrastructure contracts. This means that, supported by the BRI, loans offered by Chinese state-owned banks are tied to specific projects undertaken by Chinese corporations (Cassel et al., 2010). This closed negotiation creates more business opportunities for Chinese material industries and secures the dominance of Chinese constructors in African infrastructure markets. More importantly, a Chinese electrified railway standard was adopted and promoted across Africa (Sun, 2017), contributing to the emergence of a “Made by China” fashion in Africa. Chinese finance flowing into African infrastructure does indeed ease the financial deficit of African countries, thereby addressing one of the largest problems that restricts African development (African Union, 2014). However, it also limits the involvement of local and other foreign corporations in African infrastructural construction and thereby diverts job creation from locals (Giannecchini & Taylor, 2018; Ding, 2018). In addition, concerns related to the quality of projects have arisen because Chinese corporations monopolize infrastructure market.

The third problem, namely Africa's growing debt to China, arises from the second. Bringing billions of dollars of loans, China has become the largest lender and creditor of many African countries, such as Angola and Kenya where China financed and built large infrastructure projects (Bräutigam & Hwang, 2016). For these countries, Chinese loans are a heavy burden that they cannot afford and repay in the short term (Fowler, 2019; Muller, 2019). Moreover, the much easier access to Chinese finance compared to the strings-attached Western funds (Owusu, 2003; Babb, 2013), make African countries increasingly dependent on borrowing money from China to develop their infrastructure. However, both these African countries and China will face problems if the former are unable to repay the loans and thereby get embroiled in a new debt crisis.

These three problems converge around the question of finance, and potentially constitute challenges for African development. Solutions to these problems that should be considered when making policy suggestions concern foreign investment, debt management, BRI project management, job creation, and local business development. Seeking to address these problems regarding the financing of and partnerships within the BRI, the China Development Bank has launched a “BRI financial and partnership plan” in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme. The plan is entitled “Harmonizing investment and financing standards towards sustainable development along the Belt and Road” (China Development Bank & United Nations Development Programme, 2019). The BRI financial and partnership plan aims to pursue development in line with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the core of the Agenda 2030 and focuses on establishing standards related to investment and partnership management (ibid). The eight principles proposed in the plan are stakeholders-based and focus on issues such as the environment, employment, the benefits of projects, debt management, finance and investment, transparency, risk management, and evaluation of BRI projects (ibid, see Table 18).

Table 18. Summary of eight principles related to the RBI financial and partnership plan

Principle 1 Environment	"Respecting BRI partner countries' existing constraints and legal setting, <i>harmonize environmental assessment standards</i> in line with the United Nations' environmental requirements for sustainable development."
Principle 2 Employment and poverty	"Support shared prosperity and <i>promote employment</i> in participating countries to support <i>poverty alleviation</i> and balanced development."
Principle 3 Benefits of projects	"Promote strategic alignment with national development priorities and plans and <i>ensure economic and social benefits of projects.</i> "
Principle 4 Debt management	"Harmonize programmes and management systems for <i>debt sustainability assessments</i> in BRI partner countries; strengthen <i>debt management</i> to ensure that it is carried out in an effective manner."
Principle 5 Finance and investment	"Ensure full-cycle <i>sustainability of the financing and investment</i> for BRI projects, and establish an effective, multi-level financial and investment system."
Principle 6 Openness and transparency	"Adhere to <i>openness and transparency</i> in procurement, standardizing, and internationalizing the flow of goods."
Principle 7 Risk management	"Adhere to general <i>international financial risk management</i> requirements and establish a framework for the <i>identification and reduction of risk</i> throughout the entire project."
Principle 8 Evaluation mechanism	"Implement rigorous and objective project evaluation procedures through the <i>establishment of an evaluation mechanism</i> that <i>monitors progress throughout the project financing and implementation process.</i> "

(Source: China Development Bank & United Nations Development Programme, 2019, pp. 177-189)

These eight principles serve as general guidelines to improve the practice of the BRI in partner countries. They provide potential orientation to address the problems of Chinese investment and African debt discussed above. While the table gives an overall view of all eight principles proposed in the BRI financial and partnership plan, some of them are particularly relevant to this study. Principle 2, for example, offers a potential solution to the problem of dominance of Chinese corporations that results from the preconditions to Chinese investment; Principles 4 and 5 are more related to the problem of African debt.

Principle 2 emphasizes the importance of increasing employment in countries that participate in the BRI. Specifically, the principle proposes to focus on reducing inequality within the workforce, creating safe working environments, safeguarding workers' basic rights, compensating vulnerable groups, as well as securing the participation of indigenous people in BRI projects (China Development Bank & United Nations Development Programme, 2019). In particular, to alleviate poverty and achieve equal social development, special emphasis is given to the treatment of female workers, disabled groups, child laborers, and locals who suffer from involuntary resettlement (*ibid*). The principle does not directly deal with China's dominance in Africa, however, if these strategies are implemented, it will assist in redistributing some of the social benefits China could bring to African countries more fairly.

Principle 4 emphasizes the sustainable management of debt. Specifically, the principles put forward evaluation factors that should be taken into account when authorizing loans. These include: "already existing sovereign debt service obligation"; the "overall debt structure", the "debt service profile", the "debt repayment situation", and potential financial returns of the projects (*ibid*, p. 182). In addition to assessing debt sustainability, the BRI financial and partnership plan highlights the significance of strengthening knowledge and awareness of debt management in BRI partner countries (*ibid*). The four elements that constitute the debt management framework are: governance, stakeholder responsibility, transparency, and self-determination. More specifically, participating countries are expected to improve legislation and governance concerning BRI-related debt (*ibid*). The responsibilities of different stakeholders should be explicit, based on a transparent cooperation mechanism within which information and plans should be shared among all parties (*ibid*). Last but

not the least, debtor countries should themselves determine their development priority, i.e., sustainable goals and local capacity building (ibid).

Principle 5 emphasizes the role of the diversification of financial channels as a major way to ease financial constraints on BRI partner countries. Particularly, private funding in the form of international private investment is regarded as an important supplement to current financial sources in which Chinese policy banks and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank dominate (ibid). In addition to private capital, a wide range of cooperation in financing is encouraged. Specially, emphasis is put on national and international financial cooperation based on a unified cooperation standard and transparent system characterized by information sharing between participating countries (ibid).

While the three principles discussed above provide guidelines targeting problems identified in our study, the principles do not yet solve all problems (see the second column in Table 19). First, the principles do not suggest direct policies related to the unequal distribution of Chinese involvement across different African countries. Second, while Principle 2 highlights an increase in job creation and local participation in BRI projects, it is still not clear on how to secure local employment. Furthermore, it does not stipulate the percentage of local persons to be employed in BRI projects. Moreover, the plan does not mention how local corporations should be involved. Third, Principle 4 goes some way to provide a debt management framework at a general level; however, how China will manage development loans flowing into African BRI projects and how Africa can strategically manage their debts remains vague. Fourth, while Principle 5 emphasizes the involvement of private investment and expects international cooperation, there obstacles to attracting private and international involvement in financing, particularly how to involve Western institutions remain.

In general, the BRI financial and partnership plan puts finance at the center of BRI projects. It also aims to ensure that these developments are sustainable. The principles are largely in line with the SDGs in that they cover aspects of how corporate involvement contributes to sustainable development in BRI partner countries. This covers issues such as the environment, employment, finance and investment, and the management of BRI projects and partnerships. The SDGs reflected in the eight principles include “responsible consumption and production”,

“decent work and economic growth”, “gender equality”, and “partnership for the goals” (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). Specifically, partnership among a diversity of stakeholders - especially private investors and international actors - based on negotiated cooperation standard stands out. The principles call for the involvement of the private sector and international cooperation, and they emphasize the establishment of transparent collaborative mechanisms involving various stakeholders. However, the principles and their connection with SDGs are dominated by social goals. This means that the principles do not directly target economic development in Africa and hardly discuss other SDGs related to industrial development and economic growth. Furthermore, while the principles are more related to social and financial issues, they are goal-oriented without security or political and legal force to guarantee the practice of the plans. This means that negotiation and coordination with BRI partner countries is still needed to generate the necessary detailed and feasible action plans to achieve these goals. Specifically, issues such as security policy of employment and working conditions, Chinese financial management related to BRI projects, and Africa’s repayment of loans will be the focus of the expected action plans. In a broader sense, to secure international participation and strengthen the legitimacy of the BRI, cooperation standards should be explicit and especially involve Western actors. Therefore, the eight principles still need to be negotiated with detailed action plans based on the concrete problems and challenges.

Table 19. Summary of the problems related to China in Africa, limitations of the BRI financial and partnership plan, and their connection with the findings of our studies

Problems related to China in Africa identified in the studies in this dissertation	Limitations of the relevant principles in the BRI financial and partnership plan to address problems	Solutions to address problems based on the studies in this dissertation
Unequal distribution of Chinese involvement	No principle directly addresses this	Study 2: Diversify investment based on specific context
Dominance of Chinese corporations as prerequisite of Chinese finance	Principle 2: No detailed policy on how to secure local employment and participation of local corporations	Study 2: Secure local employment, build capacity and develop local corporations
Africa's heavy debt	Principle 4: How China and Africa manage their finance in BRI projects remains unknown	Study 3: Strategically manage BRI projects
	Principle 5: How to attract more external investment is not clear	Study 3: Attract foreign private and international investors
	Principle 5: How to achieve international cooperation is not explained	Study 1, 2, & 3: Mutually understand needs of Chinese, African and Western actors and coordinate them

While the eight principles go some way to address problems, further suggestions based on the findings of our three studies may address remaining shortcomings (See the third column in Table 19). Specifically, regarding the first problem of unequal distribution, the findings of Study 2 show that China adapted the Beijing Consensus to the African context. This inspires us to propose that Chinese corporations further **diversify their investment according to specific African contexts and mutual complementarity between China and Africa** (for elaboration, see the first of the five suggestions below). In response to the limitation relating to the participation of local residents and corporations in BRI projects, Study 2 emphasizes the priority of human capital development, collaborating with local institutions to implement agendas, and engaging in skills training and technical transfer. These development efforts contribute to **local capacity building** (see the second suggestion below), which will eventually promote Africa's socio-economic development. In relation to the

third limitation of **managing BRI projects** (see suggestion three below), Study 3 provides a brief reference to how African countries can strategically collaborate with each other to share infrastructure projects and debt. With regard to **attracting external investment** (see suggestion four below), Study 3 reveals reasons behind China's preference for involving itself in some African countries rather than others. The central determinants include the One China Policy and security. This requires that African countries improve security to attract more Chinese investment. Moreover, the Ethiopian case in Study 3 shows that Chinese investors collaborate closely with local government. This includes the latter providing supportive policies, such as improving governance and contributing part of the funding for infrastructure projects. Inspired by this study, we believe that China and its partner countries will need to establish cooperation standards based on agreement about political positions and specific policies to facilitate Chinese investment. Finally, while discussing Chinese involvement in Africa from different perspectives, the three studies suggest the need for mutual understandings of different contexts, cultures, development visions, and needs. Based on this, we expect **multilateral cooperation** (see suggestion five below) involving diverse parties – including China, the West, and Africa – to promote China's BRI in Africa as well as achieve mutual benefits for all participating countries. Therefore, based on the three studies, we propose five suggestions below to overcome the limitations of the eight principles in addressing the three problems.

First, Chinese involvement across the continent needs to be balanced and diversified. As illustrated in Study 3, China is developing multi-dimensional cooperation with African countries and strengthening Chinese-African relationships within the BRI framework. To intensify the BRI in Africa, President Xi proposed treating all BRI partners equally and has encouraged Chinese corporations to invest and operate in different African countries based on resource complementary (Belt and Road Portal, 2018). To respond to Xi's proposal, Chinese corporations need to initiate specific strategies and design suitable projects in specific countries based on local conditions and needs. This adaptability is inspired by the Beijing Consensus, which emphasizes contextual and cultural adaptation when operating in foreign countries (Ramo, 2004). For example, in countries with rich flora and fauna, such as Kenya and Namibia, corporations may pursue cooperation on tourism and eco-environment, such as wildlife protection. In countries that lack natural resources and whose populations are young, such as Ethiopia and Chad, corporations should be

encouraged to develop labor-intensive manufacturing and public services, such as healthcare and education.

Second, Chinese investments should be development-oriented and contribute to local capacity building. This means that, projects should be assessed from the perspective of African socio-economic development. Three issues stand out, namely: employment, the transfer of skills and technology, and the involvement of local businesses. These three focus areas of socio-economic development are in line with adjusting the Beijing Consensus to the African contexts. To secure capacity building in Africa, all sides should reach agreement on job creation, skills training and technical transfer, as well as participation of local businesses. These agreements must be written into project contracts. Specifically, this includes written contractual stipulations about percentages of African local employees, their positions, working hours, salaries, and working environments. Moreover, Chinese corporations should be expected to offer skills training and technology transfer. This goes particularly for corporations engaged in manufacturing and infrastructure. The purpose of the training must be to develop human capital in Africa and the technical capacity of African corporations. The participation of African corporations in BRI projects should be encouraged as the driving force of local industrialization and economic development. Also to be encouraged, is cooperation between Chinese corporations and local corporations through, for example, joint investment in special economic zones introduced by China.

Third, a sustainable debt management mechanism must be established. Importantly, assessment criteria for financing of BRI projects in Africa should be explicit. In response to this, China did propose a debt sustainability framework in 2019. This framework combines parameters that reflect the future development potential of the recipient country, its “debt carrying capacity”, and the sustainable development goals of Agenda 2030 (Ministry of Finance of People’s Republic of China, 2019, p. 12). Such a debt management mechanism serves as supporting tool for BRI partner countries and international financial institutions to “conduct categorized management on debt risks and make rational lending decisions” (ibid, p. 12). In addition to receiving such technical assistance on debt analysis, African countries will need to develop strategies based on their own conditions, taking into account overall fiscal conditions, development needs, and values and returns expected from specific

infrastructure projects (ibid). Yet another measure that might address the problem of debt is for neighboring African countries to collaborate in sharing risks and financial pressures. In this regard, the Felou Hydropower Project and Gouina Hydropower Project (See Appendix D, D-35, D-26) – which are jointly owned by Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea – could serve as examples for African countries (African Union, n.d.; International Cooperation and Development, n.d.). Moreover, to regain the trust of international institutions so as to secure future financial support, African countries will need to improve their credit records and avoid defaulting on loan repayments.

Fourth, a supportive environment is needed to attract and secure more foreign investment. In Study 3, we found that Chinese involvement in Africa is determined by diverse factors, such as the security situation in various parts of Africa and good governance of African governments to support foreign business. Based on our findings, we argue that the pursuit of peace and security should be highlighted as important concerns of business. African countries will need to ensure political and social stability in order to provide a safe environment for foreign investors. Moreover, policies related to governance and financial support should be considered as a driving force to attract more foreign investment. For example, African governments will need to provide efficient administration and more convenience for foreign investors who are not familiar with local laws, rules, and languages. One-stop shop services mentioned in Study 3 can serve as a good reference for local governments to improve their governance. In addition, considering the importance of infrastructure to private investors, African governments and corporations will need to improve connecting infrastructures such as railways and ports to make it possible for foreign investors to produce and trade on the continent.

Fifth, multilateral international cooperation involving China, African and Western countries should be strengthened with a particular focus on finance and security. The contrasting and complementary findings of the three studies inspire us to rethink how to facilitate international cooperation on important issues such as finance, security, and trade when it comes to African development. Cooperation with Western actors is to some degree difficult because of the diverse and sometimes divergent cooperation standards. For example, Western criteria for investment focus on governance, transparency, and financial returns, while Chinese criteria emphasize consistence with government's policies and exploitation of markets according to the three

studies. Therefore, negotiation on cooperation standards recognized by all involved parties should serve as a basis of multilateral cooperation. In addition to a transparent communication system (as highlighted in the BRI financial and partnership plan) cooperation standards should include common goals and the definition of the responsibilities of the three parties, especially China and the West. In particular, as part of multilateral international collaboration, the Chinese government needs to be more involved in the security affairs of the African continent and cooperate with the international community to secure regional stability. To diversify financial sources, cooperation between partners in the BRI and European initiatives such as the Compact with Africa and the OECD Eurasia Competitiveness Programme is expected (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; OECD Business and Finance Outlook, 2018). Diverse and broader cooperation between Chinese, European, and African national banks and private sectors on the BRI and coordination with other development initiatives should contribute to mutual benefits.

These five suggestions supplement the BRI financial and partnership plan by improving on its limitations to solve the problems related to Chinese involvement in Africa. These suggestions draw on the principles and visions of the Beijing Consensus in Africa and provide specific orientation for China to improve its BRI performance in Africa. Specifically, the suggestions aim to foster balanced development by focusing on Chinese investment, African capacity building, the management of BRI projects, and diversifying national and international cooperation. In particular, they are expected to strengthen Africa's capacity to develop its industries and economy and to provide more detailed action plans to stimulate local employment and multilateral cooperation on the BRI. As a rising global economic and political power, China faces mounting expectations and responsibilities regarding contributions to Africa and the international community. While China is improving the BRI in Africa and seeking international cooperation, there are still potential issues and trends relating to its involvement, which need our attention especially from an academic perspective. Therefore, the next section discusses possible directions for future research.

5.5 Future research

As shown above, China's BRI is intensively proceeding in Africa; however, current studies and policies do not sufficiently support and orient Chinese development initiatives such as sustainable development in Africa. This means there is a desperate need for systematic research on the BRI in Africa that would cover development goals, detailed action plans, and cooperation standards. While our research provided an overview of some of these dimensions, by examining China's development approach and Chinese development projects in Africa, future research is expected to contribute to specific issues which are less discussed. As noted in Section 5.4, China is improving the legitimacy and popularity of the BRI by ensuring that the development it pursues is sustainable. In addition, it is seeking broader cooperation with partner countries and international actors. However, there is space to improve current strategies and plans. Specifically, the BRI and its financial and partnership plan focus on social issues, while giving less attention to environmental and economic concerns. To pursue a more balanced development, future research might explore concerns related to the SDGs that current studies and policies do not sufficiently cover. This might include environmental issues, such as "climate action" and "affordable and clean energy" (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). It might also include development strategies and approaches consistent with SDGs such as "peace, justice, and strong institutions" as well as "sustainable cities and communities" (ibid). Such research will help us better understand China's roles in promoting African and global development that is sustainable and provides references for the BRI in Africa.

Second, the study examined Chinese involvement in Africa from a Western-dominated academic perspective, from a Chinese political perspective, and from a project-based perspective. It would be crucial to add more perspectives. In particular, future research could also explore how Africans portray Chinese involvement in Africa. Therefore, future research could adopt an African perspective and collect first-hand data by interviewing indigenous people. More specifically, studies may also explore what Africans need from China. What do Africans value about the involvement of Chinese corporations in their societies? How do Africans use and manage Chinese projects? These questions complement the present study by

providing comparisons to address the question: To what extent are the expectations of Africans satisfied by Chinese involvement in Africa?

Third, to compare Chinese involvement in Africa, it would also be of interest to study the involvement of other emerging countries, such as India, in Africa. This may help us to better understand how Africa is positioned from a non-Western perspective. And it will help us to better understand how China, as an alternative global power to the West, is similar too or different from other rising global powers in Africa.

These three focus areas serve as an orientation for future research, which aims to provide more systematic suggestions for Chinese involvement in Africa. As China has become an increasingly important global player with a growing overseas footprint, concerns have arisen related to its global strategy and expansion. Namely, what kind of global power does China pursue, especially through its BRI? This dissertation gave us a better understanding of China as a global actor that is distinct from the West. However, we are still curious about the future of international relations and China's role in promoting multilateral relations and orienting global development. As researchers, we are interested in and will track policy negotiations between all stakeholders involved and expect Chinese political actions in the coming future.

Overall, in this work, we explored different perspectives on the many ways in which Chinese involvement contributes to development in Africa. Ideologically, China brought an alternative development approach to Africa that is in line with its domestic approach –namely the Beijing Consensus. It has introduced a Chinese industrial development and management model in Chinese special economic zones distributed across the continent. Guided by the BRI, China has financed and constructed hundreds of development projects in Africa. These projects cover a broad array of countries and domains from infrastructure, to private manufacturing, public health, education, and agriculture, which are development priorities valued by the African Union's Agenda 2063. China's substantial financial package that integrates loans, business investment, and monetary aid, eases Africa's financial deficit, one of the largest challenges restricting African development. In a similar vein, China's transfer of technology, skills training, and employment creation play an important role in building African capacity, which consequently will contribute to African development. In describing the diversity and depth of the Chinese contribution to development in Africa, this dissertation has elaborated a much richer and more nuanced account of

the Chinese approach to development in Africa than that portrayed in statements by Western politicians and in Eurocentric academic texts (see pp. 4-5 above).

In a broader sense, this dissertation has shown how China is constantly adapting its approach by revising, negotiating, and renegotiating its development involvement in line with Africa and the world. What emerges is not a static set of principles, but an ongoing process constantly realigned according to China's five-year plans, its national policies, relevant contextual and cultural dynamics, and the countries with whom it engages. In this way, China is still finding and defining its leadership role in a global arena. By examining Chinese involvement in Africa from different perspectives, we not only understand China in Africa better; we also better understand China's evolving identity. Moreover, we have a new impression of Africa, especially an alternative identity that provides a distinct understanding which has not been illuminated in Western literature. In this sense, this research contributes to a shared understanding, of both the emergence of a new Africa and modern China. Such an understanding of China's current evolving engagement prepares us to also better understand future trends in the roles that China could occupy on the world stage.

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APPENDIX

Contents

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B....Overview of the data for Study 2

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A. Overview of the data for Study 1

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D. Overview of the Chinese projects across different sectors and types of involvement in Sub-Saharan African countries

D-1. Chinese projects in Angola

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Angola	Benguela Railway	Transportation	Loans & Partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0919/c90000-9501781.html
	Black Rock (farm in Malanje)	Agriculture	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company constructed and operated the farm; later handed over to Angola agricultural sector.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-09/21/content_21934754.htm
	Caculo Cabaça (hydropower project)	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Angola government financed and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2017/08/angolan-officials-break-ground-on-2-170-mw-caculo-cabaca-hydropower-plan-generation-begins-at-2-070-mw-lauca.html
	Luanda-Guangdong Business Park	Manufacturing	Investment & Partnership <i>A Chinese private company partnered with China-Africa Development Fund to invest and construct the park; Angolan government provides preferential policies.</i>	http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/uanda-guangdong-business-park-under-construction-in-angola/
	Nova Cidade de Kilamba (housing project)	Public services	Loans <i>the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided loans; Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build; loans will be paid back by resources.</i>	https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/blog/views-of-suburban-luanda-banishing-the-ghosts-from-kilamba/
	Luanda Branch of Bank of China	Financial services	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned bank opened a branch in Angola with the authority of local institution.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-06/06/content_29633002.htm

D-2. Chinese projects in Benin

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Benin	Rehabilitation of the 102-km Akassato-Bohicon Road	Transportation	Aid <i>Funded by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations</i>	http://china.org.cn/business/2011-02/04/content_21868135.htm
	Agricultural Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Aided by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations</i>	https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zfgx/jmhzt/1430749.htm
	Adjarala Hydroelectric Project	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>Financed by China Exim Bank, Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build this.</i>	http://eng.sinohydro.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=21&id=607
	Material assistance for Ebola prevention	Public services	Aid <i>Donated by Chinese government</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-09/24/content_18655954.htm
	Benin-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with local Bank to enable UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030112?type=1

D-3. Chinese projects in Botswana

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Botswana	Upgrade of Tonota-Francistown Road (A1 national road)	Transportation	Partnership <i>Financed by Botswana government, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://www.infrastucturenews/2014/02/21/tonota-to-francistown-via-dual-carriageway/
	Dikgathong Dam	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Financed by Botswana government; built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	https://www.civildesigner.com/press/dikgathong_water.pdf
	Chinese Governmental Scholarships	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government offers full-scholarships for students of Botswana to study in China.</i>	http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/wkj/scholarship/t1439368.htm
	Botswana-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Barclays Bank of Botswana to enable transaction at the ATMs and Point of Sale devices of the bank in Botswana.</i>	http://www.thepatriot.co.bw/business/item/3830-barclays-partners-with-china-unionpay.html

D-4. Chinese projects in Burundi

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Burundi	44.5-km road in Makamba Province stretching to the border of Tanzania	Transportation	Partnership <i>Funded by African Development Bank, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/27/c_136710247.htm
	Demonstration Paddy Plot	Agriculture	Aid <i>Aided by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations</i>	https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zftt/eng/zftt/gx/jmhzt/1430749.htm
	MA60 aircraft	Manufacturing	Aid <i>The Aviation Industry Corporation of China donated a MA60</i>	https://china.aidata.org/projects/30063?iframe=y
	18th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Qinghai Province</i>	http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1603659418949916891&wfr=spider&for=pc
	Burundi-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with local Bank to enable UnionPay card services.</i>	http://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/global/ICard/en/global/3/10030132?type=1

D-5. Chinese projects in Cabo Verde

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Cabo Verde	Agricultural product processing center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Funded by Chinese government, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://www.mof.com.gov.cn/article/i/jyj/k/201508/20150801075125.shtml
	Medical team	Public services	Aid & partnership <i>Sichuan Province of China dispatched medical staff to Agostinho Neto Hospital in the capital of Cabo Verde under a cooperation agreement on health made between two countries</i>	http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/chinese-medical-staff-begin-mission-at-cape-verdean-hospital/
	Banco Sino-Atlântico	Financial services	Investment <i>A Chinese private company plans to invest a bank in Cabo Verde (signed MOU)</i>	https://macaclub.com.mo/feature/pt-banco-de-empresario-de-macau-avanca-em-cabo-verde/

D-6. Chinese projects in Cameroon

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Cameroon	Renovation of the 175 Km Batschenga-Ka'a Railway	Transportation	Partnership <i>Financed by the World Bank, Chinese state-owned company will repair the railway</i>	https://www.businessincameroon.com/transports/2304-4032-china-railway-engineering-group-co-signs-renovation-works-contract-for-the-175-km-batschenga-ka-a-railway
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations</i>	https://china.aidata.org/projects/31719
	Lom Pangar Dam	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Collaboratively funded by "the World Bank, , Development Bank of Central African States, French Development Agency, European Investment Bank, and African Development Bank"; Chinese state-owned company builds.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0711/c90000-9240131.html
	Cameroon Automotive Holding Company	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Jointly set up by Chinese private company (70% stake) and a Cameroonian company</i>	https://qz.com/africa/1113621/for-a-chinese-company-building-central-africas-first-auto-plant-its-been-a-bumpy-road/
	Yabassi Technical High School	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0818/c90000-9257351.html
	Cameroon-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>Unionpay partnered with Societe Generale (France) to newly enable its card services in Cameroon.</i>	https://unionpayintl.com/en/mediaCenter/newsCenter/marketUpdate/3007882.shtml

D-7. Chinese projects in Central African Republic

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Central African Republic	15-MW Boali 1, 2	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Funded by the World Bank, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	https://www.hydrworld.com/articles/2009/02/central-african-republic-plans-emergency-rehab-of-15-mw-boali-1-2.html
	16th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Zhejiang Province; 8 doctors were sent to a children camp with provision of medicine and healthcare.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/13/WS5b20d0bca31001b82572143c_1.html

D-8. Chinese projects in Chad

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Chad	1,344-km railway linking domestic Chad and stretching to Sudan and Cameroon	Transportation	Loans <i>Signed agreement between China, Chad, and Sudan; China Exim Bank will provide \$ 2 billion; Chinese state-owned company will build this</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/chad-china-rail-idUSLDE72D2CJ20110314
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; built by Chinese institutions.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/08/c_138454409.htm
	300MW Solar Power Plant	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build this</i>	http://en.silkroad.news.cn/2018/0131/82260.shtml
	Repairing and upgrading the Freedom Hospital of Chad	Public services	Aid <i>Organized and funded by Chinese government; built by Chinese institutions.</i>	http://www.cgicint.com/index.php/en/subsidiary/afri-ca/chad/151-zdgi/news-center/2014-06-24-09-01-28/504-china-aided-chad-hospital-repaired-and-renamed
	Chad-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>Unionpay partnered with Societe Generale (France) to newly enable its cards services in Chad</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030542?type=2

D-9. Chinese projects in Comoros

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Comoros	Hahaya-Mitsamiouli road & Dindi-Lingoni road	Transportation	Partnership <i>Funded by Saudi Fund for Development, Chinese state-owned company built</i>	http://km.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201708/20170802619154.shtml
	Sending agricultural experts	Agriculture	Aid <i>China sent experts to Comoros doing investigation, research, and providing training to local farmers</i>	http://km.mofcom.gov.cn/article/todayheader/201008/20100807093000.shtml
	Solar energy systems	Natural resources and energy	Aid <i>Chinese government organized to test 500 solar energy systems for households in Comoros</i>	http://www.globaleconstructionreview.com/sectors/china-takes-lions-share-electrifying-africa/
	10th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Guangxi Province took charge of the medical teams with 10 members sent to Comoros in 2014; the team worked for their mission for two years in Comoros.</i>	https://china.aidata.org/projects/35690?iframe=y
	Comoros-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/hk/global_3/10030232?type=1

D-10. Chinese projects in Congo, Rep

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Congo, Rep	National Road No. 1	Transportation	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided concessional loans and Chinese state-owned company built</i>	https://www.egis-group.com/action/realisations/national-road-no-1-congo
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; built by Chinese institutions.</i>	http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-03/22/content_28328502.htm
	The Liouesso dam	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>China financed and Chinese state-owned company built</i>	https://www.africa-energy.com/article/republic-congo-liouesso-dam-inaugurated
	Donation of Anti-Malaria Drugs	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government.</i>	https://china.aiddata.org/projects/30513
	the Sino-Congolese Bank for Africa (BSCA Bank)	Financial services	Partnership <i>Joint venture bank, 50 % owned by the Agricultural Bank of China, 21% of stake held by Congo government, and the rest by Congo private sectors.</i>	https://en.financialafric.com/2018/04/11/congo-sino-congolese-bank-offers-35-billion-fcfa/

D-11. Chinese projects in Congo, DR

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Congo, DR	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Aided by Chinese government as a gift to Congo government.</i>	http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jyj/k/201409/20140900723167.shtml
	Acquisition of Congo's Tenke copper mine	Natural resources and energy	Investment & partnership <i>One of China's largest mine companies bought 56% stake of Congo's massive Tenke copper mine and partnered with a Chinese private company who bought 24% stake.</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-mining/china-moly-to-help-bhr-acquire-stake-in-congos-tenke-copper-mine-idUSKBN15600P
	China-Congo trade city	Manufacturing	Investment & partnership <i>Chinese corporations cooperatively invest a trade city 12 km away from the capital with 5 billion CNY (signed contract).</i>	http://nb.zjol.com.cn/system/2014/04/28/019994584.shtml
	Confucius Institute	Public services	Partnership <i>Constructed by China in 2018; collaboratively operated by Central South University of Hunan province, and the Foreign Affairs University of Congo, DR.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/04/WS5b8e2027a310add14f38985b.html
	China Taihe Bank of Congo(CTBC)	Financial services	Investment & partnership <i>A branch of Chinese private bank in Congo,DR; later it acquired International Bank for Africa in Congo (BIAC), the third largest bank in Congo.</i>	http://en.sctaihe.cn/Company_dynamics/79.html

D-12. Chinese projects in Cote d'Ivoire

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Cote d'Ivoire	Railway from Man to San Pedro	Transportation	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided loans and Chinese state-owned company built</i>	http://www.haddockmedia.com/reports/cote-divoire.pdf
	Sending agricultural experts	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; experts have trained 80 locals.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/04/WS5b8de77ea310add14f38971c.html
	Soubre hydroelectric power station	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>China financed and Chinese state-owned company built</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/01/c_136409712.htm
	Fosun-Guilin Pharma Afrique Francophone Sarl (GPAF)	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese medical company set up a joint venture company (artesumine-based antimalarial drugs) in the capital of Cote d'Ivoire</i>	http://www.guilinpharma.com/en/en/news/detail.asp?id=76
	Medical and health station	Public services	Aid <i>Handed over to Cote d'Ivoire government as part of Chinese development assistance by Chinese government.</i>	http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyj/k/201407/20140700659824.shtml

D-13. Chinese projects in Equatorial Guinea

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Equatorial Guinea	Asoke-Aconibe-Owen Road (101km)	Transportation	<i>Built by Chinese state-owned company, finance unspecified</i>	http://www.crbc.com/site/crbcEN/381/info/2010/1947889.html?id=afd3ea85-64b2-4fa1-9289-d197e2b5d6a4
	Demonstration farm	Agriculture	<i>Aid & Partnership Funded and constructed by China with a four-year technological cooperation</i>	http://www.jxric.com/CN/Pages/Page/content.asp?class=5&id=12
	Djiploho Hydropower Plant	Natural resources and energy	<i>Loans & partnership The Equatorial Guinea government (major financier) funded the project with part of the loans from China EXIM Bank; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/02/c_137645782.htm
	Mbini Industrial City	Manufacturing	<i>Investment & Partnership Chinese company responsible for infrastructure construction of the industrial park; Chinese businesses invest and settle in the park.</i>	http://www.africanreview.com/construction-amining/building/sequatorial-guinea-agrees-raft-of-chinese-investment
	27th medical team	Public services	<i>Aid Guang Zhou Health Department is in charge of sending a team with 27 members in 2014; they worked for 2 years in Equatorial Guinea.</i>	https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27756496.pdf?casa_tok=RZ-Dmc2q7GYAAAAA:Hj7mNWUuptiSHP2PL9KihWxm0xiBd0mWfEbEKZuMDTb1oT7h5lIPj4qiSPcu3wZ3eRLnocjAM37ipaxNkr9RiMr3UDs2EnUirleU6alp00WXdvLw
	2 billion USD finance for infrastructure agreement	Financial services	<i>Loans Chinese state-owned bank ICBC provides 2 billion USD as “financial support” to local government and Chinese corporations there.</i>	http://www.conventuslaw.com/report/chinese-deals-to-boost-power-and-industry-sectors/

D-14. Chinese projects in Eritrea

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Eritrea	Expansion of Massawa Port	Transportation	Partnership <i>Chinese corporations are responsible for construction; finance unspecified.</i>	https://www.tesfaneews.net/us-400-million-new-massawa-port-project-contract-goes-chinese-check/
	Solar Water Conservancy Agriculture Irrigation Demonstration Project	Agriculture	Aid <i>donated by Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to Eritrea; constructed by two Chinese corporations.</i>	https://www.linkeindin.com/pulse/eritrean-solar-water-conservancy-agriculture-project-solartech
	Acquiring 60% stake of Asmara Mining Share Company	Natural resources and energy	Investment & partnership <i>Joint venture companies set by Chinese state-owned company and other partners (local & third country)</i>	http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=83677992&Country=Eritrea&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Economic+growth&u=1&pid=846721868&oid=846721868&uid=1
	An order for a total of 1000 machines	Manufacturing	Partnership <i>Chinese companies cooperated to bid on the contracts</i>	https://www.tesfaneews.net/chinese-firm-liugong-wins-eritrea%E2%80%99s-largest-contract-for-machineries-video/
	Science College	Public services	Aid <i>Funded by Chinese government, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	https://www.tesfaneews.net/china-to-build-usd-33m-science-college-to-eritrea/

D-15. Chinese projects in Ethiopia

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa -Djibouti Railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned companies were contracted to build and operate the project</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136865306.htm
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>China dispatched experts to train local farmers</i>	http://english.agri.gov.cn/news/dqnf/201601/t20160111_164522.htm
	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided one third of loans and the rest were covered by Ethiopian government; Chinese state-owned company built</i>	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/dam-rising-in-ethiopia-stirs-hope-and-tension.html
	Eastern Industry Zone	Manufacturing	Investment & Partnership <i>Invested and owned by Chinese private company; Ethiopian government provided preferential policies.</i>	http://www.e-eiz.com/about.php?lg=en
	Tirunesh-Beijing Ethio-China Friendship Hospital	Public services	Aid <i>China donated a hospital and uses it as the base for its medical team</i>	http://www.chinafrica.cn/Africa/201709/t20170928_800105786.html
	Ethiopia-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Dashen Bank (local bank) to open an electronic banking service for Union Card users</i>	https://www.2merkato.com/news/banking-and-finance/477-ethiopian-bank-launches-services-for-union-card

D-16. Chinese projects in Gabon

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Gabon	Port Gentil-Omboue coastal road	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zjzj_663340/fzs_663828/gjlb_663832/2989_663994/
	Sending agricultural experts	Agriculture	Aid <i>Chinese government sent experts to provide training, technology transfer and assist planting.</i>	http://www.cnafun.moa.gov.cn/zx/xmxx/201305/t20130509_3456143.html
	Grand Poubara Hydropower Station	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/powerchina/2013-08/28/content_16925790.htm
	Order of smart bus	Manufacturing	<i>300 smart buses produced by a Chinese state-control car company were ordered by Gabon government.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/08/c_136879478.htm
	China-Gabon Friendship Stadium	Public services	Aid <i>Financed by Chinese government and built by Chinese state-owned company; completed construction in less two years.</i>	http://www.china.org.cn/world/OfftheWire/2016-06/17/content_38690880.htm

D-17. Chinese projects in Gambia

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Gambia	A bridge on the Fatoto-Passamas crossing point east of the country	Transportation	Aid <i>Part of \$75 million grant included in the cooperation agreements between Banjul and Beijing.</i>	http://apanews.net/en/news/gambia-gets-75m-china-grant-for-construction-projects
	HFO Power Plant	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Gambia government, Gambia state-owned company and Chinese state-owned company signed contract.</i>	http://egyptoil-gas.com/news/gambia-signs-165m-electricity-project-with-china/
	Golden Lead Factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A Chinese private company invested a fishmeal factory</i>	https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2104636/gambia-laid-out-welcome-mat-chinese-businesses-then-came
	Sending 9 doctors for treatment	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government sent 9 doctors to Gambia for medical assistance as part of the bilateral agreement.</i>	https://face2faceafrica.com/article/china-sends-9-doctors-gambia-part-technical-assistance-program
	Gambia-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030262?type=2

D-18. Chinese projects in Ghana

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Ghana	Ghanaian Africa World Airlines created by Hainan airlines and Ghanaian partner	Transportation	Investment & partnership <i>A joint venture company set by Chinese private company HNA, China-Africa Development Fund (70% stake), and Ghana financial institutions.</i>	https://www.flyafricaworld.com/another-ghanaian-start-up-africa-world-airlines-secures-investment-from-hainan-airlines-parent/
	1000 wells in rural areas	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government, Chinese state-owned company drilled 1000 wells in Ghana's rural areas.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0622/c90000-9474098.html
	Bui Hydroelectricity Project	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided 2/3 of the total loans, Ghana government covered the rest; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.watertechnology.net/projects/bui-dam-hydro-power-ghana/
	plant of Sanbao Ghana Pharmaceuticals Limited	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese state-owned company invested a medical company in Tema.</i>	http://gh2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinanews/201310/20131000361244.shtml
	Lekma Hospital (China-Ghana Friendship Hospita)	Public services	Aid <i>Financed by Chinese government and built by Chinese state-owned company.</i>	https://www.lekmahospital.org/home/about-us/
	Ghana-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Guaranty Trust Bank (Ghana) to enable its card services at ATMs.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030072?type=1

D-19. Chinese projects in Guinea

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Guinea	International airport in Maferinya	Transportation	Loans <i>China provides funds, and Chinese state-owned company builds</i>	http://lemagazine.edumanager.com/3229-guinee-projet-de-construction-dun-aeroport.html
	Guinea Kaleta hydropower station	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/beltandroadinitiative/2017-05/13/content_29330400.htm
	20th Medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Beijing; 16 medical professionals were sent for healthcare.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/22/content_11337720.htm
	Guinea-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>Unionpay partnered with Societe Generale (France) to newly enable its card services in Guinea</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/ru/global_3/10030012?type=1

D-20. Chinese projects in Guinea-Bissau

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Guinea-Bissau	A new international airport for the African nation	Transportation	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company will build the airport (signed MoU), finance unspecified.</i>	http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/portugues-empresa-chinesa-vai-construir-novo-aeroporto-na-guine-bissau/
	30 kilowatt biomass power plant	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China will invest 184 million USD to build a 30 kilowatt biomass power plant.</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-china-power/china-says-to-invest-184-million-in-guinea-bissau-biomass-plant-idUSKBN1650SN
	A fish processing plant	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese fishing firm plans to invest a fish processing plant.</i>	https://www.undcurrentnews.com/2018/01/18/chinese-fishing-firm-to-invest-in-guinea-bissau-processing-plant/
	Medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Beijing sent a medical team with 17 doctors to the country and worked for four years.</i>	http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/gb-3/

D-21. Chinese projects in Kenya

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Kenya	Mombasa Nairobi Railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.newtimes.co.rw/business/kenyas-mombasa-nairobi-rail-service-break-even-2020
	Agricultural research lab	Agriculture	Aid <i>Chinese government financed; China and Kenya's universities jointly built.</i>	http://www.africanfarming.net/technology/infrastructure/china-funding-agriculture-research-lab-in-kenya
	Olkaria V power project	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank partially funded the project in collaboration with other international financial institutions; Chinese state-owned company is responsible for early stage construction, i.e., drilling wells.</i>	http://world.xinhua08.com/a/20120724/992512.shtml
	Chinese mobile phone Tecno	Manufacturing	<i>Sold by Chinese private company, taking up over 40% of the local market share.</i>	https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/companies/Infinitix--Tecno-maker-tops-Africa-mobile-phone-imports/4003102-4871134-3brcyj/index.html
	A training center established by Huawei	Public services	Aid <i>Huawei opened a training center focusing on technical skills transfer in 2017. Providing training on computing and telecommunication, the center aims to transfer ICT skills and technologies to the employees and technicians working for Kenya's ICT sector</i>	https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/companies/Huawei--opens-training-centre-to-bridge-local-ICT-skills-gap/4003102-4219146-5dc8j pz/index.html
	Representative office of Bank of China	Financial services	Partnership <i>The Central Bank of Kenya authorized the Bank of China an official license to launch a new representative office</i>	http://www.boc.cn/en/bocinfo/bi1/201207/t20120705_1886817.html

D-22. Chinese projects in Lesotho

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Lesotho	92 kilometre Ha Mpiti to Sehlabathebe road	Transportation	Loans and partnership <i>China Exim Bank will provide 1.29 billion USD loan; Chinese company was contracted to build in collaboration with local companies (30% contract).</i>	http://sundayexpress.co.ls/china-lesotho-m1-3-billion-road-construction-deal/
	JunCao Technology Cooperation Program	Agriculture	Aid <i>A Chinese university responsible for the work including planting, demonstration, and sending experts for training.</i>	http://english.fafu.edu.cn/3e/f1/c5972a212721/page.htm
	Metolong Dam	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Funded by Lesotho government, "the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, South Africa, and Millennium Challenge Corporation", Chinese state-owned company was contracted to construct the dam.</i>	http://www.lestimes.com/chinese-firm-signs-contract-for-metolong-dam/
	Textile factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese companies invest in establishing textile factories targeting the export markets.</i>	https://agoa.info/news/article/5079-lesotho-growth-in-textiles-and-clothing-plays-central-role-in-jobs-creation.html
	Art training at the Lesotho College of Education	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese Ministry of Culture organized a senior artist to teach local people ceramics for two months in 2011.</i>	http://www.chinafrica.cn/spotlight/txt/2012-09/28/content_487259.htm
	Lesotho-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with the Nedbank (a South African bank) to enable card services in its ATMs and POS.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/jp/global3/10030282?type=1

D-23. Chinese projects in Liberia

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Liberia	50 kilometer road from Harper to Karloken	Transportation	Partnership <i>Collaboratively financed by Liberian government and the African Development Bank, Chinese state-owned company builds.</i>	http://gnnliberia.com/2014/12/22/government-of-liberia-chinese-company-sign-us42-7m-fish-town-harper-road-contract/
	China-Liberia Agriculture Technology Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organize and funded by Chinese government; a Chinese corporation was contracted to build it.</i>	http://lr.china-embassy.org/eng/sghdhzxxx/t720776.htm
	120 MW Hydropower Dam over St. John River	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Liberian government authorizes permit, and Chinese state-owned company built by partnering with local corporation.</i>	http://frontpageafricaonline.com/country-news/chinese-firm-to-build-120-mw-hydropower-dam-on-st-john-river/
	Steel plant	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese private company invested and built</i>	https://allafrica.com/stories/201706271157.html
	Chinese medical team fighting Ebola	Public services	Aid <i>Organize by Chinese government; in response to Ebola virus, a team with 9 members was sent in 2013 to treat locals.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/02/content_18236528.htm

D-24. Chinese projects in Madagascar

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Madagascar	20-km road linking two villages of Ampanotokana and Mahazaza	Transportation	Aid <i>Chinese government will fund the road which serves the egg production areas; the project is part of six projects agreed between Madagascar and Chinese Presidents.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-08/19/c_136537624.htm
	56-tons hybrid rice seeds	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized by Hunan provincial research institution; handed over 56-tons hybrid rice seeds to Madagascar; trained 100 local agricultural professionals.</i>	http://www.hn.chinanews.com/news/kjww/2010/0407/42530.html
	A dam under planning	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>A Chinese company plans to cooperate with a South African company to build a dam in Madagascar</i>	http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1564173339235955&wfr=spider&for=pc
	Sugar plant	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A Chinese state-owned company invested a sugar plant</i>	http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/885354.shtml
	21th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; so far 608 doctors have been sent to Madagascar over the past 43 years.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zf/lt/eng/jlydh/t1565333.htm
	Madagascar-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with the State Bank of Mauritius to launch the UnionPay Travel Mate Asia Card services.</i>	https://en.financialafrik.com/2018/07/25/sbom-introduces-unionpay-travel-mate-asia-card-in-madagascar/

D-25. Chinese projects in Malawi

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Malawi	A rail linking central Zambia with Malawi border	Transportation	Loans <i>Funded by Chinese government; Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build this.</i>	https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-benefit-us2-3-bn-chinese-railway-link-zambia/
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized and funded by Chinese government and built by Chinese institution.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/jghd_673046/t1400880.shtml
	Kammwamba Coal-Fired Power Plant	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>China Exim Bank will provide loans and Chinese state-owned company will build this</i>	https://www.nyasatimes.com/exim-bank-china-finance-malawi-coal-fired-power-plant-project/
	Textile factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>China-Malawi Cotton Company builds the factory in Malawi's central Salima district</i>	https://apparelresources.com/business-news/sourcing/chinese-company-invest-us-80-mn-setting-textile-units-malawi/
	University of science and Technology	Public services	Aid <i>Organized and funded by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporation.</i>	https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/malawi-china-diplomatic-ties-10-years-on/
	Malawi-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030372?type=2

D-26. Chinese projects in Mali

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Mali	Upgrade in Mali - Senegal railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided concessional loans and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.railjournal.com/africa/crcc-to-upgrade-mali-senegal-railway/
	The third sugar factory	Agriculture	Loans & partnership <i>Chinese Exim Bank provided loans; cooperatively owned by Chinese state-owned company, (60% stake), Mali government (20% stake), and Mali corporation.</i>	http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c4200693/content.html
	Gouina Hydro Power Project (GHPP)	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>Owned by Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea; China Exim Bank provided concessional loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/53646.html
	Cement plant	Manufacturing	Investment & partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company partners with the richest man in Africa to build cement plant in Mali, Ethiopia, Zambia, Senegal, Niger, and Cameroon (signed contract).</i>	https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0QV0NY20150826
	Expanding CDMA WLL network	Public services	Aid & partnership <i>Chinese telecommunication technology applied to the telecommunication network in the capital; Chinese state-control company ZTE donated 60% of the equipment, Mali government provided the rest equipment.</i>	https://www.zte.com.cn/global/about/magazine/zte-technologies/2006/3/en_140/161578
	Mali-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholder/Serv/globalCard/en/global_3/10030382?type=2

D-27. Chinese projects in Mauritania

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Mauritania	A military and commercial port	Transportation	Partnership <i>funded by the Mauritania government; Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build (signed contract).</i>	http://northafricapost.com/15505-mauritania-awards-building-ndiago-port-chinas-controversial-polytechnology.html
	Demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Funded by Chinese government and built by Chinese corporations.</i>	http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyl/k/201211/20121108455062.html
	A fish processing plant	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A sub-company of a Chinese state-owned company invested and built the plant in exchange for fishing in Mauritanian waters</i>	https://www.asso-sherpa.org/mauritania-china-fisheries-agreement-civil-society-appeals-eu-mauritanian-government
	China-aided Friendship Hospital	Public services	Aid <i>Donated by Chinese government and constructed by Chinese corporation in 2010; part of the 8 measures former President Hu proposed in the 2016 FOAC.</i>	http://cgcint.com/index.php/en/news/co-news/news/co-news/505-china-aided-hospital-completed-in-mauritania
	Mauritania-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/kh/global_3/10030302?type=1

D-28. Chinese projects in Mauritius

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Mauritius	B6 Road	Transportation	Partnership <i>Funded by the World Bank, built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_a02d8bed0101aeb4.html
	Bagatelle Dam	Natural resources and energy	Loans and partnership <i>China Exim Bank provides concessional loan, Chinese state-owned company builds (under construction).</i>	http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1599049944&Country=Mauritius&topic=Economy&subtopic=Recent+developments&aid=1&oid=77752392
	Fishing company	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A Chinese fishing company invested 5 purse seine fishing vessels in Mauritania, selling tuna locally and exporting to China.</i>	https://www.fcwc-fish.org/publications/news-from-the-region/106-chinese-firm-launches-fishing-project-in-mauritania
	32th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Heilongjiang province is responsible for sending doctors to Mauritius since 1968. So far 32 medical teams with 833 doctors have been dispatched.</i>	http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/03/c_283868.htm
	Mauritius-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>Unionpay international partnered with SBM to enable all merchants and ATMs to accept its card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/ru/global_3/10030312?type=2

D-29. Chinese projects in Mozambique

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Mozambique	Maputo Bridge and Linking roads	Transportation	Loans <i>China provided loans and Chinese state-owned company built using Chinese standard</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/13/c_137175965.htm
	Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development Limited	Agriculture	Investment & partnership <i>Chinese private company invested a farm; Mozambique government provided free lands</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/14/c_137178202.htm
	A thermal power plant	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>A Chinese company partners with the foreign company contracted to be in charge of the project</i>	https://clubofmozambique.com/news/shanghai-electric-power-co-invests-us3-million-in-mozambique/
	Cement plant in Pemba	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A Chinese state-owned company invested and produced locally</i>	http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/cement-plant-built-with-chinese-investors-starts-work-in-mozambique/
	China-Africa friendship primary school	Public services	Aid <i>Organized and funded by Chinese government; part of China's aided projects in Mozambique.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1114/c90782-8976253.html
	Mozambique - Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>Unionpay partnered with Societe Generale (France) to newly enable its cards services in Mozambique</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/15/c_136826668.htm

D-30. Chinese projects in Namibia

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Namibia	Namibia MR 125 Highway project	Transportation	Partnership <i>Funded by Namibia government, jointly contracted by Chinese and Namibia state-owned companies</i>	http://www.mwt.gov.na/projects
	Sending agricultural experts for demonstration and training	Agriculture	Aid & partnership <i>Part of South-South Cooperation (SSC) projects on agriculture.</i>	https://economist.com.na/16441/agriculture/chinese-experts-push-yields-up/
	Husab Uranium Mine	Natural resources and energy	Investment & partnership <i>Collaboratively invested by China and Namibia; Chinese companies have 90% stake and Namibia state-owned company has 10% stake; Chinese state-owned company built and operate.</i>	http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/31/WS5b88aea0a310add14f388dbf.html
	Rock Cement	Manufacturing	Investment & partnership <i>Collaboratively invested by Chinese and Namibia companies.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-10/23/content_22264102.htm
	11th Medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Zhejiang Province; 4 doctors were sent to Namibia in 2016, providing treatment to 600 locals.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zft/eng/jlydh/dfwl/t1387157.htm
	Renminbi for business transactions	Financial services	Partnership <i>Bank Windhoek (local bank) accepts Renminbi at its branches.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/19/c_136985465.htm

D-31. Chinese projects in Niger

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Niger	96 km road in Maradi	Transportation	Partnership <i>A Chinese company was contracted to build, finance unspecified.</i>	http://www.cgcc.com.cn/news/31.html
	A high voltage transmission line	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank partially financed the project with 1 billion USD; constructed by Chinese state-owned company in 2014.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/24/c_136391176.htm
	Niamey general referral hospital	Public services	Aid <i>Part of 300 million-yuans aided development projects.</i>	https://allafrica.com/stories/201608030235.html
	Niger-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030522?type=2

D-32. Chinese projects in Nigeria

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Nigeria	Lagos–Calabar Coastal Railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provides loans; Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build (signed contract)</i>	http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/china-nigeria-agree-ne7w-dea7l-12bn-coas7tal/
	Agricultural Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Funded by Chinese government as a gift to Nigerian government; the center focuses on training, planting, and marketing.</i>	http://saharareporters.com/2018/12/18/2018-we%E2%80%98ve-invested-100m-nigeria-%E2%80%93-chinese-government
	Zungeru power plant	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided 75% of concessional loans and the rest will be covered by local government; two Chinese state-owned companies were contracted to build.</i>	https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/115384/2-chinese-firms-begin-construction-of-zungeru-hydro-power-p.html
	Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone	Manufacturing	Investment & partnership <i>Funded and constructed by a Guangdong province-owned company in collaboration with Government of Ogun State; Chinese company takes up 60% stake of the zone.</i>	http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/counseloroffice/westernasiaandfricareport/201807/20180702765135.shtml
	Satellite television project	Public services	Partnership <i>A Chinese private company provides media content services covering 1000 villages in Nigeria.</i>	https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/01/replicate-chinas-1000-villages-digital-project-in-nigeria-fg-tells-startimes/
	Nigeria-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with InterSwitch (Pan-African bank) to enable its card services at ATMs and POS.</i>	https://unionpayintl.com/en/mediacenter/newsCenter/companyNews/220204.shtml

D-33. Chinese projects in Rwanda

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Rwanda	Upgrade of a 54-km long Urban road in Kigali	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://www.hopemag.com/index.php?com=news&option=read&ca=6&a=3755
	China-Rwanda Agriculture Technology Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Aided by Chinese government; serve as a training base.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/31/c_136718149.htm
	80MW Rusumo hydro-power station	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Owned by Rwanda, Tanzania, and Burundi; Financed by World Bank and African Development Bank; cooperatively built by two Chinese state-owned companies and an Austrian company.</i>	https://www.hydrorworld.com/hydro-projects/rusumo-falls-hydropower-project.html
	C&H's clothing factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>C&H Garments Ltd invested and operated a clothing factory in Rwanda's Kigali Special Economic Zone.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/02/c_137151281.htm
	Digital TV sets	Public services	Partnership <i>Chinese private company provides media content services for 400,000 local households.</i>	https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/211247
	Rwanda-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with local RSwitch to enable its card services at ATMs and POS.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/en/mediaCenter/newsCenter/companyNews/3006017.shtml

D-34. Chinese projects in Sao Tome And Principe

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Sao Tome And Principe	deep water port	Transportation	Aid & partnership <i>Partially aided by China according to bilateral agreement; Chinese state-owned company will invest part of the funds and be in charge of construction (signed MoU).</i>	https://macauhub.com.mo/2017/04/26/china-doa-146-milhoes-de-dolares-para-construcao-de-infra-estruturas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/
	Sending agricultural experts	Agriculture	Aid <i>China dispatched experts to train local farmers</i>	http://agri.hunan.gov.cn/xxgk/gzdt/snyw/dtyw/201701/t20170117_3899666.html
	200 annual internships and scholarships for students and professionals	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government funded the students in 2017 after the two countries resumed diplomatic relationship in 2016.</i>	https://macauhub.com.mo/2017/04/26/china-doa-146-milhoes-de-dolares-para-construcao-de-infra-estruturas-em-sao-tome-e-principe/

D-35. Chinese projects in Senegal

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Senegal	Ila Touba highway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201704/23/WS59bb8df0a310d4d9ab7ea212_2.html
	Sending agricultural experts	Agriculture	Aid <i>Chinese government sent experts to provide training, technology transfer and assist planting.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1579344.shtml
	Felou hydropower project	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Owned by Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and Guinea; Financed by World Bank and European Investment Bank; built by Chinese state-owned company.</i>	https://www.hydrworld.com/articles/2009/05/china-firm-signs-epc.html
	Orders of Weapons	Manufacturing	<i>Orders from Senegal government; e.g. armoured vehicles.</i>	http://www.defenceweb.co.za/land/land-senegal-has-received-new-armoured-vehicles-from-china/
	GoTa National Information Security Network	Public services	Loans & partnership <i>China provided loans, Chinese state-control company ZTE built the information security network covering Senegal, including governmental departments.</i>	https://www.zte.com.cn/global/about/magazine/zte-technologies/2010/8/en_494/188661
	Senegal-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>China Unionpay partnered with Societe Generale to enable its card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/jp/global_3/10030532?type=2

D-36. Chinese projects in Seychelles

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Seychelles	Donation of a armed patrol vessel	Manufacturing	Aid <i>Chinese government donated a newly built Type 62 Class Gunboat to Seychelles government.</i>	http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/357/China+gifts+maritime+patrol+ship+to+Seychelles
	16th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Ministry of Health, China medical team cooperated with the district administration of Pointe Larue to provide medical consultation and health check in 2017.</i>	http://sc.china-embassy.org/eng/zsgx/t1484856.htm
	Seychelles-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Barclays Bank to enable its card services.</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/gzhd_673042/t1463548.shtml

D-37. Chinese projects in Sierra Leone

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Sierra Leone	Rehabilitation and expansion of the Wellington-Massiaka road	Transportation	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company is responsible for construction and securing finance; it has been granted a 25-year operation and maintenance contract.</i>	http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0714/c90000-9241969.html
	Sierra Leone China Agriculture Development Company Limited	Agriculture	Loans & partnership <i>Mainly funded by China Exim Bank; 3 Chinese companies partnered with Sierra Leone government to constitute the company.</i>	https://awoko.org/2013/12/17/sierra-leone-news-sierra-leone-china-agriculture-development-company-limited-launched/
	An iron ore processing plant	Natural resources and energy	Investment <i>Chinese state-owned mining company will invest 700 million USD to build the processing plant at Tonkolili mine, the largest mine in Sierra Leone and now owned by China.</i>	https://awoko.org/2017/02/21/sierra-leone-news-chinese-investment-boosts-sierra-leones-mining-outlook/
	Donation of anti-cholera drugs worth 1 million CNY	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government donated the anti-cholera drugs at a cost of 1 million CNY in 2012 in response to the cholera outbreak happened in Sierra Leone.</i>	https://china.aiddata.org/projects/30274
	Sierra Leone-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/jp/global_3/10030502?type=2

D-38. Chinese projects in Somali

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Somali	2821.75 metric tonnes of rice	Agriculture	Aid <i>Chinese government offered food assistance for drought-affected people in 18 regions of Somalia</i>	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zft/eng/jlydh/t1468352.htm
	Anti-malaria drugs	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government donated anti-malaria drugs with a cost of 1 million RMB</i>	https://china.aiddata.org/projects/35217

D-39. Chinese projects in South Africa

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
South Africa	China-South Africa Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Chinese government financed and Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.gov.za/china-south-africa-agricultural-demonstration-centre-will-be-opened-gariep
	Jinchuan acquiring 45% stake of Wesizwe Platinum	Natural resources and energy	Investment <i>China's largest platinum miner acquired 45% stake of Wesizwe Platinum in 2010 under the financial support of China-Africa Development Fund.</i>	http://www.platinumgroupmetals.net/investor-relations/news/press-releases/press-releases-details/2011/Platinum-Group-Metals-Partner-Completes-Transaction-with-Chinese-Consortium/default.aspx
	Hisense's factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Chinese manufacturer invested and operated a factory in Cape Town.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/30/c_136485253.htm
	Telecommunication network points	Public services	<i>Huawei invested and promoted telecommunication upgrading, e.g. establishing two network points of presence.</i>	https://techcentral.co.za/china-telecom-to-set-up-sa-points-of-presence/81119/
	Alipay's mobile payment	Financial services	Partnership <i>Chinese private company AliPay partnered with a South African company to make AliPay available in SA.</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2017-08/31/content_31365107.htm

D-40. Chinese projects in South Sudan

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
South Sudan	Juba-Nimule Railway Project	Transportation	Loans <i>Will be financed by China and built by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50980
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Handed over to local government by Chinese government</i>	http://www.china-news.com/mil/2012/07-31/4072558.shtml
	Juba Hydropower Station Project	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Financed by African Development Bank and will build by Chinese state-owned company</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/21/c_137484702.htm
	5th Medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; 15 doctors were sent to South Sudan for one year.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/08/c_137164102.htm
	South Sudan-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Equity (a Kenyan bank) launching UnionPay card services on all ATMs and points of sale machines in South Sudan</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en/global_3/10030162?type=1

D-41. Chinese projects in Sudan

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Sudan	3,400 km-long trans-Saharan Railway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provides loans; Chinese state-owned company builds (signed agreement); linking Sudan Port with the Chadian capital N'Djamena via Khartoum; It's part of a 7,500-km transcontinental rail corridor connecting Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal.</i>	http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/china-signs-agreement-begin-planning-3400km-trans-/
	China-Sudan Agricultural Cooperation Development Park	Agriculture	Partnership <i>Collaboratively established by Chinese state-owned company and Sudan agricultural sector.</i>	http://english.aagri.gov.cn/news/dqnf/201609/t20160926_220694.htm
	The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company	Natural resources and energy	Investment <i>China's CNPC purchased the largest 40% stake of Sudanese Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company from the Western owners who retreated from Sudan oil sector because of the U.S. economic sanction.</i>	http://www.gnpoc.com/Pages/mission-statement.aspx
	An overseas plant	Manufacturing	Investment & Partnership <i>Chinese private car company Shuanghuan Auto jointly built the plant with local vehicle manufacturer GIAD.</i>	http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/461396.shtml
	Confucius Institute of the University of Khartoum	Public services	Partnership <i>Collaboratively established by China's Northwest Normal University and Sudan's University of Khartoum.</i>	http://sd.china-embassy.org/eng/whjl/t911018.htm
	Sudan-UnionPay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Fransabank China Desk to promote UnionPay Credit Cards in Lebanon.</i>	https://www.unionpayintl.com/en/serviceCenter/cardUsingInstructions/821.shtml

D-42. Chinese projects in Tanzania

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Tanzania	Mbeya-Luwanjiro highway	Transportation	Partnership <i>Constructed by Chinese state-owned company in 2017; finance unspecific; finished in 2017; it's the highest road in Tanzania.</i>	http://en.silkroad.news.cn/2017/0414/16564.shtml
	Agricultural Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Aided by Chinese government; the center conducts training, planting, and marketing.</i>	http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2015-05/06/content_35504658.htm
	Natural gas pipeline	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided concessional loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	http://www.china.org.cn/business/2015-10/12/content_36787758.htm
	DongAo Clothing Factory	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Wholly invested and owned by a Chinese private company.</i>	http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-08-10/doc-ifyixipt0901678.shtml
	Peace Ark-medical treatment	Public services	Aid <i>Chinese government organized doctor teams to provide free medical treatment by the ship.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/23/c_136774918.htm
	Tanzania-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with local Umoja to enable its card services at ATMs and POS.</i>	http://www.unionpayintl.com/wap/en/mediaCenter/newsCenter/companyNews/3011264.shtml

D-43. Chinese projects in Togo

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Togo	Rehabilitation of a dual-carriage ring-road in Lome	Transportation	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built this</i>	https://china.aiddata.org/projects/392
	Agricultural industrial park	Agriculture	Partnership <i>A Chinese state-owned company partners with Togo agricultural sector to invest and build a agricultural industrial park</i>	http://news.afrindex.com/zixun/article9669.html
	Adjarala hydroelectric project	Natural resources and energy	Loans <i>China Exim Bank provided loans of \$ 550 million; Chinese state-owned company will build this</i>	https://www.hydroreview.com/2009/05/28/china-builder-to-construct-togos-147-mw-adjarala/#gref
	Broadcast of Chinese state media	Public services	Partnership <i>Chinese state media broadcasts some programs on the airwaves of Radio Lome and Togolese Television based on the agreement made by Togolese authorities and China Radio International and CCTV; China also offers technical and material assistance for the modernization of the studios in Togo</i>	http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/46750/1/for%20JCC.pdf
	Togo-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay cooperates with local bank to issue UnionPay card services.</i>	http://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderService/globalCard/en/global_3/10030122?type=2

D-44. Chinese projects in Uganda

	Project name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Uganda	Entebbe–Kampala Expressway	Transportation	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-road/chinese-built-expressway-divides-uganda-as-debts-mount-idUSKBN1FK0V1
	Agricultural industrial park	Agriculture	Investment <i>Cooperatively invested by 6 Chinese private companies who are responsible for construction and operation of the park.</i>	http://www.fecc.agri.cn/English/SouthSouthCooperation/201802/t20180223_322784.html
	Karuma Hydroelectric Power Station	Natural resources and energy	Loans & partnership <i>China Exim Bank provided loans; Chinese state-owned company built.</i>	https://www.afrik21.africa/en/uganda-chinese-sinohydro-to-deliver-karuma-hydroelectric-dam-in-2019/
	China-Uganda Mbale Industrial Park	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Invested and constructed by Chinese private company; resident corporations are mainly from China and focus on building materials, fruit processing, furniture and glass manufacturing, automotive assembly, smart phones and new energy.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029136.htm
	Satellite television project	Public services	Partnership <i>Chinese private company providing media content services to over 500 villages.</i>	https://pctechmag.com/2018/07/government-of-china-uganda-partner-to-launch-satellite-tv-project-in-wakiso/
	Uganda-Unionpay	Financial services	Partnership <i>UnionPay partnered with Post Bank Uganda to enable its card services.</i>	https://unionpayintl.com/en/mediacenter/newsCenter/companyNews/3875.shtml

D-45. Chinese projects in Zambia

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Zambia	388.8-km railroad from Serenje to Petauke and Chipata	Transportation	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company was contracted to build, finance unspecified</i>	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-11/04/content_27271741.htm
	Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Jilin Province is responsible for the center; handed over to Zambia as part of bilateral cooperation.</i>	http://zm2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/china/news/201106/20110607608477.shtml
	Kafue Gorge Lower Hydropower Station	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Collaboratively financed by Zambian government and foreign financial institutions including China Exim Bank, Chinese state-owned company built</i>	https://www.power-technology.com/projects/kafue-gorge-lower-kgl-power-station/
	Industrial Park	Manufacturing	Investment <i>A joint venture company set up by Chinese private company</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-fiscal/china-says-will-step-up-fiscal-spending-this-year-to-support-economy-idUSKCN1PH06F
	19th medical team	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; 28 medical members were sent to Zambia for one year.</i>	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/15/c_137181147.htm
	Bank of China (Zambia)	Financial services	Partnership <i>BOA got license to set up a branch from Zambian financial department</i>	http://www.bankofchina.com/zm/about-us/ab1/201312/t20131223_2763436.html

D-46. Chinese projects in Zimbabwe

	Project Name	Sector	Type of involvement	Source
Zimbabwe	Expansion of Victoria Falls Airport	Transportation	Loans <i>China provided 150 million USD loans for the project.</i>	http://www.the-businessreport.com/article/chinese-mega-deals-set-to-build-and-expand-infrastructure/
	Agricultural demonstration center	Agriculture	Aid <i>Organized and funded by Chinese government, Chinese institution built.</i>	http://www.debon.com.cn/en/news/537.html
	400 megawatts coal methane-fired power plant	Natural resources and energy	Partnership <i>Chinese state-owned company built, investment unspecified</i>	https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwe-china-sign-1-billion-deal-investment-to-create-25-000-jobs-20180516
	Steel plant	Manufacturing	Investment <i>Will be invested by a Chinese private company and carried out by its local subsidiary</i>	https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-zimbabwe-china-steel/chinas-tsingshan-expands-plans-for-zimbabwe-steel-plant-idUSKCN1RZ2C1
	Advanced training for agricultural officials	Public services	Aid <i>Organized by Chinese government; so far 200 governmental officials were trained since its launch in 2012.</i>	https://www.thepatriot.co.zw/old_posts/advanced-training-for-agric-officials/
	Chinese yuan as the country's legal currency	Financial services	Partnership <i>This is for exchange of the debt cancellation offered by Beijing; Chinese tourists would be able to pay in Renminbi in Zimbabwe.</i>	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/zimbabwe-to-make-chinese-yuan-legal-currency-after-beijing-cancels-debts

Curriculum Vitae

Jin Ding, born on 17 June 1990 in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, China

EDUCATION

M.A., Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, 2016

Concentrations: information sciences and public policies

Thesis: Corporate Social Responsibility of Academic Publishers in China.

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Xiwen Liu

B.A., Management, Soochow University, Suzhou, China, 2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, University of Basel, 2017.02-2017.07

Proseminar: Social and Economic Development in China, India and South Africa

Teaching Assistant, University of Basel, 2018.02-2018.07

Proseminar: Sociology of Development

Teaching Assistant, University of Basel, 2018.08-2019.01

Proseminar: Sustainable Development in India and China

I co-taught the three proseminars with my colleague. We planned sections and topics, gave presentations, led discussions and offered feedback on and after classes, and gave grades to the students.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

PhD candidate, University of Basel, starting from October 2016

I am a doctoral candidate at the Social Research and Methodology Group and Centre for African Studies, University of Basel;

I study China-Africa relations and cooperation from a development perspective with a special focus on the roles of Chinese corporations;

I collaborate with my colleagues on three working papers related to Chinese involvement in Africa from an academic, a Chinese, and a South Africa perspective respectively. One paper which focuses on China in Africa from mainstream academic

perspective has been submitted to Journal of Contemporary China in November 2019.

Research assistant, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013-2016

I was a research assistant and Master student in National Science Library, Chinese Academy of Sciences from 2013-2016;

I focused on academic publishers and their interrelation with public policies, corporate responsibility, and public knowledge;

I conducted diverse research projects funded by different institutes under the supervision of my Master supervisor and published two peer-reviewed articles.

PUBLICATIONS

Ding, J., & Liu, X.W. (2015). Social responsibility of academic publishers and knowledge acquisition. *Library and Information Service*, 59(11): 55-61.

Liu, X.W., & Ding, J. (2015). Social responsibility of academic publishers: Case studies of large academic publishers. *Publishing Research*, 8, 22-26.

PRESENTATIONS

Title: *The Involvement of Chinese Corporations in Africa from a Chinese Government Perspective*. Working paper presented at the 7th World Sustainability Forum, Beijing, 19-21 September, 2018.

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

State Scholarship Fund (China Scholarship Council, 2016.10-2020.02)

Research funding from National Science Library (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2014-2015)

Research funding from National Science and Technology Library (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2013-2015)

Chun-Tsung Endowment (Soochow University, 2010-2012)

AWARDS AND HONORS

Outstanding Student Leader (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2015)

Excellent graduates (Soochow University, 2013)

RELEVANT SKILLS

Master mixed methods: Content Configuration Analysis, Multidimensional Scaling, and Network Analysis.

Master extensive knowledge of R, UCINET, and Pajek programs.

Be fluent in English and Chinese.