Bilateral k+1-price Auctions with Asymmetric Shares and Values

Wasser, Cédric. (2013) Bilateral k+1-price Auctions with Asymmetric Shares and Values. Games and Economic Behavior, 82. pp. 350-368.

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/72615/

Downloads: Statistics Overview


We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidder's shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is denoted by k in [0,1]. We partially characterize equilibrium strategies and show that they are closely related to equilibrium strategies of two well-studied mechanisms: the double auction between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two branches of the literature enables us to prove equilibrium existence. Moreover, we find that there is a continuum of equilibria if k in (0,1) whereas the equilibrium is unique if k in {0,1}. Our approach also suggests a procedure for numerical simulations.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Wasser, Cédric
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Identification Number:
Last Modified:12 Nov 2019 10:26
Deposited On:12 Nov 2019 10:26

Repository Staff Only: item control page