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Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Balles, Patrick and Matter, Ulrich and Stutzer, Alois. (2020) Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention. WWZ Working Paper, 2020 (06).

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/76482/

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Abstract

We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische ├ľkonomie (Stutzer)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Balles, Patrick and Matter, Ulrich and Stutzer, Alois
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ
Number of Pages:79
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2020/06
Last Modified:28 Apr 2020 15:34
Deposited On:28 Apr 2020 15:34

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