A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

Wasser, Cédric. (2013) A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66 (2). pp. 180-182.

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The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’s valuation of winning is increasing in the signal he observes and that a player’s probability of winning is continuous in the efforts of all players as well as increasing in his own effort.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Wasser, Cédric
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:12 Nov 2019 10:21
Deposited On:12 Nov 2019 10:21

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