THE YOUNG TURK
AFTERMATH

*Making Sense of Transnational Contentious Politics at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922*

Dissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der Philosophie vorgelegt der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät der Universität Basel

von

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Genehmigt von der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät der Universität Basel, auf Antrag von Prof. Dr. Maurus Reinkowski und Prof. em. Dr. Paul Dumont (Université de Strasbourg).


Der Dekan Prof. Dr. Thomas Grob
In memory of my late father
Kaya Yenen (1930–2004),
the man who borrowed me his world of imagination.

Dedicated to my «Golden Girls»,
my caring mother Betül
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Preface to the Online Publication in 2019

This is the electronic publication of my PhD thesis at the University of Basel, which was submitted to the PhD committee on September 28, 2016, and successfully defended on December 15, 2016. It is one of the outdated customs of German-speaking academia that a PhD thesis must be published in order to complete the formal procedure of a doctoral degree. Considering the fact that there is no central digital repository for PhD theses (comparable to ProQuest, EThOS, or YÖK databases) in Switzerland, I regard this so-called «e-dissertation» at the digital repository of the University Library of Basel as a means of documentation. While I am still revisiting and reviewing my research to prepare a revised book manuscript with an academic publishing house, this electronic publication (and its few mandatory hard copies) serves to complete this formal PhD procedure.

Therefore, I resisted to do any far-reaching revisions and updates on this e-dissertation that considerably alters and changes the thesis. Most changes on this online version are matters of orthography, grammar, and punctuation. At few occasions, I slightly adjusted or corrected the content and citations, however, without including new publications after 2016. ¹ Hence, differences in page numbers between this version and the original thesis are minimal. Unfortunately, at the time of the completion of my thesis, I wasn’t aware of the PhD thesis of Erol Ülker which provides my «Young Turk Aftermath» a complementing perspective from within İstanbul.² I had also missed Samuel Hirst’s excellent article on the early history of

¹ For instance, Taner Akçam’s recent research on the Talat Pasha telegrams confirmed my cautious predictions that a critical review of these documents was overdue. Taner Akçam, Killing Orders: Talat Pasha’s Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
Soviet–Kemalist relations. Šuhnaz Yılmaz’s recent publication on Enver Pasha’s exile activities is also not cited, as it was published shortly after I had submitted my dissertation. Among forthcoming publications, Betül Aslan is publishing an important book on Kemalist-Unionist-Bolshevik relations based on some of the same material that I used from the archives in Ankara. Osik Moses’ forthcoming PhD thesis on the assassination of Talat Pasha will surely offer further insights as well. After completing my PhD, I published “Elusive Forces in Illusive Eyes: British Officialdom’s Perception of the Anatolian Resistance Movement,” (Middle Eastern Studies 54, no. 5 (2018): 788–810), which mostly draws on my research from my PhD thesis, but does not correspond to any particular chapter.

Acknowledgments are listed in the original Preface below. Nevertheless, I would like to thank Paul Dumont for praising my PhD in his recent publication. Also Maurus Reinkowski continued mentoring and supporting me after my PhD. Moreover, I am grateful to the Institute for Area Studies at Leiden University for employing me as a university lecturer for modern Turkish history and culture after Professor Erik Jan Zürcher’s retirement. Unfortunately, my lovely aunt Rukiye Arslan tragically passed away in 2018, to whom—along with my late father, my mother, and my other aunt—I had dedicated my thesis. Therefore, I had to adjust the original dedication page. Finally, I would like express once again my ever-deepening gratitude to my wife Özge Barut whose support has been indispensable ever since.

Alp Yenen
Leiden, August 2019

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Preface

This manuscript is my PhD thesis at the University of Basel. This work could not have been started, continued, and completed without the support of my Doktorvater Maurus Reinkowski. His intellectual wisdom, liberal and sensible guidance, and moral and material support were irreplaceably crucial for this project. I am tremendously indebted to him for his trust and care. Emeritus Professor Paul Dumont kindly accepted to be my second advisor. I feel lucky to have found a co-advisor who himself researched on the same topic several decades ago. I am grateful for his critical comments in our joint colloquiums at Basel and Strasbourg.

This PhD thesis has its roots in my MA thesis, “Berlin unter dem Banner des Islams: Die jungtürkische Exilpolitik in Berlin (1918–1922) und die Propagandazeitschrift Liwa-el-Islam,” (Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2009). Long due acknowledgements are in order to Professor Christoph K. Neumann for his keen guidance and to Emeritus Professor Hans-Georg Majer for his much-appreciated comments. I had the chance to publish some of the earlier results of my research as chapters in edited volumes. Nevertheless, “The Exile Activities of the Unionists in Berlin (1918–1922),” in Türkisch-Deutsche Beziehungen: Perspektiven aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, edited by Claus Schönig, Ramazan Çalik and Hatice Bayraktar, 71–94 (Berlin: Klaus-Schwarz-Verlag, 2011), can mostly be ignored, as the editors published my conference manuscript instead of the reviewed version I had submitted. I had the chance to discuss some of my conceptual ideas in “Approaching Transnational Political History: The Role of Non-State Actors in Post-Ottoman State-Formation,” in Transnational Actors – Crossing Borders: Transnational History Studies, edited by Steffi Marung and Matthias Middell, 261–70 (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015). A
A glimpse into my research topic was given in my “The Other Jihad: Enver Pasha, Bolsheviks, and Politics of Anticolonial Muslim Nationalism during the Baku Congress 1920,” in *The First World War and its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Middle East*, edited by T. G. Fraser, 273–93 (London: Gingko Library Press, 2015). I explored some of the general ideas of my dissertation in my “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I,” in *War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State*, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, 1181–1216 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016). None of these publications correspond to any chapter of the dissertation, but, needless to say, I benefitted from their content and conceptions.

Of course, no such project can be realized without financial support. I am greatly in debt to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for granting me a doctoral scholarship for 31 months. Since February 2013, I’ve been working at the University of Basel as an assistant lecturer in Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies at the Department of Social Sciences. I owe once again gratitude to Maurus Reinkowski for his trust in me as well as for the warm atmosphere he provided at the Seminar für Nahoststudien in Basel.

The Graduate School for Social Sciences (G3S) at the University of Basel and the MUBIT Inter-University Doctoral Cooperation in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies (Basel/Zurich) allowed me to benefit from a more structured PhD program. I found much pleasure in taking advanced courses, attending research colloquia, and even organizing myself doctoral workshops. I thank those professors whom I had the honor to get to know as teachers: Erik J. Zürcher, M. Hakan Yavuz, Kemal Kırişçi, José Casanova, Meropi Anastassiadou, Bettina Dennerlein, Ulrich Rudolph, Michael Provence, Hasan Kayali, Jack Goldstone, Isa Blumi, Axel Paul, Mithat Sancar, Cyrus Schayegh, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, and others. I would like to thank the program coordinators Dr. Günter Schmidt (G3S) and my dear colleague Dr. Selen Etingü (MUBIT). From my time at the University of Freiburg, I would like to thank Professor Johanna Pink for inviting me to take part at the doctoral colloquium. Dr. Tilman Lüdke introduced me to the inspiring and thrilling book Peter Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia*, 1984. 2nd ed. (New York: Kodansha International, 1999). Professor Tolga Esmer gave many important advices on studying rumors in politics during his fellowship at the University of Freiburg. I owe also many thanks to my
treasured colleague Professor Tim Epkenhans for his constant support and for sharing his impressive knowledge about Central Asia and many other areas with me.

Thanks are also in order to those who facilitated my archival research. At the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, I would like to thank Fuat Recep for his assistance. I have spent much time in the archive of the Turkish Historical Society (TTK). I am truly indebted to Mrs. Semiha Nurdan, the chief archivist at the TTK, for her generous hospitality and for her professionalism as an archivist. I also had the chance to work at the archives of the Turkish General Staff’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE). Especially, I would like to thank Mesut Üstünbaş for his support and assistance. From my time at ATASE, I would like to thank Professor Michael Reynolds for all those invaluable conversations during our lunch breaks, eating balık ekmek in Ankara. İlhami Bebek, a retired archival clerk at ATASE and a freelance researcher, was kind enough to look over my shoulders during his spare time. He has devoted much appreciated attention to my project. At the archive of the Institute of the Turkish Revolution History at the University of Ankara, I would like to thank my colleague Hakan Yaşar for his companionship and his support. One thing that made my stay in Ankara particularly joyful was that my dear uncle İzzet Yenen and my cousin and good friend Ali Yenen hosted me at their home.

The archivists of the Deutsches Museum in Munich were immensely helpful by carefully preparing the documents that I had requested. Archivists at the German Military Archive in Freiburg, Munich City Archives as well as the Political Archive of the Auswärtiges Amt were also a great help. For sharing his material and knowledge regarding German archival documents, I would like to thank my colleague Gerhard Grüsshaber. I am also indebted to my colleague Sarah Djavid-Khayati for introducing me to the Federal Archives of Switzerland. My good friends Murat Kaya and Dr. Ramazan Hakki Öztan deserve also thanks for facilitating my research at the National Archives in London. I have benefitted immensely from the private papers of late Gerhard Höpp located at the Zentrum moderner Orient (ZMO) which included many archival documents and other sources. May he rest in peace.

For support in various ways I would like to thank (in alphabetical order): Alexander Balistreri, Ali Bademci, Alp Eren Topal, Alptuğ Güney, Anna Dippert, Anna Vakali, Enis Erdem Aydı̈n, Joël László, Kerem Uygun, Osik Moses, Stefan Ihrig, Thomas Volk, and Yavuz Köse.
would like to thank also Professor Zafer Toprak for hosting me at his private library in İstanbul and giving me valuable advices.

Such a project would have been unbearable without the intellectual companionship of some very good friends. I was fortunate enough to have Olmo Gölz by my side throughout this shared time of dissertation writing. Murat Kaya was my living encyclopedia on the Young Turks throughout the project. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan was patient and kind enough to read to whole dissertation one chapter after another and gave invaluable suggestions.

Last but not least, my loving wife Özge deserves special praise for her patience and caring spirit as well as for fulfilling my life.

I am sad that my late father Kaya Yenen could not read these lines. I hope to have cherished his memory and believe that his love for adventure and storytelling inspired me. I dedicate this book to my «Golden Girls». I would like express my gratitude for my mother Betül and my aunts Rukiye and Ayşegül for everything they have done for me and the completion of this project.

Alp Yenen

Freiburg im Breisgau, September 2016
Note on Terminology, Translation, and Transliteration

Use and choice of words can be a sensitive issue. This is especially the case in mapping the political geography. For instance, my European sources used exclusively Constantinople, whereas my Ottoman-Turkish sources rather İstanbul. I use both terms interchangeably, but used the former historic term more regularly in the pre-1923 context and İstanbul in a more contemporary and general sense. Needless to say, there is no Byzantine irredentism behind my preference. It was a choice of style mainly for the sake of contextualizing İstanbul as a cosmopolitan imperial city. The same rule applies to similar places such as Smyrna (İzmir) and Alexandretta (İskenderun), etc. Wherever I felt that the Greco-Roman term was rather alienating than convenient, I preferred the Turkish spelling as in Trabzon instead of Trebizond. This is also the reason why I preferred Ankara over Angora, because the Turkified version more precisely represents the political connotations of the city. I sometimes also stuck to the original Ottoman province names as in Diyarbekir instead of its Republican alteration Diyarbakır. Outside the Ottoman Empire I followed a similar logic and used the commonly known names of places in English language, thus rather Munich, Berne, Damascus, and St. Petersburg instead of München, Bern, Sham, or Petrograd. Wherever I felt that it was necessary to clarify, I gave other (local or current) versions in brackets. My usage of the term Turkestan, a term that is practically vanished today, is also not based on any notion of pan-Turkism, but rather on its common use for Central Asia in the sources.

It is no secret that the European sources from the beginning on and increasingly more Ottoman sources since the 19th century used Turkish and Ottoman as well as Turkey and Ottoman Empire interchangeably. Nevertheless, I strictly differentiate between the terms «Turkish» and «Ottoman» as well as «Ottoman Empire» and «Turkey». One exception is that I used the political-spatial neologism Ottoman Turkey to describe the Ottoman Empire’s remaining and disputed territories in the liminal period after the end of World War I in November 1918. After 1921, I used Turkey and Turkish in referring to the polities and policies of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. I use the term Soviet Russia for the former territories of the Russian Empire, where during the Russian Civil War new Soviet republics were founded and later merged into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.
The Young Turk Aftermath

The terms *Young Turks* (from the French *Jeunes-Turcs*, in Turkish: *Jön Türkler*) and *CUP* (Committee of Union and Progress, in Turkish: *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) are mostly used interchangeably in the literature. However, I tried to give some nuances wherever necessary. For instance, when I talk about the *Young Turk generation* or the *Young Turk movement*, I rather refer to a general category of an intellectual movement or a social group that went beyond the membership to the CUP. When referring to a certain characteristic, community or polity exclusively associated with the CUP, I rather speak of *CUP paramilitaries* or *CUP networks*. Though, I claim no consistency in these nuances and used them also interchangeably, whenever it was convenient. Needless to say, there is no such thing as *Young Turkish* (as in place of the German *jungtürkisch*). For some reason, the agent noun *Unionist* (a direct translation of the very widely used *İttihatçı*) has gained only limited currency outside the field of Ottoman and Turkish Studies (even less the loan word experiment *İttihadist*). Thus, I used «Unionist» mostly in the Ottoman-Turkish context, mostly in contrast to Kemalists and other factions and parties. Like many contemporary Western sources, I use the term *Kemalist* as an alternative term for the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, without implying that they were already adherents of Kemalism of the 1930s. Depending on the context, the Ottoman-Turkish usage of *Islam* can mean *Islam*, *Islamic*, and *Muslim*. I choose to translate the post-war CUP organization under study as the Union of *Muslim Revolutionary Societies* (*İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı*) and not Union of *Islamic Revolutionary Societies* as it has been commonly translated so far—including my previous work.

Islamicate loan words of Arab origin are spelled in the main text according to their original Arabic pronunciation and spelling, thus *jihad* instead of *cihat*. Throughout the text, I used Ottoman honorific titles following the first name such as *Pasha* (a lifelong title awarded to generals and ministers), *Bey* (similar to Mister, commonly a Muslim government official), and *Efendi* (indicating either nobility, property, authority, or mastery). Other foreign language expressions and loan words with no suited translation as well as original quotes in foreign languages are given in *italics*. Italics are also used to express emphasis and to underline some conceptual keywords. Quotes and so-called «scare quotes» are given—following the Swiss rule—in «guillemets». 
Transliteration of non-Latin scripts is certainly one of the blessings and curses of area studies. I’ve once argued (more or less satirically) that meticulous transliteration of the Arabic-scripted languages is the «initiation rite» and boundary marker of German-speaking Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies.⁶ I apologize for that I did not use a detailed transliteration system in this book. This was rather for reasons of convenience than a matter of conviction. For Ottoman, Arabic, and Persian words and names I preferred a simplified transliteration system based on the transliteration chart of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*.⁷

Colleagues shall excuse that I didn’t use any diacritical marks including the Arabic letters ayn (‘) and hamza (‘), thus not ‘ulamā’, but simply ulama. For the sake of convenience, I simply used the modern Turkish for transliteration for Ottoman-Turkish documents. I also omitted the use of circumflexed vowels (â, î, and ü) indicating palatalization. Thus, not Talʿat, Talaat or Talât, but simply Talat.

Following the same rule, I write all Ottoman-Turkish personal names in their modern Turkish version. However, I made certain exceptions to my own rule. When a person did not live to see the Turkish language reform in 1928 that romanized the Ottoman-Arabic script, I preferred the Ottoman orthography of the name without the devoicing of Arabic consonants. Thus, I call the former Minister of Finance Mehmed Cavid instead of Mehmet Cavit, who died in 1926, but I write Mithat Şükrü (Bleda) instead of Midhat Şükrü for the former Secretary General of the CUP, who died in 1956. As far as I could identify them, the modern Turkish family names (since 1934) are given in brackets as in Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)—the only obvious exception being Kazım Karabekir, who adopted his assumed name as surname. For Ottoman Arabs as well as other non-Turkish Muslims I tried to be faithful to their original tongue in transliterating their names, for instance rather Shakib Arslan, instead of Şekip Aslan, for the Ottoman-Druze deputy of Hauran, and so forth. For the sake of clarity, I standardized all the different romanized variations of an author’s name in the bibliographic entries. Thus, instead of various scattered entries such as Dchemal Pascha, Djemal Pasha, and Cemal Paşa, all the different editions of Cemal Pasha’s memoir are under the latter name.

⁷ [http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf](http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf)
For the Romanization of Cyrillic scripts in Russian, Azeri, and Uzbek words and names, I use the basic scholarly transliteration systems, but I claim no consistency. For Armenian names and terms, I preferred the Western Armenian pronunciation, thus Tashnak and not Dashnak in referring to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, ARF).

All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

In citing primary sources which use the Ottoman Rumi calendar, I simply converted the dates to the Gregorian calendar without additionally giving the Rumi date. The Ottoman Rumi calendar was a solar Julian calendar that started with the year of the Hijra in 622 CE—therefore precisely 584 years and thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar. The thirteen-day difference was equalized by the CUP government in March 1917. Thus, for the period under study there was only the difference in years and March 1 being the beginning of the year. On few other occasions where I cited sources with other lunar or solar Hijri calendars, I gave the Gregorian date in brackets.

For the specifics of pronunciation of Turkish words and names the following chart may be of help:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A, a</td>
<td>a as in rather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, c</td>
<td>j as in jungle or the German dsch as in Dschungel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ç, ç</td>
<td>ch as in church or the German tsch as in Tschüss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, e</td>
<td>e as in yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G, g</td>
<td>a hard g as in goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ğ, ğ</td>
<td>a so-called soft g that lengthens the preceding vowel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İ, i</td>
<td>unrounded i as in radium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İ, i</td>
<td>ee as in teeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J, j</td>
<td>similar to French j as in jour or s as in vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O, o</td>
<td>a as in more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ö, ö</td>
<td>same as the German ö as in Köln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S, s</td>
<td>like a hissed s as in sound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ş, ş</td>
<td>sh as in shoot or the German sch as in schön</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U, ü</td>
<td>oo as in zoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ü, ü</td>
<td>same as the German ü as in München</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z, z</td>
<td>sibilant z as in zickzack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Young Turk Aftermath

List of Abbreviations

For reasons of aesthetics and convenience, I decided to avoid an «alphabet soup» in the body text and omitted acronyms as much as possible, but the following could not be forgone:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Hêğapohêgan Tashnagtsutiun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheka</td>
<td>Soviet Emergency Commission (Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comintern</td>
<td>Communist (Third) International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations (as an academic discipline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>no date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoners of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>British Secret Intelligence Service, later MI-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Sojuz Sovetskich Socialisticêskich Respublik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations of Archives and Archival Collections Used in the References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Archives of the German Museum (Archiv des Deutschen Museums), Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW</td>
<td>Junkers-Werke Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAE</td>
<td>Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Les Archives du Ministere des Affaires Étrangères), Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATASE</td>
<td>Turkish General Staff’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAZB</td>
<td>Atatürk Kolleksiyonu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İSH</td>
<td>İstiklal Harbi Kolleksiyonu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA-MA</td>
<td>German Military Archives (Bundesarchiv, Militärarchive), Freiburg im Breisgau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Nachlass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Federal Archives of Switzerland (Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv), Berne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BayHStA</td>
<td>Bavarian Central State Archives (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv), Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abt. IV</td>
<td>Abteilung Kriegsarchiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Handschriftensammlung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Prime Ministerial Republican Archives (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi), Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOA</td>
<td>Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>India Office Records and Private Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-AA</td>
<td>Political Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Nachlass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StdAM</td>
<td>City Archive Munich (Stadtarchiv München)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMB</td>
<td>Polizeiliche Meldebogen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITE</td>
<td>Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü), Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives, Kew Gardens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Cabinet Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>War Office Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTK</td>
<td>Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu), Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Cemal Paşa Kolleksiyonu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Enver Paşa Kolleksiyonu</td>
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Introduction

On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed the armistice of Mudros, which put an end to the World War I in the Middle East. Few days right after, on the night of November 2, a small group of men from the leading political party of the war-time government of the Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, in short CUP), fled the empire in a German torpedo-boat into a self-imposed exile. Among these men was the so-called Young Turk triumvirate, which included the former Minister of Interior and Grand Vizier Talat Pasha, the former Minister of War and Generalissimo Enver Pasha, the former Minister of the Navy and war-time Governor of Syria Cemal Pasha. In their entourage there was also half a dozen of men from the éminence grise of the Committee and some of the most brutal racketeers of the war-time administration. These men were not running without a reason. They were later court martialed by the post-armistice government to death sentences in absentia for warmongering and for crimes against humanity in the persecution and extermination of Ottoman Armenians—or what is today known as the Armenian Genocide.

Yet, even before the CUP leaders left the Ottoman Empire, they had already activated their contingency plans for the post-Armistice resistance. After leaving Constantinople, Enver, who desired to reach the Caucasus from Crimea, wished to unite with the remaining Ottoman troops and continue the fighting. But he could not cross the Black Sea due to an ill-fated series of storms, shipwrecks, and diseases. The others travelled to Germany and were caught out by the November Revolution. While they could not find the Germany they hoped to settle down in their quite exile, they still found some sort of semi-legal support from their old friends within the German officialdom. They went hiding in sanatoriums and small apartments in Berlin, Munich, and Swiss cities.
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Despite the fact that they were internationally wanted as war-criminals and that it was an open secret that most of them were residing in Berlin, they remained relatively untouched in their political exile. When the Young Turk leaders went into exile, they did not disappear from the realm of politics either. Their reputation as reckless professional revolutionaries as well as their national and transnational underground networks of Turkish and Muslim partisans would make them relevant as political actors in the turmoil of the aftermath of World War I.

In the spring of 1919, they started to organize themselves politically. The partition of the Ottoman Empire had caused protest movements throughout the Muslim world, and in former Ottoman lands uprisings emerged against the Great Powers. The CUP leaders saw a great opportunity in uniting these anticolonial insurgencies and liberation movements. They got in touch with other Muslim activists in European exile. In Berlin, they met with the Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, who invited them to come to Soviet Russia to seek for assistance from the Bolshevik regime. Their German friends from the German military-industrial complex invested efforts to connect to Soviet Russia with the help of their Young Turk friends in order to subvert the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. After multiple airplane crashes and two imprisonments in Lithuania and Latvia, the CUP leaders, first Cemal and then Enver finally reached Moscow in the summer of 1920, however, with a delay of one year. After secret meetings in Berlin, they founded in Moscow the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihatı). The aim of this organization was to mobilize and unite the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements against European imperialism. While Cemal went to Afghanistan to modernize the Afghan forces for an Indian expedition, Enver participated at the Congress of the Eastern Peoples in Baku in September 1920, a Bolshevik event to mobilize the Muslim countries against Western imperialism and colonialism. The relations to Soviet Russia were, however, troubled as the CUP leaders were no communist revolutionaries. The relations to their former colleagues in Ottoman Turkey, who were leading a resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha, were similarly plagued by mistrust and rivalry. Hence, a return to Ottoman Turkey was less an option. From the spring of 1921 onwards, their movement became increasingly isolated and they were soon effectively persecuted by their old and new enemies. In March 1921, Talat who was managing the networks in Europe was killed by an Armenian avenger in Berlin.
Soon some other CUP leaders responsible for the Armenian deportations also fell victim to similar assassinations. Cemal, who wished to return to Ottoman Turkey, was killed by Armenian hitmen in July 1922 in Tiflis (Tbilisi). Meanwhile, Enver had turned his back on the Soviets and had joined the Basmachi insurgency in Russian Turkestan. In August 1922, Enver was killed in action fighting the Red Army. As the most prominent figures of this group were all killed by the end of 1922, their story and their political movement came to an end.

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This is their story—in short. Frankly, this story is not novel. I did not need to stab into historiographical darkness. Nonetheless, I had my share in shining a light on many dark spots and even more opaque areas and ill-lit parts, as it will be discussed throughout this book. Yet, I was fortunate that others before me told this story in different qualities and dramaturgies. I will spare the reader of a detailed literature assessment, nevertheless, I would like to praise some of the literature. Praise goes, first of all, to an unconventional body of literature. Long before academic historians devoted attention to this topic, semi-academic and popular historians from Turkey continuously discovered new sources and passionately told the story anew for popular readership.¹ It was only with the publication of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s very popular three-volume Enver Pasha biography that this story found its first critical and comprehensive study which placed the topic also on the agenda of academic studies.² Aydemir’s

¹ These «popular» histories include works by academic and non-academic historians that by style or design aim at a broader popular audience than an academic readership. This is, of course, a very broad category, and I don’t use it derogatorily. See, for instance: Ziya Şakir Soku, Yaka Tarihine Uç Büyük Adama: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943); Feridun Kandemir, Yaka Tarihine bir Şahifе Cemal Paşa'nın Son Günleri, ed. İbrahim Öztürk (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 2012); Feridun Kandemir, Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistan’da (İstanbul: Barman Yayınları, 1945); Cemal Kutay, Enver Paşa Lenin’e Karşı (İstanbul: Ekiçigil Matbaası, 1955); Cemal Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” Tarih Konuşuyor 1, no. 2 (1964): 133–36; Tevin Erer, Enver Paşa’nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı (İstanbul: Maytaş Yayınları, 1971); Ali Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbalıları ve Enver Paşa, 2 vols. (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2008); Cemal Kutay, Şehit Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Gurbet Hattıraları, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985); İrfin Ülkü, KGB Arşiverinde Enver Paşa (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1996); Yusuf Gedikli, ed., Enver Paşa: Hayatı ve Mağaleleri (İstanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 2007); Hikmet Özdemir, Üç Jöntürk’in Ölümü: Talat, Cemal, Enver (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007); Nevzat Köşoğlu, Şehit Enver Paşa (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2008); Kaya Karan, “İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihad,” in Türk İstihbarat Tarihi: Yolda İstihbarat Teşkilatı ve Teşkilatı-2 Mabsusa’dan MIT’e, 133–50 (İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2008); Murat Culcu, Paşaların Asya Müziyonu, 1914–1922: Talat, Enver, Cemal ve Mustafa Kemal (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2013). For the development of popular history in Turkey see: Ahmet Özcan, Türkiye'de Popüler Tarihçilik: 1908–1960 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2011).

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book (or at least its last volume) became obsolete, as popular historian Murat Bardakçı recently published a tremendously well-researched biography of Enver Pasha. Main debates in the popular histories still center around the legacies of the CUP leaders, especially Enver, in Turkish history.

Academic scholars deserve credit as well. Masayuki Yamauchi was the first scholar to use the private papers of the CUP leaders in conjunction with foreign diplomatic and intelligence documents. His work and approach has been inspiring for this project. There are several research areas that made contributions to the study of Young Turks after 1918. The critical revision of the Young Turk era since the late 1970s made way for new perspectives on the CUP’s role during the Turkish War of Independence that went beyond the Kemalist paradigm. The story of the Young Turk fugitives has received attention also by historians studying the international history of the post-war years, especially in the intersection of Turkish-Russian-German relations. The history of socialist movements in Turkey offered also many

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3 Murat Bardakçı’s book is not a biography in the strict sense of the word as it deals in detail only with the exile years of Enver, but his life before that is covered in a long historical introduction as well as in narrative flashbacks. Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015).


insights into the relationship of the CUP and the National Forces to Bolshevism. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies found also attention in studies on pan-Islamism in the Great War era. Although the international academia has not yet produced a comprehensive (monographic) study on this topic, through continues contributions from distinct but connected research fields a certain common understanding has been reached among academics regarding the general content and relevance of this episode—best summarized in Şuhnaz Yılmaz’s work. There is a fascination for this story—certainly more in Turkish popular history than in international academia—that yet deserves scrutiny.

The fascination with this episode did not necessarily come around only in retrospect. Contemporary observers devoted a great deal of attention as well. Newspapers around the world


9 I exclude here Yamauchi’s book, as it is not a monography in the strict sense of the word.

as well as diplomatic and intelligence services continued to report about «Young Turk intrigues» in the years that followed the Great War. Their acquaintances from these years wrote many pages in their memoirs about them. It was, however, the settlement of the post-war order in 1922, or 1923 respectively, and the historiographical narratives this rupture shaped in Kemalist Turkey, Soviet Russia, and the Colonial Arab Mandates that made this peculiar episode rather marginal and polarizing in the official historiographies of the region.

To begin with, Enver, Talat, and Cemal are burdensome protagonists to deal with. As much as they meant trouble by then, the sound of their names still makes eyebrows raise. Their reputation and legacy are highly disputed in post-Ottoman nationalist discourses. They are depicted either as heroes or villains in different narratives. For instance, Enver Pasha is considered at the same time as a hero of Turkestan and a traitor of the Turkish War of Independence. Similarly, Cemal Pasha is the despot of Syria and reformer of Afghanistan. Talat Pasha is either a great statesman or a Zionist agent—or even worse. Talat Pasha is considered as the «Architect of the Armenian Genocide» as much as the whole CUP leadership is held responsible for deliberately exterminating the Ottoman Armenians.

Scholars working on the post-war Young Turk activities ten years ago or more could have easily omitted in their accounts the uncomfortable question of the Armenian massacres of 1915. As late Donald Quartaert noted, since 2005 «the elephant in the room» has been unveiled. Today, more than hundred years after the tragic events of 1915, the intellectual and moral hegemony inside and outside the academia has come to accept the Armenian Genocide as a historical reality—regardless of whether one finds the term genocide appropriate or not. The genocidal outcome of the deportations and the CUP’s central role in it can no
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more be denied. Wherever the CUP leaders went and whatever they undertook after the end of the war, they carried a heavy political baggage for being stigmatized as fugitive war-criminals. They possessed an infamous reputation as brutal dictators and fierce revolutionary leaders. At the end, the Armenian Question was the reason, why the Young Turk leadership left the Ottoman Empire in the first place, and as in most cases, it was the Armenian Question that brought upon their end.

Despite or perhaps precisely because of their disputed legacy, these men still get attention. Fundamentally seen, they are transgressive actors. It is the transgression that is common to both the extraordinary transcendence of a triumphant hero and the illegitimate disruption of social order by a perpetrator. Thus, they are both heroized villains and villainized heroes, constituting the two sides of the same narrative coin. Yet, I’ve no interest in rehabilitating their reputation or further demonizing them. Their story is disputed, because it takes place in the midst of dramatized imaginations of the past. Especially Enver Pasha, as the most energetic and iconic figure of the bunch, has continued to polarize in a special way. In 1932, a connoisseur of the Islamic world wrote: « There is hardly a household between Gibraltar and China where Enver’s name has not been pronounced with hatred or love, or with melancholy or disappointed hopes. » The situation has not chance much in the existing Turkish historiography. Enver is depicted either as a desperate and clumsy charlatan scheming destructive machinations or as a quixotic adventurist following a tragic but prideful quest. Yet, as one of the leading historians of the Young Turks, M. Şükrü Hanıoğlu, noted, Enver’s history needs to be put in context:

In the light of recently published documents, [Enver Pasha’s] activities during the armistice are needed to be reconsidered not so much as his individual endeavors, but rather as the activities of the cadre of the [Committee of] Union and Progress. However, in


interpreting Enver Pasha's actions even as adventurism \([macera \vıçı]\), one needs take into account that the era he lived in was an era of adventurists \([macera \vıçı \çağ]\).\(^{17}\)

As much as its protagonists occupy disputed memories, it is the complexity and ambiguity of their interactions and their place in the geopolitical setting that deserves further attention. Masayuki Yamauchi, who conducted one of the most comprehensive studies on this subject so far, sees the relevance of this episode in that \("[t]hese were colorful and even dramatic years, marked by the eventful role that Enver played in German-Soviet-Turkish relations […].\)\(^{18}\)

This final Young Turk episode is, indeed, part of a more complex history that is connected to larger currents in Europe, Middle East, and Russia. Another leading historian of the Young Turks, Erik J. Zürcher, similarly underlined the particular historical context and urged not to jump to fast conclusions based on teleological wisdom:

One of the most amazing episodes in the history of the Young Turks is the resilience they showed after the crushing Ottoman defeat in World War I. A significant number of officers and party bosses were determined to resist the attempts of the victorious Entente to dismember the country. The Unionists who had fled abroad, in particular Enver, immediately started to organize support for the resistance and to plan a worldwide struggle against British and French interests through a network of former agents resoundingly called the ‘General Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies’. It is easy to dismiss these plans hatched in Berlin coffee houses as fanciful and adventurist, but then again: only a couple years earlier Lenin had been hatching plans for worldwide revolution in Zürich coffee houses and been dismissed as a dreamer. Mustafa Kemal’s defiance of the British and French in Anatolia was also dismissed as reckless adventurism by many at the time. The point is that from the moment the armistice was concluded the Young Turks found the energy and the determination to continue the struggle. This is something unheard of in any of the other defeated countries of World War I.\(^{19}\)

The fact that the Young Turks were among the losers of the Great War in 1918 and then, again, among the losers of 1922, does not imply that they followed a linear trajectory from bad to worse. Nor that they were predestined to fail from the very onset. Between 1918 and 1922, as this book will illustrate, the CUP leaders achieved to maintain their respected and feared reputation as professional revolutionaries with wide-reaching networks and seditious capabilities. The question is, how and why did the fugitive CUP leaders remain to be perceived as relevant and powerful actors in the eyes of their supporters and enemies? And what led to their failure and fall? The answer lies not only in understanding how they operated and interacted as a clandestine movement, but also in appreciating how they made sense of

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\(^{18}\) Yamauchi, \(The Green Crescent under the Red Star\), 1.

\(^{19}\) Erik J. Zürcher, “The Young Turk Mindset,” in \(The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building\), 121–22.
their own enterprise and the world around them as well as how others made sense of their intentions and actions.

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Although it will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, I want to briefly illustrate my approach and conceptualization. Instead of seeing the whole episode within traditional boundaries of Turkish history, I rather contextualize the story of the CUP leaders as a *transnational history* of the aftermath of World War I. In reading the immediate post-war years, I stress the necessity of appreciating the social complexities, historical contingencies, and dynamic structures. Political movements of this time were particularly characterized by cross-border connections, fluid political identities, and liminal ideas. I believe it is necessary to embed the political activities of the fugitive CUP leaders within the connected context of anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements of the immediate post-war years.

In conceptualizing the political interactions of the fugitive CUP leaders, I use the term *transnational contentious politics*, as they were acting across national borders in order to make political claims and to mobilize a global Muslim movement. The clandestine nature of their organizational behavior and their elusive networks in different settings and milieus clouded their activities with confusion and suspicion in the eyes of their critical observers. An ontological premise underlies the confusions and suspicions. Transnational contentious politics, especially its more seditious, illicit, and clandestine forms, are considered as a transgression of the nature of the (international and national) state system where states possess the only legitimate means of sovereignty. Thus, peculiar epistemologies emerged when political actors and observers tried to make sense of clandestine forms of transnational contentious politics.

The perception and representation, hence sense-making, of clandestine forms of transnational contentious politics might sometimes resemble the logic and style of *conspiracy theories* in describing so-called «international conspiracies». As I will show in great detail throughout the book, there was an influx of gossips, rumors, and conspiracy theories about the alleged and actual machinations of the CUP leaders in intelligence and press reports of the time. The wave of unrest in Muslim countries after the armistice was imagined as a great conspiracy of the CUP in conjunction with Russian Bolsheviks and German militarists. Since the Young
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Turk refugees were, in fact, involved in conspiratorial activities, some of these reports contained accurate information or at least offered a kernel of truth. Most of the interpretations were, however, rather bizarre and product of paranoid or deceptive fantasies. In a process approach, I will show the disconnect between the actual conspiratorial plots of the CUP and the rumors and conspiracy theories found in official intelligence and public newspaper reports. By questioning the cultural foundations of political sense-making of both conspirators and conspiracy theorists, I will elaborate the role of perceptions and misperceptions as well as representations and misrepresentations, thus sense-making, in politics.

There is a communicative process of sense-making between the epistemic communities of conspirators and conspiracy theorists, as I will demonstrate. In what I call a dialectic of conspiracy, the intersubjectivity between conspirators and conspiracy theorists constitute a dynamic process that can affect the contentious interactions among actors who are operating in a world of uncertainty. Even before the actual conspiratorial intentions of the CUP leaders were even put in action, the prevailing conspiracy theories made them very real in the perceptions of others. Thus, a peculiar chasm opened up between what was going on and what was believed to be going on. Their notoriety made the Young Turk leaders first prized as professional revolutionaries, but soon started to haunt them by making them dangerously rogue in the eyes of their allies and enemies, resulting in their political isolation and persecution.

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For the sake of form, perhaps some short remarks on the sources are in order. A mixed corpus of published and unpublished archival documents as well as newspapers and other contemporary publications were consulted in reconstructing the outside perception and representation of the fugitive CUP leaders. In addition to these outside sources, there is plenty of primary documents such as letters, private papers, diaries, and memoirs authored from the members of the Young Turk exile community and their acquaintances, allowing a unique glance at their organization and collective mindset. Especially the amount of letters accessible as published and unpublished sources is beyond expectations. In face of such a corpus of letters, I argue that they constitute what I call a Young Turk republic of letters, by that I mean a
transnational epistemic community of people somehow connected to CUP’s communication networks, interacting and communicating with each other mostly by mail and telegraph.\textsuperscript{20} Dispersed in a post-war geography of war and revolution, the Young Turk movement and their friends corresponded among each other by way of letters delivered either by mail or entrusted couriers or wired by telegraph. Letters from far places like Afghanistan or Turkestan found eventually their way to Berlin or Switzerland. With restricted options for mobility and political gatherings in exile, the republic of letters was for the Young Turk leaders’ main space of interaction, where plans were hatched, actions were discussed, the past was reimagined, and the future envisioned anew. For the historian, these letters establish the chronology of the events and the epistemology of the community. Additional context and information can also be found in other private papers such as diary journals. For instance, Cavid Bey’s diary, in which he usually noted, when he received and wrote a letter, confirms and complements the content and context of the letters.\textsuperscript{21}

One collection of private papers has been published by the CUP’s former publicist Hüseyin Cahit Yağcı in a series from October 15, 1944, to April 1, 1945, in the newspaper \textit{Tanın}.\textsuperscript{22} Both Cemal Pasha’s and Enver Pasha’s private papers are located at the archive of the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK).\textsuperscript{23} A relevant part of Enver Pasha’s papers at

\textsuperscript{20} This is, of course, a tongue-in-cheek reference to the “\textit{res publica literaria}” of the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe that connected a transnational epistemic community of intellectuals and scholars. See, for instance: Dena Goodman, \textit{The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

\textsuperscript{21} Cavid Bey’s diary, which is today located at the archive of the Turkish Historical Society in Ankara, was first published in an abridged version as a series in the newspaper \textit{Tanın} from August 11, 1945, to December 22, 1946. This edition has been published in: Cavid Bey, \textit{Felaket Günleri: Mütareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi}, 2 vols., ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoglu (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000). The full diary has been recently published as Cavid Bey, \textit{Meşrutiyet Rüznamesi}, 4 vols., ed. Hasan Babacan and Servet Avşar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014–2015).

\textsuperscript{22} These letters are probably from the private papers of Cavid Bey or Dr. Nazım Bey—someone, who was close to Hüseyin Cahit and perhaps was already passed away in 1940s. Unfortunately, it is not known to me, where the original letters are held today. There is some censorship and omission in the letters noted by the editor in footnotes or brackets, other than that we are pretty much depended on the \textit{bona fides} of the editor Hüseyin Cahit and his Unionist bias. Nonetheless, the general chronology, content, and style of the letters is undoubtedly authentic and correspons to the other collection of letters that survived. Copies of some of the letters which were found in archives are identical to those in this collection. For the sake of accessibility, I used the edited version, Hüseyin Cahit Yağcı and Osman Selim Kocahanoglu, eds., \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar} (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002).

\textsuperscript{23} I went through most of the related material in the Enver Pasha collection at the TTK. Cemal Pasha’s papers were catalogued only in broad typological categories in different boxes at the time of my visit, therefore I could only cursorily use these documents.
the TTK archives was published by Masayuki Yamauchi. 24 Also Arı İnan published a selected collection of hundreds of letters from Enver Pasha’s papers at the TTK. 25 The other half of Enver Pasha’s private papers are at the family archive of Enver’s grandson Osman Mayapetek. These private papers are curated by journalist and popular historian Murat Bardakçı, who has recently published them in two volumes. 26 Murat Bardakçı also published hundreds of letters and other documents from his own collection of private papers of senior CUP members like Talat Pasha, Cavid Bey, Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), and others. 27

Many documents and letters from the officials of the Ankara Government are integral part of the Young Turk republic of letters as well. I had access to some of these documents in the Turkish Military Archives (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, ATASE)28 as well as at the archive of the Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, TİTE) at the University of Ankara. Countless other letters and documents from the private papers of senior officials of the Ankara Government has been published in their memoirs or in edited volumes.

Speaking of memoirs, these offer productive co-texts to the letters and illustrate the retrospective processing of memory. Although Talat and Cemal left behind memoirs that were published posthumously, these memoirs do not have any valuable content regarding their

24 Masayuki Yamauchi edited and published nearly two hundred letters in transliteration. Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star. For the Turkish translation see: Masayuki Yamauchi, Hoşnut Olanamış Adam – Enver Paşa: Türkiye den Türkistan’a (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995). For some of the minor mistreadings in Yamauchi’s edition see: Bardakçı, Enver, 588–589, note 129. When I made reference to the letters from the TTK archives that were also in Yamauchi’s selection, I gave the page number in the Yamauchi’s book and the call number in the Enver Pasha Collection (EP) at the TTK archive.

25 İnan’s selection covers the correspondence between Enver Pasha, his brother Kamil Bey, and his wife Naciye Sultan. There is no chronological focus, the letters are from the years 1909–1922. For some reason, İnan does not mention the origin of her sources, but they are definitely from the Enver Pasha Collection at the TTK archives. Arı İnan, ed., Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997).


activities in the post-war years. Although the CUP leaders are mentioned in numerous memoirs of their friends, foes, and acquaintances, there are two memoirs that cover the exile activities of the Young Turk leaders from beginning to end and need to be introduced beforehand. Arif Cemil (Denker) was the correspondent of the CUP’s mouthpiece Tanin in Berlin and after the war he became the assistant of Talat Pasha in exile. He published his memoirs under the title «The Committee of Union and Progress Leaders’ Adventures in Foreign Lands» (İttihad ve Terakki Rüesasının Diyar-ı Gurbet Maceraları) as a series in the newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar in Constantinople from May 14 to July 13, 1922. Thus, the series was published in a time as Cemal and Enver were still living and struggling abroad so that the series attracted a great deal of attention. The second memoir is that of Emir Shakib

29 These memoirs were written during their exile in Germany as apologetic accounts to clear their name from the allegations of war-crimes. See: Hülya Adak, “Identifying the ‘Internal Tumors’ of World War I: Talat Paşa’nın Hatıraları [Talat Paşa’s Memoirs], or the Travels of a Unionist Apologia into ‘History’,” in Räume des Selbst: Selbstzeugnisforschung transkulturell, ed. Andreas Bähr, Peter Burschel and Gabriele Jancke (Köln: Böhlaub, 2007), 151–69. A detailed account on the publication stories of Cemal Pasha’s and Talat Pasha’s memoirs can be found in Hikmet Özdemir, Ermeni İddiaları Karşısında Türkiye’nin Birikimi (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2008), 31–38. Talat Pasha’s memoir was published in different versions based on different manuscripts in Turkish and German. The Turkish manuscript was first published as a series in the Constantinople newspaper Yeni Şafak from November 29 to December 29, 1921. This version was republished in Talat Pasha, Haturalarım ve Müdafaam (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006). A back-translation from the German translation was published by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in Tanin from April 3 to June 1, 1945. See also: Talat Pasha, Talat Paşa’nın Haturaları, ed. Enver Bolayır (İstanbul: Güven Basım ve Yayınevi, 1946). For more background information see: Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 266–67. Cemal Pasha’s memoirs were first published in German after his death and than in English and Turkish in the same year. Cemal Pasha, Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes, 2nd ed. (München: Drei-Masken-Verl, 1922); Cemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman: 1913–1919 (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922); Cemal Pasha, Hattat, 1913–1919 (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan ve Şüreka Matbaası, 1922). There are currently several editions of Cemal’s memoirs in the Turkish book market. Cemal Pasha, Hattat, ed. Metin Marı (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2001).

30 Later he also republished his memoir in the weekly journal Hafta in 1934. For the sake of easier access for the readers, I used the edited version, Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992). Arif Cemil also authored a historical novel on the very same subject, which tells the fictionalized story of a two of Azerbaijani adventurers, who try to smuggle arms from Germany to Enver Pasha in Turkestan. Arif Cemil Denker, Esrarengiz Kervan: Bir Teşkilat-ı Mahsusaci’nın Romani (İstanbul: Hitapevi, 2015). Before that in the early years of the war he was also associated with the activities of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. See: Arif Cemil Denker, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2006).

31 There were immediately harsh reactions in Constantinople newspapers, criticizing the Arif Cemil and the CUP leaders. For the whole debate see: Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 151–80. The series attracted also the attention of the leaders of the National Struggle. See Karabekir’s recollection and the correspondence with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the summer of 1922 regarding Arif Cemil’s claims that the National Struggle was organized by the CUP: Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbiniz (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1960), 1068–70. Arif Cemil’s series was simultaneously published in Armenian translation in the newspaper Verchin Loor (May-June 1922), cited in Jan Kirakossian, The Armenian Genocide: The Young Turks before the Judgment of History (Madison: Sphinx Press, 1992), 176. Arif Cemil’s series was also one of the main sources in Omer Kiazim, Angora et Berlin: Le complot germano-kémaliste contre le Traité de Versailles (Paris: L’Édition Universelle, 1922).
Arslan. Emir Shakib Arslan was a Druze prince from Lebanon and an Ottoman deputy. Arslan was an active voice of Ottomanism and pan-Islam and later in his life became a supporter of (pan-) Arab nationalism. In his autobiography, Shakib Arslan contributed a remarkable section to the exile activities of Talat, Cemal, and Enver. These memoirs are, of course, biased and apologetic, but invaluable as a primary source in supplying vivid and narrative co-texts. Young Turk memoirs needs to be read, as Erik Jan Zürcher demonstrated, critically against the grain of post-Ottoman teleologies and interpersonal rivalries. Still today, Young Turk memoirs has a popular readership in Turkey, where «politics of memoirs» remains to be a vibrant field between competing political identities.

Enver Pasha’s final quest along the Basmachi rebels in Turkestan constitute a particularly important episode in Enver’s popular heroization as the martyr of pan-Turkism. Nevertheless, I will only remotely deal with Enver’s activities within the Basmachi insurgency in Turkestan. The reason for this omission is a matter of focus. I argue that Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was practically dissolved at the time of Enver’s volte-face to the anti-

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33 Shakib Arslan, Sira dhātiyya, ed. Sauthan a.-N. Nasr (Al-Muhtara: Ad-dar at-Taqaddumiyya, 2008), 173–207. This chapter of the book was first translated into Turkish as Shakib Arslan, Şeyit Enver Paşa ve Arkadaşları, ed. Aziz Akpınarlı (Samsun: Samsun İl Matbaası, 1948). There have been numerous editions of this Turkish translation by various publishing houses in the recent years, I used the following: Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihanır (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005).

34 Zürcher’s innovative reading of memoirs was first demonstrated in Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, and this approach remains still to be the core of his methodology. There was a boom of political memoirs by the Young Turk generation in 1950s and 1960s due to a relaxation of the political pressure of the Kemalist hegemony. These memoirs laid the foundations of an alternative history-writing that went beyond the «official» history in Turkey. Erik J. Zürcher, “Young Turk Memoirs as a Historical Source: Kazım Karabekir’s İstiklal Harbimiz,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 17–18.


Soviet insurgents. Enver’s efforts to regroup the movement after the death of Talat Pasha had ended up in the disintegration of the organization. When Enver attempted to intervene into Anatolian affairs, the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies literally became a stalking horse for the Committee of Union and Progress and lost its purpose. Enver’s decision to break with the Bolsheviks and join the Basmachi insurgents was an individual move out of frustration and misinformation that ultimately cut him loose from rest of the networks. From there on, Enver’s story becomes indeed an individual (biographical) quest and an integral part of a history of national liberation of Turkestanis—both aspects lie, however, beyond the focus of this study.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is, again, no lack of available sources on the Turkestan episode. Enver Pasha’s private papers in the publications of Yamauchi, İnan, and Bardakçı offer countless sources in addition to the great amount of unpublished material in the TTK archives. Certain Soviet documents on Enver’s activities, which are said to be unavailable for researchers to this day, has been leaked and published in Turkey after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Young Turk republic of letters continues to deliver invaluable information on the Turkestan episode as well. Yet, most of the latter sources has been carefully studied in recent years. I leave the study of the Basmachi movement to another occasion.

37 It is said that the Enver Pasha dossiers were briefly opened to scholars after the fall of the Soviet Union, but were restricted shortly thereafter allegedly because of the pressure of Moscow. Part of these documents were published in Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa. Similarly, Uzbek author Nabican Bakiyev was allowed to conduct archival research in KGB archives and archives of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the years 1988–1991 and wrote a historical novel on Enver Pasha and the Basmachi movement, in which he also published and quoted some of the secret documents. The book is composed of imaginary letters by the author to Enver Pasha’s son Ali Enver (since Bakiyev did not know his name he named him Cengiz instead), informing him of his late father’s achievements in Turkestan. It was first published as a series in the journal Shanq Yuldazi in 2004. As a monograph it was first published in Turkish translation in Nabican Bakiyev, Enver Paşa’nın Vasiyeti, ed. Çağatay Koçar (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006). I am grateful to the Dr. Bakiyev for sharing the Uzbek edition of book with me. Nabican Bakiyev, Chingiz Afandiga Maktublar: Envar Poshoning Vasiyati (Tashkent, 2006).

38 There are three additional memoirs from Enver Pasha’s staff officers in Turkestan who published their memoirs. See: Muhiddin Bey, Bekiraga Bölüşünden Türkistan’a Yaver, ed. Yusuf Gedikli (İstanbul: Ufuk Ötesi Yayınları, 2003), first published as a series in the newspaper Vakit, from November 12 to December 23, 1923; Yaver Suphi Bey, Enver Paşa’nın Son Günleri, ed. Mehmet Kuzu (İstanbul: Çatı Yayınları, 2007), first published as a series in the newspaper Yeni Sabah, from October 24, 1938, to January 2, 1939; Abdullah Recep Baysun, Türkistan Milli Harakетleri, Istanbul: Zaman Kitabevi, 1943. I cited the the most recent edition, Türkistan İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangır (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı, 2001).

39 Ali Bademci is perhaps the most knowledgeable historian on Enver Pasha’s Basmachi episode in Turkey who published the private papers and memoirs of Enver’s Turkestani fellow combatants who had found refuge in Turkey. Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaçları ve Enver Paşa; Ali Bademci, Sarski Basmaci: Türkistan‘da Enver Paşa’nın Umumi Muhaberat Müdürü Molla Nafiz’in Hatıraları
and perhaps rather to area specialists in Soviet and Central Asian studies. Instead of analyzing the Basmachi movement from within, I will rather put it in a wider context and elaborate on the impact of Enver’s individual actions within the broader context of international affairs and transnational networks as well as discuss the political sense-making of this episode in contemporary rumors and conspiracy theories.

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This introduction will be followed by a theoretical and conceptual chapter, *Making Sense of Transnational Contentious Politics at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922*, that will explain the historiographical approach, theoretical assumptions, and key concepts of the book. Each chapter of the main story is designed more or less as a stand-alone essay with an analytical or thematic focus. In their narrative composition, the chapters diachronically follow a story-line. The *Prologue* begins with the eleventh hour of World War I, as Grand Vizier Talat Pasha made an official visit to Germany. This episode showcases the continuities and discontinuities in their path from empire to exile. *Chapter 1* deals with political maneuvers of the CUP, as they fled into an exile. For the CUP regime, going into exile meant escaping the consequences of their wartime policies. *Chapter 2* shows trajectories and continuities of paramilitary violence and pan-Islamist propaganda from war to resistance. Before the CUP leaders left the Ottoman Empire, they activated their underground and resistance networks to continue the fighting against armistice and occupation. *Chapter 3* showcases how war and revolution bring about their own contingencies and discusses how various local factors in Germany and Russia affected the exile activities of the CUP leaders in the winter of 1918-1919.

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(İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2010). Murat Bardakçısı chapter «Turan or Islam?» from his recent biography of Enver Pasha, in which he made use of Bademci’s expertise and used the extensive diary-like letters of Enver Pasha to his wife Naciye Sultan as well as other available Turkish sources, should be consulted at first place. Bardakçısı, *Enver*, 291–375.

40 For a study on the Basmachi movement that is based on Soviet archival documents see: Aleksandr Ignatievich Pylev, *Basmachestvo b Srednej Azii: Etnopoliticheskij Srez (Vzgljad iz XXI Veka)* (Bishkek: Yuchenym Sovetom Gumanitarnogo Fakul’teta KRSU, 2006). Though only a semi-academic study, a number Soviet documents are used and published also in İdil, *Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı.* There is a plethora of research on the Basmachi movement so that an overview is not possible at this place. For a contemporary Soviet account on Enver Pasha’s subversive activities in Turkestan see: D. Soloveichik, “Revoluutsionnaia Bukhara,” *Novyi Vostok*, no. 2 (1922): 274–284, cited in Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923* (London: Macmillan, 1961), 338.
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The «dialectic of conspiracy» is the central topic of Chapter 4. Although the CUP leaders had barely begun reorganizing themselves politically, wild rumors and conspiracy theories already started to surface in public and official documents in the spring and summer of 1919. Transnational relations of the CUP leaders are mapped out in Chapter 5. Their relations to Bolsheviks, Entente states, Arabs in Syria, and Kemalists in Anatolia demonstrate the disconnections between intentions and perceptions. Chapter 6 deals with the relation of CUP leaders to their friends from the military-industrial complex in Germany. Enver’s first flight attempt to reach Moscow and the complications that followed delivers a picture of CUP-German relations that challenges the conventional wisdom. Further contingencies of transnational mobility are illustrated in Chapter 7, where Enver’s various flight attempts are unfolded. As it will be argued, the delay in reaching Moscow had political consequences. The ambiguous status of CUP leaders as non-state actors caused misperceptions with mixed results in their dealings with Soviet Russia, Kemalist Turkey, and Weimar Germany. In Chapter 8, the Baku Congress is discussed as a space of contentious visions. Not only Enver’s difficult relationship with the Bolshevik leadership first became apparent, but also near and distant observers had conflicting perceptions of what the congress politically represented. Chapter 9 goes into the organization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and contrasts the reality and fiction in the organization of transnational contentious politics.

The assassination of Talat Pasha and its public aftermath is considered in Chapter 10 as a showdown of transnational contentious politics. The Operation Nemesis of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation that assassinated Talat will be mirrored in their organization and activism to the CUP networks. The increasing isolation of the CUP leaders is the topic of Chapter 11. The CUP leaders found themselves stuck between national and international rivalries. In their attempt to enhance their hand, they gambled away their remaining political credit as Enver attempted to enter Anatolia and later joined the Basmachi insurgency. This was practically the end of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Chapter 12 is devoted to the final activities of the CUP leaders. Cemal’s efforts in reforming the Afghan army as well as his personal diplomacy with Berlin, Paris, Ankara, and Moscow shows the limits they reached as transnational actors. Enver’s break with the Soviets strategically limited the political maneuverability of remaining CUP networks abroad. Historiographical implications
as well as the historical consequences of the «Young Turk aftermath» will be summarized and addressed in the final Conclusion.
Making Sense of Transnational Contentious Politics at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922

«The war of the giants has ended», said Winston Churchill at the end of World War I and noted dismissively, «the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.» However, those so-called «quarrels» proved to be of far greater consequence than the battles won and lost by the Great Powers in the trenches of Central European battlefields. The aftermath of World War I began as early as with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and then later with the armistice of 1918 and ended as soon as with the diplomatic settlement of 1922. I shall argue that the story of the fugitive CUP leaders tells an alternative history of the aftermath of World War I, in which a new world order was shaped after a complex period of war and revolution.

As revolution and war comes generally not without the other, this was also the case after the Russian Revolution and the end of World War I. A wave of revolutions, wars, coup d’états, civil wars, mass violence, independence struggles, and numerous processes of state-formations emerged after 1917, respectively 1918. More than war and revolution, however, it was Western diplomacy that sealed the final deal. Thus, the map of the world in 1923 does not even remotely pay justice to the diverse moments and movements of anticolonial resistance that saw the light of the day during the aftermath of World War I. In this «great phase of upheaval»—as imperial historian John Darwin calls these years—the broader geography of Eurasia saw the end of the continental empires of the Hohenzollerns, Habsburgs, Romanovs, Ottomans, and Qajars. It is, of course, tempting to see forces

2 I follow here David Fromkin that the «settlement of 1922» marked «the point of no return» for the fate of the Middle East. David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009), 9–10. To be sure, the aftermath of World War I in the Middle East did not end in 1922. For instance, the year 1923 saw the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey and the year 1924 saw the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, both major incidents for the history of Middle East. In addition, some uprisings continued to occur in Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Turkestan throughout the 1920s.
of nationalism behind the collapse of empires. This process of post-imperial nation-building and state-formation was discursively catalyzed by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin’s declaration on the rights of nations and US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point program, both legitimizing the right of self-determination for nations. In the East, the Russian Revolution replaced the former Russian Empire with Soviet Russia and a bloody civil war ensued. The downfall of the German and Austria-Hungarian empires brought the revolution to Central Europe, where socialists fought for new republics and reactionists violently defended the old orders and borders.

The face of the connected Muslim regions from North Africa over Middle East to Central and South Asia, which were long subjected to Western imperialism and colonialism received perhaps the most radical transformation of all. Nearly ten years of wars, revolutions, revolts, colonization,
genocides, famines, diseases, and mass migrations irreversibly changed the political landscape, demography, and social fabric of the Middle East. The last Islamic empires of the Ottomans and Qajars (though the latter was no more an empire in the strict sense of the word) disappeared from the political maps. They were replaced with newly created nation-states—few of them by their own efforts and others by Great Power decrees. The downfall of the Ottoman Empire was a decade-long «cataclysmic» process that was destructive and creative at the same time. The aftermath of World War I was a period of state-making for Muslim elites and rulers in this connected geography, where many states were founded and only few survived. As David Fromkin writes, for the history of the Middle East these years that followed the Great War were «creative, formative years, in which everything seemed (and may indeed have been) possible.»

The victors of the Great War were not spared from upheavals either. The French Republic was not welcome in the newly possessed Syria and suffered from uprisings in its older possessions in North Africa. British Empire had reached limits of its imperial overextension. «Never was British imperial history more closely entwined with world history and vice versa», wrote Adam Tooze on the Great War era, «an entanglement that continued perforce into the post-war period.» On the one hand the Irish War of Independence, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, and the uprisings in India haunted the British Empire in its old possessions. On the other hand, the more recently «liberated» Arab lands from the «Turkish yoke», namely Egypt, Transjordan, Hejaz, Palestine, and Iraq, were plagued with anticolonial revolutions and revolts in the immediate years after the war. The «Crisis

15 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 9.
of Empire in the aftermath of the Great War interconnected seemingly unrelated affairs in faraway regions with each other. Edwin Samuel Montagu, the State Secretary for India, noted in 1921:

> The concessions which look likely to be necessary in Ireland harden public opinion against any new concessions in Egypt. Anything that is done as to complete independence of Egypt might appear to encourage Indian extremists.\(^{18}\)

While European diplomats were discussing the new face of the Middle East in peace conferences in London, Paris, and San Remo, subaltern voices and forces were challenging the post-war settlement from below.\(^{19}\) The partition of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious powers caused an unexpected shock throughout the Muslim world. Indian Muslims expressed their resentment and organized protest movements.\(^{20}\) Palestinian historian Awad Halabi speaks of «liminal years», since the Ottoman regime was not replaced by the Mandate system over night. «This liminality was manifested in the connections Palestinians maintained with the Ottoman empire», as Halabi argues, «many Muslims continued to respect Ottoman religious authority as personified by the Sultan-Caliph [and] Palestinians also viewed Turks not as former oppressors but as fellow Muslims waging a similar struggle against European occupation [...]»\(^{21}\)

Michael Provence aptly challenged the conventional wisdom by illustrating connections in time and space within the Ottoman world that went clearly beyond alleged national boundaries and post-imperial ruptures: «Ottoman officers and veterans led all the movements of armed resistance and national liberation, however defined or articulated, between 1918 and 1948 in the Middle East.»\(^{22}\) I follow Provence’s argument that we should «not view the post-Ottoman revolts as separate movements of national liberation but rather as locally conditioned elements of a single, undifferentiated struggle.»\(^{23}\) Different groups of local insurgents in the Middle East shared cross-border

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Ottoman-Islamic solidarity, mutual inspiration as revolutionaries, and zeal to fight the colonial occupation. Elsewhere, I called this common spirit a “Young Turk zeitgeist.”\(^{24}\) I argue for the necessity of an alternate reading of this period, with a particular focus on political interconnections, fluid political identities, and shared world of anticolonial movements of the Middle East.

The outcome of the aftermath of World War I resulted in the climax of Entente and Soviet expansion over the connected Muslim lands. The CUP leaders were engaged in an anticolonial struggle for the liberation of the Muslim world from foreign rule and belong to the losers of this brief era. Although I am far from championing the CUP leaders as the spearhead of post-war anticolonial Muslim nationalism, they still need to be embedded in this historical context of anticolonial and liberation movements. As I will show, they perceived and framed their struggle as part of a global struggle of Muslims and other oppressed people against the Western (and later Soviet) imperialism. The Young Turk generation had an ambivalent relationship to imperialism and anti-imperialism and this became once again clear after they left their empire behind.\(^{25}\)

The story of the Young Turk exile tells an alternative history of the aftermath of World War I. By alternative, I mean a *transnational history*. The political activities and interactions of the fugitive CUP leaders can be traced in a connected geography from the Ottoman Empire to Germany and to other European metropoles, from East Europe to Russia, from the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan. The exile activities of the CUP leaders provide a transnational perspective because their movement transcended the rigid boundaries of the national. Yet, their interactions remained below the standards of what is considered international relations, i.e. *interstate* relations. Thus, the aspect of *transnationalism* comes into picture. By contextualizing the political processes in connection to their socio-political settings and in interaction with their near and distant political partners and adversaries, I show that their history is remarkably intertwined with the global moments and movements of the aftermath of World War I in a connected human geography.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) Although Young Turk regime had its own imperial ambitions and civilizing missions in the Ottoman Empire, nonetheless, it is undisputable that anti-imperialism and anticolonialism (as well as anti-Westernism) was a major force in the Young Turk movement. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 302–5.

\(^{26}\) For global movements and moments see: Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s,” in *Competing Visions of*
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According to historian Akira Iriye, transnational history is “the study of movements and forces that cut across national boundaries.”27 There is a certain paradox, when transnationalism is defined by overcoming national boundaries, but simultaneously by making itself depended on the existence of national norms and structures.28 One can argue that modern social sciences and history-writing were born with the “original sin” of methodological nationalism, namely that nations, nation-states, and nationalism predetermine scholarly methodologies and epistemologies.29 Although overcoming methodological nationalism is important, the reality of nation-states remain irrefutable at the same time.30 In Asia and Africa, where nation-building and nation-state formation were late-comers, the concept of “transnationalism” can be even more problematic, as scholars of area studies rightly cautioned.31 For the sake of convenience, I will, nevertheless, stick to the term transnational, because it programmatically challenges the methodological nationalism and lies on mental maps instinctively somewhere between the local (national) and the global (international).32 I define transnational history simply as history of trans-spatial mobility and cross-cultural encounters of actors, ideas, and commodities between distinctly defined political, cultural, and territorial spaces.33

32 If one looks implicitly for an umbrella term covering all the different forms of local or global exchanges, interactions, and experiences between two or more distinct political, cultural, and territorial spaces, then “trans-spatiality” would be the suited term. Unlike translocality, transnationalism, and globalism, space/spatial/spatiality does not have a direct antonym or dimensional alternatives. However, I do not see the necessity of imposing an alternative term, where transnationalism serves the purpose.
33 Transnational history became a fashionable new paradigm in Europe since the 2000s. For survey of the field: Margrit Pernau, Transnationale Geschichte (Stuttgart: UTB GmbH, 2011), 36–84. Different European historiography trends and research initiatives, such as Histoire croisée, Transfergeschichte, and geteilte Geschichte, supplied programmatic research agendas towards a transnationalization of history-writing by going beyond traditional comparative history. See: Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006): 30–50; Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer, eds., Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt:
The promise of transnational history might also turn hollow, since it offers primarily a self-reflexive perspective instead of a theory or method. Hannes Siegrist warned that transnational history demands a profound acquaintance of social theories and history-writing methods, because the multiplication and entanglement of spatial entities, narrative perspectives, and complex interactions is an analytical challenge which needs to be processed accordingly. Also new analytical tools, such as network analysis, might not always deliver the desired explanatory leverage. If «a network is a network, because it is a network», then there is danger of tautology. If one is inclined to find connections, one will find those. The obsession with networks and interconnections in history is sometimes even not far from conspiracy thinking (Verschwörungsdenken), as it will discussed later. Tracing entanglements and networks in transnational or global history might lead to a self-serving «fetish», if not appropriately evaluated and conceptualized, as global historian Sebastian Conrad warns:

It is not enough to prove relations and links. […] Rather, it must therefore go to analyze exactly what role did the entanglements have, how much was their influence, for which groups, in what respects. And also the resulting limits must be defined more rigorously, both in terms of the effect of transfer processes and the limits of networking.

To come back to the protagonists of our story, the fugitive Young Turk leaders—despite being marginalized political actors cast away from the decision centers of post-war settlement—continued
to extend their political networks and influence others. This deserves an explanation beyond the banality of transnationalism and the tautology and conspiracy thinking of the network approach.

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Political science and political sociology offer a particular conceptualization of transnationalism worth a glance from a historian’s perspective. Transnational relations were first paradigmatically approached under the lead of two prominent scholars of International Relations, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, who defined transnational interactions as cross-border activities, in which at least one non-state actor is involved. This non-state clause is still the basis of all definitions of transnational relations in its political sense. Hence, the «nation» in political «transnationalism», refers rather to a (nation-) state, than to an ethnic-religious nation. The study of transnational relations led to a critical assessment of the interrelation between national and international structures and the agency of networks and social movement organizations. The organization of such non-state

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actors with each other rather resembles non-hierarchical and reciprocal networks than the organization of states and community of states. Political Scientists Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, define non-state actors as «largely or entirely autonomous […] from political impulses beyond state control and direction» and «operating as or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states—thus engaging in transnational relations» in order to «affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions». Transnational politics breaks with the alleged homogeneity and hegemony of the state, because it is based on the political reality that people interact in foreign and multiple settings and also beneath or beyond the mandate of states. By introducing new political actors outside state control and direction, different phenomena [such] as overlapping authorities, split loyalties, and divided sovereignty must be taken into consideration.

Empirically seen, most non-state actors are, however, rather ambiguous in their nature and do not neatly fit into the state vs. non-state binary. There are several shades of gray when it comes to statehood, such as quasi-states, pseudo-states, or para-states. There are also other non-state actors that are rather working on behalf of or in conjunction with state actors without being part of them. These gray areas are surely more common than the pure ideal type of the non-state actor.

Non-state actors vary also by their functions and intentions, hence normativity. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned, however, «not all non-state actors are good.» Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the transnational capacity of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars as well

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47 Quoted in Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 8. The literature on non-state actors is mostly about the «good» or idealized non-state actors, such as humanitarian, philanthropist, or environmental organizations, where the scholars themselves are often committed to the political cause of the organization under study. For the «good» non-state actors bias in the literature see also: Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In,” 4; Tarrow, Transnational Politics, 10; Fred Halliday, “The Romance of Non-State Actors,” in Josselin and Wallace, Non-State Actors in World Politics, 22; Jeremi Suri, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Non-State Actors,” in Palgrave Advances in International History, ed. Patrick Finney, 223–45 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 224
as the role of violent and armed non-state actors in conflicts became irreversibly evident. Thus, various groups such as rebels and guerrillas, militias and paramilitaries, assassins and terrorists, clan chiefs and warlords, criminal organizations and smuggling bands, and mercenaries and private security companies are considered as non-state actors as well.

Since these kind of non-state actors are conducting organized violence outside the autonomy of states, they challenge the state’s «monopoly over legitimate means of physical force»—to speak with Max Weber. This means also that non-state actors are capable of conducting warfare across state borders. This is a clear transgression of the classical political theory—and «myth»—of the «Westphalian sovereignty», namely the «nationalization of war» (Verstaatlichung des Krieges) since the Westphalian Peace of 1648. According to the ontology of politics in the Westphalian age, transnational (and non-state) politics has been considered a subversion of the norm, although they have always been a part of its reality. Late Fred Halliday rightly noted: «The erosion of the Westphalian system rests upon a contemporary optic, and illusion.»

To be sure, organized violence is not the sole reason for states to be suspicious of political activities of non-state actors. If legitimate means of physical force means coercion, then its counterpart is subversion—violent or non-violent. Subversive acts and movements, such as social revolutions, social movements, strikes, oppositional activism, secret meetings, even if they are not violent in their intention and organization, can similarly be condemned and coerced by state actors as such.

Not every «political entrepreneur» needs to be a «violent specialist»—to put it in Charles Tilly’s

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49 They all are categorically bound together by their use of organized or collective violence. Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer, Warlords Rising, 9; Schneckener, “Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance,” 25–28; Mulaj, “Violent Non-State Actors,” 3.


It is rather subversion, contention, and transgression that makes non-state actors a thorn in side of states. Leading scholars of political sociology and comparative politics coined the term contentious politics to describe a variety of related phenomena as a genre of politics as well as a shared research agenda:

Contested politics involve interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics. [Emphasis in original]56

According to Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, «similar causes and effects operate across the whole range of contentious politics, from viciously violent to pristinely peaceful.»57 Thus, from non-violent resistance to terrorism, there is an analytical common ground of contentious politics. Tilly and Tarrow also underline that «it is important to look beyond the nation-state at processes such as the shift of some contention to international institutions, the framing of local issues as the results of global problems, and the formation of transnational networks, and movements coalitions.»58 The asymmetric transnational relations between non-state actors and state actors is one important issue. Non-state actors engage in transnational relations with state actors to put international pressure on an opponent state.59 State actors can also maintain transnational relations with non-state actors in order to intervene into foreign domestic politics or to delegate conflicts.60

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To look for transnational contentious politics and non-state actors in history is not an analytical anachronism. The years between 1880 until 1930s are considered as the so-called first «golden age» of non-state actors where competing visions of world order were advocated by non-governmental organizations and non-state actors.61 The years that followed the catastrophe of the Great War

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56 Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 4.
58 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 22.
59 This is called «boomerang effect». Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 12.
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witnessed the rise of internationalist organizations and transregional civil society initiatives. The difference between modern transnational non-state actors and their historical precursors is indeed vast due to recent developments in communication technologies, but they are strongly similar and comparable in their core functions and structures. The rise of non-state actors, transnational networks, and global streams in the Belle Époque was not limited to Western societies. Muslim nationalism had become a pan-Islamic proto-nationalism, as Nikki Keddie noted, that increasingly united transnational anticolonialist Muslim movements under a corporate identity. Muslim actors and networks were active in global circulation of people, ideas, and commodities. Especially the interwar years witnessed a rise of transnational networks of Muslim activists and communities in Europe.

Moreover, violent non-state actors have a history—and not just a history. As late Fred Halliday once noted, «international relations, not just in the late twentieth century but in its entire 500 years of development, has been shaped and driven by non-state actors.» Noel Malcolm speaks in the context of 16th century Mediterranean politics of «irregular powers», conjoined in a complex system of inter-power relations with the regular ones. Following late Charles Tilly’s premise that there

is an analogy and continuation between war-making and state-formation, then we must take into consideration that most state actors can be traced back to successful violent non-state actors in their origins.\(^{69}\) This «rethinking of the «non-state»» makes these actors, according to Halliday, not only «heroes and villains in different narratives of international politics», but also the original «shapers and supporters» of the modern state-system from a historical perspective.\(^{70}\) Yet, available typologies of political science such as violent non-state actors does not fully conceptualize political actors of state (re-)formation in history. Elsewhere, I argued for the necessity of thinking about revolutionary non-state actors in studying processes of war and revolution who shaped and reshaped the states and the state system.\(^{71}\) But in order to analytically appreciate the non-statehood of revolutionaries (and to differentiate them from «purely» intra-state actors in coups d’état or local revolts), we need to underline the aspect of transnationalism and follow those revolutionary actors and forces that crossed the boundaries and borders of existing states.

Transnational mobility was, however, not necessarily a cause célèbre for the interstate community in the post-war era. Stefan Zweig’s cosmopolitan World of Yesterday, where one could travel without a passport across national borders and continents, quickly perished after World War I.\(^{72}\) The year 1920 saw the emergence of the modern passport regime at the first League of Nations Conference on Passports and Frontier Formalities.\(^{73}\) Revolutionary states were no exception to this rule, as they similarly strived to control the freedom of movement of domestic and foreign subjects.\(^{74}\) Anxiety that state sovereignties were spatially penetrated by illicit transnational travelers, such as spies, (counter-) revolutionaries, and refugees, led to the development of border and passport regimes.

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\(^{71}\) Yenen, “Approaching Transnational Political History,” 270. I use the term «revolutionary» rather in more general terms as a synonym for «partisan», thus it also includes counterrevolutionaries as well as putchists and radical political activists.


\(^{73}\) There was, however, also reluctance to introduce the passport regime, because of liberal economic considerations. Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 78. See also: John Torpey, "Passports and the Development of Immigration Controls in the North Atlantic World during the Long Nineteenth Century," in Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period, ed. Andreas Fahrmeir, Olivier Faron and Patrick Weil, 73–91 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 82–87.

The hegemony of states claims also the "monopoly of the legitimate means of movement," as historical sociologist John Torpey noted, «that is, their development as states has depended on effectively distinguishing between citizens/subjects and possible interlopers, and regulating the movements of each.» 75 Measures to control mobility by passports, visas, and border controls «directly reflect the continuing dominance of the sovereign state in world politics», as Mark B. Salter noted in his study of passports in international relations. 76 Hence, the mobility of transnational actors are subjected to structural limitations and opportunities of their trans-spatial settings, which are mostly imposed by state coercion and surveillance—or the lack thereof.

State actors also claim monopoly over legitimate means of secrecy. Only the state can define what is private and what is public as well as what is secret and what is not secret. The trend towards political transparency started, according to Michel Foucault, with the Enlightenment:

A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths. It sought to break up the patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society, demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance were fomented. 77

As states define the obligations and limits of political transparency and defend their own political secrets from illicit eyes, clandestine activities of non-state actors outside state control and surveillance naturally poses a threat to the sovereignty of states. Conspiratorial and revolutionary politics constituted a major challenge to the ontology of interstate system. As scholar of International Relations Martin Wight noted: «Revolutionary politics tend to break down the important distinction between diplomacy and espionage.» 78 Therefore, clandestinely organized transnational contentious politics has been the incubus of state actors. The more violent, the more subversive, the more contentious, the more transnational, and the more clandestine a movement was in the eyes of states, the more threatening it was against the natural order of the interstate system.

76 Salter, Rights of Passage, 6.
In understanding this ecological «nature» of politics—whether national, transnational, or international—I believe that it is essential to appreciate its complexity. According to political scientist Robert Jervis, complexity «often display nonlinear relationships, outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended. Complexities can appear even in what would seem to be simple and deterministic situations.»

«International history is full of interconnections and complex interactions», as Jervis writes. Complexity comes with the price of uncertainty. Thus, perception and misperception are important factors that increase the ambiguity and complexity in politics. In a Foreign Policy essay, Stephan Walt listed «Misperception and Miscalculation» as one of the five teachings of International Relations worth remembering:

[… ] you can’t really understand international politics and foreign policy without recognizing that national leaders (and sometimes whole countries) frequently misunderstand each other and often do remarkably stupid things. One country feels threatened and reacts defensively, leading other countries to falsely conclude that it has vast and dangerous ambitions that must be countered. Sometimes it works the other way, however, and a relentless aggressor manages to fool others into believing that its aims are limited. Or states tell themselves self-serving, sanitized narratives about the past—one where they never did anything bad to anyone and their opponents are always at fault—and then they get surprised when other states don’t see the historical record in the same way.


Making sense of the actions and intentions of other actors is even more difficult in revolutionary times, where structures are open to changes and remain uncertain. Thus, understanding the complexity in history and politics requires an appreciation of contingencies and chance coincidences. In my understanding, transnational political history reconstructs, explains, and evaluates contentious interactions between non-state actors and state actors in complex processes.

The Young Turk generation had inherited and flourished its own "culture of conspiracy." The CUP since the Revolution of 1908 was no stranger to contentious politics and clandestine political violence. Their exile in 1918 meant a return to their former (non-state) contentious repertoire as so-called komitadjis (committee men) consisting of clandestine networking, subversive performances, culture of partisanship, and transnational mobilization. By telling their story in the aftermath of World War I, I will illustrate the challenges of transnational contentious politics in international affairs.

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In historically mapping the transnational contentious interactions, it is important to go beyond the interplay of structures, agents, and contingencies and engage with the role of cultures, discourses, and emotions. Conceptions and perceptions need to be taken into account in order to understand how contentious actors are making sense of what has been going on and what to do next.

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83 Political scientist Marc Lynch made an imaginative comparison to "Calvinball" from Bill Waterson’s Calvin & Hobbes comic series after the Arab Uprisings of 2010–2011. “It’s never the same! It’s always bizarre!», is one of the mottos of the fictional Calvinball game, in which players can freely change the rules during a match. See: Marc Lynch, “Introduction: Reflections on the Arab Uprisings,” Project on Middle East Political Science Studies, no. 10 (2014): 6. I would like thank Jack Goldstone for calling my attention to this article.


This is the point, however, where waters get muddied. From the moment the CUP leaders disappeared into a clandestine exile, Enver Pasha as the notorious man of action of the bunch in particular and the CUP as a secret society in general became the subject of wild rumors and more personal gossips. The rumors fueled the imperial anxieties of the Entente powers, especially Britain, in their unruly Muslim possessions, where the Young Turks were rumored to be the *deus ex machina* of the anticolonial Muslim uprisings. The stories told about them corresponded ironically to the CUP’s leaders’ own wishful-thinking as they also saw themselves leading a world revolution against Western imperialism and colonialism. Historian Michael G. Smith wrote that «the power of rumour and news to signify and invest an event with diverse meanings depend[s] on their diverse audiences.» Smith defines rumors, following the sociology of rumor by Tamotsu Shibutani, as «improvised news» and comes to the conclusion: «Arising especially in times of colonial crisis, war and revolution, they circulate between the fluid oral culture of gossip and the established print culture of newspapers.» The rumors about the machinations of the CUP being behind the Muslim uprisings went so far that conspiracy theories were collectively constructed in public news coverage and in intelligence reports. A British official claimed for instance that «Enver Pasha directs the [Anatolian resistance] movement from [Azerbaijan], Pan-Islamic, Bolshevist, Pan-Turkish and all disgruntled forces are looked for help and all are being toyed with.» In reality, Enver hasn’t been in Azerbaijan yet, nor was he directing the movement in Anatolia. Rumors mixed with fantasies had turned to conspiracy theories. «Truth and legend about Enver Pasha are so in inextricably mixed,» as one scholar rightly noted, «that it is difficult to be sure where one ends and the other begins.»


Both Conspiracy and conspiracy theory are certainly stigmatizing and derogative terms. When I say conspiracy, I mean clandestine contentious politics: secret networks of collective actors engaged in transgressive intentions and illicit initiatives for political means. When I say conspiracy theory, I mean cognitively or purposefully constructed narratives and stories that claim to make sense (or nonsense) of the political complexity by seeing concerted and coordinated agency of secret forces behind the scenes.

Conspiracy theories always existed in history in one way or another, but in modernity they became marginalized in making sense of the social world. The modernity’s ambivalent interplay between political secrecy and political transparency lies at the heart of the problem. Eva Horn writes:

Conspiracy theories offer answers to unanswerable questions permeating a political culture that breeds scandals and reveals secrets almost on a daily basis—without ever reaching a point of clarity or ultimate truth. The secrecy effect opens up a space of speculation, conflicting versions, distrust and paranoia: suddenly there are secrets everywhere; every political decision points to hidden vested interests; every ordinary or extraordinary event is controlled by clandestine networks.

Modernity’s landmark achievements in scientifically establishing a transparent social order, such as police investigation, judicial process, intelligence analysis, political briefing, investigative journalism, and social-scientific inquiry have all an ironic family resemblance to conspiracy theories.

Richard Hofstadter, in one of the pioneering works on conspiracy theories, wrote:

What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts (though it is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events.

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94 Martin Parker offers a more philosophical definition of conspiracy theories: «A conspiracy theory creates and ties together a series of events in relations of cause and effect. Conspiracy is predicated on uncovering a specific form of order and structure. Once we inhabit the elevated universe of conspiracy there can be no unexplained residues, everything has a cause, everything has meaning and nothing can be left out.» Martin Parker, “Human Science as Conspiracy Theory,” in The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the Human Sciences, ed. Jane Parish and Martin Parker, 191–207 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 193.


In their core, conspiracy theories are *stories* that try to make sense of—both in terms of understanding and explaining—complex circumstances and transformations.\(^9^8\) Both conspirators and conspiracy theorists create their own epistemic communities, i.e. networks based on shared beliefs and a common policy enterprise.\(^9^9\) As much as “gossip creates particular sociopolitical configurations”, it is the same with conspiracy theorization that aims to define in-groups and out-groups.\(^1^0^0\) In processes of sense-making, I differentiate between *cognitive conspiracy theorization* and *deceptive conspiracy theorization*. The first results from cognitive and deductive efforts by subjects in making sense of allegedly unrelated but somehow suspicious incidents by searching for unconventional and concealed connections. The cognitive conspiracy theorist sees itself as the investigative subject and in its more paranoid versions also as the victim of an unjust conspiracy that needs to be unveiled and battled.\(^1^0^1\) Deceptive conspiracy theorization is based on conscious and misleading efforts to construct esoteric or distorted narratives on real or false conspiracies. Therefore, deceptive conspiracy theorization constitutes in itself an act of conspiracy. If the cognitive and the deceptive conspiracy theorization are clinically inseparable, then we are dealing with a conspiracy ideology (*Verschwörungsideologie*).\(^1^0^2\)

Yet, there are also real conspiracies in politics.\(^1^0^3\) Not all conspiracy thinking is a popular fantasy, a nerdish hobby, or a social paranoia of the postmodern subject, as cultural studies have underlined

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\(^1^0^0\) Besnier, *Gossip and the Everyday Production of Politics*, 17. This is also the main theme in Max Gluckman, “Gossip and Scandal,” *Current Anthropology* 4, no. 3 (1963): 307–16.


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in recent years. Conspiratorial politics did not cease to exist with modernity—in the contrary. «The impulse to secrecy and to learn the secret is the first tendency of any power», as Carl Schmitt wrote, who then went on to quote Hannah Arendt saying: «Real power begins where secrecy begins.» Philosopher Karl Popper spoke of «conspiracy theory of society», where totalitarian regimes rule by conspiracies and legitimize their rule with conspiracy theories. Others see conspiratorial politics not only in totalitarian regimes, but in all modern societies, where the power elite govern the rest behind the façade of free market, democracy, and civil society. Thus, conspiracies or what some political scientists call parapolitics, i.e. informal means, illicit interactions, and secretive structures of power, are part of—perhaps the dark side of—modernity, if not politics altogether.

If the underlying complexities of a (potentially) real conspiracy is being rigorously reduced and oversimplified by the conspiracy theorist, then it is necessary to yearn for the complex. Although everything is somehow interconnected in social complexity, things are seldom orchestrated by a single center, as it is often claimed by conspiracy theorists. If conspiracy theories try to make sense of political complexity by reduction and simplification, then the key in contrasting and comparing conspiracy theories and conspiracy plots lies in understanding and appreciating social and political complexities. Real-life conspirators, contrary to the imagination of conspiracy theories, are not monolithic or unified actors that act abidingly according to secret orders and doctrines. Political conspirators mostly rival cooperate, counter, and compete with each other in the illicit markets of

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104 For leading works on conspiracy theories in cultural studies see: Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Peter Knight, Conspiracy Culture: From the Kennedy Assassination to the X-files (London: Routledge, 2000). For a critic see: Byford, Conspiracy Theories, 144–51. For an overview of research and current trends see: Peter Knight, “Plotting Future Directions in Conspiracy Theory Research,” in Conspiracy Theories in the United States and the Middle East: A Comparative Approach, ed. Michael Butter and Maurus Reinkowski (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), 345–69.
A common overgeneralization in conspiracy theorization is how conspirators are imagined as omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent. In reality, clandestine contentious politics are generally modest and restricted in their operational reach and organizational longevity. Modernity’s obsession with the idea of engineering imagines the social world as a machine, social life as mechanisms, conspiracies as machinations, and conspirators as political engineers that push some buttons to manipulate the machine with pre-designed outcomes in distant places and times. Thus, every incident is imagined as planned, designed, calculated, and executed by human agency—thus engineered against the nature. In reality, however, political engineering—not unlike social or demographic engineering—generally suffers from miscalculations, misperceptions, chaotic execution, and unintended consequences. Not only conspiracy theorists suffer from misperception and miscalculation, but also the conspirators can be very much clumsy, blind, and stupid too.

This approach to the CUP’s transnational contentious politics is rather disillusioning. They were struck by ill-fate and misfortune. They were limited by the structures of national borders. They were disorganized in their organization. The Committee’s leadership was contested. They were distrusted by friends and foes. They were cut away from their resources. Their movement campaign was disconnected from its social movement base. They were revolutionaries away from their revolution. They were insurgency leaders without insurgents. Yet, they were powerful—both in the eyes of their supporters and in the eyes of their enemies—at least powerful enough to cause trouble, find support, and attract the surveillance of intelligence agencies. Powerful enough to be politically isolated and persecuted. In short, they were powerful enough to be feared.

The currency of their power was knowledge. And this knowledge had to be generated, processed, and transmitted through space and time. The interplay between what Reinhart Koselleck called

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111 Bale, “Political Paranoia v. Political Realism,” 54.
space of experience and horizon of expectations opened certain paths of political sense-making. Memory about their revolutionary past supplied the foundation of their reputation and attributed them a certain potential as professional revolutionaries. Encounters with their political chutzpah and political gambling, while they were constantly looking for ways to turn the tables, dazzled and deceived their observers. True and false rumors about their clandestine and revolutionary activities in exile aggrandized their existing intentions and actions. Knowledge about coincidental and circumstantial events, especially massive uprisings in the Muslim world, were rationalized as concerted consequences of the CUP’s alleged actions and machinations. More than their actions, it was their discourse that brought them into the center of things.

There is a communicative process between the epistemic communities of conspirators and conspiracy theorists, what I call a dialectic of conspiracy. One of the most important epistemic communities involved in collective and official conspiracy theorization is intelligence services. «Intelligence is a game between hiders and finders», as Robert Jervis put it beautifully, «and the former usually have the easier job. Intentions, furthermore, often exist only in a few heads and are subject to rapid change.» In face of ambivalence, uncertainty, and complexity of incidents, intelligence officers—or political analysts in general—try their best to make sense of what is going on and what are the causes. They try to predict the possible consequences and prescribe future policies. Thus, intelligence reports need to be verified by the historian as well. For instance, after coming across awkward rumors in British and French intelligence reports about the CUP leader’s activities in Berlin, Zafer Toprak pointed out the reciprocal relationship between intelligence and counterintelligence, and urged for caution in trusting these reports at face value.

114 When I say intelligence service (or for instance, British Intelligence), I don’t necessarily refer to a specific governmental secret intelligence service (like the SIS/MI6 in the British case) that is distinct from the same state’s diplomatic, military, and security services, but rather use the term more general in labeling the collective epistemic community within a state apparatus that is gathering, communicating, and assessing information in order to make sense of foreign and domestic political affairs. Hence, my usage of the term intelligence simply means a body or piece of information gathered, produced, or processed by state officials. For the cacophony of different definitions of intelligence see: Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’,” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 15–22.
The context and culture of the intelligence production (and conspiracy theorization) is an important force. In most cases, I dealt with, it was the context of the British Empire that provided the imperial regime of culture and knowledge.\textsuperscript{117} New studies on British imperialism and intelligence in World War I revealed cultural misconceptions and political miscalculations in the making of post-Ottoman Middle East.\textsuperscript{118} Although, I will only occasionally make reference, the culture of French imperialism and intelligence offices were not better off when it came to miscalculations and miscalculations, either.\textsuperscript{119} Secret intelligence reports as well as public news coverage constructed bizarre conspiracy theories in explaining the unrest in occupied Muslim lands after World War I as a result of an orchestrated «Muslim menace» by «Bolshevik propaganda» and other cabals, including the CUP.\textsuperscript{120} For example, a British official said:


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it is the gospel of the latest form of C.U.P. Bolshevism directed against the British Empire more especially in India and Egypt. It shows more clearly than everything I have seen yet how this movement is connected up with every form of revolutionary activism throughout the world: C.U.P., Bolshevism, Indian and Egyptian nationalism, anti-Zionism, Sinn Fein, the extreme Labour Party, Japanese Asiaticism, [and] Persian democracy.121

«The problem was interpretation», as intelligence historian John Ferris concluded, «Britain suffered from too much and too little intelligence, and a complex foe.» Ferris explains the problem resulting mostly from deceptive conspiracy theorization on behalf of the conspirators helped to form the conspiracy ideology within the British Intelligence:

Its enemies were in a real conspiracy, but a dysfunctional one, resting on opportunism and ignorance. They lied to each other, and enabled one another’s fantasies. There was not just one fantasy, or conspiracy, but many of both. The conspiracy was more dangerous in its parts, than the whole; even so, it was a problem, which might become serious. Britain had good intelligence on the conspiracy, which it understood better than did any of its members, but this blessing was mixed. It understood real dangers; equally, excellent intelligence on fantasy made the British fantasists as well. With imagination and forged documents, the conspiracy could reach the heavens, or at least, Ireland.122

Beyond deception, deterrence, and paranoid fantasies also cultural hegemonic discourses were affecting the assessment of raw intelligence. Edward Said taught us that the «Orient» is constructed by the discourse of «Orientalism» as the cultural other of the Western world in order to legitimize the West’s imperial hegemony over the «Oriental» rest.123 The Orient was imagined—among many derogative things—as a space of old intrigues and mysteries. Knowledge, intuition, and guile was required for the Orientalist expert to explain and beat the «Oriental intrigues». Priya Satia calls this an «intuitive intelligence epistemology». There was an epistemic community of Orientalists, Arabists, and all types of «gentleman spies» that shaped the epistemology of conspiracy thinking in the British officialdom.124 Imperial intelligence in Britain or elsewhere was produced through communication networks of central and peripheral power brokers and filtered through various cultural and social scripts.125 In the context of British official conspiracy thinking, the Young Turks were from the beginning on a matter of misconception, often seen through Orientalist categories and ethnic

prejudices. Since winners write history, some of these misconceptions on the Young Turks has survived in modern historiography. Slogans such as «pan-Islamism», «pan-Turanism», and «pan-Turkism» were in their origin and logic nothing but Orientalist conspiracy theories, before they were adopted by Eastern elites as anti-Western strategies.

The conspirators were once called with the fanciful label «Enver & Talaat & the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination». Young Turks and Bolsheviks were imagined as Jews or Freemasons: «there is or ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism. The force behind all these movements is the same.» All revolutionary or heterodox movements in history were imagined in the popular culture of the time as sinister world conspiracies. These conspiracy theories were not restricted to British officialdom, as the British and international press made similar conspiracy theories public as well. In the aftermath of World War I, also other socio-psychological factors, such as imperial anxieties and post-war trauma, came to color the analyses. British officials were obsessed with the fear of mutinies and conspiracies in their Eastern dominions and these fears reached their climax in 1919, when the Rowlatt Act against Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes was released in British India and soon later the Amritsar massacre of 1919 took place. Muslim uprisings became the bête noir of the epistemic community of British Intelligence. To be

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126 Nabeel Audeh, “The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks as a Problem for Historical Interpretation: Considerations of Class, Race, and Empire in British Foreign Office Attitudes towards the Young Turks, 1908–1918” (PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1990).
129 George Kidston, minute, April 9, 1919, on Horace Rumbold (Berne) to Lord Curzon (London), April 3, 1919, FO, 371/4141, quoted in Sari, Spies in Arabia, 224.
130 See, for instance: Nesta Helen Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (New York: Boswell, 1924).
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sure, not only the British were guilty of conspiracy thinking. The officials of the Ankara Government similarly constructed and circulated wild rumors about the alleged machinations of the fugitive CUP leaders allegedly intervening into Turkish politics. Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the commander of the Eastern Anatolian front, believed that the CUP had a «secret agenda» (gizli mesai) that would result in «anarchy and Bolshevik invasion».133 The CUP leaders themselves, like most Muslim nationalists of the time, cherished the Occidentalist conspiracy ideology that the British intrigues were practically behind all the misery and misdeeds in the Muslim world.134

Conspiracy theories—manifested in interpersonal gossip, popular rumors, propaganda publications, intelligence reports, political analyses, and news coverage—construct the public and official perception of a real conspiracy. Like a shadow on the wall, the reflection of a conspiracy in its conspiracy theorization is either larger or smaller than the illuminated object. According to Ranajit Guha, one of the pioneering scholars of Subaltern Studies, there is a negative mirror image of insurgents and their collective consciences in the intelligence reports and governmental documents.135 In contrast to the Indian peasant insurgents which Guha has studied in British official documents for lack their own sources, the internal sources of the CUP leaders offer an internal perspective.136

Once mirrored with the private papers of the CUP leaders, the conspiracy theories and rumors are revealed to be mostly disconnect and distorted from the political reality of their time and space. Nevertheless, following the social constructivist motto, «what is perceived as real is real in its consequences», conspiracy theories can alter political and social reality. I argue that the dialectic between conspirators and conspiracy theorists can alter the intersubjectivity and interrelation among

133 Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkânı* (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 45.
136 Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, 14. However, Guha’s differentiation between elite and subaltern sources does not fit here, as the actors in question are all elites of some sort.
actors who are operating in a world of uncertainty. Contentious interactions usually feature a competition among the political actors to dominate the framing of what is going on. 137 Both sides read the signs and signals of the other side to make sense of what is going on and what to do next. Even more propaganda and marketing tactics are essential in the public discourse of contentious movements. 138 Hence, conspiracy theories as contentious stories of social reality can change the course of contentious interactions—for good or bad. The attention which the Young Turk leaders received contributed to their notoriety, but it was also a factor that increasingly limited their space of movement. This explains, why and how the Young Turk fugitives were (mis-) perceived as potentially powerful actors and were consequently supported and also feared and persecuted.

«Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom clearly understand quite what they are doing», noted once a scholar of revolutions. 139 Making sense of transnational contentious politics was not only a challenge to contemporary actors and observers, but it is still a burden for the historian who needs to deal with similar difficulties in making sense of uncertainties and complexities of distant times and places as well as with supposing intentions of distant and bygone minds. If we follow philosopher of history Hayden White’s argument that the craft of history-writing is not far from story-telling, then I am, too, guilty for being a story-teller. 140 After long being dismissed as a folk-science, the narrative method in history and social sciences was rehabilitated in the narrative turn. 141 The narrative is a descriptive and explanatory tool—or «simply the practice of telling stories about connected sequences of human action.» 142 The narrative tends to favor human agency in consequently structured episodes. 143 According to Hidemi Suganami every explanation that has a

beginning, middle, and an ending is a form of narrative. And the narrative is a mode of sense-making, that helps both to understand and explain, «the two sides of the same narrative coin», because explaining means nothing but «making understandable»—thus making sense. In my narrative, I have followed what anthropologist Clifford Geertz coined as «thick description», wherever this was possible for me as a historian, I tried to describe the underlying «multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit.» Since the density of sources allowed a closer zoom in on the protagonists, I am mostly writing a microhistory of a small and spatially dispersed network of people. I will contextualize and connect their microhistory with larger social, cultural, and formal currents. In contrast to a classic microhistory, I must note that the actors I study were, however, also part of macrohistorical elites of their time. The narrative method becomes especially effective in appreciating time as a dynamic setting of social change, which is essential for historians in illustrating continuities and discontinuities as well as for the social scientists in tracing «path-dependencies» and «processes». I will show that the common fallacy in most of the previous studies was in the lack of temporal concordance between the intelligence reports and political performances. There was a lap of time between intentions and actions as well as between actions and reactions that becomes essential in understanding the dialectic course of interaction. By reconstructing the processes in their interactive development, the dialectic of conspiracy becomes apparent.

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147 The issue is also the case in Malcolm, Agents of Empire, xx.
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Prologue:
From Empire to Exile:
Young Turks at the Eleventh Hour of World War I

The period from 1908 to 1918 has been a turbulent ten years for the Young Turk regime, certainly more for the Ottoman people. The Young Turk opposition movement had its origins in a secret society founded by Muslim students at the military academy in 1889. Since then the movement developed first in Parisian exile into a coalition of Ottoman oppositionals and then merged with a clandestine revolutionary organization based in Ottoman Macedonia, where a range of figures such as a post office clerk by the name of Talat Bey or junior military officers like Enver Bey and Cemal Bey played influential roles in consolidation of the committee networks.¹ In July 1908, fearing that the Great Game between Britain and Russia would bring the Eastern Question in Macedonia to a closure, some secret cells of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman army in Macedonia, including men such as Enver Bey, went to mountains and revolted against the autocratic but increasingly semi-colonized regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. In fear of derailing the empire into total chaos, Sultan Abdülhamid gave in to the military revolt and announced the restoration of the constitution of 1876, one of the major demands of the Young Turks and other opposition movements. This event went into history as the Constitutional or Young Turk Revolution of 1908.² Although, the military revolt was not a revolution in the narrower sense of the word, the restoration of the constitution resulted in a revolution of the political, social, and cultural system of the empire.³

Immediately after the revolution, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria declared independence, and Crete declared unification with Greece. The new regime could not do much

besides protesting and boycotting foreign powers. The counterrevolution of 1909 and its brutal repression by the CUP-led army factions ended up in the «brutalization of political life». In face of all the perceived external and internal threats, the CUP’s role in the capital became more and more dominated by the ideology and tactics of its guerrilla group. Meanwhile uprisings in Yemen and Albania were continuing to trouble the empire in its central and peripheral Muslim lands. The Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 demonstrated the Ottoman Empire’s vulnerability and isolation in the international arena. There, the CUP’s military arm lead by Enver Bey started a campaign of unconventional warfare with Libyan tribes.

In 1912, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria surprised the Ottoman Empire by overrunning its European territories in the First Balkan War. The CUP which was by then increasingly forced into opposition took over the imperial government with a violent coup d’état in early 1913. This marked the beginning of CUP’s imperial rule, which would irreversibly alter the face of politics, economy, military, and society in the Ottoman Empire. The Second Balkan War against Bulgaria allowed the CUP regime to recover some of its former territories, but most of the European provinces of the empire were lost and the Muslim communities of the Balkans were persecuted and displaced. The Balkan Wars are retrospectively considered as the prelude to World War I due to the brutalization of warfare and

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6 Isa Blumi, Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878–1918 (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2003).
9 For the Balkan Wars and Ottoman Empire see the edited volume M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi, eds., War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013).
societies in imperial shatter-zones. For the Young Turks, the loss of their homeland in Ottoman Macedonia was particularly bitter and caused deep resentments towards Great Powers and Ottoman Christians. After the Balkan Wars the empire became more Muslim than ever, resulting in the Islamization Ottoman imperial identity and a growing interest in the empire’s Arab provinces. The Ottoman Empire was now ruled by the so-called Young Turk triumvirate of Enver, Talat, Cemal Pashas as ministers of war, interior, and navy. This represented, however, not a trinity of authority, but the competition of three fractions.

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Before World War I began, the Ottoman calculations were more focused on a looming conflict with Greece which could have well re-started the third round of the Balkan conflict. Foreign and local Greeks were accordingly subjected to economic boycotts and persecution, and local minority populations were intended to be exchanged between the two states across the Aegean Sea. Before the beginning of World War I, their isolation within the international system and zeal to reinvigorate the empire had pushed the Young Turk regime towards the Germans as their Western ally, the latter looking for ways to extend their «grab for world


12 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).


power». In hope of a short war with German victory in Europe, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914 with an unprovoked bombardment of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The entrance to war on the side of the Central Powers was a deliberate and secret decision by a small circle of Young Turk leaders headed by the new Minister of War Enver Pasha and in correspondence with their German allies, which even excluded the Navy Minister Cemal Pasha. Soon after the Ottoman entrance to war, the Young Turk regime declared global jihad to mobilize Muslim nationalist insurgencies against the Western colonial powers. Ottoman-German propaganda and intelligence operations were set in order to revolutionize the Muslim populations of Britain, France, and Russia. The British in Egypt and the Russians in Transcaucasia possessed former Ottoman territories, which were also seen as gates to further colonized Muslim lands in North Africa and Central Asia. The Eastern front was soon lost to the Russians after a catastrophic defeat of Enver at Sarıkamış. Cemal’s attempt to recover Suez from the British ended also in a fiasco. It became clear that reconquest of former Ottoman territories was a difficult task to accomplish. Despite various infrastructural and material deficiencies the Ottoman Army managed to defend key positions against the Allied attacks, most notably in the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, thus prolonging and troubling the war effort of the Entente.

Especially, the Russian-Ottoman frontier became a zone of geopolitical contest, mass violence, and demographic engineering. Imperialist ambitions and nationalist anxieties as well

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as militarist and partisan mindset magnified and connected the disconnected events of local Armenian resistance and Russian-Armenian voluntary battalions in the eyes of Young Turk decision-makers in a conspiracy theory. Allegedly a major Armenian conspiracy was threatening the survival of the empire. Accordingly, the contingencies of war led to the perception of new internal enemies and enabled new ways to handle them. The mass arrest of Armenian political leaders on April 24, 1915, and the brutal deportation of the Armenian population of Anatolia that followed was decided by a small circle of CUP leaders and later officially ordered and personally executed by the Minister of Interior Talat Pasha and his staff. Such policies of persecution and displacement resulted in a complex process of genocidal violence and demographic engineering in different locations of the empire, resulting in the extermination of the majority of Armenian and Assyrian population of Eastern Anatolia and the confiscation of their land and property by state and military officials, paramilitary bands, and local Kurdish perpetrators. The extermination of Anatolian Armenians was meant to serve national as well as imperial interests of the Young Turk regime by creating a new national home for Ottoman Muslims in the new center of the empire and by eliminating the imagined Armenian «belt» from Cilicia to Transcaucasia that cut through the empire and was open to imperialist foreign interventions.

On the home front, displacement and persecution had resulted in human and social catastrophes. For the army the main problem remained mobilization and desertion with severe consequences for the rural population. Famine and diseases also plagued the whole empire. Especially Greater Syria suffered from famine and conscription. The execution of a group of Arab nationalists for treason by Cemal Pasha, the acting military governor of Damascus, caused deep resentments among the Arab elites, still visible even today. The Arab Revolt of Sharif Husayn of Mecca in 1916 was more a British intelligence operation than a nationalist movement, but caused a further legitimacy crisis for the empire in its Arab lands and plagued the Southern front of the empire. Nonetheless, the Young Turk regime in general and Cemal in particular invested energies and resources to integrate the Arab provinces to the center of the empire.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 came as an unexpected rescue that offered an opportunity for a positive outcome from the war, since one of the major enemies of the Ottoman Empire had collapsed and ceased hostilities. This did not only release the occupied territories of Eastern Anatolia from Russian military rule, but also opened up new opportunity spaces in Russian Transcaucasia. The publication by the Bolsheviks of the secret plans of the Entente to disintegrate and parcel the Ottoman Empire, also confirmed the Young Turk regime’s imperial anxieties and fueled their zeal in preserving the empire. Despite the diplomatic gains at Brest-Litovsk, it was still in the air that a prolonged war might not end for the benefit of the Ottoman Empire.

29 Hikmet Özdemir, The Ottoman Army, 1914–1918: Disease and Death on the Battlefield (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2008).
32 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 199–202; Ciçek, War and State Formation in Syria, 168–206.
33 Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 170–71.
The summer of 1918 had been especially plagued with crises for the Young Turk regime.34 On the war front, the British forces were advancing on Damascus and the Ottoman military efforts were now re-directed towards Transcaucasia. As for the domestic politics, a cabinet crisis since early summer continued to remain unresolved regardless of a political opening towards the opposition and the easing of censorship on the press. In addition, a new sultan, Vahideddin, was in power whose political standing towards the CUP lacked assurances, if not outright hostile. Most important of all, the Ottoman people, after four years of warfare, were severely suffering from conscription, exhaustion, disease, famine, and loss of morale—not to forget the brutal persecution and displacement of Ottoman Christians. This was the desperate situation, as the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha decided to make an official visit to Berlin in September 1918. According to Ambassador Bernstorff, the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha was under so much pressure to deliver good news from his visit to Germany that if this were not the case he might even resign as Grand Vizier.35

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The main issue on Talat Pasha’s agenda before his trip to Europe was to bring home the prospect of a «general peace» (sulh-u ummumi) settlement. Talat feared that separate peace agreements of Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany with the Entente would make ottoman Empire’s position difficult at the negotiations with the victorious Allies. On his way to Berlin, Talat held at Sofia and Vienna and preached for a collective peace before winter. Yet, behind his public statements about bringing peace, in closed-door meetings Talat was negotiating the spoils of war, namely territorial compensations for the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was the only ally of the Central Powers that had lost homeland territory to the Entente.36 Some Habsburg officials in Vienna suggested that the Ottomans should look for a compensation in the Caucasus.37 This fell, of course, on sympathetic ears. Young Turk

imperialism had already an eye on the Caucasus. Only Germany posed opposition to Young Turk plans. When Talat Pasha arrived in Berlin on September 7, 1918, the semi-official newspaper, *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* welcomed Talat as «the loyal friend of the German people and strong bearer of the alliance.» At this hour of war, loyalty could not be praised and preached enough—or as Hindenburg put it, «it would not be easy to find a substitute for Enver or Talaat Pasha, who were completely and absolutely loyal to us.»

The question of Transcaucasia was not yet settled between Germany and Ottoman Empire, while Ottoman troops together with Azerbaijani forces were ambitiously marching towards Baku, despite German opposition. Germany and Soviet Russia had recently signed a supplementary treaty to the Brest-Litovsk treaties that double-crossed the Young Turk regime’s advance into the Caucasus. The alliance was at its breaking test. Rudolf Nadolny from the Russian-Persian department of the *Auswärtiges Amt* saw in the Ottoman advance into the Caucasus an expression of Young Turk imperialism in the form of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism:

If we want to reach complete agreement with the Turks, which is indispensable in the anticipation of the return of the Entente at the peace settlement, then one needs to get rid of pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism insofar as they were expressed imperially [my emphasis]. The pan-Germanism in the way our enemies see it and also the pan-Slavism brought enough bad fortune to us. It is not necessary that pan-Turanism, even though it is only a travesty of the other two considering its lack of power (Ohnmacht), destroys our Orient policy (Orientpolitik).42

42 Nadolny, comment to Lossow on Talat’s statements, September, 9, 1918, quoted in Zürrer, *Kaukasien 1918–1921*, 119.
At the end, Nadolny came to a harsh conclusion: «It would be the best, if one would only do away Enver and all his pan-Turcanian and pan-Islamist apparatus (the family clan and Ali Bash Hamba [i.e. the Young Tunisian leader and Director of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa]).»43 Ironically, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul von Hintze noted: «we have bred pan-Islamism and fed pan-Turanism».44 Talat Pasha proposed, however, a different solution for the Caucasus than expected.45 The Young Turk regime opted for the establishment of friendly buffer states between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians instead of pan-Turkist irredentism in the Caucasus.46 Before Talat, Ottoman deputy Emir Shakib Arslan was sent by direct order of Enver Pasha to Germany in June 1918 as a consultant to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. Enver gave secret assignments to Arslan to work for the independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and especially Dagestan.47 The Young Turk regime’s aim was to push Russian influence out of the Caucasus for the feared probability that Russia might soon recover and pose once again a threat to the Ottoman Empire.48 Eventually, the conquest of Baku by Ottoman and Azeri troops on September 15 changed the whole debate.49 The Young Turk regime had once again created facts on the ground before negotiating them.

43 Quoted in Bihl, Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte Teil II, 115.
44 Quoted in Zürrer, Kaukasien 1918–1921, 119.
45 Hintze, letter (Berlin), September 8, 1918, PA-AA R 13804.
46 One major exception was the integration of the so-called «Three Provinces» (elviye-i selâse) of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum back to the Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the Tsarist army in 1917, the primary Ottoman diplomatic objective was to obtain the Three Provinces, which were lost to Russia in 1878. This territorial recovery was formally achieved at the Brest-Litovsk conference, but was realized in the make-believe plebiscite of July 14, 1918. Though, Batum remained disputed between Georgia and the Ottoman Empire. For the Batum plebiscite see: Bihl, Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte Teil II, 245–51; Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 243–45.
47 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005), 106.
48 Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 189–90.
Shortly before his departure from Berlin on September 27, Talat Pasha received the newly arrived Georgian delegation at the Hotel Adlon. In his memoirs the Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zourab Avalishvili, remembers how Talat persuaded the Georgians repeatedly: «Give up the Germans—be with us». Talat spoke of a «great policy in the East» which meant—according to Avalishvili—the formation of a Caucasian Confederation as a buffer between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, «and, mainly—the political organization of the Turkish East, from Anatolia to Turkestan.» This was, indeed, the next point on Talat’s Berlin agenda. The opportunity spaces that Talat desired to exploit went even beyond the Caucasus as far as Turkestan. «He has a new project», Paul von Hintze noted. «He wants to militarily organize Turkestan (where 14 million Muslims live according to him) in order to make them take part in the war supposedly against England and Russia. He demands German officers and petty officers.» Apparently, Talat presented his idea also to the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. «Either seriously or out of courtesy», said Talat, «they all three have approved it.» Hindenburg was skeptical about the promise of Russian Muslims as potential recruits, because

Russia had not drawn on these Mohammedans for regular military service, and now they were to fight under the Crescent. The number of the prospective volunteers, as communicated to us, revealed all the wealth of Oriental imagination. Further, if the Turkish reports were to be believed, we had to assume that the Mohammedan peoples of Russia had for long had no more intense longing than to form one great and self-contained Mohammedan nation in the Turkish Empire.

There were two major reasons behind the plans for the military organization of Russian Muslims. First, Britain was considered as the main adversary of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. According to Talat’s proposal, «one needs to take into consideration that those organized forces (in Turkestan) will, in case needed, enable to put pressure on England by dispatching these forces to the Indian border.» Second, these proposed Turkestani forces

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53 Talat Pasha, Report (Berlin), September 15, 1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2374.1.


could also be used against Soviet Russia. In spite of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was still perceived as a potential threat by the Young Turks—“the enemy of yesterday and the enemy of tomorrow”, in Talat’s words.56

“The negotiations with the Germans have not yet come to a conclusion” reported Talat Pasha in a letter to the Sublime Porte. “Nevertheless, they have confirmed in writing that they do not oppose to our [efforts in] building governments in Northern Caucasus and Turkestan and forming alliances with them.”57 By the end of the negotiations, Talat achieved a promise from the Germans not to object into Ottoman Empire’s interventions into Muslim Russia.58

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“The whole Wilhelmstrasse was there”, as the Georgian diplomat Avalishvili remembers Talat Pasha’s parting ceremony at the Anhalter Bahnhof, «in shining top hats with strained and serious expressions on their faces.»59 Talat had left his mark. As Hindenburg remembers: “Absolutely loyal from the political point of view, [as] he met us first in 1916, and [as he] said good-bye to us in the autumn of 1918.”60 While Talat’s return plans were still in the making, the Auswärtiges Amt had informed their colleagues at the German embassy in Sofia that they did not want Grand Vizier to stop by in Sofia for an official visit on his way home.61 The secret news that Bulgaria was in an attempt to plea for a separate peace reached the German official circles on September 25, 1918.62

On their way, Talat Pasha received an invitation by Tsar Ferdinand to the palace in Sofia, followed by a second telegram that canceled the invitation. There would only be a reception at the train station. Talat assumed that if the Tsar cancels such an invitation, something bad

56 Matthias Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1920), 247.
57 Talat Pasha (Berlin), letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Constantinople), September 21, 1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2374.1.
59 Avalishvili, The Independence of Georgia in International Politics 1918–1921, 109. See also: Sürmeli, Türk-Gürcü İlişkileri (1918–1921), 274.
60 Hindenburg, Out of My Life, 184; Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben, 168.
61 Auswärtiges Amt, Telegram to the German Embassy in Sofia, September 15, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 253.
62 Avalishvili, The Independence of Georgia in International Politics 1918–1921, 112.
must have happened. When the train arrived at the Central Railway Station of Sofia, Talat left the train to talk with Nedyalko Kolushev and the Prime Minister Aleksandar Malinov. «It is finished», said the Prime Minister said to Talat. «The 11th Division have broken; Bulgaria is done and we have sued for an armistice.» Malinov hopelessly declined Talat’s offer to send two Turkish divisions from Constantinople. The Bulgarians would go for a separate peace according to Wilson’s principles. The Allied Army of the Orient under the command of General Louis Franchet d’Espéry had defeated the Bulgarian forces at the battle of Dobro Pole in Macedonia. On September 25, the Bulgarian government decided to plea for an armistice, which was to be signed under unconditional terms on September 29. Talat protested: «You are wrong to have done this; we should all have asked for an armistice together. What terms shall we be given now?» After one hour of talk with Malinov, Talat was invited to the palace. But the Tsar had also no solutions that could appease the Ottoman Grand Vizier. After that Talat returned to the train. As he was crossing by the compartments where some of his friends were curiously awaiting his return, he could only say: «We’re screwed!» Back in his own cabin, he said to the others: «I wish I were dead today».

Talat Pasha’s Berlin trip in September 1918 remarkably illustrates, what the imperial regime of the CUP was perceiving and misperceiving as well as planning and trying in the final hours of World War I. Talat Pasha’s trip to Berlin was meant to bring home a peace agreement. Instead, the Young Turk regime was still very much concerned with bargaining over the spoils of war and looking for opportunities and resources to change the course of an ostensibly ill-fated and costly war or even finding ways to make the impending peace process as troublesome as possible for the Entente powers. Not only Talat, Enver was also behind some of

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65 Herbert, *Ben Kendim*, 315. See also: Mithat Sükrü Bleda, *Imparatorluğun Çöküşü: İttihat ve Terakki Katibi Umumisi* (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları, 2010), 155.
66 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 143.
68 Herbert, *Ben Kendim*, 315.
70 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytindağı* (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2009), 18.
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the geopolitical misconceptions.71 The opportunity spaces of Muslim Russia were imagined by Enver to offer potential resources for prolonging the war and mobilizing resistance for its aftermath.72 These resources were hoped to be utilized for an anticolonial struggle against British India and, if necessary, also against Russia. In a way, the Young Turk leadership unknowingly prepared the ground for their future political ventures from empire to exile.

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71 There is reason to believe that Talat and rest of the cabinet was strongly misguided about to state of military affairs by Enver Pasha. Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918, Part I,” 171, note 30.
72 Ali Fuat Cebeşoį, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000), 80.
1. Escaping the Consequences:
The Political Maneuvers of the CUP at the Brink of Armistice

Talat Pasha arrived at the Sirkeci Station from his Berlin trip on September 27. The Bulgarian surrender, which Talat had discovered at his stop in Sofia, was already the talk of the town in Constantinople. Talat informed his close associates in confidence about the details of the Bulgarian surrender. Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CUP, belonged to those who received Talat soon after his arrival. On the morale of Talat, Mithat Şükrü wrote in his memoirs:

There were great differences between the Talat who went to Berlin and the Talat who returned from Berlin. It was as if Talat was now another Talat. He was depressed and exhausted as if he had suffered a severe illness for five or ten days. He wasn’t smiling, he couldn’t hold his head high. Nothing could solace the Talat who returned to us in this condition, and how could it […]\textsuperscript{2}

Despite his depressed mood, Talat gave a press conference that day to calm the situation. «The penetration of the Bulgarian front and the setbacks we are facing at our Southern front is not as important as assumed», told Talat the journalists. There also some good news. «New forces have been formed from the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia», said Talat in hope appease the curious crowd. «These will soon be brought to the aid of the fronts and stability will be reestablished. As I was in Berlin I solved all our conflicts with the Germans regarding the Caucasus.»\textsuperscript{3} As soon as the journalists left, Talat revealed in private the gravity of the situation to Ahmet Emin (Yalman), a promising young journalist with a PhD from Columbia University: «What I told you all was to avoid a sudden outbreak of alarm and panic among the people. The truth is that everything is over, we’ve lost the war. Tomorrow is full of unknown probabilities.»\textsuperscript{4}

Unlike Talat, Enver maintained his hopes. On the day of Talat’s return, Enver sent a telegraph to Zeki Pasha at the German headquarters to convince the Germans to send German...


\textsuperscript{2} Mithat Şükrü Bleda, \textit{İmparatorluğun Çöküşü: İttihat ve Terakki Kâtipi Umumisi} (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları, 2010), 155.

\textsuperscript{3} Ahmet Emin Yalman, \textit{Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim} (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970), 1, 305.

\textsuperscript{4} Yalman, \textit{Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim}, 1, 305.
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or Austrian troops to rebuke the Bulgarians. Although, the Bulgarians signed an unconditional surrender on September 29, Talat apparently kept his poker face in front of the German officials at the embassy. Talat was according to chargé d’affaires of the German Embassy still «hopeful» on September 30. He even proposed to set up a coup d’état against the Bulgarian government with the help of Muslim Bulgarians in order to keep the alliance intact. Once again, Talat’s komitadji repertoire was delivering options—realistic or not. Talat said, if the Bulgarians make a deal that would enable an invasion of the Ottoman capital by the Entente forces, «than it is a lost case for us». «In this case I would resign for that I don’t want to conclude such a peace.»

Bulgaria was geopolitically very critical for the military defense of the Ottoman capital. The Bulgarian border lied only few hundred kilometers away from Constantinople and this was a cause for general concern within the government. In the words of Celal (Bayar), the later president of the Republic of Turkey and by than a young member of the CUP, «the catastrophe was knocking on the door».

Next morning, on October 1, even more terrible news reached the Ottoman capital. Damascus was lost to General Edmund Allenby’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Syria’s loss was probably expected by the Young Turk regime, but not the other news that reached the Grand Vizier’s ears. Talat Pasha received a telegram sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, reporting that also Germany was at the brink of calling an armistice. Talat, who was there in Germany and talked to the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff only few days ago, could not believe that the Germans were giving in for a separate peace agreement. With Germans surrendering, the war was finally lost for the Ottoman Empire. When Cemal Pasha was asked by his adjutant: «Sir, is everything over?» Cemal could not hide his tears. Few moments later recovered from the sorrowful feelings of loss and defeat,

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5 Enver Pasha, letter (Constantinople) to Zeki Pasha (Spa), September 27, 1918, quoted in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 435–436.
6 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, September 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 263.
7 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, September 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 263–64.
11 Fethi Olyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, ed. Cemal Kutay (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980).
Cemal went being himself again; he was trying to convince the police director on the telephone to persecute Nüzhet Sabit for publishing an offensive pamphlet, as if nothing had ever changed. But things were indeed about to change rapidly and radically. On October 2, in a letter to his brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha also acknowledged that the war was now a lost cause and wrote: «Since we are concluding peace, it means that we’ve lost the game.»

The «game» they played had come to a bitter closure. Now against the odds of a «tomorrow full of unknown probabilities»—as Talat Pasha put it beautifully—the CUP had to undertake urgent political maneuvers in order to take precautions and make preparations for the worst. The defeat and armistice meant the end of the CUP rule. Prosecutions and persecutions of the CUP cabinet for the war crimes they committed was on the horizon. The CUP leadership rejected to face the consequences of a future court martial. Fearing their own prosecution, they would opt to flight. They would leave the empire and go into exile. They had a heavy load of political baggage they were to carry to their exile, while leaving behind even a heavier legacy in Ottoman Turkey.

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The broader picture of the events in late September 1918 makes the German surrender less surprising. The culmination of events on different fronts made the German military leadership’s expectations for the long-awaited victorious peace (Siegfrieden) disappear painfully. This sudden change of mind within the military leadership remained long disputed in the popular imagination making way for the right-wing and militarist conspiracy theories of the «stab-in-the-back legend» (Dolchstoßlegende). According to this «national myth», the armistice was a treacherous conspiracy of the—usual suspects—social-democrats, Jews, and Freemasons, who stabbed the undefeated German military in the back through a surrender. In reality, however, mutinies among the soldiers and sailors as well as strikes and desperation on the home front were emerging; there were no more reserve resources to continue prolonged fighting; and after the Western front was breached and the American forces appeared on the

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12 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2009), 19.

13 Enver Pasha, letter (Constantinople) to Nuri Pasha (Caucasus), October 2, 1918, quoted in Aydemir, *Enver Paşa*, III, 442–443.
horizon, the disillusionment became inescapable. On September 29, Ludendorff revealed to the Kaiser at the War Council in Spa that the war was now a lost cause and it was time to maneuver into the armistice negotiations both diplomatically and domestically. Otherwise not only the defeat but also the annihilation of the remaining troops was at stake. Thus, Germany gave in for peace. The new German Chancellor Prince Max von Baden sent a telegram to Talat Pasha on October 9, writing that only the «unswerving determination for defense» will help the both defeated governments secure «honorable peace» conditions, but diplomatic courtesies did not much help to change the catastrophic situation. Talat’s cabinet had already resigned on October 7. Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire respectively, gave into Wilson’s principles, but the victorious Entente had less interest in granting concessions at this moment of victory.

It was common wisdom that the defeat in World War I meant the defeat of CUP. In the last ten years since the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the paramilitary rebels who ended up being imperial rulers had just realized—but, of course, without truly blaming themselves—that they had brought along the ruin of the empire they had originally sworn to save. The CUP leaders were up to their throat in trouble now—to say the least. The prospects of the upcoming armistice with the Allies was casting a dark shadow on the future of the CUP. The Young Turk triumvirate in particular has long been subjected to a strong antagonization—or even demonization—discourse by the Entente propaganda and the Ottoman opposition. Everybody knew that prosecutions and persecutions were awaiting the CUP. Their commitment to the Central Powers’ collective war effort and the ruthless handling of war and society would make a strong case against them at the military tribunals.

15 Chancellor Max von Baden, telegraph (Berlin) to Grand Vizier Talat Pasha (Constantinople), October 9, 1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2459.60.
16 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in the World War (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1930), 267–68. Talat’s cabinet remained in charge until the new cabinet was formed on October 14.
Fellow CUP members were indeed concerned about their prominent friends and encouraged them to get away before the arrival of the Allied forces. For instance, Rauf (Orbay) Bey and Enver’s adjutant Kazım (Orbay) Bey were both worried about Enver’s life and honor.\(^\text{18}\) Rauf Bey had also talks with Cemal Pasha about his security in those days.\(^\text{19}\) Kara Kemal was concerned about Talat Pasha and advised him to disappear for a while.\(^\text{20}\) Dr. Nazım told years later that the fear of retaliations from Greeks and Armenians was the major concern.\(^\text{21}\)

Shakib Arslan tells that the CUP leadership heard of rumors that Sultan Vahideddin had a secret agreement with the British to persecute and execute the CUP leaders.\(^\text{22}\) Later Sultan Vahideddin denounced the CUP leaders for the Armenian massacres in an interview to the *Daily Telegraph*.\(^\text{23}\) The personal safety and reputation of the CUP leaders was seen as a matter of national pride by many CUP members and precautions were needed to be taken. There were even rumors of a failed assassination attempt against Enver and Talat in the newspapers.\(^\text{24}\) There were three options on the table: Either they would hide and wait in Constantinople or they would retreat to Eastern Anatolia and start a resistance movement there. In the worst scenario, they would leave for exile and come back, when the conditions would allow it.\(^\text{25}\) Either way, they would escape the looming prosecutions.

On October 14, Field-Marshal Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha was appointed as the new Grand Vizier.\(^\text{26}\) He was not a CUP member nor had he been in favor of the decision for war, but he

\(^{18}\) Rauf Orbay, *Cehennem Değirmeni* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993), 167–68.
\(^{19}\) Orbay, *Cehennem Değirmeni*, 165–66.
\(^{21}\) Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, *Doktor Nazım Bey*, 321.
\(^{23}\) G. Ward Price, “Interview with the Sultan of Turkey: Enver Pasha’s Crimes”, *Daily Telegraph*, December 12, 1918. See also: PA-AA, R 13805, 98. «It was a great sorrow that I learnt of the treatment which certain political committees in Turkey instigated against the Armenians.» replied the Sultan. «Such misdeeds and the mutual slaughter that occurred between sons of the same fatherland have broken my heart. As soon as I came to the Throne I ordered an inquiry to be made so that the fomenters of these troubles might punished with the greatest severity. Various factors prevented my command being promptly carried out. But now this matter is being thoroughly gone into and followed up. Justice will soon be gone, and we shall never have a repetition of such ugly events.» See also a similar interview with Prince Abdülmecid Efendi in “Interview with the Heir-Apparent: Enver’s Villany”, *Morning Post*, December 14, 1918.
\(^{24}\) Germany Embassy in Berne, letter to the Chancellor (Belrin), October 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 23.
\(^{26}\) BOA.İ.DUİT.9.38
was a generally respected commander without any serious feuds with the CUP or the German military command. In forming the new cabinet, the CUP utilized some committee members with a rather unblemished record in war-time decisions, such as Rauf (Orbay), Fethi (Okyar) and Cavid in hopes to ensure an unnoticed continuation of the Committee’s influence in the armistice. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha was proposed as Minister of War, but the new Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha claimed this office for himself.

Talat Pasha soon approached the newly appointed Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, because he feared the Allied prosecutions after the armistice. İzzet Pasha’s promise was not much relief. «As long as I am in the cabinet, I will never turn you in to the enemy», he assured. «But who knows how long I will remain in the cabinet?» he rightly questioned. Talat’s concerns were not without a reason. Talat knew very well that he would be accounted for the extermination of Ottoman Armenians, once the Allies take over the Ottoman Empire or the long-suppressed Ottoman opposition becomes vocal again. On October 27, German Naval Attaché Grancy was reporting that the «radicals» were trying to replace the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha with Tevfik Pasha «in order to make Talaat Enver and others accountable.»

It was pretty much obvious that Talat and other CUP leaders and their murdering henchmen would end up at the gallows. Thus, the Central Committee of the CUP, consisting of Eyüp Sabri (Akgöl), Ziya Gökalp, Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), Kara Kemal, Bahaeddin Şakir, Dr. Nazım, Hüseyin Cahit (Yağıcı) and others, decided to bring a number of CUP leaders into safety. Nonetheless, many accounts agree that Talat somehow accepted to face his fate. According to the accounts delivered by several CUP members, Talat remained long reluctant to run away. According to Mithat Şükrü, Talat’s initial reaction to the end of the war was:

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27 See: Hans von Seeckt, letter (Constantinopel) to Dorothee von Seeckt (Germany), October 27, 1918, BA-MA, N247/218
30 Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 551.
32 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eycil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 323, 325, 326.
33 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 14; Hüseyin Cahit Yağıcı, Talat Paşa (İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, 1943), 48; Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, I, 123; Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü, 156.
«I have to answer to my country with a clear conscience. If they wish so, they should hang me...» Even until now Turkish nationalist scholars celebrate these words as a marker of Talat’s strong integrity and claim that he did not simply run away from his responsibilities. Talat was known for making such bold claims. For instance, when Portuguese Prime Minister João Franco went into exile in 1909, the reaction of Talat Bey at the Ottoman Parliament was: «We do not leave the country; we work until we die.» As a remarkably smart politician, Talat knew very well when to say what. Therefore, his boldness should be read with caution. For instance, at the opening day of the final congress of the CUP on November 1, 1918, Talat held a shockingly straightforward speech about the harms committed during his government such as the Armenian massacres. Although his apologia contains the blueprints of Turkey’s official arguments in rejecting the genocide claims, he presented himself as prepared and willing to account for the wrongs committed under his responsibility:

It’s not that I will deny the horrors. My desire is only to tell the truth and get rid of the exaggerations. The deportation incidents did occur, but none of those were enacted according to a premeditated decision by the Sublime Porte. One could not have tolerated movements during a great war that were disturbing the freedom of movement and threatening the salvation of the people and the security of the army by starting insurrections behind the fronts. In Erzurum, there were Armenian paramilitaries obstructing the movement of the army. Whenever these got in trouble, they were receiving help and protection from the Armenian villages. The churches were stash houses for weapons. The deportations were out of desperation. It’s not that I will argue that the deportations were executed orderly everywhere or that it didn’t cross the boundaries of the imperative. In many places, animosities broke out for this reason. Evil has been done that we had by no means anticipated. Certain officials enacted cruelties and violence beyond measure so that a great deal of innocents was victimized unjustly. I admit that it was the duty of the Government to prevent them. In cases where the horrors could not be prevented, it was necessary to search, find, and punish the wrongdoers. Sometimes this has been done, but it wasn’t sufficient. It would have been appropriate to conduct general investigations and launch persecutions, but it wasn’t easy to do these in times of war. Among them there were some, who committed these cruelties without being carried away by any feeling of...
animosity and [interest in] profit, but only for the purpose of serving the homeland. Their minds narrow, their ideas limited, there were many of those, who were under the force of their fanatic feelings. Could it have been appropriate to open a chasm between the two trends in the homeland in the course of a war, when the homeland was more than anything in need of unity, in a time when we had wished to create men out of stone to send them to the front? I believed that it wasn’t right. I took every responsibility and postponed all kinds of investigations for after the war.38

The irony of this confession—if it may count as such at all—is that at that time it was already decided by the Central Committee of the CUP to get Talat Pasha and other CUP leaders out of the Ottoman capital. On that very same night Talat and his friends were to disappear. Talat could take the blame, because he knew that he and other leaders were escaping anyway. Taking blame also meant to save the reputation and future of the remaining CUP members and enable their continued influence. Talat finished his speech with the following address:

As you know, the Bulgarian front collapsed so that we have no more connection to our allies. Our armies have been crushed in Syria. The war has ended with our defeat. […] Therefore, we gave the resignation of the cabinet to the Sultan.

Our policies have failed. Therefore, it wasn’t possible for us to keep the government offices by any means. Therewith, as the executive committee we collectively resign from the executive and administrative positions of the Committee of Union and Progress and leave and entrust the committee to its true and legitimate owner, the Congress Commission.39

At the end of the congress, it was decided to officially shut-down the party.40 In its place the congress founded the ill-fated Renewal Party (Teceddüd Fırkası).41 As the party congress was still taking place, Talat, Enver, Cemal and some of other notorious CUP members left the Ottoman Empire for political exile in Europe, from which most of them would ever again return. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir even sugarcoated the option of flight by comparing it to the hijra of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina.42 This was, of course, a very self-praising apologia, revealing the daring conceptualization of their own political sacrality. They

38 The congress proceedings are lost, but journalists like Ahmet Emin reported in detail about the discussions in the Constantinople newspapers. This quote is rather based on the recollection of Ahmet Emin. Yalman, Yakin Tarıhte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, I, 310–311. Content-wise, there is a similar but shorter version given in the memoir of Celal Bey. Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, I, 109–112. See also: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler II: Mütareke Dönemi 1918–1922, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), 62–69. Both memoirs correspond to reports from the congress in the newspapers. See for instance: Demirbaş, “Liderlerinin Yurt Dışına Kaçması Üzerine İttihat ve Terakki İçinde Meydana Gelen Tepkiler,” 133; Kocaoğlu, Mütarekede İttihatçılık, 65.

39 Yalman, Yakin Tarıhte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, II, 311.

40 Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler II, 51.

41 For the Teceddüd Fırkası see: Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler II, 92–137; Kocaoğlu, Mütarekede İttihatçılık, 148–86.

42 See especially the sharp comments on this comparison by the editor of the Tevhid-i Efkar, where Arif Cemil’s memoir was first published as a series in 1922. Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 12.
The Young Turk Aftermath

saw themselves as blessed (and burdened) with a sacred mission for the sake of nation and empire.

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On a night in late October, General von Seeckt had a dinner with Enver Pasha. Concerned about his protégé’s future, von Seeckt made Enver a special offer. In a letter he wrote to his wife, he said:

I promised him that he, Talaat, and some others will have a place and shelter on every ship I have on hand. It is, of course, completely doubtful, whether it will come to that.

Yet, it is reassurance for them to know.43

On October 27, Bernstorff reported from the German Embassy in Constantinople to Berlin that the CUP leaders announced the desire to leave the country and asked for the help of the Germans. According to Bernstorff, Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was involved in these negotiations though he had also his doubts because of possible blowbacks against his government. As a reassurance İzzet Pasha demanded a declaration that the émigrés should be extradited back to Ottoman Turkey by Germany in case the Ottoman Government would come up with such a request in the future. This was a hopeless inquiry.44 In his memoirs, İzzet Pasha writes that he did not help the CUP leaders leave the country and that he even did «everything in his hands to prevent it.»45 Nonetheless, the German reports tell that the Grand Vizier worked behind the curtains to facilitate the exfiltration of the CUP leaders.46 The German officials gave permission for Enver and Talat to take refuge in Germany:

To Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, who concluded the alliance with us and bore it loyal on our side, our country stands open. If they believe they need to fly away from Turkey because of political persecution, Your Excellency wants to be helpful by any means.47

Why would Germany help Enver and Talat escape the consequences of armistice and give them refuge in Germany? In the end, these men meant trouble. Some Turkish historians

43 Hans von Seeckt, letter (Constantinopel) to Dorothee von Seeckt (Germany), October 20, 1918, BA-MA, N247/218, 173, 174b. See also von Seect’s diary entry from October 19, 1918, BA-MA, N247/17, 27.
44 Albrecht G. von Bernstorff, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, October 27, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 331.
46 Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, February 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 197.
47 Auswärtiges Amt, letter to Bernstorff (Constantinople), October 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 334.
believe that by helping the CUP leaders to escape, the German military officials were hoping to hide war secrets from the Entente. Genocide scholar Vahakn Dadrian goes one step further and sees the reason behind the German support as a decisive measure by General von Seeckt and Bronsart von Schellendorf to cover German complicity in the Armenian Genocide. A rather more nuanced explanation is that the German support for granting them refuge was based solely on the notion that Enver and Talat have been loyal partners to Germany and they felt indebted to these men. It was an obligation of honor. Lieutenant Commander of the German Navy and naval historian Hermann Lorey sees the motivation behind the German support also as a matter of loyalty to those friends of Germany:

At the instruction of the Auswärtiges Amt the Germanophile leaders of Turkey were underhandedly given the chance by the Mittelmeerdivision to leave the country unopposed. For the German Reich it was obvious duty to reciprocate the same loyalty to those men, who in the long years of a tiresome war stuck inviolably to their ally, and to help them continue to work for their fatherland from abroad.

The war and the defeat had caused a strong anti-German atmosphere in Ottoman Turkey. Even German official reports admitted at the end of the war that all that Propaganda did not achieve to create pro-German sentiments in Ottoman Turkey. Therefore, Talat and Enver’s commitment on behalf of the collective war-effort was treasured and their German colleagues felt indebted to them.

49 In Dadrian’s version, it was—in addition to von Seeckt—General Bronsart von Schellendorf who allegedly planned and executed the operation. Vahakn N. Dadrian, German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity (Watertown, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1996), 123–24. Regarding Seeckt, Dadrian relies on Fethi Okyar’s memoirs, which is also wrong regarding some other facts. Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, 251. Regarding Bronsart von Schellendorf, Dadrian relies on an anti-CUP propaganda pamphlet: Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmörder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik: Sensationelle Enthüllungen über die türkische Verbrechergesellschaft, bekannt unter dem Namen ‘Komitee für Einheit und Fortschritt’ (Comité Union et Progrés). (Berlin: Verlag ‘Die Verteidigung’, 1920), 24. Within a chapter on the corrupt businesses of Enver and his undeserved marriage to an Ottoman princess, Mehmed Zeki Bey places a picture of Schellendorf as Enver’s partner in crime. He writes in the captions of the picture that Bronsart von Schellendorf had organized the escape of the Committee leaders together with Major von Bentheim and Admiral von Rhebeur-Paschwitz.
51 There were even reports about armed Ottoman deserters mistreating German soldiers demobilizing and leaving the country. Radiogram to Berlin, October 25, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 144.
52 Dr. Curt Prüfer, memorandum to Otto Günther von Wesendonk, November 2, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 147–51.
Nevertheless, the Armenian Question played an essential role in German support, but quite an opposite one as some suggests. When it came to the selection of the group of fugitives, the Auswärtiges Amt was strictly against granting asylum to those, «who do not desire to flee from the responsibility in the persecution of Armenians by running away.» It is further argued that

In the critical time we did everything in our power to prevent the horrors (Greuel), and shall not make ourselves guilty afterwards by releasing the perpetrators from their punishment.  

Peculiarly, Enver and Talat were not seen as «perpetrators». This does not mean that the Auswärtiges Amt believed that Enver and Talat had a clean record in the suffering of the Armenians—quite the contrary in fact. This political immunity was granted primarily to Enver and Talat due to their treasured loyalty to Germany as war-time allies.

On the other side, for the internal decision-making of the Young Turk leadership, complicity in the Armenian deportations did play a major role in the selection of those who should leave the empire. A remarkable episode in Mithat Şükrü’s memoir, whether accurate or not, is worth quoting. As the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CUP, Mithat Şükrü was initially considered among those who were selected to leave the country. But Mithat Şükrü’s wife objected to Talat Pasha about his husband’s leaving, because in her understanding only those who were associated with the Armenian deportations had to leave:

- Talat Bey, did Mithat have anything to do with the Armenian deportation affairs?
- No, he was not involved in anything.
- If Mithat has no share in the measures that were taken, then what is the reason that he leaves together with you? As I understand, there will be no advantage in his leaving. It is your decision, but if he would stay in Istanbul…
- I understand, madam. […] You will not bear separating from Mithat…
- No, don’t get me wrong, I just don’t want him to fall into the situation of being wrongly accused of having committed a crime… If you would allow, he shall stay here…
- Of course, madam, he shall stay, he shall stay. We would have taken him with us only to keep his company around anyway…

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53 Auswärtiges Amt, letter to Bernstorff (Constantinople), October 30, 1918, PA-AA, R 13804, 334.
54 Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü, 168–69.
One might argue that Mithat Şükrü tells this story only to clear his own name. Possibly—but it still implies that it was no secret that they were selected because of their involvement in the Armenian deportations and persecutions. The selection based on complicity in the Armenian massacres does not necessarily imply that these men were picked only to hide the secrets of a genocidal campaign, but perhaps rather to save those friends who were more threatened by court martial prosecutions. Going into exile meant rather escaping death penalty, not necessarily covering up traces of complicity.

Destroying evidence against their case was a matter dealt separately. Although the evidence is rather suggestive, all signs point to a collective if not coordinated destruction and removal of official and internal documents. Noticeably, the CUP left behind no archive or a collective body of internal documents, except for dispersed collections of personal papers. According to testimonies of other CUP members at the post-war Military Tribunals, Dr. Nazım took away a chest full of documents from CUP’s headquarters and Talat Pasha took some documents from the Minister of Interior. These documents are believed to have been burnt before leaving Constantinople. British intelligence believed that Kara Kemal brought some other Committee documents to bank vaults throughout Switzerland already in January 1918. Also General von Seeckt is accused of taking some official Ottoman documents with him to Germany, but it is perhaps a little speculative that the German military was involved in coordinated measures of hiding Ottoman documents related to the Armenian massacres.
Peculiarly, Cemal Pasha was not initially granted asylum by Germany like Enver and Talat. This was not necessarily due to Cemal’s role in the Armenian deportations. Hilmar Kaiser demonstrated that Cemal acted against the deportations and persecution of the Armenian population. Cemal’s exclusion by German officials was based rather on a general distrust towards him by German military command since he was considered to be somewhat of anti-German orientation. It was a matter of being a friend of Germany or not. The Navy Attache Grancy requested subsequently to warrant the same asylum concessions promised to Enver and Talat also to his naval colleague Cemal, « [b]ecause it would be outrages [unmöglich] to let Djemal fall alone.»

The men who were selected to leave the empire first of all included the Young Turk triumvirate of Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha. They were accompanied by CUP’s éminence grise Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım. Both belonged to the initial Parisian circle of Young Turks in exile and played a role in the merge of Parisian and Macedonian branches of the CUP before the revolution. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was the Director of the Political Brach of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and he is considered as the one of the main initiators of the persecution and extermination of Armenians. Dr. Nazım similarly worked mostly behind the scenes and his name is also associated with the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. In the last


60 Alexander Freiherr von Senarcens-Grancy, Telegramm (Konstantinopel) to OHL (Berlin), November 4, 1918, BA-MA, RA 3/2965, 345.

61 See especially Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın)’s description of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Tanıdıklarım* (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2001), 81–83, quoted in Erik J. Zürcher, “Renewal and Silence: Post-War Unionist and Kemalist Rhetoric on the Armenian Genocide,” in *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey*, 195–207 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 205–6. «What is Bahaettin Şakir’s role in the deportations? Even in our most intimate meetings this issue was not made clear to us. I have no clear, definite opinion, but based on a word here that escaped from his lips when we discussed other matters, a thought there that came out, involuntary gests, subtle and slight, even imperceptible, indications, which aroused suspicion in a person, one idea imposed itself on me with great strength: that he was the prime shaper and executor of the deportation business. I am strongly convinced that he prepared the ground when he travelled the East by himself, took the basic decisions and that, while he worked to put his own personal ideas into practice, his position meant that his orders were taken to be orders of the Central Committee and of the government and that in the end he carried some of his influential friends in the government with him. That is why, if one day it would be necessary to revive Bahaettin Şakir’s memory, the provinces in the east will be more than ready to put up his statue.»
cabinet he served as the Minister of Education. Talat personally insisted on taking Dr. Bahaeeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım into exile with him. Dr. Nazım and Dr. Bahaeeddin Şakir were considered even by fellow CUP members as being «the most sectarian komitadji» of the CUP. It is more or less clear that these two men had blood on their hands and why they were among the selected. Less clear is why necessarily Dr. Rüşühi (Dikmen) was selected. He was for sure an influential member of CUP’s Central Committee, but beyond that there is not much information on his affairs. Also notorious CUP men who worked in local administration were among the selected. Former Governor of Trabzon Cemal Azmi Bey was known for his brutal handling of the non-Muslim community of the Black Sea region. Former Police Commissioner of Constantinople Bedri Bey was responsible for the arrests and deportations of the Armenian community leaders of Constantinople in 1915. Former Governor of Beirut Azmi Bey not only belonged to Cemal Pasha’s entourage in Syria, but he was known for being the Police Commissioner of Constantinople prior to Bedri Bey. Murat Bardakçı writes that Talat’s young brother-in-law Hayreti also accompanied them, indicating that Talat was able to pick anyone he desired.

The selection process of this small circle of committee men who were chosen to leave the empire on a German vessel was—as many other things in Young Turk decision-making—rather a fait accompli of a small network of trusted fellows based on personal ambitions and fears. Germans had little to say and did not even know for sure whom they all assisted to

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63 Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene*, 552.
64 See, for instance, how Halide Edip (Adıvar) reacted to meeting with Bahaeddin Şakir, told in Atay, *Zeytındağı*, 72.
65 On some dubious information regarding his position within the CUP see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 1, no. 2 (1986): 189, note 27. Why Dr. Ruhusi was selected is asked also to Dr. Nazım, but he did not give an answer either. Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, *Doktor Nazım Bey*, 322–23.
68 Murat Bardakçı, *Enver* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 38.
escape. There were complaints among the German officials that former police commissioners like Bedri and Azmi Bey were also on board, who were associated with the murder of Mahmud Şevket Pasha in 1913, who was still treasured as a great friend of Germany. But the main objection was again: «In other ways as well, we intend to deny our help to those office holders, who are compromised in the Armenian Question or as exploiters.» But by then, it was already too late for this objection. The Germans had already assisted these men to get away and deporting them back to Ottoman Turkey would have aroused more attention.

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In the late evening of November 2, the Military Attaché of the Habsburg Empire, Joseph Pomiankowski was urgently requested to see the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha at his residence. The Grand Vizier was down in bed with influenza under heavy pillows as he received Pomiankowski. The Grand Vizier told that Topal İsmail Hakkı Pasha had disappeared. İsmail Hakkı was the Ministerial General Intendant of the Ottoman Empire and his name was broadly associated with allegations of corruption, black-marketing, and profiteering. The war-profiteer İsmail Hakkı was to be arrested, when he suddenly disappeared, as İzzet Pasha explained. Before İsmail Hakkı, there were news in Constantinople newspapers that Azmi Bey and Bedri Bey, both former police commissioners of Constantinople, tried to get away with a German vessel on September 27 and that they were then detained around Büyükdere.

According to İzzet Pasha’s information, İsmail Hakkı received the help of an Austria-Hungarian captain and escaped to Odessa. Therefore, Pomiankowski had to contact the officials in Odessa and hand in İsmail Hakkı to the Ottoman Empire. This allegation happened to

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69 Auswärtiges Amt, telegram to Berchem (Kiev), November 8, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 35.
70 Azmi Bey had also concerns that the new Sultan Vahdeddin might have grievances against him. Kaya, “İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Yurtdışına Kaçışları ve Brunun İstanbul Başındakı Yankıları,” 186.
71 Auswärtiges Amt, letter to German Embassy in Constantinople, November 4, 1918, AA R 13758, 182.
72 Waldburg, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, November 3, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 17–18.
73 Bleda, Imparatorluğun Çöküşü, 146–48; Albert Hopman, Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers (Berlin: Scherl Verlag, 1925), 177.
75 Joseph Pomianowski, Der Zusammenbruch des ottomanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen an die Türkei aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges (Zürich: Amalthea-Verlag, 1928), 409.
be wrong, however. According to Pomiankowski, İsmail Hakkı had escaped with German help. In fact, İsmail Hakkı fled to Odessa on Monday, October 28, 1918, on the German steamship General but the news spread around on November 2. The German embassy was approached by the Ottoman Foreign Minister to arrest İsmail Hakkı and deport him back to Turkey if he tries to enter German borders. The Auswärtiges Amt decided to ignore the Ottoman request. Later İsmail Hakkı fled to Switzerland via Romania, Poland, and Germany undercover as a mute Ottoman Greek. There were rumors that he already shipped some money to Switzerland before his departure. When Pomiankowski met with the Grand Vizier next time, Ahmet İzzet Pasha was already out of his sickbed, but in great distress. To Pomiankowski’s question, what had happened, İzzet Pasha answered fiercely: «What, you don’t know it yet? The Pashas are gone, despite all the precautions!»

The final decision for the exfiltration of the Young Turk leaders from the Ottoman capital was made very late. Therefore, the preparations were rather abrupt. On November 1, during a meeting at the staff of the Mittelmeerdivision, the youngest of the Admiralty staff officers present at the meeting, Herrmann Baltzer, volunteered for the operation. The exfiltration operation took place on the evening of November 1, around 10 pm. Baltzer was accompanied by Captain Kurz. The whole operation was executed in great secrecy and stealth.

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76 Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des ottomanischen Reiches, 410.
77 Waldburg, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, November 2, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 3.
78 Waldburg, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, November 2, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 3.
79 Auswärtiges Amt, letter to German Embassy (Constantinople), November 3, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 10.
80 Bleda, İmparatorluk çağları Çöküşü, 148.
81 Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene, 555.
82 Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des ottomanischen Reiches, 410. «Was, Sie wissen es noch nicht? Die Paschas sind weg, trotz aller Überwachung!»
84 Dadrian, German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide, 124.
First, Talat Pasha and five of his colleagues were to be picked up at İhsan Namık (Poroy)’s villa in Arnavutköy, where they were invited to a last supper. They were drinking heavily and discussing passionately in the final hours before their departure. The moment as they got on board of the motor boat, is described in Baltzer’s words as follows:

As soon as we tied up at the landing stage, a group of Turkish gentlemen carefully approached us and said the arranged keyword ‹Enver›. It was the former Minister President Talaat Pasha, the former prefect of Istanbul [Bedri Bey] and five other gentlemen. Each of them had only a small suitcase with them. At my invitation they disappeared in the cabin of the yacht and at that moment I saw that they changed their Fez for a European travel hat.

After that Enver Pasha and his colleagues were picked up. Ziya Şakir (Soku) writes that at that moment there was a prearranged electricity blackout in whole Constantinople. On their way to Boyacıköy to collect Cemal Pasha—according to Baltzer’s narrative resembling spy-thrillers—the propeller of the motor boat got caught in the nets of local fishermen. Luckily, the propeller could then shred the net into pieces and got loose. After picking up Cemal, they were brought to the port of Tarabya, where they got on board of the former Russian

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85 There are again inconsistencies in the memoirs. Whereas Baltzer writes that Talat and other were picked up in Moda at 10 pm, Mithat Şükrü, who claims to be present at that night, writes that they were picked up after midnight at the villa of İhsan Namık (Poroy) in Arnavutköy. Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü, 167–68. Also Talat Pasha’s wife remembers that his husband was invited to İhsan Namık on the night he left. Murat Bardakçı, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’ın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 213. See also the discussion in Bardakçı, Enver, 570–571, note 20. The rumor that they were drinking heavily before their departure was mentioned also in the newspapers, Tercüman-ı Hakikat and Sabah, November 5, 1918, cited in Orhan Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalmış Yılı 1918: Zaferi Nihat’den TamTeslimiyete (İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplar, 2000), 97.


87 One of the men who accompanied Enver is said to be the Tunisian Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agent Muhammed Ali al-Hammi. Iqbal Ahmad and Stuart Schaar. “M’hamed Ali: Tuninian Labor Organizer,” in Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, edited by Edmund Burke, III, 191–204 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 195. Gerhard Höpp, “…den Fragen der Raiffeisenorganisation zugewandt…”: Der tunesische Gewerkschaftsführer Muhammad Ali al-Hammi und sein Aufenthalt in Berlin, 1919–1924,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 3 (2001), 90. Murat Bardakçı writes that Enver Pasha was picked up first at Ortaköy, but does not give a specific source. Baltzer writes it was in Arnavutköy. According to rumors which Muhitirin (Birgen) Bey heard, they were all gathered in Enver Pasha’s villa in Kuruçeşme where they were picked up by the Germans. Birgen, İtihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, 552.

88 Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamsı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 201.

torpedo boat R-01. The CUP leaders shipped off to Sevastopol that night leaving the empire behind. Baltzer was later interrogated by the Allied officials, «if he knew, when and how the Turkish ministers shipped out!», but he did not give away his secret.

In many narratives from memoirs to recent works of history, it is said that the CUP leaders left with a German submarine. As we have seen, this is not true, it was the torpedo boat R-01. Probably in processes of sense-making, the more secretive image of submarine found more appeal in conspiracy theories, coffee shop rumors, and urban legends rather than a regular torpedo boat. Therefore, this false gossip reproduced itself again and again from historical accounts to scholarly works. Other newspapers wrote that they were wearing women’s clothes to hide their identity, which also suited the imaginary world of Constantinople rumors.

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On October 26, 1918, Emil Ludwig, a German newspaper correspondent in Constantinople and an author still famous for his psychological biographies, tried to predict the future paths of Talat and Enver in a newspaper column. He believed that Talat had a stronger personality than Enver, the latter being more concerned with social mobility and prestige. For Emil Ludwig, Talat was too strong to simply disappear. While Talat would return, Enver might

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91 There is a confusion in the literature about where the boot was headed in Ukraine. Dankward Rustow wrote that they arrived at Odessa. Rustow, “Enwer Pasha,” 699–700. Murat Bardakçı writes that their destination was Yevpatoria (Gözleve). Bardakçı, Enver, 163. According to Baltzer’s and Willrich’s above cited accounts as well as Dr. Nazım’s and Dr. Rüsuhi’s later testimonies, they arrived at Sevastopol. See: Tunaya, Türkiye’dé Siyasal Partiler III, 567–568, note 110.


93 According to one newspaper, they were even wearing German uniforms before leaving with the famous SMS Loreley. İkdam, November 4, 1918. See also: Kaya, “İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Yurtdışına Kaçışları ve Bunun İstanbul Başındakı Yankıları,” 190; Tunaya, Türkiye’dé Siyasal Partiler III, 567.

94 For a detailed discussion on the issue of submarine see: Tunaya, Türkiye’dé Siyasal Partiler III, 567; Soytürk, “İttihatçı Paşalar Nasıl Yurtdışına Çıkarılıdı?,” 43; Özdemir, Üç Jöntürk’ün Ölümü; Bardakçı, Enver, 570, note 19.

95 Ati, November 5, 1918, quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 98. See also: Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Görüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, I, 314–315.
disappear into oblivion, he believed. Emil Ludwig was not the only one speculating about the future of the Young Turk leaders. At the end of World War I, there were many theories about what would happen to men like Enver and Talat. Their disappearance would cause a major debate in the Ottoman capital.

Before Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas left Constantinople with a German torpedo boot, they left official letters to Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, explaining their «leave of absence» and thanking for his support. The official letters to the Grand Vizier were written in order to avoid accusations of absence without leave or desertion. Besides İzzet Pasha himself within his cabinet fellow CUP comrades Minister of Navy Rauf (Orbay), Minister of Finance Cavid, and Minister of the Interior Fethi (Okyar) were also informed that the Young Turk triumvirate was planning to leave the Ottoman capital, though they were not initiated to its details. Since the CUP leaders communicated their plan to leave the country to the Grand Vizier and some ministers, some of their followers—then and now—tend to downplay the subversive and fugitive nature of their escape. Fellow CUP member Muhittin Bey argues, for instance, that even the simple fact that the Grand Vizier was informed «is enough to assure that they should not be regarded as fugitives». This is, of course, mere apologia. The CUP leadership was running away to save their own neck. Regardless of the knowledge of government officials, they practically became political fugitives from the moment they left the Ottoman borders and waters behind.

Especially, the Minister of Interior Fethi (Okyar) Bey was under fire for letting them go and for not delivering concrete information about their whereabouts. Although himself a prominent CUP member, Fethi was never shy with criticism. He explained to the newspaper Atı, what their escape really meant politically: «Although I am personally a friend of theirs, I have never advised them to escape. Because with their escape they have condemned themselves.»

97 Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene*, 552.
99 Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene*, 552.
Once the news broke out in the capital that the CUP leaders left the empire, «all hell broke loose» (kıyamet koptu) in the words of journalist Ahmet Emin.\(^\text{102}\) It was a political scandal of first order. It was fiercely debated in the Ottoman media-scape, which was liberated only recently from CUP’s censorship and retaliation measures.\(^\text{103}\) Even some CUP members regarded their flight as cowardness. It was argued that they should have stayed and faced the consequences, however fierce and unjust these may come. Only few members with more loyal bounds to Enver and Talat were openly defending them.\(^\text{104}\) The letters to the Grand Vizier were—at least partly—leaked to the press and were debated publicly.\(^\text{105}\) If Talat was promising to face the consequences when the right time comes, as he promised to the Grand Vizier, then this was the time, the newspaper \textit{Vakit} argued.\(^\text{106}\) The same newspaper wrote, if Enver Pasha’s understanding of «serving the homeland» meant corruption, famine, and meaningless sacrifice of hundreds of thousands, then he shall better not promise the Grand Vizier to return back to his duty for the homeland in the future.\(^\text{107}\)

The political crisis unleashed by the Young Turk triumvirate’s disappearance opened a public debate on CUP’s war-time policies. From their allegedly submissive relation to Germany over their despotic and brutal rule to corruption allegations, the CUP was under heavy criticism. The image of CUP seen by the former opposition as a criminal band of thugs, tyrants, and megalomaniacs was now all present in Constantinople newspapers.\(^\text{108}\) They were illustrated by Ali Kemal, the notorious anti-CUP journalist, as «vagabonds, perpetrators, impudants», who came to power «with the help of their ruffians [külhanbeylerinin yardımıyla]», and were subscribed to «Napoleonicism» and «imperialism [cihangirlik, literally world-dominance]».\(^\text{109}\) In a poem mocking Enver Pasha and \textit{Teşkilat-ı Mahsusə}’s adventurous activities abroad, the

\(^{103}\) For detailed surveys of the press coverage see: Koloğlu, \textit{Aydınlıklarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918}, 95–172; Demirbaş, “Liderlerinin Yurt Dışına Kaçması Üzerine İttihat ve Terakki İçinde Meydana Gelen Gelen Tepkiler,” 131–45; Kocaoğlu, \textit{Miütarekede İttihatçılık}, 72–82; Kaya, “İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Yurtdışına Kaçışları ve Bunun İstanbul Basınındaki Yankıları,” 181–201
\(^{104}\) Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene}, 549.
\(^{105}\) Koloğlu, \textit{Aydınlıklarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918}, 104.
\(^{107}\) Ibid.
\(^{108}\) Koloğlu, \textit{Aydınlıklarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918}, 95–172.
\(^{109}\) \textit{Sabah}, November 5, 1918, quoted in Koloğlu, \textit{Aydınlıklarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918}, 98–100.
humor magazine *Diken* asked: «While the enemy was ploughing the homeland / What business in India and China we had?»

Man of letters Cenab Şehabeddin criticized the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* as «rogue and false» and pointed its dubious role of behind the call for *jihad*.

Refik Halit (Karay)’s polemic essay «Gentlemen, Where Are You Going?» most remarkably represents the climax of public resentments against the CUP and the disappearance of its leaders:

O bloody minded Pashas with clubs in hands and sabers in belts, where are you going from rooftop to rooftop?

[…] You weren’t ministers, you ruled as overlords. You weren’t directors, you ruled as ringleaders. You weren’t governors, you ruled as provost marshals. You ran rings around swashbucklers. You made tyrants marvel you. […]

[…] You weren’t satisfied with grand vizierates, high commands, ministries. Those greedy to become sultans, you almost had the Friday prayers in Damascus and Aleppo called on your names and minted coins with your names on them… You had the gallantry, you had the chivalry, you had the bragging, the swaggery and the arrogancy, you had it all… Now, where are you going like a sneaky weasel from roof to roof?

Yes, where are they going? These parvenus, who reached grand vizierships with one step from the neighborhood coffee houses, ministries after one leap from the tavern benches, governorships with single move from the rowdy barracks, where are they going?

The political scandal caused by their disappearance brought the end of İzzet Pasha’s cabinet on November 9. The departure of the CUP leaders from Constantinople meant the beginning of the end of the CUP. The Committee organization and their political legacy, however, could not simply go away overnight. Despite all criticisms in the newspapers, Cenab Şehabeddin called attention to the fact that

Un fortunately, the Unionist [*İttihatçıl*] clubs absorbed almost entirely the homeland’s less-liter ate segments. The police are Unionist, the soldiers are Unionist, the departments are Unionist, everybody is Unionist.

Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha immediately requested from the German Chancellor in a letter written on November 6 and delivered on November 11, the arrest and deportation of Enver, Talat, Cemal, Bahaeddin Şakir, Nazım, Azmi, and Bedri. The Grand Vizier warned

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113 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to the Auswärtiges Amt, November 19, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 276.
114 Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene*, 556.
Germany not to deliver the «coup de grâce» to its ally by protecting these men.116 The Grand Vizier even told German diplomats that because of their assistance in exfiltrating the CUP leaders, the German military officials in Constantinople might be held ransom until the CUP leaders are handed over.117 But the German Government responded that the return of Enver and Talat was «out-of-question» and the whereabouts of the others was not known to the German officials.118 Internal documents from the Auswärtiges Amt illustrate a dispute about this fait accompli: «We disapprove entirely if local German military authorities have helped Dr. Nasim, Bahaaeddin, and Djemal escape that Bedri and Azmi are also compromised in the Armenians or Arab Question was not known here.»119

Since the extradition agreement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire of January 11, 1917, excluded political reasons, the Grand Vizier’s proposal was based also on claims that these men had been involved in enrichment and corruption.120 In response to the allegations by the Ottoman Ambassador Rufat Pasha that Talat and others were involved in corruption and self-enrichment, Foreign Minister Wilhelm Heinrich Solf is quoted as saying that «Talaat Pasha is the most honest man in the world».121 After it became clear that Talat and Enver were untouchable and the latter perhaps not even in Germany, the Ottoman Embassy concentrated its efforts on the arrest of the remaining fugitives, Cemal Pasha, Dr. Nazım, Bedri Bey, Azmi Bey, and Bahaaeddin Şakir. Therefore, these men left Berlin. Most of them went to Munich, but sooner or later returned back to Berlin.122 There were also again and again false rumors in newspapers that Bahaaeddin Şakir was arrested or similar stories.123

116 Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet (Constantinople), letter to the Chancellor (Berlin), November 6, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 209–11.
118 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), February 26, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 162.
119 Freiherr Hilmar von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen, letter (Berlin) to German Embassy (Constantinople), November 12, 1918, ZMO, NGH 07-03, 58.
120 PA-AA, R 13758, 304–5.
121 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 22. See also: Omer Kiazim, Angora et Berlin: Le complot germano-kémaliste contre le Traité de Versailles (Paris: L’Édition Universelle, 1922), 95.
122 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), November 29, 1918, TTK, EP 1-84, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 80; Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 27.
123 BOA.DH, UM.2.Şb.66.8. When in May 1919, German semi-official newspapers reproduced a false news from a foreign agency that Talat Pasha had returned to Constantinople and was immediately arrested, the Berlin Neuste Nachrichten corrected these empty claims by stating that Talat Pasha was still in Berlin. A
According to information the Auswärtiges Amt received from Cosswa Anckarsvärd, the Swedish Ambassador and the protective power of German interests in Constantinople, the persecution of Talat and Enver would rather «come to nothing» (im Sande verlaufen), but Bahaeddin Şakir, Nazım, Cemal, Bedri, and Azmi will get a «short shrift» (kurzen Prozeß machen).124 There is especially rich evidence on Ottoman demands to extradite Bahaeddin Şakir and Cemal Azmi Bey.125

The German officials agreed to cooperate on the extradition of the remaining fugitive leaders, but requested detailed legal documentation from Constantinople.126 This was a promise on the paper and certainly a stalling tactic. There is no indication what so ever that the German state departments were involved in proactive investigation measures to find the fugitive Young Turks. German officials simply claimed that the whereabouts of these men were not known to German officialdom.127 Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha countered that he himself passed by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey and Azmi Bey, while he was promenading on the Herkulesbrücke the day before, implying that these men were walking freely in the middle of Berlin.128 The Auswärtiges Amt talked its way out by claiming that the ambassador’s former information that Cemal Pasha was residing in Bavaria—which he actually was—misled the police on a wrong trail. The Germans accused the Ottoman Government for not delivering any solid documentation in the last four months for this otherwise very «abnormal» prosecution.129 Rıfat Pasha had to admit that the communication with the Sublime Porte was in fact problematic, but insisted that the extradition agreement could be interpreted as such to arrest these men without a prior documentation dispatched.130 German diplomats closed the debate

124 Weitz, report (Berlin), April 5, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 253.
125 BOA.HR.HMŞ.ISO.125.78; BOA.HMŞ.ISO.125.77.
126 Auswärtiges Amt, report to the Minister of Interior, November 28, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 83. See also Wolff’s Telegraphische Büro, December 9, 1918, first evening issue, no. 3627.
127 Auswärtiges Amt, note verbale to the Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha (Berlin), March 4, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 221–22. See also: BOA.HR.SYS.2320.7.
128 Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha, note verbale to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), April 17, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 288.
129 Auswärtiges Amt, note verbale to Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha (Berlin), April 30, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 286–87.
130 Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha, note verbale to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), April 30, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 284–85.
by mentioning passed possibilities to send the documents, for instance by the ship Akdeniz, which arrived at Hamburg at the beginning of last April.\textsuperscript{131} Rıfat Pasha was given the blame by the Ottoman Government for not effectively working for the extradition of the fugitive ministers in Berlin and was ordered back to Constantinople.\textsuperscript{132} After Rıfat Pasha’s departure, the Ottoman Embassy was closed.\textsuperscript{133}

Meanwhile, a serious witch-hunt was set on course in Ottoman Turkey persecuting and prosecuting notorious CUP members.\textsuperscript{134} The CUP was held responsible not only for the war-crimes, but also for the recent post-armistice disorder in the disputed provinces.\textsuperscript{135} The Acting Grand Vizier and Sheikh-ul-Islam Mustafa Sabri Efendi was reported in British report as follows:

He spoke about Public Security. He said that there were certain people who wished to disturb it; that these people belonged to that class which was Committee of Union and Progress – coloured; that they were bad people; that they had opposed the Delegation to Paris desiring to be represented thereon, and that they were attempting to influence the Sultan. He added that these people must be got rid of and that the Government would like to be able to count on the Allied Authorities to help them.\textsuperscript{136}

There was also certain ambition on behalf of the Entente to put the CUP leaders on trial, but the Armenian Question had already lost its public centrality.\textsuperscript{137} On February 3, 1920, the Allies submitted a list of 890 war-criminals to the German Government for the Leipzig tribunals. This original list included the names of nine fugitive CUP leaders associated with Armenian massacres, but these names were later removed by the British.\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] Auswärtiges Amt, note verbale to Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha (Berlin), June 27, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 294–95.
\item[132] Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 22.
\item[133] Otto Göppert, internal correspondance, July 30, 1919, PA-AA, R 1736.
\item[135] Otto Göppert, internal correspondance, July 30, 1919, PA-AA, R 1736.
\item[137] When Arthur Balfour proposed to Georges Clemenceau to put Talat Pasha on trial in a conversation on December 2, 1918, Clemenceau ignored this since he believed that German and Austrian culprits were more important. Gary Jonathan Bass, \textit{Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 86, 108.
\end{footnotes}
Not only in Leipzig but also in Constantinople, Military Tribunals of 1919 and 1920 were prosecuting the CUP leaders and their accomplices. Immediately after the disappearance of the CUP leaders, the war-time cabinets of Said Halim Pasha and Talat Pasha were sent to trial. Later in the spring of 1919 many prominent CUP members were arrested and detained at the political prison Bekirağa Bölüğü. Meanwhile, a commission in Beirut issued in February 25, 1919, an arrest warrant for Cemal Pasha for his crimes during the war. The court hearings of the Military Tribunals published by then in Constantinople newspapers remain an important source that continue to reveal the facts and rumors about CUP’s shadowy and brutal businesses. At the same time, the unashamed zeal of the anti-CUP politicians and the Allied occupation forces behind the process created a disputed legacy of the tribunals. Anyhow, the fugitive CUP leaders and their fellow men in exile were all sentenced to death penalty in absentia by the Military Tribunal, although never to be legally executed. Until the assassination of Talat in March 15, 1921, the CUP leaders would enjoy a relatively safe exile in Germany far away from their past sins.

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140 BOA.HR.SYS.2461.6.

141 Taylan Sorgun, Miitareke Dönemi ve Bekirağa Bölüğü (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1998).

142 PA-AA, R 13805, 194.


Sometime in mid-November 1918, Ottoman deputy Emir Shakib Arslan arrived at the port of Nikolayev at the Black Sea. He was coming from Berlin and had an outright troublesome journey behind him. Arslan was sent to Berlin on behalf of Enver Pasha on a diplomatic mission last June, negotiating with the Germans on matters related to the Caucasus question. In early October, Enver sent a ciphered telegraph to Shakib Arslan in Berlin, in which Enver advised Arslan to leave Germany and return to Constantinople before the armistice.¹ When Arslan was on his way back to Constantinople on October 15, he was taken out of the train at Oderberg and mistakenly detained. Later the Auswärtiges Amt ordered to release him and formally apologized.² After an odyssey via Constanta and Odessa Arslan arrived at Nikolayev. From there he was planning to go to Constantinople by ship. At the harbor, he saw a bunch of men in white turbans leaving a German vessel. These were Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa activists leaving the Ottoman Empire before the arrival of the Entente. Among them there was Sharif Salih from Tunisia³ and Arslan’s future collaborators Abdel Aziz Shawish⁴ and Dr. Ahmad Fuad⁵ from Egypt as well as more than a dozen other Tunisian and Egyptian activists. Instead of going back to Tunisia and Egypt to start resistance movements, as long planned, these men were going to Germany and Switzerland. Having worked for their anticolonial cause

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² Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), wire to Border Control (Oderberg), 19. Oktober 1918, PA-AA, R 13812, 149.
⁴ Abdel Aziz Shawish (in Arabic: Shavish, Shavis, Javish or Javis; in Turkish: Çavuş or Çavuş) was an Egyptian of Moroccan origin. He had studied at the Azhar University in Cairo and was a Professor of Arabic Language at Oxford University. He played an important role in German-Ottoman propaganda campaign. The British Intelligence was highly paranoid of his activities. Despite his notoriety in pan-Islamic circles of the Great War era, there is no academic study devoted to his political career. For some valuable biographical information see: Gerhard Höpp, Texte aus der Fremde: Arabische politische Publizistik in Deutschland 1896–1945, eine Bibliographie (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 2000), 84–86. See also: Mustafa Balcıoğlu, “Mısır’lı Teşkilat-ı Mahsusacı Abdülaziz Çavuş’un Almancı Günleri,” in Teşkilat-ı Mahsusadan Cumhuriyet’e, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Asıl Yayıncılık, 2004).
⁵ For some basic biographical information see: Höpp, Texte aus der Fremde, 41.
within the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, the Young Turk regime’s propaganda and unconventional warfare apparatus, they were now turning to a different kind of activism. From the security of exile, they were hoping to continue their struggle for the independence of Egypt and Tunisia along Wilson’s principles. From these men Arslan learned that Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas had secretly left the Ottoman Empire after the armistice was concluded.6

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The Armistice of Mudros between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente was signed on October 30.7 Although the armistice did not meet with reactions of tremendous dislike and betrayal as elsewhere among the populations of the Central Powers, the diplomatic ambiguity embedded into the armistice opened up the possibility for the Allies to occupy strategic positions as well as any other Ottoman territory if «disorder» or «threat» were to occur.8 Although the CUP leaders disappeared mostly because they feared their own fate at the hands of the Entente, one cannot deny that these men saw themselves also in a self-imposed patriotic duty. The Young Turk regime could not easily accept the empire’s doomed fate at hands of the Entente. The collective ideology of the CUP, claiming to be destined to save the empire by any means, hindered the possibility for a serious processing of their defeat and crimes. They had proven themselves over the last ten years as sore losers, unable to accept political defeat. Every time they had lost politically, they turned to coercive or subversive measures to turn the table.

In the face of the question, whether to flight or fight, the Young Turks decided for both. Before their rule was over, they spent the power they still possessed in their best interest. Consequently, before their departure they invested their para-official power to prepare the

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6 Arslan and these Arab activists travelled via Russia and Germany to Switzerland, where they first settled. Later Arslan, Shawish, and Dr. Ahmad Fuad would move to Munich and then to Berlin. Shakib Arslan, *Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa*, 109–10; Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., *İttihatçı'nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmuş Bazı Kararlar* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 471–72.


8 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire and the Armistice of Mudros,” in *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War 1918*, ed. Peter H. Liddle and Hugh Cecil (London: Leo Cooper, 1998), 266–75. See also: Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, February 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 198.
fight against the armistice. Just as they had engineered their rise to power, they would once again rely on political engineering to safeguard their claim to power. In their mindset, this resistance movement would not only save the empire from occupation and disintegration, but serve the usurpation of the CUP in Ottoman Turkey. It was primarily Enver Pasha that proposed the idea of continued struggle after the armistice. Enver appears from the onset on to be have been vocal about leaving the country (or at least the capital) before the arrival of the Allies. He had even officially asked for permission to leave for Europe, which was met with great criticism in the parliament.9 Enver was talking openly also to his German friends about his plans to lead a guerrilla war against the occupation from the Ottoman hinterlands. General von Seeckt wrote to his wife in a letter after a dinner with Enver in Constantinople:

> He must go away, if a completely new regime comes here and especially if the English become the overlords here. He has too many enemies. Where he would go, he doesn’t know yet. He wants to stay in the country, but it will be difficult and even as a superior brigand chief (als besserer Räuberhauptmann) it is not advisable.10

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The CUP’s plans for resistance were threefold. First and foremost, the CUP leaders Enver, Talat, and Cemal gave their followers orders to go underground and start organizing armed resistance networks in Ottoman Turkey. Second, Enver Pasha ordered the armies in the Caucasus, which were under the command of his family «clan» members to ignore demobilization orders and continue the struggle by creating a new base in Azerbaijan. Third, the CUP, especially Enver again, ordered their agents to give their propaganda activities in the Ottoman Arab provinces and in the connected Muslim world a final boost by calling for solidarity with the Ottoman Empire and continuing the holy war against the empire’s enemies.

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10 Hans von Seeckt, letter (Constantinopel) to Dorothee von Seeckt (Germany), October 20, 1918, BA-MA, N247/218, 173, 174b. See also von Seeckt’s diary entry from October 10, 1918, BA-MA, N247/17, 27.
In his memoir, Lieutenant Colonel of the Cavalry (Süvari Yarbay) Hüsamettin (Ertürk) from the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa¹¹ tells that a secret meeting took place at the villa of Enver in Küruçeşme sometime in October.¹² Like many memoirs, Hüsamettin’s story seems to mix his recollection of the events with retrospective insights and motivations, but his narrative of this meeting illustrates the political maneuvers the Young Turk leaders initiated before their disappearance.¹³ Hüsamettin tells that Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha, and Kara Kemal were present at this meeting. There is reason to believe that the underground branches of the CUP were organized in a patronage system with loyalty ties to a certain patron.¹⁴ Kara Kemal belonged to Talat’s followers within the CUP and he was colloquially called the «küçük (little) efendi», while Talat the «büyük (great) efendi». Kara Kemal had served as Minister of the Commissaries in the last war cabinet and he was the mafia-like patron of the commerce guilds.¹⁵ Before leaving Turkey, Talat ordered Kara Kemal to organize an underground resistance network of the CUP called Karakol Cemiyeti (the Sentinel Society) in Constantinople.¹⁶ The mission of the Karakol was later formulated in the article 4 of their program as follows:

The activities of Karakol inside the country are confined to protect and, where nonexistent, establish national unity and territorial integrity by legitimate means, behind the scenes. When faced with oppressors of freedom and justice, however, we shall resort to

¹¹ By then the official name of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was the Office of Eastern Affairs (Umur-i Şarkiye Dairesi). For the sake of convenience, I will stick to the term Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.
¹³ I have the feeling that Hüsammetin’s account, or the words of his editor Samih Nafiz Tansu is too predictive and consecutive about the events that unfolded. Nevertheless, he seems to be in duty of preparing the official closure of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and possibly its reorganization as an underground resistance network after the armistice. On the rank and position of Hüsamettin Bey in the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and contradictory accounts in his memoirs and misguided interpretations in the literature, see the excellent survey by Polat Safi, ”History in the Trench: The Ottoman Special Organization – Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Literature,” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 1 (2012): 98–100. See also similar remarks by Criss on the original manuscript of Hüsamettin in Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), note 21.
¹⁴ Criss writes that Talat, Enver, and Cemal Pashas had each their own clandestine network. Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 96–97.
¹⁵ Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 97.
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revolutionary ways. We shall fight and die as free men rather than live as prisoners in
shame.17

The motto of the Karakol was first considered to be «The General Revolution of Asia against
European Capitalism and Imperialism» (Avrupa Kapitalizm ve Emperyalizmi Aleyhine Asya
İhtilal-i Umumisi), but it was then changed to «It Guards the Human Rights and the Na-
tional Independence» (Hukuk-ı Beşer ve İstiklal-i Milliyi Muhaba Eder), to underline its
primary national orientation.18

While Talat Pasha instructed Kara Kemal at one corner of the room, Hüsamettin was in-
structed by Enver Pasha to take charge of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.19 Still today, there is a lot
of mystery surrounding the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Retrospectively, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa became
the embodiment of all the shadowy aspects of Young Turk politics—whether actual or ac-
cused.20 Especially, the role of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the Armenian massacres muddies the
waters, although the use of some semi-official paramilitary bands in the massacres is undeni-
able.21 The private papers of Talat do not remove the ambiguity either. Talat wrote in a letter
to Enver in July 1919:

They accuse our friends [from the CUP who were detained by the British in Malta]
because of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Allegedly [Gûya, my emphasis] it was the Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa that did all the Armenian and Greek deportations and other evils. And it [i.e.

17 Quoted in Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 100.
18 Aslan, “Yeni Belgeler Işığında Karakol Cemiyeti, Uşak Kongresi ve Karakol Cemiyeti’nin Bolsheviklerle
Yaptığı Anlaşma,” 36
19 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 165.
20 On the conflicting interpretations of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the literature see: Safi, “History in the Trench,”
89–106.
21 The role attributed to the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the Armenian Genocide scholarship is very prominent. See
for instance: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide During
the First World War,” in Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and
Australia during the Two World Wars, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 50–82. For a recent take
based on new Ottoman archival sources, see: Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The
Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleaning in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2012). Other scholars who are closer to the Turkish position reject that Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was responsible for
the extermination of Armenians and see it strictly as a counterinsurgency force. See for instance: Guenter
Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press, 2005), 82–88; Edward J. Erickson, Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency (New York:
Palgrave, 2013); Ahmet Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-i Şarkıyye Dairesi) Taribi (İstanbul: Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014). Breaking the ranks, genocide scholar Hilmar Kaiser rejects the notion of
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa as «a poor man’s SS» in Emine Kart, “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated 1915
Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, March 22, 2009, and argues against a coordinated operation of Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa in the mass killings in Diyarbekir province, despite showing that some rogue Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa
militants and similar set of paramilitary bands took part in the massacres. Hilmar Kaiser, The Extermination of
Armenians in the Diyarbekir Region (İstanbul: İstanbu Bilgi University Press, 2014), 426–27.
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Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was subjected allegedly [tabi’imiz] to the Central Committee of the [Committee of] Union and Progress.22

In its core Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was an «unconventional warfare organization» working in the intersection of the Ottoman army and the CUP regime and within and beyond Ottoman territories assigned to special paramilitary operations, clandestine networking, and propaganda activities.23 In the meeting back in Kuruceşme, Hüsamettin Bey remembers Enver’s instructions to him as follows:

We are soon leaving the country. The reason is, it is certain that the Armistice will first and foremost demand us from the Ottoman State. But they will not take away our organization, our men, and more importantly our ideals. We find solace in this. […]

[…] we will leave for Russia with a submarine via Odessa. I will go the Caucasus, then visit Moscow. Our friends will go to Berlin. Our struggle against the Entente will continue. I hope to receive help from Moscow. The Bolsheviks are enemies of these capitalist and victorious states. They would support us. After Moscow, I will return to the Caucasus again. […]

[…] Now the second phase of this World War is about to begin. You remember, we had won the Balkan War also in its second phase!

Maybe this time it might take longer and it might be more sorrowful, but they will not be able to destroy this state. […] You will officially dissolve the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa but, in reality, this organization will never cease to exist.24

Indeed, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa did not seize to exist with the armistice, but went underground and contributed to the Anatolian resistance movement.25 On November 15, Hüsamettin was officially commissioned by the Minister of War for the liquidation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.26

It was therefore in the Caucasus, where Enver Pasha saw his near future. Enver explained in a letter to his uncle Halil (Kut) Pasha that he «would soon get bored of unemployment» and thus he made plans to leave for Azerbaijan, for which he sent a large amount of money in late

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22 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed. Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hüusi Yazızmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 157.
26 On the liquidation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa see: Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi, 18–26.
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October to his uncle’s army in Transcaucasia. Enver asked both Halil Pasha and his brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha to give reports about the situation in Azerbaijan. Halil Pasha’s response was rather disillusioning:

I am sure that the people here will not be able to serve the purpose and accomplish anything without our government’s mediation and not even with our soldiers accompanying them. Tomorrow when other powerful governments will have influence here, the people who embraced us by claiming that we are their kin will first turn their back on us. Unless there is a personal urgency on your behalf, I do not approve that you come to Azerbaijan area to work here by your own will.

But Enver would choose to ignore these remarks. In Crimea, on his way to the Caucasus, Enver was hoping to find support from Cafer Seydahmet (Kırımer) Bey’s connections to the Crimean People’s Republic—in Enver’s words: the «Islamic Republic» of Crimea. It was later rumored that Enver Pasha received 45,000 Lira in the name of the Crimean Republic. Hüsamettin recalls in his memoir that secret instructions were delivered via agents to Enver’s uncle Halil Pasha and brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha in Azerbaijan, and to Çerkes Yusuf İzzet Pasha in Dagestan. Regardless of the official orders coming from the Ottoman capital, the battalions in Erzurum and in the Caucasus were not to be demobilized or disarmed.

One thing that calls for attention is that when Talat and Enver gave orders to Kara Kemal and Hüsamettin, they were no more officially in power within the Ottoman officialdom. They had no more the mandate of the government or that of the Sultan. But in the eyes of their fellow committee men such as Kara Kemal and Hüsamettin as well as in their own self-esteem, they were distinctively qualified to represent the nation, the state, and the empire. This para-official nature of their politics constituted the ambiguity of CUP’s power in the eyes of its followers as well as their enemies. They did not need to be in office to have power

27 Enver Pasha (Constantinople), letter to Halil Pasha (Gyumri/Gümrü), October 8, 1918, quoted in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Aya’ya (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 446.
28 Halil Pasha, letter (Gyumri/Gümrü) to Enver Pasha (Constantinople), October 10, 1918, quoted in Aydemir, Enver Paşa, III, 443–445.
30 For Ottoman Empire’s relations to the Crimean Republic see: Hakan Kırmılı, “Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, 1918–21,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 4 (1998): 204–7.
or to constitute a paramilitary force and pseudo-governmental polity. As Enver revealed to Hüsamettin, the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was also initiated to these plans and would support the resistance behind the curtains. The Grand Vizier was indeed trusted with overseeing the implementation of CUP’s contingency plans, but did not necessarily support such risky undertakings. Anyhow, the mention of Grand Vizier’s complicity was rather an internal certification attempt, blurring the lines between the CUP and the Ottoman officialdom. The CUP’s contingency plans were an open secret and once again a fait accompli. In his letter of leave to Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, Enver Pasha openly declared that he was planning to go to the Caucasus and work there for «Muslim independence».

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During the war, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa had been involved in missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, and Egypt in French and British North Africa; Iran, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and India in the British East, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Crimea, Bukhara, and Khiva in Russia, and Rumelia in Greece. Therefore at the end of the war, there was a large group of Muslim and Arab activists residing at the Ottoman capital. They were either brought, invited, or recruited by the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. They were accommodated in the medreses of the Fatih district. There were nationalist intellectuals, mujahidin, sheikhs, tribal chieftains, and clerics among them—all waiting to be deployed to Muslim lands to lead anticolonial resistance and pan-Islamic propaganda activities. The most famous of them was the Libyan Sheikh Ahmed al-Sharif al-Senussi, who was brought from Tunisia with a German submarine. The Arab activists in Constantinople were to be transported back to their home countries, before the arrival of the Entente, as Enver ordered to Hüsamettin. For this task German military command agreed to provide a submarine. Most of them, however, fled to German or Swiss exile,

32 This ambiguity led many people to see the origins of the Turkish «deep state» (derin devlet) reaching back to the CUP. For a discussion of this deep state continuities see: Ryan Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure Outlaw’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish ‘Deep State’,” Past & Present, no. 206 (2010): 121–44.
36 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 165.
since their homelands were all occupied by the Entente. Afghan liaison officers working with the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* against the British were also sent in November to Germany. Similarly, Iranian nationalists from the «Turkish-Iranian Muslim Union» had to leave the Ottoman capital and sent back to Iran. «All these men served our Empire,» as Enver explained to Hüsamettin, and added that «they will do it in the future as well!» Serving Islam meant serving the Empire. Further directives were also delivered to Commander-in-Chief of the Africa Groups in Tripoli, Prince Osman Fuad Efendi, not to surrender under any condition. «Because,» as Enver concluded, «the holy war will continue!» It is even rumored that Enver himself considered to go to Libya instead of Caucasus to help the anticolonial struggle there, where his brother Nuri Pasha had been active during the war and Enver himself during the Italian-Ottoman War in 1911. Enver gave Hüsamettin Bey one last key information about the reorganization of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*:

> From now on, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s name will be ‹General Revolutionary Organization of the Muslim World› *Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı*. Our communication will always circulate under this title. You are the Chief of the Istanbul Branch of this organization. I am the founder, and I select you. Soon the central board of this organization will meet in Berlin. I give you the names of the board members. These are Talat Pasha, Doctor Bahaeddin Şakir, and Nazım Bey. Allah may help you!

If Hüsamettin’s account is not only based on retrospective reimagination, the «General Revolutionary Organization of the Muslim World» was nothing but the prototype of the «Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies», which the CUP leaders later found in their exile years as their new political organization. There is reason to believe that CUP’s political reorganization in the aftermath of World War I was premediated and prepared before they left Constantinople, because it was in its core the continuation of existing policies and repertoires.

There is an organic connection between the Young Turk imperialism in World War I, its unconventional warfare organization embodied in the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, and the CUP’s

38 Minister of War, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt, April 23, 1919, PA-AA, R 13759, 346.
39 Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 166–67. «Çünkü cihad-ı mukaddes devam edecektir!»
41 Peculiarly, Cemal Pasha—even though present in the room—was not declared a board member. Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 168.
42 In fact, elsewhere in his memoir Hüsamettin uses the General Revolutionary Organization of the Muslim World as synonymous to Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 161.
transnational anticolonial activities and support for national resistance struggles after the armistice. Muslim transnationalism was an important part of the continuation of CUP’s activities from empire to exile. Contrary to common wisdom, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa represented rather Muslim transnationalism than Turkish nationalism. The transnational dimension of the existing policies of anticolonial resistance and pan-Islamic propaganda enabled the Young Turk leaders to hold on to their political agenda, even well after losing their imperial positions and status as state actors. These established networks and ideas of Muslim nationalist partisanship transcended the structural boundaries of state, nation, and empire, and became the official cause of their transnational politics. In his official report about the official liquidation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Hüsamettin wrote:

> After the Armistice it would not have been possible [otherwise] to see that the outcry and activity of the whole Muslim world and Muslim countries were directed against the proposals of the Europeans for the Ottoman State. The time and efforts spent for this purpose show not only, what a right move the foundation of this department [i.e. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa] has been, but will herald and demonstrate the resolute state of affairs of the Ottoman State and the Muslim world in the upcoming episodes in a very near future.43

These anticolonial and Muslim nationalist resistance plans were voiced mostly by Enver Pasha and his associates.44 These ideas of Enver that «the second phase of this World War is about to begin» or that «the holy war will continue» or that the «struggle against the Entente will continue» are based on Hüsamettin Bey’s recollection, thus questionable to a certain degree in their wording. Nonetheless, they are in accordance with Enver’s general political ideology and his framing of political issues before, during, and after World War I. Even as early as August 1914, three months before the declaration of the Ottoman jihad of 1914, Enver believed that

> War with England is now within the realm of possibilities. Contact [the local Arab leaders]. Since such a war would be a holy war [böyle bir harb mukaddes olacağını] ... it will definitely be pertinent to rally the Muslim population ... in [neighboring] Iran under Russian and English rule to revolution. […] I invite everyone to come to the state’s defence in this war [in which] Muslims will rise up [and] end Christian rule over Muslim peoples.45

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43 Quoted in Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umut-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi, 22.
44 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992), 13.
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Four years later in October 1918, this anticipated «holy war» had still not taken hold in the Muslim lands ruled by Britain, France, and Russia. Therefore, the jihad of 1914 has been trivialized as nothing but hot air ever since.46 However, this seems not to have bothered Enver’s optimism about the rise of anticolonial Muslim nationalism.47 In 1920, as we will see in later chapters, Enver would still claim: «Let’s see, what Allah will bring upon us. Is there hope for the future? The World War did not end yet. No matter what happens, I am sure it will end with the redemption of Islam.»48 There is a consistency in Enver’s idea of anticolonial Muslim nationalist struggle from 1914 (or even as early as 1911) to early 1920s.49 The former imperial schemes were now to be formulated as post-imperial, anticolonial, and transnational politics.

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These three countermeasures, paramilitary resistance networks, continued military struggle in the imperial shatter-zones, and anticolonial Muslim nationalist agitation, were not novel initiatives, but rather reorganization and reformulation of existing imperial policies and wartime practices as transnational contentious politics. A British memorandum in January 1920 saw strong continuities of CUP’s policies and influence inside and outside Ottoman Turkey—of course, not without exaggerating:

> It is fair to assume that the Committee of Union and Progress in one form or another will continue to control Turkish politics and the Sultan and his Government. Their policy is imperialistic both at home and abroad; it definitely against any form of foreign interference (whether British or French). At home their policy is that of a centralised bureaucracy and of Turkification, so far as the subject races of Turkey are concerned. As regards foreign policy they employ two weapons, (a) Panislamism (religious); (b) Panturanianism (secular and nationalist). […] Both are employed according to circumstances against the Christian rulers of Mohammedan countries and all who threaten Turkish independence. […]

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46 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 6.
48 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım (Orbay) Bey, September 23, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 57.
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The Committee’s strength is the strength of these two ideas. These ideas cannot be controlled by the physical power of the Allies nor can the Allies physically control the Committee. All the members and its organization are not known. Its ramifications are wide.50

Although imperial paranoias were exaggerating the CUP’s influence on the Government and the Sultan, the overall assessment was rather accurate. The CUP was following an «imperialistic» policy that was directed against «Christian rulers» of the Muslim world. The CUP was an intangible movement that could not be «controlled» by physical power. Indeed, the Young Turk model would soon become the viral contentious repertoire and zeitgeist of anticolonial Muslim uprisings in the post-war Middle East.51 A British Cabinet Paper claimed after the end of the war:

The C.U.P., in fact, have [sic] not given up the game. The war may lead to the opening of the Straits and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. But it has immensely weakened the orderly forces of civilization, and loosened the hold of Europe over large areas of the Moslem world. There may still be room in this World for Enver.52

The CUP’s contingency plans and initiatives for armed resistance to the armistice were to fall on fertile ground especially in Ottoman Turkey. A National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) started in Anatolia that successfully challenged the armistice settlement.53 There were several factors that contributed to the rise of a resistance movement in Ottoman Turkey. A certain «culture of paramilitarism» had emerged in Anatolia, in most cases brought in by Muslim immigrants persecuted from the Balkans and Caucasus, further complicating the already existing inter-communal conflicts of Anatolia.54 Armed resistance had a special place also in the space of

53 The history of the National Struggle or the Turkish War of Independence, as it has been retrospectively named is a research area still dominated by Turkish popular-nationalist or official-national historiographies. The most comprehensive study in English language is also very much close to its Turkish counterparts, Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918–1923: A Documentary Study, 5 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2002). For a great introductory survey see: Hasan Kayali, “The Struggle for Independence,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World, vol. 4, ed. Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 112–46.
experience of the Young Turk generation, which were shaped by the experience of insurgency and counterinsurgency as well as foreign intervention and intercommunal violence in Macedonia with brutal lessons learnt and implemented during the war years in Anatolia. The recruitment of criminals from prisons, tribal bands, and sectarian orders to form irregular bands and local militias had further contributed to paramilitarization of larger segments of Anatolian Muslims at the end of the war, especially in rural regions of intercommunal diversity. The problem of desertion whereby vast numbers of soldiers began to make a living out of brigandage and plunder would ironically benefit the upcoming post-war resistance movement both by offering some—more or less willing—manpower to the resistance and by troubling the occupation forces. Although, Anatolia was now mostly homogenized after the persecution of Ottoman Christians, there were still areas of intercommunal contestation, which were at this «Wilsonian moment» perceived as a threat by the Muslim nationalist segments of the society. Especially in areas with large Greek and Armenian populations one observes the mushrooming of local committees of the «National Defense League» (Müdafaa-i Millîye Cemiyeti), i.e. CUP-fashioned civil societies of intercommunal vigilantism, racketeering, and paramilitary mobilization. Although there was no single initiator of the Anatolian resistance, the CUP’s underground networks as well as its tangible and intangible political legacy played a major role in the organization and mobilization of a nation-wide resistance

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movement. Reports would flood the British occupation forces claiming that the National Struggle «appears to be directed by agents of the C.U.P.»

To be sure, paramilitary resistance to the armistice regime was not genuine for Ottoman Turkey. For instance, in Germany the resistance option was also a matter of discussion, but rather more publicly debated. Paramilitary violence in the aftermath of World War I, especially in the contested and lost territories of Central and Eastern Europe, was a major phenomenon. There was indeed a «mobilizing power of defeat» in these regions. But nowhere else was the transformation of imperial military warfare structures to national resistance networks as seamless and successful as in the case of Young Turks. Erik Zürcher writes:

One of the most amazing episodes in the history of the Young Turks is the resilience they showed after the crushing Ottoman defeat in World War I. A significant number of officers and party bosses were determined to resist the attempts of the victorious Entente to dismember the country. [...] The point is that from the moment the armistice was concluded the Young Turks found the energy and the determination to continue the struggle. This is something unheard of in any of the other defeated countries of World War I.

The events unfolded with the armistice devastated the hopes of most of the Ottoman Muslims for a just settlement with the Allies. The consequences of the armistice resulting in occupation and the harsh persecution of the CUP members throughout Ottoman Turkey would later justify in the eyes of many the decision of the Young Turk leaders to have left

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59 In the historiography of the Turkish War of Independence there is a tiresome debate regarding who initiated the resistance movement. The standard Kemalist narrative gives Mustafa Kemal ( Atatürk) the single agency, which has been criticized as early as by other leaders of the resistance movement. Leftist Kemalists romanticize the social mobilization of the popular masses and lower classes as a true people’s revolution. Given the role played by military and civil elites, this is a problematic generalization. Conservative revisionist authors argue that Sultan Vahideddin was the mastermind behind Mustafa Kemal’s movement, in which the former was later betrayed by the latter. The Sultan’s «hidden hand» is rather wishful-thinking, but conservative authors are correct in underlining the the symbolic power of Sultanate and Caliphate as well as Islam in the social mobilization in Anatolia. Post-nationalist and post-Kemalist historians underline the role of the CUP behind Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara government and understand the mobilization of collective action as a result of conflicts and coalitions between central and local power holders.


the empire. In an ironic way, history would prove their anxieties and ambitions right. The Allied occupation of Constantinople and the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia would give the Young Turks credit and opportunity once again to save the day.\textsuperscript{65} The occupation of Constantinople, which included also Greek forces, was celebrated by the Ottoman Greek masses, which in return resulted in the resentments of the Muslim population of the capital.\textsuperscript{66} The whole social system of Constantinople and also of Anatolia collapsed due to the economic afterpains of war. With the persecution of the CUP’s racketeering apparatus without an instant substitute in effective governance, general lawlessness and disorder emerged in the cities.\textsuperscript{67} A British Intelligence report from Switzerland in June 1919, quotes the former Minister of Justice Necmettin Molla (Kocataş) saying:

\begin{quote}
The Allies have perhaps rendered us a service by deciding upon the partition Turkey and by allowing the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. These measures will contribute to the awakening of the Muslim world. We shall defend ourselves by every means in our power and are now organizing action.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

Also Vice-Admiral Calthorpe reported to London from Constantinople that «the Greek occupation of Smyrna […] threw the whole of the Turkish people into the Orbit of the Committee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken up.»\textsuperscript{69} Retrospectively, the CUP leaders’ escape was reasoned as a farsighted plan to dodge the looming doom of the Allied occupation and a secure way of organizing resistance.\textsuperscript{70} In its core, however, if one looks beyond the patriotic discourse and teleological reasoning, the CUP’s contingency plans against the armistice were simply the result of sore losers not giving up the game after defeat and loss. Talat Pasha admitted to Enver Pasha assuming common consent: «Instead of committing a suicide, I think it is appropriate to sell our blood with a high-price tag.»\textsuperscript{71} The majestic plural of «our blood» was spoken in a context that once again ambiguously unified Talat, Enver, Muslim people, and the Ottoman Empire in one body and one purpose. Quitting government positions, closing down the official party, and going

\footnotesize{\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{65} Cruickshank, “The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey,” 18.  \\
\textsuperscript{66} Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, February 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 200.  \\
\textsuperscript{67} Vala Nureddin, \textit{Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti}, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), 43.  \\
\textsuperscript{68} Hugh Whitall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 73  \\
\textsuperscript{69} Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe, letter (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (London), July 31, 1919, FO 406/41, 166–167, no. 80, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1}, 64–65.  \\
\textsuperscript{70} Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 35. See also: Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene}, 549–50.  \\
\textsuperscript{71} Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Bardakçı, \textit{Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi}, 154.
\end{tabular}}
into a clandestine exile meant being a revolutionary non-state actor—once again. This was a return to their original *modus operandi*, when they started their political life back in the Hamidian days as so-called *komitadjis*. Dr. Nazım, for instance, was planning to cross the Greek border to unite with Yörük tribes from the Kalkış villages around Salonika to whom he had ancestral relation. He was planning to cross over to Anatolia with their militias. Even their choice for their new cover names in their clandestine exile were obviously inspired by their former pseudonyms during their underground struggle against the Hamidian regime in Ottoman Macedonia. The rebels and conspirators who became rulers were now once again rebels and conspirators.


73 Talat Pasha took his *nom de guerre* from the pre-revolutionary days in Saloniki, *Sai*, but Talat used several versions as well, such as *Cafer Sai* or *Ali Sai*, and on few occasions *Hayri* and *Hamdi*. In some memoirs one finds also *Ali Sami* or *Ali Salih*, instead of *Ali Sai*. In Arabic *sai* means the traveler or the courier. Allegedly Talat Pasha picked this name because he believed that he was himself a *traveler*. See: Cemal Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” *Tarih Konuşuyor* 1, no. 2 (1964): 133. Enver was most of the time *Ali*, but also used *Abbas* as well as *Süavi*, the latter being a reference to his personal idol from Young Ottomans Ali Süavi. Cemal was Halid. Nazım was *Rüstem* or *Ramiz* and Bahaeddin Şakir *Yakub Kadri*. See also: Aydemir, *Enver Paşa*, III, 492, 526; Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 81; Murat Bardakç, ed., *Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehcirli Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hasısa Yazar* (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 152; Murat Bardakç, *Enver* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 163
3. The Dawn of Chaos: Paths of Clandestine Exile in Times of War and Revolution

On the morning of November 3, 1918, the R-01 arrived in Sevastopol. Admiral Albert Hopman in charge of the *Schwarzmeer-Flotte* in Sevastopol received a confidential message that Talat, Enver, and Cemal were on board of the torpedo boot. One can observe a general commitment to the secrecy of the operation. Hopman wrote: «As much as I wanted to shake hands with my old friends, I had to avoid it for the sake of secrecy.» The fugitive CUP members who were accommodated in Hotel Kist together with officers of the Admiralty, were committed to the tradecraft of secrecy as well. In Sevastopol, the CUP leaders Enver, Talat, and Cemal did not even reveal the identity of their fellow comrades to the German officials «due to the protection of the incognito that the travelers asked for». At the hotel, once Hopman came across Enver, who was hiding behind dark sunglasses. The two men passed by each other as they were two strangers.

Apparently, the fugitives were not sure, how to proceed with their political life in exile. They believed that after three or four months they would be able to return to Ottoman Turkey. Before they left, Talat Pasha told Dr. Nazım:

I sold the automobile. I had rented a farm which I also sold. I believe that I have eight or nine thousand lira. To avoid allegations that I’m taking away money, I accounted it. In any event, we will stay in Europe for three-four months [...]. Therefore, the money would be enough.

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2 Albert Hopman, *Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers* (Berlin: Scherl Verlag, 1925), 312.
3 Berchem, telegraph (Kiev) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 9, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 38.
4 Hopman kept his friendship to Enver Pasha as the latter was hiding in Berlin. Hopman, *Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers*, 312. Later also Cemal Pasha would hide suspiciously behind dark glasses on the photograph on his Prussian passport issued for P. Michailowitsch, see the passport issued by the Berlin Police Director Maul on February 11, 1920, TTK, CP 01-01.
5 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926)* (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 323.
Legend has it that they had a debate on their way to Sevastopol.⁶ According to what Shakib Arslan heard, Talat Pasha held a dramatic speech, declaring the «end» of their political future:

Our political life has ended. The nation’s hatred and wrath, whether justified or not, now turned against us. The shortest and most appropriate way for us to take is the road that leads to Europe where we need to sit in a corner in a retreat. None of us shall make even the slightest move for any reason whatsoever. We shouldn’t desire after anything. We should observe the events the time will bring along. If one day an opportunity would arise, of course, we would take advantage of that opportunity. But in our current state and in world’s conditions today, there is nothing for us but to simply retire to a corner away from any kind of tyranny and any kind of selfishness. In fact, we are not guilty in our conscience. Because we wanted to save our nation and raise our country, but luck was not on our side. Therefore, we need to handover our duties to others.⁷

However, Enver Pasha had other plans than simply disappearing and waiting for better times, since he was planning to go to Transcaucasia and start a resistance movement there. Enver and Talat’s different approaches to contentious politics, probably resulted from their different backgrounds and personalities. Whereas Enver was a man of action who opted for military or paramilitary tactics, Talat seems to have taken the defeat and exile harder and proposed to hide and wait for better times to return to civil politics at home or abroad.⁸ As it seems, other fugitives did not necessarily realize how serious Enver was about going to Transcaucasia. The train they took to Germany via Simferopol (Akmescit) was travelling only during the day time. After they had their first over-night stop, they were surprised to find out on the morning of their departure to Germany that Enver was not around.⁹ Azmi Bey told later to Shakib Arslan:

If Enver Pasha had revealed me his true agenda, I wouldn’t let him go alone, but rather accompanied him. Yet, on that morning at our departure station, when we looked for him, we could not find Enver Pasha and assumed that he was gone.¹⁰

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⁶ Arslan probably learned about these discussions later in Berlin when he met the CUP leaders there. Thus, Arslan’s narrative shows possibly the internal discourse within the Young Turk fugitive community in Berlin rather than the actual debate that took place.


⁸ Murat Bardakçılı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 167.

⁹ Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 327–28.

¹⁰ Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 75. In another version, Enver Pasha unawaiteedly says goodbye to the others. Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihın Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 204.
In Sevastopol, Enver Pasha told the German officials his wish to go to Poti in the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{11} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} reported that while Talat Pasha and his fellows were traveling from Sevastopol to Germany, Enver was planning to go to Transcaucasia.\textsuperscript{12} Regarding Enver’s request the German Embassy in Constantinople answered that a «possible journey of Enver to Transcaucasia is preferably to be hindered, because this would cause a cabinet crisis and might result in the appointment of an Entente-friendly minister.»\textsuperscript{13} The German Embassy was more interested in maintaining the relatively German-friendly government of İzzet Pasha than allowing Enver to start his own vengeance against the armistice. Similarly, the German military officials in Kiev had concerns in assisting Enver to reach his brother in the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{14} Enver remained in Simferopol where he was accordingly advised by the German officials to go to Germany instead.\textsuperscript{15}

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While Enver was in the Crimea, his uncle Halil (Kut) Pasha was also on his way back to the Caucasus as the newly appointed ambassador to Armenia accompanied by the Armenian delegation on the steamer \textit{Reşid Pasha}. Halil had returned to Constantinople from the Caucasus sometime in late October 1918. He had been in Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia negotiating with different parties after the siege of Baku. In Constantinople, he had only briefly met Enver Pasha without having the time talk to each other.\textsuperscript{16} After that Halil had an appointment with Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha. In Grand Vizier’s office, an Armenian delegation was also present with Halil’s «old Armenian friends». The Armenian delegates were apparently pleased to see Halil and insisted that he should be assigned as the new ambassador to the Armenian Republic. Although Halil Pasha had been a self-proclaimed persecutor of Armenians in his Caucasus campaign, after the foundation of the Armenian Republic, which the Young Turk regime supported, he made an official visit to Yerevan. There Halil had

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\textsuperscript{11} Albert Hopman, Tagebuch und Aufzeichnungen (Sewastopol' 1918), in Baumgart, \textit{Von Brest-Litovsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution}, 637.
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{12} Auswärtiges Amt, Handwritten Note, November 5, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 19.
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\textsuperscript{13} Waldburg, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, November 3, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 17–18.
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{14} Lersner, telegram (Spa) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 5, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 24.
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\textsuperscript{15} Berchem, teleghraph (Kiev) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 9, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 38.
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\textsuperscript{16} Halil Kut, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kabramamı Halil Paşa'nın Anıları}, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 196–97.
\end{flushright}
somehow developed good relations with the Tashnag leadership. Therefore Halil Pasha accepted the position of ambassadorship in Yerevan and shipped off together with the delegation.

Halil’s ship was approached at the port of Zonguldak by a torpedo boat. The Ottoman naval officer from the torpedo boat told Halil Pasha that Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas were missing and suspected to be on the same streamer. After a search on the ship that failed to find the fugitives, Halil Pasha was ordered to return to the capital. Back in Constantinople, when Halil asked the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, why he was ordered to return to the capital, the Grand Vizier answered: «If Enver and you would have united in the Caucasus, you could have caused a lot of trouble to the state […]». Even the slightest possibility that these two men would meet and collaborate in the Caucasus was a potential threat that needed to be contained.

After the German Navy declined to transport Enver Pasha to the Caucasus, he took matters in his own hand and sailed off with a small boat. Admiral Hopman remembers that after a storm Enver was stranded in Crimea «with a Tatar sailing boat». In Simferopol (Akmesit) Enver found shelter in Seyyid Abdülcelil Hattatof’s house, probably a Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa asset. From Crimea, Enver wrote a letter to his brother Kamil, on November 12, 1918:

You know how things turned out. We’ve lost the war and the English would come to İstanbul according to the separate armistice we made. Instead of seeing the English there, I decided to go to the Caucasus to serve Islam. I came to Crimea from İstanbul via Ukraine. Here, I am waiting for transportation this past week. I can’t find any. We will see, how it will work out?

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18 Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 198–99. See also: Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 327.

19 Hopman, Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers, 312.

20 This is the post address Enver Pasha gave his brother in Enver Pasha, letter (Crimea) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), November 12, 1918, TTK, EP 01-34, in Arı İnan, ed. Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektubları (Ankara: Image Kitabevi, 1997), 71. See: Bardakçı, Enver, 165

21 Enver Pasha, letter (Crimea) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), November 12, 1918, TTK, EP 01-34, in İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektubları, 71.
To put it mildly, things did not really work out for Enver in Crimea. In a conversation with Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha held in Moscow in 1921, Enver described what happened in Crimea as follows:

By counting on the power of our armies in the Caucasus I would have established a transitory government with Baku being its center. I would have then tried to restore the fatherland with my forces depending on the severity of the peace conditions which our enemies had proposed and pressured on us. But after I landed at the shores of Northern Caucasus [read: Crimea] I got sick and had to stay at a village for a long time. During this time, the commanders [in the Caucasus] lost faith in me and followed the orders of the Istanbul Government and returned partly to Erzurum and Istanbul. When I got back on my feet, there was no more a force there to carry out my vision.22

Later in 1921, in a Young Turk propaganda journal published in Berlin, Enver Pasha wrote anonymously in third person: «In the winter of 1918-1919 he failed four times to reach the Caucasus from Crimea by sea and in his last attempt even the poles of the sail boat broke, tossing him around in the storms of Black Sea for three days, only to find himself back in Crimea away from the shores of Caucasus.»23 After that he was sick with typhus for two months.24 The sickness was followed by a depression.25

The ports of Odessa and Batum were occupied by the Entente powers on November 21, further limiting Enver Pasha’s freedom of movement in the Black Sea.26 Also the land route from Crimea and Caucasus was blocked due to the Russian Civil War, when Crimea and Ukraine were the setting of clashes between the Whites and Reds. Legend has it that Enver tried to reach Caucasus by land, but the roads were blocked and Enver ran into the forces of Anton Denikin’s White Army.27 The Crimean Tatars chose to fight alongside the Red Army. Only in late April 1919, Crimea was conquered by the Red Army.28

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22 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000), 99–100.
25 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), May 28, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
26 Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, February 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 203.
27 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992), 16–17. See also: Tekin Erer, Enver Paşa’nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı (İstanbul: Mayataş Yayınları, 1971), 16.
Russian Civil War seems to have affected Enver’s political perception of this global moment of revolution. By February 1919, Enver had still not reached Caucasus. Talat did not approve Enver’s attempt to go to the Caucasus on his own, because he found it to be reckless and ill-considered. In a letter to Enver, Talat made once again clear that he did not support Enver’s individual actions and advised him to come to Berlin:

I believe that no useful result will be reached from you wandering around like a rogue. Even if you achieve to reach the Caucasus there will be still no benefit and I fear that you will jeopardize your life. I’ve no right to intervene in your business and ideas, you can act as you want; but I think that it is rather appropriate that you would come to Germany and that you would assess the situation from here and act by watching future developments.29

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Meanwhile, Talat Pasha had long arrived in Berlin, but like Enver he did not miss any revolutionary experience. When Talat and his fellow travelers set foot on German soil at the German border on November 8, the news of the November Revolution reached them.30 The German surrender was a watershed, which, coupled with a chain of revolutionary events changed the political system of Germany drastically from Reich to Republik—a revolutionary process which Talat and his Young Turk friends ended up observing very closely.

The German revolution was already on the air since the last days of October. Mutinies had already started among the sailors in Kiel and revolts were about to spread to other major German cities. At the border town they arrived, the Young Turk refugees heard that a general strike was called for the next day, so that they stayed at the border town. On November 9, out of fear of a looming social revolution in the magnitude of the Bolshevik example, Chancellor Max von Baden announced that the Kaiser Wilhelm had abdicated. The Kaiser immediately deserted to Holland to exile. This was, however, not enough to settle the revolutionary rising. Later that day, Social Democrat leader Philipp Scheidemann declared the German Republic and Friedrich Ebert as the new Chancellor. Meanwhile, Karl Liebknecht declared the Socialist Republic. Due to the opening of the political system after the German surrender,

29 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), February 26, 1919, in Murat Bardakç, ed. Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hasısal Yazarımlar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 162.
30 Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 180.
Liebknecht was released from prison on October 23 together with other political prisoners.31 Liebknecht had founded the Spartacist League and was pushing for revolution. On the night of November 9, the November Revolution finally broke out.32

Next day on November 10, the fugitive Young Turk leaders arrived with a freight train at Berlin, which was the battleground of revolutionary clashes. There was a contest for social space between the police, the military forces, and the Freikorps on the one side, and the revolutionary organizations on the other.33 This was the situation in Berlin, which Talat and his friends arrived at.34 They rented some rooms in a small hotel at Alexanderplatz. Arif Cemil (Denker), who was in Berlin in these days, narrates the atmosphere of Berlin on the day of their arrival as follows:

At Alexanderplatz, which was close to worker districts, there was such a dangerous scene that it was nearly unpassable on that day. Because the police headquarters was on that place, the revolutionary workers were trying to occupy the police administration. The police and soldiers situated in the building were defending it from inside so that there was a rain of bullets in the whole place. Basically, everywhere in Berlin was messed up. On the Unter den Linden Avenue, which had been the setting of great patriotic events in the last thirty years, now revolutionary people and workers were patrolling back and forth on trucks with red flags in their hands. To terrorize the people every now and then they were firing out of their truck with their rifles or machine guns a volley shot to the air. They were proclaiming the downfall of German grandeur and pride to the world. When Talat Pasha and his fellows went to Berlin with many hopes from Germany, the German capital and whole Germany was in this condition.35

Dr. Nazım remembers that even their hotel was getting hit by the bullets.36 In his first letters from Berlin to Enver Pasha in Crimea, Talat Pasha described the situation in Berlin as follows:

Only after ten days we left you, we arrived at Berlin. The day before the Socialists took over the Government by a revolution. On the day of our arrival the revolution continued. Some men were killed. Today the Government is in the hands of the Social Democrats. The famous Liebknecht is the leader of a group called Ispartakus [sic, Spartacus] and any given moment they try to overthrow the Government. Their program is based completely

35 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 17–18.
36 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 328.
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on Bolshevik principles. The Government is very weak. There is no equivalent organiza-
ton or force.37

The November Revolution did not necessarily make Talat Pasha more sympathetic about
socialist ideas, but it manifested the revolutionary momentum of the time, which made many
things considered to be impossible suddenly appear possible. The revolutionary atmosphere
of Berlin continued to occupy Talat’s mind. In July 1919, Talat wrote to Enver:

Since some days the Spartacists emerged again. Today, general strike was announced.
There is no train to Berlin [from Neubabelsberg]. Towards the evening they told me on
the telephone that there will be clashes between the Spartacists and the government. The
police want Erçberg [sic, Minister of Finance Matthias Erzberger] to resign which is an-
other mistake. There is no one strong here except for Noske.38 I’ve met him, we ate
together. He is a seriously energetic man, but the Spartacists are vehemently against him.
Let’s see, what will happen. It is said that the Spartacists are spending a lot of money to
win over the soldiers and even won over some of them.39

Few days after their arrival at the Hotel in Alexanderplatz, Talat Pasha checked in at the
Sanatorium of Dr. Sinn near Neubabelsberg, where he stayed until autumn 1919.40 Dr.
Nazım and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir went to Bavaria after two weeks in the Sanatorium.41 Talat
was diagnosed with diabetes. The doctors prescribed a strict diet. Whenever Talat became
sloppy with the diet, his conditioned worsened and he got sicker.42

Talat Pasha had no passport, when he arrived to Berlin. The Ottoman Government had
ordered the Berlin Embassy not to issue any passports to the fugitive ministers. Legend has
it that Talat was searched by the police one day and it was a problem that he could not
identify himself. Apparently, Social Democrat Party leader Friedrich Ebert gave a reference
letter to the police, stating that Ali Sai Bey—Talat’s cover name—is permitted as a resident

37 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), November 29, 1918, TTK, EP 1-84, in Yamauchi,
The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 80.
38 It is not clear whether this is Gustav Noske, the Minister of Defence, as Murat Barkakçı previously noted in
Murat Bardakçı, ed., Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan
Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Huwusi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 158, note 4. In another
document addressed to Oberkommando Noske, Bardakçı notes that this Noske should not be mistaken with
the Defence Minister Gustav Noske, because there is a note by Kamil Bey saying “Police Chief of Berlin”
39 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı
Metrukesi, 158.
40 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 27; Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Adan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver
Paşa, 111. See also: Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), September 27, 1919, in Hüseyin
Cahit Yağcı and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds. İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan
Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 143.
41 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyici, Doktor Nazım Bey, 328.
42 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 33–34.
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in Germany under the guardianship of the Soldier’s and Worker’s Councils (Asker ve Amele Cemiyetleri, probably Soldaten- und Arbeiterräte).\(^43\)

Talat Pasha’s presence in Berlin became the talk of the town, especially within the Turkish community of Berlin. The nationalist orator Hamdullah Suphi (Tannöver) Bey was the president of the Turkish Club located at Kantstraße 8.\(^44\) A nationalist agitator associated with the CUP, Hamdullah Suphi was inflicting revolutionary ideas to the Turkish students.\(^45\) Soon Turkish naval cadets arrived at the Turkish Club, who had taken part with their German comrades in the Sailors’ Revolt in Kiel. These men would later associate themselves with the Spartacist movement and found the Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası).\(^46\) The Turkish Club had become the home for long nights of heated debate on revolutionary topics between the socialist students and Hamdullah Suphi’s nationalist students.\(^47\)

On the night of November 19, these debates reached their climax. Turkish and German sailors barricaded the Kantstraße and let only members of the Turkish Club pass. First Hamdullah Suphi held an inflammatory speech accusing the fugitive CUP leaders with national treason and theft of state funds.\(^48\) After Hamdullah Suphi, novelist Sâvveti Ziya Bey accompanied with an Armenian clerk from the Ottoman Embassy announced that he founded a

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\(^{43}\) Here, Arif Cemil gives the name «Ali Sami», for the sake simplication I reduced all the different variations of Talat Pasha’s cover name to «Ali Sai». Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 18.

\(^{44}\) Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar I: (1908–1925) (İstanbul: Berdan Yayınları, 2000), 293, note 1.

\(^{45}\) Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 19. See also: Gerhard Müller, report on Turkish Club to the Auswärtiges Amt, November 22, 1918, and Hamdullah Suphi’s telegram to the the German Chancellor Friedrich Ebert, November 19, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 230–32.


\(^{47}\) Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 34. One of these students was Vedat Nedim (Tör). See: Vedat Nedim Tör, Yıllar Böyle Geçişi: Anılar (İstanbul: Millyet Yayınları, 1976), 7–10. Vala Nurettin, who met the some these socialist students in Anatolia in 1921, tells also that there was clash between the socialist and nationalists students at the Turkish Club in Berlin and that Hamdullah Suphi was the leader of the nationalist fraction. Vala Nureddin, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçişi, 65.

\(^{48}\) Gerhard Müller, report on Turkish Club to the Auswärtiges Amt, November 22, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 230–31.
committee which would claim the arrest and deportation of fugitive CUP leaders from Germany for the murder of 800,000 Armenians. In a memorandum signed, this committee requested from several German ministers and high officials the arrest and deportation of the CUP leaders, who were responsible for the «Armenian massacres» and committed «crimes against reason and humanity». Also other Turkish communities, such as the Ligue Ottomane de Paix at Liberation in Geneva, sent telegraphs to the German Government. Also a group of Turkish women under Fatma Halil from Geneva protested Germany. Safveti Ziya Bey’s memorandum was also published in Berlin newspapers and later criticized by other members of the Turkish community in Berlin, who supported the right of asylum granted to the Young Turk leaders. Former editor of the newspaper Müdafaa—and in Talat’s words a «convert from a Jew» (Yahudiden dönme)—Mehmed Zeki Bey was also among those responsible for this «infamy» (kepazelik) against Talat.

Arif Cemil writes that the students and cadets, enraged by Hamdullah Suphi’s agitation, were on the brink of hunting down the CUP leaders in Berlin. A similar story is also told in

49 Turkish Colony Berlin, memorandum to Foreign Minister Solf, November 20, PA-AA, R 13805, 50. See also Safvet Ziya Bey’s letter to the Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha, January 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 151. See also: Rıfat Pasha, telegraph (Berlin) to Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 20, 1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2321.1.

50 Kemal Midhat, telegraph (Geneva) to Friedrich Ebert, November 26, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 88–89.

51 La Tribune de Genève, November 28, 1918. See also: PA-AA, R 13805, 118.

52 „Die geforderte Auslieferung der jungtürkischen Führer“, Berliner Tageblatt, November 25, 1919. See also: PA-AA, R 13805, 75.

53 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), November 29, 1918, TTK, EP 1-84, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 80–81. Mehmed Zeki was originally a Romanian Jewish immigrant to the Ottoman Empire who later converted to Islam. For some of the dark details of Mehmed Zeki’s past see: Harry Stuermer, Zwei Kriegjahre in Konstantinopel: Skizzen deutsch-jungtürkischer Moral & Politik (Lausanne: Payot, 1917), 120–25; Harry Stuermer, Two Years of War in Constantinople: Sketches of German and Young Turkish Ethics and Politics, with the assistance of E. Allen (London: Hooler et Stoughton, 1917), 138–145, here 141. For his intrigues between Weimar Germany and the Turkish Republic in the mid-1920s see: BOA.HR.IM.132.41; PA-AA, R 30648

54 These remarks on Hamdullah Suphi’s agitation against Talat Pasha might come across as somehow out-of-character, if one is inclined to see the CUP as a monolithic body of Turkish nationalists. Hamdullah Suphi was the president of CUP’s cultural society of Turkish Hearts (Türk Ocakları). He is known to be a famous Turkish nationalist agitator, often quoted for his xenophobic and fachist talks, see for instance: Lerna Ekmekcioglu, Recovering Armenia: The Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 103–5. However, Hamdullah Suphi was never a very popular figure among the CUP leaders, because of his competition with Ziya Gökalp over the ideological leadership within the Turkish Hearts Society. He had also distanced himself from the Enver and Talat Pasha’s circles and preferred rather the patronage of Cemal Pasha after the latter’s return from Syria. It was Cemal Pasha, who had sent Hamdullah Suphi to Berlin to inspect the activities of Turkish students in Berlin. Erol Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey During World War I (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 216, note 71. Arif Cemil had also a personal quarrel with Hamdullah Suphi. See also his further remarks in Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 28–29.
Shakib Arslan’s memoir that these enraged students were planning to lynch or assassinate Talat Pasha. 55 Apparently Hamdullah Suphi changed his position, fearing that his words might lead the Turkish sailors to irresponsible acts. The Auswärtiges Amt reported that there were two meetings at the Turkish Club on November 26, one organized by Safveti Ziya with twelve participants and the other by Hamdullah Suphi with seven participants. A serious debate arose between the two agitators. While Hamdullah Suphi was arguing for extradition for political reasons, Safveti Ziya had allegedly a personal vengeance against the CUP leaders and plied for more radical measures such as building people’s court and sentencing these men to death. Suphi also warned the club members not to break good relations with Germany. But according to the German informant, Suphi had now difficulties in convincing the Turkish sailors, who were more interested in Safveti’s radical demands. 56

Arslan writes that the Turkish Students Association in Berlin organized a protest rally demanding the deportation of the former Ottoman ministers back to Ottoman Empire. According to Shakib Arslan’s narrative, Talat Pasha decided to have a talk with the students. Arslan sarcastically notes that Talat was known for easily watering his eyes when it came to matters of national politics. In tears he told his version of the story of the Armenian deportations and the students apparently changed their mind. 57 Only after some of the students and cadets left Germany, the tense atmosphere among nationalists and socialists at the Turkish Club ended. 58 The revolution in Germany was, of course, not an exciting experience for every Turkish student. The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies believed that those students under the age of 16 were “in great distress ever since the signing of the Armistice and some may be eloquent witnesses of the complete downfall of Germany.” 59

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56 Gerhard Müller, complementary report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the meetings of the Turkish Club, November 26, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 189–91.
59 High Commissioner Calthorpe, report (Constantinople) to Lord Curzon (London) on the payments by Turkish nurses to Turkish students, July 10, 1919, FO 4142/107162.
Cemal Pasha was once again the odd guy of the triumvirate. He was for some reason in dispute with Talat Pasha and the two soon took separate ways. According to his police registration record, Cemal—undercover as Bosnian engineer Cevdet Ahmed Halid—first settled in Switzerland in November 19 and then moved to Munich in March 1919 under the assumed surname Babowitsch. 60 On April 6, 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Munich. Thus, Cemal also did not miss the revolution. Cemal was friends to some members of the George Circle (George-Kreis) since the war years. The George Circle was a romantic-nationalist network of men of letters devoted to the charismatic mentorship of the German poet Stefan George. Cemal stayed at historian Erich von Kahler’s house in Heidelberg for a short period of time in early 1919. The Kahlers even introduced Cemal to Stefan George and the two discussed philosophical matters related to state structures. 61 Especially, Professor Arthur Salz from the George Circle helped Cemal to settle in Munich. 62 In Munich, Arthur Salz asked Cemal to give shelter Rosa Meyer-Leviné, the wife of Eugen Leviné, the leader of the Munich Communist Party and the Soviet Republic in Munich, who was hiding from the police. 63 Rosa Meyer-Leviné wrote in her memoir: «My host was a Turk, a man of some distinction whose friendship with Salz dated from the German-Turkish war alliance. He occupied as a sub-tenant a luxurious flat, complete with a devoted servant». 64 It was these networks around Arthur Salz and others like Paul Weitz that probably enabled

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60 See: police registration record for Djewdet Ahmed Halid from Bosnia, StdAM, PMB, H 38. See also the identification paper for Ahmed Babowitsch from Bosnia, issued March 25, 1919, by the Munich Police, TTK, CP 01-01. See also: Aydemir, *Enver Paşa*, III, 497.


Cemal to become vocal again. In the Frankfurter Zeitung, Cemal declared that he was «not responsible for the Armenian atrocities» and he even punished those who were responsible.65

The writing, translation, and posthumous publication of Cemal Pasha’s memoir was all connected to Arthur Salz.66 Apparently Cemal had also further good connections in Munich, so that he was considered to be a semi-official «guest of honour» of the Town Major, Police Director, and the State Soldier’s Council.67 The reason for Cemal’s move from Switzerland to Germany after the arrival of his family was mostly for financial reasons. After moving to Munich, Cemal wrote in a letter:

Life in Munich is unbelievably cheap. Especially if you take into consideration the difference between Swiss Francs and German money, you might say that you live here nearly for free. My wife and myself, two children and one servant, we stay altogether as five people in three rooms at a guest house. Although the rent includes accommodation and meals, we pay less than a hundred marks a day. According to today’s money rate it makes 15 francs, three francs per person.68

Inflation and other economic factors accompanied by political reasons were an important force making post-war Germany rather attractive for Muslim revolutionaries and revanchists of different color to come to Germany.69

Contrary to Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha seems to have seriously considered the option of returning to Constantinople. The Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin Rifat Pasha wrote to the Sublime Porte: «Among them only Talat Pasha approached me and declared his regret to have left İstanbul and says to announce the Imperial Government that he would return as

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67 Otto Göppert, letter to Otto von Lossow, April 3, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158. See also: Mangold-Will, Begrenzte Freundschaft, 55.
68 Cemal Pasha, letter (Munich) [to Talat Pasha?], November 27, 1919, in Aydemir, Enver Paşa, III, 497–498.
soon as [the roads] are open." The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, where Young Turks’ close friend Paul Weitz was working, announced for instance that Talat was seriously considering to go back to Constantinople and give himself in to the Ottoman Government, once the railroads are open again. Also in a letter he wrote to Enver, Talat said: «To my opinion we should return, when the roads are opened.»

The exile of the fugitive CUP leaders had an ambiguous nature. Their situation was different than that of Wilhelm who abdicated and went to Netherlands or that of the Habsburg monarch. Whereas the Ottoman Sultan was allowed to stay and reign, the CUP leaders were those who opted for exile. Late political scientist Dankward Rustow stated that the CUP leaders were residing «semi-legally» in Germany, whereas Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, who met with Talat and Enver in Berlin in the summer of 1919, stated that they were rather «semi-illegally» in Germany.

In a letter to Enver Pasha in July, 1919, Talat Pasha wrote: «I don’t live here secretly. Nazım Bey and everybody else knows that I am at a sanatorium in Neubabelsberg.» Despite the regime change, Talat soon assumed that there was no threat to him in Germany and advised also Enver to come to Berlin:

> There is no danger for you here. Therefore, you can come here without revealing yourself. Then you can proceed according to the situation. I regard it as possible that you can travel by land from here to the Caucasus. But if you think it is possible from there, then may Allah give peace upon you.

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70 Rıfat Pasha, telegraph (Berlin) to Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 20, 1918, BOA.HR.SYS.2321.1.
71 *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 25, 1918. See also: PA-AA, R 13805, 76.
74 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Bardakçı, *Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi*, 158.
75 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), November 29, 1918, TTK, EP 1-84, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 80.
4. Intriguing Rumors: Young Turks and the Uprisings from Morocco to India in 1919

«The escape of the Pashas lies in the spotlight», as one German press report from Constantinople noted, «and since nothing positive can be ascertained over their whereabouts, the most preposterous rumors are circulated […]».¹ With the disappearance of the CUP leaders into a clandestine political exile, false rumors and conspiracy theories about their whereabouts and whatabouts started to mushroom everywhere from newspapers to intelligence reports. Although the Young Turks have always been the source for wild rumors and conspiracy theories,² with their decision to «go underground», they practically disappeared from the political radar, making room for more imaginative and fanciful explanations about their political undertakings.

More reasonable theories argued that the CUP leaders were either still hiding in Constantinople or went to the Caucasus where Enver Pasha proclaimed to the Grand Vizier go, or they went to Europe, possibly Germany or Switzerland. But all these theories were embellished with fancy details. Whether they were hiding or went into exile, many people continued to believe that they were still somehow secretly governing the state of affairs in Ottoman Turkey.³ The increasing bizarreness of these rumors is remarkable. The newspaper *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* claimed already few weeks after their disappearance on November 23 that Talat Pasha dispatched some German agents to Constantinople disguised as Englishmen and Americans making Bolshevik propaganda.⁴ Also *Yeni İstanbul* wrote on November 25, something so bizarre that the irony of history would later prove somewhat to be prophetic:

> There is no doubt that by changing into new forms the [Committee of] Union and Progress desires to dive into the profundity of the people and embrace their disposition. And now they realized that there is no more a possibility for them to emerge as a government.

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¹ Report on the Turkish press from November to Dezember 1918, PA-AA, R 13908, 3.
² Nabeel Audeh, “The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks as a Problem for Historical Interpretation: Considerations of Class, Race, and Empire in British Foreign Office Attitudes towards the Young Turks, 1908–1918” (PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1990).
⁴ Quoted in Koloğlu, *Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918*, 158.
Therefore, it is certain that these men are after a new plundering plot to give the homeland a final blow. It is not a distant possibility that they would stage this very vicious blow in the name of Bolshevism.\(^5\)

Not only furious Constantinople newspapers, but also the Entente intelligence started produce very similar theories about alleged conspiracies of the CUP leaders. Soon after their disappearance the Young Turks were imagined as partners in crime with other notorious cabals such as the Bolsheviks and Germans. Curiously, until the summer of 1919, there is no information in the Young Turk ego-documents regarding any plea for help to the Bolsheviks, and the German support was everything but cabalistic.\(^6\) These conspiracy theories and false rumors had a great impact on the general perception of the Young Turk activities after November 1918—long before they even settled—by muddying the waters for contemporary observers.

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For a long time Enver Pasha remained missing. From late November 1918 to the summer of 1919, none of Enver’s letters survived. Yet, we have some letters addressed to him by his colleagues in Berlin, answering his now lost letters.\(^7\) In his disappearance rumors about Enver continued to surface in different newspapers. The *London Times* reported as «a fact» that Enver had arrived in Berlin in late November:

According to a Berlin telegram, the Independent Socialist paper, *Freiheit*, states it to be a fact that Enver Pasha and his friends have fled to Germany and are now in Berlin. This has caused much excitement, regret being expressed that Enver, who caused the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent Armenians, should be under the protection of new free Germany.\(^8\)

Meanwhile the Italian Embassy in London reported about the news that Enver and Talaat left Ottoman Turkey and urged the British officials

\(^{5}\text{Quoted in Koloğlu, *Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918*, 158.}\)
\(^{6}\text{One major exception is Hüsamettin (Ertürk) Bey’s memoir that claims that the rapprochement to the Bolsheviks was premediated before they left Constantinople, but I believe he adds some retrospective insights to thicken his recollections. Hüsamettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, ed. Samih N. Tansu (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996), 166.}\)
\(^{7}\text{There is some indication that Enver Pasha had also some contact to fellow CUP men in Constantinople. Muhittin Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’dede On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu*, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), II, 584.}\)
\(^{8}\text{*The Times*, “Enver Pasha in Berlin,” November 25, 1918. Later it was reported that Enver’s arrival in Berlin was uncertain, *The Times*, “Enver and Talaat,” December 11, 1918.}\)
to trace both of them, and by any means to prevent them, especially Enver Pasha, from reaching Northern Africa on the pretext of serving there the cause of Islam. Such an eventuality would in fact constitute a threat not only for Libia [sic] but also for Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.9

Enver Pasha was already imagined as commanding insurgencies in Muslim lands. His path was discursively predetermined. The Foreign Office’s answer made no secret about the shared imperial anxieties about Enver leading an Islamic insurgency in North Africa: «His Majesty’s Government fully realise the danger which would ensue if Enver Pasha should succeed in landing in North Africa and will do everything in their power to prevent such an eventuality.»10 Even wilder theories on Enver’s whereabouts would see the light of day in international newspapers. Friend or foe, everybody was following the news coverage of Enver allegedly being in Caucasus, Kurdistan or Turkestan.11

In January 1919, for instance, there were rumors that Enver and Talat were among the «pan-Islamic Turkish officers» who joined the resistance of Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuni (also known as Raisuli) in Spanish Morocco.12 Raisuni was a local warlord, who had been involved in an uprising against the colonial regime since the World War I. After the war the Spanish High Commissioner Dámaso Berenguer started a counterinsurgency campaign against Raisuni.13 The Italian Embassy in London sent a note to the Foreign Office stating that Italian newspapers reported that «Enver and Talaat Pashas intend to try, with the help of disguises and false passports, to reach Spanish Morocco and to obtain help from and protection from Raisuli». The same note continued that «the Italian Consul-General at Tunis states that the Residency have received news that Enver Pasha has sent a message from Germany to Tunis announcing his early arrival in Tripoli with the object of placing himself at the head of the

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9 Italian Embassy in London, note to Foreign Office, November 23, 1918, FO 371/3411, 304.
11 These rumors about Enver’s alleged whereabouts is best summarized in Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., İttihatçı’nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı Kararlar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 472. See also: Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005), 76.
12 Directorate of Military Intelligence, letter to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Office, January 24, 1919, FO 371/4141, 14537.
rebels.” In response to these rumors, Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, preferred to believe that the misperceptions were caused by deceptive measures of the CUP:

there is possibility of Enver and Talaat being at Constantinople and considers the various reports which are being spread abroad of their being in Berlin and other places, are merely part of their plan to draw attention from Constantinople.

The belief in deception is a common trope in conspiracy theories to assume that “plots, schemes and conspiracies imply some kind of agency which is preventing [the conspiracy theorists] from discovering the truth, from connecting events and causes in a correct manner.” Another report proudly announced: “We are aware of any amount of oriental deception and intriguing”.

In the spring of 1919, the British had more and more conflicting intelligence on Enver Pasha’s whereabouts, reaching from a hospital in Berlin and then Constance at the German-Swiss border over Caucasus to Turkestan and Afghanistan. Besides his whereabouts, what he was up to also troubled British officials. There were rumors that from his alleged hiding place in Constance, Enver was not only “able to communicate freely with [his] friends in Switzerland”, but he was also “in close touch with Egyptian extremists and probably [was helping] them to communicate with their friends in Germany and possibly even with Turkey and Egypt.” Further intelligence reports claimed that Enver left Constance and traveled to Berlin in mid-April. There is no indication or what so ever in the private papers and memoirs of the Young Turks that Enver was in these places in the spring of 1919 and all signs indicate that he was still somewhere in South Russia. Nevertheless, Talat Pasha mentioned the problem of the rumors in the press:

14 Italian Embassy in London, note to Foreign Office, January 9, 1919, FO 371/4141, 7921.
15 Directorate of Military Intelligence, letter to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Office, January 24, 1919, FO 371/4141, 14537.
17 Turks in Switzerland: Intelligence Report on their Activities, July 8, 1919, FO 371/4142, 99746, 150.
19 Sir H. Rumbold, cipher (Berne) to Foreign Office, April 3, 1919, FO 371/4141, 53322.
Now since we hear continuing rumors that you are present in the Caucasus, in Baku, in Azerbaijan, and from the publication of Dutch newspapers even that Baku was conquered by you, we thought that we wouldn’t receive a news or letter from you for a long time.21

The exact date when Enver Pasha arrived at Berlin is not clear from the primary sources.22 For long scholars believed that Enver was in Berlin, beginning as late 1918 or early 1919.23 Thanks to letters from Talat Pasha’s private papers, which Murat Bardakçı published in 2009, we know that Enver was still not in Berlin as late as July 1919.24

In May 1919, the Viceroy of India believed that Enver was leading the Afghan forces in Kandahar.25 Also the German Ambassador in Berne had no idea where Enver was roving around and reported: «I hear from Turkish circles that Enver Pasha is actually in safety in Afghanistan.»26 Despite all the distant places Enver’s ghost was sighted, most theories concluded that he was in the Caucasus. According to rumors the British Intelligence heard, Enver was leading the National Defense Organization (Milli Müdafaa Cemiyeti) in Ottoman Turkey from Azerbaijan:

At its best the National Defence Organization is credited with being in close touch with AZERBAIDJAN, while Enver Pasha directs the movement from NAJHITCHEVAN [sic] near Urmia on the Persian frontier.

Pan-Islamic, Bolshevist, Pan-Turkish and all disgruntled forces are looked for help and all are being toyed with.27

Azerbaijan was the most commonly assumed hiding place of Enver Pasha in early summer 1919. The commander of the Eastern Front, Kazım Karabekir Pasha, reported to Mustafa Kemal Pasha: «According to news received it is rumored [söylenmekte olup] that the forces,
approaching the Arpa River on behalf of the Bolsheviks, is commanded by Enver Pasha [...]»28

Every now and then, the rumors got out of hand and many British officials seemed to get tired of conflicting intelligence reports on the CUP leaders. The British Military Attaché in Rome reported to Director of Military Intelligence: «There is a rumour that Enver Pasha is in the neighborhood of Venice in disguise—but I have no reason for believing this to be anything but a ‹canard›.»29 In August 1919, also General Malleson at Meshed came to the conclusion «as a result of very complete and widespread enquiries, that Enver is not now, and never has been, east of Caspian within the last two years».30 Nevertheless, the conspiracy theories and false rumors continued to reappear in the same fashion. As late as September 1919, the British press was speculating on Enver’s disappearance from Constantinople.31 In December 1919, Enver was even crowned in some newspapers as the «King of Kurdistan».32

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While Enver Pasha was missing and believed to be leading Muslim insurgencies from Morocco to Afghanistan, there were indeed revolts and revolutions slowly but surely emerging in the vast Muslim geography. In Morocco, for instance, the revolts had already started which would develop into the Rif War by 1920. The denial of the Egyptian Delegation (Wafd) Party under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul by the peace conference in Paris generated in Egypt a massive social movement. The ensuing arrest and deportation of the Egyptian delegation to Malta by British officials on March 8, 1919, caused mass demonstrations in Cairo and later in other cities, followed by labor strikes and large-scale peasant and tribal uprisings in the hinterlands in 1919.33 Following the assassination of the Afghan Emir Habibullah in

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28 Kazım Karabekir, report to the Third Army Inspector Mustafa Kemal Pasha, June 22, 1919, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 17, gömlek no. 7.
29 Presence of Young Turks in Rome, June 23, 1919, FO 371/4142, 94154, 95.
31 By the time of their escape from Constantinople, Enver Pasha’s wife Naciye Sultan was pregnant with her second child. Based on a wrong date of birth of Enver’s second daughter, the *London Times* assumed in September 1919 that Enver must have left Constantinople considerably later than assumed. *The Times*, “Enver’s Flight,” September 18, 1919, 12. Enver’s daughter Türkan was born in July, 4, 1919, when Enver was still in Crimea. Murat Bardakçı, *Enver* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 188.
February 1919, the new Emir Amanullah Khan attacked British India to legitimize his rule, starting the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Meanwhile, mutinies and revolts were already plaguing the British India after the Amritsar massacre in April 13, 1919.\textsuperscript{34} Especially after the Greek invasion of Smyrna in May 1919, the Anatolian resistance movement became more and more a security problem for the Allied administration.\textsuperscript{35} In an alarming memorandum, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen from the British delegation at the Peace Conference wrote:

\begin{quote}
With Egypt in revolt, Afghanistan proclaiming a \textit{jihad}, trouble brewing in Mesopotamia, the not at all unlikely prospect of an Indian mutiny and general upheaval such as will eclipse all previous efforts to throw off the British yoke in India, and an almost certain prospect of an Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine—on top of all this, we are deliberately inciting Mohammedans all over the world to unite against the Christian, which is the British Empire, and do not let us deceive ourselves we are unable to meet it.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Cautionary voices as such were, however, mostly ignored, whereas more flamboyant explanations gained currency. Therefore, the CUP was filling an important gap in making sense of these uprisings from India to North Africa. Due to its political ambiguity, the CUP was everything and nothing at the same time. Its pragmatic and eclectic use of allegedly conflicting policies and ideologies hindered the explicit and definite political categorization of the CUP. Therefore the CUP was now after the end of the war able to «embrace pan-Islamic, Egyptian Nationalist, possibly Bolshevic, and even Indian Nationalist activity.»\textsuperscript{37} The CUP was not regarded as a political organization with pragmatic policies in cooperation with foreign counterparts and strategic partners, but rather as a mysterious political phantom capable of changing disguises and infiltrating and manipulating diverse political spheres regardless of «natural» boundaries. David Fromkin writes:

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37 Supplement to GHQ Intelligence Summary, April 26, 1919, quoted in Priya Satia, \textit{Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 206.
\end{quote}
When the uprisings in the Middle East after the war occurred, it was natural for British officials to explain that they formed part of a sinister design woven by the long-time conspirators. Bolshevism and international finance, pan-Arabs and pan-Turks, Islam and Russia were pictured by British Intelligence as agents of international Jewry and Prussian Germany, the managing partners of the great conspiracy.38

“A number of reports have been recently been received, from a variety of sources», wrote Vice-Admiral A. Calthrope from the British High Command at Constantinople to the British Embassy in Switzerland, «which leads me to believe that there has been an increased activity among Egyptian Nationalists, Committee of Union and Progress Turks, and Indian Nationalists, in Switzerland.»39 On Calthrope’s initiative, Hugh Whittall, a British intelligence agent, was assigned to Switzerland in May 1919 to gather intelligence on «Turco-Egyptian intrigues». Whittall prepared an extensive report, which was divided into different sections under fancy titles such as «The Revolt of Islam», «Switzerland the Centre of Moslem Intrigues», «The League of Eastern Revolutionists and the Young Turks», «Lenin’s Hand in the Game», and «The Socialist Camouflage». The impact of this report on the manifestation of the conspiracy theory about the Young Turk activities in the eyes of the British officialdom cannot be understated. The report was the first full theorization of a conspiracy theory that was collectively in the making among the members of the British diplomatic and intelligence community and CUP’s public opponents in Constantinople and Europe.40 Former British Ambassador to Constantinople Louis Mallet stated that Whittall’s report «entirely confirms the stray pieces of information which we have been receiving for some time past and it is borne out by what has actually happened and is happening today: in Egypt, Kurdistan, Afghanistan and in Constantinople itself».41

Like any conspiracy theory, Whittall’s report urged for attention. It was «unwise to take the conspiracy other than somewhat seriously», he warned his readers about the gravity of the

38 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009), 466.
39 Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthrope, letter (Constantinople) to British Embassy (Berne), May 4, 1919, FO 371/3717, 123065, 102. See also: ZMO, NGH 11-05, 004.
40 For a brief assessment of Whittall’s report see: John Fisher, “Major Norman Bray and Eastern Unrest in the British Empire in the Aftermath of World War I,” Archives 27, no. 106 (2002): 45–46. Isaeah Friedman takes Whittall’s theories for granted. I also don’t share his opinion that this and similar reports were ignored by the policy-makers in London. Friedman, British Miscalculations, 18–20.
situation. To undermine the report’s claims, Whittall tried to credit his sources and his intelligence methodology. Due to his former secret intelligence work in Switzerland during the war years, Whittall got in touch with «several EASTERN «conspirators»>, whom he considered «former friends». He assured that he «had a large number of Eastern and Western agents in [his] service», and therefore «can speak fairly authoritatively on this subject».42 In the final sentence of the report, Whittall stated that the importance of continuing intelligence gathering and added that «this can best be done by men who know the East and its languages and have personal acquaintance with some of the «conspirators» themselves.»43 The job required what Priya Satia, a cultural historian of the British Empire, calls an «intuitive intelligence epistemology», which only few imperialist Orientalists like Hugh Whittall believed to have possessed in deciphering «Oriental intrigues».44 Political Scientist Robert Jervis similarly believes that «[a]ll too often, intelligence and critics rely on intuitive ways of thinking and rhetorical forms of exposition.»45 To be sure, although cultural prejudices and imperialist anxieties were dominating Whittall’s verdict on the events in his intelligence reports, there was something undeniably typical for the scientific thinking of the «age of anxiety». In his comparison between conspiracy theories and the logic and method of human sciences, Martin Parker writes:

> The role of the seemingly ubiquitous conspiracy theorist is to connect things which were previously unconnected—to posit causes, motives, plans and plots. Importantly, the grammar of these theories is not insane speculation—or a romantic poetic wildness—but a form of detective work which uses the tools of the hypothetico-deductive method. Photographs, documents, eye witness accounts and so on are used to demonstrate that a particular explanation successfully draws together a series of events and causes.46

The content and language of the report is so straightforwardly unapologetic about imperialist and colonialist schemes as well as Orientalist and culturalist prejudices that it is worth a detailed look. The summary of the report concluded:

A. The Eastern enemies of Great Britain have united with the avowed object of overthrowing British rule in the East.

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43 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 78.
44 Satia, Spies in Arabia, 5.
B. They can rely upon the support of Germany and of the Russian Bolsheviks, whose interests coincide with their own.

C. They have great hopes of gaining the ENTENTE SOCIALISTS also of their cause.

D. The Centre of the movement is in SWITZERLAND; and will remain in SWITZERLAND, where communication with the GERMANS, the RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS and the ENTENTE SOCIALISTS is assured and no serious interference on the part of the SWISS Authorities is to be feared.

E. The movement will attain its full development only AFTER the conclusion of peace, when demobilization and the abrogation of present restrictions on traffic and correspondence will increase the chances of success.47

The wording of this report is particularly fruitful in demonstrating the «paranoid style» within the British intelligence community.48 Even beyond the intelligence community, this report seems to have played an important role in shaping similar conspiracy theories in the British and international press. A slightly updated version of Whittall’s report appeared in the Daily Chronicle from July 2, 1919, dispatched by the special correspondent in Geneva. This article has so many word-by-word similarities to Whittall’s secret report that it must be an official leak to the press.49 One day later also the New York Times published the very same news received by «special cable» from Geneva. The leaked news announced:

Under the name of the Oriental League has recently been established at Berne a central organization uniting all the various secret societies of Moslem and Hindu nationalists in Europe which have hitherto acted independently. The aim of the new association is to prepare for joint revolutionary action in Asia and Africa after the definite conclusion of peace.

Reliable information enables me to give a full account of this vast conspiracy, the effect of which may already be traced in recent events in Egypt, India, and Afghanistan. […]

The League is, of course, of German origin. […] Thus the Oriental League is in reality the reincarnation of Wilhemstrasse’s Oriental Department.

The exiled Young Turk leaders, Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, have likewise an active part in the organization of the league, and continue to exert a decisive influence over its activities. It is to Enver Pasha’s talent for intrigue that the union between Moslems and Hindus, the most striking and dangerous feature of the movement, is chiefly due.

47 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 66. Whittall’s report has the date May 5, 1919, but it must be a typo, because in the report he refers to events and dates later as late as May 17.

48 In his classic study, Hofstadter notes: «What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts (though it is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events.» Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 37.

49 Daily Chronicle, July 2, 1919.
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[...] Besides enjoying the support of the Germans, the league is also in close touch with Lenin [...].

When compared with German official documents and private letters of the CUP leaders—sources originating from the alleged lion’s den—the fallacies of Whittall’s conspiracy theory becomes clear. For instance, a contemporary German report titled «Relations between Islamic Movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism», prepared by Herbert Diel from the Auswärtiges Amt, is worth a comparison. Diel’s report addressed these issues:

In the press of foremost Entente powers, the prognoses [on Islamic movements] are a matter of continuous and increasingly disturbing interpretations. In a similarly growing magnitude, the influence of Bolshevism is depicted now either as the causative or the promoting force. Truth and fiction are hard to unravel and entangled in this net[work] of news.

While Diel denied such schemes, Whittall’s report claimed that Germany «still appears to have a control over this revolutionary Moslem organisation» and found «new and powerful allies» in Bolshevik Russia. Whittall came to the conclusion that «there is some close relationship existing between Germany, the Russian Soviet Republic and the Anti-British agitators of the East». Nevertheless, Whittall saw structural obstacles in the realization of this «plot», because the «present restrictions on international correspondence and traffic» hindered freedom of movement and communication for transnational politics. «Thus, peace in EUROPE might be anything but rest in the EAST» he dramatically concluded and warned that «in fact, it may give a fresh impetus to seditious activity and insurrectionary movements against BRITISH and FRENCH rule.»

Whittall explained in several clichés and sensationalistic jargon, why Switzerland was the «hotbed of MOSLEM agitation». First, Swiss officials were traditionally «inclined to IGNORE THE POLITICAL INTRIGUES OF FOREIGNERS». Second, «some of the most influential statesmen» of Switzerland were «little better than GERMAN AGENTS» and thus ready to protect «MOSLEM conspirators». Lastly, Switzerland was logistically «the back-
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doors to GERMANY» and «the outpost of RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM». In addition, it was «the favourite meeting-place of Socialists of all nuances, who are also open to be influenced in favor of MOSLEM «independence».»

Whittall somehow surmised that there was a so-called «League of Eastern Revolutionists and the Young Turks», later called «Oriental league» in the press leaks, organized in several regional or national departments and were ambitiously publishing propaganda pamphlets and journals as well as coordinating the activity of field agents in different lands:

Perhaps the most significant circumstance about the present activity of the Eastern revolutionists in Switzerland is that the INDIAN, EGYPTIAN, TURKISH, PERSIAN, etc. nationalists, who used to act independently are now tending to combine together and join forces.

Intelligence assessment was reproducing «its own strongly held beliefs» based on assumed ideas about the human nature as well as culture and behavior of adversaries. Therefore, a political union among Muslim, Hindu, and other Eastern nationalists was regarded as abnormal. The assumption that Oriental races had different and incompatible characteristics is based on Orientalist prejudices that underline the (philological, cultural, and racial) differences between Semites, Indo-Persians, and Turkic-Tatars as well as sectarian distinctions between Sunnites, Shiites, and Hindus. Middle East historian Nabeel Audeh argues that in British officialdom «the racially-specific component of Oriental political movements is commonly regarded as more significant than the ideological messages these movements espouse.» This means that the «ostensible differences» of race and sect were «considered much more meaningful than the underlying ontological similarities they share» as anticolonial nationalisms. The racial-sectarian compartmentalization of Asian and African people was not only a cornerstone of Orientalist curriculum, but also a pragmatic imperative of colonialism: divide et impera. «Our aim must be to divide and to conciliate, and to rule», as a staff member of the British High Commission in Constantinople unapologetically proposed as a measure

54 See also: Memorandum on Switzerland as a Bolshevik Centre, November 2, 1918, FO 371/4369, 99–102.
55 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 68–69. The German agent at the Socialist Congress in Berne in February 1919, was rather more skeptical regarding the sympathies of Entente socialists towards their Eastern colleagues. Herbert Diel, Orientalentvertreter und Berner Sozialistenkongress, February 21, 1919, AA R 14553.
57 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 160.
58 Audeh, “The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks as a Problem for Historical Interpretation,” 690.
against pan-Islamism, «because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fundamental but at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-Moslems.»

There was also no such thing called «League of Eastern revolutionaries» or «Oriental League» in early summer 1919. The only thing that remotely resembles an Oriental League, was perhaps the Orient Club (Orient-Klub e.V.; in Turkish: Şark Kulübü; in Arabic: al-Nadi al-Sharqi) at the corner of Kalckreuthstraße 2 and Motzstraße in Berlin. Talat Pasha initiated in Berlin the foundation of an «Oriental house» (originally Şark Yurdu), where different members of the Eastern communities can have a shared forum. But due to rumors in Constantinople newspapers that Talat was opening a coffee shop in Berlin, Talat soon lost interest in this project. The Orient Club was later founded at the apartment of the young student and former Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agent Muhammed Ali al-Hammi. Emir Shakib Arslan was elected president while Abdel Aziz Shawish served as his deputy. The Orient Club had the purpose of assisting and educating Eastern students as well as making propaganda by publications and other means. These men organized also protest events in Berlin together with Dr. Ernst Jäckh and other German Orientalists. Nevertheless, all sources indicate that the Orient Club was not founded before 1920. Once again the intelligence was to be proven awkwardly prophetic, in its actual imprecision. One year later after Whittall’s report, another British Intelligence report still claimed:

63 Shakib Arslan was still living in Switzerland in December 1919. Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Bardakçı, İttihatçı’nin Sandığı, 471–77.
After the Armistice we saw from reports emanating from Geneva, Rome, and London, the development of Unionist activities working in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Russia. These same Germans and Turks who had been working together during the war again came to notice in association, and as early as February 1919 it became evident that the Unionist chiefs were actively preparing a Pan-Islamic movement in connection with Bolshevism and with the assistance of the very efficient, so far unsuccessful, German organisation which had been co-operating for five years against British prestige in the East.64

In Whittall’s report, the slightest possibility of an autonomous agency of Eastern revolutionaries in finding common terms for cooperation was explained away by making it «principally GERMANY's work.» Behind the League of Eastern revolutionaries, British intelligence saw the machinations of Germany’s infamous war-time center for pan-Islamic propaganda, the Intelligence Bureau for the East (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient).65 The usual suspects, such as Orientalist diplomats Otto Günther von Wesendonk and Max von Oppenheim, were still imagined as the masterminds behind the scenes. Oppenheim’s role was exaggerated—his name barely pops out in the German documents in the aftermath of war. Yet, Wesendonk was in fact assigned to the German Embassy in Berne and he was also named in the press leaks to Daily Chronicle and New York Times as being the «leading spirit» of the «Oriental League», which was nothing but «Made in Germany».66 As we will see, Wesendonk’s role was not as obvious as it was claimed.

According to Whittall’s report, Wesendonk met with Halil Halid Bey in Montreux, in connection with the Socialist International Congress held in Berne in February 1919, where they also had contacts with Young Turks discussing «the all-Moslem combinations».67 Halil Halid Bey, born in Ankara in 1869, was a former Cambridge University lecturer and Vice-Consul in London, who later became an anti-British public intellectual associated with the pan-Islamist propaganda activities of the Ottoman Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and the German Intelligence

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66 Daily Chronicle, July 2, 1919.

67 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 69–70. For the Socialist International Congress in Berne Halil Halid had published the propaganda pamphlet, Halil Halid, La Turcophobie des Impérialistes Anglais (Berne: Staempfli, 1919). At the congress Halil Halid gave a memorandum in which he criticized the «Navalism», i.e. continuation of naval arms race and colonial expansion, see the short summary of Diel’s report, March 25, 1919, AA R 14553.
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Bureau for the East. In fact, a German agent, possibly even Wesendonk himself, was in contact with Halil Halid in Switzerland in late May. Halil Halid told to his German confidant that after reading all the news from the Entente newspapers that the CUP was cooperating with the Bolsheviks, he too started to find this idea more and more appealing. Nevertheless, Halil Halid was rather skeptical: he held the fugitive CUP leaders for traitors for escaping; he dismissed the resistance movement in Anatolia as mere Muslim banditry in Greek and Armenian populated areas; he accused the Dagestanis for being corrupted by the British against Russia and Turkey; he believed that the Persians were submissive to the British imperialism and thus unreliable; and he was also critical about the Egyptian activists in Switzerland, declaring Abdel Aziz Shawish as «incompetent» (unfähig) and speaking «despicably» (verächtlich) about Shamsi, and did not even knew about the publication of Muhammad Farid’s ambitious Bulletin du Parti National Egyptien. Although Whittall knew Halil Halid had contact to the Germans, he did not have insights into their conversations.

Whittall also reported on the propaganda activities of Egyptian nationalists in Switzerland, including Abdel Aziz Shawish, Shamsi, Muhammad Farid, and the others, who were allegedly also connected to Berlin networks. Nonetheless, Whittall made clear that he only knew Turkish and thus had limited access to the Egyptian community only through other «specialists». According to the above mentioned German report in late May 1919, the British Government was deeply concerned about the propaganda activities of exiled Egyptians operating from Switzerland, because they believed that these men were behind the uprising in Egypt. Due to the pressure from the British, the Swiss Federal Council is said to have urged Egyptian activists in Berne and Zurich, including Abdel Aziz Shawish to caution.

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69 Similar discontent about rapprochement between the Northern Caucasian delegation and the Entente during the Peace Conference is criticized also in Fuad Salim, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), April 30, 1919, TTK, EP 03-73.

70 A letter from Switzerland to Auswärtiges Amt, May 21, 1919, PA-AA, R 13567.


73 A letter from Switzerland to Auswärtiges Amt, May 21, 1919, PA-AA, R 13567. See also: Mahmoud Kassim, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Ägypten, 1919–1936* (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 2000), 73.
dubious Egyptians, possibly British agents as Wesendonk assumed, were sent to him to request German support for Egyptian propaganda, but he rejected. The Egyptian propaganda was dismissed by Wesendonk as «foolish squabbling» (törichten Zänkereien).\textsuperscript{74} Also in Diel’s report it was said:

In explaining the completely unanticipated Egyptian uprising, the involvement of Young Turk and Bolshevik emissaries—which were deliberately equated with each other—was again and again held by the English and especially English-inspired neutral parties responsible for the events. There was no lack of fantastic finery in this regard: accordingly, it was said that Dschemal Pasha was personally leading the «operations» of the rebels.\textsuperscript{75}

Whittall continued to report on the activities of Mahmut Muhtar (Katırçıoğlu) Pasha, the former Ottoman commander and ambassador in Berlin, who left Lausanne to Munich to allegedly meet Enver, Talat, and Cemal and immediately started «organizing a Turkish Nationalist Movement» after his return.\textsuperscript{76} Though Whittall mentions some disputes among the Swiss Turkish community, he is not able to pinpoint the orientation of the «Ligue Ottomane», which was in opposition to the CUP leaders.\textsuperscript{77} According to a conversation Wesendonk had with Mahmut Muhtar (Katırçıoğlu) Pasha in February, he learnt that the British believed that the CUP leaders were leading the Anatolian resistance from their exile and that this movement was allegedly supported by Germany:

The Entente claims to have reliable proofs showing that this movement [in Anatolia] is put together by Young Turk leaders like Enver, Talat, Dschemal and their friends hiding in Germany and receiving instructions from the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. With them they are in constant secret connection through people like Professor Jaeckh as it is precisely known to the Allied governments.\textsuperscript{78}

Mahmut Muhtar advised Wesendonk that Germany should publicly denounce and disown its relation to «Enver’s clique and its German following (Prof. Jaeckh, etc.)», in order to avoid

\textsuperscript{74} A letter from Switzerland to Auswärtiges Amt, May 21, 1919, PA-AA, R 13567.

\textsuperscript{75} Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 2.

\textsuperscript{76} Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 70–71. A previous report had also stated that «Mahmoud Mouktar Pasha went to Munich where he met Djemal and Talat». Sir. H. Rumbold, report (Berne) on activities of two Turkish ladies from the Red Crescent Society, April 2, 1919, FO 371/4141, 51394. According to Auswärtiges Amt Mahmut Muhtar Pasha met with Cemal Pasha in Munich, which is plausible, but the claim that Mahmut Muhtar received large amount of money to start propaganda activities seems rather unlikely, given the fact that Cemal Pasha had himself financial problems. Herbert Diel, report on the political activities of Turks in Switzerland, April 30, 1919, AA R 21282, also published in the appendix of Hans-Lukas Kieser, \textit{Vorkämpfer der "Neuen Türkei": Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee (1870–1939)} (Zürich: Chronos-Verlag, 2005), 149–51.

\textsuperscript{77} Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 71.

\textsuperscript{78} Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), February 28, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 223.
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a breach of diplomatic relations with Ottoman Turkey and further pressures from England. As Mahmut Muhtar’s advice to Wesendonk shows, it was now already common wisdom that Germany was supporting, if not leading outright, the Young Turk’s pan-Islamist campaign. Meanwhile British Intelligence followed the same logic: «Whatever the title of Young Turk organisation in Switzerland may be does not matter. Reports show that it is run by the Turkish leaders in Germany with German help and that it hopes to continue working upon the Moslems of India as well as upon Moslems elsewhere.»

Whittall reported that a meeting of the «Ligue Ottomane» took place in Lausanne and another one few days later in Geneva, where «[m]eans were also discussed to prevent the Greek occupation of Smyrna». A telegraph, which the «Ligue Ottomane» sent to Edwin Samuel Montagu, the State Secretary for India, was enclosed to the report, which was calling for «the combination of all Moslems (as also Hindus) against the rule of the British over their respective countries.» Whittall was unable to differentiate different Young Turk fractions that were opposing the CUP, but also opposing the Allied occupation of Ottoman Turkey and other Muslim lands. Another report noted:

The title Pan-Islam is a misnomer in the case of the new League I mentioned, which was being formed by Rifaat Pacha, Hilmi Pacha, etc. From subsequent enquiries and conversations I am under the impression that only those peoples who were of the original Turkish Empire at its zenith can be included with certainty, i.e. Turkey, Turkestan [sic], Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the whole of North Africa. If INDIA is included in the organisation, it is not through the Swiss branch as far as can be ascertained at present.

The Ottoman League in Switzerland, however, dissolved after the French Embassy started to propagate that Enver and Talat had secretly infiltrated the league through the membership of Emir Shakib Arslan. Another person, who is listed in Whittall’s report as belonging to the «Ligue Ottomane», the publisher of the newspaper İkdam, Ahmet Cevdet (Oran) Bey,

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79 Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), February 28, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 224.
80 Dossier on Turkish Intrigues in Switzerland, September 13, 1919, FO 371/4142, 128926, 259.
81 The ligue published later the following pamphlet in French and English: Ligue pour la défense des droits des Ottomans, Atrocités grecques dans le vilayet de Smyrne (mai 1919): documents inédits et témoignages des officiers anglais et français (Geneva: Bureau permanent du Congrès turc de Lausanne, 1919).
82 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 72.
83 As it seems, this differentiation was made clear in the updated press leaks: The New York Times, “Germans Inspire New Plot in East,” July 3, 1919.
84 Dossier on Turkish Intrigues in Switzerland, September 13, 1919, FO 371/4142, 128926, 260.
85 Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Bardakçı, İttihadçı’nın Sandığı, 477.
was living in European exile due to CUP’s pressures since the Counterrevolution of 1909.\footnote{Ahmet Cevdet, \textit{Ligue pour la défense des droits des Ottomans: Comité central} (Genève: Bureau permanent du Congrès turc de Lausanne, 1919).}

\begin{quote}
In the meantime, Ahmet Cevdet had a conversation with a Turkish informant of Auswärtiges Amt. He said that he was under pressure to send his telegraphed column to the İkdam from an anglophile position.\footnote{On the ambiguous relation of Ahmet Cevdet to the CUP see also the report of the police (Geneva), January 16, 1919, cited in Kieser, \textit{Vorkämpfer der “Neuen Türkei”} 91.} Ahmet Cevdet also told that

\begin{quote}
he learned from official English sources that the English commissioner in Constantinople acquired secret documents regarding organization of a great pan-Islamistic movement in all Mohammedan countries. The revelations found in these documents affected England to mitigate its attitude towards Turkey and to win over certain Turkish elements by various promises.\footnote{Adolf Müller (Berne), letter to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), June 28, 1919, PA-AA, R 13565.}
\end{quote}

German Intelligence tapped Giacomo Agnese, Head of the Colonial Department at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying:

\begin{quote}
I receive from English sources intelligence that the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who are still in Germany (and are moving towards Switzerland and Italy?), are in the possession of several million Turkish pounds, which are meant to be spent to set up the uprising of the Mohammedans who are currently subjects of the Entente governments. Headquarters for this movement are established in Switzerland, Greece, Spain, and in Russia. The main branch is said to be in Switzerland. The goal of the organization is to prove by all means that the butchering of the Armenians by the Turks was a matter of self-defense. This news has been confirmed also from other sources.\footnote{Secret note delivered by the Ministry of Justice, PA-AA, R 14553.}
\end{quote}

These rumors were all originating from British Intelligence itself. The tautology is that authenticity of these British Intelligence reports was based on being originating from the British Intelligence. Conspiracy theories «are entirely self-confirming belief systems», Martin Parker noted.\footnote{Parker, “Human Science as Conspiracy Theory,” 194.} It was not uncommon that the British Intelligence was rediscovering and reproducing the same rumors and conspiracy theories that they themselves or their political profiteers had unleashed earlier elsewhere. A discourse of a menace was collectively in the making, which would later affect the intersubjectivity of the actors, once this discourse became more and more perceived as a reality. Those who were seeing ghosts were those who already believed in ghosts. David Fromkin put it more beautifully:
In fact there was an outside force linked to every one of the outbreaks of violence in the Middle East, but it was the one force whose presence remained invisible to British officialdom. It was Britain herself. [...] The shadows that accompanied the British rulers wherever they went in the Middle East were in fact their own.91

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Regarding the actual role of the CUP leaders, Whittall explained that the «Emissaries» of the CUP in Switzerland were receiving instructions by «the ‹chiefs› in Berlin» and Azmi Bey was responsible for correspondence. Although specifics of his intelligence cannot be disproven, the CUP leaders in Berlin had indeed started organizing themselves politically. In a letter Talat Pasha wrote to Enver Pasha, the right way to proceed was described as follows:

I think that it is necessary to choose a headquarters for us depending on what form the peace will take. And then we struggle on behalf of the Muslim and Turkic world by reviving the old [Committee of] Union and Progress organization and [removing] the existing disputes and uniting the political networks in these circles and by convening annually congresses and carrying out their decisions.92

Contrary to Whittall’s assumptions of remote control over insurgencies in Egypt, Anatolia, Afghanistan, and India, Talat Pasha was primarily concerned about propaganda. Sometime in the spring of 1919, Talat travelled together with Nesim Mazelyah to a conference of the Socialist International in Amsterdam where he had a meeting there with the Secretary General of the conference, Belgian socialist Camille Huysmans.93 «I explained the Armenian Question as best as I could» (Ermeni mes’ellesini dilim döndüğü kadar anlattım), Talat wrote later in a letter. Talat also told Huysmans about the history of Great Power interventions in the Ottoman Empire, gaining the impression to have convinced him. Huysmans advised the Young Turks to engage in more serious propaganda activities, because no one knew their side of the story. Huysmans said: «no one gives breast to a child that does not cry.»94

91 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 468.
92 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Bardakç, Talat Pa’a’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 157.
93 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 113; Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 23–24; Abraham Galanté, Türkler ve Yahudiler: Tarihi, Siyasi Tertik (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1947), 92; Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Hüseyin Cahit Yaçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds. İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 207–8. Although all sources confirm this socialist conference in Amsterdam, I could not find any information on a Socialist International conference held in Amsterdam in 1919.
94 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 24.
This meeting with Huysmans is marked as the beginning of their propaganda activities. After that Talat Pasha started writing his memoirs. Meanwhile, Cavid Bey, who found refuge in Berne, tried to represent Turkey in the Congress of the Socialist International in Berne, but was denied access. In his place, Talat asked the Georgian representative and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli to defend the Turkish cause against the Armenian accusations. A press bureau in The Hague was opened under the leadership of Nureddin Feruh, who was the former secretary of the Liberal Party (Ahrar Fırkası) and the Chief Clerk at the Ottoman Embassy in the Netherlands. The Hague bureau was allegedly very successful in getting their telegraphs published in news outlets such as Reuters and Het Vaderland. Asım Süreyya [İloğlu], the secretary of the Turkish News Bureau in The Hague, wrote that they were working together with several Dutch press and telegraph agencies and were also in touch with German and French newspapers. In fact, the British Intelligence reported that Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, Dr. Nazım, and Azmi Bey had arrived in Scheveningen near The Hague in late June 1919. According to the British, they founded a «Bureau for Information for TURKEY». Once again, the Young Turks were under suspicion to be «supplied with funds from GERMANY» and for conducting «Espionage and Propaganda work on behalf of GERMANY» in order «to create trouble in TURKEY». Later in early 1920, Talat rented a two-room flat at the Uhlandstraße 194 near his own apartment in Berlin which served as a press bureau. Under the editorship of Arif Cemil (Denker) French, English, and German

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95 Report to Otto Göppert (Berlin) on the activities of Turks residing in Switzerland, February 26, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 195. See also: Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Bardakçı, İttihatçı’nın Sandığı, 476.

96 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 208. Similarly, Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), also known as Kara Şems, was represented by the Bulgarian delegation. See: Herbert Diel, Orientalenvertreter und Berner Sozialistenkongress, February 21, 1919, AA R 14553. See also: Reşit Saffet Atabinen, Le prolétariat turc au Congrès socialiste international de Berne, 1919 (Berne, 1919).

97 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 152–55; Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukleri, 156–58; Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 204–10.


100 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Garbet Maceraları, 131. The CUP leaders were living at Pension Schubert at Uhlandstraße 47. Toprak, “Bolevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Komинтерни,” 6. According to Mehmed Zeki Bey the press pureau was first located at Arif Cemil’a apartment in Kufsteiner Straße 18 and then later at Uhlandstraße 75. Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmörder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik, 113.
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newspapers were read and reports were prepared to be sent to other press bureaus abroad. 101 The Berlin bureau was intended to be in liaison with the nationalist cultural networks of the Turkish Hearth Society (Türk Ocağı Cemiyeti). 102 These other associated Turkish press bureaus were located in Rome, The Hague, and Lausanne. 103 However, these press bureaus seem to be more or less local and autonomous initiatives by an ideologically heterogeneous network of Young Turks of different color (and some other Muslim nationalist intellectuals) loosely united under the flag of opposing the post-war settlement. 104

The relation between the Auswärtiges Amt and the fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin was such a common wisdom that again and again letters and messages for Talat Pasha were delivered at Wilhelmstraße. Sending these letters through the Ottoman Embassy was not an option, because it was closed down and embassy officials were not trusted with some of these messages. 105 For instance, Zeki Abdi, an intelligence agent sent by Talat for a secret mission to Geneva during the war undercover as Greek Anastas Papadopulos, was now penniless and trying to contact Talat at the German Consulate in Geneva. 106 The Auswärtiges Amt responded that they did not know the post address of Talat in Berlin. 107 This was an official

description of the Berlin Bureau at Uhlandstraße, see: Richard Euringer, Der Serasker: Envers Ende, Irrfahrt und Kampf eines kühnen Türken (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939), 57.

101 We have no information on when this Berlin bureau was established, but I believe, this was probably not sooner than May 1920. Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 39 For some of the outrageous rumors about Talat Pasha’s network of press bureaus in European cities, see: Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmöder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik, 113–14.

102 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 9, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 153.


104 The many propaganda publications of these Turkish and Muslim diasporas in Europe shared a common narrative on continuing Great Power intrigues and also regarding the Armenian massacres. See: Hans-Lukas Kieser, “La ‘Grande Guerre’ vue par la diaspora turque en Suisse (1918–1922),” in The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. Olaf Farschid, Manfred Kropp and Stephan Dähne (Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 2006), 231–46; Hikmet Özdemir, Ermeni İddiaları Karşısında Türkiye’nin Birikimi (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2008), 20–30

105 For instance, Captain Baltzer, who helped the Young Turk leaders escape, brought from Constantinople a private letter addressed to Talat Pasha and delivered it at the Auswärtiges Amt, because the Ottoman Embassy was closed. Hermann Baltzer, letter (Dresden) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), July 16, 1919, PA-AA, R 1736. Also Kamil Bey, the former Ottoman Consul in Geneva, asked the German representatives in Switzerland to deliver a secret letter to Talat Pasha, but not to transmit it via the Ottoman Embassy in Berlin. German Consulate in Geneva, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 26, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 96–97.

106 German Embassy in Bern, letter to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), February 24, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 211.

107 Auswärtiges Amt, letter (Berlin) to the German Embassy in Berne, March 11, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 226.
lie, of course. Nonetheless, the letters continued to come and seem to be forwarded to Tala\-t. 108

According to the rumors Whittall heard from the Turkish community in Switzerland, Enver Pasha «had dispatched a number of officers to Afghanistan via Persia in order to create trouble on the Indian frontier.» 109 Even the previous assassination of the Afghan Emir Habibullah Khan on February 20, 1919, was explained as a «C.U.P. plot». 110 In addition, Whittall reported that Cemal Pasha went to Moscow «to discuss with the Bolshevik leaders and arrangements were made to foment insurrections in India and Afghanistan.» If Whittall’s intelligence report would have been dated for 1920 or 1921, most of his claims would have been more or less accurate. But in May and June 1919, these were mere fantasies—even more the fantasies of conspiracy theorists than that of conspiracy practitioners.

Certain «statements» by leading Muslim activists in Switzerland led Whittall to the assumption that «recent events in India, Egypt and perhaps Afghanistan, are not totally unconnected with ‹Islamic› activities in Switzerland.» Necmettin Molla (Kocataş) was quoted in the report, saying:

The Young Turks are preparing well organized revolts in Anatolia and the armies of occupation will not be able to suppress them, they will work together with Moslems in other countries, all directed by the ‹Pan Islamic Committee› in Switzerland, which is establishing branch sections in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Afghanistan, etc. Later on, Algeria and Morocco, etc. will be brought into line. 111

It was perhaps Necmettin Molla’s wishful-thinking or a bluff to claim the existence of such an organization. It was nothing but a hoax. A certain Ali Bey Dhulfiqar, the «Secretary of the Egyptian revolutionary party» and «one of the chiefs in the press department of the Turkish Legation in Berne» was quoted in similar fashion to make the point that national movements were now in a union:

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108 German Consulate in Geneva, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), October 1, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 310.
110 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 75. The CUP leaders knew very little about the assassination of Habibullah. Later in 1921, Azmi Bey wrote a detailed report on the recent history and politics of Afghanistan, in which he introduced Habibullah’s successor Emanullah as a modern ruler. Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
111 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 73.
The Egyptians are firmly resolved to liberate themselves no matter what measures the British take to prevent them. The Moslem world is about to be awakened: a union has been effected between the various Moslem nationalities and all have decided not to cease their activities until the liberation of Islam has been accomplished.\textsuperscript{112}

To be sure, the British Intelligence did not need to fabricate these voices of discontent and calls for mobilization. In 1919, a social movement of anticolonial Muslim transnationalism was emerging simultaneously at multiple settings and voiced by multiple actors. But there was mostly an intellectual unity and collaboration in public claim-making among these movements. These activities neither constituted a conspiratorial union nor a coordinated insurgency to «bring about a downfall of the British Moslem Empire [sic!]».\textsuperscript{113} The connecting force between distant events was contingency, rather than conspiracy. Ottoman-Egyptian Fuad Salim Bey wrote in a letter to Enver Pasha:

Either way, while all these programs [on the partition of the Ottoman Empire] are still ambiguous [mübhem], the English Government was forced to reconsider [its policies]. On the one hand, revolts and unrest which are taking place in religious places in India are either meant to induce autonomy or as a reaction to the injustice the Ottoman Government has been subjected to. On the other hand, the great revolution in Egypt that started in March 8 and continues to this day is influenced by the desire to claim independence as well as a reaction to the catastrophes brought upon the chair of the Caliphate. I see the continuation of these revolts and especially their spread to other places in the East as the only possible means for salvation to save our state.\textsuperscript{114}

While ideas were getting formed and connections between distant events were seen more and more as an opportunity structure, these revolts were actually far away from being coordinated by secret conspirators in Switzerland or Germany. Although the compass of the British Intelligence was showing more or less towards the right direction that there was a somewhat unified message behind these events, intelligence officers like Whittall were too eager in their interpretations to see the work of secret cabals behind it all. The reaction to the Indian activist Sheikh Mushir Hosain Kidwai’s book, \textit{The Sword against Islam},\textsuperscript{115} summarizes the official British perception of these connections:

\begin{quote}
It is the gospel of the latest form of C.U.P. Bolshevism directed against the British Empire more especially in India and Egypt. It shows more clearly than everything I have seen yet
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112}Hugh Whittall, \textit{The Nearer East and the British Empire}, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 74.
\textsuperscript{113}Hugh Whittall, \textit{The Nearer East and the British Empire}, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 75.
\textsuperscript{114}Fuad Salim, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), April 30, 1919, TTK, EP 03-73, mistakenly attributed to Ismail Hakki Pasha in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 81–83.
Pan-Islamism became such a threat in the summer of 1919 that the British officialdom started to see the only countermeasure in supporting local ethno-nationalisms based on the Orientalist assumption of a dichotomy between nationalism and Islam. Thus, Muslim nationalism was declared undesired. «What ever they may have been once», Arthur Hirtzel argued, «Moslems are now as little of a nation as the Jews are, and it is retrograde policy that would treat them as though they were.» His logic went on to proclaim that «Panislamism is undoubtedly a danger—a potential danger», but as he explained, «[t]he antidote is nationalism.» Hirtzel believed, like many others, that «the nationalist movement if properly guided & controlled will tend against Panislamism [...]» Herbert Young believed that «the encouragement of the Arab movement would have been the surest way of weakening political Pan-Islamism in Syria and Mesopotamia.» On the other side, Middle Eastern intellectuals followed another logic: «Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam.... Be loyal to Islam because it is the only way to save our national inheritance.»

Certain individuals occupied central places in the construction of these elaborate scenarios. Dr. Parvus was perhaps the most notorious man in the conspiracy theories of the World War I era. Dr. Parvus, was, of course, not missing in Whittall’s report either: «One of the more notorious intermediaries between Eastern Nationalists in Switzerland and the Russian Bolsheviks is the German agent, Parvus [...]». Israel Lazarevich Gelfand (or Helphand), or

119 A minute by Herbert Young, August 21, 1919, FO 371/4233, 115573, 462, quoted in Friedman, British Miscalculations, 52.
120 A memorandum by Andrew Ryan, December 25, 1919, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 1003.
more commonly known as Alexander Lvovich Parvus, was the central figure in the German-Bolshevik themed conspiracy theories in the World War I era. Parvus had played an important role in the German involvement in exfiltrating Lenin to Russia in 1917, which eventually triggered the Russian Revolution. The German involvement through Parvus in the Russian Revolution was made public in late 1918 in a pamphlet called *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, where the author claimed that «the Bolsheviks were Germany’s paid agents.» All this infected the official and public opinion with the bizarre idea that the Bolsheviks were actually part of a German-Jewish conspiracy against the British Empire, in which Parvus was the international man of mystery that connected the worlds apart. In addition, Parvus was also known to be connected to the Young Turk regime from his former years in Constantinople, where he successfully acted as an influential public intellectual on economics, war, and revolution. Nonetheless, his personal relation to the exiled CUP leaders was not on record, which accordingly left much room for speculations. Hugh Whittall in his intelligence report claimed that it was nobody but Parvus, who «facilitates the frequent journeys of the Moslem emissaries and the transportation of funds to Switzerland». Parvus’ so-called secretary Coppete allegedly told Whittall that «C.U.P. is still strongly organized in Turkey and that a revolution was being secretly prepared which would, to say the least, CAUSE ANXIETY TO THE ALLIED FORCES OF OCCUPATION.» Peculiarly, Talat Pasha

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123 Edgar Sisson, a former US government agent in St. Petersburg, published alleged secret documents in this pamphlet, the so-called Sisson Documents. However, as historians made clear, «the existence of ties between Parvus and the Bolsheviks does not mean to establish that Lenin was a German spy.» Helena M. Stone, “Another Look at the Sisson Forgeries and Their Background,” *Soviet Studies* 37, no. 1 (1985): 90.


125 Regarding his role in Ottoman Turkey, Karaömerlioğlu writes: «Parvus involved himself deeply in Turkish politics, developing relationships with the Young Turk leaders and devising policies especially concerning economic issues in the Ottoman Empire. […] Although we do not know exactly when and how Parvus developed close relations with the Young Turks, he became a popular figure in the Young Turk press and focused extensively on economic issues.» Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “Helphand-Parvus and his Impact on Turkish Intellectual Life,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 151. Kieser writes: «Together with such politically diverse figures as the Turcologist Ernst Jäckh, the Orientalist Max von Oppenheim, the left-liberal politician Friedrich Naumann, the journalist Erwin Nossig, and officers like Enver Pasha’s friend Hans Humann, Parvus had been among the German friends of the Young Turk regime and of the war party in Istanbul.» Hans-Lukas Kieser, “World War and World Revolution: Alexander Helphand-Parvus in Germany and Turkey,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 2 (2011): 408. See also: Paul Dumont, “Un économiste social-démocrate au service de la Jeune Turquie,” in *Mémorial Ömer Lûtfi Barkan*, 75–86 (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1980), 78.

wrote in letter to Enver Pasha in late May 1919 that he was planning to dispatch Arif Cemil (Denker) to Berne to work with a certain Coppete (Kopet) to open a press bureau there and added: «Of course, in this undertaking we remain unseen.» Cavid Bey speaks of a «Socialist Copette» with whom he was in touch in Switzerland. But this is unfortunately a cold trace, since Arif Cemil remained in Berlin and Cavid does not mention Copette anywhere else. The only other occasion, where Parvus has been brought in connection with the fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin was in a dubious propaganda pamphlet in 1920. The author addressed the social-democrat Chancellor Scheidemmann a rhetorical question: «Did perhaps your friend Dr. Halphand [sic], better known under the name of ‹Parvus›, persuade you to grant asylum to these people [fugitive CUP leaders] in Germany?» Also Gregor Alexinsky, an ex-member of the Duma, suggested in 1923 in an article titled «Bolshevism and Turks» that it was Parvus, who was at the center of German-Bolshevik-CUP relations, but he did not offer any concrete evidence to back his claim either. No matter how tempting it is to imagine Parvus in devious relationship with the fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin in scheming a German-Turkish-Bolshevik plot, the evidence is rather speculative, if not untrustworthy. Regardless of whether Parvus was actually involved, the fact that his name pops out in these reports and pamphlets is rather the manifestation of conspiracy theories in collective processes of political sense-making. David Fromkin writes:

While in the clear light of history this conspiracy theory seems absurd to the point of lunacy, it was believed either in whole or in part by large numbers of otherwise sane, well-balanced, and reasonably well-informed British officials. Moreover, it could be supported by one actual piece of evidence: the career of Alexander Helphand. Helphand was a Jew who conspired to help Germany and to destroy the Russian Empire. He was closely associated the Young Turk regime in Constantinople. He did play a significant role in selecting Lenin and sending him into Russia to foment a Bolshevik revolt with a view to helping Germany win the war. He did continue to weave his conspiratorial webs after the war. He was what Wingate and Clayton believed a Jew to be: rich, subvertive, and pro-German. [Emphases in original.]

127 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 154. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify this Coppete in other sources or in biographies of Parvus.
129 Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmörder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik, 138.
131 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 467.
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While their alleged connection to the Bolsheviks was already common in the conspiracy theories, it was still a very vague idea for the CUP leadership to cooperate with Bolsheviks in late spring 1919. There is, however indication, that it was Enver Pasha, who now an eyewitness of the Russian Civil War and perhaps saw the cooperation of Crimean Tatars with the Red Army, proposed this idea in his (now lost) letters. Talat Pasha suggested to discuss «the Bolsheviks, et cetera matters» (Bolşeviği, vesaire mes’eləsini) rather face-to-face, implying this was a topic brought up previously by Enver.\(^{132}\) Former Ottoman Ambassador in Berne and one of the leaders of the exiled Egyptian leaders Fuad Salim Bey complained also in his response to Enver about the other CUP leaders for not taking any steps towards Russia—again implying that Enver brought up this topic:

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\text{Talat Pasha is said to be hiding in Berlin and Cemal in Munich. Considering the great field of operation [saha-i faaliyet] such as Russia standing in front of them, it is a matter of great astonishment for the true patriots [erbab-ı hamiyetçe] that they and their friends remain lazy. If they believe that they can come out and play a role once the circumstances are clear, then they are certainly mistaken.}^{133}\]

More than the obvious factual incorrectness, there was a constant temporal disconnectedness between the CUP’s alleged conspiracy and the conspiracy theories about their undertakings. The Blochian simultaneity of the non-simultaneous (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen) was never as detached as in the time frame between their disappearance in November 1918 and their reappearance in Berlin in the summer of 1919. In a time of early and modest political activism, such as lobbying, networking, petitioning, and publishing, the interpretations in intelligence reports were remarkably more far-reaching and revolutionary—especially, considering the fact that Enver Pasha, was actually absent and missing in action. The intelligence reports rather described the future (or desired) outcomes of politics, than their current situation. This was not due to prophetic analyses, but these assessments soon became formative in building social structures and affecting political agents.

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\(^{132}\) Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Bardakçı, *Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukeşi*, 155.

\(^{133}\) Fuad Salim, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), April 30, 1919, TTK, EP 03-73, mistakenly attributed to İsmail Hakkı Pasha in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 81–83.
Contrary to received wisdom, many German officials were quite critical about the activities of the Young Turks in Germany and on continuing former policies in Middle Eastern affairs. No one, but Adolf Müller, the German Ambassador in Berne, advised the Auswärtiges Amt not to support the activities of Talat Pasha in Switzerland or elsewhere:

First of all, it appears questionable to me, whether we should still encourage the Comité way, which stuck in pan-Turanian beliefs proved to be shortsighted especially in policies towards foreign peoples (Fremdvölkerpolitik). Besides, it is abhorrent to the right of asylum that is granted to Talaat Pasha in Germany to spur him for political actions. Regarding Switzerland as the terrain of the intended propaganda, enough-good and less-good things are taking place already.⁴

Adolf Müller also advised the Auswärtiges Amt not to assign Wesendonk for further duties, who has been «compromised due to Orient propaganda» by the «continuous attacks of the Entente press», Wesendonk in his internal statement denied the accusations, which were «of course entirely plucked out of the air» (natürlich völlig aus der Luft gegegriffen). Contrary to Whittall’s accusations, Wesendonk championed political discretion in Eastern affairs: «In this critical time, Germany shall not incur even the gleam of ambiguity. Nothing shall take place in Switzerland which would cause misinterpretations. But in Berlin events occurred that are a matter of suspicion to the Entente.» Wesendonk refers to the meeting of the «Oppressed People» in Hotel Adlon in April 1919 with Irish nationalist George Chatterton-Hill, Indian nationalist Dr. Chempakaraman Pillai, American reactionist Colonel Edwin Emerson, and Egyptian nationalist Dr. Mansur Rifat holding lectures. Talat Pasha and his friends most certainly had relations to this meeting of the oppressed nations as Talat’s assistant Arif Cemil (Denker) was one of the lecturers. Whittall also criticized that Mahendra

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⁴ Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to the Auswärtiges Amt, February 28, 1919, PA-AA, R 13759, 115–16.
⁵ Adolf Müller, telegraph (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), August 11, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 22156.
Pratap, long compromised from the Hentig-Niedermayer mission to Afghanistan, went recently to Moscow in company of other Indian activists, sending wrong signals regarding Germany’s role.¹³８ These were problematic «remnants of military espionage» (Überbleibsel des militärischen Agentenwesens) from the war-years and Entente’s interpretation was accordingly based on their war-time experience with counter-espionage against Germany’s pan-Islamist policies. Wesendonk concluded: «Of course, the Entente, which is familiar with the war-time affairs, believes that I am in connection with the processes in Germany. If you want to have peace, then the meetings such as the one in Adlon cannot take place publicly and the [Journal] ‹Neue Orient› must quit its Bolshevik tendency.» Even though blunt propaganda was to be omitted, yet Wesendonk cautioned not to completely abandon and neglect Germany’s good relations to Asian countries. Wesendonk advised to carefully wait and utilize the connections in the East.¹³⁹ Caution did not mean a policy change for imperialist Orientalists like Wesendonk. The Orient was still a space of resources. Nonetheless, Adolf Müller from the German Embassy in Berne, again, urged the Auswärtiges Amt to be careful with men like Wesendonk, «[b]ecause it is assumed in many ways that he [Wesendonk] is still active in Switzerland for ministerial assignments, the steps taken by him might give rise to misinterpretations, which do not necessarily represent our interests and perhaps needs to be rather avoided.»¹⁴⁰

To come back to Herbert Diel’s above mentioned report to contrast it to Whittall’s report, he saw three strategies behind «the careful tracing and also frequent inventing of connections between ‹Panislamism› and ‹Bolshevism›». First, this connection served as a measure to «deny the genuine emergence of unrest out of the state of mind and declaration of will by the subjected people». Instead the uprisings are depicted as a «mechanical contagion» of Bolshevik propaganda activities. The conclusion was that «the imminent threat of Islam» would directly disappear, as soon as Bolshevism is defeated. This strategy was supported by propagating the notion that «Bolshevist theories and Islamic social order» are «completely incongruent in their nature». The second strategy behind the «Bolshevist labeling of all liberation movements

¹³⁹ Otto Günther von Wesendonk, letter (Lucerne) to Herr von Hanich, August 9, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 22743.
¹⁴⁰ Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), September 5, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 24370.
The evidence that the mandatory powers have an interest in spreading the belief that there is a Bolshevik infection of their Oriental people does not entitle one in any way to believe that every connection is invented. It is rather worthwhile to pick out the grains of truth that, as already hinted at, are hidden in the husks of the false evidence. In one point the enacted concerns displayed by the Entente are actually real and correct, despite all the fantasy in the particular details: that there is a logical connection between incidences that are spatially disparate, such as in Egypt and in India. The concept of a Bolshevik origin is merely a very transparent veil, with which the controlling powers of the Entente attempt to enshroud the eyes of the ‘profanum vulgus’ from their own realization that there is an awakening sense of solidarity in the Islamic Orient.143

Diel rightly notes that the Entente will argue against the potential of an «all-Muslim community spirit» by pointing to the failed jihad of 1914.144 But now in the aftermath of World War I the situation changed radically:

Then the collapse of the Central Powers happened and along with it the demasking of the Entente’s aims in the Orient. The secret treaties came to light out of the darkness of archives, not to be torn apart, but rather elevated to become laws. Their individual paragraphs have been ‘matched’ to meet the Wilsonian formula without changing the content, but only by interchanging the headline ‘share of the loot’ into ‘mandate’.145

Diel pointed out that there were broken promises of reform, autonomy, and independence from Morocco to India.

In short, there is no Islamic country in the coalition of the ‘victors’ whose disappointment about the consequences of their loyalty is less bitter than the despair of Turkey in face of the unmercifulness of its ‘punishment’. […] The commonalities of these experiences wrap a new strong bond around the whole Orient. Thus, the sentiments blur into an

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141 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 3–4.
142 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 4.
143 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 5. See also: Yenen, “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I,” 1204.
144 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 6.
145 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 7.
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aligned grievance, which rises among the Mohammedanian populated territories from Indian to Atlantic Ocean. It has a completely different momentous than the single flashes of open uproar, in which they scatteredly cringe for the time being. The underground fire of this grievance is hardening the consciousness of a community of fate and the necessity of an association to overcome their present-day fate.146 Despite its wishful-thinking in the potential of these movements, Diel correctly described these events as independent social movements transnationally connected in the framing of their political cause as a struggle against the global hegemony of Western colonialism and imperialism. Italian Orientalist Leone Caetani also pointed out a similar trend in a lecture he delivered in Rome on May 28, 1919:

The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of anti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, and Libya, are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment and have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world against European civilization.

The principal reason for this ferment is the report spread throughout the world that the Entente wishes to suppress the Ottoman Empire, dividing its territory among the powers and ceding Palestine to the Jews. This report has deeply disturbed Mussulmans, who see in these projects a grave threat to their most sacred religious sentiments. England, the greatest Mussulman power in the World, and also the other countries which will eventually be commissioned to administer the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, must take into account these sentiments if they wish to avoid serious complications.147

In sum, it was the spread of colonial rule despite the promise of self-determination and the disintegration and perceived defamation of the Ottoman Empire that gave these distant and detached incidents from Morocco to Afghanistan a common framing. In this regard, the Bolshevik connection was more imagined than real. As Diel argued: «The direct exertion of influence by the Bolshevists in the processes in the Orient is for sure ‹hic et ubique› vanishingly low in relation to the ghost sightings of the Entente press and their alarm calls.»148

Compared with Whittall’s conspiracy theories, Diel offered a rather sociological explanation for the relationship between Islamic and socialist movements. According to him, the «conspicuous analogy» between socialist theory and the emancipation demands of the Muslim people lies in the class society of states in the League of Nations, where all Muslim nations

146 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 8.
148 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 9.
are denounced as «mandate states» (Mündelstaaten), i.e. «proletariat of the states» (Staatenproletariat). Diel offered a remarkably postcolonial perspective, when he said: «The hegemony of the imperialistic system in a way discredits as a rule the Islamic character of a state as a disqualification for its acceptance among the upper classes of states—which is reserved to the European civilization.»¹⁴⁹ Elsewhere in his memorandum Diel made the observation: «The religious fanaticism that is ascribed to Islam obtains its main food from the pretension of the superiority of occidental «civilizers», who until today have a delight in draping themselves in crusader cloaks.»¹⁵⁰ Diel believed that this understanding was adopted by certain Muslim intellectuals and were now being publicly expressed in international forums.¹⁵¹ In addition, the «organization of Islamic movements» successfully adopted the contentious repertoire of mass demonstrations and strikes as it was being demonstrated in Egypt.¹⁵² Diel believed that very soon an «Islamic International» will be founded after the socialist model that would join the «struggle against the capitalist-imperialist dominance».¹⁵³ As much as Diel romanticized these social movements of Muslim nations, it was completely against the grain of contemporary cultural interpretations that saw Islam, nationalism, and socialism irreconcilable. The impact of this tradition is still present in the scholarship.¹⁵⁴

To be sure, it is perhaps questionable, how representative Diel’s observations were for German imperialism and Orientalism in 1919.¹⁵⁵ He was, nevertheless, as representative as Whittall was to British imperialism and Orientalism. Regarding Germany’s role in all these affairs,

¹⁴⁹ Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 11.
¹⁵⁰ Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 15.
¹⁵¹ Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 12.
¹⁵² Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 13.
¹⁵³ Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 17.
¹⁵⁴ Hans-Lukas Kieser, for instance, is still inclined to be suspicious of any connection between Turkism, Islam, and socialism, and follows the received wisdom: «Türkisten waren von ihrem völkischen Glauben her schlechte Vertreter des Islams und hatten von ihrem rechtsmodernistischen Weltbild her nichts gemeinsam mit internationalem Sozialismus.» Kieser, Vorkämpfer der „Neuen Türkei“ 93.
¹⁵⁵ For German Orientalism see: Sabine Mangold, Eine “weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft”: Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004); Ursula Wokoeck, German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800 to 1945 (London: Routledge, 2009); Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion Race and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
Diel had one last advice, namely to abandon the «power politics of the old style» (*Machtpolitik alten Stils*) and to adopt a «comprehensive policy of ideas» (*grossangelegte Ideenpolitik*). Germans were in the post-Versailles trauma everything but adventurous and daring, although deeply resentful.

In the end, the British officialdom possessed mostly reliable intelligence. Their interpretation was, however, very much speculative, to say the least. Patterns and tropes of conspiracy theories led the way in making sense out of the complexity of transnational politics and this trend would reach its climax in the summer of 1920 as it will be discussed in later chapters.

The British Intelligence assessments were no better off than the sensationalist news coverage of Entente press. The paranoid thing was shared mentality of the imperial officialdom. When *The Times* announced that allegedly a delegation from Anatolia had arrived at Berlin in order to conduct secret negotiations with the German Government, the German representative in London reported to Berlin: «In this context, the English newspapers strive to persuade the public with all kinds of allegedly dangerous machinations of the Turks in order to justify the English policies in the Middle East.» But also through purposeful public leaks to newspapers and to informants, the British Intelligence was also constitutive in the making of a conspiracy that went beyond theory, altered perceptions and behaviors. Count Carlo Sforza remembers, how «an Intelligence Service composed of specialist English officers who, little by little, were taking over all political control» of the political discourse at the Constantinople Headquarters. These intelligence reports and their press leaks made the Islamic-Bolshevik alliance a possibility in public imaginations—for good or bad. On the other hand, the imperial paranoias of the British officialdom in 1919 were also somewhat prophetic, as they prophesized and exaggerated tendencies and alignments, which were to be realized or attempted not much different than the way as they were envisioned in past intelligence assessments. These prophetic misjudgments perhaps helped the British Empire to be few steps ahead of

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156 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 18. For further ideas and policy suggestions of Diel see his memorandum “Orient, league of Nations, and German Policy” (Berlin-Grunewald), April 15, 1920, PA-AA, R 78479.


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their adversaries. Indeed, soon later Talat and Enver looked for ways to approach the Bolsheviks and found a league of Eastern revolutionaries.
5. «You all Need to Get Organized!»:

Transnational Relations with
Bolsheviks, Entente, Arabs, and Kemalists

While the CUP leaders has been imagined in conspiracy theories as plotting grand schemes involving Bolshevik-sponsored armies and pan-Islamic insurgencies on behalf of Germany, the CUP leaders slowly started to crawl out of their hide-outs and engaged more and more in politics in the summer of 1919. «I see hope for the future where the sun rises», Talat wrote to Cemal Pasha on December 21, 1919. «It is necessary to work there with all our existence and to grow stronger», as Talat believed.¹ The same day, Talat also wrote another letter to Cavid Bey, where he said: «I set my hopes from now on entirely on the place where the sun rises. With all my existence I will work for that region. And I seriously foster great hopes.»² Since the sun rises in the East, both the Muslim East and the Russian East were now politically related to each other in their horizon of expectations. One of the contacts of the exiled CUP leaders in Berlin, Wipert von Blücher from the Auswärtiges Amt, wrote in his memoir:

By no means, they were willing to accept the defeat [in World War I] as something definitive. Instead they immediately began to search for new combinations. Outlawed in homeland, persecuted by the Entente powers, they had to turn their eyes towards the East.³

Whereas diplomats and delegates were discussing and deciding the future of distant lands in the peace conferences of Paris and San Remo, the CUP leaders participated at unofficial meetings in Berlin and Switzerland. Secret letters were exchanged by couriers between Berlin, Ankara, Damascus, and Moscow that manifested the engagement of the fugitive CUP leaders in transnational relations.

¹ Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), December 21, 1919, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoglu, eds. İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 186.
² Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 21, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 145.
³ Wipert von Blücher, Deutschland’s Weg nach Rapallo: Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliele (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1951), 130.
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The ambivalence of transnational contentious politics is important to be considered. In the absence of the legalism and formalism of international diplomacy, transnational politics constituted ambiguous interactions, which tend to be marginalized or criminalized by diplomatic histories. A friendly handshake at a secret meeting in a café houses or some promises spoken behind the closed doors of a private apartment or few cordial words in a letter from somewhere important like Moscow, Syria or Anatolia was enough to imagine that political alliances were in the making—both by conspirators and conspiracy theorists. By the same token, when at these secret meetings or in these private letters such threats were expressed to organize insurgencies and conspire with other states, this again was imagined as serious contentions. The clandestineness of the revolutionary non-state actor, its transnational networks, and its potentially subversive capabilities fueled both the anxieties of state actors as well as the ambitions of revolutionary non-state actors to read more into such transnational contentious politics. Thus, the already existing rumor-based conspiracy theories of CUP activities were enhanced by the evidence of very real transnational interactions that the CUP leaders were part of. Furthermore, direct dialog of Entente agents with the CUP leaders delivered the confirmation of existing fears. In the meantime, the increase of transnational relations with numerous political actors gave a boost to the imagination and ambition of the CUP leaders in pursuing their usurpation plans.

The ambivalence of transnational contentious politics also blurred the cohesion of a group of transnational actors in the eyes of distant observers. For instance, there were some serious disputes between Talat’s and Enver’s factions. But these differences were consciously concealed to the outside. In the midst of negotiations with a number Entente states, Enver wrote in a private letter to Cemal: «And for now I think it is better not to show that we are working independently from Talat in order to look stronger from outside.»4 The cohesion between Kemalists and Unionists was similarly a matter of speculation and deterrence. «The Committee’s strength is the strength of these two ideas», as one British memorandum concluded. «These ideas cannot be controlled: by the physical power of the Allies nor can the Allies

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4 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 205; Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), December 1, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 30.
physically control the Committee. All the members and its organization are not known. Its ramifications are wide.»

The fugitive CUP leaders were engaged in transnational relations with state actors such as Soviet Russia as well as with Entente states of Britain, France, and Italy as these will be discussed below. The relationship of the Young Turk refugees to German officials deserves a more detailed discussion as this will be covered in other chapters. The CUP leaders also maintained transnational relations with other non-state actors, such as Arab, Turkic, and Muslim activists from different lands, as well as with quasi-state actors from the Middle East, such as the provisional government of Prince Faysal in Syria and the (soon to be announced) Ankara Government of the National Forces under Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

In reading dialectic processes of sense-making in transnational contentious politics, once again perceptions and misperceptions as well as promises and deterrence were entangled with each other. Thus, ideas and ideologies come into play in understanding the strategies and agendas behind these transnational relations. The CUP leaders were considered as trespassing the given political and ideological boundaries. Why would Muslim nationalists seek an alliance with Bolshevik communists? Why would Young Turks reach out to Entente states? Why were supposedly hostile Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists collaborating with each other? Why were Kemalists and Unionists supporting each other, although they were rivals? Not only the state-centric ontology of international relations, but also the epistemologies of intellectual histories has been responsible for misconceptions and misinterpretations.

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Karl Radek, formerly known as Karol Sobelsohn, was born to a Polish-Jewish family in Austria-Hungary in 1885. Since his student days, he had been an influential figure in the Polish and German Social Democratic movements. During the war, he became a confidante of Lenin in Switzerland and had accompanied him in the «sealed train» to St. Petersburg. From

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the beginning of the Russian Revolution onwards, Radek belonged to the inner circle of leading Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia. He was generally in charge of foreign and press affairs. He had been a Soviet delegate at Brest-Litovsk negotiations, where he had met Talat Pasha for the first time. As connoisseur of German affairs, he has been a close observant of the November Revolution in Germany. In the last weeks of 1918, Radek decided to attend the «Reich Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils» in Berlin with a Soviet delegation. At the border, the German border patrols denied the Soviet delegation permission to enter Germany. Since he was a Germanophile Polish Jew, Radek and his three comrades disguised themselves as Austrian POWs on their way home from captivity in Russia. Without any trouble the group crossed the border, but still missed the already dissolved congress in Berlin. Nonetheless, on December 30, 1918, Radek participated at the founding congress of the Spartacist League, where he held a lecture on «The Russian and German Revolutions and World Politics».

When the clashes between the Spartacists and police began in January, the Berlin police and its Freikorps vigilantes started a witch-hunt against Spartacist leaders with brutal results. Spartacist leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were tortured and executed on January 15, 1919. Radek immediately went hiding, because there was also a similar arrest warrant against him, accusing him of sedition and conspiracy. After several weeks of hiding, Radek was arrested and imprisoned in the Moabit prison on February 12, 1919, for the accusation of being a Soviet agent provocateur for the Spartacist uprising. In return, the Soviet Republic of Ukraine declared him ambassador in Berlin, hoping that diplomatic immunity might help him get released from prison. As a Bolshevik, Radek was considered a transnational conspirator. As a Soviet diplomat he might have enjoyed the privileges of international diplomacy. But in the eyes of German officials, Soviet Russia was still a revolutionary quasi-state and Radek its seditious agent. To make sure that no harm was done to Radek, the Soviets

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8 Weismann, report on Karl Radek, August 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 2043.
9 Gutjahr, Revolution muss sein, 363.
10 Gutjahr, Revolution muss sein, 365.
11 Chicherin, radiogram (Moscow) to Bela Kun (Budapest), June 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 2043.
took prominent German residents in Russia hostage until Radek’s release. German officials considered Radek to be the «most skillful and influential agitator» of the Bolsheviks and his release and extradition was feared, although the evidence against him was admittedly scarce and speculative. After several months under harsh conditions of solitary confinement, on July 1, 1919, Radek voluntarily revoked his nominal diplomatic status and was granted with larger quarters with many privileges. Radek’s loyal comrade Karl Moor, a German-Swiss communist with far-reaching connections in Berlin, arranged several political guests of different color for meetings in Radek’s new quarters. In Radek’s words: «Within a day my cell had become a political salon». 

Sometime in the summer of 1919 Enver Pasha also arrived at a prominent political salon in Neubabelsberg, near Berlin. From May to July 1919, Enver was able to send some letters from his hiding place, presumably in Crimea, to the addresses of his old pal Hans Humann and his sister Maria Sarre (married to the Director of the Museum of Islamic Art, Professor Friedrich Sarre) in Berlin. Hans Humann and Maria Sarre were the children of Carl Humann, who was a German engineer and archaeologist, who had discovered the Pergamon temple. Thus, Hans and Maria had spent their childhood in the colony of German expats in the Ottoman Empire. The Humanns/Sarres and Enver became family friends as Enver was Military Attaché in Berlin from 1909-1911. Enver’s letters from these years to Humann’s sister Marie Sarre are an important source of his intellectual development and a matter of gossips about a romantic affair. As a proud German imperialist and expert on the Ottoman

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13 Memorandum on the Radek affair, July 18, 19119, PA-AA, R 2043.


17 Talat writes that he got Enver’s letter from Madame Sarre, Hans Humann’s sister, in Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., *Talat Paşa’nnın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Teşirleri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hısusı Yazışmalar* (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 153.

18 These letters now in the Ernst Jäckh Papers at the Yale University Library are published in M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, ed., *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989). Some of these letters were
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Empire, Hans Humann served as the Naval Attaché to the Ottoman Empire and played a key role in Ottoman-German relations during World War I. Although Enver’s letter to Maria Sarre and Hans Humann are missing, Hans Humann asked General von Seeckt as Enver’s “good-old mentor” to give him some advice in his current “loneliness.” Regarding Enver’s political position, Humann commented:

In his current involuntary buen retiro he hears probably only Turkish or Bolshevik voices. They both are partly superficial, partly not independent from an unintended tendency. He will have this bias as a statesman or at least obtain it.

Once arrived at Berlin, Enver, first stayed at Sanatorium Sinn together with Talat Pasha, but soon found shelter in the Villa Sarre in Neubabelsberg, which belonged to his befriended couple Maria and Friedrich Sarre. The Villa Sarre was a popular meeting place of Orientalists, militarists, imperialists, and many other public figures in Berlin. A contemporary wrote:

At the home of the Humanns many policies have been made, especially regarding Turkey. I can remember that the old privy councilor [Maria Sarre’s father Carl Humann] was a great connoisseur of the state of affairs in the Orient and that diplomats were in and out his home. And now, at the [house of] family Sarre the old relations are continued and political strings are woven.

The son of Maria and Friedrich, Hans Sarre, wrote in his memoir, how Enver Pasha was hiding in a guest room in the loft of his childhood home. Although the children soon learned, what was going on, Enver’s presence was kept as a secret. His food was brought to his room and Enver seldom left his quarters. Whenever he came across the children in the corridor,

also published in newspapers by Ernst Jäckh for propaganda measures and later as a book. Enver Pasha, Um Tripolis, ed. Friedrich Perzyński (München: Bruckmann, 1918). See also: Hakan Gökpinar, Deutsch-türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914 und die Rolle Enver Paschas (Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2011), 122–43; Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 27, 109, 584, note 62. For the gossip that Maria Sarre’s son was allegedly from Enver, see: Rıza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, 4 vols. (İstanbul: Altundağ Yayınları, 1967–1968), III, 926.

19 On Hans Humann see: Malte Fuhrmann, Der Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2006), 359–62.
20 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), July 12, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 6.
21 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), July 12, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 6.
22 Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, 132.
23 For the Villa Sarre as a place of social gathering see: Jürgen Gottschlich, Beihilfe zum Völkermord: Deutschlands Rolle bei der Vernichtung der Armenier (Berlin: Links, 2015), 60–65.
24 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
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Enver used to mask his face playfully with his hands. It was only a matter of time that the political salons of Radek and Sarre/Humann would be connected with each other.

With Enver’s arrival in Berlin in the summer of 1919, the CUP leaders, Enver and Talat, met again for the first time since November 1918 as they went separate ways in Crimea. Meanwhile the National Struggle in Anatolia had already started and they were keenly observing and absorbing all the news they could about Ottoman Turkey from newspapers and recent visitors. Although it is not necessarily known, how their thought process came to embrace the idea of a «Turkish-Russian entente», but as soon as Talat and Enver reunited in early August 1919, they decided to visit Karl Radek at his Moabit prison. Talat Pasha was, first, to visit Karl Radek. Later Radek acknowledged Talat’s significant role in this critical moment:

And to be fair to Talaat Pasha, it must be noted that he understood the significance of Soviet power at the moment of its greatest impending danger. In September 1919, during the Denikian advance Talat entered negotiations with the Soviet representatives abroad and propagated the idea of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement.

Enver and Talat continued to visit Radek until he was deported from Germany in January 1920. Radek wrote in his prison memoir:

Two of my first guests were the former Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha, the Head of the Young Turk Government, and his War Minister Enver Pasha, the hero of the defence of Tripoli. After the rout of Turkey, they lived semi-illegally in Berlin—the Entente was demanding their extradition—and they were planning how to conduct the further defence of Turkey.

Regarding the impression Enver and Talat gave, Radek noted:

I knew Talaat from the time of Brest-Litovsk. There I had seen him at the victors’ table. Here in the Berlin prison, a broken man, he recalled that he was the son of a telegraphist.

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26 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992), 26–27. Other sources that are more sympathetic of Cemal Pasha write that it was Cemal, who first proposed to approach the socialists and Bolsheviks. Arthur Salz, “Dschemal Pascha,” Frankfurter Zeitung, July 29, 1922; Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 205–7.

27 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 331.


and himself a former telegraphist, [...] We discussed the Armenian question many times. Talaat did not defend his policy, but pointed out that, surrounded as they were on all sides by the Entente which used the Armenians as an element of internal disruption, they were compelled to resort to the most brutal measures. I must say that Talaat struck me as a man with great innate intelligence and will power; he spoke a mixture of broken German and French. Enver Pasha, expressing himself freely in French and German, nervous by temperament, gave the impression of an unstable man who had completely lost his balance and was fighting for his personal position than for his country.30

In their conversations with Radek, the CUP leaders «kept saying that the Moslem East could free itself from slavery only with the support of the popular masses and an alliance with Soviet Russia.» Both Talat and Enver were compelled to underline that «there were no essential divergences between them» and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has been publicly disassociating himself from the CUP—allegedly only as a deception. As Radek remembers, Enver and Talat were claiming that «they were organizing help for him abroad». The CUP leaders believed that Turkey in its current situation was depended on auxiliary resources from abroad, especially from the Muslim and Turkic peoples. Talat was convinced that the Soviets had given up their plans to conquer and centralize former Tsarist territories and were at this moment of civil war ready to grant autonomy and independence to Russian nationalities, including the Muslim republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These opportunity spaces of Muslim Russia were long imagined by the Young Turk leadership as a potential resource for Ottoman Turkey’s rescue. To mobilize these resources in Muslim Russia, they needed the blessing and support of the Bolshevik government.

Radek was convinced that these men could be an asset for Soviet interests and advised them to go to Moscow and talk these matters with Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders.31 Together with Radek they decided upon a provisory «Turkish-Russian agreement» (Türk-Rus İtilafi).32 A telegraph from Moscow gave a preliminary approval to this agreement.33 This agreement is a matter of discussion when comes to the relation between Islam, nationalism, and socialism in writing the intellectual history of this liminal period. The agreement with Radek was summarized by Enver Pasha in a letter to Cemal Pasha in six points:

1- Redemption of the Muslim nations,

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32 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 55.
33 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 331.
2- Cooperation with the socialists, since it is my goal to collectively struggle against Europe’s imperialist capitalism.

3- Acceptance of principles of socialism in the liberated countries on the condition to respect the traditions and nature of internal affairs.

4- Utilization of any means of force including revolution for the liberation of Islam.

5- Cooperation with non-Muslim captive nations in this regard.

6- Tolerance of cultural improvement of all the elements [i.e. non-Muslims] living within Islamicate societies.\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), [December, 1919], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 34. See also: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 493; Paul Dumont, “La fascination du Bolchevisme: Enver Pacha et la Parti des soviets populaires 1919–1922,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 18, no. 2 (1975): 145.}

In Enver’s six points there is a clear boundary set to the adoption of socialist principles. These presumed boundaries are marked by the premise of protecting and respecting «the traditions and nature of internal affairs» (idare-i dahiliyesinde esasat ve bünyeye tevafuk ettirmek şartı ile). When one newspaper announced that Talat Pasha was in touch with Radek in Berlin, but only to achieve his own goals and to «use Bolshevism as a weapon», Talat is said to have been very sad about this. In their agreement with Radek, they had openly acknowledged each other’s respective political differences and granted each party with political autonomy.\footnote{Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 65.}

Thus, a certain cultural incompatibility between Islam and socialism was seen in the conduct state of affairs, but this mismatch did not necessarily mean a rejection of socialism per se. To the contrary, certain socialist ideas and terminology was consciously adopted by the CUP leaders.\footnote{Paul Dumont writes: «Par cette clause, Enver envisage plus qu’une simple alliance tactique avec les communistes: il va jusqu’à concevoir une sorte de socialisme islamique dont il serait le champion. Cela peut être interprété comme un premier pas en direction des Bolcheviks.» Dumont, “La fascination du Bolchevisme,” 145. See also: Masayuki Yamauchi, ed., The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 18; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye de Siyasal Partiler III: İttihat ve Terakki (İstanbul: Hürrüyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 577; Bardakçı, Enver, 178.}

The interpretation of British Intelligence was, again, rather exaggerated:

The most important development in Anatolia to-day is undoubtedly the movement towards Bolshevism. […] The Unionist wing, however, […] insists that it is useless to hope for the slightest assistance from the Bolsheviks unless Bolshevism is adopted with all its consequences; and they maintain that the tenets of Islam are capable of complete reconciliation with Bolshevik doctrines. […] It [the Unionist wing] is in constant communication with Talat, who is the principal protagonist of Islamic Bolshevism in Europe and
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who is making every effort to obtain control of the nationalist movement, with the assistance of the Russians and Germans.37

In the imagination of British Intelligence, the CUP was already inseparable from the Bolshevists. Therefore, it was very common to conclude that «[t]he ostensible bolshevik, pan-islamic and nationalist propaganda are all apparently organized and controlled in the near East by Turks.»38 In the perception of the British officials, the CUP and Bolsheviks merged to a single political body in the aftermath of World War I. As one British official concluded «there is or ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism», because, he argued, «[t]he force behind all these movements is the same.»39 In the same breath, Pan-Islam and Bolshevism were equally grouped together. «Bolshevism and Islam were both giant secret societies in the British official mind», as Priya Satia explains, «their members following party decrees and clerical fatwas, respectively.»40 For instance, T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) was even talking about a «wahabi-like Moslem edition of Bolshevism».41

On the other hand, others saw mere realpolitik behind the union of Islam and Bolshevism. Islam and Bolshevism were commonly imagined as contradictory beliefs. Thus, their union was considered to be based on an intrigue. «No principles, for example, are more fundamentally incompatible than those of Bolshevism and Islam», as one political officer on the staff of the British Naval Commander-in-Chief concluded in a report on the effects of Bolshevism. He argued that «no two systems have less in common.» This incompatibility, as it was stated, did not hinder the Bolsheviks to «use any instrument and any device» in order to «delude Moslems» that «Great Britain is the enemy of Islam».42 In addition, the «rise of the nationalist movement and the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress has provided valuable allies or, more correctly tools.» Others granted the CUP more agency, but also saw an alliance with Bolshevism in instrumental terms. «The Moslem respects power above all else»,

38 GHQ Intelligence Summary, EEF, April 9, 1920, WO, 106/196, quoted in Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 206.
39 George Kidston, minute, April 9, 1919, on Horace Rumbold (Berne) to Lord Curzon (London), April 3, 1919, FO 371/4141, quoted in Satia, Spies in Arabia, 224.
40 Satia, Spies in Arabia, 211.
41 T. E. Lawrence, note, [September 20, 1919], FO 371/4236, 129405, quoted in Satia, Spies in Arabia, 212.
as another British official claimed. If Turkey desires to achieve to assure its «hegemony in Islam», he believed that «she will use [Islam] for the iconoclastic purposes of the Committee of Union and Progress and Bolsheviks.»

The power of realpolitik cannot be denied in CUP-Bolshevik relations. Hans Humann, who paraphrased the information he got from Enver Pasha, draw a rather pragmatic picture of the Islamic-Bolshevik rapprochement: «Lenin makes favorable offers; goes without social or Bolshevist movement and contents himself with active anti-English policy dressed as pan-Islamism according to the motto of right of self-determination of the peoples.» A British official, who had interviewed Enver in Berlin, reported a similar version of the events—perhaps revealing Enver’s opinion:

> In dealing with ENVER and his supporters the Bolshevic policy has been extremely clever. The Bolshevists have given everything and asked practically nothing in return. They do not wish to establish Bolshevism in Turkey and do not even ask the Turkish leaders to say they approve of Bolshevist methods in Russia. All they have asked is that ENVER should work for Pan-Islamism directed principally against England. In return for this they have supplied money and equipment for the Turkish troops in Caucasia and Turkestan.

One of the German friends of the CUP leaders in Berlin wrote:

> T. [a.k.a. Talat] considers the flirtation with Bolshevism without a risk. It constitutes a significant threat against the Entente and T. [a.k.a. Talat] thinks that Turkey is practically seen absolutely not a field for Bolshevism. Therefore, the experiment is without any risk. It can be turned off whenever desired.

Legation Council Hey from the Auswärtiges Amt, who accompanied Karl Radek’s deportation to Russia via Poland in January 1920, came to a similar conclusion after several conversations with Radek:

> Regarding the anti-English propaganda in these regions [the Bolsheviks] expect much from Enver Pasha. Radek had detailed conversations with him and also with Talaat Pasha, who are united by the common enemy. The cooperation is relieved by the fact that

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43 A minute by Mr. Vansittart (Paris), February 9, 1920, CAB 21/177, XC/A 51185, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, IV, 1004. See also: ZMO, NGH 07-10, 68.
45 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) Otto von Lossow (Munich), February 21, 1920, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
46 Major Ivor Hedley, report (Berlin) on a telephone conversation with Enver Pasha, February 25, 1920, FO, 371/5211, 1311, 40.
47 Undated letter by a German diplomat to Otto von Lossow (Munich), BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
even the Bolsheviks hold it for impossible to establish Soviet Governments in Central Asia.48

To be sure, there was no ideological conversion to socialism. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the Young Turk interest in Soviet Russia as a bogus maneuver. The Young Turks’ approach to Soviet Russia and Bolshevism was to a certain degree based on a sincere curiosity and fascination for revolutionary politics. As self-acclaimed revolutionaries, they acknowledged the power of the revolutionary moment coming from the epicenter of Soviet Russia. Young Turks knew very well that global revolutions offered opportunity structures, where new alliances could be merged across boundaries and new ideas could be adapted to local exigencies and repertoires.49

«The task did not differ markedly from one which the C.U.P. had itself undertaken before», as Masayuki Yamauchi correctly noted, which was «the spread of anti-imperialist and particularly anti-British propaganda, conveyed in Muslim phraseology, throughout Anatolia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, India and Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan.»50 In their intellectual approach to socialism and Bolshevism, the CUP leaders cherry-picked those ideas that were common to their existing ideological repertoire and similar to their own political mindset. Bolshevik-inspired anti-imperialism, for instance, offered a seamless translation to Muslim anticolonialism. The idea of revolutionary politics similarly corresponded to their komitadji repertoire, and was, thus, adopted and admired. The Young Turks were also no strangers to populist rhetoric and social mobilization tactics of mass politics. The Marxist class-struggle and proletariat ethos corresponded to their nationalist self-victimization discourse as oppressed people in face of foreign and infidel economic exploitation. Communist internationalism was seen as a federative framework for Muslim transnationalism. All in all, coming to terms with the Bolsheviks did not meant a serious policy shift or intellectual rupture for the CUP leaders, but rather the continuation and transformation of their existing experiences.

After the Young Turk leaders decided with Karl Radek upon the principles of their cooperation in the Moabit prison in Berlin, it was then necessary to go to Moscow to seal the deal with the Bolshevik leaders. Enver Pasha dreamt of arriving at Moscow in the official company

of Karl Radek. Being Radek’s fellow traveler would certify his political mission in Moscow. Enver’s wish did not come true, as we will see later. Nonetheless, the CUP leaders, both Talat and Enver, seem to have been very much occupied in cooperating with Karl Radek in Berlin. For instance, in a letter from November 7, 1919, Enver wrote to Cemal that he has been busy, dealing with Radek’s release.\(^5\) Talat wrote the following in a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, probably not without exaggerating his own role:

> I am in touch with the Bolshevik leaders here [in Berlin]. I met several times with Radek who was imprisoned until recently. And we agreed to cooperate within the principles I described above to be approved by Lenin. I worked a lot with the Germans and achieved Radek’s release and his transportation to Moscow by airplane. And I arranged his travel documents under another name. For this reason, Radek and the Bolsheviks here are gratefully indebted to us. Because Radek is the specialist on eastern affairs within the Bolshevik government, he assures that our agreement will be accepted by the central committee.\(^5\)

How far Talat Pasha is telling the truth here is doubtful. He probably wanted to impress Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Except for these few bold claims in their private letters, there is no evidence in archival documents that Talat or Enver had anything to do with Radek’s release.\(^5\)

Nonetheless, regarding the rapprochement with the Bolsheviks or anyone else, Mustafa Kemal made clear that no one but he was the king of the castle. «In any kind of approach or alliance with the foreigners», Mustafa Kemal declared in his correspondence with Talat, «last word and last decision must be communicated with here.» «For instance,» he said and defined it more precisely, «the arrangement with Radek which is to be approved by Lenin must be approved and examined by me as well.»\(^5\)

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While the British Intelligence saw the CUP leaders engaged in anti-British conspiracies everywhere possible, ironically both Talat and Enver were trying to come to term with British decision-makers. These were mostly efforts to clear their own name of war-crimes, but also

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\(^5\) Lerner, for instance writes: «Somehow a compromise was reached, and Radek was allowed to leave Germany for Russia in January 1920.» Lerner, *Karl Radek*, 90. There is also no mention in Gutjahr, *Revolution muss sein*, 410–12.

partly sincere efforts to do something against the situation in Ottoman Turkey. Talat Pasha reached the conclusion that he first needed to convince the prime victor of the war, the British Government, that he was not responsible for the Armenian massacres. Therefore, Talat wrote a letter to Lloyd George where he introduced himself as a «man who does not occupy any official and political positions». Yet, his status as a non-state actor was not helping and the Armenian Question was certainly making doors slammed at his face. Talat wrote George that the British needed the Turks in their current conflict with Soviet Russia. He never received an answer. Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, as he was still hiding somewhere in South Russia, wrote a letter to Winston Churchill, urging him to intervene Lloyd George’s foreign affairs. But not without warning him about the «deep fire of Islam», if Britain would not come to terms with Ottoman Turkey.55 Talat considered Churchill to be «a little charlatan» (biraz şarlatan). In these attempts to get in touch with senior British politicians, they knowingly risked to get «caught by entrapment» (yakalatmak için tuzak). Enver would not receive an answer from Churchill either.56

When Talat Pasha realized that Lloyd George would not answer his letter, he decided to write a letter to his «ancien ami» Aubrey Herbert, whom he knew prior to the war and treasured as a trustworthy and Turcophile (Türkiye muhibbi) British official—more on Aubrey Herbert later in Chapter 10. In his letter to Herbert in September 1919, Talat had claimed again that «he was not responsible for the Armenian massacres, that he could prove it, and that he was anxious to do so.» To settle the strife with the British, he wished to have a talk with Herbert in a neutral country. One British government official, whom Herbert asked for advice on how to response, was not happy at all hearing about the identity of Herbert’s pen pal.57 «What did you want to bring me into this for?», he stood up and moaned. «Couldn’t you have left me out? It’s illegal to correspond with the enemy.»58 As a result, Herbert politely answered

56 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 36–39; Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 156–57.
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to Talat that a meeting would not help him clear his reputation in these days. As a fugitive political actor, there were structural barriers between him and the decision-makers in London.

In August 1919, Major Ivor Hedley, a member of the British Military Mission in Berlin, approached Maria Sarre at her villa in Neubabelsberg, claiming to be interested in her family’s collection of archaeological artefacts. Major Hedley’s real intention was, however, to meet the fugitive CUP leaders, whom Maria Sarre was rumored to maintain good relations. Somehow, Hedley and Sarre reached an understanding and Talat Pasha was first to meet Major Hedley, soon followed by Enver Pasha. Major Hedley referred in his reports to Maria Sarre as «the lady through whom I used to communicate with ENVER» or «the Fair Lady», who is always in close touch with ENVER’S movements. It was even rumored in circles close to the Young Turks in Berlin that Major Hedley promised to bring the CUP back into office with Talat Pasha as the Grand Vizier, if they would offer their help in finding a settlement in increasingly troubling Ottoman Turkey. How far Major Hedley really went in beguiling Talat is not certain. However, British documents tell a different story, namely, that it was Talat, who «practically offered his services» to establish «a united Turkey […] in the Turkish-speaking territories of Europe and Asia». Talat’s offer implied putting the grand schemes of saving the Muslim world from colonization aside and instead settling on securing Ottoman Turkey on behalf of the CUP. Despite these mutual overtures, Major Hedley seem to have handled on his own, because the British Government considered that it would be highly improper for them to enter into any kind of negotiations with this man whose surrender is about to be demanded under the Treaty of Peace and who is personally responsible not only for the policy leading up to the entry of Turkey into the war but also for some of the worst cruelties and atrocities perpetrated by the Turks during its continuance.

60 Major Ivor Hedley, report (Berlin) to Major-General Neill Malcolm, February 23, 1920, FO 371/5211, 1311, 33, 34.
62 Earl of Derby, letter to Directorate of Military Intelligence, October 6, 1919, FO 4142/136150.
Nothing came out from the first talks with Major Hedley. In early October 1919 after coming to an arrangement with Radek, Talat Pasha travelled to Switzerland, visiting Cavid Bey, and Enver took the airplane to Moscow. 63 «Both the Italians and French wants to establish good relations with those Young Turks whom they consider to possess the government in the future», Talat Pasha explained to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his letter, implying that the Unionists and Kemalists were considered to be the future powerholders. Both Italy and France were ready to «give us the best possible assistance», he assured, «however, under the condition not to bring them in a difficult position with the English.» The Italians were more forthcoming than the French, Talat noted. «I am at all times in touch with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Sforza and thus with the Italian government», Talat bragged to Mustafa Kemal. 64 In return, Mustafa Kemal made clear that he too had «personal friendship» to Count Sforza. 65 In Switzerland, Talat and Cavid got in contact with French officials. Cavid as a liberal-minded finance expert was strictly against a serious cooperation with Soviet Russia and hoped to find an alternative partner in post-war France. Meanwhile, France and Britain were experiencing more and more troubles with each other at the Paris Conference. «If it comes to an agreement with the French», Cavid noted in his diary, «we explained that we would abandon all the other efforts and until then we would not start dialogue with the Bolsheviks». Furthermore, they explained to the French officials, as Cavid wrote, «what kind of benefits we could arrange for the French in the Caucasus and Arabia.» 66 However, Talat made sure in correspondence with Mustafa Kemal that in these talks they were only prearranging future negotiations with legitimate representatives from Anatolia. 67

63 See diary entry on October 5, 1919, Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, 4 vols., ed. Hasan Babacan and Servet Avşar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014–2015), III, 607. See also: Reşat Halis from the Ottoman Imperial Legation, letter (Berne) to Chief of Foreign Affairs Division Dr. Charles R. Paravicini (Berne), October 2, 1919, BAR, E20018.1000/1501.304.
64 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 208.
66 See diary entry on October 27, 1919, Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, III, 630.
On January 6, 1920, Enver Pasha had a secret meeting with Major Hedley at Knauseestraße 17 in Grunewald. This was in midst of Enver’s various unsuccessful flight attempts to Moscow.68 Enver explained the reason why Turkey and Britain had to come to terms to Major Hedley with the Turkish proverb: «To be good friends one must have quarreled well». Turkey had quarreled enough, so that Enver «had to look to his late enemies to find a real friend for Turkey».69 This was also the same masculine logic behind the CUP leaders’ more or less known overtures to Soviet Russia. Later in their propaganda journal, Liwa-el-Islam, they argued in similar terms that

Tsarist Russia was an enemy of the Ottoman Sultanate. Nevertheless, it showed his animosity openly. [...] All of this is evidence enough to show us that the Russians were brave and honest enemies and the English are fraudulent and perfidious enemies.70

But for Enver Pasha, sitting on the negotiation desk in front of a British agent in February 1920, «[i]t was, therefore, to England» to be Turkey’s friend, as Hedley paraphrased, because the British Empire was «the strongest nation in the world.» Enver made clear that only the CUP was capable of establishing «an independent Turkey closely and secretly associated with Great Britain». Compared to Talat Pasha, who was ready to settle for Ottoman Turkey, Enver was more willing to act as a global player. To Major Hedley, Enver promised to solve their «difficulties and dangers in Egypt and other Mahommedan countries further East». Relying on the power of the rumors and conspiracy theories about him, Enver, warned that «[i]t will not be possible to convert them to be entirely anti-Bolshevik», because, as he bragged, «the thing has gone too far already». In reality, the fugitive CUP leaders had not achieved much yet, besides some conversations with Radek and publishing some propaganda pamphlets and telegrams in European metropoles. Nevertheless, Enver self-confidently assured that «it will be possible, to a large extent to remove, the Anti-English feeling.»71 «What I understand from the ongoing dialogue is», Talat concluded about Hedley’s interest in talking

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68 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 6, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 146.
70 “Alem-i İslam ve Rusya,” Liwa-el-Islam 1, no. 3 (1921): 25.
71 Major Ivor Hedley, notes on an interview with Enver Pasha, January 6, 1920, WO.32.5620, quoted in Ferris, “The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand,” 325.
to Enver, «that they seem to be terribly afraid of the Bolsheviks.» This was the only reason why Major Hedley approached the CUP leaders in the first place, Talat believed. «These blokes are pragmatic», Talat noted, but also admitted that «there is a chance that these might be empty promises.» But it was worthwhile to gamble with. «Let’s see what will happen», he said.72

Cavid Bey learned about this meeting in a telephone conversation with Berlin but remained rather suspicious. «The chief of the British Mission there approached him [Enver]», he noted in his diary, «allegedly [gûya] to establish an offensive and defensive alliance.»73 On January 20, Cavid received a letter from Talat Pasha, which said, that their British contact person went to London and to Paris, spoke with Churchill, Lloyd George, Montagu, and Curzon, and came back to Berlin again.74 The review of Hedley’s report by British decision-makers was mixed, but more negative than positive. While it was stated that for Enver «is wanted for Atrocities; that we must know before going any further exactly what he can and will do to help», investigations were ordered to assess, «what he is doing against us & whether his influence would be of any value if he took our side».75 Most of the reactions were, however, more critical about negotiating with criminals and enemies, so that Hedley was ordered not to promise anything.

After Hedley’s return, the Young Turk leaders figured out that the British were putting breaks on the negotiations. Therefore, as Talat explained, for now they «did not cut any connection with the other side», meaning the Bolsheviks.76 Enver, however, seem to have insisted on coming to terms with the British, unless more trouble was to be awaited in British India, as he warned Hedley. Regarding his relation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Enver claimed boldly to the British—playing on their fears—that Mustafa Kemal «was willing […] to take his orders from Enver if necessary, thus though appearing to be still enemies, they would in reality be

72 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 6, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 147.
73 Diary entry of Cavid Bey, January 9, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 57.
74 Diary entry, January 20, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 60.
75 Minutes of meeting in the Prime Minister’s room (Claridge’s Hotel, Paris), January 11, 1920, CAB 1/29, quoted in Ferris, “The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand,” 334.
76 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 20, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 148. See also Cavid Bey’s diary entry, February 2, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 62.
working for the same ends for their country». This was, as it will be discussed below, an outright bluff. In a letter to Cemal Pasha, Enver paraphrased the outcome of negotiations, as Hedley saying:

As you see we [i.e. the British] leave Istanbul to you. Those places, where the Turks are in majority will become independent and Turkish. We recognize the independence of the Caucasian Republics. We will help them by any means necessary, and regarding the independence of Turkestan we will not object. In addition, we will not enter any secret engagement. As you see, in return my government disregards to work with you and all parties are free in their conduct. You are free to act for or against whom you want [...].

Regarding the indifference of the British answer, Enver said: «I consider everything in this way, even by our intrigues [dolabımızla bile olsa], a benefit for our country.» This would enable Enver to work more freely in Turkestan, as he believed. «Honestly, I would be lying», he confessed, «if I say, I am not happy about being freed in this matter.»

A potential intensification of their overtures to the Entente states was considered an option in case of a negative outcome of Enver’s visit to the so-called «desired place» (mahal-i maksud), the code word for Moscow. «It is not possible to give the state leader [Salarüddevle] a positive answer», as Talat explained Cavid, «not before going there [Moscow] and meeting with the necessary people».

On February 23, 1920, Major Hedley was contacted by Mr. Robbins, the British Commercial Commissioner in Berlin that an informant desired to meet him. Arrived at Mr. Robbins’ office, Hedley found the man whom he described as «a German-Russian, a supporter of the Deutsche Militar Partei [sic], and in need of Money.» From this man they received the following information:

ENVER PASHA and DJEMAL PASHA, accompanied by a courier from VICTOR KOPP to the Soviet Government, were due to leave Berlin this morning by aeroplane from the Johannisthal Aerodrome; they will reach Konigsberg to-night, stay overnight in that town and fly on to-morrow morning to WITEBSK. From there they will go on to

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80 I believe that the honorary title «Salarüddevle» (or salar al-dawla) was a code word for Britain, not to be mistaken with the Qajar Prince by the name of Salar al-Dawla, who was exiled to the Ottoman Empire.
81 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 29, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 149.
If this information was true, Hedley knew, Enver and Cemal could be arrested in Königsberg. Hedley called Maria Sarre to check the information. He learned that Enver indeed left Berlin that morning. Maria Sarre said she could, however, arrange a meeting with Talat Pasha, but he was also out-of-town for a few days. Talat was in Munich and rushed back to Berlin, when he heard from Maria Sarre that Major Hedley had contacted her. Meanwhile, however, Enver’s plane had a crash landing soon after their departure. Next day on February 24, Hedley met with Enver, where Enver again declared that he would rather work with the British than with the Bolsheviks. Hedley asked Enver, “if, in consequence of this, he intended to modify his anti-English campaign throughout Islam or continue the very wide active propaganda that he meditated”. Enver answered boldly “that he was so far embroiled in the campaign since that refusal that it would now be very difficult to break it off.” This was, of course, a bluff. Enver knew, at least from the flamboyant news coverage about his alleged adventures, that he possessed an elusive power rooted in the enemy’s (and his own) constant overestimation of his potential influence. After the last refusal of negotiations, as Enver bluffed to Hedley, “he had immediately set his machinery in motion and himself intended to take an active part in the East.” As soon as the airplane was repaired, as Enver explained, he would fly to Moscow “to work with the Soviet Government simply and solely with a view to stirring up insurrections, small and large, against England throughout her Mussulman possessions.”

In detail Enver continued to reveal his plans to Hedley. Since it was “obviously impossible” to fight “England in the East” in a conventional war with “a large Mussulman army”, Enver rather preferred an unconventional campaign that would “cause sufficient trouble” to make England reconsider its economic overreach in trying to maintain military control in the East.

The next day, Enver asked Major Hedley to call him on the telephone. There was courier, ready to be dispatched to Constantinople that evening, so Enver wanted to talk over some
issues with Hedley, before sending orders to Ottoman Turkey. Hedley noted that Enver was «still extremely anxious to work with England rather than with Bolshevic Russia.» Enver even postponed his flight to Moscow. Again posing as the champion of the Muslim world, when Enver talked about «Turkey’s favour», his demands went far beyond Ottoman Turkey and combined a vast geography reaching from Egypt to Afghanistan and Turkestan. Enver believed that many points that were previously discussed in January seem to have already been settled. Turkey appeared to be able to keep most of its European and Asiatic possessions; «independence for Caucasia and Turkestan» seemed in Enver’s vision «to be certain»; England had «recognised the independence of Afghanistan»; and was «prepared to grant independence to Northern Egypt». In addition, Enver demanded independence in Egypt (including Sudan) and the right of self-determination throughout Ottoman Arab lands as well as the settlement of the Smyrna and Thrace questions. If the British would agree to work with him, Enver offered to break all on-going relations with the Bolsheviks and proceed to Constantinople—«of course incognito»—«in order to talk with the leaders there». From there he would travel to the Caucasus and Turkestan and work for their independence. More importantly, however, Enver made clear that «his presence would be essential if the feeling towards England is to be entirely changed.»

This was said in Hedley’s report to London.

Enver has a remarkably different recollection of the negotiations with Major Hedley. In a letter, he told the same story, but his own demands were rather reformulated as Hedley’s offers:

The above mentioned told that the English ministers had regretted greatly that they abandoned the first negotiations. Yet, the opinions of their ministers [changed] and the English are now free to pursue independent policies from the French. Secondly, the English abandoned their former policies and decided to work together with those nationalists who represented the majorities. In this connection, he told that they would leave Istanbul for us and that those soldiers temporarily staying at the straits would leave in two years. They would recognize the independence of the Caucasus republics. In addition to İzmir, all territories of Syria and Iraq will remain with us, although the decision about Iraq is not absolutely definite. Consequently, in return he [Enver] should abandon working against the English and leave any propaganda against them aside. And he said that they would give independence to the northern part of Egypt.

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86 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), February 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 37.
We don’t know, who tells the truth here. We know definitely that Enver was deceiving Hedley about many things. He could barely process, what was going on. «Isn’t it awkward?» (Garip değil mi?), he asked Cemal Pasha. But perhaps, Hedley was also lying to Enver about potential British overtures in order make Enver reveal more and more details about his political plans and delay his rapprochement with the Bolsheviks. Hedley’s official reports barely mentions, what he was offering as a bargain to keep the CUP leaders away from further anti-British intrigues. Hedley was more or less negotiating without governmental authority. After hearing reports about Major Hedley’s continued conversations with Enver, Lord Curzon ordered to abandon «any such intercourse with a criminal whose surrender has been demanded from Germany». «I don’t support them in any question of doing things behind Lord Kilmarnock’s back», the Director of Military Intelligence noted, implying that Hedley was acting on his own in Berlin.

These negotiations with the British also leaked to the press—perhaps on purpose, in order to damage Enver’s relation to the Bolsheviks. On March 7, Cavid Bey wrote in his diary, that while Enver was having secret talks with the British in Berlin, The Times was reporting that «Enver was in Berlin and scheming intrigues with the Entente states by making offers». The negotiations with the British, as Cavid believed, were «without a doubt» an «entrapment» to spy on them, but, as Cavid complained, Enver «didn’t understand it». The article in The Times announced the news, which was said to be confirmed «from a wholly independent source», that Enver, currently in Berlin, was «credited with the desire to enter into relations with the Entente Chargés d’Affaires.» The article reassured that «[t]here is no indication, however, of a reciprocal desire on the Entente side», indicating that the leak to the press possibly came from British officials. After claiming that Enver the «Turkish Napoleon» has allegedly fallen from grace in Weimar Germany, the final verdict was yet: «That he is still intriguing, however, admits of no doubt.»

87 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), February 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 38.
88 Foreign Office, letter to the Secretary of the Army Council, March 26, 1920, FO 371/5211, 1311, 42.
89 Major-General Willian Thwaites, letter to Lord Curzon, March 17, 1920, FO 371/5211, 1311, 29.
90 See diary entry, March 7, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 68.
While these talks took place, most British officials dismissed the negotiations with war-criminals in the likes of Enver and Talat as a matter of principle. W. S. Edmonds from the Foreign Office believed, for instance that «[t]he CUP and the Bolshevists will work together, whatever Enver may say, and if we made terms with Enver, we should only give him more prestige to use against us». But still for many other British officials Enver somehow always possessed an elusive power that he was too dangerous and scheming to be simply let off the leash. After hearing the rumors that Enver was seen in Afghanistan, in February 1920, Montagu said that this was yet «another fruit of the decision we took to have nothing to do with this man».

During the London Conference in February 1920, the partition of Constantinople was solidified. The Ottoman Parliament, however, did not accept terms of occupation and published the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) on February 17, 1920, which practically legitimized the Anatolian resistance movement. This move resulted in the Entente decision to intensify the exiting occupation. The Ottoman Parliament was resolved on March 14, 1920. The military occupation of Constantinople and the Straits was realized on March 16, 1921. All this had a tremendous impact on the perception of the Young Turks regarding the good will of the British Empire. Enver was quoted in newspapers as threatening the British with holy war:

> Not I alone, but hundreds of thousands of Mohammedans will sacrifice their lives to lead the Muslims in a holy war, if Constantinople and Dardanelles should be robbed from the Turks. Turkey would ally with Moscow, and woe betide the British Dominions when the sleeping peoples of Asia will be awakened.

The negotiations with the British had a brief aftermath in June 1920. A Polish informant of the British Military Mission in Berlin stated that due to their concerns about Soviet Russia becoming Russian nationalist, Talat Pasha and Cavid Bey were once again «anxious to enter into some sort of understanding with Great Britain.» The Foreign Office was, however, more curious, whether the Polish informant «was a real Pole by race», because «a certain

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92 W. S. Edmonds, note, March 12, 2020, FO 371/5211, 1311.
95 *Die Rote Fahne*, March 12, 1920, reporting from Daily Telegraph.
number of Moslem Poles were associated with the C.U.P.» 97 Ideas of racial intrigue continued to surface, when it came to understanding the CUP. The memorandum of the Polish informant claimed that there was a «Young Turk Government now in Berlin».98 The minutes on the dossier summarized the proposal as follows: «The leitmotif of these Young-Turk proposals would thus seem to be that Great Britain, as a remedy for the present disagreeable situation, should discard her «intriguing» French and Italian Allies, abandon Greeks, Poles etc., and champion «Young Turkey» as the kernel of Islamism by modifying in her favour the terms of San Remo.»99 Lord Curzon made, again, clear that «no intercourse should be held with these refugees.»100

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Meanwhile, the British Intelligence suspected that an alliance was in the making between Arab insurgents in Syria and Iraq and Turkish nationalist forces in Anatolia. To be sure, the prevailing Orientalist presumptions in the British intelligence and diplomatic community imagined Turks and Arabs as racial enemies. Therefore, a potential alliance of Arabs and Turks was considered as abnormal and only the result of Oriental intrigues and despotism, if not atavistic Muslim fanaticism.101 The propagation of a discourse of Turkish-Arab animosity was one of the cornerstones of the British war-time agenda in the Middle East. On March 22, 1920, Winston Churchill unapologetically made clear at the House of Commons: «There are the Arabs who have been disturbed by the [French] occupation of Syria, and who

98 The rumor that the CUP leaders found an exile government in Berlin was also mentioned as a Turkish Soviet Republic in an intelligence report of the French Embassy in Berlin to Quai d’Orsay, May 29, 1920, cited in Zafer Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Kominterni: İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadi (İttihad-ı Selamet-i İslam),” Toplumsal Tarih 8, no. 8 (1997): 6.
99 Minutes on the dossier FO.371.5173, 6709, 98.
100 Earl Curzon, letter (London) to Lord Kilmarsnock (Berlin), June 26, 1920, FO 371/5173, 6709, 197.
are inclined now, for the first time, in many ways to make common cause with the Turkish Nationalists, thus uniting two forces by whose division our policy has hitherto prospered.»

What Churchill and many others did now know was that the Arab insurgents of the Arab Revolt of 1916, whom the British Intelligence had propagated as an anti-Turkish awakening of Arab nationalists, had mostly an ambiguous, if not even favorable, relation to the Ottoman Empire and to their Ottoman-Turkish compatriots. Nuri al-Said, who left the Ottoman Army to join the Arab nationalist secret society of *al-Ahd* (the Covenant) and became one of the commanders of the Arab Revolt and later Prime Minister of Iraq, wrote once: «None of us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire. Our thinking was directed toward obtaining a local Arab administration, the recognition of Arabic as an official language, and Turkish-Arab association in the administration of the general policy of the state [...]». Indeed, the same Nuri al-Said gave a secret letter to a befriended Turkish officer, during the Armistice negotiations between the British-Arab forces and the 7. Ottoman Army on November 3, 1918. The secret letter was addressed to Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha and proposed a Muslim federation of Turks and Arabs against Allied plans. The acting commander of Ottoman delegation in Qatma, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha, however, dismissed the letter as a British intrigue. What Ali Fuat Pasha did not know, was that at the same time, Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was envisioning and proposing a solution to the Allies that was very similar to Nuri al-Said’s proposal, an Ottoman imperial federation of Turks and Arabs. «With the vast majority of Moslems Arab nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms», as one British political officer in Damascus rightly concluded. «It will, however, inevitably lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal.»

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106 Political Offcier at Damascus J. N. Clayton, report on the political situation in Damascus and Syria, October 15, 1919, enclosed in Colonel Meinertzhagen, letter (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (London), December 2, 1919, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, IV, 566.
During the war, the British had made conflicting promises to the French, Zionists, and Sharif Husayn.\textsuperscript{107} Behind the Sykes-Picot agreement there was, what diplomatic historian Alan Sharp calls, a «deliberately ambiguous approach». «[W]hat we mean by» Arab independence, as Viscount Alfred Milner explained, «it is that Arabia while being independent herself should be kept out of the sphere of European political intrigue and within the British sphere of influence: in other words that her independent native rulers should have no foreign treaties except with us.»\textsuperscript{108} Contrary to the plans of British Intelligence officers at the Arab Bureau in Cairo or the British decision-makers in London, the situation was more complex. An American intelligence officer who made inquiries in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria in late 1917 and throughout 1918, reported: «The great masses of people in the Near East are illiterate and fanatical Moslem, whose only desire is to be free from the domination and rule of the Christian nations of the West.»\textsuperscript{109}

Soon after the armistice, resistance to colonial or foreign forces emerged in Greater Syria (\textit{Bilad al-Sham}) and Mesopotamia, which were actually areas considered by the Entente as liberated from the Turkish yoke. In Iraq large-scale uprisings against the British administration occurred as early as May 1919 among the Kurdish tribes. Syria was soon to rebel under the rule of the leaders of the Arab Revolt of 1916, nominally Prince Faysal and de facto the Young Arab Society (\textit{al-Fatat}). The British forces left Syria for the French (to whom the territories had been secretly promised) in the autumn of 1919, which gave rise to broad scale uprisings in urban and rural areas in Syria. This did not only undermine the right of self-determination of Syrians, but France was also considered by the Muslim Arabs as an historical ally of Christian minorities of Syria and Lebanon. These Middle Eastern uprisings against foreign-infidel rule reached a new height in the year 1920, as Syrian resistance against the French occupation forces came to a disastrous climax at the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 1920. Meanwhile in neighboring Iraq, British occupation forces were busy struggling from summer to autumn of 1920 against the Great Iraqi Revolt, which could only be stopped by

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] Quoted in Alan Sharp, \textit{The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919–1923}, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 188.
\end{footnotes}
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major air strikes. All these uprisings in Syria and Iraq were very similar to the resistance
movement in Anatolia and there seem to be some connections between the movements,
which bedeviled the Entente administration.\textsuperscript{110}

One year before the climax of events of summer 1920, in August 1919, the British acquired
a secret treaty between Mustafa Kemal and Faysal, signed by intermediaries on June 16, 1919,
in Aleppo.\textsuperscript{111} The British officials immediately assumed that it was a forgery. They had ac-
quired the document by Boghos Nubar Pasha of the Armenian National Delegation in
Paris.\textsuperscript{112} Previously, the French officials in Constantinople had acquired the same document
from another Armenian, Dr. Topjian, for one hundred and fifty Turkish liras.\textsuperscript{113} An alliance
between Mustafa Kemal and Faysal was surely a major threat to the future of Armenian Cilicia,
which was under French occupation. This explains perhaps why the Armenians had an
interest in spreading the news.\textsuperscript{114} The treaty’s first clause proclaimed:

\begin{quote}
In order to put an end to the regrettable discord which is observed in the Islam World
the Turkish and Arabic races which have material, moral and religious bonds between
them are in duty bound to help each other towards perfect agreement in matters of reli-
gion and country.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

The treaty went on and «adopted the declaration of a Holy War for the safety of the Country
and of Religion» and invited to this Holy War «Mesopotamia, the Yemen, the Hedjaz, Me-
dina, Syria, Tripoli of Barbary, Benghazi, Algeria, India, Morocco and Tunis and will see


\textsuperscript{114} Colonel French, telegram (Cairo) to Lord Curzon (London), September 3, 1919, FO 371/4233, no. 417, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1}, 92. Unlike the British officials and some Turkish colleagues, such as Salahi Ramadan Sonel, \textit{Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlerinde İngiliz İstihbarat Servisi’nin Türkiye deki Eylemleri} (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995), 20, I am no more convinced that Armenian activists fabricated this (draft of a) treaty.

that their participation is assured.» Other more outrageous sources such as Ibn Saud claimed, for instance, that the Sharifian forces in the Hijaz, Syria, and Iraq, Turkish nationalists in Anatolia, the Egyptian Nationalist Party, and the Egyptian Wafd (Delegation) Party were allegedly waging a jihad against the British forces.\footnote{John Ferris, “‘The Internationalism of Islam’: The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840–1951,” \textit{Intelligence and National Security} 24, no. 1 (2009): 66.}\footnote{Political Officer at Damascus J. N. Clayton, report on the political situation in Damascus and Syria, October 15, 1919, enclosed in Colonel Meinertzhagen, letter (Cairo) to Earl Curzon (London), December 2, 1919, in \textit{Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939}, IV, 566.} Another report from Damascus said: «This movement may not take the form of a definite \textit{Jehad}, although given favourable conditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted […].»\footnote{See: British General Headquarters (Constantinople), Telegram to War Office, September 23, 1919, FO 371/4233, 136149, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938)}, Vol.1, 121.}

In the collective imagining of the British officials the alleged treaty between Mustafa Kemal and Faysal was integrated into the existing template of conspiracy theories and the usual suspects were added to the bunch. Thus, few months later Mustafa Kemal «was represented as commanding a new national army associated with Enver Pasha, Feisul, the Soviet etc.»\footnote{Colone French, telegraph (Cairo) to Lord Curzon (London), September 3, 1919, FO 371/4233, no. 417, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938)}, Vol.1, 92.} There was, of course, no mention of Enver and Soviets in the treaty, or whatsoever. «At the same time I do not believe that such a treaty exists», a British Intelligence officer in Cairo concluded and continued, «though C.U.P. would no doubt like to conclude it»,\footnote{Chaim Weizmann, letter to Louis Bols, March 31, 1920, in Meyer W. Weisgal, ed., \textit{The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizman} (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1977), IX, 331–333, quoted in Friedman, \textit{British Pan-Arab Policy}, 1915–1922, 271.} Although this was an accurate estimation on the general ambitions of the CUP to unite the struggles, it also marked the paranoid style in intelligence assessment. Another report said that Faysal was «attempting to play the role of a Near-Eastern Napoleon […] in cooperation with the dark forces radiating from Constantinople and Konia is challenging Europe—constantly [evoking] the specter of Pan-Islamism, Bolshevism and similar phenomena.»\footnote{Abdul-Karim Rafeq argues that «there are indications that the treaty could have been genuine.» Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “Arabism, Society, and Economy in Syria 1918–1920,” in \textit{State and Society in Syria and Lebanon}, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 1–31 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 7–11. Also Dr. Hadiye} Despite rumors and allegations that the treaty was a forgery, it made sense in the historical context.\footnote{Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “Arabism, Society, and Economy in Syria 1918–1920,” in \textit{State and Society in Syria and Lebanon}, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 1–31 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 7–11. Also Dr. Hadiye} Therefore, the treaty was a matter of serious concern. A handwritten note by a British official, possibly Curzon himself, on the copy of the treaty said:
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Even if this treaty is a forgery, which is more likely, as Faisal would not be such a fool as to sign anything of the kind, it would I think, be a mistake for us to under-estimate the risk of his taking some such action. What line are the Allies to take it as an immediate result of Treaty with Turkey, the Moslems of the Middle East combine on religious grounds to drive out the infidel invader?  

These fears were then materialized in December 1919 and January 1920. During the Arab raid on British troops in Dayr al-Zor (today in Syria) in December 11, 1919, and the following Turkish campaign against French troops in Cilicia in January 20, 1920, there were many contacts between Turkish and Arab insurgents. Not without reason, the British documents indicate that these two attacks were connected. 122 «Lloyd George’s proposal to partition Turkey», a Turkish military intelligence note from February 1920 concluded, «will result in the revolt of the Muslim world and in the future the danger of a union of Turks with Bolsheviks and Arabs.» 124 The opportunity structures were visible to friends and foes alike. Shakib Arslan, assuming that Enver was already in Russia in December 1919, said that it would be the best for the Muslim world to work with Soviet Russia after Ottoman catastrophe. 125

Arnold Wilson was more close to the truth, when he assumed that the alleged treaty was «accurate in substance, even though formal treaty may not exist». 126 It was no secret that Mustafa Kemal and Faysal were trying to establish an official and lasting cooperation between the Arab and Turkish nationalists. 127 Faysal was known for his interest and admiration for

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126 Arnold Wilson, telegraph (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), September 20, 1919, FO 371/4233, 211, 496, quoted in Friedman, British Miscalculations, 54.

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the Kemalist movement in Ottoman Turkey. In early 1920, a secret Arab delegation was sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. An emissary from the General Syrian Congress, Said Haidar, a founding member of the Young Arab Society (al-Fatat), belonged to this secret delegation. In an interview Said Haidar told years later that in Constantinople they met with representatives of Mustafa Kemal who was by-then already in Anatolia. They agreed on a four-point agreement on fighting the colonial occupation. The fourth and last point of the agreement said:

(4) In the event of the successful outcome of their efforts against the West, the Arabs and the Turks will live side by side in two independent states but their relations will be nearly on the same line as the relations of Austria and Hungary in the pre-War Austro-Hungarian Empire. This relationship will be governed by a Treaty to last for fifty years.

In the Turkish military archives, there is five-point manuscript of a different but similar Turkish-Arab agreement, implying that at least such negotiations took place. However, these negotiations were aborted by Faysal in June 1920. Faysal would soon regret his withdrawal, when he was defeated by the French in the Battle of Maysalun, July 24, 1920.

In this period of Turkish-Arab rapprochement with rumors of alleged treaties and indications of secret connections, the CUP leaders were, of course, not missing in the bunch—both in conspiracy theories and in real-life conspiracies. In May 1919, intelligence reports came in about Young Turk and Arab nationalists meetings, where an «Islamic Revolt» was prepared with the «support of Germany and Russian Bolsheviks.» According to British Intelligence, «a very important meeting» was held around November 15, 1919, in Montreux, then another one in December in St. Moritz, between Talat Pasha representing the CUP and Turkish nationalists, the Ottoman-Egyptian Fuad Salim and an emissary of Faysal on behalf of the Arab nationalists. Other sources corroborate the existence of some kind of meetings in

128 Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, 134. For Faysal’s pro-Turkish sentiments see: Friedman, British Miscalculations, 57.
130 ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 641, gömlek no. 103.
131 This agreement was not ratified by Faysal. Faysal feared on the one hand Bolshevik intervention through the Kemalists and on the other hand that the Kemalists would come to an agreement with the French. FO 371/5036, 7174, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 2, 156–57.
Switzerland. Talat was indeed in Switzerland from October 23 until November 19, 1919. It seems to be the talk of the town by then that Talat was in Switzerland, as *Tribune de Genève* reported that Talat arrived in Switzerland with a fake passport and was trying to establish the new Young Turk headquarter in Zurich. Talat was back in Switzerland as late as December 24 and stayed there until mid-January 1920. In addition, German archival sources as well document a meeting of Young Turk leaders in St. Moritz in January 1920. During these meetings, the British Intelligence reports that a preliminary alliance was formed by the exiled CUP leaders, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and Arab nationalists representing Faysal. According to British Intelligence it was Emir Shakib Arslan, trusted by both the Young Turks and Faysal, who was chosen to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets. Shakib Arslan was indeed contacted by emissaries of Faysal who desired to travel to Ottoman Turkey and meet with Mustafa Kemal and Rauf (Orbay). The Syrians were in great need for arms and ammunition. The emissary told Arslan that they were even ready to look for support from Soviet Russia. Arslan who did not even knew where Enver was in December 1919, asked how to proceed. The British archival sources document that Arslan declared in a letter to Maxim Litvinov, the leading Soviet diplomat in Europe, that «all [Arab] hatred against the Turk had been dispelled and all that was now wanted was mutual trust and combination in support of the common cause.»

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135 Compare Cavid Bey’s diary entry from October 23, 1919, Cavid Bey, *Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi*, IV, 33–34. and Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), November 21, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İtilâfçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 144–45. See also: Reşad Halis from the Ottoman Imperial Legation, letter (Berne) to Chief of Foreign Affairs Division Dr. Charles R. Paravicini (Berne), November 9, 1919, BAR, E2001B.1000/1501.307.


137 Cavid Bey mentions in a diary entry from December 24, 1919, that he received a telegram from Talat Pasha who was by then in St. Moritz. Cavid Bey, *Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi*, IV, 52.

138 Adolf Müller, report on the meeting of Young Turk leaders in Switzerland, January 14, 1920, PA-AA, R 14162.

139 Yamauchi relies on the same British Intelligence reports like Major Bray and documents these meetings in Switzerland in which Emir Shakib Arslan «played the important role of transmitting messages from Faysal to Talat». Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 20.

140 Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Bardakçı, *İtilâfçı’nın Sandığı*, 475.

141 N. N. E. Bray, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, September 1920, FO 371/5230, 12339, 4–5. For Shakib Arslan’s letter see: India Office, report (Switzerland) to Foreign Office concerning the alleged intrigues of Faisal with the Bolsheviks, February 10, 1920, FO 371/5032, 21.2.44, quoted in Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 134–35. The same report, however, contains also rather dubious information as such that «FUAD SALIM BEY is reported to have informed SHAKIB ARSLAN that ANWER
Aziz Ali al-Misri visited Talat Pasha in Berlin in December 1919. Aziz Ali was of an Egyptian of Circassian origin and belonged to the CUP’s circle of military officers in the Balkans. He had served with Enver and Mustafa Kemal in Tripoli. In Tripoli Aziz Ali got in a dispute with Enver. Although Enver threatened him with death penalty, Aziz Ali was allowed to leave for exile thanks to Cemal Pasha’s intervention. Exiled to Egypt, Aziz Ali became one of the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement as the founder of the secret society al-Abd (the Covenant). During World War I, Aziz Ali served as one of the military leaders of the Arab Revolt. As he told to Talat, Aziz Ali al-Misri believed due to malgovernance of the Entente, it was now possible for the Arabs in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to form a «federal government» with the Turks. Talat believed that they could profit from men like al-Misri and even attached a message from Aziz Ali even to his letter to Mustafa Kemal.

«Connections and agreements are said to be existing down to Arabia», as Hans Humann heard from Enver Pasha. He continued: «Likewise Mesopotamia is said to have joined the movement.» The British Intelligence knew already better: «Enver Pasha throughout December 1919, was actively engaged in making supreme efforts to bring about an alliance between the C.U.P. Nationalists, Pan-Arabs, and Pan-Islamists [...].» In the letters, Enver’s involvement in Arab affairs is rather missing, while Talat was more proactive and vocal. «The Arabs have been totally disillusioned after the armistice», Talat told Mustafa Kemal. «Someone from the entourage of Amir Faysal said in a conversation with someone from us in Switzerland», as Talat updated Mustafa Kemal about his activities abroad, «the Arab Youth would forget about the past and would rather favor to unite with the Turks like old Germany [...].»

PASHA had been appointed Yeshil Amir (Regent) of Turkestan, and that on the request of ANWER PASHA the Sultan had allowed his wife to go to Turkestan.«


144 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), December 21, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 186.


146 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) Otto von Lossow (Munich), February 21, 1920, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.

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or Austria-Hungary and cooperate to hinder the occupation by the Allies.» Talat believed that «[i]t might be a great advantage, if the Arabs in the course of the negotiations for the peace conditions show that they wish to unite with the Turks and propagate legitimately this cause, so that the power of the Caliphate continues and survives in that area.» One policy option which Talat proposed to Mustafa Kemal was: «To create an organization, which would make a Turkish-Arab union possible by capitalizing the current desperation of the Arabs, and which would generally create a trend within the Islamic world for our benefit.»

Mustafa Kemal in his answer to Talat acknowledged connections, but was rather distrustful:

For a long time, relations have been established with Syrians and Iraqis and joint actions are set against the English and French.

Decisions have been taken with legitimate Arab delegates that came to us in order to proceed as a united operation under more serious principles. The formula that we proposed to the Arabs from the beginning on is this:

To unite in form of a confederation, once each nation has established independence. Arabs delightfully accepted this principle.

Even Emir Faysal’s trustees have approached us to unite under this principle. The thought and the possibility that Faysal might be following a secret policy on behalf of the French makes us proceed cautiously. Nonetheless, the actions taken regarding a cooperation with the Arabs started with the settlement of the other fractions.

Mustafa Kemal supported the idea of Arab nationalist movements, but was rather distrustful towards monarchical ambitions of Faysal. Although the British Intelligence overestimated the existing connections, there were indeed on-going relations between Arab and Turkish nationalists. But again, misinformation was ever-present. A British report told that Palestinian activist Sheikh Abdel Qader al-Muzaffar went to Anatolia in mid-March 1920 and met also with Enver Pasha in order to establish an alliance with the Turks. In an intelligence report in April 1920, Enver was identified as the force behind Turkish-Arab rapprochement

151 Y. Y. Upmal-Angarski, interview (Ankara) with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Jaunary 1, 1921, in Mehmet Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetlerle Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005), 259.
152 Friedman, British Pan-Arab Policy, 1915–1922, 278.
under Bolshevik support. The fugitive CUP leaders were once again in the midst of transnational relations, although their movement was still certainly limited.

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With rise of the Anatolian resistance movement, a new kind of political actor emerged in Ottoman Turkey, which was soon labeled by the Entente as the Kemalists, i.e. followers of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, or sometimes simply as «Nationalists» in upper case. The true nature of this movement caused a general confusion in the perceptions of its contemporaries. What was the difference—if any—between the Kemalists and Unionists? Were they the one and the same? Or, were they rivals? If they were different movements, what was the relationship between them? If these two parties were collaborating, who was subordinated to whom? If they were rivals, on what terms were they in conflict? These are complex questions, and there is still not one answer.

This political ambiguity posed a major challenge for distant observers trying to make sense of the nature of political affairs in Ottoman Turkey. «I beg to express the opinion that the whole movement originates with Enver Pasha», Captain Perring stationed at Samsun reported to British Headquarters in Constantinople, and continued by arguing that Enver’s «presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and his appearance at the head of the present organization is openly talked of.»

His superior officer, Admiral Richard Webb had doubts, however. «I do not agree with his opinion» that «the movement [is] originating with Enver», he said, because «other reports rather go to show that Mustafa Kemal has no dealings with him whatever.» This confusion was not singular and continued to reoccur in political observations from the time. Mostly based on the information they received from the Sublime Porte and other anti-CUP circles, many reports claimed that «MUSTAFA KEMAL is in constant communication with ENVER.» Also French Intelligence officers were having

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154 J. S. Perring, Report (Samsun) to Vice-Admiral Sir D. de Robeck (Constantinople), October 1, 1919, FO 406/41, 292, no. 139–1, in Şimşir, *British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1*, 159
trouble in understanding relation between Enver and Mustafa Kemal by making misinformed analogies between them. If both men were associated with the CUP, and because Enver was a notorious Germanophile and more recently rumored to be a Bolshevik, then, as it was accordingly assumed by French Intelligence, Mustafa Kemal was similarly working for the CUP with the support of Germans and Bolsheviks.  

In October 1919, the Constantinople newspaper started to spread the news that Enver Pasha, who was allegedly commanding the Nationalist Forces in the Caucasus will soon assume the leadership of the Anatolian Nationalist Forces. The commanders of the Nationalist Forces (Kuva-yı Milliye) were complaining about the propaganda that associated them with the Unionists. Colonel (Galatalı) Şevket, reported from Constantinople: «The issue, which the oppositionals here most strongly advocate is, convincing everybody that the nationalist movement is a Unionist movement and that Talat and Enver will soon come into power.» Şevket urged to find ways to replace the directors of press and telegraph agencies with politically reliable individuals. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied personally to Colonel Şevket and made clear: «In any given occasion, we did not restrain to deny that we have anything to do with Unionism [İttihatçılıkla].» Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself publicly distanced himself from the CUP and its leaders like Enver. In an interview to the United States Radio Press, he stated: «It is untrue that we are working with Enver Pasha. We believe his policies injured Turkey. We do not know his whereabouts. It is rumoured that he is with the Russian Bolsheviks.» 

Kazım Karabekir Pasha reported that the news of Enver entering Anatolia is «anything but a lie» (katiyen yalandır). He even doubted that Enver was in the Caucasus. Karabekir believed

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158 Hüsref Sami Bey, letter (Constantinople), October 15, 1919, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 15, gömlek no. 30. 
159 Colonel Şevket, cipher (Constantinople) to 3rd Army Corps, October 12, 1919, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 9, gömlek no. 83. 
160 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, cipher (Sivas) to Colonel Şevket (Constantinople), October 10, 1919, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 9, gömlek no. 83. 
that there was «propaganda about the national movement being a mandate of the Unionists». Kazım Karabekir reported that there were rumors that some groups belonging to the Nationalist Forces had crossed the Caucasus border and were involved in fights with Armenians and that Mustafa Kemal was in contact with Enver in Azerbaijan. These news «were not true at all» Karabekir complained. «I don’t even believe that Enver is in Azerbaijan», he wrote, because «[t]he French representative in Trabzon told the local commander that he was in Turkestan! All these false rumors were «nothing but fuss» (yaygaradan başka bir şey olmadığın) to damage the nationalist movement. According to intelligence mostly based on hearsay statements in so-called «Nationalist circles», in February 1920 Enver was still believed to be in Azerbaijan and exercising influence on the nationalist movement. The association and subordination of Mustafa Kemal to Enver and the CUP was a conscious instrument by the Constantinople regime and anti-CUP politicians to delegitimize the nationalist resistance movement.

 Nonetheless, in retrospect, one can identify a certain Unionist Factor—to use the title of Erik J. Zürcher’s seminal book—that the CUP took «the first steps to organize a national resistance movement […] by establishing an underground network». Even more, the CUP’s «spirit»—if not always physical and personnel presence—was unmistakably observable within the resources, repertoire, and mindset of the Kemalist movement. There were also some contemporary voices within the British officialdom that delivered similar explanations of the relationship between the Kemalists and Unionists:

But Mustapha Kemal had set himself up against the Central Government, having inherited the adherents, the organisation, and, I feared, also the spirit of the Committee [of Union and Progress, my emphasis], and it looked as if he hoped to establish himself somewhere in the interior where he was intangible, and whence, he could direct all the proceedings of the regularly constituted Government, who would dance to his tune.

162 Kazım Karabekir, cipher (Van) to Ministry of War, November 1, 1919, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 197, gömlek no. 224.
163 Kazım Karabekir, cipher (Erzurum) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 3, 1919, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 45, gömlek no. 51.
165 Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, 168.
166 An account of a conversation between Mr. T. B. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy, October 14, 1919, FO 406/41, 294–295, no. 140/1, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1, 164.
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Also Admiral Richard Webb, who doubted that Mustafa Kemal was subordinated to or associated with Enver, saw behind the Anatolian movement a certain CUP-like motivations:

> Whether the organizers of the national movement can properly be called Committee men or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. They want Turkey for Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection. Ottoman Christians are their cattle and they want to do with their own that they will. They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life. 167

At the end, to answer the initial question, I shall argue that by their nature Kemalists and Unionists were the same but different; they were simultaneously allies and rivals; while being separate, they were actually inseparable from each other.

To be sure, the CUP leaders in Berlin had only limited correspondence with the resistance movement in 1919 and 1920. Although the CUP’s underground branches in Constantinople and in Anatolia has been actively following the blueprints for post-armistice resistance, they were more or less autonomous cells working without a hierarchical organization structure. The fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin were not at the top of a direct chain of command that controlled the CUP networks on ground. Due to the restrictions of communication between Germany and Ottoman Turkey, a remote control of the movement was practically impossible. The information they received from their fellow Committee men, such as Kara Vasif from the Karakol (Sentinel) Society in Constantinople, did not give them a realistic picture of the situation, either. For instance, Enver proudly announced:

> I received a letter from Kara Vasif in Istanbul. He reports that they [the Unionists] control ninety-five percent of the state of affairs. But all their hopes are connected to pan-Islamism and Turanianism movements. They need airplanes and so forth. They want me to command the Turkistan and Caucasus operations personally. They report that they have Syria and Iraq under their control. The news are not bad. 168

This was mere wishful-thinking, if not an outright lie. Despite the limits of communication, it is undeniable that from late 1919 on both the expatriate CUP leaders and their Karakol networks in Ottoman Turkey were set on the same track leading towards Soviet Russia. In

168 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), March 28, 1920, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçıl Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 38.
autumn 1919, Baha Sait (Bey), one of the founding members of the Karakol, went to the Caucasus to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. On behalf of the National Forces, as he claimed to represent, Baha Sait signed a treaty with the Bolsheviks on January 11, 1920. The later Soviet Ambassador Upmal-Angorski would even compare the Karakol with many praises to the Italian Carbonieri. The bravado and the lack of controllability of the Karakol was, however, considered as a breach of authority by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Kazım Karabekir Pasha. Despite their own efforts to come in contact with the Bolsheviks, Baha Sait’s treaty was not ratified by the leadership in Anatolia, which led Mustafa Kemal’s break with the Karakol networks. Baha Sait, Dr. Fuat Sabit (Ağacık), and other «Leftist Unionists»—as they are called by later historians—founded the (crypto-Unionist) Turkish Communist Party (Türk Komünist Fırkası) in April 1920 in Baku. In Trabzon, one of the CUP strongholds in Anatolia, French Intelligence reported that the crowds were shouting «Long live Lenin, Talat, and Enver» in May 1920. Disconnection and deliberate deterrence was causing disinformation.

169 Baha Sait (Bey) was one of the Renaissance men of his era. He was of Dagestani origin and was a polyglott. He had done historical and ethnographic research Turkic history and Anatolia tribes and sects. Besides his military and paramilitary activities on behalf of the CUP regime, he was poet and artist as well as an active philanthropist in several nationalist and cultural civil society organizations. After Baku Baha Sait returned to Anatolia and became one of the «heroes» of the National Struggle. For his interesting biography see: Fethi Tevetoglu, “Milli Mücadele Kahramanlarından Baha Sait Bey,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 6, no. 16 (1989), http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-16/milli-mucadele-kahramanlardan-baha-sait-bey-biga-1882-istanbul-16-ekim-1939.


172 For the Turkish Communist Party see: Hamit Erdem, 1920 Yılı ve Sol Mücadele: Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti, (Hafiz) – gizli – Türkiye Komünist Partisi, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyan Fırkası, (Resmi) Türkiye Komünist Fırkası (İstanbul: Sel Yayınçılık, 2010), 38–46. The (crypto-Unionist) Turkish Communist Party is not to confuse with Communist Party of Turkey, which was founded by Mustafa Subhi and his friends in Baku on September 10, 1920, nor with the (official) Communist Party of Turkey, which was founded by the order of Mustafa Kemal Pasha on October 18, 1920, in order counter Mustafa Subhi’s Communist Party. The Communist Party of Ankara sent deputy Tevfik Rıştı (Aras) to Moscow in early 1921 to Moscow. See: Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), February 10, 1921, TTK, EP 02-44.

173 Orr, “‘We Call You to Holy War’,” 1105.
The relative disconnectedness of CUP networks between Berlin and Anatolia, however, did not hinder the fugitive CUP leaders to claim that they were directing the national resistance from abroad. Most of the knowledge they had about the situation in Ottoman Turkey was, however, based on common news coverage in European newspapers. The fugitive leaders in Berlin could only occasionally receive some letters from Constantinople and Anatolia. Recent arrivals from Constantinople delivered private letters to the CUP leaders and brought Ottoman newspapers with them. Not unlike other Western observers, the CUP leaders learned the rise of Mustafa Kemal, or the «Blond Pasha» in the vernacular language of their letters, from Western newspapers.

The knowledge Mustafa Kemal Pasha and other leaders of the National Forces had about the fugitive CUP leaders was also based on rumors and news originating from the international and Constantinople press with respective misconceptions. An article in the *Alemdar* by Reşad Halis, the former Ambassador in Berne and one of the signatories of the Sèvres Treaty, claimed that CUP leaders were controlling the state of affairs in Ottoman Turkey with the support of their German friends. In an article in the *Açık Söz*, it was reported, by referring to *Débat* and *The Times*, that the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs established a «Middle East Committee» (Şark-ı Vusta Heyeti) for the «redemption of the Muslim World», which was represented by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. The newspaper suspected that the Germans were behind the organization with Talat Pasha pulling the strings from a Berlin committee. The Turkish military intelligence was receiving more and more conflicting news about the alleged movements of Young Turks from late 1919 to the summer of 1920. The military officials noted and translated, for instance a *Times* article that announced on November 11, 1919, that a Turkish-Afghan-Bolshevik alliance was signed.

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174 The same news was published also in *Democratie Nouvelle*, December 30, 1919, as well as in *Nationalzeitung* and *Journal de Genève*, January 13, 1920, and under the title “L’Union et progrès vit toujours” in *Le Temps*, January 13, 1920, and in *Le Monde Libre*, no. 5 (February 1, 1920): 140–141. Adolf Müller, telegram (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), January 12, 1920; Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), January 21, 1920, PA-AA, R 13761, 191–212. The same news caused also a lot of curiosity in French Intelligence offices, see: Orr, “We Call You to Holy War,” 1102.


176 ATASE, İŞ, kutu no. 110, gömlek no. 72.
Among all these rumors, one was particularly notorious, suggesting that Enver Pasha was returning to Anatolia with a Soviet-sponsored Muslim army, the so-called Green Army (Yeşil Ordu)—as green being the symbolic color of Islam. Italian administration in Antalya were spreading rumors in January 1920, as Turkish military intelligence reported, that flyers were dropped from an airplane on Constantinople that proclaimed that Enver was returning to Ottoman Turkey with «seven army corps» under his command. Official responses corrected that «the mentioned issue is not true.» It was believed to be a deception by Italian officials «in order to understand our anticipations» (hassasiyetimizi anlamak için), and urged to react «cautiously and discreetly» to such news. This kind of news and rumors continued to catch the attention of officials in Anatolia. In May 1920, newspapers in Batum, which were regularly used by Turkish military intelligence, announced that Enver was appointed by the Soviet Government as the Chief of Staff in Moscow and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks. A news in The Times reported from Constantinople in May 1920 that: «In the Caucasus, Enver Pasha’s so-called Green Army is in reality composed of units of the Bolshevik red Army, and is quite ready to advance with him into Asia Minor, or wherever he may lead it; but more […] out of mercenary motives than from political consideration.» The official newspaper of the Kemalist movement, Hakimiyet-i Milliye, reported often on the activities of the Green Army of Russian Muslims, fighting its way through Caucasus to Baghdad and through Turkestan to India, mostly quoting English or French newspapers.

The idea that a Green Army was coming to Anatolia’s rescue was initially a combination of paranoid Entente rumors, Unionist and Bolshevik propaganda, confusions with the Peasants’ Green Movement in Russia, and the collective memories of the Ottoman campaign of the

177 Secretary of Staff, 12th Army Corps, intelligence report (Burdur), January 28, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 328, gömlek no. 41.
178 Intelligence report (Trabzon) to Fifth Army Command, May 28, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 914, gömlek no. 90; Kazım Karabekir, cipher (Erzurum) to Ministry of National Defence (Ankara), May 31, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 651, gömlek no. 67.
Islamic Army of the Caucasus in 1918 with its green flag. Once these Green Army rumors were captured in the prose of official intelligence reports, they became perceived as a reality of their own. Unintendedly, it was the Eastern Command of Kazım Karabekir Pasha that gave the Green Army legends currency and credibility by transmitting them to various command outposts in Anatolia. This discursive power of the Green Army was so strong in the spring of 1920 that the Ankara regime utilized it and started to build its own Green Army. When Kazım Karabekir sent a unit of irregular cavalry to suppress the Anzavur uprising, he gave the unit «a quite powerful name» (pekala kuvvetli bir isim), namely the Green Army. As Karabekir explained, the reputation of the Caucasian Green Army was already well-known and «the effect [of the color green] on our nation was tremendous», thus it helped to «ag-grandize it in reputation» (manen büyütmek). Finally, in early summer 1920, the Kemalists decided to fully capitalize the Green Army and found officially the Green Army Society (Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti). The discursive power of rumors was once again defining and provoking behaviors and affecting the intersubjectivity. Ironically, both the Green Army and its parliamentary faction People’s Group (Halk Zümresi) would eventually become Unionist strongholds in Ankara.

182 Erdem, 1920 Yılı ve Sol Mücadelet, 49–55; Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar, 197. See also: Cemal Kutay, Milli Mücadelede Yeşil Ordu Efsanesi: Yakın Tarih’in Mečhul Sahifeleri (İstanbul: Ercan matbaası, 1956).
184 Kazım Karabekir circulated, for instance, the intelligence that there was Muslim Bolshevik force by the name of Green Army, which was fighting Denikin’s White Army in Northern Caucasus. Kazım Karabekir, circular note (Erzurum) to all provinces, autonomous districts, divisions, cavalry regiments, and army corps, March 16, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 502–3, cited in Erdem, 1920 Yılı ve Sol Mücadelet, 51.
185 Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 607.
186 Hüsamettin Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkaası, ed. Samih N. Tansu (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996), 479. Later the Green Army movement was hijacked by the partisan leader Çerkes Ethem and was accordindy criminalized by the Kemalist Government. Paul Dumont, “La révolution impossible: Les courants d’opposition en Anatolie 1920–1921,” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 19, 1–2 (1978): 145–51; Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, 125–26; Paul Dumont, Du socialisme ottoman à l’internationalisme anatolien (İstanbul: İsis, 1998), 349. The history of the Green Army Society is beyond the scope of this study. For further studies see: Mustafa Yılmaz, Milli Mücadelede Yeşil Ordu (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1987); Tevetoğlu, Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar, 197–260; Necip Hablemitoğlu, Milli Mücadelede Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti (İstanbul: Birharf, 2006); Erdem, 1920 Yılı ve Sol Mücadelet, 55–126.
The Young Turk Aftermath

The idea to get in touch with Mustafa Kemal became urgent after their negotiations with Karl Radek, where they bluffed about working together with Mustafa Kemal and supporting him from abroad. The first attempt to get in touch was made in December 1919 by Talat Pasha, probably because he had a better relation with him compared to Enver. Asım Süreyya İlloğlu, a young student in Europe, was chosen as the courier. After a long journey via Switzerland, Italy and Greece, Asım Bey delivered the letter two months later to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Ankara. In the letter Talat explained the future he envisioned:

The Turkey, which will be restrained by the Peace, will not be able to set boundaries to Europe’s plans. Therefore, it is necessary to search for this strength abroad and build auxiliary forces. I think this can be found in two great domains and by building a strong organization. One of this force lies in the vast Turcic world, the other in the Islamic world.

Talat saw these struggles abroad rather suited for Enver, because

I consider Enver as an important asset, who can work in the Islamic World, not only because of his influence and fame there, but also because of his determination and firmness. Besides, under the current situation his return to the homeland is impossible.

The CUP leaders made an important division of labor in two categories, the struggle inside (dahilde) and the struggle outside (hariçte) Ottoman Turkey. Talat proposed that the relation between the organization must be kept secret because of the stigma of the CUP leaders as war criminals:

There should be no open relation to those assets abroad [hariçte]. It is required to establish a Sublime Court for the prosecution of those responsible of war. This is completely a different matter. On the one hand, this direction must be pursued. On the other hand, there can be occasionally a connection to me only through the medium of men sent to me. […]

All this organization can be subordinated now or later to the person of Mustafa Kemal or a bureau he appoints. Since I will provide the liaison center of the organization abroad

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188 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 21, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 145. See also diary entry, December 27, 1919, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 52–53.
190 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 204.
Contrary to their claims that Mustafa Kemal was following their orders, they were voluntarily subordinating their struggle to Mustafa Kemal. In doing so, Talat hoped to guarantee that he was the liaison person for the organization abroad, while Mustafa Kemal led the movement in Ottoman Turkey and Enver the operations in the Caucasus and Turkestan.

In his answer to Talat, Mustafa Kemal gave a detailed report on the progress made by the Anatolian and Rumelian Societies of Defense of Rights in the last year. This not only was to undermine the sovereignty of his movement, but also a signal of confidence to Talat. Regarding the question of the struggle beyond «Turkish and Kurdish national borders», Mustafa Kemal reported on the relations to Arabs in Syria and Iraq, as described above, and came to the topic of Caucasus. Mustafa Kemal noted that he had assigned Enver’s uncle Halil Pasha to Azerbaijan and Enver’s brother Nuri Pasha to Northern Caucasus, where they both gained experience from the end of World War I. «For now, communication and connection to both of them continues», Mustafa Kemal explained to Talat and continued: «Halil Pasha is leading an Azerbaijani force in Zangezur [today Syunik in Armenia] and combating the Armenians, while Nuri Pasha is commanding the Northern Caucasus forces. We gradually provide them with officers.» The assignment given to them was to establish Azerbaijani and Circassian independence in the Caucasus with good relations to Georgia. Due to false rumors circling in the press, Mustafa Kemal still believed that Enver was in Turkestan. Mustafa Kemal ordered Halil Pasha to establish communication with Enver in Turkestan. «Both in the Caucasus and in Turkestan», as Mustafa Kemal ordered to Halil and Nuri, «the operations and activities that will be materialized are to be directed towards the interests of Turkey.»


Perhaps these orders given to Halil or Nuri were somehow transmitted to Enver in Berlin. Even before Mustafa Kemal’s cited letter to Talat was written, Hans Humann wrote, «[Enver] received a letter recently from Mustafa Kemal.» «He seems to be very happy», as Humann observed, «about how things turned out.»195 Perhaps Enver was lying or there are other letters that are lost today. Nonetheless, in their initial correspondence there was a mutual understanding between the fugitive Unionists and the Kemalists in Anatolia in early 1920. Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained his vision to Talat Pasha as follows:

As you can understand from the formula I used in the alliance with the Arabs and the instructions I gave to our friends in the Caucasus, what I have in mind is that we should provoke the various Muslim masses against those enemies of Turkey for them to obtain independence. By this means, their autonomous employment can lighten the burden of the pressure put on Turkey and can produce maximum advantage for its material and moral strength. And then in the future we can unite with those Muslim masses that safeguarded their independence in a confederation. So far, the work that was invested manifests a result that seems to be gratifying.196

Meanwhile, the British had good intelligence on Mustafa Kemal’s approach to Bolshevism. «Mustapha-Kemal’s entourage state», as British Headquarters in Constantinople reported to War Office, «that they want to join Bolshevists in the event of Turks receiving hard peace terms, Bolshevism being preferred to loss of independence.»197 Indeed, Mustafa Kemal Pasha wrote to Talat Pasha:

Therefore, instead of the inauspicious risk of our homeland getting disintegrated and seeing our nation under the English yoke, it is considered to find the means for redemption in effectively implementing Bolshevik principles. In that case, despite the difficulties regarding its execution, based on the strength we possess today, it might be required to engage with that issue as well.198

«Your efforts in Europe since one year are a matter of gratitude», Mustafa Kemal congratulated Talat and said: «The continuation of these efforts in the same way will give more beneficial results».199 Nonetheless, Mustafa Kemal also made clear that he was the sole decision-

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maker and even though Talat was allowed to manage the networks abroad, he was subordinated to his command. Mustafa Kemal Pasha finished his letter with the following arrangement: «For now, I see it as required that you correspond only with me and only through the medium of Asım Bey. Because if you correspond through other means and with other persons, it leaks out… As a matter of fact, it did…».200 Talat did not even informed Enver about these letters, where Talat made himself the center of communication with Ankara.201 The correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and Talat remained, however, not a secret within the leadership of the nationalist movement. A letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara protested: «In what occasion and according to which commission’s decision, a courier was sent to Enver and Talat Pashas.»202

Although the Kemalist movement was somehow associated with the CUP, being labeled as Unionists was considered a terrible stigma. «By this, we would be labeled as Unionists», Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained to Talat, «as our all initiative in the homeland has been seen as such. Thus, we would give our enemies a weapon and chance to diminish our strength.»203 Retrospective knowledge of consequent events that opened the chasm between the Kemalists and Unionists blurs the understanding of these two letters. Talat’s correspondence with Mustafa Kemal was a matter of mutual misunderstanding, as the former CUP publicist Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) believed after publishing the letters in 1945.204 On the other hand, Kemalist historiography is rather inclined to read a clear rejection of the CUP and its policies in Mustafa Kemal’s answer to Talat’s alleged bid for dual-leadership.205 Nonetheless, archival documents show that Talat (and Enver) continued to send secret couriers to Anatolia, as one of them Artillery Lieutenant Salim Bey, who had brought letters from Talat and Enver from

201 Enver Pasha complained about this in his letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), April 11, 1921, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürpriz Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 133.
202 İsmet Bey, cipher to aid-de-camp Salih Bey at the Ministry of War, February 21, 1920, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 23, gömlek no. 110.
204 Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 224.
205 İlkin and Tekeli, “Kurtuluş Savaşında Talat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal’in Mektuplaşması,” 345.
Germany was taken into custody by the officials in Antalya only to be permitted to travel to Ankara.

To be sure, Mustafa Kemal’s horizon of expectations was less clear in early 1920. There is a turn in Mustafa Kemal’s policies sometime in 1921 and he would later rhetorically frame it as if he had always thought and acted by secularist and republican means, the so-called «national secret» (*milli sırr*). Thus, he was still exploring and exploiting all potential options and strategies inside and outside Turkey and his letter is a special manifestation that republicanism, secularism, and nationalist isolationism were not yet foundations of his policies.

Yet, Talat Pasha was perhaps also inclined to read into the letter an official approval of collaboration between Unionists abroad with Kemalists at home. At his prosecution in 1926, Dr. Nazım told the authorities that Talat was working in Berlin «in the name of Muslim revolutions against the enemies of our homeland». Talat’s activities abroad were sanctioned in «a letter from Ankara», as Dr. Nazım explained, but under the premise «not to intervene into Anatolian affairs». To courier who came from Constantinople, Talat said: «You all need to get organized! You should work inside [the homeland] and we from abroad and stir up the Muslim world. Soon the English Empire will fall into pieces!».

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206 Western Front Command, letter to the General Staff (Ankara), November 1, 1920, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 664, gömlek no. 3; Commander of the Antalya District, letter (Antalya) to the 12th Army Division, November 14, 1920, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 844, gömlek no. 160; Director Intelligence Western Front Faruk, letter (Eskişehir) to Generat Staff Office of Intelligence and Cipher (Ankara), November 11, 1920, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 664, gömlek no. 8.

207 The «national secret» theory is formulated Mustafa Kemal’s Great Speech (*Nutuk*) to the Grand National Assembly in 1927 and implies that from the beginning on Mustafa Kemal had a secret agenda for all his future reforms. This is the major trajectory of Kemalist teleology. I am not convinced that Mustafa Kemal secretly followed a blueprint for his visions for the future. The making of Kemalism was more contingent than premediated. For the strong Muslim phraseology Mustafa Kemal used during the first years of the National Struggle see: Erik J. Zürcher, “The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 137, no. 1 (1999): 81–92.


209 Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 164.
While the peace settlement in the Middle East yet proved to be a far cry, the peace in Europe was settled on June 27, 1919. The peace treaty was, however, a bitter pill to swallow for Germany. After deadlocked negotiations, the German Government signed under protest the somewhat Carthaginian peace with the Entente at the Versailles Palace. Alone the place of the peace treaty was a symbolic blow. In 1871, after the devastating Prussian victory over France the German Kaiserreich was proclaimed provocatively at the very same Versailles Palace. Now 38 years later at the same palace, the German cataclysm was manifested. The Treaty of Versailles not only established the German guilt as fact for in the outbreak of World War I, but it also demanded serious territorial concessions, excessive reparations, and radical curtailment of war-related industry and commerce. The Entente powers knew perfectly well that Germany was barely capable to pay the reparations and survive the burden of peace conditions. Cultivated by imperialism, militarism, and nationalism, brutalized by trench warfare, ashamed by defeat, enraged by surrender, impoverished by war-economy, and radicalized by revolution, most of the Germans regarded the harsh and dishonorable conditions of Treaty of Versailles as the climax of resentments and bitterness. Especially the ancien régime, i.e. the Prussian-styled imperialists and militarists from Kiel to Munich, were joined by the völkisch-oriented masses of nationalists, irredentists, and revanchists in their collective resentment. German socialists and Spartacists similarly despised the Versailles conditions typical for Western imperialism and capitalism. Except for few liberals and pacifists, the German political spectrum from right to left agreed that Versailles had to be overcome somehow.

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Karl Radek’s political salon was established in the midst of these days, where Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha were one of his first visitors. Such guests of Radek’s Moabit salon uniquely illustrates the political complexity of post-Versailles Germany. Radek’s contact man to the outside world, Karl Moor, had far reaching contacts to Berlin’s diverse elites, ranging from socialists to militarists, and used his contacts to bring these different minds to Radek. Moor was so influential in Berlin that at the German Ministry of Defense, «where all doors opened before him», he used to arrange forged passports for those people who desired to meet Radek off-the-record. Now as the German Revolution was brutally suppressed and the peace proved to be worse than ever expected, Soviet Russia came to be seen as an opportunity space to subvert the Versailles settlement. One of the visitors of Radek in the Moabit prison, M. Philips Price, remembers

I had the impression that Radek had succeeded in finding some elements in influential circles in Prussia, either of the Left or Right, who were prepared to use him against the Entente Powers who were at that time in process of forcing the Versailles Treaty on Germany. That probably accounted for the astounding scene that I witnessed in Moabit prison. Later I heard that Radek had become friendly with certain officers of the Reichswehr, and quite possibly this was the beginning of the move that led later to Reichswehr units getting training in Russia to escape from Entente control.

There is a certain overestimation of the reach of Radek’s hand from his political salon into the state of affairs between Berlin and Moscow. Especially Radek’s relation (via Moor’s arrangements) to German militarists is subjected to a great deal of speculations. Nonetheless, Radek’s political salon was something extraordinary, a crystal ball to envision possible futures for post-Versailles Germany, where many dared a look inside.

One of the most important visitors of Radek’s political salon happened to be Walther Rathenau, President of the General Electricity Company (Allgemeine-Electricitäts-Gesellschaft, AEG) and later German Foreign Minister. Like many others frustrated by the economic burden of peace settlement, Rathenau was interested in building economic and trade relations

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between post-Versailles Germany and Soviet Russia. Although commercial and industrial cooperation was welcome, for Radek it was clear that «Soviet Russia is not looking for a German alliance against the Entente». The cooperation had to take place on grounds of material needs and rational choices. One successful result of these talks between Radek and Rathenau and others was the Treaty of Rapallo signed in 1922. The Rapallo Treaty was an official rapprochement between Weimar Germany under now Foreign Minister Rathenau and Soviet Russia that enabled commercial and industrial as well as secret military cooperation that would avoid the restrictions of Versailles.

Ever since, the Rapallo Treaty was seen as an «unholy alliance». A so-called «Rapallo myth» emerged in imaginations that demonized every Russian-German interaction as a «secret and potentially dangerous collaboration». For this reason, the Rapallo Treaty had also a strong effect in reading the precedent interactions following a certain teleology leading to the «suicidal alliance». This Rapallo teleology implies that there was a collective intention and agency in post-Versailles Germany in early 1919 that pushed for cooperation with Soviet Russia. The process was, however, rather unilinear and complex.

The teleology of Rapallo might also be a problem in reading too much into Enver Pasha’s role in the Soviet-German rapprochement. It is common to find Enver as the deus ex machina in explaining the initial and continued approach of German military, especially his old mentor and the new Chief of Staff General Hans von Seeckt, towards a cooperation with Soviet

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Russia. Ayşe-Azade Rorlich once summarized the state of research as: «If Enver is to be credited with any role in this, it is certainly within the context of those indirect levels of communications which paved the way for Russo-German rapprochement.»¹⁷ This notion is mostly based on Radek himself, who wrote in his Moabit memoir that

Enver, having fled after the rout through Soviet Russia illegally to Germany, was the first to bring home to the German militarists that Soviet Russia was a new and growing world force with which they would have to count, if they in fact meant to struggle against the Entente.¹⁸

Before the Rapallo teleology, conspiracy theories were already paved the way for a German-Soviet-Turkish alliance. For instance, the British representative in the Caucasus had received intelligence from Denikin that «German agents» were in contact with Kemalists and Bolsheviks.¹⁹

After several meetings and reaching a preliminary agreement with Karl Radek, the CUP leaders decided to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss their plans with the Soviet leadership. While Enver, who had only recently returned from South Russia, was eager to go back and visit Moscow, Talat Pasha decided to send Bahaeddin Şakir Bey as his representative.²⁰ This chapter will show how the attempts of the CUP leaders to travel from Berlin to Moscow is uniquely illustrative in understanding the ways in which the military-industrial complex in post-Versailles Germany approached Soviet Russia in late 1919 and early 1920.


²⁰ Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992), 55. See also: Tank Zafer Tunuva, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler III: İttihat ve Terakki (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 570. It was planned to send three delegations after another. The first consisting of Enver Pasha Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir; the second, Cemal Pasha and Bedri Bey; and the third delegation would be Talat Pasha and Dr. Nazım. See: Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyiciıl, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 332.
I use the concept of *military-industrial complex* in the context of post-Versailles Germany to describe a dynamic and informal network of elites of different established institutions within state and society, such as military and industry etc., which are collectively profiteering and racketeering from fortunes of war and accordingly manipulate the state of affairs. 21 As the «complex» in the name suggests, the concept implies neither uniform agency nor tangible and static structures. Both Enver Pasha through his friendship to the family Humann/Sarre and to General Hans von Seeckt, and Karl Radek, through the social contacts of Karl Moor, had access to important nodes in the military-industrial complex of post-Versailles Germany. Enver Pasha’s role in connecting the German military-industrial complex with Soviet Russia was certainly an extraordinary (and extraterritorial) factor that was not easily replaceable in that specific context. To be sure, besides Enver there were also plenty of other and even far more influential agents and structures that were involved in the making of this rapprochement that resulted in the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, Rathenau being the most obvious example. Enver was perhaps only the most flamboyant and conspicuous agent in the lot. Yet, as I will argue, the unanticipated contingencies of and the disorder caused by his transnational political activism between Berlin and Moscow—rather than his intended actions—had a more lasting impact on the intensification of Soviet-German affairs. Somewhat like Inspector Jacques Clouseau of the *Pink Panther* series, if I may caricature, who successfully cracked difficult criminal cases by the unintended fortunes of chaos and ineptness, Enver’s story from Berlin to Moscow was similarly chaotic and had many unanticipated consequences in the complex process that led to Rapallo Treaty of 1922.

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«Emin is still here», Naval Lieutenant Commander Hans Humann wrote on August 14, 1919, in a letter to General Otto von Lossow, implying that Enver Pasha had arrived in Berlin. 22 Humann was also in contact with other fugitive CUP leaders such as Talat Pasha, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, and Dr. Nazım, and he admits to have found their political ideas more

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21 The term has been popularized after President Dwight D. Eisenhower used it in his farewell address on January 17, 1961. There were also studies that had shed light on this topic before Eisenhower. See for instance: Charles Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).

22 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
and more inspiring. 23 «More importantly», Humann continued, «in 5 days he [Enver] flies to Moscow with Radek who is released from prison». 24 Two days later, on August 16, 1919, Radek was, in fact, released from the Moabit prison, but was held under military detention until his extradition in due course. 25 Radek’s extradition (and also Enver’s travel plans) were, however, accursed by geopolitics: East Prussia and the Baltic region were under Allied occupation, thus an arrest by the Entente was feared; the Polish-Soviet War made travelling by land dangerous, especially for the Polish Bolshevik leader Radek with whom Enver desired to travel with; the peace conditions forbade any kind of commercial or other kind of interaction between Germany and Soviet Russia. Therefore, the land route via Poland and the Baltics was literally unsurpassable—at least for notorious men like Radek and Enver. The CUP leaders, who were already impatient about their come-back to high-politics by a devious route via Moscow, were eager to push for alternative routes, and soon came up with the idea to fly to Moscow. 26

While the plans were in the making for the flight to Moscow, Hans Humann wrote a letter to General Hans von Seeckt on September 19, 1919, that elaborated on the possibility of a land route via the Baltic region. 27 In this letter Humann mentions a common friend from Constantinople—again—by the name of Said Emin Efendi, a so-called «confident and emissary of Enver Pasha», who desires to travel incognito to Moscow for political reasons. This Said Emin Efendi was, of course, no one else but Enver himself. Peculiarly, Enver was already aware about the wrong rumors about his whereabouts and hoped to utilize these rumors as deception. Humann explained:

He insists with great tenacity on absolute incognito. The reason is not his desire for personal security, but the deliberation that this serves the military-political interests of Turkey to deceive the English about his current place. The English believe him to be in

24 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
25 Karl Radek, radiogram (Berlin) to People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Moscow), August 16, 1919, PA-AA, R 2043. See also: Schüdekopf, “Karl Radek in Berlin,” 97.
26 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Mühterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005), 77.
Humann’s plan was to send Enver Pasha through East Prussia and Baltic states to Russia. Humann was hoping for the assistance of German military officials, still stationed in the region, who had established contact with the Red Army front. Therefore, he needed a recommendation letter or maybe even support from General von Seeckt who had been the chief of staff of the Northern Battalions with connections to the troops in the Baltics. On October 1, 1919, Seeckt was appointed as the chief of the newly founded Truppenamt (Troop Office), a camouflage organization for the German General Staff, which was formally forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Humann suggested that Enver should contact General Rüdiger von der Goltz who was at that time stationed in Joniškis in Northern Lithuania. There, Enver would pass the border with Goltz’s assistance or on his own. General von der Goltz was in the Baltic region since early 1919, first as military governor and later as commander of the Freikorps, where he has been aggressively fighting the Latvian Soviet Government.

In the same letter, Humann declared that he was appointed as the new Director of Naval Intelligence Bureau, which was soon to be united with the Army Intelligence to a joint Military Intelligence Bureau. Intelligence work, as Humann writes, was his «old expertise» (altes Arbeitsgebiet).

Humann’s role in the initial German-Soviet rapprochement in 1919, especially in his position as the Chief of the Naval Intelligence Bureau in arranging Enver Pasha’s flight to Moscow, needs attention.

Regarding Enver Pasha’s travel arrangements, General von Seeckt was only remotely associated in the beginning. As Humann requested General von Seeckt’s help, Seeckt was, according to his diary, on leave and not in Berlin, but a reference letter for General von der Goltz was still somehow prepared.

28 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 51.
30 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 52.
to General von Seeckt until late October 1919. This contradicts the common wisdom that General von Seeckt was the man pulling the strings in Enver’s flight to Moscow in 1919. Nevertheless, it is for certain that General von Seeckt became later on the most important German ally of Enver in Berlin. That being said, Seeckt was indeed one of the first militarists to consider the idea of a Russian-German cooperation—even before Enver’s arrival to Berlin. General von Seeckt’s man in the Baltics, Fritz Tschunke stated years later to Seeckt’s biographer that

the establishment of connections between Germany and Russia was conducted through military hands, [emphasis in original] and through the foresight and initiative of General v. Seeckt. What his motives were at that time is difficult to discover today.

As we led the Grenzschutz forward through the Baltic in 1919, I was commissioned to show the French, American, and English military commissions there that we were doing the business of the Entente and were raising a wall between us and Russia … General v. Seeckt’s oft expressed opinion at that time was that those of us who favored Ostpolitik would be able—naturally refusing to accept the Bolshevistic theories—to establish a broad basis for an area of contact with the Soviet Union.

There are also rumors that General von Seeckt had a secret meeting with Karl Radek, though this remains as a speculation. Anyhow, General von Seeckt belonged to military milieu that increasingly favored a Soviet-German rapprochement as a strategic maneuver against the Versailles settlement.

Buying an airplane was apparently not difficult, because the German military aviation was in the process of getting disarmed. Indeed, according to the peace conditions, it was forbidden for the German military staff to be in the possession of an air force. The problem with finding an airplane was that it had to be done so secretly, that not even the German Government was

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34 From Seeckt’s staff, Ernst Köstring (later German Military Attaché in Moscow), belonged to Radek’s visitors. In an interview he gave to Svenska Dagbladet, September 5, 1949, Köstring claimed that Seeckt and Radek had a secret meeting, but later denied it. General von Seeckt and Radek met for the first time in February 10, 1922. Carr, “Radek’s ‘Political Salon’ in Berlin 1919,” 413, note 4; Schüddekopf, “Karl Radek in Berlin,” 90; Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1967), 322–23

35 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 55–56.
allowed to find out, since the pressure of the Allies was too much on Germany. Also the Auswärtiges Amt, as Humann discovered at a meeting with Otto Göppert, had objections on sending Radek together with Enver to Moscow, because the German Government might get compromised. While Humann got cold-shouldered by the Auswärtiges Amt, he thought highly of the Social Democrat Minister of Defense Gustav Noske, implying that he was willing to cooperate. «Working with Noske is very pleasant», Humann explained, because, he «comprehends extremely easy, and has not only very much courage, but also the responsibility and determination typical for the rage de perfection of German craftsmanship.» The German official assistance to Enver’s travel plans to Moscow was limited and never a fully official governmental policy, but it reached up to the upper floors of Berlin. Yet, it remained as a confidential and semi-official conspiracy of a group of high-ranking state officials.

Hans Humann himself met Radek in mid-October. Humann talked with Radek about possibilities to work out an oil deal between Soviet Russia and Turkey in order to weaken Britain, implying that Soviet Russia was increasingly an eligible partner for the German ancien régime. Hans Humann’s plans to transport Enver to Moscow was also a family matter. Behind the scenes, his sister Maria Sarre took the matters into her hand. Later she would admit that «she had been virtually the initiator of the enterprise.» As for the pilot, Lieutenant Hans Hesse, famous as the «Baghdad aviator» (Bagdadflieger) for flying from Berlin to Baghdad, was friends with the Sarres since his childhood. One day Maria Sarre asked him, if he would accept to fly Enver Pasha to Moscow. After speaking with Enver at the Sanatorium Sinn, Hesse travelled to his hometown Dessau to the Junkers-Werke, one of Germany’s leading

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36 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 56.
37 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
38 Hans Humann, letter to Chief of the Admiralty Adolf von Trotha, October 10, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
39 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
40 Hans Hesse first published his memoir of the Moscow flight in the local newspaper Deister- und Weserzeitung in 1934. Adolf von Hatzfeld inofficially novelized the recollections of Lieutenant Hans Hesse in Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau. Later Hesse’s daughter published his full memoir in Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann. Since both editions are rare to find, I cited both of them, but quoted only Hesse’s own wording.
41 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
aviation companies, where he had good connections to its founder and director. Hesse told to Professor Hugo Junkers:

Herr Professor, I want to talk about a curious matter with you. It is an adventurous matter, but it delivers an opportunity for Junkers-Werke to create a potential market that is due to the Entente settlement otherwise not given. I can fly with an airplane as the first German to approach Lenin and Trotsky. It is a political flight that one must keep silence about. German and Russian authorities are informed about the flight and approve it. I want to buy sufficient war machines, but I want to make another offer to you. Provide me with your newest all-metal airplane so that I can make propaganda for your company and sell your airplanes abroad.

For Professor Junkers, this idea was not new. He himself has been hatching similar plans so that he accepted Hesse’s offer. Since the German aviation industry was hit hard by the Versailles conditions, the Junkers-Werke had interest in deploying the production to newly opening market in Soviet Russia. Already in May 1919, Professor Junkers was approached by Herr Maier-Haller from the Ural-Caucasian Society (Ural-Kaukatische Gesellschaft) from St. Petersburg. As an expert on Russian affairs Maier-Haller informed Professor Junkers about production possibilities in Russia. «In order to thwart the English plans», Prof. Junkers asked, «what political possibilities will result regarding the airplane issue—manufacturing and commercial routes.» Maier-Haller had also information that the German Government intends to start commercial relations with Russia, but they were over-cautious not to attract any attention from the Entente. Nonetheless, the times of free-trade relations was over, for good or bad, thus, the future of German-Russian commercial relations had to be of a different nature, he said. Hesse’s offer was dropped in the midst of these on-going debates within the Junkers-Werke. On September 30, the management of the Junkers-Werke send a telegram to Professor Junkers:

Lieutenant Hesse has opportunity to fly with six-person airplane on a political mission to Russia, backed by German and Soviet Governments. [He] proposes urgently to utilize this with Maier-Haller as our representative. Departure is due at the very latest on Saturday. [We] recommend unanimously to execute the flight. Cable decision urgently.

42 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 12–15; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 117.
43 Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 117–18.
44 Minutes of Prof. Junkers’ meeting (Dessau) with Maier-Haller from St. Petersburg, May 24, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01.M01., nobib.
45 Maier-Haller, letter (Ulm) to Herr Früh, July 18, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01.
Hans Hesse had meanwhile also contacted Meier-Haller. Hesse could not reveal the real intention of the mission to Russia, as Meier-Haller reported to Dessau, but he still made a good impression. «Regarding the matter of Lieut. Hesse», Meier-Haller concluded, «I can only say that after all what this gentleman was kind enough to bring forth to me, the case is rooted to the soil [die Sache Grund und Boden hat].» Maier-Haller assured that, if Hesse achieves to reach Moscow, he would be able to sell the patent of the airplane there and even that of other machines. 47 Maier-Haller’s recommendation for Hesse’s mission convinced the Junkers managers. 48

For the pilot Hesse, the Junkers-Werke applied for a certification register (Zulassungsbescheinigung) at the Reich Department for Aviation (Reichsluftamt). 49 Hans Humann arranged this official flight permit, prepared by an official called Lieutenant Walter Lange from the Zentralstelle Grenzschutz Ost of the German Ministry of Defense. This was a flight permit for five passengers, including the pilot Lieutenant Hans Hesse, granting them protection and assistance in airports on their route. As Humann had already communicated with General von Seeckt in his letter, the flight permission explained that Lieutenant Hesse was instructed to deliver an important letter to General von der Goltz. 50 All parties were required to commit to outmost secrecy until shortly before the flight. 51 But still enough people were initiated. Apparently, Walter Rathenau arranged additional papers with the help of Karl Radek. 52 On October 4, the Minister of Defense Gustave Noske called Minister of Foreign Affairs Hermann Müller on telephone. Noske informed Müller «that there is an opportunity to transport Karl Radek to Russia, because a Turkish delegation would proceed by airplane to Russia.»

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47 Maier-Haller, letter (Berlin) to Major Seitz, October 1, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01.
48 Major Seitz, minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Maier-Haller, October 1, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01.
50 Walter Lange, certification for Lieutenant Hesse as pilot of "Anneliesen" for 5 passangers, October 2, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87.
52 Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 118.
Noske added that «Radek had heard about this and is supposedly content with this transport route.» But Müller insisted that until the release of the German hostages this was not an option. He said that once the hostages were set free, Radek could fly with any airplane he wants. The Auswärtiges Amt under Minister Müller stayed out of the operation. Thus, Radek’s return was delayed—but not Enver’s.

The Junkers bureau in Berlin contacted the Lieutenant Lange and the latter underlined «that the flight of Lieutenant Hesse is not a military affair, but very well supported and promoted by the military.» Lieutenant Lange explained that the whole operation was based on the consent of Admiralty and Ministry of Defense and Lieutenant-Commander of the Navy Hans Humann as the Director of Naval Intelligence was named by Lange as the responsible person.

The airplane chosen by the Junkers-Werke for the flight to Moscow was one of the prototypes of the model F 13 named Annelise (or sometimes also wrongly called Anneliese in the documents). The F 13 was a very special model. It was in metallic silver and looked with its six-passenger cabin like a «new and interesting construction» in contemporary eyes. It was the first all-metal commercial aircraft in the world. The model’s first flight took place on June 25, 1919, with the other prototype Herta. The chosen prototype, Annelise, had recently broken the world record in high-altitude flight on September 13, 1919.

54 Hermann Müller, notes meeting with Viktor Kopp, November 2, 1919, in John P. Fox, Peter Grupp and Pierre Jardin, eds., Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, Serie A: 7. Mai bis 31. Dezember 1919, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1984), II, 391. Bardakçılı was also correct in his assumption that the Auswärtiges Amt was not involved, but it was not a secret. They knew that the Ministry of War was planning the transportation of the Young Turk leaders to Moscow, but Müller did not support these plans. Bardakçılı, Enver, 180.
55 Lützow, letter (Berlin) to Junkers-Werke Head Office (Dessau), October 11, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
56 This story was first told in Hofmann, “Der Moskau-Flug der F 13 ‘Annelise’”. The short summary in Bardakçılı, Enver, 181–82. is fairly accurate, although no source is cited.
According to logbook of the airplane, it was originally arranged that the pilot Hesse would fly on October 2 from Dessau to Berlin, but then it was delayed for October 8. On October 10, 1919, the crew met for the first time at the Johannisthal Air Field near Berlin. The occupants of the flight were Hans Hesse as the pilot, Paul Maruszyk as the mechanic, and Abraham Frankl as the engineer and interpreter from Junkers-Werke. The special guests arrived by car were Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir. Among the crew, only Hesse knew their true identity and purpose of their trip, but the others probably figured it out sooner or later.

Although Hesse had previously given strict directives, the two Turkish passengers had too many baggage. They each had two travel bags and additionally each a handbag. Because they were planning to stay in Moscow in the coming winter, they had their winter clothes in the bags. Meanwhile, the Junkers-Werke officials took several photos of the airplane for promotion purposes. Interestingly enough, Junkers-Werke also insisted that Hesse’s special passengers were to pay the fuel costs and other expenses.

On October 10, the plane took off from Berlin flying across the Polish Corridor. It was probably the first time that Enver and Bahaeddin were flying. Bahaeddin Şakir was the only one on board too corpulent to fasten seat belts, which would soon become a matter of concern. On route they had two very dangerous forced landings due to technical malfunctions, one near Czersk and the other in Dirschau (Tczew) in Poland. The propeller was broken in the first crash and had to be changed as well as a new cooler was requested to be sent to Königsberg. They had already lost three days, as they had barely left the German borders.
behind. The Annalise landed in Königsberg (Kaliningrad) on October 13.\cite{R.B.Ward67} From Königsberg, pilot Hesse wrote letter to Professor Junkers, in which he explained the malfunctions and the troubles they survived. Hesse came to the bitter conclusion that the Annalise «is not yet fit for long-distant flights.»\cite{HansHesse68}

Nevertheless, the Annalise left Königsberg on October 15 and landed on the same day in Shavli (Šiauliai) in Lithuania. There, they were welcomed by anti-Bolshevik troops and had their meals there.\cite{R.B.Ward69} Shavli was occupied by the anti-Bolshevik West Russian Volunteer Army in September-October 1919, which was infiltrated by and acting on behalf of the German Freikorps.\cite{GeorgvonRauch70} The recommendation letter they received had fulfilled its purpose after General von der Goltz gave orders to his troops on the telephone to help the flight crew.\cite{AbrahamFränkel71} Later on that afternoon the Annalise left Shavli to the fiercely fought over city of Dvinsk (formerly known as Dünaburg, today Daugavpils in Latvia), where they believed that the Red Army troops had control over the area around the airfield according to the German General Staff maps they were given in Berlin.\cite{Hatzfeld72} Radek and the Soviet emissaries in Berlin had informed Moscow about the arrival of the special delegation from Berlin. The airplane only needed to cross the Russian front line.\cite{Denker73}

During the flight, however, the Annalise had to make an emergency landing on a field due to an approaching snow storm and the looming nightfall.\cite{Hatzfeld74} From the local peasants astonished by the airplane, they discovered that they landed near Abeli (Obeliai, today in Latvia), which

\begin{itemize}
  \item R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 44.
  \item Hans Hesse, letter (Damerau, today Sokolowka) to Professor Hugo Junkers, October 11, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
  \item R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 44.
  \item Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annalise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
  \item Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 33; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 123.
  \item Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 56.
  \item Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 37–38; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 123–24. See also: Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 56–57.
\end{itemize}
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was under Lithuanian authority, around 200 km northwest of Kovno (Kaunas in Lithuania) and only 100 km away from the next Russian front line at Dvinsk.\(^75\)

The Baltic States were in a brutal process of state-formation. The Lithuanians were known to be against the Russians and Bolsheviks were persecuted in the region. After their landing, they met a German veterinarian by the name of Dr. Nye, living in a nearby house. Dr. Nye invited the visitors from Germany to his home to stay overnight. Town guards were assigned to watch the airplane over the night so that they were already the talk of the town. At that night they were woken up by an officer from the Lithuanian counterintelligence police (Kontr-Razvedka).\(^76\) The officer accused them of being Bolshevik agents. Hesse’s prognosis that a snow storm was approaching had proven to be a misjudgment, making the reason for their landing in Abeli even more suspicious. Nonetheless, the police officers remained friendly and were rather interested in Enver’s camera. Anyhow, the Lithuanian secret police had any reason to be suspicious because, as the officer in charge boldly explained to the detained flight crew, they had intelligence on a Bolshevik airplane that was scheduled to land three days earlier. This was an alarmingly accurate intelligence, if one considers the three-day delay which they had due to the technical issues on route. Apparently, there was an information leak in the Berlin networks.\(^77\)

The next day, October 16, 1919, the pilot and the mechanic with Lithuanian officers on board flew to Kaunas where the plane was confiscated. Kaunas was under Allied control since the summer 1919.\(^78\) Shortly after they landed a British commission inspected the airplane. Their reaction after seeing the brand new airplane was: «Damned Germans», as pilot Hesse proudly remembers.\(^79\) Enver Pasha, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, and Abraham Frankl were brought

\(^75\) Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. See also: R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 44.

\(^76\) Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.

\(^77\) Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. See also: Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 41; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 126; Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 58–59.

\(^78\) Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, 22.

\(^79\) Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 51; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 129.
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to Kaunas by train, where they were interrogated after their arrival.\textsuperscript{80} The crew was, however, not imprisoned, but held under detention in a Hotel in Kaunas.\textsuperscript{81}

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The official cover story of Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was that they were delegates of the Ottoman Red Crescent (\textit{Hilal-i Ahmer}) on a mission to conduct inspections on the situation and extradition of former Ottoman POWs in Russia.\textsuperscript{82} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had diplomatic passports of the Ottoman Red Crescent under its possession, with which Talat Pasha had already traveled to different European destinations.\textsuperscript{83} Talat wrote in a letter to Cavid Bey:

\begin{quote}
My first thought has been to issue a passport for you here and to send it to you. I already heard that your brother was here. Yesterday I asked Ziya [former Deputy of Smyrna] for his photographs. Today we met in Berlin. I got the photographs. But he told me that your brother doesn’t look like you. Now I will get the passport and send it to you through Vitalis Efendi. I will write your first name and your father’s name in the passport. The passport will be diplomatic and I will get it issued for a Red Crescent delegate. If it arrives before the démarche it can be of use. Otherwise you can use it for travels.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Meanwhile, the question of Ottoman POWs was a topic in Russian-German dialogue on the exchange of prisoners, thus not an unreasonable cover.\textsuperscript{85} Nevertheless, the Red Crescent was also a matter of suspicion as well, because it was often compromised as a cover for \textit{Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa} and other clandestine CUP activities.\textsuperscript{86} An incident in the spring of 1919, when two Turkish lady delegates of the Red Crescent arrived in Switzerland with a check for \textit{Banque Fédérale} over four million francs for the support of the Turkish communities (embassy offic-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, \textit{Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939}, II, 44.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 58. See also: Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 51; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 129.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 57; Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 19; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 22.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), September 27, 1919, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds. \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar} (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 143.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Red Cross International, telegraph to Ottoman Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 7, 1919, BOA.HR.SYS.2246.50.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Erik Jan Zürcher, \textit{The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926} (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 76. See also: Sabine Mangold-Will, \textit{Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei, 1918–1933} (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 44.
\end{itemize}

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cials, students, and patients) in Europe, it had caused many rumors in intelligence and diplomatic reports. These funds were supposed to be meant for «adherents of C.U.P.», as one British report declared, to be «used for propaganda and conspiracies against England in connection with Egyptian Nationalist Committee.» Nevertheless, the Red Crescent mission by the two ladies proved to be no cover for clandestine activities.

According to the report of the British official in Kaunas, one of the two passengers of the Annelise was a Chemist by the name of Dr. Dimitri Nicola, alias Sayd Emin, an Ottoman Christian of Bulgarian descent, and the other one was called Dr. Muhammed Ali Sami, a doctor of medicine from Constantinople. There is some confusion in the literature on who is who. Azade-Ayşe Rorlich argues that Muhammed Ali Sami was Enver Pasha, since Ali was indeed Enver’s code name in his secret correspondence. Murat Bardakçı, who edited the private papers of Enver, published a permission letter to visit Karl Radek for a Dr. Mehmed Ali (living in Lehrterstraße 3), issued on November 21, 1919, implying that Enver was undercover as Dr. Mehmed Ali. Nevertheless, I choose to follow other sources that imply that it was the other way around.

There is reason to believe that Enver was the Bulgarian chemist and Bahaeddin Şakir therefore Dr. Mehmed. To begin with, Hans Hesse tells that «Enver Pasha traveled as Bulgarian pharmacist Ali from Sofia and claimed to be the assistant of Professor Mehmed, alias Bah

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88 For this mission see: Seçil Karal Akgün and Murat Uluğtekin, Hilal-i Ahmer'den Kızılay'a (Ankara: Kızılay Yayınları, 2000), 174. The Auswärtiges Amt reported that the Red Cross assured that these funds were to be distributed according to protocol and the rumors that these funds were meant for the CUP originated from the informant of the British Intelligence, Mehmed Mükerrem. Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), March 19, 1919; Adolf Müller, letter (Berne) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), April 3, 1919, PA-AA, R 13565. Later the British also acknowledged «the innocence of the two ladies of any political intent». High Comissioner Calthorpe, report (Constantinople) to Lord Curzon (London) on the payments by Turkish nurses to Turkish students, July 10, 1919, FO 4142/107162. The Red Crescent Society was, however, indeed politically oriented towards the National Defence Societies. For the relationship between the Red Crescent and National Defence societies, see: Karal Akgün and Uluğtekin, Hilal-i Ahmer'den Kızılay'a, 253; Mesut Çapa, Kızılay (Hilal-i Ahmer) Cemiyeti: 1914–1925 (Ankara: Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Yayınları, 2009), 70.
90 Rorlich, “Fellow Travellers,” 291.
91 High Command Noske, permission, November 21, 1919, in Bardakçı, Enver, 178. This persimission is also issued after their arrest in Lithuania.
Eddin».\(^{92}\) During the interrogation, Muhammed Ali claimed to be the head of the mission but the interrogating Lithuanians reported that they suspected that Said Emin was the actual leader. Said Emin was talking about curious things, such as that the German Government asked him to «make arrangements for the return of some German hostages in exchange for Radek.»\(^{93}\) This observation corresponds with pilot Hesse’s recollection that it was rather Bahaeddin Şakir, who was the charismatic one among them and acting as the leader, while Enver, hiding behind dark glasses, acted as being «only a poor pharmacist» (Ich bin nur armer Apotheker).\(^{94}\) Shakib Arslan also heard that Bahaeddin Şakir was undercover as a doctor of medicine and Enver his assistant on their way to Moscow.\(^{95}\) It is convincing that Bahaeddin Şakir would act as a physician and not Enver, since Bahaeddin himself was a Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Constantinople. Halil Pasha heard from Enver that he was undercover as a pharmacist from Monastir (Bitola).\(^{96}\) Enver’s wife Naciye Sultan tells that Enver spoke very good Bulgarian and acted as a Bulgarian during his captivity with Bahaeddin Şakir.\(^{97}\) Last but not least, in the above quoted letters of Humann to Seeckt and Lossow, Humann was using the same code name, Said Emin or Emin, for Enver.\(^{98}\) Despite suspicion that these Red Crescent men were somehow suspicious, the British mission had no idea, who had just fell into their hands.

Meanwhile, the news that the flight crew was arrested in Lithuania had reached Berlin. But Lieutenant Lange from the Ministry of Defense believed that the arrest of the flight crew would not catch the attention of the Entente officials in Kaunas, «because the enterprise is posed as a purely private matter.»\(^{99}\) However, he was mistaken. The British officials quickly

\(^{94}\) Hatzfeld, *Flug nach Moskau*, 18, 63; Hesse, *Kusch Adam der Vogelmann*, 118, 133.
\(^{95}\) Shakib Arslan, *Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa’nın Anıları*, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 263.
\(^{96}\) Halil Kut, *İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kabramamı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları*, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 263.
\(^{98}\) Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87; Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
\(^{99}\) Minutes (Dessau) on telephone conversation with Lieutenant Lange (Berlin), October 24, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. «da das Unternehmen als rein private Angelegenheit dargestellt ist.»
understood the true purpose of the mission. According to the report of the Assistant British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces, the Allied forces found two suspicious letters on Fränkl, the interpreter of the crew. These suspicious letters were from a Junkers employee, by the name of Depp (or elsewhere Doep), addressed to his father in St. Petersburg. The report concluded that

These letters go to prove that Hesse had two tasks to perform in flying the aeroplane to Moscow, viz., (1) to start trade relations with the Soviet Government; and (2) to take a person from Germany, who, he states, is like his father to come to Moscow, so that he could arrange for Krasin, a well-known Bolshevik Commissar, to make the acquaintance of either Hesse or this important personage, but here the text is not quite clear.100

The Junkers managers, who commissioned the flight, did not know anything about these letters Fränkel was carrying and Hesse claims to have hidden or destroyed other evidence.101 Hesse insisted that they were on a commercial mission to Russia and their papers were sufficient. The report wrote:

According to Hesse, he was commissioned by his firm to fly this aeroplane to Moscow in order to make inquiries as to the possibility of selling the Patent and establishing a factory in Russia for the manufacture of aeroplanes of this kind. I enclose a copy of a document he had with him in connexion with this. Apart from this and the fact that he is the aeroplane pilot, he says he knows nothing about the other passengers whom he was told to take in ordinary course of his duties.102

The suspicion that there was a person of importance on board in a mission to meet high-ranking Bolsheviks in Moscow troubled the Entente officials, while Lithuanians were rather concerned that they were Bolshevik agents against Lithuania. The Lithuanian counterintelligence suspected even Fränkel to be Karl Radek for a while.103 A further evidence that was highly suspicious was the German General Staff issued map of the region, which the Allied forces found hidden in the airplane. This map was updated on September 1, 1919, and

101 Major Seitz, report (Berlin) on recent developments regarding the airplane Annelise, December 30, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
103 Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
showed the strategic positions of anti-Soviet and Soviet troops in the Baltics. In the presence of all these conspiratorial evidence, the British authorities in Lithuania advocated to hold the flight crew under detention until further instructions from London or Paris followed. In sum, the British officials had reached a quite accurate assessment over the incident.

(1) In view of the blockade it is not permitted for an aeroplane to proceed into Russia without some form of pass;

(2) The journey was avowedly undertaken to commence trade between Germany and Russia, which is not permitted at present;

(3) The map discovered in the aeroplane gives one to suppose that some form of spying was intended;

(4) The passengers have insufficient and unsatisfactory papers to enable them to undertake a peculiar journey of this kind at such time.

The Assistant British Commissioner sent a copy of his report to the Foreign Office and to the Paris Peace Conference. The mentioned telegraph was from Colonel Rovan Robinson, British Military Representative at Kaunas, including Ward’s above-mentioned report. The telegram was sent two days after the landing, on October 17 and was received at the Paris Conference on October 21. At the Paris Conference, during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Head of Delegations on October 22, nearly a week after the arrestment, the message was read out.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to bring to the attention of the Council a telegram which had just been received, according to which a German aeroplane had made a forced landing in the neighbourhood of Kovno [Kaunas]. The aeroplane carried two German civilian pilots and three passengers, one of whom was Russian and the other two Turkish; this aeroplane was travelling from Berlin to Moscow and was being held until further orders.


107 Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delagations of the Five Great Powers at the Paris Peace Conference, October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 44.


However, the conference attendees did not grasp the potential gravity of this telegraph and soon the telegraph drowned among the other agenda items. Many British Generals forwarded the report among each other, all advocating the confiscation of the plane and the imprisonment of its crew and holding the German Government to account. But before the Allied decision-makers in London and Paris could take any measures, it was already too late.110

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The story of how Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir escaped the Lithuanian captivity is a spectacular episode, resembling adventure movies. Yet, it still shows how far the German officials were ready to go in order to protect Enver Pasha from the Allies.111 For some reason, the Lithuanian authorities assigned a very lax surveillance to the flight crew. Their guards simply escorted them in the city from coffee houses to theaters.112 Once during their daily visit to the local tavern with the guards, Hesse could disappear briefly with the excuse of going to the restroom. Across the street there was the offices of German official delegation, where they were so far denied contact by the Lithuanian authorities. Hesse informed the German officials on duty about the situation without revealing the secrets of the mission.113 On another occasion, Hesse could easily manipulate the Annelise during an inspection of the airplane, where he was asked to accompany Lithuanian officials. After that the Lithuanians could not fly the airplane.114 After Hesse had informed the German mission about their captivity, they were finally granted permission to meet the Chief Representative of Germany, where Major Fritz Tschunke, a protégé of General von Seeckt, and other German officials immediately recognized Enver.115 Soon rumors started to spread across the city that one of the Turks was

111 Besides Hans Hesse’s above cited memoir, Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, Major Fritz Tschunke’s account is an important source as well, Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175.
112 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 60.
114 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 59; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 131.
115 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 68; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 132; Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175. Naciye Sultan tells that it was Fischer, General von Seeckt’s aid-de-camp, but she mistakes Fischer for Tschunke. Naciye Sultan, Acı Zamanlar, 58.
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a person of interest. This resulted in the measure that the Entente commission took photographs of the flight crew and sent these to Paris peace conference for further investigation.\footnote{Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 69; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 132–33.}

It was now only a matter of time that Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir were to be identified as fugitive war-criminals.

Hesse immediately started making plans for the rescue of the two Turks. He had previously established contact to a German pilot, Lieutenant Harry Rother, working for the Lithuanian military and bribed him to fly the two Turks to safety. For this they decided to highjack a Lithuanian airplane in a nearby airfield.\footnote{Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 60–91; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 131–32. In Arif Cemil’s narrative, it is Enver Pasha himself, who establishes the contact to the German pilot. Denker, \textit{Ittihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 60. Tschunke tells about the German pilot, Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175. For the pilot’s account see: Minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Herr Offermann (Junkers Bureau in Berlin), November 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.}

Meanwhile Tschunke contacted General von Seeckt about Enver Pasha’s captivity.\footnote{Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175, 13. See also: Shakib Arslan, \textit{Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa}, 77.}

Naciye Sultan tells that the German officers sat in front of the window of Enver’s room and pretended to be drunk, revealing the details of the escape plan in their German drinking songs.\footnote{Naciye Sultan, \textit{Acı Zamanlar}, 58–59.}

The date was October 28, 1919.\footnote{Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. There is an oft repeated confusion of dates in the literature, resulting from the wrong date on Tschunke’s machine typed manuscript. Tschunke first wrote that it took place in February 1919 and later it was corrected by handwriting as April 1919. Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175. For the pilot’s account see: Minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Herr Offermann (Junkers Bureau in Berlin), November 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.}

Following their instructions, Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir walked together with their guard to the hayfields of Niemen (Neman, near the same named river) not far away from their hotel.\footnote{Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175, 13. See also: Shakib Arslan, \textit{Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa}, 77.}

Arrived at the fields, Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir started to do a small picnic and offered their guard a bottle of cognac and

\textsuperscript{116} Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 69; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 132–33.
\textsuperscript{117} Hatzfeld, \textit{Flug nach Moskau}, 60–91; Hesse, \textit{Kusch Adam der Vogelmann}, 131–32. In Arif Cemil’s narrative, it is Enver Pasha himself, who establishes the contact to the German pilot. Denker, \textit{Ittihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 60. Tschunke tells about the German pilot, Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175. For the pilot’s account see: Minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Herr Offermann (Junkers Bureau in Berlin), November 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
\textsuperscript{118} Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175, 13. See also: Shakib Arslan, \textit{Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa}, 77.
\textsuperscript{119} Naciye Sultan, \textit{Acı Zamanlar}, 58–59.
\textsuperscript{120} Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. There is an oft repeated confusion of dates in the literature, resulting from the wrong date on Tschunke’s machine typed manuscript. Tschunke first wrote that it took place in February 1919 and later it was corrected by handwriting as April 1919. Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175. For the pilot’s account see: Minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Herr Offermann (Junkers Bureau in Berlin), November 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
chocolate. Bahaeddin had put few drops of morphine from his medicine case on the choco-
lolate. The guard got soon drunk and dizzy. Meanwhile, pilot Rother hijacked the Lithua-
nian airplane and took off from the nearby airport in Alexota (Aleksotas, near Kaunas). Once
appeared over the rooftops of Kaunas, the airplane faked an emergency landing, flying in
circles, and landed on the hayfields of Niemen near the picnic venue.

Pretending to be curious what was going on, Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir raced to the air-
plane. Their intoxicated guard was weaving behind them. Other people were also attracted
by the emergency landing and watching what was going on. Suddenly the pilot of the airplane
pointed his gun at the guard and the two CUP leaders jumped on board. The engines started
and the airplane took off. The drunk guard helplessly watched them fly away.

As for the rest of the crew, first the mechanic Paul Maruszyk and later pilot Hans Hesse were
released after several weeks of imprisonment and were able to return to Germany. The inter-
preter Abraham Fränkl was, however, not as lucky. Since he was a Russian citizen, the Ger-
man officials could not do much for his release. After six months in a shabby Lithuanian
prison, Abraham Fränkel wrote in his report after his arrival in Dessau:

All in all, the escape was very well planned, but the same plan could have also included
all of us. […] Unfortunately, this opportunity was not appreciated. I believe that the
German Mission wanted first and foremost to bring the two Turks into safety and there-
fore disregarded everything else. On the very same day, as one might have anticipated,
we were quite ungently conducted under escort: Lieutenant Hesse to the police head-
quarters, Maruczyk and myself to the prison.

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123 Fritz Tschunke, Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175, 13–14.
126 Ludwig Baehr, letter (Chernyshevskoye, also known as Eydtkuhen) to Junkers-Werke (Dessau), December 5, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. See also:
127 Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
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The *Annelise* remained in Lithuania, despite several attempts by the *Junkers-Werke* and the *Auszwärtiges Amt* requesting its extradition. The *Annelise* was soon repaired and served the Lithuanian military until August 22, 1923, when it crashed and was wrecked.128

The airplane that rescued Enver Pasha and Bahaeddin Şakir landed in Tilsit, near Königsberg (today Sovetsk, near Kaliningrad). Lieutenant Tschunke, who claims to have been on the airplane with Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir, writes that General von Seeckt personally came to welcome Enver.129 Although Enver was under Lithuanian detention for barely two weeks, from October 15 to November 28, in an article he wrote anonymously in 1921, Enver stated that he was in prison for two months in Kaunas.130 This article was meant as a response to another article published in the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the official mouthpiece of the Kemalist Government in Ankara, which charged heavily on Enver.131 This is certainly the reason, why Enver lied about being imprisoned for two months in Kaunas. He probably wished to dramatize his own suffering and struggle in face of Kemalist accusations.

Soon after Enver Pasha and Bahaeddin Şakir fled, the French military commission identified the photographs.132 The Allies had taken their photographs during the interrogations and sent them to London and Paris to identify them. Remarkably, the Young Turk community in Berlin saw these news in the newspapers and mentioned it all in their memoirs.133 They were fascinated by the fact of being part of a political mystery, in which they outsmarted the

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128 Baltshunas, report on crash of *Annelise* (Kaunas) to Junkers-Werke (Dessau), October 1, 1923, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.

129 I am not convinced that Tschunke was really on board or that General von Seeckt actually went to Königsberg to welcome Enver. Fritz Tschunke, *Befreiung Enver Paschas aus litauischer Gefangenschaft im Februar/April 1919*, February 13, 1939, BA-MA, N247/175, 14.

130 Enver Pasha, "Haksız ve Luzumsuz bir Tarız," *Liwa-el-Islam* 1, no. 13 (1921): 125–26. This is wrong and has been reproduced itself in the literature. Kurt Okay uses this article in *Liwa-el-Islam* and makes the same claim. Kurt Okay, *Enver Pascha, der große Freund Deutschlands* (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1935), 335. Many scholars who cite Kurt Okay also wrote that he was imprisoned for two months. See, for instance: Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923*, 247; Rorlich, "Fellow Travellers," 291.


Entente. Naciye Sultan tells that the Allies had mistaken Enver for Cemal Pasha, because Enver had a beard by then, just like Cemal used to have in his day. In fact, The Times of November 29, 1919, reported from Constantinople:

In certain Turkish circles [Constantinople] the two Turkish passengers captured with three Germans in an aeroplane which descended at Kovno have been identified with Talaat and Djemal Pashas, and the German passenger with Lieutenant von Geisner, a friend of Talaat. A local Entente newspaper, while giving the information under reserve, adds that the reports is current here that Talaat and Djemal, fearing that the German Republic would hand them over to the Entente Powers had recently decided to escape and join Enver in Turkestan or Transcaucasia via Soviet Russia.

It was remarkable that Enver was not even considered to be in the Baltics, since it was common knowledge that he was already in Turkestan or Transcaucasia. The German military overheard from British radiograms reporting the same news:

According to a message from Kaunas, Cemal Pasha and Kemal Pasha [sic] were on board of the airplane that was shot down near Kaunas, who fearing their extradition to the Entente wanted to escape to Soviet Russia with the help of the German Republic in order to get to Enver Pasha in Turkestan.

In Constantinople, meanwhile, Enver’s brother Kamil was taking care of Enver’s wife and children. Naciye Sultan was sick since her last childbirth in last July. Regardless the medical report that she should go to Europe for treatment, she was denied departure by the Allied administration. The reason was, again, the belief that Enver was plotting schemes against Britain in Turkestan:

The real reason, why the English don’t want to let us go is the news about my brother [Enver] that are generally heard here. Most important one, as it is read in the newspaper Times, claims that he has been crowned by a five hundred men Muslim Congress in Tashkent. He is said to be building a vast organization. It is said that only this organization could destroy the English.

Strangely enough, in January 1920, the British Foreign Office was apparently neither informed about the prisoners’ identity, nor about their escape from captivity in Lithuania. A letter sent to the Director of Military Intelligence asked what actually came out of the investigations. The inquiry was never replied. While a British official from Switzerland told London that “[i]t is further alleged that Enver Pasha proceeded from Central Asia to Berlin

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134 Naciye Sultan, Acı Zamanlar, 58.
136 Major Seitz, minutes of telephone conversation with Lieutenant Lange (Berlin), October 31, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
137 Kamil Bey, letter (Constantinople) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 12, 1919, in Bardakçı, Enver, 485.
138 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 47.
by aeroplane, and he was obliged to descend at Kowno where he was seen by some of British Military authorities but not recognized.\footnote{Mr. Russel, cipher (Berne) to Foreign Office (London), January 15, 1920, FO 4142/170885.} Another message commented that this information was «incorrect, for photographs of the two Turks who were forced to descend at Kovno some months ago in an aeroplane which was proceeding from Berlin to Russia have been seen at this Dept. and were not those of any prominent persons.»\footnote{W. S. Edmonds, letter to Foreign Office, January 20, 1920, FO 4142/170885.} The bureaucratic chaos of intelligence assessment was unable to figure out what was going on. But rumors had already a life of their own, as Consul James Morgan curiously asked whether the rumors were true which he heard in Aleppo in March 1921:

> Enver Pasha was in Tashkent, and that when flying there, dressed as a German officer, he came down in Roumania and was taken prisoner. He was handed over to the British authorities, who were unaware of his identity and released him a month or two later.\footnote{James Morgan, letter (Aleppo) to Earl Curzon (London), March 22, 1921, FO 406/45, 203, no. 141, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed., British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 3: January – September 1921 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1979), 260.}

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The episode had a bureaucratic and diplomatic aftermath in Germany as well, which again reveals the network that was behind this daring enterprise. August Euler, the Under Secretary of Department of Aviation and Motorized Transportation (Reichsamt für Luft- und Kraftfahrwesen) and a pioneer in German aviation, was an ambitious bureaucrat and a keen advocate of civil aviation. Contrary to the German militarists, Euler saw an opportunity for the development of the German civil aviation in the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Therefore, he took his job very seriously and was not willing to tolerate legal violations by government offices. In February 1920, for instance, he wrote a warning letter to all German aviation companies—likely including \textit{Junkers}. In this letter he complained about the increasing illegal cross-country flights supported by German private companies.\footnote{August Euler, letter to all German airlines, February 27, 1920, BA-MA, RH 2/2197, 109.} Euler went even further and wrote a very similar warning letter to the General Staff and to other state departments in March 1920. In that letter he complained about the increasing support of German ministries for illegal flights abroad.\footnote{August Euler, letter to General Staff (Berlin), March 19, 1920, BA-MA, RH 2/2197, 172.} Other archival documents from Euler’s bureau show
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that Enver’s flight was not a single case—German state departments had a general interest in East Europe and Russia, politically as well as commercially.

The reason for Euler’s admonitions was the *Annelise* case. On January 6, 1920, Euler sent an inquiry letter to the Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske.\(^\text{144}\) In his inquiry, Euler asked for information on an illegal flight piloted by Lieutenant Hesse, where a brand-new *Junkers* airplane was confiscated by the authorities in Lithuania. Before the Minister received the letter, an internal inquiry at the Ministry of Defense started. First, Lieutenant Lange, who had prepared the papers for the flight permit was asked to give a statement.\(^\text{145}\) In his defense, Lange wrote that he issued the papers according to a personal order from the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Naval Lieutenant Commander Hans Humann. Lange also wrote that Humann was acting in accordance with General von Seeckt and called it a «highly political» matter. Therefore, the internal inquiry was forwarded to General von Seeckt, who, however, forwarded it with no further comments to Humann.\(^\text{146}\) Humann answered:

To issue at hand I respectfully report hereinafter:

1. It is about the flight of two Turkish statesmen to Russia.

2. Herr General v. Seeckt did not arrange anything in this instance. He was, as I recall, in vacation by then. The statements of Lieutenant Lange regarding this must be a matter of confusion.

3. I had informed the Minister of Defense [Gustav Noske] and Minister of Foreign Affairs [Hermann Müller] by then about the plan. A meeting took place between the two mentioned ministers and myself. The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave me the assignment for one of the Turkish statesmen. –Considering the political and other circumstances utmost secrecy was required.

4. To support the operation I took responsibility for the issued papers by the Zegrost [Central Office of Border Protection East, *Zentralstelle Grenzschutz Ost*] (Lieut. Lange).

5. I am willing to report verbally and in private to Under Secretary of the Department of Aviation and Motorized Transportation in this regard, but request only a reassurance of official secrecy, because these were not my private affairs, but rather political processes.\(^\text{147}\)

\(^{144}\) August Euler, letter to Minister of War Gustav Noske, January 6, 1920, BA-MA, N247/87, 91–92.

\(^{145}\) Walter Lange, Stellungnahme zur Ausstellung des Ausweises für Oberleutnant Hesse, January 15, 1920, BA-MA, N247/87, 98.


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A handwritten manuscript of a letter signed by the Minister of Defense Noske, found in the German Military Archives, attests Humann’s statements. Noske admits that he was informed on the nature of the flight.148

The *Auswärtiges Amt* was everything but amused about the diplomatic aftermath of the whole incident. «The Auswärtiges Amt will absolutely not undertake anything regarding the issue of *Airplane Annelise*», as Lieutenant Lange informed *Junkers-Werke* on the telephone, «because they were not at all informed by Captain Humann about this plan.»149 To the question of the British official in Berlin, Lord Kilmarnock reported that the German Foreign Minister said that it was scarcely likely in the present state of relations between Germany and Soviet Russia that the German Government would lend itself to such a traffic. He professed complete ignorance of Enver’s presence in Germany, but said he would ask his Department whether anything was known on the subject. He promised also to draw the attention of the Minister of Defence to the reports in question with a view to preventing any such activity by aeroplane as was suggested.150

On the other hand, General von Seeckt had, as I argued above, played no part in Enver’s flight in October, but only because he was out-of-office. Nonetheless, Seeckt believed in the idea of reaching out to Soviet Russia to overcome Versailles restrictions. Seeckt wrote in January 4, 1920: «Only through a firm confederation with greater Russia will Germany have any chance of regaining its position as a world power.»151 Seeckt would support from there on Enver’s attempts to connect with Moscow. Nevertheless, claims found in Entente press regarding «a German-Russian-Turkish plan in the East» were still mere paranoid fantasies.152

Most importantly, Noske had full knowledge and had authorized the whole operation. Noske’s relation with the Young Turk leaders reached far behind. He had personally con-

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149 Minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Lieutenant Lange (Berlin), November 11, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01.
tact—at least once—with Talat Pasha as early as in June 1919, where they had a meal togeth-
er. Hans Humann was the person, at the end, who connected the nodes within gov-
ernment offices and within the military. Outside the state structures, it was his sister Maria
Sarre, who micromanaged the initiation of this plan by assigning Hesse, who had contacts to
Junkers. From his captivity in Kovno, Hans Hesse wrote his first letter to Germany not to
Junkers-Werke or Lieutenant Lange, but to Maria Sarre, implying that she was a major player
behind the scenes. Maria Sarre made no secret about her role either. Nevertheless, the
Junkers-Werke also continued to follow their plans to move production to Russia and
achieved this in 1922 with help of the German military.

At the end, this story of «Enver’s odyssey», as Ayşe-Azade Rorlich rightly argues, «offered
vivid testimony to the commitment of the Germans in helping Enver as a link with Mos-
cow.» The argument, however, needs to be differentiated, because the commitment of the
military-industrial complex in post-Versailles Germany was neither unitary nor resolute. It is
in the complex, where one needs to dig in, to understand the processes that arranged the
flight and rescue of Enver Pasha in the autumn of 1919. The diplomatic and bureaucratic
aftermath of the confiscation of the Annelise, proved that not all German officials would
support such enterprises, but a certain milieu in the post-Versailles Germany did.

There was a shared milieu of the CUP leaders with the German imperialists and militarists,
which became more obvious during the Kapp Putsch. On March 13, 1920, the Kapp Putsch
took place in Berlin. This was one of the major reactionary outbursts that followed Versailles.
It was a right-wing military coup d’état against the status quo of Weimar Republic after the
November Revolution and the Versailles Treaty. A large-scale general strike was called by the
trade unions to protest the coup, which eventually forced Wolfgang Kapp and other putschist

153 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed. Talat Paşa’nın
Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve
Hususi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 158.
154 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW,
0612.T01.
155 Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, 171. See also: Carsten, Reichswehr und Politik, 142–43; Groehler,
Selbstmörderische Allianz, 32–34; Robert Henry Haigh, Dennis S. Morris and Anthony R. Peters, German-
156 Rorlich, “Fellow Travellers,” 292.
to give up. 157 Some of the friends and guardians of the CUP leaders were, of course, not missing in the Kapp Putsch. General Rüdiger von der Goltz, who had been the spearhead of the Freikorps in the Baltics, was responsible for the defense of Berlin during the putsch. General von Seeckt, though ideologically not far away from the putschists, but not involved due to his already high position as the chief of Truppenamt, had, nevertheless, ordered his troops not to shoot the putschists. General von Seeckt was though too powerful to put away with and remained in power. This was not the same for Hans Humann, who was the chief of Naval Intelligence. Humann was an open supporter of the coup and was later removed from his desk. 158 Yet, the military-industrial complex offered him other options soon. Humann was appointed by the industrial mogul Hugo Stinnes as the publisher of his newly acquired the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a conservative-nationalist newspaper. 159

Ernst Troelsch, a theologian and philosopher, noted that the leader of the putsch, Wolfgang Kapp, was asked by a French journalist right after the putsch, who would be in his cabinet. Kapp answered honestly that he did not think it through that far, but will come up with a cabinet in due course. In criticizing Kapp, Troelsch made reference to Talat Pasha who he saw as «the experienced master of revolutions». Talat had commented that «it is completely a childish prank» to start a revolution «without having a cabinet in the bag»—by that he, of course, did not differentiate between revolution and coup d’état. 160 After the putsch, Enver Pasha found shelter in the same room Wolfgang Kapp had stayed at the home of Hanna von Wangenheim, the wife of the former ambassador to Ottoman Empire. There in Kapp’s room, Harry Kessler noted sarcastically in his diary after a dinner at Frau Wangenheim’s home in Berlin, Enver «conspired with his Bolshevists». 161

“You remember that about the time of the Kapp outbreak”, the Foreign Office wrote to Lord Curzon, who was currently at the San Remo Conference, «it was suggested here that representations should be made to German Government to cease harbouring these persons», referring to the fugitive CUP leaders. By then Humann had already taken precautions. «Just in case, I arranged their accommodation as good as possible», he wrote to Lossow. «Reliable informant tells me», Lord Kilmarnock reported from Berlin, «that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs are well aware of Enver’s activities. He characterizes Minister of Foreign Affairs statement to me […] to the effect that he knew nothing of the matter as a deliberate lie.» «I am told by same source», he wrote in another telegram, «that question of activities of Enver and other anti-British plotters was raised in German Cabinet». After long discussions, as Lord Kilmarnock reported, «Chancellor utterly denied that he had any knowledge of such activities», but an arrest warrant for Enver «seems not to have been accepted.» The Foreign Office asked Lord Kilmarnock to «give privately a hint to Minister for Foreign Affairs that rumours of the activities of Enver and other anti-British plotters have reached our ears». At the end, it is, nonetheless, important not to overestimate the investment of the military-industrial complex in Enver Pasha and his friends. In a private conversation Talat Pasha had with a British informant in December 1920, he described «his relations with the German Foreign Office [as] indirect and that there is dislike and suspicion on both sides.»

162 Foreign Office, telegram (London) to Earl Curzon (San Remo), April 24, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
163 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), February 21, 1920, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
164 Lord Kilmarnock, telegram (Berlin) to Foreign Office (London), April 9, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
165 Lord Kilmarnock, telegram (Berlin) to Foreign Office (London), April 22, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
166 Foreign Office, telegram (London) to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin), May 1, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
167 Lord D’Abernon, letter (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (London), December 5, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 140.
7. Soldiers of Misfortune: 
Young Turks in Moscow 1920

«A report reaches me that Enver Pasha is now in Berlin, having arrived here about a week ago [my emphasis]», as The Times announced in early March 1920, assuming Enver has already been in Russia long before.1 Enver’s movements continued to be a matter of public and official interest. Enver was imagined as being constantly mobile, frequently travelling between Germany, Russia, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Turkey. For instance, the Foreign Office received the news in January 1920 that «Enver Pasha was recently in Berlin, that he was in close negotiation with present German Government for the purpose of creating further difficulties for Great Britain, and that he has left again probably for Asia Minor [my emphases].»2 Swiss Intelligence assumed that Enver «is currently in the Caucasus or Turkestan, where he had organized Bolshevik bands that are ready to intervene in Anatolia.»3 In reality, the CUP leaders were once again lagging behind their own reputation.

Since Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir’s first flight attempt to reach Moscow in October 1919 ended with an arrestment in Lithuania which they had escaped thanks to a daring rescue operation, the Young Turk leaders were more or less stuck in Berlin from November 1919 until April 1920. This was, however, not for the lack of trying. Numerous flight attempts were hindered due to complications and contingencies of cross-border mobility in post-war Eastern Europe—not to forget the technical troubles of air travel in those days. After surviving several crash landings that smashed a couple of airplanes, most Young Turk leaders gave up the idea of flying for good—but not Enver. After a final solo flight attempt Enver ended up in captivity in Latvia. While Enver was in prison in Latvia for a couple of months, he was considered to be missing in action for his friends and family. Only in May 1920, Cemal Pasha and his friends were first to successfully travel to Moscow—undercover in a convoy of Russian POWs. Later in mid-August 1920, Enver, who was released from his captivity, could finally reach the Soviet capital thanks to the help of his friends from the German General Staff and Bolshevik emissaries in Berlin. At the end, it took nearly a year after the initial talk

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2 Mr. Russel, cipher (Berne) to Foreign Office (London), January 15, 1920, FO 4142/170885.
3 Political note (Lausanne), February 27, 1920, BAR, E20018.1000/1501.313.
with Karl Radek that Enver could set a foot in Moscow. The delay, however, had high cost for the CUP leaders. They missed certain opportunities structures, as the state of affairs in Moscow and elsewhere had continued to move on without them.

Their struggles and troubles to reach Moscow from October 1919 to August 1920 showcases not only their growing—but not necessarily more effective—entanglement with German militarist and Russian Bolshevik circles in Berlin, but also the structural complications of transnational mobility and contingencies of travel by air across East European regions of war and revolution.

The plan that a Young Turk delegation should secretly travel from Berlin to Moscow continued to occupy German-Russian relations in Berlin. The main reason was that Karl Radek, who was still awaiting his extradition, could fly secretly with Enver Pasha and his friends avoiding the Polish land route. Therefore, the exiled CUP leaders were still in touch with Karl Radek in Berlin. In many ways, the Soviet mission in Berlin was cooperating with the CUP leaders. The Soviets purchased two airplanes for the planned flight. Radek was, for instance, personally helping them to get new papers issued. In late November 1919, Radek—still under detention—was moved to a flat of Eugen Freiherr von Reibnitz in Berlin. Eugen von Reibnitz was an old friend of General Ludendorff, and himself a «National-Bolshevist». He was also a relative of Baron Ago von Maltzan from the Auswärtiges Amt. Ago von Maltzan was the Commissioner for Eastern Affairs and had been working for Radek’s release for quite some time. Both these men were no strangers to the CUP leaders in Berlin. General Erich Ludendorff is rumored to have been in touch with the Young Turk leaders in Berlin, although there is no solid evidence. Ago von Maltzan, on the other hand, was closely

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5 Karl Radek, letter to Frederik Stroem, November 25, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 179.
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in touch with these men either personally or through intermediaries. Nonetheless, one can observe the same network of German officials around both Karl Radek and the exiled CUP leaders in Berlin.

In early December, 1919, Enver Pasha’s plans to travel together with Radek to Moscow were getting once again more concrete. Before the departure they arranged some test flights to assure that the airplane could fly long distances. Meanwhile, the Chief of Police was, however, rather impatient to get Radek out of the city. The flight was scheduled for mid-December. Radek decided, however, not to fly with Enver. He had heard of a conspiracy of Polish officials against his flight. Polish secret service wanted to bribe the pilot to land in Poland to arrest Radek. Nonetheless, Enver was permitted to keep the airplane and fly to Moscow with it. Everything was set on December 21, and the crew was only waiting for the weather conditions to improve. The plan was to travel on December 31, 1919, in hope that the New Year’s celebrations would distract from their flight. But ten minutes after their
take-off, the airplane crashed into a nearby garden. The plane was wrecked to pieces, but no one was seriously hurt.19

For the next flight, they arranged a new plane, but this time a smaller and lighter one.20 During one of these test flights they crashed the plane again.21 At the end of January, 1920, Enver was once again planning his next flight.22 This time, there was a bureaucratic complication concerning Enver’s plane which, again, delayed his departure on February 8.23 On Monday, February 23, 1920, Enver finally took off, but the plane had again an emergency landing without anyone getting hurt.24 The next flight was scheduled for March 10, 1920, after Cemal Pasha had arrived in Berlin.25 This time the flight was canceled due to troubles which occurred right after the take-off.26 For two days, they tried to take off, and after an hour of flight they crashed and wrecked the airplane.27 Bahaeddin Şakir noted, «hopelessly we are now forced to stay in Berlin.».28 Their frustration was understandable. From October to April they had five flight attempts. Except for the first flight with the Annelise in October, they had not left the German borders once. They had countless emergency landings and had already wrecked several airplanes.

19 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey and Talat Pasha (Switzerland), January 3, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 35; Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 64.
20 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey and Talat Pasha (Switzerland), January 3, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 35.
21 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 65–66.
22 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), January 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 36; Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 29, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 149.
24 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), February 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 37; Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 89–90. Major Ivor Hedley from the British military mission in Berlin reported that the plane had only an engine trouble during the take-off, so that the departure was just delayed and Enver left for Switzerland for a week. See: Major Ivor Hedley, report (Berlin) on a telephone conversation with Enver Pasha, February 25, 1920, FO 371/5211, 1311, 36.
25 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Kamil Bey (İstanbul), March 6, 1920, TTK, EP 02-05, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 90.
26 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 66.
28 Bahaeddin Şakir, letter to Cavid Bey, April 7, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 426.
The continuing problems that were hindering their arrival at Moscow was increasingly becoming a burden to their political enterprise. When Cemal Pasha told Cavid Bey in late February that he decided to accompany Enver Pasha on his next flight attempt to Moscow, Cavid urged them to hurry, because «there was no time to lose during the current state of politics». 29 «Our friend E. [a.k.a. Enver] is still in Berlin», Hans Humann wrote on the same day and complained that «[i]t is a great pity considering the situation in the Near East and Russian Orient that none of these matadors is there.» 30 «Enver declared to a friend about two months ago», Lord Kilmarnock reported to London from Berlin, «that ‘all the mines would be laid by June and it would be possible to fire fuse in September.’» 31 Indeed, the Young Turk leaders were missing the action. The unrest in the Middle East had started to accumulate. After his arrival in Moscow, their new comrade Karl Radek was appointed as the new Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which was definitely a promising opportunity for future collaborations with the Bolsheviks. 32 Everything was falling into place, and only they were lagging behind. But once in Moscow, they believed, they would catch up and land on top.

These numerous airplane purchases and flight attempts could not remain unnoticed either. On March 6, The Times reported that Cemal Pasha came to Berlin to fly together with Enver to Soviet Russia. The newspaper reported also about an earlier «unsuccessful aerial attempt», implying an intelligence leak from the British military mission in Berlin. 33 After stating that there was «a frequent traffic of airplanes between Germany and Russia», Mehmed Zeki Bey, a critical observer of the CUP leaders in Berlin, claimed in his propaganda pamphlet that the Young Turks even purchased an airplane fabric in Germany and that they were planning to ship the military equipment they bought in Germany to Tripoli and Tunisia. 34 A French intelligence report from May 29, 1920, made the same claim that the Young Turks bought

30 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) Otto von Lossow (Munich), February 21, 1920, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
31 Lord Kilmarnock, telegram (Berlin) to Foreign Office (London), April 22, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
33 The Times, “Enver’s Offer to the Bolshevists: Ready to Stir up Trouble in Afghanistan,” March 6, 1920, 14.
an airplane fabric in Germany and had already transported airplanes to the Caucasus and Turkey via Russia.\textsuperscript{35} Once again the rumors found in intelligence reports and contemporary publications shared—if not the same informants—the same template in imagining Young Turk movements.

Meanwhile, in Constantinople there were rumors made in circular by the underground branches of the CUP «alleging that Enver Pasha is now in India marching on Bombay.» Given Enver’s reputation and inflation of similar allegations in the press, the Reuter’s news agency commented: «This news is believed by many Turks.»\textsuperscript{36} Swiss authorities reported that Enver was in Berlin, in March 1920, and that «he was in contact there with the extreme socialist and Lenin’s friend Moor.» It was assumed that «the Young Turks are apparently making common cause with the Bolsheviki in Moscow. Enver assumed the false name of Enim \textit{sic}, Emin Bey.»\textsuperscript{37}

The next airplane they arranged had only one seat behind the pilot, so it was up to Enver to fly alone. His flight was scheduled for Monday, March 29.\textsuperscript{38} In a letter, dated April 7, Dr. Bahaaeddin Şakir wrote: «Ali Bey [a.k.a. Enver Pasha] is gone. But so far we could not receive any news yet on whether he arrived at the desired place [i.e. Moscow].»,\textsuperscript{39} For a long time no one would hear anything from Enver. While Enver was practically missing, false news about his whereabouts continued to muddy the waters. For instance, Talat had heard from Hans Humann that the British believed that Enver had arrived in Moscow.\textsuperscript{40} Turkish Intelligence reported that newspapers in Tiflis (Tbilisi) were writing that Enver was in Moscow.\textsuperscript{41} In early June, \textit{The Times} reported that Enver came back to Berlin from Moscow to negotiate with the German military and left again for Moscow.\textsuperscript{42} Enver had not reached Moscow.

\begin{itemize}
\item Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Kominterni,” 6.
\item \textit{The Times}, “Enver Marching on Bombay,” February 25, 1920.
\item Intelligence note on Enver Pasha, March 13, 1920, BAR, E20018.1000/1501.313.
\item Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), March 28, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 38.
\item Bahaaeddin Şakir, letter to Cavid Bey, April 7, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 426. See also diary entry, April 11, 1920, in Cavid Bey, \textit{Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi}, IV, 82.
\item Diary entry, April 30, 1920, in Cavid Bey, \textit{Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi}, IV, 91.
\item Telegraph to Ankara, June 6, 1920, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 910, gömlek no. 146.
\item \textit{The Times}, “Enver and German Militarists: A Visit to Berlin,” June 9, 1920, 15.
\end{itemize}
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Most false news and rumors claimed that Enver’s specter was seen in the Caucasus or in Turkestan. The Tripolitanian newspaper Rakib of May 4, 1920, reported that Enver together with his uncle Halil and brother Nuri were leading a Bolshevik-sponsored army in the Caucasus. The newspaper was only with the claim: «Political circles of all descriptions are much occupied with Enver Pasha.». From Yemen, «a sample of rumours» arrived at London that «Anwar [sic] Pasha has returned from Afghanistan with a large quantity of gold, and has been sent a part of it to Mustafa Kemal in order to strengthen his armies». The British press claimed that Enver was in Baku with «a mixed Russo-Tatar force, approximately 50,000 strong». «The fall of Baku on April 28 is a signal for us that you are there», Kamil wrote in wishful-thinking in a letter from Rome to his brother’s address in Berlin. At a meeting the Society of Oriental Languages in Frankfurt, Captain Philipp Rühl, who had previously served as a translator in the staff of Enver and now a lecturer for Turcology at the University of Frankfurt, gave a lecture on Enver Pasha’s career. The Frankfurter Zeitung reported on this lecture, where the so-called «champion of pan-Islamic ideas» Enver’s «name has been mentioned once again in the last time in connection with the events in Central Asia and the organization of the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia.» Reporting on the same lecture, the Mittagsblatt supposed that Enver, the so-called «hero of Islam», was in the Caucasus. In early July, Cavid Bey stated in an interview that he supposed that Enver was in Turkestan. It is once again amazing how friends and foes alike shared the same imaginary trajectories about Enver’s whereabouts. Anyway, Enver could only so much as to wish to be in Moscow, Caucasus, or Turkestan in his current situation.

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46 Kamil Bey, letter (Rome) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), June 7, 1920, TTK, EP 01-82, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 92.
47 Frankfurter Zeitung, June 6, 1920; Das Mittagsblatt, May 15, 1920. See also: Captain Philipp Rühl, letter (Frankfurt) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), June 22, 1920, TTK, EP 11-74.
48 Diary entry, July 9, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamei, IV, 118.
«My informant states that Djemal is here now», Lord Kilmarnock reported from Berlin on April 22. After all the airplane accidents they suffered one after another, both Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Cemal Pasha gave up the idea of flying to Moscow. Soon Bahaeddin Şakir came up with the idea that they could travel to Russia with the hundreds of Russian prisoners of war. In the spring of 1920, negotiations between Soviet Russia and Germany were taking place in order to settle the question of POWs. Because Poland did permit the transit of Russian POWs over painfully defended Polish territory, the Russian war prisoners were to be transported to Stettin (Szczecin, today in Poland). Once arrived there, they were to be boarded on vessels and to be shipped to Reval (Tallinn, Estonia) and from there they could travel by train to St. Petersburg and beyond. This mass migration of former POWs delivered an opportunity for the CUP leaders to travel to Moscow without getting any attention by an extravagant flight attempt or suspicious Red Crescent passports.

The Bolshevik delegation under Viktor Kopp in Berlin provided fake papers identifying the CUP leaders as POWs. On this journey, Cemal Pasha and the former police chief Bedri Bey as Cemal’s aid-de-camp were accompanying Bahaeddin Şakir. Cemal and others were dressed up as shabby Russian war prisoners and left with the convoy of other prisoners from Stettin to St. Petersburg. Kilmarnock’s source in the German secret police, Baron Eckhardtstein, had suspected that something was going on, but was ill-informed. He reported that

Djemal Pasha and two other Turks are leaving probably to-night for Stockholm whence they intend to proceed via Finland and Estonia to Moscow. They will be met by Enver on the Russo-Estonian frontier and travel to Azerbaijan where meeting is to take place with dignataries [sic], officials and religious leaders of Mohammedan world including many Sheiks. They will take with them many boxes and sacks latter to be filled at Moscow with forged English bank notes chiefly of fifty pounds denomination. These to be used for buying gold from Sheiks. Whole plan is being forged with Kopp and many influential Germans are [involved] though German Government are kept in ignorance.

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49 Lord Kilmarnock, telegram (Berlin) to Foreign Office (London), April 22, 1920, FO 371/5173, 2119.
50 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 67.
51 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 67–68.
52 Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, 132.
From the German secret police, they also received the cover names of the three men disguised as Russian Azerbaijanis: Cemal being «Dadshemirof», the other two, respectively «Kemiroff» and «Kaplanoff». Following this information, the Danish authorities were asked to detain these men. The intelligence was accurate, Cemal’s cover name was Taştimurov from Baku. Together with five hundred Russian POWs, Cemal, Bahaeddin, and Bedri left Stettin on May 18, and arrived in Narva at Estonian-Russian border on May 23. From there on they travelled by train to St. Petersburg. They arrived at Moscow on May 27 at eleven o’clock in mid-day. The three men were travelling luxuriously with eight bags, which they could barely carry themselves, thus hired a porter. They left Bedri by the bags at the station and the other two went to the Commissary of Foreign Affairs, which they found with the help of a former Russian General they met earlier in the train. One can only imagine, what a scene it was, when Cemal in his shabby disguise tried to convince the ministerial officials that he was the former Ottoman Minister of Navy Cemal Pasha, requesting an appointment with Chicherin. Cemal unable to meet with Chicherin that day, but he managed to be received by Karl Radek, by then the Secretary General of the Communist International.

Cemal Pasha was, however, not the first Turkish delegation arriving at Moscow. Halil Pasha had arrived at Moscow briefly before him. Cemal soon met with Halil Pasha and Dr. Fuat

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54 Earl Curzon, telegraph (London) to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen), May 28, 1920, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, IX, 500–501. In Peyam-ı Sabah, December 5, 1920, it was reported that Enver Pasha was in Copenhagen and was ordered to leave the country immediately. ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 645, gömlek no. 146.

55 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 3, 1920, in Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 13. «Şimdiki halde ismim Taştimurof tur.»


57 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha, June 11, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektubları, 236. See also: Rorlich, “Fellow Travellers,” 291.

58 This episode is imaginatively told in Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 207–9.

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Sabit (Ağacık). The latter was sent in order investigate the Bolshevism, who ended up becoming a (pseudo) communist. Previously, Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat had escaped from the Bekiraga Prison on August 9, 1919. By coincidence, Enver Pasha’s brother Nuri Pasha escaped from his prison camp in Batum on the very same night, and this led conspiracy theories. «It would be naïve to assume that their escape at the same night […] is a coincidence», Kazım Karabekir Pasha cautioned. For Kazım Karabekir it was clear—as late as at the moment of writing his memoir—that these two prison breaks were both planned and coordinated by the British Intelligence. According to Karabekir’s conspiracy theory, the British freed these men from prison because they ended up in need of support from Tashnag Armenians, Menshevik Georgians, and Musavvat Azeris to build a bulwark in the Caucasus between Turkey and Russia. Karabekir suspected that these men were assisted to break from prison by British agents in order fuel the existing chaos in the Caucasus. This was, of course, nonsense. Soon after his escape, Halil united with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas. Both Halil and Nuri were personally assigned by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to work in the Caucasus in order to prepare the war against the Armenian Republic. With Halil and Nuri making trouble in the Caucasus, The Times supposed that «it is reasonable to suppose that Enver is not far off». In June 1920, Halil Pasha had arrived at Moscow as a special emissary of «Government of Asia Minor». In his first meeting with Soviet officials Halil Pasha underlined that both Anatolia and Russia were fighting against the same enemy. The British were supporting Denikin and the Tashnags to protect their interest in the Caucasus and Asia in general. Halil Pasha played an important role in organizing the first arms delivery from Russia to Anatolia.

60 Dr. Fuat Sabit, letter (Moscow) to Rüştü Bey, June 3, 1920, in Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1960), 788–89.
61 Secretary of the Grand Viziership, announcement to the provinces on the escape of Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat Bey, August 11, 1919, BOA.DH.ŞFR.102.102.
62 Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani, 7, 10.
Chicherin promised Halil Pasha to give support to the Anatolian national movement and the Afghan national movement. In a letter to Lenin, Chicherin said:

It would be better not to fall into allure of grand perspectives and throw ourselves into adventures that exceed our limits. Nonetheless I must note that the rapprochement with the Turkish Grand National Assembly might help our policies flourish in the East.

This was the situation before Cemal Pasha’s arrival. «In short, we are guests in the full sense of the word», Cemal wrote to Talat Pasha. Both Halil and Cemal as well as their entourage were lodged in the Sugar King’s Palace, which was right across the Kremlin at Sofiskaya Naberezhnaya 14. The building is today rather known as the former British Embassy. The Palace has its name from Pavel Haritonenko, a wealthy Ukrainian sugar merchant, who commissioned its construction as a family mansion in 1891. After Harientko’s widow abandoned the mansion during the Russian Revolution, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs occupied the palace as a residence for state guests. As state guests, Cemal and Halil had Lithuanian servant and they were getting three meals a day as well as a cigarette pack. «We eat and drink superbly», noted Cemal. Karl Radek was taking good care of them.

Not everybody in Moscow was pleased about the arrival of the Young Turk Pashas. The Turkish communist leader Mustafa Subhi criticized the arrival of the CUP leaders to Moscow in his Moscow-based Turkish newspaper. Mustafa Subhi noted that Mustafa Kemal had renounced any association with the CUP. «This means that it is not correct to speak of any political or diplomatic status that can attach rebellious Turkey to Soviet Russia.» Also the Russian-Turkic community soon got alienated by some of the opinions and mannerisms of CUP leaders. Cemal, Halil, and others met with Zeki Velidi (Togan), the Chairman of the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee and former chairman of the briefly independent Bashkortostan. When Zeki Velidi, already heartbroken with Soviet promises, told them that he was

67 Chief of General Staff İsmet, letter (Ankara) to Deputy of Lazistan Osman Bey (Rize), June 30, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 613, gömlek no. 114.
69 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha, June 11, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektuplari, 237.
secretly planning to go to Central Asia to work against the Soviets, Cemal protested: «please do not do that; let us all of us join in and become one with the Soviets, and induct all of Turkistan in uprising into the army we are going to form.» During the feasts they gave for the Young Turk guests at the Mansion of the Representatives of Bashkortostan, which was formerly the residence of a Russian rich man with a large collection of wines and liquors, the Young Turk leaders made themselves unpopular in the eyes of their Russian-Turkic hosts, as they could not control their liquor and were unpleasant drunks. Even more they proved to be ignorant of the state of affairs in Turkic Russia. Cemal Pasha could barely understand the Turkic dialects and he was arrogant on top.\(^72\) Cemal himself was rather annoyed by the behavior of fellow committee man Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, who was acting as a «propagandist of the [Committee of] Union and Progress» in the company others and with his «extreme nationalist principle» (müfrit bir milliyetperestlik prernisi) he was stirring up the Tatars against the Bolsheviks. Cemal requested that Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir should rather return to Berlin.\(^73\)

One week after their arrival, Cemal Pasha met with the director of the Eastern Branch of the Committee of Foreign Affairs.\(^74\) According to the proposal Cemal made to the Bolsheviks, Halil Pasha was to lead the Iranian revolutionary movement, Cemal himself would lead the Afghan and Indian revolutionary movements, and Enver Pasha, once arrived in Moscow, would command these movements from the Moscow headquarters. While the fugitive CUP leaders would manage these insurgencies abroad, Mustafa Kemal Pasha would lead the movement in Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt from Ankara.\(^75\) In talks with Radek, Chicherin, and Karahan, Cemal could convince them to support his expedition to Afghanistan.\(^76\)

To the bitter disappointment of Cemal Pasha, he soon learned that he had no more the backing of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The understanding which Mustafa Kemal and Talat had

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\(^73\) Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), July 5, 1920, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds., *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 246.

\(^74\) Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha, June 11, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 238.


\(^76\) Cemal Pasha also had an appointed with Lenin, Stalin, and Trotzki, «the corner stones of the revolution». Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha, June 11, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 239–41.
reached in early 1920 that the fugitive CUP leaders were allowed to manage the struggle abroad was unilaterally revoked by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. «It cannot be permitted», Mustafa Kemal wrote to Kazım Karabekir, «that Enver Pasha and his fellows autonomously and individually intervene into the affairs of homeland and the nation.» 77 The fact that Enver was actually still missing in action did not matter, as he was omnipresent in rumors and news. The Ankara Government soon released an official decree that «Talat, Cemal, Enver Pashas has no authority to engage in any political enterprise in the name of the Grand National Assembly and they have no communication or association with us». 78 Karabekir considered this decision by the cabinet to be «too heavy» (fazla ağır gördük) and supposed that it would have «a bad effect» (fena bir tesir-i has edecekini) on the Soviet Government. Karabekir requested not to submit this decree to Chicherin. 79 But Mustafa Kemal had already made up his mind.

When Cemal Pasha heard from this decree, he politely protested that this decree contradicted the sole purpose of his journey. Because Talat Pasha had told him in Berlin: «In order to provide assistance to Turkey from abroad we are entitled to engage in all kinds political enterprise. This goes so far as the last word and the right of command and decision belongs to the Grand National Assembly.» He assured that he had not entered into any negotiations so far and that would continue to follow Mustafa Kemal’s instructions. 80 As the Kemalist delegation closed its door on Cemal’s face, he immediately channeled his activities towards working for the Indian revolution. 81

Cemal Pasha could, nevertheless, convince the Soviet Government that to send him with a delegation to Kabul. It was long no secret that Cemal had long before coming to Russia to

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77 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), May 30, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 613, gömlek no. 45.
78 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), June 20, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 613, gömlek no. 80.
79 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 24, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 613, gömlek no. 51.
81 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), July 5, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 250.
personal goal of working in Afghanistan in his mind.82 “I am leaving tomorrow that is Monday, 12 July [1]920, for Tashkent”, Cemal reported to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.83 Arrived at Tashkent, Cemal got soon frustrated, because of being stuck there. He became good friends with Mikhail Frunze, the notorious Red Army Commander of the Eastern Front, who gave Cemal a Circassian saber as a present.84 Together with 14 Turkish officers, 9 Turkish soldiers, and 9 Turkic soldiers from Tashkent as well as the Indian Maulana Barkatullah85 they traveled to Kabul. Cemal was fortunate enough that his personal project to work in Afghanistan against British India coincided with Comintern’s campaign to establish an Indian exile government in Kabul and a military-revolutionary training camp in Tashkent.86 Cemal requested an unofficial delegation of teachers and professors from the «Ottoman-Turkish Revolutionary Government» (Osmanlı-Türk Hükümet-i İnkılabiyesi) to be sent to Afghanistan.87 Cemal Pasha’s plan was work for the Indian revolution (Hindistan ihlilali) in Kabul, as he wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha before leaving for Kabul.88

Cemal Pasha gave Enver Pasha also an extensive report on the recent developments in Turkestan and Afghanistan. Cemal saw Oriental despotism, in his words «the mindset of our Oriental sultans» (Bizim şark padişahlarının ahval-i rubiyesi), as well as Islamic fundamentalism, namely «the captivity of an Islamic emirate in the hands of a bunch of ignorant and naïve people called the ulema» (ulema denilen bir sürü cahil ve safiye insanların elinde bir emaret-i islamın esareti) was the cause of the backwardness of the region from Bukhara to

82 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 66; Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adama, 206–7. More peculiarly, a Times article from March 1920 also claimed that Cemal Pasha intends to go to offer his services to the Soviet Government to create trouble in Afghanistan. The Times, “Enver’s Offer to the Bolshevists,” March 6, 1920.
84 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), August 19, 1920, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 58; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 12. See also: Baykal, “Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile Cemal Paşa arasında Yazımlar,” 379–439.
87 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), August 27, 1920, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 58.
88 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 29, 1920, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 17.
Afghanistan. Cemal Pasha himself believed that the reactionary Emirate of Bukhara constituted a barrier for the modernization of Turkestan. In a public gathering in Tashkent, as one contemporary Turkestani nationalist remembers, Cemal declared that the Emir of Bukhara should abdicate for the sake of the people.89 While the former Emir of Afghanistan Habibullah was similarly considered as an incompetent Oriental sultan, Cemal’s intelligence on the new Emir of Afghanistan Amanullah framed him rather as a reformer and an enemy of Britain. After the Fergana Government was suppressed by the Red Army, its Jadidist leaders went to the mountains and started a guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks. However, as the young Jadidist leadership died out, Islamic fundamentalist took over the leadership and started to terrorize the local Muslim population.90 Behind the devastating social and cultural decay in Turkestan, Cemal saw a secret force. «Who is the instigator behind these poor rebellious people of Fergana?», Cemal asked rhetorically. «Would you know that it is again our notorious English! These well-known clever fellows are behind half of all the blood and fire in the world.»91

In Turkestan Cemal Pasha witnessed that the local Soviet officials, contrary to the cordial Soviet-Afghan relations in Moscow, were not very fond of the neighboring Afghan Government, because the latter was accused of supporting the Emir of Bukhara and engaging in anti-Soviet propaganda throughout Turkestan.92 «Cemal Pasha, why would you go to Kabul, what would you do there?», asked a senior Soviet official in Tashkent dismissively, «Afghanistan is entirely a lost cause for us.» Only recently, the Afghan Government and British India had reassumed negotiations first time after the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919. Soviet officials in Turkestan assumed that bold promises were made to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Khan Tarzi. Afghanistan was, indeed, looking for British support to liberate Bukhara and Khive, but the first round of talks went actually nowhere.93 In the world of rumors, all this

90 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 13, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 58.
91 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 13, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 58.
92 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), July 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 267.
looked a little different. According to rumors, Cemal heard in Tashkent, a secret agreement was concluded after the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs made a visit to British India. It was decided to establish a Great Afghanistan in Central Asia as a bufferzone between British India and Soviet Russia. It was rumored that the Caliphate would also be offered to the Afghan Emir, only if the Afghan Emir would conclude an anti-Russian agreement. Eventually, we can regard the Afghanistan-England alliance as a fait accompli, supposed the Soviet official pessimistically. «Therefore, it is totally in vain and possibly even harmful, if you would proceed to Kabul», he said to Cemal. «Because the Afghans might capture and hand in you the English.»

While Cemal Pasha was on his way to Kabul, on August 28, 1920, the Red Army in conjunction with the leaders of the Young Bukhara movement took over the Emirate of Bukhara. The Emir Alim Khan fled and went to exile in Afghanistan. «As you see, I arrived at Kabul right in these times», as Cemal recapitulated a year later. The Sovietization of Turkestan, despite its obvious brutality, would, nevertheless, help Cemal to have a fresh start in Kabul. The news of Cemal Pasha coming to Kabul travelled fast, as The Times announced: «Jemal Pasha […] is now on his way to Kabul via Tashkent at the instance of the Soviet Government. There is reason to believe, however, that Jemal is more concerned with the Pan-Islamic movement than with Bolshevism.» In face of alleged British overtures to the Afghan Government, Cemal explained his plans as follows:

I want to reach Afghanistan as soon as possible, in order to thoroughly explain the Afghan Emir what murderous consequence such considerations would have. And I want to incite and persuade him to animosity against the English, which is the sole solution for the political salvation of the East. By this, I want to prepare a road and a gateway for the Indian revolutionaries at the border of India. Let’s see who will succeed.
When Cavid Bey received the news that Cemal Pasha and the others had arrived in Moscow, but Enver never reached Moscow, he was concerned. What Cavid was not told was, however, that Enver had already reappeared in Berlin after a long and difficult journey. After leaving Germany, Enver’s plane made a forced landing in the Polish Corridor in Danzig (Gdańsk) due to an engine trouble. There, Enver and his pilot Lieutenant Eberhart Gruda could only by chance avoid an arrestment by the Allied troops. Somehow the responsible British officials at the airfield did not devote their highest attention to Enver’s airplane so that the two men could proceed without further complications. On April 5, they had a further stop at Königsberg (Kaliningrad), where they repaired the malfunction they had during their flight. As it seems the engine trouble was not sufficiently solved. On the flight to the Lithuanian-Russian border, they had to make another emergency landing in Latvia. There Enver and his pilot were imprisoned in Riga and later in Volmar (Valmiera).
The situation in the Baltic region was still precarious, when Enver found himself in a Latvian prison. This time, he was not as lucky as he had been in Lithuania six months ago. Latvia had suffered immensely by both Red and White terrors since its independence in November 18, 1918. There are nearly no sources on Enver Pasha’s time in Latvia—except for memoirs. In the retelling of his friends, the story of Enver’s captivity has been told in different versions. While in one version Enver was either disguised as a German communist by the name of Malessa, in the other he acted as a Polish-German, while others claim that he was impersonating a Jewish German communist by the name of Heinrich Altmann. Yet, others claim that he was disguised as a Russian with papers prepared by the Bolshevik mission in Berlin. 104

One important source for Enver’s prison time is his collection of drawings from his prison days, recently published by Murat Bardakçı. 105 As Bardakçı states, his drawings are signed with different names, including Malessa, Altmann, Ali, and even Enver, implying that Malessa and Altmann were both the one and same cover. The drawings and their handwritten titles and descriptions indicate that Enver was imprisoned mostly with Bolsheviks and communists.

Whether he had German or Russian papers, or perhaps both, is not clear. Either way, it was a hard time in Latvia both for Germans and Russians. Latvian nationalists had been fighting both against the Soviet Russians and local communists as well as against the local German land-owners. The Baltic Germans traditionally possessed most of the wealth in Latvia. In

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104 Naciye Sultan writes that Enver was a German communist by the name of Malessa and was arrested by the authorities, Naciye Sultan, *Aci Zamanlar*, 56. Arif Cemil writes that Latvia (he mistakes it for Estonia) was ruled by a Bolshevik government and Enver Pasha was arrested for being a Baltic German aristocrat caught at the airplane as he was fleeing from the country, Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 69–70. According to an entry in Cavid Bey’s diary from July 24, 1920, Enver was undercover as a Polish German, Cavid Bey, *Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi*, IV, 124. Louise Bryant tells that Enver Pasha was travelling under disguise as «Mr. Altman», «a Jewish German Communist of no importance», Bryant, *Mirrors of Moscow*, 156–57. Blücher from the Eastern Department of the *Auswärtiges Amt* writes that Enver had a fake name and Russian identification papers, Blücher, *Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo*, 132. Enver drawings from his prison days imply that he was imprisoned together with other Bolshevik prisoners, Murat Bardakçı, “Enver Paşa’nın Torununun Ayakta Kalma Mücadelesi,” *Hürriyet*, July 11, 2004.

1920, the Baltic Germans were strongly discriminated and disliked by their Latvian compatriots. The events of 1919, especially the Allied intervention had strengthened the Baltic nationalisms. General von Seeckt wrote in a memorandum that the Entente forces in the Baltics rather preferred the expansion of Bolshevism than the continuance of German settlement in the Baltic region. Indeed, the general atmosphere was in favor of the Allied interests and therefore considerably against Germany and Germans. But Russian Bolsheviks and Latvian communists were no better off than Germans. Latvian Bolsheviks had set up a Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in December 1918 by pushing the government of independent Latvia to German-controlled territories. Only in May 1919 the Soviet Republic of Latvia was dissolved, but Latvian Bolsheviks still posed a threat to the Latvian nationalists in the second half of 1919 and first half of 1920.

In Arif Cemil’s retelling of Enver’s story, everyday life in the prison is described as unbearable and poorish. When Arif Cemil’s memoir was first published in a Constantinople newspaper in 1922, his sympathetic account on Enver’s captivity aroused a controversy. Falih Rıfkı (Atay) criticized Arif Cemil for audaciously dramatizing Enver Pasha’s fate. Falih Rıfkı argued that the Anatolian people had not even the boiled beans to eat, which Enver apparently had with dislike every day in prison. «Enver Pasha, who played Napoleon for thirteen years», as Falih Rıfkı ridiculed, was now «rather seen after the Armistice somewhat in the role of Arsèn Lupin», the fictional Gentleman burglar, having adventurous travels from one country to another.

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107 Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, 23.
109 Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, 30.
111 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 71. See also: Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 81.
With his drawings Enver Pasha could make some money in the prison. This made him popular among the prisoners and wardens so that he even draw portraits of the prison director.\footnote{Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 72; Naciye Sultan, *Acı Zamanlar*, 56–57; Bryant, *Mirrors of Moscow*, 156–57. See also the drawing of the police director of the Riga prison in Bardakçı, *Enver*, 662.\textsuperscript{113}} Somehow Enver was also in touch with a Monsieur Walter from the Danish Embassy in Riga and Monsieur Heinberg, the deputy consul at the Danish Consulate in Volmar.\footnote{114} Eventually, Enver benefited from a prisoner exchange between Germany and Latvia and returned to Germany, implying that he had probably German papers.\footnote{The conflict between Germany and Latvia was normalized on July 5, 1920.\textsuperscript{116} According to a dedication note on the collection of his prison drawings Enver gave his wife as a present, signed on July 28, he was imprisoned from April 10 until July 6, 1920.\textsuperscript{117}} The conflict between Germany and Latvia was normalized on July 5, 1920.\footnote{Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 72–73; Naciye Sultan, *Acı Zamanlar*, 57. See also diary entry, July 24, 1920, in Cavid Bey, *Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi*, IV, 124.\textsuperscript{118}}

When Enver Pasha arrived in Germany in mid-July 1920, his wife and children had now arrived from Constantinople.\footnote{For Naciye Sultan’s story from Constantinople to Berlin see: Bardakçı, *Enver*, 187–97. See also: Admiral de Robeck, cipher (Constantinople) to Foreign Office (London), July 12, 1920, FO 371/5173, 8251.\textsuperscript{119}} His wife Naciye Sultan’s journey from Constantinople to Berlin is another manifestation of state control over transnational mobility. For being Enver’s wife, Naciye Sultan received a harsh treatment from the Allied forces. First, she was kicked out of her villa at Kuruçeşme, which was given to the French General Louis Franchet d’Espéray as a residence.\footnote{Georg von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1917–1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Trans. by Gerald Onn, 75.\textsuperscript{115}} When asked to leave for Europe, this was denied. The Allies were holding her as a quasi-hostage in Constantinople—measures Enver considered to be “childish.”\footnote{Bardakçı, “Enver Paşa’nın Torununun Ayakta Kalma Mücadelesi,” *Hürriyet*, July 11, 2004. See also: Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 72.\textsuperscript{120}} Naciye Sultan had been seriously sick since the birth of her second daughter, but was not permitted to leave for Europe for treatment.\footnote{Denver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), December 6, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 31.\textsuperscript{121}} Thus, Naciye Sultan, a Princess of the

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\footnote{Denver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 12, 1919, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 32–33.\textsuperscript{122}}
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House of Osman, had to secretly escape the imperial capital. Naciye Sultan left Constantinople in disguise of the nanny of the famous Italian architect Dinari and his family. Arrived in Germany via Rome, she checked in at the sanatorium of Dr. Carl Franz von Dapper-Saalfels in Bad Kissingen. After arriving in Berlin, Enver went directly to the sanatorium. It was the first time that he saw his second daughter Türkan, who at that time was already 11 months old. The family reunited after more than one and a half years and spent one or two weeks together at the sanatorium. When Naciye Sultan’s health was soon restored, they settled in Berlin where Nazım Bey (Enver’s sister’s husband, not be mistaken with Dr. Nazım) rented a house in Grunewald. Despite the long-awaited family reunion, Enver could not settle down. He stayed about two weeks in Germany. «Naciye, why would you cry at all?», Enver would write to his depressed and sick wife on his way to Moscow. «Think that I am leaving to work for a great Muslim mission, for the humanity, for the Turkic world [Türklük], he cheered her up, «but for me even more holy, I am leaving to work for you, so do not grieve.»

Duty was calling. Enver had still not reached Moscow, while others were already there. Before he left again, he had a meeting with Emir Shakib Arslan who arrived Munich to talk on matters regarding the Arab world. Since a Kemalist delegation was supposed to be in Moscow, Enver wished to represent the Arabs and other Muslims in Moscow. There was collective effort in hiding the embarrassing fact that Enver had never reached Moscow so far, while in public rumors he was constantly being sighted in Moscow and beyond. Enver’s return was kept secret even from trusted CUP colleagues, like Cavid Bey. After being confronted by Cavid, who heard of Enver’s return from other sources, Talat explained that

122 Naciye Sultan, Acı Zamanlar, 57. See also diary entry, July 24, 1920, Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 124.
123 Naciye Sultan, Acı Zamanlar, 57–58.
125 Enver Pasha, letter (Königsberg) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 6, 1920, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 32.
126 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aşlan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 81.
127 Cavid Bey had learned about Enver’s return on July 24, in a letter from Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was living in Vienna since his retirement. Enver’s brother/uncle in law (enişte) Nazım Bey had visited him in Vienna and told him about Enver’s reappearance after his Latvian captivity. Cavid Bey was angry about Talat’s secrecy towards him. Cavid Bey heard from Enver’s presence in Berlin, once again, from the former Ottoman Ambassador to Bern, Fuad Salim Bey, who in fact did not actually know it—at least according to Talat Pasha. See diary entries, July 24, 30, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 124, 127; Talat
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The Ali [a.k.a. Enver] issue is indeed a secret. However, not a secret from you. After going through months of escapades and adventures and being exposed to great dangers, ten days ago he suddenly showed up. [side note: top secret] Last night he went off in the company of Hayreti, Secretary Ziya Bey, Dr. Ahmed Fuad the Egyptian. If you allow, I won’t give any details here. In ten days, he will arrive at the desired place [mahalli maksuda, i.e. Moscow]. I will report to you on the details. [...] Depending on the situation he finds there at his arrival, I will travel also by the same route and come back again.128

«As if the Ali [a.k.a. Enver] issue is a secret!!», Cavid noted angered in his diary. «I wrote a letter to Talat», he noted two days later. «I made fun of Berlin’s ‘mystery’», Cavid continued and told Talat that «those things considered secret are already on everyone’s lips.»129

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Since the Bolshevik advance in Poland, the Russian front line once again bordered to East Prussia in summer 1920. Therefore, travel by land seemed to be a better plan.130 Once again Enver Pasha needed the assistance of the German authorities. His old pal Naval Lieutenant Commander Hans Humann was no more the Chief of the Military Intelligence. Therefore, Enver contacted General von Seeckt. For this assignment, General von Seeckt had one man for the job, Cavalry Captain Ernst Köstring. Seeckt usually appointed Köstring to «special assignments», as Köstring later told.131 «In the war, I received my orders from him», remembers Köstring and these orders were rather «small, but exhaustive». As a disciplined Prussian officer, Köstring did not bother Seeckt with questions about «why and what consequences» these special assignments had.132 Köstring got his instructions for this mission first from General von Seeckt’s aid-de-camp, Captain Herbert Fischer.133 The assignment was to deliver Enver through the Allied occupied East Prussia to the Soviet controlled Lithuanian border. Once arrived there, Enver had to be smuggled over the border and handed over to the Red Army officials, awaiting him. If caught by the British officials, as Fischer briefed Köstring, it would cause a «political spectacle and humiliation» (politischen Mordspektakel und Blamage). When Köstring later discussed his overcautious plans with Seeckt over tea at Seeckt’s home.

Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [August 1920], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 161.
128 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), July 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 159–60.
129 See diary entries, August 13 and 15, 1920, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, IV, 130–131.
130 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 73.
131 Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 41.
133 Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 42.
«Hit the road, you will somehow figure it out», General von Seeckt laughed, while playing with his dog.\(^\text{134}\)

In his machine-typed original version of his memoirs, Köstring first wrote that it was an initiative of the Auswärtiges Amt to bring Enver to Russia, but crossed it out and wrote in the margin that it was von Seeckt’s initiative instead.\(^\text{135}\) Further below in the manuscript, he wrote a note that the Auswärtiges Amt and the German Government embraced this idea. In the publication of his memoirs, there is no mention of these governmental bodies.\(^\text{136}\) It was, again, rather the work of a few than an official policy. In the minds of these few German collaborators, this mission served also national interests. The potential benefits of Enver re-connecting the «Russian wire» was obvious.\(^\text{137}\) The ambitions of Enver’s German friends went but perhaps even beyond the enhancement of a German-Russian rapprochement. Köstring was told that «Enver was a beacon for the Mohammedanian-Turanian people.» From Enver’s collaborations with Moscow, Köstring believed that Enver’s friends in Berlin «anticipated ramifications for the Mohammedan population of India and thus trouble for England.»\(^\text{138}\) Negotiations between Germany and Soviet Russia had started in support of the anti-Entente struggle in the East even prior to Enver’s arrival in Moscow. Military material was planned to be transported from Germany via the ports of Trabzon or St. Petersburg.\(^\text{139}\)

On August 4, 1920, Enver Pasha and his entourage, Hayreti Bey, Ziya Bey, and Dr. Ahmed Fuad Efendi, in the company of Captain Köstring and a Bolshevik emissary by the name of Leo left Berlin by train to Stettin.\(^\text{140}\) From Stettin they travelled with the ferry Odin to the

\(^{135}\) Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 41.
\(^{136}\) Ernst Köstring, General Ernst Köstring: Der militärische Mittler zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion 1921–1941, ed. Hermann Teske (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag E. S. Mitler & Sohn, 1965), 41.
\(^{138}\) Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 41. In the publication, the word «Turanian» was omitted.
\(^{140}\) Kazım Karabekir published this anonymous travel journal (August 4 – September 17, 1920) under the title «Diary» (*Muhtıra*), where the details of this journey and personal impressions are briefly documented, in Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani*, 256–60. The details of the text imply that it must authored by Hayreti, Talat Pasha was brother-in-law and one of the men, who left Constantinople together with the CUP leaders. It is though not clear, how Kazım Karabekir took hold of the journal. The journal is also quoted in its entirety without citing Karabekir in Tekin Erer, *Enver Paşa’nın Türkistan Kurtuluş...*
port of Pillau (today Baltiysk) near Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Köstring was appalled by Enver’s attempt to send an open radiogram from the ferry to Berlin with the message that «the route is perfectly hazard-free». While Enver stayed with Köstring at the officer’s guest house in Königsberg, the others stayed at a hotel. It was still unsure how to cross the border. While Enver, Köstring, and Leo had papers, others still needed passports to cross the border. «Again, difficulties appear on the journey», Enver complained in another letter to his wife. «Those arrangements planned in Berlin always become complicated. Let’s see what will happen?...» Contingencies of transnational mobility was plagued with complications. They stayed for few more days in Königsberg, spending their days with sightseeing in the city, doing shopping or visiting the zoo. Köstring made some inquires at the border meanwhile. On the morning of August 9, Köstring, Enver, and Leo left and headed to Johannisburg (today Pisz in Poland). From Königsberg (Kaliningrad) they travelled to Lyck (today Elk in Poland) by train. In Lyck they had to wait two hours for the next connection train. Somehow, they caught the attention of British troops at the station. Enver improvised immediately and started to draw a portrait of Köstring in his sketchbook, distracting the British officials. Köstring tells that Enver somehow was in possession of a press card of the *New York Times* as a cover for his journey. Later in Johannisburg, they even shared the only hotel in town with British officers and sat together with them during the meals without raising any suspicion. Arrived at Kolno, Enver—again, by ignoring all the security measures—asked Köstring to drop by a letter he wrote to his wife at the local post office, which was even enveloped in a couverte with the Ottoman coat of arms on it. Köstring, of course, did not do it. There, they also met with the others from Enver’s entourage, who had travelled with

_Savascı_(İstanbul: Mayataş Yayınları, 1971), 17–23, 32–34. Enver wrote that he left Berlin on August 4, together with Secretary Ziya Bey and one more person. Enver Pasha, letter (Baku) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [around September 8, 1920], in Yağmur and Kocahanoglu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 42. According to Talat Pasha, Enver left with Hayreti, Secretary Ziya Bey and Dr. Ahmed Fuad the Egyptian on July 24, 1920. Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), July 25, 1920, in Yağmur and Kocahanoglu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 159–60. Köstring does not mention these persons in his narrative. Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 42.

141 Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 42.
142 Enver Pasha, letter (Königsberg) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 6, 1920, in Bardakçlı, *Naciye, Rubüm, Efendim*, 30.
143 Hayreti, diary entry, August 6, 1920, in Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı*, 256.
144 Ernst Köstring, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, BA-MA, N123/6, 42–43.
fake German passports and were collected by car.\textsuperscript{145} There was, however, a problem with the passports. Dr. Ahmed Fuad was an Egyptian and protested, «since I don’t look like a German at all, I can’t travel with this passport.» Hayreti and Ziya crossed the border first and figured out that the border patrols were only looking at the visa.\textsuperscript{146} In the night of August 12, they crossed the Russian border and Köstring escorted Enver and his entourage to the Russian troops that resembled in the eyes of the Prussian officer nothing but a «terrible bunch of thieves». Enver and his friends waved to Köstring, while he left them behind in Russia.\textsuperscript{147} After that Köstring returned to Germany.\textsuperscript{148} From Russia, Enver sent further messages to Lieutenant Tschunke and Lieutenant Fischer from General Seeckt’s staff, Ago von Maltzan from the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, and last but not least to Hans Humann—drawing the network of his relations in Berlin.\textsuperscript{149} On August 12, the Red Army officials took Enver and his fellow travelers to Grodno (Hrodna in Belarus) by car.\textsuperscript{150} From there they travelled in a sleeping car via Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow.\textsuperscript{151} From a letter he wrote to Talat after crossing the Russian border, he told that his journey had been «very easy and comfortable».\textsuperscript{152} «Anyway, praise Allah, he arrived at last», was Talat’s reaction.\textsuperscript{153}
Enver and his friends arrived at Moscow on August 15, at 11 o’clock.\textsuperscript{154} They first went to the former German Embassy. From there, the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs accommodated them at the Sugar King’s Palace across the Kremlin, where also Mustafa Kemal’s delegation was hosted.\textsuperscript{155} «Thus we are for now the guests of the government», Enver wrote to his wife. Therefore, he explained, «we don’t need money. Yet they give us money. But we don’t ask for much.»\textsuperscript{156} Enver was back on the diplomatic parquette—so he believed.

Sooner than later Enver Pasha understood that diplomacy in Soviet Moscow was something else and the warm welcome he hoped for remained shallow. «After all,» said Muhittin (Birgen), «there was a whole lot of large and small Enver Pashas from all over the world in Moscow at that time.»\textsuperscript{157} Moscow was the Mecca of revolutionaries in 1920. There was, however, some legitimate suspicion whether Enver was a true believer. The status of the so-called «Ali Bey Mission» in Moscow was, in fact, a matter of ambivalence. «The distinguished guests believed that theirs was a diplomatic mission, and were waiting for a formal reception», remembers M. N. Roy who was also guest at the Sugar King’s Palace. Roy observed that Enver and his friends avoided publicity for that they had not received a formal reception.\textsuperscript{158} In due course, Enver was received by Soviet leaders such as Karahan, Chicherin, and Bukharin, but Lenin would continue to ignored him.\textsuperscript{159} British Intelligence claims that Enver was «received by LENIN and was invited to a sitting of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, specially summoned to meet», was only far from the truth.\textsuperscript{160}

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\textsuperscript{154} On one occasion Enver said that he arrived at Moscow on August 14, and on another occasion he told that it was August 15. Enver Pasha, letter (Baku) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [around September 8, 1920], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 42; Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 20, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 39.

\textsuperscript{155} Hayati, diary entry, August 15, 1920, in Karabekir, \textit{İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani}, 258.

\textsuperscript{156} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 23, 1920, in Bardakç, \textit{Naciye, Rahum, Efendim}, 43.

\textsuperscript{157} Muhittin Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu}, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), II, 743.


\textsuperscript{159} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 40.

In order to elevate his status on the diplomatic parquet, Enver Pasha searched for fields in which he could present himself as a valuable asset to the Soviet Government. One of these fields was in the Soviet-Kemalist negotiations. In his first letter to Mustafa Kemal, Enver wrote that he came to Moscow «with the purpose to realize an organization in the Muslim regions and to work for the redemption of our homeland». Enver soon got in contact with delegation of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s diplomatic delegation. These were trying to arrange an offensive and defensive pact as well as military and financial aid. «Me and my friends are for now working to help them without being involved to the delegation», Enver told to Cemal, not without bragging, of course. «And I believe that my influence was beneficial to their treatment. Because the deal will now be completed in few days, although the delegation hasn’t achieved anything in the last one and a half months.» Later when Enver defended his involvement into the initial Kemalist-Soviet talks, he told that the Ankara’s head diplomat Yusuf Kemal (Tengišenk) feared that Bolsheviks would demand Turkey to become communist and, hence, hesitated to push for talks. Enver used his contacts to Karl Radek and arranged the initial meetings. Once he even participated at a meeting between Chicherin and the Kemalist delegation, as he later claimed, only to demonstrate his solidarity with the Anatolian movement. To Mustafa Kemal, Enver stressed that he never officially acted on behalf of the Ankara Government. As a symbol of his diplomatic restraint, Enver did not want be on the same photograph as the Ankara delegates to avoid further misconceptions, although the Soviet officials insisted —apparently still confused about their distinction.

Enver Pasha’s plan to help the Anatolian struggle was to establish a Red Army cavalry unit consisting of Russian Muslims, possibly from Dagestan and the Caucasus, and dispatch them to Anatolia in the spring of 1921. The first reactions to Enver’s plans by senior Kemalist officials was surprisingly positive. Kazım Karabekir Pasha even encouraged Enver Pasha to

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161 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 43; Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkansı, 21.
162 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 40.
164 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İŞ, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası'nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Saphi, 176–78; Bardakçı, Enver, 539–42.
delay his expedition to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and India in order to establish an Azeri battalion that could come to the help of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{165} It was necessary to give Enver and his friends a «program that would allow them to work for the benefit of our homeland in abroad», only if «they don’t forget about us while following their own convictions.»\textsuperscript{166}

Another area, where Enver Pasha believed to offer invaluable assets, was his connection to the German military through General von Seeckt. Enver needed military material for Turkey and Afghanistan etc., but Soviet Russia was similarly in need for military material. Thus, Enver was working with the German military officials in Moscow and Berlin to organize a way for arms delivery. Under the code name Heinrich Altmann, Enver was able to send regularly letters to Berlin via German diplomatic courier.\textsuperscript{167} In letters addressed to General von Seeckt, he gave not only reports on the state of affairs, but also asked for possibilities of receiving from Germany radio transmitters and telegraph machines for both Turkey and Afghanistan. In Turkey, there was a great need for cartridges as well as machines to fill cartridges, Enver explained. There was also a lack of technical personnel. With General von Seeckt’s help, Enver hoped to transfer these from Germany via Russia to Turkey.\textsuperscript{168} Enver also asked his brother to collect intelligence from Seeckt’s aid-de-camp Lieutenant Fischer on Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian armies for the sake of the «general operation» (\textit{harekat-ı ummumiye}), since intelligence could be an important asset for Enver in establishing working relation between Berlin and Moscow before the planned uprising in the Muslim lands in the spring of 1921.\textsuperscript{169} Enver had put himself as communication channel to General von Seeckt. «However,» as noticed Chicherin, «regarding the purchase of military equipment from Germany, we already started […] talking, but Enver claims that the approval of the government

\textsuperscript{165} Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Enver Pasha (Baku), September 7, 1920, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 50. For the same letter see also TTK, EP 01-70. See also: Aslan, \textit{Türkiye Komünist Fırkasının Kuraları ve Mustafa Süphis}, 167–68.

\textsuperscript{166} Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Mustafa Kemal (Ankara), September 21, 1920, in Karabekir, \textit{İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı}, 25.

\textsuperscript{167} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 25, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 4; Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan, August 26, 1920, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciyeim, Ruhum, Efendim}, 44; Kamil Bey, letter (Grunewald) to Enver Pasha (Baku), September 7, 1920, TTK, EP 01-83, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 101. Later Enver’s cover name was chaged to Dr. Schulze, because Altmann was compromised. Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 14, 1921, TTK, EP 03-74, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 206.

\textsuperscript{168} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 25, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 4.

\textsuperscript{169} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 23, 1920, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciyeim, Ruhum, Efendim}, 41.
means nothing if Seeckt does not give his consent. [...] Enver waits for his response.  

In return for the pre-1914 borders for Germany, Enver promised to Chicherin that General von Seeckt would arrange arms delivery for Russia and support inciting an insurgency in Poland. Chicherin commented to Lenin: «It seems to us like a diplomatic lie.» Enver was hoping to find allies among Trotsky’s clique. After talks with Trotsky, Lenin wrote a letter to Chicherin:

> Comrade Chicherin. As you see the things work out. Speed up the Enver Question (because Trotsky is leaving tomorrow): We will find the general who promised everything to Enver (through Trotsky I talked to him); as long as we get arms, cloaks, and boots.

If it doesn’t work out, to hell with Enver.  

On August 25, Enver apparently had a meeting with E. M. Sklianski, deputy of Trotsky. In a letter to General von Seeckt the next day, Enver told:

> There is party here which has real power. Trotsky belongs to this party as well and he is in favor of a rapprochement with Germany. Sklianski said that their party is willing to recognize the former German border of 1914. They see only one way out of this world chaos and that is collaboration with Germany and Turkey. In order to strengthen their party and to win over the whole Soviet Government, would it be possible to supply unofficial help, such as by intelligence on the Polish Army or, if possible, by selling or smuggling arms. 

But after the setbacks against Poland in late September 1920, Trotsky was dropped. Enver Pasha complained that «politicians are by their nature cowards…». Later in September, Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s long-time agent in Turkestan, had arrived at Berlin. In Germany, on behalf of Enver he made inquiries with German officials and friends about buying arms for the Anatolian resistance movement. «They gave the answer that the official government will not dare to undertake anything», he reported to Enver. «Although it is possible to supply some secretly, there is no possibility to deliver them, thus, they advised

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173 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 26, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 6.

174 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), September 28, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 46.
to supply it to Turkey from elsewhere abroad like Italy.\textsuperscript{175} Enver himself went back to Germany in October 1920 in order to organize the arms delivery for Turkey. In Berlin Enver met with Hans Humann and with Professor Friedrich Sarre as well as some military officers at the Villa Sarre. The informant of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, Paul Weitz recommended «not to raise the subject in the cabinet» and not to have «any direct or indirect connection» with Enver, because the Allied officials were already aware of Enver’s presence in Berlin. If possible, Enver should be hindered in delivering arms from Germany.\textsuperscript{176} Enver’s plan was to organize the transport of arms and uniforms to Anatolia via Russia and Baku. For this he was making inquiries about Allied controls of ships in the Baltic Sea.\textsuperscript{177} As reaction, German authorities decided the expulsion of Enver from Germany.\textsuperscript{178}

Meanwhile, Enver was able contact several German arms dealers and get some offers. After Berlin, Enver made visits to Rome and Budapest for further inquiries.\textsuperscript{179} In a letter to Moscow, he told that he could purchase 50,000 rifles, 200,000,000 ammunition, 500 machine guns to be transported via Italy. To begin with, he wanted to purchase 200 machine guns, 1000 rifles, and 7,000,000 ammunition. More money was needed to purchase more, as he explained. From Russia he could purchase uniforms and boots.\textsuperscript{180} Karahan sent a Soviet emissary to Berlin in order to manage Enver’s arms deals in Germany and Italy.\textsuperscript{181} Enver continued to work for delivery of the arms previously acquired in Germany to Anatolia.\textsuperscript{182} Enver Pasha later explained in a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the Russians promised to deliver more arms to Turkey, if he would also manage to deliver arms to Russia from Germany. But

\begin{footnotes}
\item[175] Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), September 30, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69.
\item[176] Stockhammer, report on Enver Pasha’s activities in Berlin, October 22, 1920, ZMO, NGH, 07-03, 59.
\item[177] Stockhammer, report on Enver Pasha’s disappearance from Berlin, November 18, 1920, ZMO, NGH, 07-03, 59.
\item[178] See: Paul Weitz, letter to Auswärtiges Amt, January 16, 1921, ZMO, NGH 037-03, 56. There were already rumors in December 1920, that Enver Pasha declared \textit{persona non grata} by the German Government, since he was considered to be too «dangerous». See: Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to the General Staff (Ankara), December 12, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 617, gömlek no. 81.
\item[179] Bardakçı, \textit{Enver}, 211.
\item[180] Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Halil Pasha [?] (Moscow), October 24, 1920, TTK, EP 01-63. For an undated list of military material which the Ankara Government asked to acquire from Italy, see: TTK, EP 03-24.
\item[181] Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 16, 1921, TTK, EP 02-32.
\item[182] Ali Fuat Pasha, cipher (Moscow) to the Grand National Assembly (Ankara), March 1, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 7. This cipher could, however, not be deciphered by the Grand National Assembly. See: Mustafa Kemal Pasha, telegraph (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), March 9, 1921, ibid.
\end{footnotes}
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then, the armistice between Poland and Russia was signed, which made Russian needs obsolete.\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 16, 1921, TTK, EP 03-27, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 92.}

The development of events had moved faster than Enver. In a declaration Enver Pasha gave at Baku in September 1920, he stressed that his arrival in Russia (and also in Caucasus) was delayed, first, by sea storms in the Black Sea in the autumn and winter of 1918 and, second, by «the bars of the prisons of Kovno and Riga and the forced landing of airplanes» from the summer of 1919 to the summer of 1920.\footnote{Quoted as in Riddell, \textit{To See the Dawn}, 140. For the original see: Enver Pasha, manuscript of the speech submitted to the Baku Congress, [ca. August – September 1920], TTK, EP 01-77, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 319.} In similar terms, Arif Cemil believes that the one-year delayed arrival at Moscow had a damaging effect on CUP’s plans. In October 1919, when Enver first flew to Moscow, Soviet Russia was indeed not in a confident situation because of the Russian Civil War. In the course of the last year, the Bolsheviks had settled many fronts in the civil war, and even advanced into Caucasus and practically bordered to Turkey and Iran once again.\footnote{Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 73–74.}
8. Ambiguities of a Bolshevik Jihad: 
Bolshevism, Islam, and Enver Pasha at the Baku Congress 1920

On June 18, Karl Radek declared at an executive meeting of the Communist International (in short Comintern) that it was not enough to «send salutation and congratulation telegraphs» to those movements in the East revolting against «world imperialism». Instead, Moscow needed to be the «center of incitement».1 The first policy move in this regard was to convene a conference. Both the Comintern and Soviet leaders took concrete steps to do and made preparations to convene the First Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku, more commonly referred as the Baku Congress.2 After some delays, the Baku Congress was scheduled for September 1 to 8, 1920. Historians have already pointed out with good reason the significance of the Baku Congress in studying the complexities of the national and colonial questions during the eventful years of the Russian Civil War.3

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2 The congress idea was on the agenda of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on June 18, 1920, where it was decided to convene the Baku Congress. Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 132. The Soviet Government also supported the idea. On June 29, 1920, the People’s Council of Commissioners made the decision following Lenin’s initiative to convey an Eastern congress. Cosroe Chaqueri, “The Baku Congress,” Central Asian Survey 2, no. 2 (1983): 90. Ahmet Zeki Velidi (Togan) claims that it was his idea to assemble a Muslim congress. Zeki Velidi, a leading political figure in Russian Central Asia and former president of the Republic of Bashkortostan, was then in 1919 working with Radek in Moscow. After some discussions on where to convene the congress, the Comintern decided for Baku. Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, Memoirs: National Existence and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and other Muslim Eastern Turks, Translated by H. B. Paksoy (North Charleston: CreateSpace, 2012), 263. See also: Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 99.
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The turn towards the East was a matter of strategy for the Bolshevik regime. Facing the disappointment of the failed revolutions in Europe, the Bolshevik revolution seemed to have come to a dead end in the West. «The route to Paris and London is through the cities of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal», as Trotsky had proclaimed in a memorandum in August 1919. Although Red Army’s situation in Poland seemed more favorable after the Kiev offensive was checked in May 1920, victory was still far from sight. Nonetheless, most of European Russia was recovered from the Whites. When Baku was conquered by the Red Army in April 28, 1920, Soviet Russia’s gates to the Middle East via Turkey and Iran were (re-) opened. Baku was chosen as the venue for the Eastern Congress due to its logistical and geopolitical centrality. Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the Eastern Front, appreciated the increasing importance of Baku as the «center of Muslim and Slav politics». «We propose Baku for the congress venue, not Moscow», Radek declared. «Because it is easier for us to go to Baku than for Eastern delegates to come to Moscow. Besides, Baku is the actual center of the East.»

With the rise of Baku to center stage, the former Great Game between Russia and Britain over Asia had reemerged in the aftermath of World War I. In the East, after the fall of Baku new geopolitical developments were now finally accessible for the Bolshevik regime which directly threatened British interests in the Middle East. With the help of the Soviets, for instance, Mirza Kuchik Khan’s Jangali Movement in Northwestern Iran had founded the Soviet Republic of Gilan in May 1920. Kuchik Khan himself was no communist rather a Muslim nationalist revolutionary, who found in Soviet Russia and in the former Baku-based Communist (Edalat) Party of Iran valuable assets, and vice versa. The Kemalist movement in Ottoman Turkey was also a Muslim nationalist revolutionary

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6 Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkânı (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 15.
7 Quoted in Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Karuluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 133.
movement, conducting a people’s war against the common Western enemy. Although the Anatolian movement was a far cry from communist revolution, numerous local and regional forms of Soviet-style constitutional councils (șura) and congress-like governmental bodies (kongre or kurtulay) had demonstrated a bottom-up democratic spirit that resulted in the foundation of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in April 23, 1920. All this won some considerate sympathies among the Bolsheviks. These anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements in immediate proximity of Caucasus seemed to offer sympathetic auxiliary forces to Soviet Russia in return for financial and agitational support.

«Pan-Islamism was a revolutionary force and, as such, should be welcomed and supported as an ally of the proletarian world revolution.» This motto had increasingly become a commonplace notion in Moscow, as Indian communist leader M. N. Roy remembers distastefully. By then, the first delegation of Indian Muslims had arrived at Moscow in March 1919 and others soon followed. As a convinced communist and connoisseur of Eastern affairs, Roy himself strongly disagreed with utilizing Muslim nationalism. He feared that a nationalist revolution in the East might come to terms with imperialism at the expense of the proletariat. Roy also questioned the sincerity of the Comintern leaders in convening a conference, since in his eyes this was anything but mere agitation. Many others, however, regarded the Baku Congress as a welcome wind of change in Moscow, one that was could possibly change the wind in the West as well.

The ideological framework for the Baku Congress was manifested by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress. The Congress first took place in St. Petersburg in July 19, 1920, and continued in Moscow from Jul 23 to August 7. For the Comintern Congress, Lenin prepared his preliminary draft of his «Theses on the National and Colonial Questions».

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10 Mustafa Kemal offered diplomatic relations to Chicherin in May 1920 in order «to unite both States in their struggle with international imperialism.» Admiral de Robeck, telegram (Constantinople) to Foreign Office (London), June 12, 1920, FO 371/5178, 6346, 88. The Paris-based Bolshevik mouthpiece La Cause Commune published a letter from Chicherin to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The letter proposed independence to Turkey and the states of Arabia and Syria and so forth. La Cause Commune, “Tchicherine et Mustapha-Kemal pacha”, June 26, 1920. See also: FO.371.5178, 7384, 94.
13 Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 127.
Previously Lenin had called for the right of national self-determination which had appealed to many. Now in 1920, he proposed to support revolutionary movements in the colonial world regardless of their stance towards communist ideals. The main objection came from M. N. Roy, who in private meetings convinced Lenin that his approach was rather naïve and theoretical. Based on Roy’s «supplementary thesis», Lenin made some terminological adjustments. The initial term «bourgeois-democratic» was replaced with «national-revolutionary». Objections of Zeki Velidi (Togan) from Bashkortostan was, however, rejected by Lenin, for Lenin himself did not have faith in the revolutionary potential of the Eastern proletariat—at least not in strict Marxist terms. In article six of the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern, this idea was manifested as follows:

Consequently, we cannot limit ourselves at this time merely to recognizing or proclaiming the friendship of the toilers of various nations. Rather we must pursue a policy of implementing the closest possible alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. The forms of this alliance will be determined by the level of development of the Communist movement within the proletariat of each country or of the revolutionary liberation movement in the backward countries and among the backward nationalities.

Regarding the adoption of the new Eastern policy, the Bolshevik Orientalist M. N. Pavlovich announced the general euphoria in the Comintern as follows: «All Communists—Russian, French, Italian, and so on—have now become Asians and are resolved to help every revolutionary movement in the East and in Africa.» The main motto of the Second Congress of the Comintern and of the following Baku Congress was reformulated as: «Workers of the world and oppressed peoples, unite!» «Of course, the modification is wrong from the standpoint of the Communist Manifesto», Lenin frankly admitted the opportunism behind this revision, «but then the Communist Manifesto was written under entirely different conditions. From the point of view of present-day politics,
however, the change is correct." Rather than unchanged ideologies, political contingencies and necessities were defining the Bolshevik turn to East. It was a multi-faceted and complex policy with many contradictory and conflicting aspects both for Comintern and Soviet polices.

The call for the Baku Congress especially addressed «the enslaved popular masses of Persia, Armenia, and Turkey». Accordingly the Russian Muslims and also geopolitically distant Eastern nations were not the primary target audience of the congress, but were invited to join as well. During the planning nearly 3,280 delegates were invited. In the end, around 2,000 showed up. Contrary to the expectations of the organizers, the majority of the delegates were Russian Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia. It was not easy to communicate the invitation and enable the travel of the delegates in Entente controlled territories. Zinoviev later regretted that there were only very few delegates from India and China.

Less surprising was the fact that most of the delegates were not members of a communist party, and were in many cases even members of a petty-bourgeois movement. The demands on delegates were set by the Comintern to be as inclusivist as possible. Zinoviev recalled that «it was decided to invite to the Congress, not only Communists, but also representatives of national revolutionary organisations, and non-aligned personalities of anti-imperialist tendency from Eastern countries».

The announcement of the Baku Congress first reached Cemal Pasha’s ears who wrote a letter to Talat Pasha and urged him to send experienced activists such as Arif Cemil Bey to the Baku Con-

23 Call to Baku Congress, June 29, 1920, in Riddell, To See the Dawn, 40–46.
30 See Zinoviev’s speech in Riddell, To See the Dawn, 71–72. See also Mikoyan, Une vie de lutte, 481, quoted the English translation in Chaqueri, “The Baku Congress,” 91.
gress in order to «demonstrate what kind of personalities are assembled among the Turkish revolutionaries» (Türk ihtilalcierinin ne gibi şahsiyetlerden terekküp ettiğini). Cemal believed that the Baku Congress offered a special opportunity for Turkey: «If you would send some of the most distinguished and convincing orators of Turkey and some of our most brilliant friends to this conference, then it will be possible for Turks to take hold of the leadership position in the Eastern World.» Mustafa Kemal, however, had mixed feelings about the Baku Congress, because the Ankara Government was not officially invited by Comintern officials. During a parliamentary debate, Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared:

Lately, they are conveying an international congress at Baku. Official and unofficial requests reached us that invite us to send delegates there. These invitations are directly addressed to our people. […]

[…] We, too, go to congresses. We go everywhere and attend everything. But only we do it. The nation goes [to congresses], that is to say the [Grand National] Assembly goes, which is composed of the delegates of the nation […].

Thus, the Ankara Government was not officially represented at the Baku Congress, but sent İbrahim Tali (Öngören) stationed at Moscow in an observer mission to Baku in addition to several local delegates from Anatolia. These Turkish delegates to the Baku Congress were carefully selected by the Ankara Government and their local branches. They received strict instructions not to be persuaded by communist promises, since the situation in Turkey did not share the same problems as in industrialized countries. They were also cautioned not to give any promises regarding Turkey’s position and policies. The Kemalist-Bolshevik rapprochement was not be rushed, when it came to ideologies.
The contradiction of Soviet support for nationalist forces in Turkey, Iran, India, and China was a disputed issue. «Don’t paint Nationalism red», Lenin is said to have cautioned his Comintern colleagues subsequently. 37 Making sense of this new national and colonial policy was running the risk of making no sense at all, thus it was necessary to justify it again and again. In his opening speech of the Baku Congress, Grigory Zinoviev defended this policy as follows:

And so I say that we patiently support groups that are not yet with us and even against us on some questions. For example, in Turkey, comrades, you know that the Soviet government supports Kemal. We do not forget for one moment that the movement headed by Kemal is not a Communist movement. [...] It is not out of some mercenary calculation that we support national movements like those in Turkey, Persia, India, and China. Rather we support them because a conscious worker will tell himself that the Turks who today do not yet understand where all their interests lie will understand this tomorrow. We must support this Turk and help him, and wait for a real people's revolution to arise in Turkey, when veneration for sultans and other obsolete notions will vanish from his mind.38

Whereas Mustafa Kemal Pasha possessed some sort of legitimacy as a leader of a national movement in September 1920, it was more a complex and complicated affair for the Bolshevik regime to make sense for themselves and for others, why Enver Pasha was present at the Baku Congress. Regarding Enver’s participation at the Baku Congress, Louise Bryant wrote, for instance:

The Communists understood perfectly well that Enver Pasha was not at the Oriental Conference as a sudden and sincere convert to Internationalism, and he knew that they knew. Both Zinoviev and Enver were actors taking the lead rôles in a significant historical pageant. The results are really all that matter, since the motives will soon be forgotten.39

It is these forgotten motives we will explore throughout this chapter. In their struggle against imperial powers, the Bolshevik regime was hoping to utilize the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements and the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements, the latter, including Enver Pasha, were hoping to utilize the resources of the Bolshevik regime in turn. «The Transcaucasus is adrift in rumors», as Robert Scotland-Liddell, a British reporter from Russia once put it beautifully. «They blow about in the air like the mountain winds.»40 Conflicting and concurring perceptions and agendas as well as distant rumors were in a contentious interaction to make sense of the Baku Congress.

37 Quoted in Roy, Memoirs, 395.
38 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 82, 84; Persyv s’ezd narodov vostoka, 41–45. See also: Küçük Talat Bey and Nail Bey, report (Erzurum) on the Baku Congress to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, October 20, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkans, 40.
39 Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 157–58.
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Since Enver Pasha was mostly ignored by the Soviet leadership after his arrival in Moscow, he set out to find more interested audience. During the two weeks he was in Moscow, Enver surrounded himself mostly with dignitaries of Moscow’s Muslim community, ranging from the Mufti of Kazan to the Afghan Ambassador, enjoying a warm welcome by the Muslim community in Moscow. Many receptions were given in his honor. On August 25, the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice (*eid al-adha*), «[w]e performed our feast prayers yesterday morning at one of the two mosques here, which was closer to us», Enver wrote to his wife. «The affection, which the people showed, was truly marvelous», he said. Afterwards there was a reception for Enver at the Tatar Theater with 300 or 400 guests, where Enver held a long speech, which was translated into various languages. For Enver’s Muslim nationalist romanticism, these events constituted hope for the future: «There were representatives from Afghanistan, Khiva, Iran, almost from all of the Eastern-Muslim nations. Many speeches were held. It was as I always believed. I was pleased to see that the Islamdom [Islam] is striving to get better.» The next day there was a play at the Tatar Theater in honor of Enver. Before leaving for the Baku Congress, the company of the Muslim community of Moscow made Enver rather optimistic:

> Here [in Moscow] I got in touch with all the Muslim delegations. Either they be communist or not, they all support from their heart a military enterprise for the Muslims. From the mufti of Kazan to Sultan-Galiev. Accordingly, I am sure that great services will be done for the Islamic World when the general spirit is as such.

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43 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 26, 1920, in Bardakçı, *Naciyeem, Ruhum, Efendim*, 44; İnan, *Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları*, 151.


45 Mirza Sultan-Galiev was one of the leading Tatar Bolsheviks, who is considered as the first prominent victim to Stalin’s purges. Sultan-Galiev was collecting intelligence on the CUP and its policies. In a telegraph Sultan-Galiev sent to Turkish communist leader Mustafa Subhi, he requested information among other things on «Committee of Union and Progress, its social character and economic principle. The change of form of [Committee of] Union and Progress after the Armistice and its activities. The relations of [Committee of] Union and Progress to other parties and groups and its standing regarding the national movement and the agrarian question.» Mirza Sultan-Galiev, telegraph (Moscow) to Mustafa Subhi (Baku), July 20, 1920, quoted in Aslan, *Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Karuluğu ve Mustafa Suphi*, 194. Sultan-Galiev’s posthumous popularity is grounded in his conceptualization of Muslim national communism, the so-called Sultangalievism. For Sultan-Galiev see: Alexandre A. Benniges and Chantal Quelquejay, “Der ‘Sultangalievismus’ und die nationalistischen Abweichungen in der Tatarischen Autonomen
I am leaving in few days for the Islam conference that will take place in Baku. At this congress the decision of the Second Congress of the Third International will be implemented that enables assistance to those movements which are considered revolutionary, but not communists. I am convinced that good decisions will be made regarding the Muslim movement.46

Enver was not alone in his optimism. «It is a very important matter that you will be present at the Baku Conference», wrote Kazım Karabekir Pasha in a letter to Enver Pasha, «where the fate of the Islamic World and all nations of the East will certainly be discussed [...]».47 For many Muslim nationalists, the Baku Congress had therefore gradually turned into a rising sun in the horizon of expectations.

On August 26, 1920, Enver Pasha traveled from Moscow to the Baku Congress in the same train with Comintern leaders Grigory Zinoviev, Karl Radek, Bela Kun and other prominent delegates.48 The Comintern train travelled through the newly secured, but heavily destroyed and civil war-struck landscapes of South Russia.49 The train arrived at Baku on the morning of September 1 with a great ceremony.50

Yet, Enver Pasha’s presence at the Baku Congress had a highly ambiguous nature. Enver was travelling to the Baku Congress not as a delegate, but rather as a «special guest» of the Comintern.51
This meant that Enver was important enough to participate at the Baku Congress, but perhaps too important to let off the leash as an independent delegate. Accordingly, it has been an important matter for the Bolshevik leadership to restrict Enver’s activities at Baku. The Comintern leaders feared that Enver could cast a shadow on them. Their fears would soon prove to be true.

When Enver Pasha entered the congress hall during Zinoviev’s opening speech and sat next to the Kemalist delegation in one of the front loges, his sudden presence caused a great curiosity and excitement among the Muslim delegates. One can only imagine how annoying this must have felt for Zinoviev that many delegates came to Enver to kiss his hand, while he was still in the middle of his long speech. Without a doubt, it was a warning about Enver’s political schemes, when Zinoviev said at his opening speech that “[t]he enormous significance of the revolution that is beginning in the East does not consist in requesting the British imperialist gentlemen to take their feet off the table, only to then permit the Turkish rich to stretch their feet comfortably on the table.”

After Zinoviev’s opening speech, Enver Pasha attempted to read his declaration, but was denied permission. The official Soviet historian of the Baku Congress, G. Z. Sorkin, noted that “at the beginning, the presidency of the Congress permitted Enver to speak to the Congress», but claimed that his wish was rejected afterwards due to alleged objections from the crowd.

What made Enver Pasha such an uncomfortable guest in the eyes of the Comintern leadership was not the objections against him, but rather the fact that Enver enjoyed a remarkable popularity

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52 For the reactions of the delegates see: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 543; Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 190.
54 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 74; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 45.
55 There is a peculiar break right after the translation of Zinoviev’s speech into Turkic and Persian, from 11.50 pm until 12.15 am. Afterwards the chairman informs the delegates only shortly about the coming session and closes the first session, and strangely enough it is already as late as 01.10 am. Riddell, To See the Dawn, 89. British intelligence and newspaper sources both report that during this first session Enver Pasha attempted to hold a long speech, but was interrupted, because of time limitations. See: Report on the Baku Congress (Constantinople), October 25, 1920, FO 371/5178, 11702, 146; The Times, “Communist Congress at Baku: Its ‘Asiatic’ Policy,” October 1, 1920.
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among the Muslim delegates. Hafiz Mehmet Bey reported to Ankara Government «that the kind
regards and affection showed to Enver Pasha in the streets of Baku and at the congress venue was
mind-blowing and historically unprecedented [muḥayyir-ūl ukul ve tarihen na-mesbuk].» The
young and ambitious Turkish delegate Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) has a similar recollection of En-
ver’s public appeal:

[Enver] Pasha’s fame in the Muslim Orient was like a fairy tale or a legend. According to folk
belief, he was not a human being from this world. Everywhere he appeared, the sky had to open
up, the ground had to split up, and great and magnificent things had to occur. He was over
everything and over everyone.

In an interview to a local newspaper, the Turkish delegates from Trabzon Abdülhalim Efendi and
Ali Kemal Efendi also took note of the amazing fame Enver enjoyed among the Muslim delegates
in Baku:

The assembly was opened. The speeches were proceeding. Suddenly at one of the loges Enver
Pasha appeared. When the Muslims saw Enver, all hell broke loose. Everybody ignored the as-
sembly and encircled him. Some were kissing his forehead; some were caressing his back, some
were touching his clothes; and some were looking at him amazed. They wanted to imagine him
to be almost a superhuman creature [fevkal-beşer bir mahluk]. [...] He had so much fame in the
Islamic world that he nearly became a symbol of union and salvation. There is, I believe, no
Muslim at all who had never heard of him.

«The delegates of a number of different nations visited Ali Bey [Enver] today», noted Hayati Bey
in his diary, «he was much applauded by the people in the streets.» A British Intelligence report
confirms these reports. Enver «exercised great influence over the Moslem delegates from the various
districts of Central Asia». The report claimed that he was «looked upon by them as heroic figure
and the representative of Moslem hostility to the Western powers and particularly England.» Fur-
thermore, the British Intelligence reported, many senior Muslim representatives «insisted on ren-
dering Oriental obeisance to Enver Pasha when presented to him». Ankara Government’s diplo-
mat Rıza Nur heard from his colleagues that people were kissing the ground in Baku behind Enver’s
steps. Even Zinoviev himself confessed later in Halle:

In Baku, the influence of Enver over a large part of the Muslim population is so great that people
on the streets kiss his hands and feet. Of course, this is regrettable. I will not hide that. But I do
not want to hear that the whole Muslim population is totally different compared to us. This is
what we must understand. We must be able to respond to and remove such local difficulties
which the working class in the Orient always comes across.

Despite the obvious distrustfulness of the Comintern leaders, Enver Pasha did not hesitate to in-
dulge in self-promoting schemes either. For instance, he galloped on a near-by hill during the mil-
itary parade and saluted the crowds on his reared horse, hoping to steal the show. This intervention
by Enver strongly displeased the Comintern leadership and they suspended Enver from the con-
gress. Fantasy or legend though not implausible, Lev Nussimbaum wrote under his assumed name
Essad Bey that Enver had made visits to the mosques of the city, holding speeches and reciting the
Koran, very much to the arousing suspicion among his Cheka surveillance. Enver also used his
coming to Baku to get in touch with old friends and to extend his political network. He tried to
reach out to his uncle Halil Pasha in Nakhichevan. Enver invited Halil to Baku, but they could not
meet. Nevertheless, Enver’s home had become a meeting center for numerous delegates who
sought his audience.

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62 Report of British High Commissioner (Constantinople) about the Baku Congress, Nov. 5, 1920, November 5,
64 Grigory Zinoviev, Die Weltrevolution und die III. Kommunistische Internationale: Rede auf dem Parteitag der USPD
in Halle am 14. Oktober 1920 (Hamburg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1920), quoted from the
English translation in Ben Lewis and Lars T. Lih, Martov and Zinoviev: Head to Head in Halle (London: November
Publications, 2011), 140.
65 Rosmer, Moscou sous Lénine, 147. See also: Menemencioğlu, “Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku,
September 1920,” 2225.
67 On September 3, Halil Pasha headed to Baku in order to meet Enver Pasha. Halil Pasha, cipher (Nakhchivan) to
the Eastern Front Command (Erzurum), September 3, 1920, ATASE, ISH, kütü no. 1021, gömlek no. 58. In a
telegraph from September 6, which the Ankara Government’s military intelligence tapped into, Enver Pasha asked
Halil Pasha to come to Baku, ATASE, ISH, kütü no. 620, gömlek no. 124; ATASE, ISH, kütü no. 615, gömlek no.
27; Küçük Talat Bey, letter (Baku) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), September 17, 1920, TTK, EP 07-03, 07-07, in
Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 103. See also: Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-
Terakki Erkani, 17, 37–38.
68 Hayreti, diary entries September 1–8, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani,
259–60.
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All this attention had made the Comintern leadership uneasy. Although Enver was not allowed to hold a speech, his declaration was eventually accepted to be read out to the delegates. Later during the Labor Conference in Halle, Zinoviev had to explain the presence of Enver Pasha at the Baku Congress against the criticism of his European comrades:

I have to say that comrade Crispien really has taken in with this Enver Pasha business. Such outrageous flimflam has been written on the question of nationalities. But it is not only in Germany that people are talking of this spectre Enver, but in Switzerland too. I just received a letter from the Swiss comrade Rose Bloch, in which she asks: Well comrade, tell me, is Enver really your ally? Tell me, is the terrible Enver Pasha your ally? And I have a pamphlet from Frankfurt, signed by Güttler and Kohl, which cries that Enver Pasha, the executioner of the Armenian people, is admitted into the Third International, but Ledebour the old revolutionary fighter is refused admittance.

Allow me to tell you how things really stand (Heckles. Unrest) Enver Pasha was present at the Baku congress, he was not a delegate. He requested that we give him the opportunity to issue a statement. [...] So, we did not allow him to speak, indeed this was at my instigation as president of the congress. Then he asked us to read out a statement. We agreed to do that. [...] So that is what the Enver Pasha story looks like. (Unrest) Enver Pasha was not a delegate, and there was even a resolution against him. Of course, Enver Pasha was the leading butcher of the Armenians, and we also told him that to his face.

The stigma of war-criminal surely haunted Enver to a certain degree at the Baku Congress, but this was limited to certain groups such as European and Armenian delegates. But there was some opposition to him among the Muslim delegates as well. Some Turkish communists did protest his participation for he should rather be prosecuted at a people’s court as an imperialist war-monger. Underground networks of Azerbaijani nationalists of the defeated Musavvat Party, on the other hand, were rumored to have planned the assassination of their former hero Enver Pasha, because of his collaboration with the Bolshevik enemy. The Bolshevik leadership of Azerbaijan under

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69 Alfred Rosmer wrote that it was mostly the anti-Soviet publications that told that Enver Pasha hold a speech. Rosmer, Moscou sous Lénine, 147. A further cause for misunderstanding is that Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha, the representative of the Kemalist Government to Moscow, wrongly reported in his Moscow memoires that Enver hold his own speech in Baku. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 21.

70 Zinoviev, Die Weltrevolution und die III. Kommunistische Internationale, quoted here from the English translation in Lewis and Lih, Martov and Zinoviev, 135–36.


72 Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 191.

73 Report on the Baku Congress (Constantinople), October 25, 1920, FO 371/5178, 11702, 147. Most Azerbaijani nationalists preferred to see a rapprochement between Turkey and Britain. Cafer Bey, letter, December 20, 1920, TTK, EP 03-05. «Azerbaycanlılardan görüşüklерimin de bütün umitleri İngiltere ve ile Türkiye’nin anlaşmasındadır.»
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Neriman Nerimanov tried to undermine Enver’s presence in Baku as well.74 Also Celaleddin Korkmasov, a Dagestani delegate, criticized the «intrigues of the Turkish imperialists» in Northern Caucasus and expressed disappointment about Enver’s presence at the Baku Congress.75 But for most of the Muslim delegates, his dark past probably did not really matter or remained unknown.76 Even less noticeable was the speech delivered by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, the master-criminal behind the Armenian Genocide.77 The summary of his speech renders it as an apologia for Ottoman Empire’s war-time policies.78 Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was even elected to the nonparty faction at the Council for Action and Propaganda.79

Enver Pasha’s declaration was read out on the fourth session, on September 4, 1920.80 Mehmed Emin, a Turkish communist delegate, who read out the Turkish original text of Enver’s declaration, presented it dismissingly and disapprovingly. Thus, a confusion among the Muslim delegates arose, as Şevket Süreyya remembers. Many delegates were not sure whether to cheer or not. Hurrahs and boos mixed with each other in the congress hall.81 The news of his declaration, as it was circulated in Ottoman Turkey, however, received mostly positive reactions. Strangely enough, Comintern and communist publications published Enver’s declaration and contributed to its circulation.82 Enver’s name was enough to give the British sleepless nights. Therefore, in Bolshevik propaganda outlets his presence at Baku was neither denied nor neglected.

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74 See, for instance, Buniatzadeh’s speech at the second session, September 2, 1920, in Riddell, To See the Dawn, 111–12; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 76. See also: Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1.
75 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 123–127, 124; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 92–96
76 It was mainly the non-Muslim delegates that opposed Enver Pasha. FO.371.5172, .13879, cited in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 33.
78 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 112–13; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 77–78.
79 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 237.
80 Enver’s declaration was read out by Ostrovsky, the secretary to the Baku Congress and the representative of the indigenous Jewish population of Turkestan, in Russian and then the Turkish original text was read by Mehmed Emin, a Turkish communist close to Mustafa Subhi. On Mehmed Emin see: Aydemir, Enver Paşa, III, 544; Aydemir, Suya Arayan Adam, 191.
81 Aydemir, Suya Arayan Adam, 191.
82 The Turkish communist newspaper, Yeni Dünya (Baku) published in September 18, 1920, an accurate summary of Enver’s declaration. The Intelligence Bureau in Trabzon forwarded this news that «Enver Pasha delivered a great speech» to the General Staff in Ankara on October 11, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 717, gömlek no. 16. Also from Moscow radios were a source for the spread of Enver Pasha’s declaration at Baku. Intelligence report on radio news from Moscow, September 18, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 936, gömlek no. 137. The 15th Army Corps had already forwarded an extended report on the Baku Congress, including a summary of Enver Pasha’s declaration, to all fronts on September 24, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 717, gömlek no. 83; ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 717, gömlek no. 13.
In his declaration, Enver Pasha expressed his solidarity with the Bolshevik Revolution and the achievements of the Comintern. According to his self-given title, Enver claimed to represent the Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia and India. It is convenient to assume that this Union was specially designed for the occasion of the Baku Congress to represent the absent Muslim nations. On the one hand, Enver argued that the Young Turk regime was not motivated “by any sense of imperialism under any circumstances” (hiçbir zaman emperyalizm hissi değildi). To the contrary, as Enver claimed, the Ottoman Empire was nothing but the victim of the clash between British or German imperialisms. On the other hand, Enver made efforts to underline the Young Turk regime’s anti-imperialist motivations in defending Tripoli for the Tripolitanians and Azerbaijan for the Azeris against imperialist and colonialist powers. All in all, Enver was explicitly polite and praiseful in addressing the Comintern and the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution. There were several pseudo-socialist references to Anatolian peasants and laborers in his manuscript showing that he already adopted the Comintern topics and terms. At the end of his declaration, he called for a further cooperation with the Comintern for the anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggle in the East.

Masayuki Yamauchi was first to compare the Ottoman-Turkish hand-written manuscript of Enver Pasha’s declaration stored at the archives of the Turkish Historical Society with the Russian stenographic record officially published by the Comintern. The result showed that Enver’s Muslim nationalist phraseology and expressions in the original manuscript such as “army of mujahideen” (mücahidler ordusu), “the sacredness of the people” (halkın mukaddesatına), and “victory by the
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grace of Allah» (Hak’tan muvafakiyetler), etc., was changed in favor of Bolshevik terminology or completely omitted in the Russian publication.85

A resolution was immediately adopted by the congress in reaction to Enver’s declaration. Despite solidarity with «all Turkish fighters in combat against world imperialism», the third clause said:

The Congress finds it necessary to act with special caution toward the leaders of the movement [i.e. Unionists] who in the past led the interests of one of the imperialist groups, thereby subjecting the toiling masses of Turkey to twofold ruin in the interests of a small group of rich men and high-ranking officers. The congress proposes to these leaders that they prove in deeds that they are now ready to serve the toiling people and make amends for their false steps in the past.86

This clause demonstrates Comintern’s strategy about exploiting Enver Pasha for the mobilization of anticolonial Muslim nationalism. Although he was to be utilized and kept close, collaboration in revolutionary politics with Enver was to be justified, if not publicly downplayed. Enver did not attend any of the congress sessions thereafter.87 Enver wrote later in a letter to Mustafa Kemal, «[…] if I had ever worked to obtain a personal benefit from the Bolsheviks, […] I had not come under the senseless attack of some the people in Baku for I declared the world the truth and my purpose.»88

Zinoviev later said before the St. Petersburg Soviet:

The former Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish armed forces during the Imperialist war took part in the Congress. He declared himself to be a sincere partisan of the Communist International. But we have warned the partisan of the Congress to be prudent in their relations with apostates of this sort. Enver Pasha and men of his like cannot be sincere. Seeing no solution for their country, which dismembered by Western bourgeoisie, they come to us for protection. This reaffirms the strength and importance of the Congress.89

85 It is, however, not clear whether the text was changed for the reading or for the publication. Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 33. Murat Bardaçlı writes that there are two versions of the text in the TTK archives. Bardaçlı, Enver, 593, note 182. For the Russian original see: Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 108–12, republished in Ataöv, “1–7 Eylül 1920 Doğu Halkları Birinci Kongresinde (Bakü) Enver Paşa’nın Konuşma Metni ve Bununa İlgili Kongre Kararı,” 46–47. For the English translation of the Russian text see: Riddell, To See the Dawn, 138–42.

86 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 147; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 116–17. I don’t share Emel Akal’s view that this declaration can be seen as an alliance between the Bolsheviks and Enver Pasha. Akal, İştirakiyancılar, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazinesi, 201. This resolution was also quoted in detail in Küçük Tala Bey and Nâil Bey, report (Erzurum) on the Baku Congress to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, October 20, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkam, 40.

87 According to British Intelligence, when Enver’s attempt to hold a speech was rejected, «such an uproar arose, that Enver was obliged to withdraw and left the Congress in a fury. He refused to attend subsequent sittings but sent a long written document which was read to the Assembly […] on his behalf.» Secret Political Report, October 25, 1920, FO 371/5178, 13412, quoted in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 31–32. Şevket Süreyya also remembers that Enver did not attend any sessions after it was not permitted him to hold a speech. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 191.


Zinoviev and the Comintern leaders discovered that even as a fallen hero of pan-Islamism and as a fugitive war-criminal, Enver Pasha was still too strong be left alone in Baku. On the one hand the Bolsheviks distrusted Enver’s schemes and publicly disassociated themselves from his past crimes. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks’ general skepticism over the potential of spread of communism in the East made Enver a more practical asset in anti-imperialist struggle than some Eastern communists. In a secret meeting with a British representative in February 1921, Talat Pasha frankly admitted that

An alliance with the Bolsheviks was purely a matter of expediency. You might say it was a double-edged sword, but its edge, as far as the enemy of Turkey were concerned, was sharp, and its dangerous edge to Turkey was very blunt. The Turk and the Bolshevik had nothing in common but a temporary alliance, a convenience from the point of view of Russia that answered a need from the point of view of Turkey. […] Enver was at the moment in Moscow […] not through any liking of Bolshevism. Enver […] was colourless, as far as policy was concerned. He was doing the best in his power for his country.

At the last evening of the Baku Congress on September 8, Şevket Süreyya was introduced to Enver Pasha at his poorly furnished quarters in Baku. There was also Küçük Talat (Muşkara) Bey. Later, Azmi Bey and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey joined them as well as they came from with groceries in their hands. A Turkish POW was cooking a meal at one corner of the room. At that night, Enver and his friends were uncertain, whether Zinoviev would even take them with in his Comintern train back to Moscow. As Şevket Süreyya left, there was still no news from Zinoviev. «According to information from a good Caucasian source», as The Times informs, «Enver Pasha has left Baku for Moscow in an armoured train in the company of Zinovieff.»

The Baku Congress was a uniquely transnational event of Orientalism. On the one hand, Eastern delegates expressed self-Orientalizing notions of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Asianism.

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90 Masayuki Yamauchi argues that Enver Pasha was in touch with leading Muslim delegates, and the Bolshevik feared a possible coup d’état in Baku. Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 33–34.
91 There is a general trend in studies of Turkish communism and its ill-fated leader Mustafa Subhi to see the Comintern leadership rather favoring Enver over Mustafa Subhi at the Baku Congress. Aslan, *Türkiye Komünist Firkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi*, 197; Akal, *İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri*, 201. Although there is evidence that Mustafa Subhi was increasingly losing ground in Moscow, I don’t agree that this was due to Enver’s alleged rise in Bolshevik policies.
On the other hand, the Baku Congress aroused also sentiments of Orientalism in the sense of the postcolonial theory of Edward Said. One might see Orientalist (imperialist) intentions and discourses on behalf of its Bolshevik conveners that haunted the Baku Congress from the onset. The Baku Congress was a complex social event that was perceived differently in the eyes of its diverse witnesses and in the imagination of its distant observers. The Baku Congress did not make immediately sense for it was a very ambiguous event. The significance of the Baku Congress remained contested thereafter as well. Some considered it a fiasco or a farce, but for others it remained a lost and forgotten moment for anticolonial movements of the East.

One should not forget that despite the political opening towards nationalist-revolutionary movements of the East, the Baku Congress was foremost a Soviet event. Before the sessions started, the communist faction had a meeting with more than 400 members. At this meeting a proposal was prepared for the statute and executive committee of the Congress, which was put for ratification at the first session. Thus, it was assured from the beginning that the Baku Congress was—to put it in Zinoviev’s words—the «complement, the second part, the second half» of the Second Comintern Congress. Though the autonomy of the Comintern from the influence of the Soviet Government was given to a certain degree in 1920, it was never fully independent from Soviet state of affairs either. As the British Baku delegate H. G. Wells concluded, the Bolshevik motivation behind the Baku Congress was presumably not much more «than a vague idea of hitting back at the British Government through Mesopotamia and India, because it has been hitting them through Kolchak, Deniken, Wrangel, and the Poles». In Wells’ critical eyes, the Baku Congress was only «a counteroffensive almost as clumsy and stupid as the offensives it would counter.» Even critics such as M. N. Roy accepted the strategic gains: «It might not yield any lasting results, but why forgo the fun of a picturesque show which was sure to give the then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, some sleepless nights.» In fact, Trotsky wrote at the eve of the Baku Congress to Chicherin that «a

96 Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Sufhi, 151. This was also criticized by men from Enver Pasha’s entourage in Baku. Küçük Talat Bey and Nail Bey, report (Erzurum) on the Baku Congress to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, October 20, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbinizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 41.
97 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 71.
99 Herbert G. Wells, Russia in the Shadows (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1921), 97–98.
100 Roy, Memoirs, 392.
potential Soviet revolution in the East is now advantageous for us chiefly as a major item of diplomatic barter with England.» 101 Most Comintern leaders had certainly an honest interest in the Eastern Revolution beyond Soviet strategic interests. 102 The delegates holding speeches were stressing the revolutionary potential of the East for the struggle against imperialism. 103 For many Comintern enthusiasts, the World Revolution was more than a lip service. However, they seemed to be rather ignorant, if not arrogant, in dealing with the East. One must give Wells credit, when he wrote: «I did my best to find out […] what they thought they were doing in the Baku Conference. And frankly I do not think they know.» 104

The Baku Congress was convened with typical Soviet-style parades and Internationalist ceremonies. The topics under discussion also reveal a certain Euro-centric understanding of communism. For instance, one of the major issues was why the Third (Communist) International was superior to the Second (Socialist) International. To entertain the delegates, the anthem «International» was playing repeatedly by an orchestra during ovations. On September 3, 1920, there were no sessions out of respect to Friday prayers, but a military parade of the Red Army took place. 105 In this military parade there was also a Red Turkish regiment consisting of former Ottoman POWs carrying a Turkish flag. 106 A huge statue of Karl Marx was unveiled by Comintern leaders in the city center with a great ceremony. 107 One of the propaganda highlights was a public performance at which the effigies of Lloyd George, Alexandre Millerand, and Woodrow Wilson were show-trialed and set on fire. 108 At the end of the congress sessions, there was a ceremony for 26 Baku commissars, executed previously by the British in Baku. 109 At the end of the congress, a Council of Action and Propa-

104 Wells, Russia in the Shadows, 97–98.
105 Rosmer, Moscou sous Lénine, 147. See also: Hayati, diary entry, September 3, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 159.
106 Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkasının Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Saphi, 180, note 167.
107 White, “Communism and the East,” 500–501. There is a photograph of this event in Riddell, To See the Dawn.
109 Rosmer, Moscou sous Lénine, 145–46.
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ganda was elected with the duty to administrate the propaganda and agitation by publishing jour-
nals and pamphlets after the end of the congress. Furthermore, a University of the Peoples of the
East was also to be founded in Moscow. The Council published a propaganda journal called
Narody Vostokak (and Şark İli in Turkish). Many articles as well as guidelines were prepared for
further correspondence, propaganda, and organization. As a communist and Soviet event, how-
ever, the Baku Congress was not necessarily convincing. The Comintern leaders practically did not
really know how to deal with the situation in Baku. The targeted crowd was mostly uneducated
and uninterested in debates on class-struggle as well as presumably unimpressed by the outlandish
Internationalist ceremonies. Major Arif Bey, who was sent by Kazım Karabekir Pasha to the Baku
Congress, concluded: «The Congress principally serves the purpose of propaganda.»

The hope to mobilize the anticolonial Muslim nationalist feelings proved to be double-edged sword
for the Bolshevik regime. Although the Baku Congress was directed against the rest of the world as
an asset to Soviet foreign affairs, the over-proportionate representation of Russian Muslim delegates
and the impact of Enver Pasha on them tied the Baku Congress unintendedly with the Soviet
domestic affairs in the Caucasus and Turkestan. One of its most important delegates, the leader of
the nonparty fraction Narbutabekov from Tashkent, for instance, harshly criticized «the local au-
thorities, whose policy is alienating the working masses from the Soviet government.» He called
upon the communist leaders to pull back their «colonizers who are now working behind the mask
of communism!» Narbutabekov did not even hesitate to say that only when «that is done, I am
sure, not a single Muslim will venture to raise his hand against Soviet power.» Major Arif Bey
came to the conclusion that the promise for autonomy in Turkestan and Dagestan has proven to
be disappointing, because «its execution is a trouble» (tatbikatı bir aksidir). The representative of
the Ankara Government İbrahim Tali (Öngören) also expressed the inconsistencies of the Bolshevik

112 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Sarikamış) to the General Staff (Ankara), October 23, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu
no. 615, gömlek no. 55. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 201.
113 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 116–23. Enver Pasha probably refers to Narbutabekov’s speech, when he tells that
Russian Muslim delegates criticized the Soviet Government for malgovernance. Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no.
327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 177; Bardakçı, Enver,
540. Kurt Okay in his Enver Pasha biography especially emphasized the importance of Narbutabekov’s speech.
114 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Sarikamış) to the General Staff (Ankara), October 23, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu
no. 615, gömlek no. 55. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 201–2.
agenda in his report to the Ankara Government: «My mind doesn’t grasp the Bolsheviks’ depiction and perspective of a world federation. What I heard from Khiva and Turkestan and what I saw in Azerbaijan has opened my eyes to this mentality.» Although Comintern leaders would go strides to deny it, Soviet «internal» imperialism and colonialism was on the rise in its Central Asian frontiers.

Despite the Soviet spectacles, the Baku Congress was at the same time a remarkably pan-Oriental event. Without exception, all eyewitnesses underline its unique exotic atmosphere. The British science fiction author H. G. Wells, who attended the Baku Congress during his research trip to Russia, remembers with a touch of cynicism «a quite wonderful accumulation of white, black, brown, and yellow people, Asiatic costumes and astonishing weapons.» «The auditorium was extremely picturesque», as the French delegate Alfred Rosmer similarly noted. «All the Eastern costumes gathered together made an astonishingly rich and colourful picture», Rosmer wrote in his memoir. Turkish delegate Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) also depicted how Baku resembled «the colorful view of one of the great cities of Asia in medieval times». «Arabs, Indians, Iranians, Afghans, Mongols, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, […] Kurds, and people from many more tribes and nations» were present, according to Şevket Süreyya, all dressed in their traditional costumes. «They all had sabers, daggers, pistols, and knives on their shoulders and belts», he wrote and mentioned their numerous and distinct head wears. One Turkish delegate from Trabzon told in an interview: «What a great and an astonishing gathering it was. There were people in various images and costumes. Endless nations.» This exotic pan-Oriental scenery was partly responsible as to why many commentators derided the Baku Congress as a serious gathering. «I cannot take this Baku Conference very seriously», wrote

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115 İbrahim Tali, report on the Baku Congress to the 15th Army Corps, October 1, 1920, ATASE, İSH, Kuru 570, Gömlek 53.
117 Wells, Russia in the Shadows, 96–97.
119 Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 187.
H. G. Wells, a view that has for long determined the ridiculed legacy of the Baku Congress. «It was an excursion, a pageant, a Beano», he explained and concluded that «[a]s a meeting of Asiatic proletarians it was preposterous.» 122 Not without a reason, the pan-Oriental atmosphere of two thousands of Muslim delegates mixed with Marxist phraseology and Soviet public ceremonies were perceived as a confusing and artificial scenery.

To be sure, there was a good portion of Orientalism in Comintern’s approach to the «backward nationalities»—to quote the Bolshevik nomenclature of the time. The Bolshevik Orientalism somewhat differed from imperialist and colonial Orientalism of the time, since it was openly anticolonial and gave the Eastern delegates a platform to voice their demands. Yet, it was still culturally Eurocentric and politically hegemonic in its over-all approach to the «Orient» and « Orientals». 123 As an anticolonial intellectual M. N. Roy believed that «the idea [of the Baku Congress] was exotic and appealed to the curiosity of the western delegates to the Second World Congress». 124 Therefore, Roy mocked the Baku Congress as «Zinoviev’s Circus». «I refused to join the picturesque cavalcade to the gates of the mysterious Orient», Roy wrote in his memoir. 125 American journalist John Reed, who died shortly after the Baku Congress, was strongly disappointed by Zinoviev’s and Radek’s insincerity and cynical rhetoric in dealing with the Eastern nationalities. 126

Despite the Bolshevik overtures to Orientalist clichés and hegemonic ambitions, tropes of Orientalism were clearly stronger on the part of the critics of the Baku Congress. Despite his alleged insincerity, Zinoviev ended up defending the Baku Congress against the Orientalism of his European comrades in Halle. Zinoviev made painstaking efforts to counter Rudolf Hilferding’s criticism of «mullahs of Chiva, whom the demagogues, the Bolsheviks, were trying to draw into the Communist international.» 127 British Intelligence even ridiculed the intellectual competence of the delegates. «The majority of the delegates seem to have been illiterate», as one report concluded, «and to have taken far more interest in each other’s weapons and in selling the produce, which they had

122 Wells, Russia in the Shadows, 99.
124 Roy, Memoirs, 391.
125 Roy, Memoirs, 392.
127 Lewis and Lih, Martov and Zinoviev, 69, 88, 136–140.
brought with them from their native countries, than in the proceedings of the Conference.» 128 One Comintern functionary Elena D. Stasova was annoyed about the Muslim delegates, «a variety of khans and beks, who decided to utilize their journey to Baku to attend to various commercial matters—the selling of carpets, leatherwork and so forth.» 129 Also Şevket Süreyya dismissively recalls in his memoir—from the retrospective of Kemalist Orientalism—that the first sessions of the congress passed by with parades, screams, roars and cheers. The swords were drawn out without ceasing. Besides these, a few program meetings took place, but since it was necessary to listen to the speeches there, rather than drawing out the sword and yelling, these didn’t get the attention of the honorable delegates. 130

«In view of the fact that the Soviet gave free meals to the delegates at the expense of the Baku population», as The Times mocked the event, «the following Russian mot seems to be a good summing-up of this sorry farce:—The Eastern Communists Congress has simply shown that Orientals like pilaff [a rice meal] and that our Communists have not understood the Moslem mentality.» 131 Despite the motives of Orientalism in criticizing the Baku Congress, there was certainly a disconnection between Bolshevik intentions for social mobilization and the socio-political motivation of the targeted social movement base.

Although the oft-mentioned Oriental atmosphere casted a shadow on the Bolshevik momentum of the Baku Congress, for most of the Eastern delegates the congress probably meant something else. Despite his retrospective sarcastic tone, Şevket Süreyya gave credit to the general euphoria and solidarity among the Muslim delegates filling the streets of Baku. He remembers, how everybody was fraternizing with each other, even though they could not speak or understand each other’s language. Everybody was celebrating the so-called «awakening of the East». The end of the long-lasting oppression of Asia was believed to have arrived. It was felt like a «judgement day», as Şevket Süreyya remembers. The sleeping nations of the East were now waking up from their «centuries-


130 Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 189.

old sleep» to finally overthrow their oppressors and besiegers. Şevket Süreyya summarizes his youthful feelings in Baku in a popular poem, «which all the young men of the time knew by heart»:

I gazed at your silent horizon where delusions sleep,
O Orient! Haven’t you slept enough for ages?
Those peaceful domes, still the most soulful shelter,
Those minarets, still echo a call for destiny…
A piece of blood is enough to defeat thousand sufferings,
O Orient! Wake up, enough is enough, O Orient, wake up, it’s enough!

The oft-repeated maxim of the Baku Congress was that «[a] new world [was] awakening to the life and struggle: the world of the oppressed nationalities.» Naciye Hanım, a young lady delegate from Ottoman Turkey, was proclaiming that «in order to see the dawn one has to pass through the dark night.» This metaphor of the «awakening of the East» had a long history at least since the Muslim reform movements of the 19th century—from the Young Ottomans over Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and the literary Arabic nakhda (awakening) movement to Tatar Jadidist movement. In this sense, the modernist-progressive worldviews in the Middle East imagined their encounter with modernity as an awakening. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had a further effect in appreciating the geopolitical potential of a modernist awakening by Eastern nations. This metaphor of the «awakening of the East» was simultaneously supported by the imagination and anxiety of European Orientalists.
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One year after the Baku Congress, at the third conference of the Communist International, Enver Pasha was still a «special guest» of the Comintern. The declaration of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was read out by a so-called Makhul Bey. The declaration was a celebration of the global struggle of Muslims since the end of the war:

It is now almost a year since the Baku Congress of the Eastern Nations. With great pleasure, we observe the struggle towards freedom of a people of five-hundred-million Muslims making the four-fifth of the people from the Atlantic Ocean over North Africa reaching into the Great Chinese Ocean who are thirsty for freedom.

Those independence struggles in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Albania, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and India which has joined the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and the results achieved so far are rapidly encouraging our hopes. […]

Like we said last year, the war between the imperialists which started in 1914 still continues. These monsters whose rapacity cannot be satisfied will long quarrel over the body of oppressed nations they knocked down.

Let us continue to prepare for the world revolution so that when the time is ripe let us all free ourselves by working together as hand in glove. Time is working for our benefit. Let us not sleep, but move with courage. Definitely, the last triumph will be ours. Because we are the oppressed, we are the rightful.138

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«Bolshevism and Islam can no more mix than oil and water», The Times propagated boldly on the occasion the Baku Congress but claimed that «Enver is no Moslem.»139 Of course, Enver could not disagree more with the latter assumption, although the former was a matter of dispute. Indeed, in the year 1920 discussions on Islam and Bolshevism was passionately discussed in the Muslim world.140 A British Intelligence report on pan-Islamism and Bolshevism said: «Both the Turks and other [Arab] nationalists put forward hostility to Britain as common ground on which to unite with the Bolsheviks».141 The Bolshevik leaders made no secret about their utilitarian approach to pan-Islamism, even when speaking to Enver Pasha. Enver told Mustafa Kemal:

140 For survey of debates in Ottoman newspapers see: Uygur Kocabasoglu and Metin Berge, Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 229–41.
On the way [to the Baku Congress], I talked to Zinoviev and his friends. They think that there is no fertile soil for communism in the East and believe that by working along communist principles in the East would turn the public against us [i.e. the Muslim nationalist revolutionaries]. Therefore, they explained that they see the solution in relying on the principle of pan-Islamism [iťihād-i İslam] in sponsoring and encouraging all revolutionary movements directed against the English and capitalism.142

The relation between socialism and Islam has always been considered suspicious in Orientalist imaginations. The Baku Congress was, therefore, in the eyes of many observers the «heyday» of this «unholy alliance».143 The reason for this perception was one particular aspect of the Baku Congress. Zinoviev finished his long speech at the first session of the congress with the following appeal to Eastern delegates:

Comrades! Brothers! The time has come when you can set about organizing a true people’s holy war against the robbers and oppressors. The Communist International turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them: ‘Brothers, we summon you to a holy war, above all against British Imperialism!’

Loud applauses followed Zinoviev’s call for holy war. Delegates stood up and cried «Hurrah!», while holding up their weapons. Zinoviev was unable to continue for some time. The collective voice of the delegates, according to minutes of the congress, cried: «We swear it!» 144

The Bolshevik call for holy war was, of course, the most obscure moment of marriage of socialism and Islam. The Marxist motto that religion is «the opium of the people» bedeviled the jihad of Baku 1920 from the beginning on.145 This call for jihad was not a slip of the tongue by Zinoviev. It was programmatic. Radek and many others repeated the call for holy war in their speeches. In the «Manifesto of Peoples of the East», which was accepted by the Baku Congress, «holy war» was one of the signal words, which was frequently repeated. The final declaration of the Baku Congress called: «May the holy war of the peoples of the East and of the toilers of the entire world against imperialist Britain burn with unquenchable fire!»146

Why would the Bolsheviks call for a holy war? Common wisdom—then and now—shows that the «Great Jihad» (cīhad-ī ekber) of 1914 declared on the eve of World War I had failed to impress its

142 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TTTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Bardakçı, Enver, 539.
143 These terms are borrowed from Fowkes and Gökay, “Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists,” 1.
144 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 88.
146 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 263.
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adversaries.\textsuperscript{147} The German and Ottoman call for a global pan-Islamist uprising and large-scale mutinies of Muslim soldiers against Ottoman Empire’s enemies proved to be nothing but hot air.\textsuperscript{148} Nevertheless, the jihad of 1914 had not been a total failure from another perspective. Despite the large number of deserters, the Ottomans demonstrated a much-respected determination and a terrifying zeal and violence in fighting the «infidel» enemies.\textsuperscript{149} The use of Muslim nationalist and jihadist terminology was more effective for Ottoman war mobilization, counterinsurgency, ethnic-religious cleansing, and homefront propaganda than for stirring Muslim uprisings abroad.\textsuperscript{150}

The picture differed severely in 1920. The defamation of the Ottoman Empire and the unapologetic parcellation of Muslim territories by the Entente powers had caused mass protests and mass uprisings in the Muslim world. In the summer of 1920, major Muslim uprisings were simultaneously taking place in Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. Although post-Ottoman nationalist historiographies were all too eager to frame these uprisings as «national awakenings», calls for jihad were very common in the Middle Eastern uprisings of 1919-1920. Arguing against grain of nationalist narratives, Michael Provence demonstrated that «rebel participants […] did not view the post-Ottoman revolts as separate movements of national liberation but rather as locally conditioned elements of a single, undifferentiated struggle.» The insurgents shared, according to Provence, a «common Ottoman genealogy of armed struggle, nationalism, and patriotism».\textsuperscript{151} «The sense of religious identity is far stronger than that of national identity», as one American intelligence report from Syria had pointed out in late 1918 and continued: «The so-called Arab Movement is essentially and fundamentally a religious, and not a national movement.» The conclusion was that

\textsuperscript{147} See, for instance: T. Lothrop Stoddard, \textit{The New World of Islam} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921), 73–74.
\textsuperscript{149} By this I do not want to rehabilitate the «jihad and genocide» thesis of Vahakn N. Dadrian, \textit{The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus} (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 4, 240, and recently rehashed in Richard L. Rubenstein, \textit{jihad and Genocide} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 43–57. Nevertheless, the current dominant paradigm’s sole focus on Young Turk ethnonationalism, rather blurs the role of Muslim nationalism on different levels of society.
Arab nationalism was in reality a form of "Moslem nationalism." Indeed, Muslim nationalism was still the dominant political identity in the aftermath of World War I.

Regardless of the mischiefs of the jihad of 1914, the British officials were still haunted by the specters of jihad and pan-Islamism in 1920. In post-war Syria, where people who had recently escaped the conscription of the Ottoman and Faysal governments were now freely participating in the jihad against the French occupation. During the Iraqi revolt in the summer of 1920, there were calls for jihad by Shiite mujtahidin. Gertrude Bell wrote from Iraq to her father: «We are now in the middle of a full-blown Jihad.» Uprisings were taking place at the Afghan-Indian border in 1919-1920 after the Afghan Emir had declared jihad against British India in Third Anglo-Afghan War. Jihad cries were now heard everywhere from Morocco to Afghanistan.

Bolsheviks were not deaf to these numerous calls for holy war throughout Muslim lands. A Comintern document summarizes the Comintern perception of the Muslim uprisings as follows:

> The devastation and spoliation wrought by the capitalist great Powers for four years aroused stormy revolutionary movements in the English colonies … which draw courage and strength from the example of the Russian revolution and the existence of Soviet Russia. They are primarily of a nationalist and religious character, but they are also bound up with social revolutionary struggles. … From the Atlantic to the Himalayas and to China, the Moslems are stirred up and restive. However various the forms in which this disturbance among the peoples of Asia and Africa is expressed, they are all directed against the capitalist States and are only intensified by the competition among these States.

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Zinoviev did not need to seek far in finding ways to mobilize anticolonial Muslim nationalism. The Muslim concept of jihad was already an established framing strategy for political and military mobilization. The Comintern tried use the Islamic concept of holy war, however, without making direct reference to Islam. The word «Islam» was not mentioned literally in the call for holy war at the Baku Congress and the Muslim religion was mentioned only on few occasions also in other speeches. Nevertheless, Zinoviev’s call for a holy war (in Russian: sviașchennaia voîna) was meant most certainly as an Islamic jihad. It was surely translated into Turkish, Azeri, and Persian as jihad, if not by other synonymous variants such as ghazavat or harb-i mukaddes.

Although Islam remained somewhat a taboo word, some speakers were going long distances in emphasizing that «the Muslim religion is rooted in principles of religious communism». Whereas Islam was barely mentioned by name, there was a repeating and derogative discourse about pan-Islamism. «Pan-Islamism, Musavatism, all these trends are not ours», Zinoviev proclaimed: «We have a different policy.» Already in Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions, the article 11, c) made a similar objection regarding pan-Islamism, rendering it nothing but Turkish imperialism:

> It is necessary to struggle against the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian movements and similar currents that try to link the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with strengthening the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobles, large landowners, clergy, and so forth.

These were no single remarks. As much as the call for jihad was programmatic, the rejection of pan-Islamism was similarly stressed as a provision. Disclaiming pan-Islamism while calling for holy war had ambiguous consequences. It simply did not make sense for many Muslim delegates. On the one hand, some true communists were displeased. Louise Bryant criticized later that «there was hardly anything Socialistic about Zinoviev’s appeal for a holy war.» On the other hand, for Muslim delegates, the strict rejection of pan-Islamism was alienating, because the «Muslim union» (ittihad-ı İslam), the actual term for pan-Islamism, was generally perceived as a desired ideal to

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159 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 95, 159.
160 Kemper, “Red Orientalism,” 450; Yenen, “The Other Jihad,” 282. The official Turkish language propaganda journal of the Baku Congress used the word «cihad», Şark İli, no. 1, 11–16, as quoted in Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası'nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 185–93.
161 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 209. See also: Fowkes and Gökay, "Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists," 11.
162 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 84.
163 Lenin, “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,” 305.
164 Fowkes and Gökay, "Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists," 11.
165 Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, 158.
many Muslims of different political color. Some Turkish delegates to Baku Congress believed even that there was a fanatic Christian movement that tried «to hinder the Bolsheviks from working together with the Muslims, because they claim that the revival of the Muslim nations will cause a pan-Islamism problem [ittihat-ı İslam meselesi].» British Intelligence was proudly reporting the news coverage from Tiflis newspapers that «the Congress has been a failure. From the point of view of those Muslims, who sincerely expected to further the cause of Islam, it is certainly a failure.»

After reading the intelligence report on the Baku Congress, Herbert Young from the Foreign Office noted: «It is quite clear from this report that Bolshevism and Pan-Islam are gradually separating from incompatibility of temperament.» Later it was confirmed by Muslim communists that by rejecting Pan-Islam, the Comintern had rather damaged its relation to Muslim masses. A report prepared by two Unionists from Enver’s entourage in Baku for the Ankara Government had the impression that the Eastern delegates were surely disappointed (inkisar-ı hayale uğradıkları şüphe edilemez) by the outlandish celebrations and communist-bias of the Congress declarations. Although the Soviets did not demand a communist regime in Turkey, the same report concluded that «Turkey was in need of developing a Leftist movement», because Turkey’s relation to «the East, that is the Turkic and Muslim world», was depended on its good relations with Bolshevism.

«The innate contradiction between Pan-Islam and Soviet-style atheist internationalism was constantly pushed into background», because, as Selim Deringil puts it, «both the Soviets and the Turkish exiles realized that they needed one another against the common enemy—Britain.» Enver Pasha knew very well that the Bolshevik approach to Islam was problematic. Enver Pasha wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha:

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169 Theses on the Eastern Question adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress, November 1922, in Degras, The Communist International, 1919–1943, 382. See also: Carrère d’Encausse and Schram, Marxism and Asia, 188.
170 Küçük Talat Bey and Nail Bey, report (Erzurum) on the Baku Congress to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, October 20, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 41.
Nevertheless, at the [Baku] congress I talked to many Muslim delegates, either they be communists or not, from Turkestan, Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, Dagestan, and Caucasus and Chechienia. They have demonstrated by their spirit and acclamations that they are allied to Turkey and possess an indescribable degree of attachment to the Turks with strong ties. As far as I understood, as a result of a general revival of Islam [İslamda bir intibah-ı umumi], they came to the conclusion that any war taking place against Turkey will bring a greater degree of attention to them. Some of these ovations out of this position made the communists concerned. For some reason, I think that the Russian communist executive committee which considers Turkey as aspiring to communist rule, did neither understand that this Muslim union [ Müslüman birlüğünün] is a force nor that this force cannot be obtained by communism.172

Despite being aware of the problems in the cooperation between Muslim nationalist revolutionaries and Soviet Russia, Enver Pasha told all the Muslim dignitaries in Baku to continue collaborating with the Soviet regime.173 Also a newspaper article quoted in a British Intelligence report stated that «Moslem delegates, particularly [...] those from Turkestan, [...] pour out their many wrongs into Enver’s ear.» However, the newspaper approved that «Enver Pasha urged the Turkestan delegates to try and forget the evil past even if they only forgot it temporarily.»174 Enver believed that Soviet modernization, however difficult it may come, would eventually help the Russian Muslims establish independence and foster nationalist ideas.175 Enver wrote even to Mirza Kuchik Khan, who was rumored to have abandoned the Soviet cause after witnessing their malgovernance in Gilan, a letter trying to convince him to come to term with the Russians «for the sake of general interests».176

«Let’s see, what Allah will bring upon us. Is there hope for the future?», Enver Pasha asked in another private letter after returning from the Baku Congress. «The World War did not end yet. No matter what happens, I am sure it will end with the redemption of Islam», he preached once again.177 Islam became the main frame of reference in Enver’s political enterprises. When Enver

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172 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Karuluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 176–77; Yenen, “The Other Jihad,” 290; Bardakçı, Enver, 539–40.
173 This has been the strategy of Halil Pasha and the Turkish Communist Party as well. Halil Pasha, in the name of the Turkish Communist Party, declaration to the people of Azerbaijan, April 27, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkansı, 252–53.
174 It is cited from Volni Gorets in Report on the Baku Congress (Constantinople), October 25, 1920, FO 371/5178, 11702, 154.
175 According to Enver, both the Russian Muslims and Turkey were better off with Bolsheviks being in charge than with any other alternative regime in Russia. Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 10, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Rahum, Efendim, 81.
176 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 21, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Karuluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 177; Bardakçı, Enver, 540–41.
177 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım (Özialp) (Erzurum), September 23, 1920, ATASE, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 57.
asked Kazım Karabekir to send Turkish officers to Moscow and Baku to work for pan-Islamism, for instance, he insisted that they should be pious Muslims, not drinking alcohol. In an internal note of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies on the results of the Baku Congress, Enver made clear that he was rather suspicious of communism, but ready to cooperate with Soviet Russia and the Comintern against the British. First, the autonomy of all anti-imperialist struggles in the Muslim World must be guaranteed. Second, no “export of communism by the bayonet” was to be tolerated in these countries. The third and last principle read: “Since we have the opinion that we can mobilize them against our enemies in the Islamic world only by operating as Muslims and only then they can move towards progress, no other ways of operation need to be considered.”

In negotiating to win over the British, the CUP leaders expressed more openly their concerns about Bolshevism. In an interview with a British informant in December 1920, Talat said that he “had no fear of Bolshevist propaganda among Mahomedans”, because—he explained—it “was doomed to failure, being opposed to their mentality and to the Koran.” In February 1921, Talat’s words were even harsher. “He spoke of the natural antagonism between the principles of Bolshevism and Islam”, as Talat’s friend Aubrey Herbert remembered, “fire and water were not more different.”

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British accounts on the Baku Congress were more eager to trivialize the congress. For instance, there were many official reports claiming that they “have heard from other sources that the Baku Conference was a farce.” Nevertheless, the British officials were in the meantime very much concerned about the Baku Congress. For instance, the British occupation forces in Turkey and Persia did everything to prevent the arrival of delegates to Baku. They even used deadly force, as in the case of some unfortunate Persian delegates. British newspapers were reporting that the Baku

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178 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım Karabekir, September 23, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 52; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 13; Karabekir, İstiklal Harbiimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 48.
179 Enver Pasha, remarks on the Baku Congress and the domestic situations of Russia, [September or October 1920], TTK, EP 07-06, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 321–22.
180 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 144.
181 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 322.
Congress proposed to unleash a wave of anti-British propaganda material «issued on the question of freeing India from British tyranny.»\textsuperscript{185}

At the center of imperial anxieties was Zinoviev’s call for holy war. Not unlike the overtly vocal role the Germans played in the jihad of 1914, once again the «infidel» calls for Muslim jihad were broadly perceived as suspicious by distant observers. Especially because the jihad call came this time from atheist Bolsheviks—and most of them were of Jewish origin, as some public voices enjoyed to underline as an evidence of conspiracy. Once again publicly voicing prejudices of British imperialism,\textsuperscript{186} The Times reported:

At this remarkable gathering Apfelbaum, who masquerades as Zinovieff, declared a holy war against Imperialism, and 1,800 Turkish, Kurdish, Persian, Arab, and Tartan delegates drew their swords as a token of acceptance of Jehad. Apfelbaum is a Jew, like his associate Bela Kun, or Cohen, from Budapest, who was also at Baku; and of all the strange things which have happened in the last few years, none has been stranger than this spectacle of two Jews, one of them a convicted pickpocket, summoning the world of Islam to a new Jehad.\textsuperscript{187}

Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, the international media depicted the Bolsheviks as Jewish conspirators—and the British newspapers were no exception to the rule.\textsuperscript{188} «According to the crazier section of the British Press», as H. G. Wells confirmed the tradition of conspiracy thinking, «they [i.e. the Bolsheviks] are the agents of a mysterious racial plot, a secret society in which Jews, Jesuits, Freemasons, and Germans are all jumbled together in the maddest fashion.»\textsuperscript{189} In early 1920, the infamous propaganda pamphlet, The Jewish Peril: Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, was first published in English.\textsuperscript{190} This anti-Semitic forgery has been the main source for conspiracy theories of the alleged Jewish plot for world domination ever since.\textsuperscript{191} In David Fromkin’s words, «the Protocols explained—among other things—the mysterious revolts against Britain everywhere in the world.»

\textsuperscript{186} Ullman noted that the official British reports on the Baku Congress «did little better than the [British] Press. The Foreign Office was, of course, not represented at [the Baku] congress, and was therefore dependent for its information on summaries broadcast by the Bolsheviks themselves, local press reports, and reports and materials furnished by […] intelligence officers, and the Government of India’s Special Bureau of Information.» Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet Accord, 318.
\textsuperscript{189} Wells, Russia in the Shadows, 79.
\textsuperscript{190} Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 3rd ed. (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), 152.
\textsuperscript{191} There is a mountain of scholarly literature critically deconstructing the cultural sources and legacies of the Protocols that can barely be summarized here. Notwithstanding, the Protocols continue to be rediscovered by new generations of anti-Semitic conspiracy ideologues throughout the world.
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East.»192 The Morning Post was perhaps the most outspokenly anti-Semitic voice in mainstream press in Britain, where the Protocols were republished and cited in a series of articles in July to August, 1920. The Protocols were presented as an evidence for «the existence of a vast Pan-Oriental Conspiracy», where Bolsheviks as agents of International Jewry were «The Cause of World Unrest».193 To be sure, the worldwide circulation of the Protocols in 1920 was not the origin of Jewish-themed conspiracy theories, but unfortunately the outcome of farther-reaching anti-Semitic prejudices and discursive traditions of conspiracy ideologies.

The Jewish element was, of course, not missing in the conspiracy theories about the Young Turks, either. Even the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had been explained by many British experts as a pro-German Jewish-Freemason plot against the British interests in the Middle East.194 The assumption was that the «hidden hand» of the so-called «International Jewry» in form of crypto-Jews and Freemasons was behind the CUP and the revolution of 1908. This conspiracy theory was based on Orientalist as well as anti-Semitic prejudices. The question of Muslim agency was explained (away) by the incapability of the «Oriental mind» and the secret power of «Jewish influence». Robert Irwin, a British scholar of Orientalism, pointed out that there is an Orientalist tradition to interpret every Muslim resistance to the Sunni orthodoxy as «super conspiracies dedicated to atheism, republicanism, free love and general mayhem.»195

Soon after the disappearance of the CUP leaders in November 1918, the conspiracy theories about the Young Turks regained currency as we have seen in previous chapters. Once again, the «Jewish

192 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009), 469.
194 Elie Kedourie, “Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews,” Middle Eastern Studies 7, no. 1 (1971): 89–104; Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 41–43; Nabeel Audeh, “The Ideological Uses of History and the Young Turks as a Problem for Historical Interpretation: Considerations of Class, Race, and Empire in British Foreign Office Attitudes towards the Young Turks, 1908–1918” (PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1990), 155–57; Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 204. Gerald Fitzmaurice, the chief dragoman of the British Embassy at the Ottoman capital, was the most influential promoter of the Young Turk conspiracy theory of 1908. On Fitzmaurice see: Geoff Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939): Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007).
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influence» was not missing. Sir Eyre Crowe from the Foreign Office claimed that «the heart and soul of all revolutionary and terroristic movements have invariably been the Jews, the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress», thus identifying the triumvirate of evil.196 This idea that CUP was a Jewish and Masonic organization continued to color British Intelligence analyses. A British Intelligence report claimed that it was the Kemalist «dislike of the Jewish Free-Masonic elements dominating the Unionists» that was partly responsible for the chasm between the two movements.197 One British official went even farther in labeling the usual suspects behind the Middle Eastern unrest. According to him, there was a «far more dangerous party, that of Enver & Talaat & the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination» which was, «with the Pan-Islamic offensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed against Great Britain».198 All these conspiracy theories played into the British views of the Baku Congress. As late Richard H. Ullman, a diplomatic historian of Anglo-Soviet relations, noted, the word «propaganda» became in the terminology of the British officialdom «the shorthand term which increasingly came to stand for the whole complex of Soviet revolutionary activities against British interests, especially in Asia.»199 «The real danger in Middle Asia, as elsewhere», as The Times claimed, was not the Red Army, but rather the «Bolshevist propaganda.»200 In Lord Curzon’s words, it was the «Russian menace in the East», which threatened the British Empire «incomparably greater than anything

200 The Times, “The Red Flag in the East,” September 23, 1920. Such news from The Times were also collected and translated by the political intelligence bureaus of the Ankara Government. An article in The Times on September 18, 1920, it was reported from Constantinople that Enver Pasha had attended the Baku Congress in order to lead the «great army that would march to India». ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 642, gömlek no. 123. Another Times article about «Bolshevik intrigues in the East», from December 23, 1920, was translated and circulated by the Anatolian News Agency, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 649, gömlek no. 108.
Even when facing the lack of facts and proofs of any Bolshevik propaganda or organization in the Middle East, the paranoid style was delivering creative explanations:

I do not think we can say Bolshevism does not exist because we can certify that no Bolshevist organization exists [emphasis in original]. We are looking for something far more elusive and intangible than that, viz: tendencies and sympathies on the part of the Turks or any of the peoples of Turkey, which foreshadows a fusion with Bolshevism or may end directly or indirectly, morally or materially, in aiding the Bolshevik cause to our detriment.

[…] There have in fact been a number of incidents relevant to the subject, which, with the concomitant evil of Pan-Islamism, seem to fill the near horizon day by day with greater power of disturbing the British world.

According to a sarcastic report of The Times, at the Baku Congress «Enver Pasha […] assumed the mock title of Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevist forces marching on India.» And this army was nothing but «Enver’s stage army», merely a device of «Bolshevist propaganda». Enver’s limited agency was first revealed at the Baku Congress for distant and critical observers. To be sure, Enver and the CUP still continued to haunt the minds of the British officialdom, but slowly sarcasm was used to express the increasing disillusionment with Enver’s specter.

Although Enver Pasha had every reason to be disappointed about the long-desired cooperation with the Bolsheviks after the Baku Congress, he was still seeing the glass half-full. On September 7, Enver wrote to Kazım Karabekir: «I’m very pleased with the Eastern Congress. It will produce great results in the future.» «Anyway, I am greatly satisfied with the result of the conference», Enver repeated in a following letter. Enver had now discovered perhaps for the first time with his own eyes that his legendary fame in the Muslim and Turkic world was a political reality and the Bolshevik leaders had also witnessed with fear and despise Enver’s great appeal. It is surely safe to say that Enver «suffered» from what political psychologists call a narcissistic personality disorder—common

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204 Enver Pasha, letter (Baku) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), September 7, 1920, in Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı*, 38–39.

to many dictators and charismatic leaders.\textsuperscript{206} Thus, his fame was certainly one of the reasons why he was pleased with Baku Congress. His personal ambitions put aside, Enver saw in Baku, what he had been dreaming of for a long time, namely the grand gathering of the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movement which he hoped to unite under his aegis. A Turkish informant of the British intelligence reported that Enver’s presence was «though undoubtedly useful in that it added importance to the proceedings, was nevertheless a cause of some anxiety to the Bolshevik authorities».\textsuperscript{207} There is indeed an ambivalence in Enver’s presence at the Baku Congress. Masayuki Yamauchi rightly asked, whether the Baku Congress was the «apogee» or the «eclipse» of Enver’s relation to the Bolsheviks. «Enver’s participation in the Baku Congress represented the apogee of his cooperation with the Bolsheviks», as Yamauchi explained, «but it resulted in the commencement of the eclipse.»\textsuperscript{208} At the Baku Congress, Enver Pasha was, indeed, a political beast—but he was in chains in a traveling circus, admired and feared by spectators.

\textsuperscript{207} Report on the Baku Congress (Constantinople), October 25, 1920, FO 371/5178, 11702, 153.
\textsuperscript{208} Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 24, 36.
9. Causes of Unrest in the Middle East:

Muslim Revolutionary Societies

between Fiction, Intention, and Action

While the British Intelligence had long elaborated on an international conspiracy behind the Muslim menace, this chapter tries to map out the political organization in question by recovering historical facts from fiction. It illustrates the attempts of Enver Pasha and his friends to establish the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. As it has been argued so far, up until the summer of 1920, the political activities of the CUP leaders lagged behind their rumors and reputations. When newspaper and intelligence reports confirmed the presence of Enver at the Baku Congress, the rumors and conspiracy theories circling around since November 1918 finally found their approval, remarkably in a time when the unrest in the Middle East had reached its climax.

Major Norbert N. E. Bray, a Special Intelligence Officer working for the India Office in Iraq, prepared in three reports the most definitive treatment on the so-called «causes of unrest in the Middle East». Major Bray’s reports in fall of 1920, similarly to Hugh Whittall’s report from May 1919 discussed in Chapter 4, were important in pseudo-theorizing the alleged

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Young Turk intrigues from Germany and Switzerland to the Middle East via Russia. Previously, Major Bray had made a visit to Damascus and Jeddah in 1917, when he had already made up his mind about the brewing dangers of the pan-Islamist movement. His fears were now approved by the revolts taking place in Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, and Iraq. Despite increasingly accurate intelligence, the reports still followed the same conspiracy ideology in projecting current events as trajectories of grand conspiracies.

According to Major Bray’s “preliminary report,” the Middle Eastern unrest was a “concerted action” directed by secret societies originating from Berlin and Moscow. Since many detached local groups like the “Pan-Arabs, the Nationalists, the disgruntled Effendi, the tribesman […], and the fanatical priest” were now rebelling collectively against the British rule in Iraq, but also elsewhere, Bray concluded that there must be an “outside influence […] making concerted action possible.” According to Bray’s preliminary report, an “Asiatic-Islamic Federation” was established with the purpose to unite and coordinate these diverse movements.

In his consecutive report on the “causes of unrest,” Bray argued again that the “internal revolution” was “organized by secret societies working on one principle but under different guises in different spheres”. But, of course, as Bray made sure, all this was “directed by Moscow.” This Bolshevik plot, in Major Bray conspiracy theory-laden words, “proceeds to consolidate and organize her position thus obtained and from these nuclei to again throw out her sinister tentacles which, gripping about in every direction, seek to fasten themselves on local soil, into which their roots will strike, giving her a fresh grip of organized conspiracy” [emphases added]. This conspiracy was “fostering any local discontent, preaching her doctrinism unsettling men’s mind, weakening authority.” The verdict was: “Russia has taught the Eastern world new lessons in statecraft and intrigue.” But, of course, not only Russia was behind it after all. “The Eastern movement is being actively supported by the German Foreign Office

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by every possible means short of proving military forces», as Bray explained. In support of his claims, Bray presented a chronological «diary» of «culmination of the various steps leading up to direct control by Moscow». In detail, the reports were surprisingly accurate in many aspects, however, the overall interpretation was rather overblown with tropes and vocabulary of conspiracy ideology. In short, these steps were summarized as:

1. Discontent of the various communities of Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia.
2. The focusing of this discontent into organized societies.
3. The junction of these societies with each other.
4. The linking up of these societies irrespective of policy on an Asiatic Islamic basis.
5. The conversion through the above into Bolshevism.

Major Bray concluded that «it is the very complexity of interests [emphasis in original] that weakens the opposition.» Therefore, as he proposes, «we must remember that our opponent is working on a highly organized and single-minded system; we have to oppose an organized resistance [emphases added].» In addition to his conclusions, Bray also presented a ridiculous «chart illustrating German-Bolshevic-Asiatic Intrigue». All in all, the CUP leaders were depicted in the midst of all these networks. While Enver Pasha was «charged with the direction of the movement in Caucasus»; Cemal Pasha was «charged with the direction of the movement in Afghanistan»; and Halil Pasha was «charged with the direction of the movement in Persia». The danger was real and present: «The ball has been set rolling.»

In a summary of Bray’s report, it was listed that a «union with Turkish nationalists was brought about» and «active cooperation has been obtained between Syria and Anatolia», in which «a violent and well organized pan-Islamic policy has been instituted both in Syria and Angora.» As it was explained, this «organisation has been traced back to Switzerland and Berlin.» «Controlling influence in the movement is C.U.P., though it has combined pan-Arab and nationalist elements as well as tribes. [...] Great endeavors are being made to unite Moscow and Enver Bey with the above.»

5 This chart is reprinted in M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 222.
reports in 1921 to forecast the coming of a wave of chaos caused by extreme Muslim nationalism:

The national sentiment in the East created and bolstered by anti-Christian forces has grown to be a living reality in the hearts of even the moderate Moslem elements throughout the East. National independence is being striven to an unreasoned intensity unparalleled in politics. Regardless of cost, impervious to reason, its extremist adherents press forward as result, attainment of which, should throw the whole Eastern world into an inextricable chaos.8

If we filter out the imperial prophecy of doom, there was, in fact, a very real and present conspiracy lurking beneath connections that Bray’s reports brought about. Although we have heard the same story many times before, now by the fall of 1920, the intelligence was more accurate than ever before, as real conspiratorial politics were more active and present than ever before. To be sure, some of the intelligence sources were partly distorted by the factoid or deceptive proclamations of CUP leaders, while they were secretly negotiating with the British agents. In a secret interview with a British intelligence officer, for instance, Talat Pasha boldly claimed that «Enver’s supporters had been given carte blanche to organize Moslems from Turkestan to Asia Minor and incite them to embarrass England everywhere in the East.»9 Such claims were half-truth, half lies.

In assessing the validity of Major Bray’s reports, Middle-East historian A. L. Macfie came to the conclusion that «while the information collected was for the most part accurate enough, the conclusions drawn were dangerously misleading.»10 As intelligence historian John Ferris concluded, the British fears of a conspiracy «were not unreasonable.»11 Major Bray was actually right when he claimed that Talat Pasha had been trying to establish cooperation with the Syrian and Iraqi insurgents, Egyptian nationalists and Indian Muslims as well as with Russian

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8 N.N. Bray, memorandum on the present situation in the Middle East, [1921], BL, IO, LPS 11/194, 1114, quoted in in Friedman, British Miscalculations, 91.
9 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 144.
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Bolsheviks. All these conversations and connections were tapped by the British Intelligence in one way or another.

Nonetheless, at the time Bray’s reports were circulating by the fall of 1920, the CUP leaders had indeed started to organize a more tangible movement that went beyond coffee house debates and midnight meetings while playing cards in Berlin. Beneath Bray’s «Asiatic-Islamic Federation», there was indeed an organization founded by the CUP leaders that called itself the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. In the end, the fugitive CUP leaders had reached the parquet of high politics once again. Enver Pasha had finally reached Moscow and presented himself to the global public at the Baku Congress as a fierce revolutionary. As for Cemal Pasha, he was busy in Afghanistan eagerly reforming the armed forces of the Emir at the Indian frontier. They finally caught up with the rumors. The perceptive gap between conspirators and conspiracy theorists was now getting narrower as more overt action was taking place. This time, however, a new gap emerged between their own intentions and actions as these were laid out in their programs and correspondence.

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“This attempt and this organization», namely the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, «was stillborn anyways, rather dead long before its birth», was Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s verdict. According to the British intelligence, on the other hand, the organization had existed long before, even before its actual conception. «Europe hosted the creation of various émigré Muslim societies, but this was the most ambitious», wrote Martin Kramer, because unlike other societies, it was founded «to regulate a wide network of other Muslim societies.» However, Kramer also pointed out that it «subsequently led little more than a fictitious existence». Thus, we are dealing with an organization that was «ambitious» and «fictitious» at the same time.

The conflicting manifestations of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in different sources—such as in public and official intelligence reports, in constitutional statutes and charters, in propaganda outlets, and in the correspondence and recollection of its members—illustrate the thin line between ambition and fiction. In this context, we need to differentiate between movement and organization as well as between milieu and network to be able to tell which is which. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was rather a political movement defined by its cause, namely anticolonial Muslim nationalism, than a full-functioning political organization which is a system of sovereignty for sovereignty. To be sure, it was both in many ways in ambition, but we need to differentiate here as much as we differentiate between the Young Turk movement and the Committee of Union and Progress. On the other hand, the cultural and social space of a milieu can provide discourses, structures, and resources for a movement/organization and networks qualitatively organize trans-spatial and interpersonal relations inside and outside the movement/organization. Not every other actor within a shared milieu or network was also inside the same movement/organization, and vice versa. Although the social milieus and political networks of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies emerged as early as the spring of 1919 in Berlin, the organization was officially founded in early fall 1920 in Moscow.

“\[This is the Union of [Muslim] Revolutionary Societies, founded in 1919\]”, said Zinoviev while introducing the organization at the third congress of the Comintern in 1921, implying that the movement formally traced its foundational roots back to 1919.\(^\text{15}\) As Dr. Nazım later testified at the Independence Trial, the idea to found a new organization that would unite the revolutionary movements in the Muslim lands first came up in Berlin in the spring of 1919. When Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım returned from Munich to Berlin, they held a meeting with Talat Pasha and Dr. Rüşuhi, where they discussed for the first time the idea to unite different movements with a single movement.\(^\text{16}\) The CUP leaders’ experiences with the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* made them no stranger to the politics of Muslim transnationalism. If we are to trust Hüsamettin Bey’s memoir, the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* was the precursor of the


\(^{16}\) Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eycil, *Osmansı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926)* (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 328.
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later exile organization after being renamed as «General Revolutionary Organization of the Muslim World» (Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı).  

The social milieu of cosmopolitan revanchism of post-war Berlin with its politically active Muslim community provided the intellectual forum and accessible interpersonal networks for the CUP leaders to establish a transnational social movement of Muslim anticolonialism. In Berlin, there was a remarkable community of Muslim activists, who had been formerly associated with the German-Ottoman propaganda and intelligence machinery. In addition, Dr. Nazım tells that there were thousands of Muslim students in Berlin and the CUP fugitives established contact to most active ones among these students. One can also argue that the Orient Club, located at the Kalckreuthstraße 2, served most certainly as a precursor organization or as a civil society branch of the later Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The Orient Club was part of the same movement. In this context, Talat Pasha’s activities in Berlin are accredited in a report by a former insider as the origin of this movement, where alliances were made to «Turkish and Egyptian political immigrants» (Mısır ve Türk muaçirin-i siyasisi) and to the «League of Oppressed People» (Akvam-ı Mazlume Cemiyeti) in Rome. In explaining the roots of their movement, Enver Pasha gave credit to their time in Berlin, too:

In Berlin, we witnessed the emergence of some local movements against the Entente in the general Muslim world. We were thinking about the unification of these Muslim

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19 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 329.

20 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar I: (1908–1925) (İstanbul: Berdan Yayınları, 2000), 109. Also the Press Bureau at the Uhlandstraße is said to be origin of the idea of uniting the Muslim movements. Richard Euringer, Der Serasker: Envers Ende, Irrfahrt und Kampf eines kühnen Türken (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1939), 57.

movements that had no organization and were deprived of material assistance. After talking with friends, it was decided to unite them.22

Except for the Orient Club, however, no political organization is known to be founded in Berlin in this period—at least not according to internal documents of the CUP leaders that has survived. On the other hand, French Intelligence from May 1920 claims that a «Union pour la libération de l’Islam» was founded by Talat Pasha and his friends.23 Other Western intelligence reports claim that at the time of their negotiations with Karl Radek in August 1919, the CUP members founded a new organization that was commissioned «by the Musselman Section of the Eastern Branch of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Government».24 The Ottoman archival sources corroborate that a Muslim congress has indeed taken place on September 2, 1920, in Berlin—possibly initiated by the Orient Club—where Turkish, Arab, Indian, Egyptian, Azeri, Syrian, Tunisian delegates were gathered. The declaration sent to the Sublime Porte in Constantinople said: «For every Turk and for every Muslim these kinds of [post-war] stipulations are nothing but a murderous conspiracy [suikast] and even a declaration of war against the Muslim world.» The sixth and last point of the declaration called for «legal and if necessary armed resistance [hukuki ve gerek musellehen mukavemeti] […] with the purpose of defending their freedom [hürriyetlerini müdafaa maksadiyla]».25 News of similar Muslim congresses organized by the CUP leaders were long in circulation in the international press—although there is no further evidence. For instance, as Turkish military intelligence reported, a Muslim congress took place in Munich under the auspice of CUP leaders in early summer 1920.26 In the end, the idea of organizing so-called Muslim congresses were experiencing a heyday in the aftermath of World


24 This is reported from The Times in Açıklık, “Anadolu’daki Hareket-i Milliye ve Bolşevikler,” March 6, 1920, quoted in Uygur Kocabaoğlu and Metin Berge, Bolşevik İstilâl ve Osmanlılar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 188. See also: Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Komıntını,” 9, 11.

25 See the Ottoman-Turkish translation of the declaration in French sent to the Sublime Porte, September 13, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 639, gömlek no. 128.

26 İsmet, Army Intelligence report, June 6, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 871, gömlek no. 80.

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War I and such congresses were already part of the contentious repertoire of social movements in the Muslim world. Rumors of existence of CUP organizations in Berlin were even propagated by the Young Turk leaders. «Here in Berlin a semblance of an independent Turkish Government was maintained», Talat Pasha told to a British informant in December 1920. «Thus the Emir Chekkib Arslan was Minister of Foreign Affairs.» Talat’s claim of an exile government rather seems to be a fiction of deterrence than an actual attempt to found an exile government. Nonetheless, internal evidence implies that a new political organization was being formed that intended to build a federation or confederation of Muslim nationalist organizations and represent the collective movement. Talat first mentioned a so-called «Muslim Union Society» (İttihat-ı İslam Cemiyeti) in July 1920.

When Enver Pasha had arrived at Moscow in August 1920, he said that he represented the «Muslim Revolutionary Organization» (İslam Teşkilat-ı İhtilaliyesi) as well as the «Muslim Revolutionary Society» (İslam İhtilal Cemiyeti) in the very same document, implying that the movement had not yet formally brought out its organization. «In addition, I talked to Karahan, Chicherin, and Bucharin», Enver reported about his first negotiations in Moscow. «They say that they would support any revolutionary movement, even if it is not colored <communist>. Above all, they are quite favorable to our Muslim Revolutionary Society [Müslüman Cemiyet-ı İhtilaliyesi].» Enver had proposed to open a «school for future terrorists in Moscow», as Chicherin reported to Lenin. The final name of the organization was coined only after the Baku Congress, where Enver still claimed to represent the so-called «Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia, and

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28 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 143.
29 Talat Pasha, letter to Cemal Pasha, July 14, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 188.
30 Enver Pasha, memorandum on the cooperation of the Muslim Revolutionary Organization with Soviet Russia, [Summer 1920], TTK, EP 04-15.
31 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 40.
India (Cezaýir, Tunus, Trablusgarb, Mısır, Arabistan ve Hindistan İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihatı). Meanwhile, Hacı Sami was complaining that «those working at home and abroad [dahil ve hariçte] are not only united around a common program and purpose, but do not even think about uniting». Thus, after returning from Baku, Enver convened the founding meeting of the «Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies» (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihatı) on October 15 at Moscow. It was probably a meeting of the few former CUP members in Moscow—some of which were not even present. As it was later instructed to the branches in Constantinople, the Central Committee consisted of Enver Pasha (chairman), Ziya Bey (secretary), and Dr. İbrahim Tali (treasurer), in addition to the board members Halil Pasha, Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, and Seyfi Bey. In its official policy, the movement subscribed to the anti-colonial Muslim nationalist movement. The charter of the Union of the Muslim Revolutionary Societies said:

The aim of the Society is to make the Muslims—who are used like slaves, enslaved and dominated by the imperialists and capitalists—masters of their own fate under the leadership of Turkey; to ensure their free and independent organization within their national culture; and to liberate them from captivity. The aim of the Society is to create the organization necessary to realize the aforementioned goal, by uplifting and uniting the Muslims spiritually and materially.

The overt structure of the newly founded organization was a combination between the internationalism of the Comintern and the committee-system of the CUP. Thus, the concepts «soviet» and «committee» had merged into each other in their minds. Not unlike an «Islamic

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34 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), October 1, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 112.  
35 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to the Constantinople Branch of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, January 25, 1921, TTK, EP 01-22, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 144–45. This foundational meeting must have taken place before November 10, 1920, as İbrahim Tali and Ziya Bey left Moscow for Berlin. See: Diary entry, November 10, 1920, in İbrahim Tali Öngören, Dr. İbrahim Tali Bey’in Günlüğü (1920–1924), ed. Erdal Aydoğan and Şaban Ortak (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 2000), 3.  
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international», the Union was supposed to represent different associated parties from different countries.\(^{37}\) An annual congress was intended to assemble the various national branches.\(^{38}\) The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies had also taken up certain organizational characteristics of the CUP as a revolutionary secret society. The idea of membership very much resembled a komitadji-style clandestine revolutionary organization.\(^{39}\) «There are no differences of rank and prestige among members; all are brothers and equal», the statue proclaimed. Acceptance as a member was also based on trust networks, since it was required that «two present members must nominate and give assurances» for a new member. Membership also did not resemble a regular political party or federation membership, but rather that of secret societies: «Every person who joins the Society shall be bound to it for the rest of his life, and is not permitted to leave it.»\(^{40}\) Each member was required to profess an oath as part of their initiation:

I swear to God and give my word of honor that I will fulfill each assignment to the limits of my power and give my property and life in order to liberate my oppressed brothers from captivity and raise them spiritually and materially and that I will not reveal the secrets of the society, I swear.\(^{41}\)

«Ziya Bey told me about a secret Muslim Society [bir haifi İslam Cemiyetinden]», wrote a fellow politician and journalist from Rome to Enver Pasha. «Herewith I join in advance this society under your leadership. Please sign in my name. […] I would like to work for Turkey and Islamdom [İslamiyet] by any means.»\(^{42}\) After the establishment of the organization in

\(^{37}\) Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 38; Toprak, “İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadi (İttihat-ı Selamet-i İslam) ve Panislamizm,” 175.

\(^{38}\) Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkani, 103–4. See also: Kramer, Islam Assembled, 71.

\(^{39}\) For a political anthropology of komitadji-style revolutionary organizations in Ottoman Macedonia see: Keith Brown, Loyal unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 70–97.

\(^{40}\) In this respect, Bray’s report was quite close in ist claim that «a solemn oath is administered and the death penalty threatened if this oath should be broken or the organization betrayed in any respect.» N. N. E. Bray, Causes of the Unrest in Mesopotamia – Report No. II, September 1920, FO 371.5231.7765, 4. This oath was also mocked by fellow CUP member Muhittin Bey. Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), II, 736.


\(^{42}\) Ahmet Rüstem (Bilinski), letter (Rome) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), November 21, 1920, TTK, 01-18, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 128. Yamauchi wrongly transliterated «haфи» (secret) as «hukuki» (legal). İbrahim Olgun wrongly attributed this letter to Dr. Nazım whose code name was also
Moscow, Ziya Bey had gone to Europe to establish further connections between Moscow, Berlin and Rome as well as other places in the Middle East. Previously, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karahan had urged Ziya Bey to send trusted men to Constantinople, Rome, and Berlin in order to stay «en contact» with different centers. Although the internal documents required a strict code of membership, other more vivid evidence implies that intentions were not necessarily put in action. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies had beyond its members to the Central Committee no individual membership, but only member societies, as Dr. Nazım testified. Each associated national-revolutionary society was responsible over its own members and recruitment.

The policy of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was, however, more military than revolutionary in its action plan. Enver Pasha soon revealed to Cemal Pasha that he wanted give this revolutionary organization «a military color» (askeri bir renk). The purpose of Enver’s journey (maksad-ı seyahat) to Moscow was, as it was put down in a memorandum, to organize a general campaign (umumi hareket) in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan that will take place against the «capitalist governments and especially England» in the coming spring of 1921. For this campaign, the Muslim countries needed the assistance of Soviet Russia. The Soviet Government was asked to support the establishment of this new Muslim revolutionary organization that would coordinate this general campaign. Soviet Government was also asked to supply cavalry units consisting of Russian Muslim soldiers and militias. In order to administer the propaganda and prepare the military campaign in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan Enver proposed to stay in Moscow in the Winter of 1920/1921. In a letter to General von Seeckt, Enver described his grand strategy as follows:

I want the operations to concentrate on the Turkish, Persian, and Afghan borders this winter [of 1920] in order to keep the position until the spring. Until then one would

43 M. Ziya Bey, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), October 19, 1920, TTK, EP 03-36.
44 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 329–30.
45 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 20, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 39.
46 Enver Pasha, memorandum on the cooperation of the Muslim Revolutionary Organization with Soviet Russia, [Summer 1920], TTK, EP 04-15.
make preparations, and can proceed in the spring on all fronts in the offensive. On this point, I would like to know your opinion.47

Enver explained the possible outcomes of this strategy by its potential connection with other movements. «when the operations in Egypt, Indian, and Iraq will also join in, then the position of England will eventually become pretty complicated.»48 «If the Russians trust us», Hacı Sami wrote to Enver, «then you will take the lead of the military organizations in the Muslim lands and you will appoint Cemal Pasha, Halil Pasha, Nuri Pasha, and other gentlemen to the command of each front.»49 Cemal proposed a similar military approach where he visualized four fronts of revolutionary warfare. The first front was in the South directed against India, Turkestan, Fergana, and Afghanistan under the command of Cemal himself. The second front was towards Western Asia in Iran, Bukhara, Khive, and Turkmenistan under Enver Pasha’s command. The third front was in Asia Minor under the (rather autonomous) command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The fourth and last front was commanded by Halil Pasha in the East directed at Eastern Turkestan at the Chinese border.50

There was a clear disconnect between civilian and military approaches in the organization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Previously, Cemal Pasha had expressed his disenchantment that the revolutionary branch of the CUP had secretly drafted a program of action for Turkey behind his back. Cemal increasingly mistrusted secretive committee politics.51 «I think, we don’t need a society [cemiyet] or etc. at all», Cemal wrote to Enver. It was «enough to reach our goals», he said, if they could win over the confidence of the Bolsheviks and work with their material support individually as professional soldiers-cum-revolutionaries.52 The liberation of the Muslim lands was for Cemal and Halil Pashas primarily a military affair that was strategically based on revolutionary warfare in Asia in conjunction with local revolutionaries. The central coordination of the fronts and the local revolutionary movements did not necessarily need a secret society of its own. Cemal was rather interested in

48 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 44; Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkansı, 22.
49 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), October 1, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69.
50 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 1, 1920, TTK, EP 07-29.
51 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), July 5, 1920, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoglu, eds., İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 247.
52 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 1, 1920, TTK, EP 07-29.
establishing associated national revolutionary societies: “I think of establishing a central com-
mittee of an Indian revolutionary committee which will unite all delegates of the political
organizations in India.”

Similarly, Halil Pasha was not particularly interested in a political organization modelled after
the CUP with its oligarchical Central Committee, in which every board member was practi-
cally an executive leader of the CUP. Halil would only take orders from Enver Pasha and no
one else from the Central Committee, as he insisted in a meeting in Moscow. Due to his
opposition, Enver was elected not only as the political chairman (reis) of the Central Com-
mittee but also as the «commander-in-chief» (başkumandan) of military operations. Halil
Pasha could not wait to be on the front. On January 11, 1921, Halil asked Commissar of
Foreign Affairs Karahan whether the Soviet Government would object, if he would decide to
go to India to join the Indian independence movement. For his mission, he would not even
need any material support from the Soviet Government except for the facilitation of arms
delivery from Germany via Russia and Afghanistan, as he explained. Karahan said that he
personally supports this idea. However, Krassin was currently in London negotiating with
the British. The British Government was demanding the end of Bolshevik propaganda in
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. India was not yet mentioned. Thus, for now, the Soviet Gov-
ernment would support this venture. Even five thousand rifles had been arranged, ready to
be transferred to India, as Karahan assured Halil. When Halil asked whether the Soviet Gov-
ernment would oppose if Enver would also work in India, Karahan promised that both Halil
and Enver were free to go anywhere they desired. “I’m also tired of being in the Caucasus
all the time”, Halil wrote to Enver and said that he decided to go to Tashkent together with
Hacı Sami and then proceed to Afghanistan, Kashgar, or India. Adventure was calling.

53 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), November 30, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu,
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 256–57.
54 M. Ziya Bey, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), October 13, 1920, TTK, EP 01-65, Yamauchi, The
Green Crescent under the Red Star, 117.
55 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 12, 1921, TTK, EP 02-66. See also: Sami
Sabit Karaman, İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa: Trabzon ve Kars Hatıraları, 1921–1922, 2nd ed. (İstanbul:
56 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), n.d., TTK, EP 02-22, Yamauchi, The Green Crescent
under the Red Star, 111.
Meanwhile, Talat Pasha was usually assigned for propaganda work among Muslim émigrés in Europe. It was known among CUP members that Talat had distanced himself from Enver. As the political head of the CUP, Talat remained a thorn in side of Enver and others who desired a military campaign with Soviet support. «For now, I am still working with Talat Pasha», Enver told to Halil with displeasure and instead proposed, «we should organize ourselves so that we can take over the control of the state of affairs if necessary. For this purpose, I keep the organization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in our hands.» Nonetheless, Talat remained mostly autonomous and unchallenged in his position in Berlin. Within the civilian faction, Talat was still the primus inter pares and the soul of the CUP—neither formal organization nor election was required. Talat’s influence and network went also beyond the European metropoles. One the one hand, Cemal Pasha was entrusting Talat with assignments to coordinate in Europe support for his Afghanistan mission. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was making compliments to Talat’s support from abroad and requesting intelligence on state of affairs in the West.

As most Muslim nationalist activists were still mostly in Europe, Berlin stayed as the center of the movement despite Enver’s attempts to move the center of the organization to Moscow. If Moscow was the Mecca of revolutionary pilgrims of different colors, the cosmopolitan-revanchist milieu of Berlin was a bazaar of dissident émigrés exchanging ideas and goods with one another. Different societies such as the German-Turkish Society (Deutsch-Türkische Gesellschaft), League of Asian Fighters (Bund für Asienkämpfer), School of Oriental Languages (Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen), German-Persian Society (Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft), German Society for Islamic Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde), Egyptian National Party (Ägyptische National Partei), Association of Violated Nations (Vereinigung Vergewaltigter Völker), and Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Turkey (Sozialistische Arbeiter-und Bauernpartei der Türkei) within the shared networks and milieu of the fugitive leaders enabling vivid political exchanges in Berlin, although none of them were member societies in

57 Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki‘de On Sene, II, 735.
58 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Halil Pasha (Moscow), January 1, 1921, in Karaman, İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, 90.
59 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), November 30, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 254–56.
60 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), October 25, 1920, TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 220.
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the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. 61 It was no secret that Talat Pasha had regular contacts, for instance, to Egyptian student association (Ägyptischer Bund, al-Gamiya al-Misriya). 62 In the prose of British Intelligence these connections were exaggerated as far as that Talat «presides over the Turkish Egyptian organization» and that Auswärtiges Amt was «indirectly subsidising Egyptian students in Berlin» and the money was «finally distributed by Talaat in order that the Egyptians and everyone else may believe that the money comes from Pan-Islamic sources. The students in this way are induced to carry out Pan-Islamic propaganda», a claim that some scholars dismiss today. 63 The expert on the Arab community in interwar Berlin, Gerhard Höpp rather dismissed these concerns by the British authorities as baseless. 64

Berlin has also been an important center for Indian revolutionary activities since the Great War. 65 When the CUP leaders were negotiating with a Hindu delegation in Berlin, the latter suggested that the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies as an umbrella organization had to be associated with the League of Oppressed People in order to connect also with non-

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62 Aubrey Herbert, Ben Kendim: A Record of Eastern Travel, ed. Desmond MacCarthy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 324. Shakib Arslan writes in his memoirs that he saw Talat Pasha for the last time before his assassination at a gathering of Egyptian students in Berlin on March 9. Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005), 126. The date given by Shakib Arslan, March 9, is after the meeting with Herbert, thus Talat seem to have visited the Egyptian students at least twice during that time.

63 Directorate of Intelligence, A Monthly Review of Revolutionary Movements in British Dominions Overseas and Foreign Countries, no 24, October 1920, C.P.2192/A, quoted in Eric Bogosian, Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015), 327. Similar conspiracy theories about Egyptian students in Berlin were also circulated in the the British press. In The Times of April 8, 1920, it was claimed, for instance: «There is little doubt that the sojourn in Berlin is part of a well-conceived plan for the propagation of pro-German, possibly of Bolshevist doctrines in the Near East, in which the notorious Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish, who is said to be living sumptuously in Berlin, is taking part …. It is highly probable that some, if not all, of these candidates for German diplomas will return as active pan-German or Bolshevist agents and will constitute a serious danger, not only to their own country but also to the peace of North Africa and the Middle East.» Quoted in Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 359.


Muslim anticolonial nationalists. 66 The *Lega dei Popoli Oppressi* was the brainchild of Gabriele D’Annunzio and it was imagined as an «anti-League of Nations». 67 Alleged links between Gabriele D’Annunzio, Lenin, and Enver were already embellishing fancy news coverage. 68 Other more or less accurate rumors of connections between the CUP leaders and League of Oppressed Nations in Berlin and Rome were also in circulation. 69 A congress of the so-called *Union des peuples opprimés d’Orient* that took place in Genoa, May 1922, seems also be connected with the remnants of CUP networks in Europe. 70 «Therefore, instead of fearing an imagined pan-Islamism», the official propaganda outlet of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies proclaimed, «England should rather be afraid of the union of the oppressed which is the union of all nations that aren’t English.» 71

And it was again the Indian revolutionaries that suggested to Talat Pasha to enter into conversation with the Irish nationalists. The deputy chief of the Irish nationalist was invited to Berlin. For one and a half months he negotiated with Talat, where Talat tried to convince them to invest money and resources in stirring up a revolution in India. 72 Talat said once to a British emissary that he was rather unimpressed by the representatives of the Sinn Fein. 73 That being said, the CUP leaders continued to observe the Irish War of Independence closely

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66 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, *Doktor Nazım Bey*, 333. For the principles and aims of the League of Oppressed Peoples, see: ZMO, NGH 07-13, 68.


70 For a congress of this *Union des peuples opprimés d’Orient* see: Ottoman Imperial Embassy at Rome, letter to Ottoman Foreign Minister Ahmet İzzet Pasha (Constantinople), May 18, 1922, BOA.HR.SYS.2470.88. Omer Kiazim claims that the *Union des peuples opprimés d’Orient* was financed partly by the *Deutsche Hilfswerk fuer die Kämpfende Türkei* which was associated with Hugo Stinnes group. Omer Kiazim, *Angora et Berlin*, 107.


72 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, *Doktor Nazım Bey*, 333.

73 Herbert, *Ben Kendim*, 326.
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and regularly expressed their solidarity with Irish cause.\textsuperscript{74} In his declaration for the third congress of the Comintern, Enver Pasha underlined that they were in constant touch with the «Irish heroes» in addition to the non-Muslim Asian revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{75} These claims rather seem to serve propaganda than manifesting actual alliances. The only ties to the Sinn Fein were through the League of Oppressed Nations in Rome where their colleague Egyptian Abdel-Hamid Said was serving as the president.\textsuperscript{76} Rumors reproduced in a French intelligence report from May 29, 1920, that the CUP leaders had supported the Irish revolutionaries with huge sums of money were similarly groundless.\textsuperscript{77} Despite all the shared desires and collective efforts, no organizational ties emerged between Irish and Muslim revolutionaries, as it was later regretted.\textsuperscript{78} Nonetheless, these claims at the Comintern Congress were enough to make the British concerned:

I have been reading to-day an account given by Enver Pasha in Moscow at the end of June, about the work that was being done under his auspices. I read of the relations of his organisation with the revolutionaries of Ireland, the Kopts in Egypt, the Christians in Syria and Albania, with great interest because it proves that although the association is pan-Islamic, it is allying itself with every kind of revolutionary movement. Enver gives an account of an organisation extending from Morocco to China, including such countries as Java, The Yemen, Somaliland, besides Afghanistan, Egypt and India. The account proves conclusively to my mind that this is done under the auspices of the Soviet Government and the Third International which they control.\textsuperscript{79}

Dr. Nazım later testified that they had contacts with activists from Egypt to India, Syria to Iraq, Iran to Algeria and Morocco. The idea of an umbrella organization seemed to have appealed to the needs of Muslim-nationalist activists of the time who framed their local and national struggles within the larger anticolonial moment. Revolutionary organizations from

\textsuperscript{74} For instance, Enver Pasha explained the importance of the Irish movement as a great opportunity. See: Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 44; Karabekir, \textit{İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkamı}, 22.

\textsuperscript{75} This remark about the Irish revolutionaries can be found of Enver Pasha’s declaration at the Third Conference of the Communist International (Moscow), June 5, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 306. See also: “Bir Nutuk,” \textit{Liwa-el-Islam} 1, no. 12 (September 1, 1921): 119. This passage is, however, omitted in the official publication of the congress declarations, Riddell, \textit{To the Masses}, 846.

\textsuperscript{76} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 75.

\textsuperscript{77} Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Kominterni,” 6.

\textsuperscript{78} The lack of organizational ties was criticized in “Şark ve İrlanda,” \textit{Liwa-el-Islam} 2, no. 11–12 (August 1, 1922): 45–46.

\textsuperscript{79} Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, December 1, 1921, CAB 24/131.
all these counties are said to have sent delegates to the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies.\(^8^0\) In an intelligence report, the member societies of the so-called «League of the Salvation of Islam» (\textit{Ligue lie la délivrance de l'Islam / İttihat-ı Selamet-i İslam}) were listed as the Egyptian Nationalist Party, Turkish Nationalist Party, Committee of Union and Progress, Indian Nationalist Party, League of Afghan Patriots, Union of Muslims of the Caucasus, Russian Muslim Congress, and League of Iranian Nationalists.\(^8^1\) This claim sounds rather exaggerated. All evidence implies that the members were mostly those notorious Muslim nationalist activists living in European exile with already former ties to the \textit{Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa} or the German Intelligence Bureau for the Orient, if not other local political leaders touring throughout European capitals for propaganda rally’s and diplomatic negotiations who then somehow ended up in a meeting with Talat Pasha or Shakib Arslan. For instance, Enver informed Mustafa Kemal on the establishment of ties to Muslim activists in Berlin as follows:

> Relations to the representatives of Muslim countries in Europe was established, especially with Indian Mohammad Ali. As a result of these talks, a society was constituted consisting of representatives from every corner that decided to direct these movements from one center.\(^8^2\)

Enver Pasha was more or less telling the truth, but such name droppings and exaggerations about the extent of their network were all too apparent in the communication of the CUP leaders with the «outsiders». Maulana Mohammad Ali from the Indian Khilafat Movement was in Europe from February to October 1920.\(^8^3\) The fate of the Ottoman Empire has long been serving as a strong political discourse for Indian Muslims in expressing their opposition

\(^{8^0}\) Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, \textit{Doktor Nazım Bey}, 329–30.


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to the British Empire. The movements of Khilafat delegation was, of course, closely observed by the British Intelligence, as an extensive report was prepared by no one else but Major Bray. During their tour in Europe, the delegation of the Khilafat Movement met with prominent Turkish politicians scattered throughout different European cities. The Europe trip of the Khilafat delegation was put into templates of existing official conspiracy theories. An informant of the British Intelligence in Switzerland, for instance, had claimed on April 27, 1920, «that the Germans, Turks, and Russians have made up their minds to assist by every possible means the Indian revolutionaries». The CUP networks were eager to establish connection to the delegation as well. In Zürich, it was reported that Mohammad Ali was scheduled to meet with Ismail Sidqi, the leader of the Egyptian Revolutionary Committee, before travelling to Rome. When Talat Pasha heard that Mohammad Ali was coming to Italy via Switzerland, he traveled to the Swiss-Italian border to meet him there, but could not find him first. Then, on August 6, 1920, he managed to meet him in Territet, Switzerland, where the two men talked about preparing a revolution in India which would be supported by the invasion of a Bolshevik sponsored Afghan army including the Indian Hijrat Movement in Afghanistan. There is reason to believe that Mohammad Ali took Talat’s overtures quite seriously. Later at Rome, Mohammad Ali and his delegation met with Edip Servet (Tör) and other Unionists and Kemalists. Turkish nationalists in Rome were able to collect money from the Khilafat Delegation. «Recently», as Dr. Ahmed Fuad reported in late March 1921, «ammunition and arms, which were purchased in Italy by Abdel Hamid Bey,

84 Mushir Hosain Kidwai, “A Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Muslim Outlook, February 12, 1920. See also: Özcan, Pan-Islamism.
88 Edip Servet, letter (Rome) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [late June or July, 1920], in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 194.
89 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [June or July, 1920], in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 199.
90 India Office, Memorandum on Turkish Intrigues (London), cited in Asgar Khan, “The Turkish Nationalists and the Indian Khilafatists,” 30. See also: Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 221–22.
91 Edip Servet, letter (Rome) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), July 23, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 195.
head of the Rome Bureau, with the 12 thousand lira we received from the India Branch, were shipped to Samsun." 92 But, when it comes to activities of the Rome Branch, it is hard to put the Arab nationalists, Kemalists, and Unionists apart. Historians have not studied post-war Rome as a hub of transnational Muslim politics yet. 93 Nonetheless, occasional meetings and shared worldviews were celebrated as extension of the organization, while it was rather dubious which societies were associated with Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. 94 We know that Talat Pasha met with the president of the Egyptian Revolutionary Committee in Constance, in early summer 1920, where the latter accepted in the name of his Committee to join the Union. 95 Enver Pasha once recommended Karahan and Chicherin that they should work together with the Iranian Democrat Party (Hezb-e Demokrat-e Iran) by supplying them with military and financial resources, but we don’t know whether the Iranian democrats were officially associated with them. 96 Enver had also taken the position of a mediator (and king-maker) among the Muslim nationalists. For instance, when it was decided at a congress in Tripoli that either Sayyid Ahmed Sharif al-Senussi or an Egyptian or Ottoman prince should be the proclaimed monarch in Libya with the support of Italy, the Rome Bureau asked Enver to write a letter to Sulayman al-Baruni who was supposed to be opposing this deal. 97 Nevertheless, it is rather doubtful whether the reach of their organization ever went beyond their republic of letters.

In order to convince the Bolsheviks that other Muslim representatives were united in the organization, Enver requested that Abdel Aziz Shawish, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, Dr. Nazım, Emir Shakib Arslan, Muhammad Bash Hamba, and Arif Cemil should be invited to Moscow in

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92 Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, report on Anatolia, Iraq, and Syria (Berlin or Munich) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-56.
93 This lack of research has also been pointed out in Sabine Mangold-Will, *Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei, 1918–1933* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 43, note 11.
94 Martin Kramer came to similar conclusion: "No independent evidence confirms the existence of such close ties. Occasional contacts maintained with various émigrés in Europe seem more likely to have been the extent of this network." Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 72.
96 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 9, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 64.
97 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 9, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 64.
order to establish a propaganda center in Moscow.98 For some reason, however, the Soviet leaders hesitated with issuing visa for these men.99 When Enver was back in Berlin in October 1920, he met with the Soviet representative Viktor Kopp. Enver told Kopp that the center in Berlin will no more exist. Thus, Eşref Bey, Dr. Nazım, Dr. Fuad, Muhammad Bah Hamba, Shakib Arslan, and Halil Halid should all be invited to Moscow.100 Meanwhile, Halil Pasha had a meeting with Karahan. Because of the ongoing negotiations with the British, Halil Pasha feared that «the propaganda delegation from Berlin might not find the desired welcome» in Moscow.101

The idea to move the center of the organization from Berlin to Moscow had been in Enver’s mind since he arrived at Moscow. «I have now established a center in Moscow», Enver wrote in a private letter to his brother-in-law Kazım Bey (Orbay) in late September 1920. «Our central bureau is here. But I am regularly on the move.»102 Moving the center of the organization to Moscow was risky. Cemal Pasha, for instance, was opposed to bringing men such as Muhammad Bash Hamba, Abdel Aziz Shawish, Shakib Arslan, of Vehip [Kaçı] Pasha to Moscow to direct the headquarters there. Cemal instead saw Berlin or Switzerland to be appropriate for pan-Islamic activism.103 Bedri Bey also agreed with Cemal and considered that the relations to Soviet Russia can suffer, if Russian Muslims would start to approach the Central Committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in Moscow to express their discontent with the Soviet regime.104 In a meeting with Halil Pasha on January 16, 1921, Karahan asked why the Central Committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was not yet moved from Berlin to Moscow.105 After his return from Berlin, Enver

98 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 23, 1920, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürün Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 43; Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), August 25, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 40.
99 Hacı Sami and Dr. Nazım repeatedly asked Viktor Kopp about the visa permission, but they were told that there was no such order from Moscow. See: Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), September 30, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69.
100 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Halil Pasha (?) (Moscow), October 15, 1920, TTK, EP 01-63.
101 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), February 10, 1921, TTK, EP 02-44.
102 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım (Özalp) (Erzurum), September 23, 1920, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 57.
103 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 1, 1920, TTK, EP 07-29.
104 Bedri Bey, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), February 10, 1921, TTK, EP 01-81, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 160.
105 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 16, 1921, TTK, EP 02-32.
managed to get assurance that the finances of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies will be covered by the Soviet Government.\textsuperscript{106} Dr. Nazım tells that they received no funding from the German Government.\textsuperscript{107} Further financial gifts were received from the Afghan Emir Amanullah.\textsuperscript{108} In April 1921, Chicherin proposed to finance the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies with 15,000 Lira yearly. As he explained: «These elements which are remnants of former group of Young Turk leaders have wide relations in Central Europe, and they have influential branches and relations in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco etc. In order to maintain their insurgent groups in various countries and send their men to Egypt etc., they need money.»\textsuperscript{109} Besides Chicherin, also Radek continued to lobby for Enver’s cause to revolutionize the Muslim masses against Europe.\textsuperscript{110}

The move to Moscow was partly realized after Talat Pasha’s assassination. Talat’s demise required a reorganization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, since he was the head of the movement in European exile. The secretary general of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, Ziya Bey, was complaining that the Berlin Bureau was doing nothing but spending money, while everybody was minding his own business. «In my humble opinion», Ziya protested, «we are not a den of idlers \textit{miskinhane}, but a political party.»\textsuperscript{111} In order to regroup with members and old friends, Enver Pasha made a visit to Berlin and Rome. At Rome Enver, renewed the existing alliance with the League of Oppressed People and Vehip Pasha was appointed as the director of the Rome Bureau.\textsuperscript{112} Already in February

\textsuperscript{106} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), February 23, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 58.
\textsuperscript{107} Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eycil, \textit{Doktor Nazım Bey}, 331.
\textsuperscript{108} Enver Pasha and Dr. Nazım, receipt for Emir Amanullah’s donation, June 25, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 308. See also: Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 22.
\textsuperscript{110} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 23, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciye, Rahum, Efendim}, 103.
\textsuperscript{111} M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 1, 1921, TTK, EP 02-63.
\textsuperscript{112} Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 959.
1921, as Enver reported to Cemal, Rome bureau had become an important center of communication with different Muslim countries.\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), February 23, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 58.}

It was only in late June 1921, after the death of Talat Pasha, that the promised delegation from Berlin arrived at Moscow. Among the delegation there was Emir Shakib Arslan from Syria, Khalid Bey al-Gargani from Libya,\footnote{Khalid al-Gargani, like many of the leaders of the Republic of Tripoli made afterwards a career in other Arab countries. He lived first in Syria and later he was one of the leading diplomats of Kind Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia. See: Ali Abdullahif Ahmida, \textit{The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization and Resistance, 1830–1932} (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1, 113; Parker T. Hart, \textit{Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 17.} Dr. Rifat Mansur from Egypt as well as Dr. Nazım, Captain Hüseyin Feyzi, and Fahri (Türkkan) Pasha, the famous defender of Medina. Enver Pasha made a visit to the secretary of the Comintern. The delegation submitted their memorandum. Their visas were given by the German Embassy in Moscow.\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), June 30–31, 1921, in Bardakçi, \textit{Naciye, Rubum, Efendim}, 210.} Uncomfortable with Enver’s overtures to Bolsheviks, Emir Shakib Arslan stayed only 4 days in Moscow, and after his return he gave a debriefing to the British Press Attaché Major Timothy Florence Breen, with whom he and Talat had been in contact previously. Shakib Arslan told that they had been accommodated in the Savoy Hotel and received diplomatic ration cards.\footnote{Major Breen, Report on Russian-Turkish-Afghan relations (Berlin), July 14, 1921, FO 406/47, 26, no. 14/1, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 3}, 540.} The delegation also met with French communists and agreed to cooperate with each other in propaganda.\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), June 29, 1921, in Bardakçi, \textit{Naciye, Rubum, Efendim}, 208.} Shakib Arslan, the so-called Prince of Eloquence (\textit{amir al-bayan}), was trying to find Soviet support for the Arab and Syrian revolution and had meetings with Chicherin. Shakib Arslan made, however, clear to Chicherin that he «did not represent any Arab country» but was a connoisseur of the «conditions and situation of the Arab nations in Africa and Asia». Arslan suggested that the Soviet Government should supply military material to Syria via Anatolia.\footnote{Ali Fuat Pasha, report (Moscow) on the interview with Emir Shakib Arslan to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 22, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 36; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 18.}
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While the delegation from Berlin was in Moscow, the executive committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies were elected. Enver Pasha, Bedri Bey, Dr. Nazım were elected as executive members and Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, Doctor Raik, Khalid Bey al-Gargani as deputy members while Emir Shakib Arslan, Dr. Rifat Mansur, Fahri Pasha and Topçu Rıza Bey are also mentioned as board members. The statute of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was personally drafted by Enver, months before the arrival of the delegates. Dr. Nazım saw that in Moscow Enver was surrounded by a dozen of men from Albania, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Tripoli, India and Egypt. Ali Fuat Pasha reported to Ankara that “Enver and his colleagues renounced their desire to go to Turkey” and declared that they would work in Muslim countries with the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies.

A British Intelligence report from Damascus, October 21, 1921, shows how the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was propagated to local Muslim leaders in the Middle East. As the British Consul in Damascus reported that several of his “informants seem to consider there is real danger of a Pan-Islamic explosion in the near future.” The most recent and urgent development was that Zeki al-Halabi and Abdul Fettah—both “ex Turkish officers” and “in communication with Mustafa Kemal”—were observed to be in touch with a Hindu activist, “who has recently arrived here from a meeting of the Islamic Society in Berlin”. This Hindu activist had a message to the local Arab leaders from this meeting in Berlin. The translation of the Arabic propaganda document from Berlin announced:

This branch has been founded in Berlin under the name Jamiat el Islamiat. The Members are the chief great Mohammedan thinkers and their great politicians who are constantly at work in order to succeed in these aims. […]

A military branch has been founded in this Society under the leadership of Anwer Pasha and its members are chosen from All Mohammedan of the East and West who have delegates in the General Society and this holy movement has prevailed all over and is in communication with all the revolutionary movements in Asia, in Egypt, in India, in the East and West and with the rest of the enslaved countries so as to unite the different

119 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), June 29, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 208. See also: Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 81.
120 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 29, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 115.
121 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 337.
122 Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 16, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 31. For the decisions of the congress see: Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 16, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1082, gömlek no. 16.
movements and insure these aims. [...] This society is also in agreement with Moscow and Ireland and other countries who will aid us with money and arms, and force when necessary, without however accepting the principles of the Bolsheviks. [...] the preparations are every day increasing for this revolution of the Great Mohamadan world. The liberations of these countries cannot be done except by the guerilla war (Şeta) and this will not succeed unless it is directed by a secret party which orders its movements of the same nature in either parts of the world.123

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During the second congress of the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies, propaganda was formally named as one of the main purposes of the organization. The Berlin Bureau and the Liwa-el-Islam was named as the most active and publicly visible propaganda center of all.124 To be sure, propaganda has been an important part of the CUP leaders’ exile activities since 1919. But the formal organization of the movement under the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies as well as the new financial resources they received from Soviet Russia made the professionalization of existing propaganda activities a priority in 1921.

Propaganda activities was started by Talat Pasha at a time when Enver Pasha was still somewhere in Crimea. After his meeting there with the Belgian socialist Camille Huysmans at a congress of the Socialist International in 1919, Talat had come to appreciate the urgency of doing propaganda in Europe.125 The Turkish cause was mostly unknown among Europeans, as Talat discovered, and the Turkish national resistance offered a sympathetic frame of reference for anti-imperialist struggle. Since Talat was personally in center of attacks because of his complicity in the Armenian deportations, he became quite active in efforts to clean his name. This was also the reason that made him to write his memoir, which was rather an apologia on the Armenian deportations and massacres than an autobiographical account of his wartime activities.126 At one occasion, Talat also personally engaged in ways to interfere

123 C. E. S. Palmer Consul, report (Damascus) on Kemalists and pan-Islamists to the Foreign Office (London), October 21, 1921, FO 371/6463, 122616. See also: ZMO, NGH, 11-05, 3.
124 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 960.
126 A detailed account on the publication story of Talat Pasha’s memoir can be found in Hikmet Özdemir, Ermeni İddiaları Karşısında Türkiye’nin Birikimi (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2008), 31–36. For a literary analysis of the apologetic content of the memoir see: Hülya Adak, ’Identifying the ’Internal Tumors’ of World War I: Talat Paşa’nın Hatıraları [Talat Paşa’s Memoirs], or the Travels of a
into news coverage on the Armenian massacres. His intervention into the liberal newspaper *Berliner Tageblatt* which published many pieces on the Armenian massacres and condemned the Young Turk rule was one such move. Arif Cemil Bey urged the chief editor of the newspaper, renowned German journalist Theodor Wolff, to meet with Talat to listen to his version of the story. Wolff and Talat agreed to hold a secret interview which Wolff promised not to publish. Although Talat could not convince Wolff to agree with him, Wolff decided to be more reserved on the Armenian Question.\(^{127}\) Arif Cemil remembers that the *Berliner Tageblatt* did not publish anything afterwards on the Armenian Question until Talat’s murder.\(^{128}\) Indeed, Theodor Wolff would even deliver a rather reserved editorial to Talat’s assassination.\(^{129}\) The revolutionary socialist journal *Die Aktion* would even mock Wolff’s *Berliner Tageblatt* as «*Berliner Talaatblatt*».\(^{130}\) Such individual efforts for propaganda and public opinion engineering put aside, there was also organized efforts to produce and spread propaganda on behalf of the fugitive CUP leaders.

As Chapter 4 has illustrated, Talat Pasha founded himself or arranged contacts with several Turkish press bureaus in Berlin, Rome, The Hague, and Lausanne.\(^{131}\) These press bureaus, however, were mostly independent and local clubs for émigré politicians of different color to voice opposition to the post-war settlement. As much as these initial press bureaus were connected to each other in Turkish émigré networks, they were not organizational parts of the later Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The obvious exceptions are the bureaus in Berlin and Rome which later also became important political centers. The transformation from press bureaus to organization centers in Berlin and Rome seems to have been fluid and difficult to pinpoint. In late 1920, for instance, Enver, who had recently returned from Moscow, had advised his fellow CUP colleagues in Berlin to continue propaganda activities. Dr. Nazım was appointed as the chief of the propaganda bureau in Berlin. A German by the

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\(^{127}\) Theodor Wolff was one of the most important German journalists of the interwar years, especially due to his vocal criticism against the Nazi regime. The Theodor Wolff Prize is given to outstanding works in journalism by the Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers.


\(^{130}\) "Das 'Berliner Talaatblatt'," *Die Aktion* 11, 23/24 (1921): 320–23.

\(^{131}\) Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 1, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 152; Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 39.
name of Schneider with excellent command of French and English was helping the CUP leaders place articles in European newspapers. The spring of 1921, both Berlin Bureau under Cemal Azmi Bey and Rome Bureau under Vehbi Pasha and Cami Bey were considered as important propaganda centers. The Rome Bureau had also autonomous links to Ankara Government. Arab members of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies proposed Enver to found a branch in Adana in order to coordinate the activities and operations of the "sacred committee" (cemiyet-i mukaddesemiz) in Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, Palestine, Egypt, and also Anatolia, but this was never realized.

The Berlin press bureau was preparing a pan-Islamic newspaper to boost their propaganda activities. The plans for a French-language newspaper under title Réveil d’Orient was also underway, with the experienced activist Muhammad Bash Hamba as its chief editor. In February 1921, it was reported to the Auswärtiges Amt that the Turkish community in Berlin under the leadership of Talat Pasha was planning to publish a Turkish and Arabic newspaper in order to counter the manipulative news coverage of Entente-friendly news outlets. However, after the sudden death of the latter on December 27, 1920, the newspaper plans were temporarily put on hold, as they lacked an appropriate editor.

Soon they found the desired editor in Prof, Dr. İlyas Bragon, a relatively unknown political figure until then. Late Gerhard Höpp identified Bragon as a veterinarian and a pan-Islam
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activist who had fled from Ottoman Turkey to Berlin in 1920.139 İlyas Bragon was a former professor for veterinary medicine at the university in Constantinople of Tatar origin, who was a self-proclaimed «fanatic Mohammedan».140 The new newspaper was called Liwa-el-Islam (in Turkish Liva ül-Islam or colloquially also Liva-yi İslam) and it was a bi-weekly propaganda journal that was published from March 1921 to December 1922 in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, and German issues.141 Initially, the Liwa-el-Islam was planned to be published in French and English as well, but this was never realized.142 As Ziya Bey, the secretary of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, was coordinating the activities of the bureaus in Berlin and Rome, he reported in detail about the publication of the newspaper to Enver Pasha:

Regarding the question of pamphlet: we decided to print every week five-hundred Arabic and five-hundred Turkish copies with a [lithography (rönelu)] machine that we purchased for 2 thousand marks for our budget is unavailable for publishing a printed pamphlet. German and French ones will be released when the budget is available. Since it became clear that publishing in European languages with a [lithography] machine is cheap and it can be released when there is an appropriate occasion. The newspaper [Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung] offered to distribute the news we will receive and the articles we will translate inside and outside Germany without any costs. They also have their own agence télégraphique so that this will announce our news to the world. By this, the question of propaganda in Europe will be realized through European newspapers and the propaganda in the Muslim world will be through the newspaper we will publish in Arabic and Turkish. Each week we will bring out two hundred copies.143

The first issue of the paper was scheduled for March 15, 1921. However, the release of the first issue was delayed after the sudden assassination of Talat Pasha and because the would-

140 Bragon could later not return to Turkey, because he rejected to hand in his correspondence with Enver Pasha to the Turkish authorities. Thus, he desired to work as a veterinary in Kabul, where his trustee Fahri (Türkkan) Pasha was the Turkish Ambassador. See: Auswärtiges Amt, letter (Berlin) to Dr. Fritz Grobb (Kabul), November 27, 1925; Prof. Dr. İlyas Bragon, letter (Braunschweig) to Dr. Fritz Grobba (Kabul), December 12, 1925, PA-AA, R 77922. See also: Paul Müller-Heymer, report on Muslim periodicals published in Berlin, October 25, 1921, ZMO, NGH 07-13, 68.
142 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 75.
143 M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (en route for Moscow), February 15, 1921, TTK, EP 01-20, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 161.
be editor Abdel Aziz Shawish subsequently fell ill. In addition the previously purchased lithography machine delivered very poor results, forcing them to make a deal with a printing house. Their choice for the publishing house fell upon the Druckerei Kaviani, which was formerly funded by the German propaganda offices during the war and had recently became private company. Kaviani as a self-proclaimed «Oriental company» (Şarklı bir şirket) was publishing also other papers of Berlin’s Muslim community such as the Iranian nationalist Kaveh and the pan-Islamic Azadi-e Sharq as well as books on Islamic studies. One observe the same network of Muslim activists around these publications, which implies that the Orient Club in Berlin was also one of the intellectual centers behind the Liwa-el-Islam.

The cosmopolitan-revanchist social milieus of post-war Berlin as well as the former activist networks of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and German Intelligence Bureau for the Orient were continuing to bring out propaganda publications despite the ever eroding governmental funds and support in Germany.

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144 Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 177; Cemal Hayri Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 28, 1921, TTK, EP 07-27.


149 This claim can be found in *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 9, 1922, also cited in Omer Kiazim, *Angora et Berlin*, 105–7. A similar claim is made also in “La politique de l’Allemagne en pays musulmans,” *Revue du monde musulman* 54 (1923): 33. However, the address of the Liwa-el-Islam was differnet than of the Orient Club. See: Yenen, “Berlin unter dem Banner des Islams,” 96.
Unofficially, however, the support from German revanchists for anti-British propaganda activities had not disappeared. The credit for distributing *Liwa-el-Islam* by the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* domestically and worldwide belongs to Enver’s old pal Hans Humann. After losing his position as military intelligence chief in the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch, Humann found employment as the director of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. On June 4, 1920, the industrial mogul and national-liberal politician Hugo Stinnes had purchased the newspaper. Previously known as the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (renamed in November 18, 1918) was a semi-official newspaper with Auswärtiges Amt as one of its shareholders. The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* was one of the keen observers of Turkey and displayed very strong Turcophile positions. There were also other interesting characters who perhaps ideologically did not belonged to the irredentist-revanchist social milieus of post-war Berlin but were still part of the networks around Young Turks and their German militarist friends such as the social-democrat Orientalist Friedrich Schrader who knew the CUP leaders from Constantinople and worked as a journalist for the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. According to the heading of letter, the notorious Middle-East expert of the *Auswärtiges Amt* Otto Günther von Wesendonk was also employed at the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

In addition to the cooperation with the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the CUP networks were distributing the *Liwa-el-Islam* also by post and couriers to Moscow, Rome, and Constantinople, and beyond. Enver Pasha’s aides were also bringing some copies from Moscow to Turkestan. The branches of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in Trabzon and

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155 Otto Günther von Wesendonk, letter (Berlin) to Edgar Haniel (Berlin), March 19, 1921, PA-AA, R 77898.
156 Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 6, 1920, TTK, EP 01-01, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 198.
Constantinople had access to the newspaper as well. Vehip (Tör) Pasha from the Rome Bureau had also offered to facilitate the distribution of copies of the newspaper to Albania, Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and India. British documents show that issues of *Liwa-el-Islam* as well as the similarly anti-British *Azad-e Sharq* were reported to be seen as far as in Egypt, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and India. The *Liwa-el-Islam* protested in its last issue in December 1922 that its distribution in Palestine has been prohibited by the British authorities there.

Although Talat Pasha has been essential the *Liwa-el-Islam* had soon become, especially with the appointment of Bragon as its editor-in-chief, «Enver Pasha’s newspapers», as it was once called Enver’s clique, causing further distrust among Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım. Enver not only organized funds for the newspaper from Moscow, but contributed also some lead articles. As the plans to move the political center of the organization from Berlin to Moscow were still under consideration, publishing a newspaper in Moscow had become an issue as well. As early as in September 17, 1920, Karl Radek had advised Enver to publish a Muslim revolutionary journal in Moscow. Radek believed that Moscow was a better propaganda center than Germany because there was still no connection between Germany and Ottoman Turkey. Thus, from the Ankara Government Enver requested on behalf of the Soviet Government five to six typesetters. In need of information on the developments in Ottoman Turkey, Enver was also asking his friends to send him newspapers from Constantinople and Ankara. Before he returned to Moscow, Enver purchased typeset letters in Berlin so that he could print a six page pamphlet in Moscow. After his return to Moscow,
Enver was publishing pamphlets under the title «Revolutionary Library» (İhtilal Kütüphanesi) in Moscow.168 Louise Bryant remembers from their shared time at the Sugar King’s Palace that Enver «was constantly writing articles for Turkish papers which he printed on a hand press in his own room».169 Unfortunately, none of these pamphlets are known to have survived either in the archives or private collections.

While the Liwa-el-Islam went in print in Berlin, Enver Pasha already had new plans to publish two other newspapers in Moscow. The one newspaper with the title Towards Liberation (Kurtuluşa Doğru) would be the new official publication outlet of the Union Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The other newspaper New Turkey (Yeni Türkiye) would be the official paper of the People’s Councils Party.170 These propaganda plans in Moscow were threatened after the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, was signed which prohibited all kinds of Soviet-sponsored propaganda activities in the East. Regarding Enver request to publish two newspapers in Moscow, Chicherin argued at the Central Committee of the Communist Party that these newspapers should be supported despite the treaty with Britain:

> Enver wishes to publish in Moscow two Turkish papers. One of them aims at the Turkish people, and the other at the other Muslim countries … The papers will promote the struggle for emancipation of the East and will emphasise on the significance of Soviet Russia for the liberation of all oppressed peoples. The [forthcoming] agreement with England prohibits all propaganda activities outside the boundaries of Russia, but it does not say anything about such activities within Russia. The delivery of the papers to the Muslim world will not be done by us so [the publication and the delivery of the papers] can not be seen as a breach of our agreement [with Britain] … This extraordinary politician [Enver] understands the situation well and he knows that we require him. We propose to allow him and to render him all necessary assistance to publish the papers [in Moscow].171

In a following letter to the Central Committee, Chicherin urged once again to support Enver Pasha’s newspapers and his movement.172 Eventually, Chicherin’s proposal to continue financing Enver and his two publications was formally accepted by the Central Committee of

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168 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 962.
169 Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 154.
170 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 12, 1921, in Bardakç, Nâciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 84.
172 Chicherin, letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, April 22, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 37–38.
the Russian Communist Party. However, it never came to the publication of these newspapers. The question of publishing propaganda papers was not undisputed either. One critical voice inside the organization questioned the purpose of publishing propaganda newspapers in various Middle Eastern languages whereas a single English-language periodical would be more effective. Thus, it was argued that «it is the most reasonable policy to concentrate on clandestine organization and to be content with releasing a bulletin in Europe rather than a publication for the Muslim world. The objective of revolutionary societies is operation and organization, not publication.»

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Although the movement embodied in the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was not an intellectual movement in the strict sense of the word, it is necessary to have brief look at the intentions and mentalities behind the propagated political ideas and agendas.

The choice of word for «revolution» and «revolutionary» in the self-proclamations of the movement, was «ihtilal». It meant «revolt» or «insurrection» in the strict sense of the word, underlining the (often violent) act of contention. A differentiation between revolt and revolution, the latter, most appropriately expressed in the word «inkilab», did not exist in their political vocabulary. Both terms were used as synonyms. Being a revolutionary was an important feature of the political culture of the Young Turks and similar Young movements. Revolution was understood in two ways. On the one hand, it was meant as a revolt against an unjust indigenous regime. On the other hand, it was also used in describing resistance against a colonialist or imperialist foreign rule. In a letter to Enver Pasha, the Afghan Emir put a red sign next to his signature, which was a reminder of Emir Amanullah’s own revolutionary (revolüsyoner) times as an oppositional prince associated with the Young Afghans.

After returning from his espionage adventures in Turkestan, Hacı Sami went with Enver’s wife Naciye Sultan and brother Kamil to a theatre in Berlin to see Georg Büchner’s Danton’s

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173 Excerpt from the protocol of the meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, no. 16, April 23, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 41–42.
174 Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, letter (Munich) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 26, 1921, TTK, EP 07-24, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 211.
After seeing the drama in setting of the French Revolution, Hacı Sami wrote to Enver that Naciye got very excited: «So even she is becoming a revolutionary [ihtilalci] bit by bit.»

They perceived themselves as professional revolutionaries. «[A]nd if I could become an Indian revolutionary», said Cemal Pasha once, «than he [Enver] can become an Iranian revolutionary too.» Their concept of revolution was mostly based on their komitadji background and resembled rather guerrilla culture. According to Şevket Süreyya’s retrospective insight as a connoisseur of Soviet regime of the 1920s, Enver had a misperception about the revolutionary nature of Bolshevism and Bolsheviks. By seeing in Bolsheviks somewhat fellow komitadjis, Enver believed that they shared a common code. Just as a thief knows a thief as a wolf knows a wolf, Enver saw komitadjis in Bolsheviks:

As I understood, according to [Enver Pasha] those in Moscow were nothing but a bunch of komitadjis. He assumed that the Bolshevik Party came to power by a komitadji coup d’état like the secret society of Committee of Union and Progress did. Probably [Enver Pasha] was seeing a resemblance between what was going on in Russia and how [the Young Turks] took over the palace and the state […]. [Enver Pasha] had even such an attitude which one could observe from his expressions, something like a komitadji knows a komitadji: [Komitacı, komitacının dilinden anlar].

The Bolsheviks were, however, a different beast. In Moscow, certainly no one would mistake Enver for a Bolshevik, nor the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies for a communist organization. However, this did not hinder Enver is consciously playing the role of a would-be communist in front of the Soviet leadership. «I act like a communist to the Russians», Enver confessed to a Turkish diplomat. «It is a lie. Inside me, it’s something else».

Another Turkish diplomat and friend of Enver, Dr. İbrahim Tali also noted once that the Bolsheviks «consider him [Enver] to be quite leftist» (kendisini pek sol tanıdıkları), thus they were making overtures to him in regard to Anatolian affairs. Enver’s personal experience was not that positive. No one really bought that he was a communist:

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176 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), September 30, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69.
177 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), November 30, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 257.
178 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 7th Ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979), 195–96.
179 The anti-CUP intellectuals in Constantinople such as Ali Kemal, however, saw some similarities between the Unionists and Bolsheviks as both being parvenus and tyrannic. Ali Kemal, “Bolşeviklik ve Türklik”, Peyam-i Sabah, December 10, 1920, quoted in Kocabensoğlu and Berge, Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar, 267.
181 Kazım Karabekir, summary (Kars) of İbrahim Tali’s intelligence from Tuapse to Fevzi Pasha, March 25, 1921, ATASE, İSH, Kutu 619, Gömlek 34.
Because I am not a communist and the Europeans severely charge the Bolsheviks because of me, I could not even meet with Lenin. Besides they are in no way obliged to give me the command of the Noble Forces [Kuva-yı Şerife]. And of course they have no reliance [to do so] … Besides, I certainly can’t work as a Bolshevik commander and surrounded by the Russian military commission and as an instrument of all their orders. Well, like I said, there is also no one asking me either! We will reach our objectives rather better when we reinforce our organization as pure revolutionaries."

Perhaps, Lenin was concerned about Enver Pasha’s enterprise. Anyhow, the collaboration with Soviet Russia was based on the shared notion of fighting the common enemy. «Comrades, a revolutionary organisation of Muslims, which is not Communist, has approached the Presidium with a request that it be allowed to present a declaration to the congress», Zinoviev introduced the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies at the third congress of the Comintern. «To repeat, they are not a Communist organisation, but rather an organisation that struggles against the subjugation of Muslims and against imperialism.» «However, we are not communists», Enver made once again clear in an internal document of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. He continued to explain his ideologically diffuse policy as follows: «We are following a policy that adopts and approves people’s sovereignty according to the principle of Socialism and within limits of Caliphate and Sultanate.» Enver wanted simply everything, but did not want to renounce anything.

«Russians regarded Enver as the greatest revolutionary of the world», as one former colleague of Enver reported sarcastically, although Enver had openly proclaimed that he was not a communist. The reason for this celebration of Enver as revolutionary was rather opportunistic: «By exaggerating Enver’s influence in North Africa, India, Iran, and whole Central Asia they wanted to present him almost as an Islamic emperor. So that they kept Enver in their hands against the European imperialist governments […]». Similar claims were made also by the Turkish ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha. In his memoir, he argues that the Soviet Government «believed that especially Enver Pasha but also his friends […] could turn Turkey against

182 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 73.
184 Riddell, To the Masses, 843.
185 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to the Constantinople Branch of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, January 25, 1921, TTK, EP 01-22, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 145.
186 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 965.
the Entente, because they believed that they were still known in Turkey as powerful personalities and enjoyed the same prominence in the Muslim world. [...] By this, they wanted to bring the central committee of pan-Islam under their own influence."\(^{187}\)

Both the communists and the Young Turks knew perfectly well that only after a victory over the Western imperialism the question of adopting communism would become issue, but not before. Thus, both sides acted opportunistically. By taking advantage of the ongoing class struggle in Europe, Enver Pasha hoped that the Muslim uprisings would eventually find legitimacy. As Enver advised to Mustafa Kemal, however, it was necessary to establish a pseudo-leftist oppositional party in Turkey. Enver believed that it was not possible for the Entente to come to terms with Soviet Russia, and that the struggle would continue. Because it would take many years until the whole world becomes communist, Enver believed that the communist-capitalist struggle was a «divine gift» (mevhibe-i ilahiye) for the Muslim world. «Only if the whole world would unite as communists around the Third International», then adopting communism would become an option, as Enver wrote sarcastically. He continued and assured that, if necessary, one could easily abandon the alliance with the Bolsheviks any day. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was not communist, but it was simply working on common goals as the «world communists», as he assured.\(^{188}\) The name of the organization revealed that it was a Muslim one. Although the collaboration with Soviet Russia was a matter of expediency, the working relationship has to be of indirect nature, as an alliance with Bolshevism would generate its own counter-discourse. During an evening with M. N. Roy at his Moscow quarters, Enver «put his cards down» and said: «The liberation of Asia was a task of the Asians themselves. If the Russians were directly connected with the plan, devilish British propaganda would incite the religious sentiments of the Islamic world against the Bolshevik infidels.»\(^{189}\)

When Cemal Pasha heard from Talat in December 1920 that Enver founded in Moscow an organization dubbed «Union of Muslim Revolutionaries» (İslam İnkılapçıları İttibadi), he


\(^{188}\) Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), March 4, 1921, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İtihat-Terakki Erkani, 106–9.

\(^{189}\) Roy, Memoirs, 406.
considered this title to be inconvenient. «As you know, we are branded as pan-Islamists (İttihad-ı İslami)», as Cemal warned. «Our even slightest move or attempt is immediately interpreted as such. If the Bolsheviks, too, who are today our friends, reach a similar conclusion, then there will be no area for us to work.» Cemal was not mistaken, since the Bolsheviks had surely an aversion towards the label of pan-Islamism.

In similar terms, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had also warned Enver Pasha that the use of pan-Islamism should only be directed against the British and not against the Bolsheviks. Later Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself told a Soviet diplomat that he was receiving letters from all over the Muslim world, calling him to organize a Muslim congress in Ankara in the spring of 1921. Mustafa Kemal Pasha positively acknowledged Enver’s organization in this regard: «Enver is working to organize all the Muslim countries. I consider this idea to convey such a congress for the struggle against Western imperialism positively.» When the Soviet diplomat warned Mustafa Kemal of the dangers of pan-Islamism that «can snowball to religious fanaticism», Mustafa Kemal answered: «No, this movement does not have a pan-Islamist character. We don’t want pan-Islamism, either.» After hearing about Mustafa Kemal’s plans about conveying a Muslim congress in Ankara, Dr. Nazım send a message to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, against against the congress idea. Dr. Nazım explained that while he was responsible for propaganda activities in Berlin, he witnessed that the nationalist character of the Anatolian movement was a huge factor in winning over public opinion in Europe. If the Ankara Government would adopt a rather pan-Islamic image, as Dr. Nazım argued, this might go the risk of alienating Westerns sympathizers. Dr. Nazım’s message was: «Ankara needs to continue to appear as a nationalist force in the eyes of Europe.» Enver’s thoughts about Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s Muslim congress were similarly dismissive as rumors of pan-Islamism would only come to the benefit of Turkey’s enemies. This idea was based, once

190 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 1, 1920, TTK, EP 07-29.
191 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), October 4, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbinizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkansı, 34–35.
192 For the plans of this Muslim congress in Ankara see: Kramer, Islam Assembled, 76–78.
194 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 337.
195 Dr. Nazım sent this message to Eyyüp Sabri (Akgoğl) with the wish that he would read it to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Dr. Nazım, letter (Moscow) to Eyyüp Sabri (Ankara), July 11, 1921, TTK, EP 03-23.
196 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), July 5, 1921, in Yaşın and Köçahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 87.
again, in the differentiation between the national struggle inside (dahil) Turkey and the trans-
national Muslim struggle abroad (hariç). The relation between the struggles inside and out-
side Turkey would rather prove to be a disputed issue among the CUP leaders, but their
differentiation was important. «Besides, since I’m convinced that not the Muslims will save
the Turks, but rather the Turks will save the Muslims», as Dr. Nazım once declared honestly
in a private letter, «I’m foremost a Turkist […]».

Enver himself wrote to Mustafa Kemal that although Turkey was also facing the danger of
becoming another Muslim colony, it was not possible for the Ankara Government to follow
a pan-Islamist policy. Enver believed that pan-Islamism would attract even more the wrath
of Turkey’s enemies. This had to be done outside Turkey and was the purpose of the Union
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Anyhow, no Muslim nationalist desired to be labeled
as a pan-Islamist, since the term was considered to be an Orientalist slogan to justify Western
imperialism in the East. The official propaganda outlet of the Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies wrote, for instance, that Britain had invented an «imaginary danger of pan-
Islamism» (hayali İttihad-ı İslam tehlikesini) in order to legitimate «the absolute enslavement
of Eastern peoples» (Şark akvamını esaret-i mutlakede edame için).

When Enver Pasha first arrived at Moscow, the first principle of his memorandum which
highlighted cooperation with the Soviet Government was «on the condition that Muslims
will achieve independent administration within their national borders» (İslamların milli
hududları dahilinde serbest idareye malik olmaları şartıyla). The Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies had two foundational principles regarding the organization of the Muslim
revolution: First, each nation will take its own fate in its hands. Second, each nation will not
rely on any force than its own. Thus, the Muslim revolution was to be organized in na-
tionalist terms that divided the Muslim peoples into existing national spheres of action. The

197 Dr. Nazım, letter (Munich) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), April 5, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu,
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 114.
198 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), March 4, 1921, in Karabekir, İstiklal
Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkans, 107.
200 Enver Pasha, memorandum on the cooperation of the Muslim Revolutionary Organization with Soviet
Russia, [Summer 1920], TTK, EP 04-15.
201 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 329.
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Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was meant as an umbrella organization, a transnational league or federation of existing Muslim nationalist organizations. 202

Thus, when Cemal Pasha objected that the organization should avoid pan-Islamist connotations and instead encourage the various local movements to show a «national color». As the motto, he proposed, for instance, «Iran belongs to Iranians!» (İran, İranilerindir!), as this did not necessarily contradict the Muslim nationalist orientation of the movement. 203 But the balancing act between celebrating distinct Muslim nationalist movements and uniting them within an anticolonial Muslim movement was not always easy to manage. In its first public announcement, the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies presented its political agenda as follows:

[We are] against all parties and societies, causing a split among the nations of Islam under the clause of nationalism [...]. [...] This does not mean that we are against the principle of nations [...]. An Arab, Turk, Albanian, Kurdish, Persian, Indian, Georgian, Lase, Bosnians or Circassian who is not proud of his national history and the merits of his nation for the Islamic community cannot be described as a worthy person. What we simply refuse are those dubious scoundrels that cause cleavages among the Muslim peoples under the cloak of nationalism to serve the cruel intentions of our enemies or those who instrumentalize nationalism for their personal benefits. 204

For common Muslims, the dichotomy of Islam and nationalism was not as strict as scholars of Islamic Studies would like to have it. «Yet Islam and nationalism are mutually exclusive terms», said one profound connoisseur of the Middle East. «As a constructive loyalty to territorially defined national group, nationalism has been incompatible with Islam in which the state is not ethnically or territorially defined, but is itself ideological and religious.» 205 This assumption is, of course, true from a textual understanding of Islam, as Islamists and Orientalists both cherish to practice. For common Muslims who lived in the modern times, Islam and nationalism were mere different layers of identity, «sister ideologies» so to speak. 206

202 Left Unionist in Ottoman Turkey were championing the idea of an Asian Federation. See: Hakkı Behiç (Bayiç), letter to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), November 8, 1920; Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), “Asya Birliği”, Anadolu ‘da Yeni Gün, December 22, 1920, quoted in Kocabaşoğlu and Berge, Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar, 227.

203 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 1, 1920, TTK, EP 07-29.


Nonetheless, nationalism continued to plague the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies from within. In expressing his resentments to Enver Pasha, one Egyptian colleague of the CUP leaders in Berlin noted: «There is no wholehearted camaraderie at the Berlin Bureau. Both regarding the journal issue as well as all decisions and expenditures that have occurred and continue to take place are obvious examples for this.» Although there was a regulation that limited the number of representatives from same country to only two delegates at the executive boards of each local branch, this was violated by «our Turkish brothers» who were the majority, as the critic went on. «And instead of establishing an Islamic brotherhood, feelings of superiority and factional politics are prevalent in the community.»

Elsewhere it was argued by the Ahmed Fuad and Abdel Aziz Shawish that «instead of an inter-Muslim [beynelmüslimin] society, it was made almost a Turkish society.» To be sure, there were certainly also other reasons behind this criticism, such as discontent over the distribution of limited financial resources, competition over prestigious positions such as the editorship of Liwa-el-Islam, and social mobility of new members within the committee hierarchy. Dr. Ahmed Fuad underlined that the Arab members, who has been recently subjected to discrimination and disrespectful treatment by some of their younger Turkish colleagues were veteran revolutionaries who sacrificed their noble lives for the cause of Islam. «According to the well-known Indian revolutionary, Chempakaram Pillai», reported the British Intelligence, «the Oriental Club in Berlin will be dissolved shortly, as the Turkish element desire to form a new and exclusively Turkish Club.» These tensions lead to the resignation of Dr. Ahmed Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish from the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies. In their resignation, they wrote:

The reason for the foundation of this Society was Muslim union [ittihad-ı İslam]. This idea was abandoned to a certain degree so that the idea was to return to the Muslim union that existed thousand years ago. Nationalist politics slowly infiltrated our affairs. The expression Islamic International scared us. Obviously, if a religion or an idea is spread among more than one nation, then it is called international. […] This means that even if this respected Society doesn’t exist, an Islamic International still exists. And its

207 Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, letter (Munich) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 26, 1921, TTK, EP 07-24, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 211.
208 Dr. Ahmed Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish, resignation letter to Enver Pasha (Moscow), n.d. [May 1921], TTK, EP 03-02.
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greatest congress takes place annually in Mecca. Therefore, this expression is in our modest opinion only reinvented for the nationalist movement.211

On the other hand, the Arab members were accused of similar, if not worse, nationalist and selfish ambitions. «According to our opinion», a Turkish member of the Berlin Bureau reported to Enver Pasha, «these men», as the Arab members of the Bureau Emir Shakib Arslan, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, and Shaikh Abdel Aziz Shawish were meant, «are only trying to get as much money as possible from us while not doing anything and informing the other side [i.e. the Entente] about our movement.» He continued and said: «Their sole ambition is to make Arab propaganda only and to feed some Arabs with our money and our means.»212 Ziya Bey, the target of one of attacks of the Arab faction, wrote: «The one thing that I regret most is that Turkism and Arabism [Türklük ve Arablığın] are still and everyday increasingly growing apart. [...] Actually, I totally believed with all my being that Arabs and the Turkic world [Arabların ve Türklüğün] needed to work together. However, I see it every day and I feel it. Arabism is something else and Turkish is something else. Arabs always try to take advantage of us.»213 The picture gets even more diffuse, as Kamil Bey wrote to his brother that it was Dr. Nazım, a Turkish nationalist by definition, who was stirring up the Arabs against Enver and his sidekick Ziya Bey.214 Enver personally intervened into the debate by publishing an anonymous lead article in the Liwa-el-Islam with the cautious title «Let’s be Careful and Don’t Let us be Deceived!». According to Enver nationalism was a European «trend» (moda) intended to split the Muslim peoples.215 In another article, Enver described the anticolonial struggle of a unified Muslim front as «the one and only way».216 The ideal of a Muslim fraternity, as it was cherished and propagated in their public declarations, had proven to be a complicated project to realize, when everybody involved in the movement was a professional revolutionary at the same time.

211 Dr. Ahmed Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish, resignation letter to Enver Pasha (Moscow), n.d. [May 1921], TTK, EP 03-02.
212 Cemal Hayri Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 28, 1921, TTK, EP 07-27.
213 M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 1, 1921, TTK, EP 02-63.
214 Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 1, 1921, TTK, EP 01-79.
215 [Enver Pasha], “Dikkat Edelim, Aldanmayalım,” Liwa-el-Islam 1, no. 8 (July 1, 1921): 81–83. It is telling that translation of this article was published in the Persian issue under the title “Hoshyar Bashim, Farib Nakhirim,” 81–84, but not in the Arabic issue.
216 [Enver Pasha], “Biricik Yol,” Liwa-el-Islam 1, no. 12 (September 1, 1921): 117–118.
One last significant aspect of the collective political mentality behind the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was its own tendency to conspiracy thinking. At the heart of their political sense-making was an Anglophobe and Occidentalist conspiracy ideology, in which everything bad in the Muslim world was a result of the devious schemes of British imperialists. The Occidentalism was not racist or dehumanizing at the first place. It was rather based on resentments resulting from “authentic Muslim critiques of modernity, international order, and colonialism.” In a propaganda publication, animosity against Britain was explained as common human reaction against oppression and imperialism:

If you ask someone from any nation, big or small, who has more or less interest in politics, then you will see that great hatred and animosity is expressed towards the English. In the countries under the rule of the British riots have already occurred. There is no doubt that even more are in preparation.

The anticolonial critic of Britain was, however, not limited to general observations. In the propaganda journal, *Liwa-el-Islam*, an Anglophobe philosophy of history in which not only every misery in the Muslim world, but also the history of the whole world was explained as a conspiracy of the British Empire:

[...] Every country has a policy that changes according to times and needs. In this respect England differs from other countries. England has centuries-old political principals that do not change over time or for any reason. No matter which party leads the British government, they never think of changing these principles. [...] It was England that instigated the European nations against Napoleon, who sought to rule the world, because it did not want any other nation than England to grasp for world domination. It was England, which tolerated the defeat of France in the war of the 1870. Because France was the strongest naval power at that time. Every nation that has a strong navy is the target of English hostility. It was England that initiated the Russo-Japanese war because Russia posed the greatest danger for India, which constitutes the entire wealth and majesty of England, so that its subjugation became the actual objective of England. It was England, who conspired for World War, because the navy, oversea trade, and industry of Germany had increased to such an extent that the English arrogance and pride could not bear such a rise of another nation. Another reason for the destruction of Germany’s position was its support for the awakening of the Muslim world and the Orient.

Such Occidentalist conspiracy theories against the British had sometimes their origins in German or other dissident Western propaganda. The Occidentalist conspiracy ideology

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218 M. R. [Mansur Rifat], “İngiltere İmparatorluk Meclisi,” *Liwa-el-Islam* 1, no. 9 (July 15, 1921): 90.


was adopting such existing tropes of Western revanchism and reproducing it in Muslim nationalist terms. From Egypt to India, the whole Muslim world subjected to British imperialism in one way or another had adopted these kind of conspiracy ideologies about British machinations. Dehumanizing language did not lack either in the propaganda of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, as the British Premier Minister Lloyd George was depicted in another article in *Liwa-el-Islam* as «the beast feasting on the blood of Muslims» (*Islam kanıyla beslenen bu canvar*).221

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Meanwhile, Soviet officials were curious about the German experience in dealing with British intrigues in the Middle East. Karahan asked Halil Pasha to make some inquiries regarding this.222 German officials were rather becoming reserved about their influence on Muslim revolutionaries, since this had become a major concern for Britain:

One of the few political assets that we still possess in the eyes of the English and by their abandoning we might even purchase some concessions from the English is Germanophile feelings of the Orientals that actually still exist to this day. [...] It is obvious that this concern is essentially unfounded, but it will be accepted as a fact. This is apparent from the great nervousness of England which is surveilling the movements of the rather insignificant and uninfluential Oriental revolutionaries that are residing in Germany.223

Other rather critical voices such as Professor Johannes Lepsius went to the other extreme and totally dismissed the idea that the British Government would even consider Turkey as a serious threat. «There are also still German amateur politicians who expect that Turkey, allegedly the most dangerous enemy of the British world empire, would redraw the world map», said Lepsius and mocked these ideas as «childish hopes». His harsh verdict was: «Five million Turks—because there is hardly any more than this—do not play a role in a policy that deals with continents.»224 Lepsius was wrong both in demographics and in politics.

By early 1921, however, British foreign policy started to see the world affairs differently, particularly in relation to its role in the Middle East.225 The anti-imperialist opposition was growing in Britain as well as becoming a serious global trend. The conservatives, for instance,

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222 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 16, 1921, TTK, EP 02-32.
223 Secret note, July 6, 1921, PA-AA, R 30648, K016858.
225 Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation*, 258–76.
had increasingly become anxious and critical about the overextension of the Empire since the end of the war. It was in December 1920 that the Milner Commission submitted its report on the future of Egypt with the advice to grant Egypt semi-independence.\(^{226}\) In addition, troublemakers in the East, like Bolsheviks and Kemalists, were looking for a pragmatist rapprochement with the British Empire. In the midst of these subtle shifts, peculiar contacts occurred between Talat Pasha and some real and alleged British agents. In the CUP networks, it was rumored that Talat was seeking to come to an understanding with the British.\(^{227}\)

In December 1920, things started becoming curious. The British official in Berlin with whom Talat Pasha regularly conversed asked in one of their meetings: «If you would come back to a position of power, would you be able to restore order on behalf of your country?» Talat elaborated on what he would do in that situation and advised the British to reconsider a rapprochement with Turkey. Once Turkey is respected again, he explained, the order in Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus will be restored too.\(^{228}\) The British conversation partner concluded that «[h]is influence was sufficient to put an end to the unrest in the East should the occasion arise.» Talat is reported to have explained his proposal as follows:

The advantages of a reconciliation with the Turkish Nationalists to Great Britain were obvious. Mesopotamia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus could be readily tranquilized. The oil-fields could be secured to British exploitation. In fact, order and peace in the Near East depended on a reasonable settlement. An Amnesty should be granted to the leaders and to the political prisoners in Malta. The Vilayer of Smyrna might become a free state akin to Danzig. Some Turkish influence be permitted north of the line Alexandretta-Mosul. He had read Mr. Colby's note from the U.S. State Department on the oil-fields. Turkey was not an industrial country and needed no oil. A settlement in favour of Great Britain was a bagatelle if Turkey secured some financial help.

The struggle of Europe against Bolshevism would be facilitated by the support of the Mahomedan republics bordering on Russia which were a natural barrier against Bolshevism or any other form of Russian penetration. He could count on the support of twenty million Mahomedan subjects living within Russia. The permission to organise these territories was a weapon which Enver could use more readily against Moscow than with Moscow.\(^{229}\)


\(^{227}\) Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’ in Raporu,” 964.

\(^{228}\) Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 2, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 170–71.

\(^{229}\) Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 144–45.
Nevertheless, Talat Pasha found this sudden interest in his person curious. He suspected that the British were maybe planning to use him against Mustafa Kemal Pasha.\textsuperscript{230} Talat was even semi-officially invited to a dinner at the British Embassy in Berlin where he drank champagne and talked about politics.\textsuperscript{231} Although these talks gave Talat an opportunity to express his ideas and positions to the British, they did not necessarily seem to go anywhere.\textsuperscript{232}

One unintended result of Talat Pasha’s talks with the British officials in Berlin was, however, that the Bolsheviks became very angered once they heard the news. In December 1920, Karahan had expressed his concerns about Talat’s negotiations with the British.\textsuperscript{233} «When [Talat Pasha] let his good relations with the English reach the level of exchanging banquets», Enver Pasha told Cemal in a confident letter, «I was forced to state to the Russians that I did not agree with this behavior of his […].»\textsuperscript{234} German officials also noted that Enver had dispute with the Soviet Government, because Bolshevik spies had discovered Talat’s talks with the British.\textsuperscript{235} Viktor Kopp and Leonid Krassin expressed their concerns about Talat’s activities during their visit to Berlin in early March 1921. They believed that Talat represented the right wing of the Young Turk movement, while Enver the left. Ziya, who was in Berlin as the representative of Enver, had talks with Kopp and Krassin, and reported afterwards:

\begin{quote}
Kopp and Krassin arrived. I talked with both of them. […] [T]hey declared that they would approve if the right and left wings which are already indeed separated would definitely apart. Because, he said, it would not look good, if we have palsy-walsy relation to Talat Pasha, who took the leadership of right wing.\textsuperscript{236}
\end{quote}

Enver got increasingly suspicious as well. He told the Kemalist representative in Moscow that Talat Pasha was England’s man and that Talat had promised to the British to restore order
to Anatolia, if he would be granted with Grand Viziership.\footnote{Nur, \textit{Hayat ve Hattatlam}, III, 885.} Enver was used to say to his colleagues at the Moscow Brach: «We’ve lost Talat; he became a follower of the English.»\footnote{Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene}, II, 744.} In this sense, perceptions and misperceptions over the position and intention of different actors was pushing others to take certain positions and actions.

One of the reasons behind the mistrust towards Talat Pasha was that he was planning his return to Turkey. This was no secret. While Enver was in Berlin during the winter 1920–1921, Talat talked openly with him about this. Eventually, Enver and Talat both agreed that Talat should go back to Turkey.\footnote{Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), January 30, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 175.} Rumor has it that Talat had made secret travel arrangements for March 17, 1921, to enter to Anatolia via the port of Antalya.\footnote{Cemal Kutay claims to have heard this rumor from Turgut Bleda. Kutay told this in an interview on June 19, 1987. See: Eyicil, \textit{Doktor Nazım Bey}, 192, 219, note 66.} In a later interrogation, Dr. Nazım told that they had sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha through Şerif Pasha in Antalya, requesting permission to enter to Anatolia.\footnote{Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, \textit{Doktor Nazım Bey}, 334.} In a following but undated letter to Cemal Pasha, Enver was more precise with his complaints about Talat’s last attitudes, especially regarding his rapprochement towards the British. «As I saw Talat Pasha in an ambition to be on top of a party that would unite everything once he would return to homeland», said Enver, «then I decided to form the organization that I have been planning only with those friends, who would work without distrusting each other and so that we don’t have to censor our letters.»\footnote{Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [end of March or early April 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 69–71.}

Around the same time a couple of peculiar characters with certain ties to Britain started to approach Talat Pasha. For instance, Talat was in touch with a certain Italian by the name of Caputto, a freemason friend of his, who was associated with Talat’s friends from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Caputto visited Talat in Berlin, he travelled to England to make some inquiries. Upon his return, it was decided that Caputto should organize conferences and lectures in major cities to make Turkish propaganda. In addition, he proposed that an inspection commission of «unofficially friendly foreigners» to be sent to Thrace and
Smyrna to prepare a report that would defend the Turkish cause. But the other Young Turks in Berlin, such as Dr. Nazım, did not know Caputto and were rather reserved towards these overtures. Later, Dr. Nazım would hear rumors from Rome that Caputto was allegedly a British spy.

Another dubious person in this context was a Bulgarian by the name of Davidoff who aroused suspicions. Davidoff had contacts to another Bulgarian, Kirtcheff-Varney, working at the staff of Lloyd George. Davidoff was a former Bulgarian komitadji and a friend of the Bulgarian revolutionary leader and statesman Stefan Stambolov and after Stambolov’s death he lived in Constantinople. He had previously worked as informant both for British Intelligence as well as for Talat Pasha during the war. Previously, Davidoff had tried to act as a liaison between Young Turk leaders and Lloyd George for several times, but so far with no results. Now in December 1920, Davidoff appeared again claiming that the British invited Talat for a meeting in Lausanne. But Talat did not necessarily trust Davidoff’s offer and thus politely refused it. Nonetheless, Talat entrusted Davidoff a letter of recommendation. «Bearer of this letter Monsieur Davidoff is my friend», wrote Talat on December 27, 1920. «He is aware of my opinions and my beliefs about the policy that Turkey should follow towards England.» British Intelligence reported that Talat Pasha «wishes to make special agreements with England». «Also if England agrees», Talat offered «the policy of the Moslems in Turkestan and the Caucasus will immediately become anti-Bolshi». But senior voices in the Foreign

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244 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 127–29.
247 Talat Pasha, letter (Garmisch-Patenkirchen) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 18, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 182–84.
248 Quoted in Mr. A. Davidoff, an expose (Paris) concerning the Turkish Question to the Foreign Office (London), November 17, 1921, FO 371/6580, 12737, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 4, 81.
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Office noted that they do not «want to complicate the present situation by opening negotiation with Talaat.» Later it was rumored that Davidoff had a role in Talat Pasha’s assassination, because he would later be seen also in Rome during the assassination of former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha. However, this appears to be a mere coincidence, as Davidoff was in Rome to convince the Kemalist representative Cami Bey to continue with Talat Pasha’s plan and reach an Anglo-Turkish agreement. British documents show that Davidoff was neither a spy nor did he have anything to with Talat Pasha’s or Said Halim Pasha’s assassination other than the coincidence of having been in Berlin and Rome.

Other geopolitical shifts had occurred in the meantime as well. In late October 1920, Alexander, the King of Greece, had died after peculiar incident where he was bitten by his pet monkey. In his place former king in exile, Constantine, was recalled by the royalists to take the crown. One of Constantine’s close associates in exile was General Ioannis Metaxas, later dictator of Greece. Metaxas was a German-educated military officer who had opposed the Greek invasion of Anatolia. Talat Pasha met with General (and later dictator) Ioannis Metaxas in Berlin. Metaxas sent a message to that he did not want to visit Talat at his home for the fear of being seen. Thus, the two men arranged to meet at the house of Madame Wangenheim. Once the two men were left alone, Metaxas told Talat that both the Turks

250 İsmail Canbulat, letter (Rome) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 23, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 444–46.
251 Mr. A. Davidoff, an expose (Paris) concerning the Turkish Question to the Foreign Office (London), November 17, 1921, FO 371/6580, 12737, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 4, 82.
252 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009), 432.
255 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 86–87; Herbert, Ben Kendim, 325. However, neither the meeting with Talat Pasha nor his visit to Berlin is not mentioned, but Metaxas wrote one day before departing for Greece on November 16, 1920, in his diary: «Wrangel was destroyed. The Bolsheviks were united with Kemal. How will Gounaris [the Greek new Prime Minister] or the others hold before the upcoming storm?» Ioannis Metaxas, To Prosopiko tou Imerologio, 4 vols. (Athens: Govostis Publications, 1951–1964), II, 640. Reference by courtesy of Yannis Skalidakis.
and the Greeks were played against each other by the Great Powers. After some rather «academic» elaborations on possible points of conflict and cooperation, Talat, again, told that he was not entitled to engage in official negotiations on behalf of the Ankara Government.256

A German friend of his, Admiral Hofmann (or perhaps Alfred Hopman) brought one day a Russian General, to Talat Pasha’s apartment in Berlin, as the former Grand Vizier was still alive. In November 1920, General Wrangel and his White Army including their families had found refuge in Constantinople.257 The Russian General had only recently arrived from Constantinople and belonged to the trusted friends of General Wrangel. He told Talat that Wrangel’s army was ready to serve under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and fight against the Allied and Greek occupation. Talat answered that he was not entitled to give a definitive answer and gave him contact address of the Kemalist delegation in Rome.258 In Moscow, Enver also heard the news that the Wrangel army in Constantinople was looking for a new vocation. Dr. Nazım tells that they heard of rumors that the Greeks had expressed interest in utilizing the Wrangel forces as a foreign legion against the Turkish national forces. Indeed, there were such rumors in Constantinople so that the British occupation forces censored this news in the press.259 One of Wrangel’s senior officers had offered the forces also to Enver. Also, the Bolsheviks had interest in these forces. A former Ottoman officer from Albania, a certain Ekrem Bey, was also in Moscow and offered to start a revolt in Ionnina (Yanya). Therefore, Enver ordered Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir to organize Muslims of Bulgaria for a guerilla war against Greece. Enver told this all to ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha. Enver also gave the name of the man, Naim Cevad, he sent to Constantinople to negotiate with the Wrangel forces.260 However on April 29, Naim Cevad was arrested in Amasra at the Anatolian Black

256 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 2, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 177–78.


258 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 2, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 177. British Intelligence reports that Talat was approached by the Russian Monarchist Delegation in Paris as well, but «refused to deal with them». Intelligence report (Constantinople), March 23, 1921, FO 371/6509, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 3, 270.

259 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eycil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 338; Nur Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 117.

260 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Anakara) to Ali Fuad Pasha (Moscow), May 10, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 41. See also: Cebesoy, Moskova Hattraları, 192.
Sea Coast for propaganda activities on behalf of Enver Pasha. Turkish Intelligence also approved that he was on his way to meet with Wrangel’s men in Constantinople, but it was rather the program of the People Councils Party he was distributing, which caught the attention of the officials.\(^{261}\) This Naim Cevad affair made Enver very frustrated.\(^{262}\) There were also contacts to Anton Denikin and members of the White movement among the White Russian exile community in Constantinople. But as Enver explained, the CUP branches decided to not to get involved, because it might have complicated the good relations to the Soviets.\(^{263}\)

Developments in Iraq were troubling British decision-makers as well. There were rumors that the Kemalists were trying to promote Sheikh Ahmed Sharif al-Senussi as the new «King of Iraq».\(^{264}\) Only last year, the Sharifian Prince Abdullah was proclaimed as the King of Iraq in March 1920 by the Iraqi Congress. As this recent appointment double-crossed previous arrangements with Britain, Abdullah had refused the crown. Since the end of the war, Iraq has been under military administration of the India Office. After his defeat against the French in July 1920, the exiled King of Syria, Abdullah’s brother Faysal, was preferred by the British officials in Baghdad as the best candidate for the post of the new Iraqi monarch. Sheikh Senussi’s claim for the Iraqi throne challenged these plans. Senussi enjoyed a popularity in the Middle East as a revolutionary-religious leader with strong ties to Kemalists and Unionists. According to news which the CUP leaders received, Sheikh Senussi made a visit to British occupied Mosul where he called the Iraqi Muslims to wage a jihad against the British, which highly alarmed the British officials there. Allegedly, a representative of Sheikh Sennusi even proposed to open a branch of Enver Pasha’s Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in Mosul.\(^{265}\)

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\(^{261}\) Intelligence report sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Eastern Front Command, June 11, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 121.


\(^{263}\) Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanıoğlu, *İtilahta Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 80.


\(^{265}\) This news about Sheikh Senussi’s approach to the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies is approved also in Cevad Naim Bey, letter (Moscow) to Halil Pasha (Tuapse), April 22, 1921, in ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 118.
of the Ankara government was invited to London and why Talat Pasha was approached by the British in early 1921.266

In February 1921, Talat Pasha, once again, asked his British informant in Berlin to arrange a meeting with his old friend Aubrey Herbert.267 On February 21, 1921, Major Timothy Florence Breen from the British Military Mission came to Shakib Arslan’s apartment and told him that he was looking for Talat everywhere. Talat was in Munich. He needed to find Talat and arrange a meeting.268 To his surprise, Talat received a positive answer from London this time. Aubrey Herbert would meet Talat in Germany.

I must spare a moment to introduce Aubrey Herbert (1880-1923) who is considered as one of the archetypical British «gentleman spies».269 Like many other gentleman spies, most notably T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) with whom he was also friends, Herbert belonged to the British upper class and was trained in elite schools like Eton and Oxford. He was a true Orientalist, both in the intellectual and imperialist sense of the term. He spoke Turkish, Arabic, Greek, and Albanian and had widely traveled far corners of the Near and Middle East and made friends in important places, including among Albanian nationalists and Young Turks. Like many other Orientalists, Herbert constructed his eccentric selfhood based on his intuitive understanding of everything Oriental, which qualified him as an expert in political and military affairs related to the Near and Middle East.270 Although he never occupied senior government posts, he was an imperial jack-of-all-trades in professional terms. He was a member of the parliament from the Conservative Party from 1911 until his death in 1923. Although mostly a «backbench» parliamentarian, he was not afraid to march to different tunes

266 Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey, report on Anatolia, Iraq, and Syria (Berlin or Munich) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-56.
267 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 12, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 179–81. See also: Talat Pasha, letter (Garmisch-Patenkirchen) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 18, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 182–84.
268 Report to the Auswärtiges Amts on Major Breen’s meeting with Emir Shakib Arslan (Berlin), February 23, 1921, in ZMO, NGH 01-24, 054.
270 Satia, Spies in Arabia, 133.
and follow «maverick» projects. Herbert also had a long working relationship with the Foreign Office as a diplomat. He was a former attaché in Tokyo and Constantinople and otherwise he acted as a voluntary informant on foreign affairs and on distant lands he traveled. During the Great War he returned to his old unit of Irish Guards. First, he fought with his unit in France and was wounded. Then he found his true vocation as an intelligence officer in the Middle East for the War Office and the Admiralty. He was nearly in all of the major battles in which the British fought against the Ottomans. He served first at the notorious espionage hub of the Middle East, the Arab Bureau in Cairo. After that he was a liaison officer for the Admiralty during the Gallipoli campaign, negotiating with the Ottoman command. During the decisive battle of Kut in 1916 he served as an intelligence officer in Mesopotamia. As a supporter of subaltern struggles from Yemen to Ireland, Aubrey Herbert was also a prominent advocate of Albanian independence and he was, hence, proposed by his Albanian friends as the man who would be the king of Albania. His legacy as the «gentleman spy» has been manifested even in his lifetime in his friend John Buchan’s spy-thriller Greenmantle. Buchan’s literary figure of Sandy Arbuthnot, the polyglot master-spy and eccentric connoisseur of Oriental intrigues from Yemen to Albania was based foremost on Aubrey Herbert.

In London, Sir Basil Thomson invited Aubrey Herbert for a meeting at the Scotland Yard. After the reorganization of the British intelligence community in 1919, Thomson was not only the head of the Special Branch at Scotland Yard but now also the newly created Director of Intelligence at the Home Office. Thus, not only the secret police and its executive powers, but also the whole intelligence apparatus related to homeland security was under his command. Thomson had been quite active in counter-espionage activities during the war years, dealing with Ottoman-German operations against British India as well as with Irish revolutionaries. But now in the post-war era the purpose of the newly structured intelligence com-

274 Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 68.
munity was more occupied with the Bolshevik «menace». Thomson was known to be a ma-
nipulative and ruthless career bureaucrat.275 We still do not know why, but it was Thomson
who granted Talat Pasha’s request and asked Herbert to go to Germany and get in touch
with the fugitive Young Turk leader. Herbert was curious to see Talat again, but he had
reservations against Lloyd George and his government.276 When Herbert shared this secret
assignment with his trusted friend Lord Robert Cecil, the latter responded: «Good Heavens!
Who on earth runs our Foreign Policy? Scotland Yard?»277

On February 26, 1921, Herbert travelled to a small town called Hamm in Germany, which
he describes as «a miserable industrial village, that seemed to be inhabited by potential sui-
cides.»278 Talat Pasha had received a telegram informing him about Herbert’s coming, so he
traveled from Garmisch-Partenkirchen to Berlin and then to Hamm.279 When he and Talat
met at the hotel that evening, Herbert remembers Talat as follows:

He had grown much thinner, and his good looks were sinister; his black hair was turning
grey; his eyes were very bright, glittering while he talked like the eyes of a wild animal in
the dusk. The urbanity of his manners remained the same. He was neat and well dressed,
but obviously poor.280

At that night, the two old friends talked briefly. Talat presented his position on the Armenian
Question, which still corresponds to the «official» Turkish stories of Armenian treason and
governmental incapability. The next day the two men took the train to Düsseldorf to escape
the depressive atmosphere of Hamm. They conversed the whole day enjoying each other’s
company.281 Talat was sweet-talking the relations between Young Turks and the British Em-
pire in hope of reenacting a Turco-English rapprochement. In his opinion, the Young Turks

273 On his Sir Basil Thomson’s career see: Jeffrey Bloomfield, “The Rise and Fall of Basil Thomson, 1861–
1939,” Journal of the Police History Society 12 (1997): 11–19; Victor Madeira, “‘No Wishful Thinking
Allowed’: Secret Service Committee and Intelligence Reform in Great Britain, 1919–23,” Intelligence and
274 Herbert did not necessarily felt comfortable in doing undercover work for Lloyd George’s government, so
that he asked for a written confirmation for his assignment and received one. Herbert, Ben Kendim, 308.
275 Quoted in FitzHerbert, The Man Who Was Greenmantle, 232.
276 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 308.
277 Talat Pasha, letter (Düsseldorf) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 27, 1921, in Yalçın and
Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 184–85.
278 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 308. Compare also Herbert’s diary entry after his first acquaintance with Talat Bey
in 1908: «His face oval and sallow, with a wide forehead and very thick hair, heavy eyebrows and a hawk
nose; a light in his eyes, rarely seen in men but sometimes in animals in dusk». Quoted in FitzHerbert, The
Man Who Was Greenmantle, 83.
279 FitzHerbert, The Man Who Was Greenmantle, 234.
and the British were reluctant antagonists and it was a misfortune that they fell apart before
the war. «We Young Turks practically offered Turkey to you, and you refused us», said Ta-
lat.282 He wished England to support Turkey once again. Otherwise, he declared, «Turkey is
at war with England».283 Talat was openly threatening with guerilla warfare from Anatolia to
Central Asia:

Our geography is a fortress to us—a very strong one. Our mountains are the strongest of
our forces. You cannot pursue us into the mountains of Asia; and stretching back into
Central Asia are six republics, composed of men of our blood, cousins, if not brothers,
and united now by the bond of misfortune.284

This guerilla warfare was like a «child’s game» (jeu de gamin), as Talat beautifully put it and
«compared it to cutting telegraph wires». «That might do very little damage», Talat explained
«but, on the other hand, it might do a great deal of harm.»285 He continued and frankly
admitted: «we are engaged in propaganda throughout the East, and inciting India, though
not very effectually […] pursuing a policy of enlisting as many people […] against Great
Britain, and undertaking all possible reprisals open to her.»286 The solution to this problem
was, however, simple. Talat assured Herbert that «the trouble in India would cease automati-
cally when [the British] entered into friendly relations with Turkey.»287 When he spoke of
Turkey, it was never clear what he actually meant, whether the Ankara government or rather
the CUP networks inside and outside Turkey, or maybe both. But this ambiguity was exactly
the reason behind his elusive power. In Talat’s explanations, everything was neatly connected
with each other: the CUP, the Kemalists, and even India. And this corresponded to the par-
anoid imagination of British Intelligence. Talat himself presented his purpose and position
in these political arrangements and entanglements literally very central: «I do not want power
or office», said he, «I speak for myself, but I am in the centre of things.»288

While Muslim insurgencies were spreading from North Africa to India since 1919, Talat and
his friends—despite their wide-reaching network—had practically no active play in these
uprisings, as we have seen in the previous chapters. But somehow, they convinced their

282 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 310.
283 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 320.
284 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 319.
285 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 320.
286 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 320.
287 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 323.
288 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 327.
friends and foes (and perhaps even themselves) that they had a voice in these complex incidents. In fact, their voice was now being heard, maybe not necessarily in Tripoli, Baghdad, or Hyderabad, but in London.

At the end of their two-day conversations both men went separate ways with the shared hope that their talk might bring back order to the Middle East. «The interview with my friend in Düsseldorf took place a little more seriously and thoroughly», wrote Talat to Cavid. «In sum, for our part we gave our assurance and for his part he gave his trust.»289 Talat was very pleased with the conversation as he told his friends afterwards in Berlin.290 And Herbert, on the other hand, truly wanted to believe that Talat had no play in the Armenian massacres. Herbert was still convinced that Talat «had rare power and attraction» and he possessed the ways and means to steer the chaos back into order. Despite all the odds, the mutually cherished charisma, chutzpah, and fantasy of both men seem to have painted them an optimistic picture of the near future. The Auswärtiges Amt was well informed about Talat’s talk with Herbert so that we can assume that Talat or his followers shared this information also with the Germans:

But that also the British government judged this relationship [between Talat and Mustafa Kemal] quite different […], may be appreciated from the fact that in March [sic, February] this year the member of the House of Commons Mr. Herbert met in Dusseldorf with Talat to ask him on behalf of the British Government to use its influence for the means of the English demands submitted in Angora. According to statements of Mr. Herbert, the British would have nothing against Talat’s return to Turkey. Similar overtures have been repeatedly offered to the former Great Vizier also by the British Embassy [in Berlin].291

As a Turcophile imperial Orientalist Herbert saw what he calls «the chasm that separates us from Turkey and from Islam» and hoped for ways to abridge this gap. He believed that Talat might have been a possibility to do so. However, he also saw major obstacles, but rather in «the incompetency of Mr. Lloyd George and his Government».292 When Herbert arrived back to London, he wrote in his diary some curious things:

Friday March 4th, 1921. Reached London on Tuesday, wrote my report that night and Wednesday morning, sent it in yesterday. To-day, I went to see Sir Basil Thomson, to

289 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), March 7, 1921, in Yüksek ve Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 185.
290 Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 176–79.
291 Note to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1921, PA-AA, R 30648, K016873.
292 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 328.
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tell him that I thought that he much better send it to Lord Curzon. It seemed to me much better to meet trouble half-way. [Sir Allen] Leeper dined last night. I saw he knew something. He is a curious fellow, all light and no heat, all brain no soul, and an Australian accent in his heart. Basil Thomson quite agreed with me. He also seemed to have given it away [to Curzon], pretty freely, on his own, but said that he had been going to write and ask me if he could not do what I suggested.293

Somehow Herbert was uncomfortable, how things were done behind the curtains of Britain’s new intelligence community, where he seems to have had limited access to higher echelons of decision-making.

293 Aubrey Herbert Papers, quoted in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 174–75.
10. Ides of March: 
Talat Pasha’s Assassination as a Contentious Site of 
Transnational Activism

On March 15, 1921, a young Armenian student by the name of Soghomon Tehlirian murdered a man on a busy street in Berlin. The victim was no other than Talat Pasha. The German court would later let Tehlirian go without any punishment, citing his psychological instability resulting from his genocidal trauma. After Talat’s murder, some other former decision-makers of the Young Turk regime, too, fell victim to Armenian avengers. For a long time, these political assassinations were understood as singular and unconnected acts of revenge carried out by traumatized Armenian survivors. As for some contemporary observers, on the other hand, these political assassinations were part of a larger conspiracy—claims that remained long unconfirmed. The cloak of mystery was unveiled after the publication of the memoirs of some of the Armenian revolutionaries in the second half of the twentieth century. The proud confessions revealed that the assassinations were part of a clandestine campaign of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Hêghapkhôgan Tashnagtsutiu, ARF), also known as Tashnagstutyun or the Tashnags. The code name of this secret mission was «Operation Nemesis».

1 Even children and grandchildren of some ARF members associated with the Operation Nemesis learned about the role of their fathers and grandparents decades later. Marian Mersobian MacCurdy, Sacred Justice: The Voices and Legacy of the Armenian Operation Nemesis (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2015). 2 Jacques Derogy, a French investigative journalist showed the broader public in 1986 that actually ARF’s clandestine network was behind the revenge killings. Derogy was inspired by the work of renowned scholar of irregular warfare Gérard Chailand and genocide scholar Yves Ternon. With the help of Tashnag expert Gerard Libaridian, Derogy conducted archival research in the ARF archives in Boston. He also critically
The Operation Nemesis was a social movement campaign by the ARF, utilizing what social scientist call «clandestine political violence» in order to call world-wide attention to the Armenian Question.\(^3\) The use of political violence was a concerted communicative performance of claim-making. The story of Talat Pasha’s assassination is deeply entangled in nationalist narratives, both Turkish and Armenian. As I will show, the assassination of Talat Pasha shows remarkably how political interactions and performances can immediately be entangled in the imagination of political conspiracies and framing of public discourses. I will argue that there is a connected and complex framework of transnational contentious politics that elaborates the dialectic processes of sense-making.\(^4\)

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«I have regarded the assassin organizations as illusion, as phantasm, as exalted opinion of individuals who generalized some symptoms», German statesman Gustav Stresemann said on July 5, 1922, after he survived an assassination attempt. «I must note with deep shock that I can no longer hold on to this assessment.»\(^5\) Rationalization and disenchantment of politics dismissed conspiracy theories, as science had dismissed folk belief. But conspiracies were still very much real in times of mass politics. While the CUP leaders were secretly conspiring schemes in Berlin, they were themselves the target of other conspiracies. Armenian triangulated his findings with the narratives found in the published Armenian memoirs. Although the result failed to meet academic standards, his book was, nevertheless, able to illustrate that it was a concerted and premediated plot behind the assassinations, which Armenian nationalist narratives had long subdued and forgotten. Jacques Derogy, *Opération Némésis: Les vengeurs arméniens* (Paris: Fayard, 1986). For its English translation see: Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations*, ed. A. M. Berrett (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990).

\(^3\) I prefer to use Donatella della Porta’s term «clandestine political violence» instead of the term «terrorism». Donatella Della Porta, *Clandestine Political Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6–11. Although the Armenian revolutionaries themselves used the term «derroreh» to describe their (heroic) violent acts, the term has a very derogative and ambiguous connotation which makes it a contested analytical concept. Khachig Tololyan, “Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 2 (1992): 13.


\(^5\) Quoted in Emil Julius Gumbel, *Vier Jahre politischer Mord* (Berlin: Verlag der neuen Gesellschaft, 1922), 124. Streseman was referring here to the secret societies of the political right, which were responsible for many political murders since the November Revolution and even attempted to kill him on June 4, 1922. Heinrich Hannover and Elisabeth Hannover-Drück, *Politisiche Justiz 1918–1933* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1966), 124–28.
«ghosts», secret agents and assassins of the ARF, were shadowing them. The story of these ARF agents complements the story of the CUP in the aftermath of World War I and reveals the dynamics and dialectic of transnational contentious politics.

In the second half of 1920, the Armenian Republic was already doomed, stuck between the advancing Kemalist and Bolshevik forces. Although the Sèvres treaty had promised the foundation of an independent Armenia in Anatolia, the Turks had been very successful in their military offensive, sealing the tragic fate of Western Armenia for good. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, approved to be eager on Sovietizing the young Republic of Armenia. The chaos of the aftermath of World War I therefore cast dark clouds over the Armenian Question. Armenians had to demonstrate their resistance. The more they would politically mobilize against the crimes they suffered, the more they would find support to establish a new national homeland in the post-war settlement—so they hoped.

Although Western newspapers—echoing their governments—had long been calling that «Talaat and his evil associates […] will be hunted down and treated as common murderers by the avenging powers», nothing serious had happened yet to bring them to justice. The courts martial of 1919-1920 did not produce a satisfying verdict, as the responsible CUP leaders, who escaped the prosecutions, were moving freely in their semi-illegal exile in Germany, and the other accused CUP members imprisoned in Malta were not effectively being put on trial. Because of the lack of international structures and determination that would

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bring war criminals to justice, the ARF decided to privatize the punishment of war criminals by assassinating high-value targets as symbolic acts of revenge and justice.\(^{10}\) In the vernacular language of the ARF, the «debt» needed to be cleared off.\(^{11}\) The CUP had to be punished and the ARF had to take it into its own hands—not only for vengeance, but to call for attention for the political cause and to mobilize political and social resources.

A renowned expert of Turkish-Armenian relations, Raymond Kérvorkian beautifully put it when he said: «You must understand. The Tashnags and the Ittihad, they were like lovers who hated one another.»\(^{12}\) And if men like Talat Pasha from the CUP had their love-hate counterparts in the ARF, one man particularly comes to mind, namely Karekin Pastermadjian, also known under his nom de guerre Armen Garo.\(^{13}\)

The spectacular life history of Armen Garo shows how far individual men can develop political agency in complex historical contexts. As a student, Armen Garo was already a well-known activist within the ARF circles in Anatolia and Europe. As a young man, he became one of the notorious fedayis of the ARF, including his prominent participation in the Ottoman Bank hostage crises of 1896. In political exile in Europe, he rose to top positions within the ARF. After the 1908 revolution, he became a member of the Ottoman parliament where he cultivated close ties to the CUP in general and Talat Pasha in particular. With the outbreak of the war in 1914, Armen Garo had a controversial part to play in the Young Turk decision-making processes, as he was one of the most prominent Tashnags who deserted to

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\(^{11}\) See for instance: Armen Garo, letter (Paris) to the ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), June 4, 1919, quoted in Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge*, 58. The metaphor of «debt» or sometimes also referred as «blood debt» frames the killing of the perpetuators as an «honor killing».


Russia in order to join the Armenian Volunteer Units against the Ottoman Empire. He was traumatized by the news of the massacres in Western Armenia and his health suffered immensely which would never really recover once again. After the collapse of Tsarist Russia, he became the first ambassador of the Armenian Republic to the United States. Despite occupying a prominent diplomatic position, Armen Garo did not put away his komitadji/fedayi persona. Thus, it was none other than Armen Garo who masterminded the Operation Nemesis. If Armen Garo had to name his personal nemesis looking back to his life, this was surely Talat.

In October 1919, it was decided at the General Congress of the ARF in Yerevan to centralize the use of political executions and assassinations. There was some opposition, but Armen Garo and his sidekick Shahan Natalie (Hagop Ter Hagopian) from the US Central Committee convinced the majority of the delegates for an operation of vengeance. The congress adopted a secret assassination program under the code name Operation Nemesis. The ARF started to collect the names of war criminals in so-called death lists. In all the lists, the undisputed number one was Talat Pasha.

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16 From then on each regional central committee would be accountable to the party congress for their political executions. Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 60.
17 Interestingly, in November 12, 1919, the former Ottoman Foreign Minister Gabriel Noradungyan contacted Cavid Bey in Switzerland and asked him to mark the names of those from the list who were not associated with the Armenian deportations. Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, 4 vols., ed. Hasan Babacan and Servet Aşar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014–2015), IV, 39. There were many such lists with certain variations in circulation among ARF networks and sometimes forwarded to Allied powers to support their persecution of the Young Turk perpetuators. The original list was prepared by Manoog Hampartsumian in December 1918. See: Armenian Revolutionary Federation, “A List of Those Responsible for the Massacres and Deportations of the Armenians,” Armenian Review 35, 3, 4 (1982): 290. For Shahan Natalie’s handwritten version of Hampartsumian’s “The One Hundred List” found in the private papers of Aaron Sachaklian see: MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 116–117, 143–147. See also: Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 59.
18 Operation Nemesis is sometimes also associated with the killing of two leaders of the Azerbaijani Equality Party (Musavat Partiyası) who played key roles in the fall of Baku to the Ottoman Army in September 1918. On June 19, 1920, Fatali Khan Khoyski, a former minister in the Azerbaijan People’s Republic, was killed by twenty years old Aram Yerganian in Tiflis. Later in July 18, 1921, the former Azerbaijani minister of interior Behbud Khan Javanshir was assassinated by Misak Torlakyan outside the Hotel Pera Palace in Constantinople. Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 60–61, 117–121. Also the execution of at least three Armenian collaborators are associated with the work of Operation Nemesis. Hmayag Aramianz, the traitor in Hnchak Party’s 1914 assassination plot against Talat Pasha, was executed by Arshag Yazdian. Vahe Ihsan Yesayan, a collaborator accused of helping the Ottoman officials in preparing the list of arrests of Armenian
As Armen Garo and Shahan Natalie received their mandate for their «special mission» (in Armenian: hadug kordz), they chose Boston as their headquarters. ¹⁹ In this «special corps» (in Armenian: hadug marmin) Armen Garo would be the head of the operation, i.e. the guide.²⁰ Shahan Natalie, former editor of the Hairenik (Fatherland) newspaper in Boston, was the professionally devoted master-spy collecting intelligence and coordinating the operation in the field. Hamo Paragharnian was the secretary of ARF’s central committee of America and the liaison officer between the ARF and «Garo’s mission». Public accountant Aaron Sachaklian was the meticulous head of financial and logistical matters. The operation was funded by a «special fund» (in Armenian: hadug kumar) sponsored mostly by American-Armenians.²¹ All they needed was volunteers:

We need three members with the following qualifications: someone who has attended military officers school, a gunsmith, a chemist who knows how to work with explosives. These people must be prepared to work unconditionally and to give their lives. Please send names of nominees so a list may be prepared. Of course, this is to remain secret. Your nominees should be bachelors.²²

One of these young bachelors was Soghomon Tehlirian. He was born in 1896 near Erzincan in the Erzurum Province at the frontier to Russian Caucasus. As a young man he went to Serbia to study mechanical engineering. During World War I he traveled to Tiflis and joined the ranks of the Armenian Volunteer Units of the Russian armed forces, fighting against the Ottoman Empire. In March 1916, as Tehlirian entered his destroyed hometown together with the Russian forces, he found out that his whole family was perished and their house was now a Russian barracks for soldiers. Like many survivors, despite many searches he never saw a family member ever again. From this moment on Tehlirian suffered from epileptic seizures,
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anxiety attacks, and hallucinations and nightmares with images of his dead family members. Especially the image of his mother continued to haunt him. In his sense, this opportunity was a supernatural call to avenge for his family.23

After the end of the war, Tehlirian travelled to Constantinople. In the Ottoman capital, he was soon recruited by an Hnchag-turned-Tashnag activist Yeranuhi Danielian.24 She convinced Tehlirian to kill the Armenian collaborator Harutiun Meqerdichian. One night without an order from anyone, Tehlirian shot and wounded Meqerdichian to death.25 After this successful assassination attempt, Danielian recommended Tehlirian to be recruited to the «special corps» of Operation Nemesis.26 Tehlirian traveled to Paris in order to receive further instructions by the ARF. After some desperate weeks without a clue where to start from, Tehlirian was contacted by an emissary of ARF’s Boston cell and was invited to the US by Hamo Paraghamian.27 The delegation of the Armenian Republic organized him a passport and a ticket on board of the Olympic. After arriving in the US on August 25, 1920, he traveled to Boston. There in the building of the newspaper Hairenik, he met Hamo Paraghamian and Armen Garo. He received his instructions from Garo.28 He was given many photographs of the Young Turk leaders and their wives to memorize their faces.29

Meanwhile, Shahan Natali, the field operator of the operation, travelled to Europe to collect intelligence on the whereabouts of the Young Turk fugitives and to coordinate Tehlirian’s operation on the ground.30 Traveling to Paris and Geneva, Natali was able to collect crucial intelligence. He learned that Talat Pasha visited Zurich in early September 1920 undercover as an old hoça by the name of Reşid Şemsı Abdülkadir to meet with Necmeddin Molla.31 Natali was getting intelligence over an asset who had bribed an official from the Swiss secret

24 Avakian, The Cross and the Crescent, 47–53.
26 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 139.
27 Hanemian [Ardavazt Hanumian], cable (Paris) to Armen Garo (Washington, DC), July 28, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 164.
28 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 141–42.
29 In Aaron Sachaklian’s private papers, for instance, there are sixty-five photos of Turkish targets. MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 148.
30 Armen Garo, letter (Washington, DC) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), July 23, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 163.
31 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 26, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 179–80.
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In autumn 1920, Soghomon Tehlirian returned to Paris, where the ARF supplied him a fake Persian passport to guarantee that he would not be handed over to Ottoman officials, had he got arrested. Tehlirian managed to get his papers so that he could get a visa from the Swiss Embassy in Paris, on November 17, 1920.\textsuperscript{34} From Paris, Tehlirian travelled to Geneva. The ARF headquarters in Geneva were located at the building of the newspaper \textit{Troshag} (Flag).\textsuperscript{35} Mr. Anton Kosh, the old caretaker of the \textit{Troshag} facilities, gave Tehlirian a sealed message from Shahan Natali who had left for Berlin:

\begin{quote}
I am your contact, but I could not wait for you, as a comrade sent directly from the Committee in Constantinople has asked me to come at once. He has got onto the track of a ‘relative’ and you should meet him too. You must come here and enroll in the university and resume your mechanical engineering course.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Tehlirian obtained a student visa and left for Berlin on December 2, 1920.\textsuperscript{37} While the Armenian Republic was in great trouble for survival, Armen Garo expressed the emergency of the «special mission» as follows: «If Shahan and S [Soghomon] too don’t live up to our hopes it means we have arrived at a moral bankruptcy.»\textsuperscript{38}

The team Shahan Natali established in Berlin consisted of several persons with different assignments. Natali was the field operative in command, while Tehlirian was the hitman. But

\textsuperscript{32} Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to Aaron Sachaklian (Syracuse), October 4, 1920, in MacCurdy, \textit{Sacred Justice}, 186.
\textsuperscript{33} Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 30, 1920, in MacCurdy, \textit{Sacred Justice}, 182
\textsuperscript{34} Legation of Switzerland in France, letter (Paris) to the Section of Foreign Affairs (Berne), March 19, 1921, BAR, E2001B.1000/1501.323.
\textsuperscript{35} Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 20, 1920, in MacCurdy, \textit{Sacred Justice}, 175. For \textit{Troshag} see: Louise Nalbandian, \textit{The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 217.
\textsuperscript{36} Quoted in Derogy, \textit{Resistance and Revenge}, 73.
\textsuperscript{37} Soghomon Tehlirian, letter (Geneva) to Hamo Paraghamian (Boston), December 1, 1920, in MacCurdy, \textit{Sacred Justice}, 196.
\textsuperscript{38} Armen Garo, letter (Washington, DC) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), November 10, 1920, in MacCurdy, \textit{Sacred Justice}, 192.
there was also Hrach «Hrap» Papazian, codename «the European» because of his gentleman-like demeanor. He was the undercover spy in the Turkish community of Berlin under the assumed name of Mehmed Ali impersonating a Turkish student from a rich family. He was associated with ARF’s «Office in Charge of Assassination» at the building of the Jagadamard (Battlefront) newspaper in Constantinople and was sent to Europe to assist Operation Nemesis. 39 Another member of the group Hagop «Hazor» Zorian, a history student in Berlin, was the contact person of Hrap, alias Mehmed Ali, and Tehlirian’s local guide in Berlin. Vahan «Vaza» Zakarian, one of the founders of the German-Armenian Association, was their contact person in the Armenian community of Berlin and in the Armenophile circles around Johannes Lepsius. His excellent command of German made him the key asset in gathering intelligence from Germans and in making logistical arrangements. He would later act as Tehlirian’s interpreter in the trial. Not without a reason, one of Tehlirian’s lawyers Dr. Kurt Neimayer would even say in court: «Mr. Zachariantz reads the words from the defendant’s lips.» 40 The diplomatic delegation of the crumbling Armenian Republic, especially vice consul Libarit Nazarian and his secretary Yervant Apelian, was helping the Operation Nemesis agents by transmitting their ciphered messages to Geneva, Boston, and Yerevan. 41 Meanwhile, Tehlirian enrolled at the university in Berlin as a mechanical engineering student and engaged in activities to establish an alibi for being a foreign student in Berlin by befriending other Armenian students, going to dance classes, and taking German lessons. 42

Shahan Natali’s experience with transnational clandestine activism corresponds to the experience of CUP fugitives in establishing their networks in Europe. Travel was time consuming, visas were hard to obtain, letters took long to reach their recipient, wired correspondence could be intercepted, cash was in short supply but always needed in great amounts to make things happen, fake identities were necessary as protection and disguise, gathered intelligence was often contradictory or unreliable, trustworthy helpers were hard to find, and bureaus were necessary to keep constant communication with different centers and agents. But most

39 Shiragian, The Legacy, 121, 132; Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 159; Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 74.
41 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 159; Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 77.
42 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 35–42.
of all, contingencies and coincidences determined the course of events—or in Natali’s own words:

Under the present circumstances it’s about 30 hours from Geneva to Berlin. Germany allows entry for only seven days, although I was successful in receiving a one-month conditional pass. Imagine that during the time I was in Berlin that news had reached me and I needed to arrive in Switzerland; under the fastest conditions I am able to arrive in three days, and by then the individuals in question move from one place to the other or they return to Germany, so that my work becomes tied to chance. So I am under these conditions. In order to overcome at least in part those difficulties, it is necessary that I have a working partner whom I can use as needed; then my money at my disposal must always be plentiful, so that he gets to assist me by the force of that money. Up until now I have already allocated to the work the equivalent of 1000 Swiss francs through someone else.43

Especially Natali’s letters are remarkable in that they show how far transnational contentious politics was subject to the contingencies on the ground. He reported that «there are many difficulties that one cannot understand until they are subjected to these difficulties.» He adds that «if in advance the conditions had been a little familiar» to him he «would have absolutely arranged things differently.»44 With all their secrecy procedures and clandestine networks, Shahan Natali and his team members in Berlin were already ahead of their preys, who had long become sloppy with their clandestine tradecraft.

There is a tendency in the literature telling the story of the Operation Nemesis to claim that the fugitives CUP leaders were enjoying a well-protected and luxurious life in Berlin.45 The financial situation of the Young Turks in exile is an important matter of contention. Contrary to common wisdom, however, neither did the CUP leaders enjoyed the full support of the German government, nor did they have millions in gold in secret bank accounts. Most of these claims can be traced back to rumors and gossip circulated by anti-CUP politicians and publicists.46 One of the most reoccurring themes in the private correspondence of the fugitive

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44 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 30, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 183.
45 For instance, despite his otherwise sharp observations, author Eric Bogosian overplays his hand in his book Operation Nemesis, when he claims: «In contrast, Talat and his comrades had surrounded themselves with a well-organized underground network of former police, spies, and diplomats as well as full, if unacknowledged, support of the German government. Swiss and German bank accounts holding millions in gold would sustain the Ittihad exiles, while the Nemesis conspirators relied on an austere budget of thousands of dollars. While Talat’s cohorts enjoyed the freedom of unrestricted funds, Shahan Natalie would have to argue for every penny spent, down to the smallest purchase.» Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 151.
46 Rumors that Talat Pasha was living a life of luxury were wide spread. Even the Ankara Government had intelligence that Talat Pasha was «living rather sumptuous.» Kazım Karabekir, summary (Kars) of İbrahim Tali’s intelligence from Tuapse to Fevzi Pasha, March 25, 1921, ATASE, İSH, Kutu 619, Gömlek 34.
CUP leaders is their lack of financial resources. According to Dr. Nazım, Talat Pasha brought with him around 70,000 Mark from Constantinople. Few months before his death, the money was already spent. Talat was supporting his life by selling his golden cigarette cases and his medals and his wife’s jewelry. His mother and two sisters in Constantinople were also now selling their valuables to survive.47 Talat was also indebted to some of his friends.48 The fact that Talat had serious financial troubles, does not necessarily mean that he lived a parsimonious life. The Nemesis agents did find the Young Turk exiles settled in a comfortable social life in Berlin—especially given that they were internationally wanted war criminals and seasoned revolutionaries conspiring for a world revolution.

In telling his story decades later, Shahan Natali once said: «Killing Talaat was the easiest thing if only we recognized him… Even his name had been changed».49 Nevertheless, it proved to be a less difficult undertaking to recognize Talat Pasha and his friends in post-war Berlin. Talat was living incognito in Berlin «to obviate embarrassing the German Authorities.» With his fake identity Talat managed to travel to Italy and Switzerland. One of his fake papers was issued for «Monsieur Dupont a Swiss subject». «His identity was fairly secure», as Talat told around. «In Rome a lady remarked his resemblance to Talaat Pasha!», he told light-heartedly to a British informant.50

With the arrival of their wives and children, they were no more the exiled revolutionaries who played bridge, smoking and drinking until late in the night in their secret club rooms, while conspiring plans about their return to politics. Now with their spouses and children joining their political exile, they were also going out for walks in the park, going to the opera and the movies, receiving friends for dinner parties, and doing touristic trips around the country.51 Talat Pasha’s life in Berlin, for instance, was more settled after the arrival of his wife Hayriye Talat (Bafralı) to a more social and cultural life-style. Talat was known for being

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47 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds. İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 105–8.
49 https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/tribute-to-shahan-natalie#story
50 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 144.
very attached to his wife. Mrs. Talat had secretly fled from Constantinople in 1920 with the help of Count Balduino Caprini, the commander of the Italian occupation forces. The Auswärtiges Amt had intelligence that Talat Pasha was «no. 1 on the death list of Armenian terrorists», as Blücher wrote in his memoir. So they offered Talat to take refuge in a remote widow’s mansion in Mecklenburg, but Talat refused, because he would rather stay at the center of the social life in Berlin. One month before his death, Talat was already complaining that he had too much visits in Berlin so that he was thinking about moving to another more quite town. The CUP leaders ended up living the social life of exiled elder statesmen. For instance, when Talat was once warned by his friends about the Armenian assassins, he is said to have answered:

> It is the responsibility of the German government to save the life of a person that immigrated to Germany as a citizen of an allied country. If Germany is not even strong enough to protect the Grand Vizier of its ally Turkey, what can we all do, when the death comes around?

Even as early as late 1919, there were rumors that Armenian agents were sent to Berlin, disguising as French military officers in order to locate the fugitive CUP leaders, but soon left after failing to locate them. Talat Pasha was known for «not adopting the principle of precaution» and neglecting the tradecraft of revolutionary clandestinity, as Dr. Nazım once wrote. Shakib Arslan similarly recalled that Talat, although being warned about Armenian

52 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992), 33.
55 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 12, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 179–81.
57 Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Masayuki Yamauchi, ed. The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 178. I could not find a clue regarding this in the sources on Operation Nemesis.
58 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 185. Also Murat Bardakçı, the holder of Talat’s collection of private papers, comes to a similar conclusion. Talat Pasha was sending, for instance, a postcard with a photograph showing him and his wife during a trip and he was also sloppy in using his undercover name in his correspondence. See: Bardakçı’s introductory comments to Talat Pasha, postcard (Berlin) to his wife Hayriye (Budapest), October 13, 1920, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-i Metrukesi, 176–77.
threats to his life, soon became sloppy with security precautions and secrecy procedures. 59
When Aubrey Herbert asked him, if he feared assassinations, Talat answered that «he never thought of it». «Why should any one dislike [me]?», asked Talat. Baffled by this response, Herbert said: «Armenians might very well desire vengeance, after all that had been written about [you] in the papers.» But, Talat «brushed this aside.» 60

When Tehlirian arrived in Berlin in December 3, 1920, he met with his contact man in the restaurant of Tiergarten Hotel where he had booked a room. His unnamed contact man showed him a newspaper article written by a certain Mehmed Zeki defaming the Young Turk fugitives in Berlin. 61 Mehmed Zeki was known as a charlatan, as one contemporary observer recalls, whose history «is nothing but a characteristic extract from life as it is lived by hundreds of rogues in the East.» 62 Mehmed Zeki’s polemic book, Bandit Killers as Guests of the German Republic, published in Berlin in 1920 mixed many facts he knew and observed with wild conspiracy theories. 63 Tehlirian’s contact man told:

Zeki may be a charlatan and a turncoat. We know that among the ‹birds of some importanc...}_ladies were doing the dirty work of the CUP in the absence of their leaders. Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmörder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik: Sensationelle
64 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 74.

Accordingly, Hazor, Tehlirian, and others frequently went to a nearby café from where they could easily observe Cemal Azmi’s (no. 40 on the list) tobacco shop. They also followed

61 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 74
62 For this quote and some of the dark details of Mehmed Zeki’s past see: Harry Stuermer, Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel: Skizzen deutsch-jungtürkischer Moral & Politik (Lausanne: Payot, 1917), 120–25; Harry Stuermer, Two Years of War in Constantinople: Sketches of German and Young Turkish Ethics and Politics, with the assistance of E. Allen (London: Hooder et Stoughton, 1917), 138–145, here 141. For his intrigues between Weimar Germany and the Turkish Republic in the mid-1920s see: BOA.HR.İM.132.41; PA-AA, R 30648.
63 According to his allegations the Young Turk fugitives were even smuggling cocaine and arsphenamine. Mehmed Zeki’s wild accusations went even as far as to claim that the Young Turks founded a secret club of female assassins in Constantinople, where «Amazon–like _fedayi_ ladies were doing the dirty work of the CUP in the absence of their leaders. Mehmed Zeki Bey, Raubmörder als Gäste der Deutschen Republik: Sensationelle

suspicious men and women going in and out of the shop. Soon they would first identify a lady they believed to be Enver Pasha’s wife. Enver, no. 3 on the death list, was a more difficult target to locate since he was consistently on the move and many false rumors about his whereabouts were in circulation. The Armenian Vice-Consul advised the Nemesis agents: «I think that Enver will not take the risk of coming to Berlin. Despite the precautions you are taking, the Ittihadists here have smelled a plot. You must restrict your investigations to Talat alone.»

Tehlirian and his partners spotted a man they believed to be Topal İsmail Hakkı Pasha, no. 47 on the list. Hazor soon identified Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, no. 15, coming out of Cemal Azmi’s shop. One day they identified a man walking along Bahaeddin as Dr. Nazım, no. 14, entering an apartment on Uhlandstraße 47. Now their bureau was also discovered. But they all were not high enough on the death list, the group was waiting for the number one—Talat Pasha—to appear.

One day Hrap, alias Mehmed Ali, delivered Hazor an important intelligence, which he gathered from the Young Turk community. The CUP leaders were planning a meeting in couple of days in Rome. Shahan Natali instantly booked a ticket on the same train and found himself in the midst of the Turks in the same compartment. As Bahaeddin Şakir came with his bags, Natali believes to have identified also Bedri Bey, no. 72, next to him. Then just before the train left, a man with a crane appeared on the train station to say goodbye, whom all the other Turks called «Pasha». The Nemesis agents became curious. Tehlirian and his friends followed this «Pasha» from the train station to his apartment at Hardenbergstraße 4, an address they had already came cross several times while following the suspicious customers of the tobacco shop.

Later at his room, Tehlirian compared the man he just saw with photos of Talat Pasha and he was sure that it was Talat—although the famous fez and the mustache were missing. One of the Nemesis agents Vazan went over to the address in the following days impersonating a

65 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 159; Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 77.
66 In Manoog Hampartsoumian’s list İsmail Hakkı is described as the governor of Adana. There must be a mistake. Perhaps these are two different İsmail Hakkıs. MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 145, 377. According to Arif Cemil, Talat Pasha was not very fond of İsmail Hakkı Pasha and was against his coming to Berlin. Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 80–85.
67 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 74–75.
68 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 165; Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 78.
Swiss insurance agent looking for an apartment. The landlady revealed that the nine room apartment was rented by two «polite and refined» Turks, the first a «distinguished trader» by the name of Ali Sai and his wife and the other a physician by the name of Dr. Rüsuhi. Ali Sai was, of course, Talat Pasha. Talat had not registered his address at the Berlin police for two years although this was obligatory to do for foreigners within 48 hours. It was only in late 1920 or early 1921 that he registered himself and his wife for the apartment in Hardenberstraße 4. Peculiarly, the CUP’s central committee member Dr. Rüsuhi (Dikmen) did not even use a cover name, although he was also sentenced to death in absentia by the Ottoman court martial.

When Shahan Natali returned from Rome, Tehlirian informed him about the new evidence leading to Hardenbergstraße 4, which was reported to Geneva, Boston, Paris and Constantinople. From ARF’s Geneva headquarters, they received a message which reported that Talat Pasha was seen in front of the British consulate in Geneva a month earlier, hence making the Nemesis agents unsure, whether they were on the right track. Later in early March 1921, the Nemesis agents received a critical telegram via Paris and Geneva from the ARF headquarters in Constantinople: «The comrades confirmed that Talat lives in Berlin at Hardenberg 4 under the pseudonym Ali Salih Bey and asked that the Talat affair be ended through all possible measures.»

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It was a busy morning on Tuesday, March 15, 1921, at the apartment of Talat Pasha at the Hardenbergstraße 4. Talat Pasha and his wife were awaiting guests for lunch, namely Dr.

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70 In the primary sources of Operation Nemesis Talat Pasha’s cover name is given for some reason as Ali Salih, but all other sources confirm rather Ali Sai, therefore I corrected it here.

71 Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 132.

72 Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge*, 82. Talat Pasha was indeed in Switzerland in early January 1921 visiting Cavid Bey after his own trip to Rome. See: Cavid Bey’s diary entry from January 6, 1921, noting Talat’s arrival. According to the diary entry from Januar 13, Talat had already left by then. Cavid Bey, *Felaket Günleri II: Mütareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi*, 2 vols., ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoglu (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000), 95–99; Denker, *İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları*, 43.

Ernst Jäckh and his wife and the usual crowd including Bahaeddin Şakir and others. On that day, Soghomon Tehlirian was surveilling Talat’s flat from his second-floor room at the other side of the street at Hardenbergstraße 37. He had rented the room since the 5th of March. On that morning the maid walking through the corridor had heard Tehlirian weeping in his room. He had drunken a little cognac with his tea to settle his nerves. Shortly before 11 o’clock, Talat was spotted by Tehlirian on the balcony, a ritual Talat usually did before leaving the house, which Tehlirian had observed several times for the last ten days. Tehlirian remembers that Talat seemed depressed, his head hanging. “Apparently life was not easy for him after the crime he committed in the desert”, Tehlirian concluded later in his autobiography.

Talat Pasha was indeed not in a good mood, but rather for a silly reason. He needed to go out and buy a new necktie before the guests would arrive. Before he was about to leave, Talat said to his wife: “I don’t want to go at all. […] I mean, I don’t want to be away from you.” Talat was known for being very attached to his wife. She, although 21 years his junior, answered as she remembers decades later: “Ohh, but Pasha, […] now you are exaggerating. Are you a child? […] Will you always hide behind my skirt like this?” Talat was already at the door. He wanted her to accompany him. But she could not leave, because she was busy preparing the lunch. Before Talat left, Refik, a young dentist and brother-in-law of former Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs Ahmet Nesimi (Sayman), arrived. Refik agreed to accompany Talat and help him with his shopping. Before they left, Mrs. Hayriye asked

75 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 32–34.
77 According to his wife, it was a necktie. Dr. Nazım writes that he went out to buy a pair of gloves, see: Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 105–8.
78 Even Tehlirian wrote in his autobiography: “I knew from Istanbul that she [Talat’s wife] had abilities and was involved in her husband’s affairs. … It was said that she had great influence on her husband.” Tehlirian, Verhishumner, 304, quoted from Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 184.
80 Bardakç, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” 221. See also for his «nephew» accompanying him during the assassination: Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, 135. However, in later eyewitness accounts he is not mentioned—somewhere in the narratives he disappears. Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 20, 25.
her husband, if he felt alright. According to later narratives, Talat answered before leaving: «I don’t know. I have a funny feeling.»81

As Talat Pasha left the house, Soghomon Tehlirian grabbed his coat, his hat, and his gun, and left the house. Two days ago, he had done the same routine, but then missed Talat, because he could not open the gate. This time, however, the gate opened.82 It was shortly before 11 o’clock.83 Few days ago, he had received an order from the ARF’s Central Committee of America: «The time has come to go into action. We order you to kill Talaat without delay and to leave the other criminals be, even if it means they escape.»84

Eyewitnesses would later testify that Tehlirian approached Talat Pasha at a great pace from behind, although Tehlirian claimed to have crossed him before and faced him in the eye.85 There were later rumors in the press coverage that Tehlirian had first chatted up Talat or that he shot him in the face.86 But in reality, Tehlirian shot Talat in the back of his head without

81 Quoted in Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlinindeki Son Günleri,” 135.
83 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 34.
84 Quoted in Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 84.
85 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 25–29. Tehlirian insisted to have come face-to-face with Talat, before shooting him from behind. He followed Talat Pasha from the other side of the street. Later he speeded up so that he left Talat behind. Then he went on Talat’s side of the street and started walking towards him. Tehlirian tells that as he crossed by Talat from a very close distance and he looked him briefly in the eyes in a dramatic moment before turning and pulling out his gun. Although Tehlirian’s version contradicts all the other eyewitness accounts, Armenian narratives still tell it according to Tehlirian, where he looks for a brief moment in the eyes of Talat. Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 10. See also: Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 21–22.
86 Especially newspapers wrote that Tehlirian first chatted up Talat Pasha impersonating a fellow Turkish citizen, before suddenly shooting him. See, for instance: The Times, “How Talaat Pasha Was Shot: Armenian’s Story of Vengeance,” March 17, 1921. These rumors are still reproduced in different narratives. See for instance: Hasan Babacan, Mehmêd Talat Paşa: 1874–1921 (Sîysi Hayât ve İcrâât) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2005), 229. Aram Andonian claims also that Tehlirian shot Talat in the face: «We could forgive Bayan Hayrie [Mrs. Talat] for labeling Talaat’s assassination cowardly, but that would not be a proper description. Tehlirian, who followed Talaat on Hardenberg Strasse in Charlottsburgh, could have shot Talaat in the back, but he chose to pull the trigger while facing him, after he had called out his name. Talaat was wounded in his eye when he fell. It was Talaat who was the coward, as he had stabbed the Armenian people in the back, by duplicity and treachery, always with a smile on his lips and deception in his words.» Andonian refers here on Mrs. Hayriye Talat Bafrañ’s comments in Hüseyin Cahit Yaçın, Talat Paşa (İstanbul: Yedigün Neşriyatı, 1943), 63, cited in Aram Andonian, Exile, Trauma, and Death: On the Road to Chankiri with Komitas Vartabed, ed. Rita S. Kuyumjian (London: Gomidas Institute, 2010), 2. Others again add new fantasized details. Samantha Power, for instance, writes without a reference that Tehlirian shouted «This is to avenge the death of my family!». Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002). I. Power probably relies on Raphael Lemkin’s autobiography, where he writes that Tehlirian had cried: «This is for my mother». Donna-Lee Frieze, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 20.
uttering a word, right at the corner of Hardenbergstraße 17 and Fasanenstraße.87 Talat was not unarmed. He had a Browning handgun in his back pocket, but this would not help him either.88 The single 9mm bullet, which Tehlirian fired from his «Parabellum revolver» from a close distance—maybe «three or four fingers» as Dr. Nazim would later attest—entered the back of Talat’s head and exiting it right above his left eye—killing him instantly before his body face downwards hit the ground.89 Symbolically the German standard edition military handgun had the year of the Armenian Genocide, 1915, engraved as its production date, which Tehlirian claims to have purchased in 1919 in Tiflis.90 As a matter of fact, it was his field commander Shahan Natali, who gave him the gun on March 12, 1921, with the words: «It is examined and ready under the command of your finger.»91

«The monster fell on the ground», Tehlirian wrote in his memoir.92 After Tehlirian saw Talat’s dead body on the ground, he became aware that he was about to get beaten by an enraged mob of pedestrians. Tehlirian dropped his gun and started running away. Soon he was caught and beaten down by the mob.93 A woman who witnessed the assassination from close distance had screamed and fainted so that people thought that he had also killed the woman.94 Tehlirian was hurt badly in the beating. Someone from the crowd was hitting his face with a key ring. By a coincidence, also Turgut (Bleda), Mithat Şükrü’s son studying in Berlin, was among the violent mob beating Tehlirian with his «great uncle» Talat’s walking crane he had just grabbed.95 Tehlirian was seriously injured with a 22 cm wound on his face as one newspaper claimed.96 Tehlirian was first brought into the guard house in Bahnhof Zoo and then

87 Rolf Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis: Die Türkei, Deutschland und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2005), 9.
89 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 185–86. See also Dr. Schmulinsky’s testimony in Wegner, Der Prozeß Talat Pascha, 29.
90 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talat Pascha, 19, 30.
91 Quoted in Moses, “Assassination of Talaat Pasha in 1921 in Berlin,” 27.
92 Tehlirian, Verhishumner, 195, quoted in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 139.
93 Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 9.
95 This is how Mrs. Talat tells the story. Bardakç, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” 222.
transferred to Charlottenburg Police Station. 97 As he was interrogated the next day the prosecutor’s Armenian interpreter George Kalusdian had brought sweets and chocolate to Tehlirian. When the prosecutor asked, why he was bringing treats to a murderer, Kalusdian protested: «What, a murderer? This is a great man, whom we all adore!» 98 Kalusdian was not wrong. Soghomon Tehlirian would never be the same man again—he was now an Armenian hero.

On the other hand, Tehlirian’s assassination of Talat Pasha made Talat in the collective imagination of Turkish nationalism an eternal martyr. Emir Shakib Arslan would write to Enver Pasha: «It is a fortune that late Talat’s life has been crowned with martyrdom. As long as death is the end, it is best to die like this.» 99 The martyrdom of Talat was framed in Muslim nationalist phraseology and expressed underlying anti-Armenian sentiments. From Baku, Azmi Bey, the former Governor of Beirut, wrote to Enver: «I am very sad that Talat Pasha has been a victim of an Armenian bullet. Not only that of [Talat] Pasha, the death of any petty Muslim by this way is unbearably sad.» 100

In the mental processing of his followers, Talat Pasha’s martyrdom is narrated as his self-chosen destiny, an inescapable price for his past achievements as a revolutionary. «Poor Talat Pasha’s murder really shocked us», Küçük Talat (Muşkara) Bey wrote to Enver Pasha. «But what can we do, the pitcher goes so often to the well, that it is broken at last.» 101 Also Enver accepted the assassination as Talat’s inescapable fate: «The assassination that Sai Bey [Talat Pasha] was subjected has indeed grieved me in spite of everything. But in that case, what can one do!» 102 Louise Bryant witnessed the moment in Moscow, when Enver received the news

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98 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talat Pascha, 46.
100 Azmi Bey, letter (Baku) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 04-01.
101 Küçük Talât Bey, letter (Trabzon) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 28, 1921, TTK, EP 01-06.
102 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), [end of March, 1921], TTK, EP 01-52, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 180.
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of Talat’s death.103 He did not show any emotion and only said: «His time had come!»104 The claim that martyrdom was Talat’s destiny shows the political fatalism of the Young Turk leaders in pardoning their own faults and wrongs as God’s will.

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It was only quarter past eleven, as the former director of maintenance, Salim Bey, arrived at the bureau of the Young Turk fugitives at Uhlandstraße 47, where Dr. Nazım and others were chatting with each other. The former Jewish deputy of Smyrna Nesim Mazelyah was also there visiting them.105 Salim told that someone on Hardenbergstraße was murdered or had committed suicide. He saw the corpse and the crowd from a distance. He mentioned the color of the coat and the shoes of the dead man lying on the ground. The men in the bureau became curious. Then Dr. Rüsuhi arrived, who was living at Talat’s apartment and was present when the latter left. He told that Talat left home fifteen minutes ago to do some shopping and would make a short stop to the bureau before going back home. He should have come by until then. As Salim asked the color of the coat and shoes Talat was wearing that day, Rüsuhi’s answer matched that of the dead body’s which Salim had seen on Hardenbergstraße. The men rushed in panic out to the crime scene. In Dr. Nazım’s words: «As we opened the blanket covering the corpse, we too were shot into our brains.»106

103 On the day of the assassination, telegraphs were sent to Enver Pasha in Moscow via German and Russian officials followed by letters. M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 15, 1921. TTK, EP 02-14, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 173–74. However, Enver first received the news of Talat Pasha’s death via radio and forwarded the news to Cemal Pasha. In this version of the story, however, Tehlirian had introduced himself to Talat as a fellow «countryman» and walked with him for few steps deceiving Talat’s trust by making compliments before suddenly shooting him in the neck. Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 20, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 65–66.

104 Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 159. See also: Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Nacifye Sultan (Berlin), March 17, 1921, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Nacifye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürüşün Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 91.


106 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 105–8; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 185–87.
Meanwhile, Hazor, who was assigned to observe the tobacco shop, saw that a young student came in hurry—probably either Refik or Turgut—and then quickly left together with seemingly upset Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir. It was Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir who informed the police over the true identity of the victim. But the police officer insisted on proceeding according to the protocol and wait for the homicide squad to arrive. This meant that Talat’s body was to stay there on the ground for couple of hours. In their Islamic cultural coding, this was an act of disgrace to the deceased, but they were helpless. They left the crime scene to Talat’s flat to give the sad news to his just widowed wife. They were crying and yelling in their attempt to explain what had happened. Mrs. Hayriye asked in despair: «Nazım Bey… Is it what I fear?» And then she fainted.

Around 11:30 Dr. Ernst Jäckh and his wife passed by the crime scene by car, but they did not stop since they were already late for their appointment at Talat Pasha’s home only few blocks away. At the door Dr. Jäckh could hear «a woman weeping and moaning». When Dr. Nazım opened the door, he said: «Praise Allah you are here! Help us get Talaat’s body. He is lying on the step a few houses down the street, shot by an Armenian, and the police will not release his body until the Homicide Squad arrives. That will take several more hours.»

Refik or Turgut, one of the young fellows, had immediately informed Wipert von Blücher from the Auswärtiges Amt about that assassination. Thereafter Shakib Arslan and his friends were informed on the incident by the Auswärtiges Amt revealing the connection the German officials had to the pan-Islamic activists in Berlin. Meanwhile, the Iranian journalist Abdolrahman Saif, some Afghan friends, and the Egyptian activist Abdel Aziz Shawish,
who had seen the incident on the street, came to Shakib Arslan’s place to pick him up. They were few blocks away from the incident. They went all to the crime scene.\textsuperscript{113} Dr. Jäckh and others arrived at the crime scene to have the body transported to the morgue, but the police officer guarding the corpse still insisted on protocol. Dr. Jäckh had to call the police chief from a nearby telephone and convince him about the political gravity of this homicide case.\textsuperscript{114} On the telephone, Jäckh stated that «the man lying in the street was in a way, the ‘Turkish Bismarck’ and our loyal ally in the war.»\textsuperscript{115} Ironically, in their last meeting on June 13, 1914, Armen Garo had confronted his soon-to-be nemesis Talat Pasha: «Power is turning your head and making you into a megalomaniac. You take yourself for a Napoleon or a Bismarck!» Talat answered: «Bismarck? Why not?»\textsuperscript{116}

In understanding the dialectics of Talat Pasha’s assassination in the contentious episodes that followed, the funeral of Talat Pasha was a major performative act.\textsuperscript{117} The Young Turk community in Berlin used the funeral to publicly claim that Talat was a great statesman who got murdered unjustly. The assassination of Talat shocked the Young Turk community in Berlin by demonstrating their vulnerability in face of their assumed power and by subjecting them—and Talat in particular—to a public process of defamation. Whereas \textit{Le Journal de Genève} announced Talat Pasha’s death under the derogative title «The End of a Bandit»,\textsuperscript{118} the \textit{London Times} was writing that Talat was «unscrupulous politician, who with more education and in better surroundings might have become a statesman.»\textsuperscript{119} Talat was depicted by the

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\textsuperscript{113} Shakib Arslan, \textit{Emir Şekib Aşlan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa}, 126.
\textsuperscript{115} Derogy, \textit{Resistance and Revenge}, 56.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Le Journal de Genève}, “La fin d’un bandit,” March 18, 1921.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{The Times}, “Talaat’s Career: Exterminator of Armenians,” March 16, 1921.
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Entente media as a robber baron, a brutal gypsy turned Oriental despot, who butchered the Armenians just for the sake of it. Thus, Talat was a criminal, if not a monster, definitely anything far from a modern statesman. Hence no wonder, the word «statesman» became the buzzword of Talat’s commemoration ceremonies.

In their defense, the mourning Young Turk community and their German supporters in Berlin committed themselves to construct a legacy of Talat Pasha as a great man of his era—a Cinderella story of a simple telegraph clerk turned great statesman. This was a project which was not new. German war-time propaganda and official discourse had already set up the foundations of this «democratic» image of Talat. For instance, while openly condemning his role in the «Armenian sin», Bernstorff commemorates Talat in his memoir as follows:

> I am thinking primarily of Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha—who was later murdered by an Armenian in Berlin—whom I came to highly respect and adore during my occupation in Constantinople. With complete integrity, he was a man of rare gifts, which enabled him to traverse the steep climb from simple telegraph clerk to senior statesman, namely a statesman in the true sense of the word.\footnote{Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, 
*Erinnerungen und Briefe* (Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1936), 126.}

The editorial of the newspaper *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, for instance, protested that Friedrich Hussong in an article in the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* referred to Talat Pasha as a «revolutionary». The pro-Turkish *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* insisted that Talat Pasha was a «statesman» and nothing else.\footnote{Ihrig, “Genocide Denied, Accepted, and Justified,” 164.} The funeral manifested the efforts of the Young Turks in institutionalizing the commemoration of Talat Pasha in Turkish nationalist imagination as one of the greatest statesmen of his era.

Funerals as public rituals need to occupy a presentative social space to generate symbolic power. It is the funeral which can make a «great man» out of a deceased statesman. Peter Wien noted on the funeral of a similar figure of the same era, namely the former Ottoman officer, later Iraqi prime minister, and Arab nationalist leader Yasin al-Hashimi (1882-1937), that «the funeral was also a transitory rite that turned Yasin al-Hashimi into a «great man».» In a Durkheimian approach, Wien recapitulates:

> Cults of both heroes and saints depend on locality and the performance of commemoration to gain meaning in national or religious discourse. […] Without action and public
participation, the mnemonic or memory-related quality of a place (such as a tomb) dies. A funeral is therefore a mnemonic festival.\textsuperscript{122}

Similar to Yasin al-Hashimi’s funeral, Talat Pasha’s funeral was also organized in the tradition of the French republican funerals making him a «great man» in memories of his followers.\textsuperscript{123}

Talat’s body remained in the Charlottenburg morgue until the funeral four days later on Saturday, March 20, 1921. We can assume that it was probably Dr. Jäckh who played the key role in organizing the funeral as a semi-official event in Berlin.\textsuperscript{124} The funeral was organized from the beginning on as a public ritual to make three claims. First, Talat was to be represented as an honest and respected statesman with chief achievements, worthy of a stately commemoration. Or in Dr. Jäckh’s words from his obituary: «With Talat a statesman is diminished, a born «statesman», one of the few real statesmen of historic proportions and size in this present time that is so poor in leader personalities.» Second, again in Jäckh’s words, Germany lost with Talat a «loyal ally and a reliable friend», who deserved Germany’s solidarity. Third, it was claimed that Talat was murdered and martyred because he was struggling for the defense of the Muslim world against Western colonialism and imperialism. Again in Jäckh’s dramatic words, «Constantinople and Angora roar with anger and clench their fists—and along with the Turkish people an Islamic world of Arabs and Tatars, Persians, Indians, and Afghans, all have sworn allegiance at Talaat’s corpse at the Berlin cemetery, who was the intrepid, tireless champion of the oppressed peoples against English and French imperialism.» These three claims—or speech acts—were by made Jäckh and the other orators to construct a common political identity among the heterogeneous German and Muslim masses attending the funeral and to establish a strong political legacy of Talat Pasha.\textsuperscript{125}

Although Dr. Nazım and others did their best to make sure that Talat Pasha’s body did not stay on the ground for long, hence dishonoring him, Muslim burial regulations did not play a great role afterwards. Instead of a regular burial within few days, Talat’s body was embalmed


\textsuperscript{124} Hosfeld, \textit{Operation Nemesis}, 11.

\textsuperscript{125} Ernst Jäckh, “Talaat,” \textit{Deutsche Politik} 6, no. 14 (1921): 315, 322.
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«for hundred years», as his wife proudly remembers, ready to be transferred to Turkey whenever politics would permit it.126 His body, which now possessed a symbolic power, had to be buried in a sacred space, namely the Adobe of Islam—at best, in Turkey. Thus, his body was prepared for «bridging time and space» for following and continuing political rituals at his final destination in form of a heroic shrine.127 His embalmed body was put in a zinc coffin covered symbolically in a red flag with a white crescent and with a Fez at its head end, signifying him as a Muslim statesman.128 Immortalization of Talat’s body was so important for the Young Turk community in Berlin that they took conscious measures. A German sculptor was employed to build a bust of Talat based on a clay impression of his damaged head. One of the two busts prepared were to be displayed at Dr. Jäckh’s home, the other was designated for the embassy.129 Dr. Nazım was very conscious about building a civic religion from Talat’s commemoration. «Nevertheless, there is no doubt that for those who appreciate Talat’s greatness», as he wrote to Cavid Bey, because his bust «will have the same effect as Jesus has on a devout Christian. This idea will certainly enable a very precious commemoration.»130

Finding the appropriate symbolic space was the first problem. At that time, there was no mosque or Muslim graveyard available in Berlin. Ironically, Talat himself was lobbying on behalf of the Orient Club to build a new Muslim graveyard in Berlin, which was still under construction at the time of his death.131 Therefore, it was decided that his coffin should be brought to a chamber in the graveyard of the St. Matthew’s Church (Sankt-Matthäikirche) in Schöneberg.132 The Swiss Ambassador, who dealt with Ottoman diplomatic affairs as a protecting power in post-war Germany, requested to arrange the funeral ceremony at the

129 It is not clear, whether the Dr. Nazım refers to the Ottoman embassy in Germany or the German embassy in Constantinople, when he speaks of the «Alman sefaretbanesi». Both options seems very unlikely in the armistice regulations limiting direct diplomatic relations between the two states. Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 106.
130 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), April 2, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 111–13.
131 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aylan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 117.
132 Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 11.
Ottoman Embassy, but the Ottoman diplomats opposed the idea, since Talat was a fugitive who was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity by an Ottoman court martial. Instead, the prayer ceremony was organized at Talat’s home. The invitations were sent out under the name of his widow and the Orient Club.135

The funeral prayer led by the imam of the Ottoman embassy Hafız Şükrü Efendi134 was arranged for 10:30 am. During the prayer, many people were gathered together making the large apartment at the Hardenbergstraße 4 seem small. Seeckt noted: «Many people in the small apartment.»135 The many exotic head-dresses was observed by the journalists.136 After the funeral prayers, Imam Hafız Şükrü closed the ceremony with the standard ritual of te-zkiye, in which the imam asks the community of believers gathered at a funeral, whether the deceased was known to be a good and honorable Muslim: « Here before you, Mehmed Talaat Pasha, was a man of high virtues, a servant of God. Is anyone among you who knows the opposite? » The gathering collectively negated the question as part of the ritual.137 His status in collective memories as an honorable martyr was, thus, testified and sealed by a speech act of his friends and followers present at his funeral.

After the prayers at home, there was a funeral procession. The masses walked along the ostentatious funeral carriage transporting Talat’s coffin to his resting place.138 The whole funeral did not necessarily seem to have impressed the Prussian General von Seeckt. Few days later, he wrote to his wife: «Typically Turkish, unorganized. It started a quarter of an hour too early and after the speech no one knew what was going on until Enver’s brother summoned to proceed. Down there a crowd of people, not large, police cordon, photographers. Soon later I returned [...] .»139

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133 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 106; Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 176–79. See also: Hayriye Talat and the Orient Club, invitation to Talat Pasha’s funeral on March 19, 1921, PA-AA, R 78551.
136 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, ”Talaats Begräbnis,” March 20, 1921.
137 Ibid.. See also: Höpp, “Tod und Geschichte oder Wie in Berlin prominente Muslime bestattet wurden,” 23.
Although Seeckt belittled the crowd on the street, the Young Turk community seem to have been impressed by the people gathered for the funeral.\textsuperscript{140} Emir Shakib Arslan tells that the funeral was magnificent and «ten thousands of people» accompanied the funeral procession.\textsuperscript{141} More realistic is probably Dr. Nazım’s estimation of four or five thousand people.\textsuperscript{142} In addition to German friends and dignitaries, a large number of members of the Muslim community in Berlin attended the ceremony. There were alone around 100-150 Muslim students.\textsuperscript{143} In their letters to Enver Pasha and Cavid Bey or in their later memoirs, the whole event is described by Talat’s followers as a stately ceremony with many name-droppings underlining the respect and fondness the deceased statesman enjoyed from important dignitaries of his time.

It is worthwhile to recollect the list of prominent participants to comprehend the representative claim of the funeral and the power networks Talat Pasha was embedded in. The Reich President Friedrich Ebert, the Chancellor Konstantin Fehrenbach, and Minister of Justice Rudolf Heinze sent official representatives. The exiled Kaiser Wilhelm II was represented by his chamberlain Hofmarschall Graf Oskar von Platen-Hallermund. From the Auswärtiges Amt, there were many officials present at the ceremony, including Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff and Wipert von Blücher as well as former foreign ministers Arthur Zimmermann and Richard von Kühlmann. The funeral wreath Ernst Jäckh placed near the coffin resonated the official German motto: «A great statesman and a loyal friend».\textsuperscript{144} From the military there was Hans von Seeckt, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, Otto von Lossow, and probably some others. Some of the German officers were wearing their Ottoman military uniforms as a symbol of loyalty.\textsuperscript{145} Swiss and Italian ambassadors also attended the ceremony. Others who could not attend by person sent in condolence telegraphs, including General Ludendorff.

\textsuperscript{140} Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 105–8; Denker, \textit{İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları}, 145.
\textsuperscript{141} Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 176–79.
\textsuperscript{142} Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 185–87. For a picture showing the large masses accompanying the funeral convoy see: Höpp, “Tod und Geschichte oder Wie in Berlin prominente Muslime bestattet wurden,” 36.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung}, “Talata’s Begräbnis,” March 20, 1921.
\textsuperscript{144} See also: Hosfeld, \textit{Operation Nemesis}, 12. «Einen großen Staatsmann und treuen Freund».
\textsuperscript{145} This can be seen on the screen shots of the film of the funeral ceremony in Murat Bardakçı, ed., \textit{Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hasısal Yazışmalar} (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 260–65
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Talat’s wife remembers that they even dropped down condolence flyers from an airplane. The name-dropping of official dignitaries served to certify the acclaimed reputation of Talat Pasha as a great statesman and as a trusted friend of Germany.

The highlight of the funeral ceremony was the two-hour long speeches delivered by various dignitaries from different countries. Funeral speeches and poems were already a part of the repertoire of modern Middle Eastern political rituals. This selection of speakers further illustrates the political network around Talat Pasha.

The former director of the Bagdadbahn Franz J. Günther and Dr. Ernst Jäckh delivered speeches both on behalf of the Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir gave a eulogy in Turkish but he could barely speak. Emir Shakib Arslan delivered an especially touching speech in French—the lingua franca of the larger part of the audience. Shakib Arslan underlined the unity of Turkish and Arab people, which the Entente was trying to sabotage with the murder of Talat Pasha and other schemes. As a coincidence, Sheikh Abdel Qader al-Muzaffar, or according to British Intelligence «a dangerous man of Nationalist and Bolshevik tendencies» for that he was an anti-Zionist and pro-Turkish activist from Jerusalem, had arrived to Berlin from London few days before the incident. He delivered a eulogy in Arabic. There were also two orators speaking on behalf of the Iranians, one of them was

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146 This account of the ceremony is based on the following sources: Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 176–79; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 106; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 185–87; Bardakçı, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” 221. See also: Hosfeld, *Operation Nemesis*, 11–13.

147 Yaseen Noorani, *Culture and Hegemony in the Colonial Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 51.


149 Günther talked about building an «altar within ourselves» to commemorate Talat Pasha. PA-AA, R 78551. See also: ZMO, NGH 07-03, 17.

Mirza Hassan,\textsuperscript{151} the chairman of the \textit{Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft}. In addition, two unnamed students spoke on behalf the Egyptians. Imam Alim Idris Efendi spoke on behalf of Tatars as the imam of the prisoner camp for Russian Muslims, the so-called \textit{Weinberglager} at Zossen. Idris was therefore also no stranger to the German-Ottoman propaganda circles.\textsuperscript{152} An Azeri student delivered a speech about two Azeri politicians who were also recently killed by Armenians.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, he pointed out that this murder was not a single case of vengeance, but part of a campaign of political assassinations by Armenian committees. There were also two Indians among the speakers, one of them Chempakaraman Pillai. Pillai was a renowned Indian revolutionary and, since the beginning of the war, part of the Indian Berlin Committee and an accomplice in the so-called Hindu-German conspiracy.\textsuperscript{154} He was also a board member of the Orient Club in Berlin.\textsuperscript{155}

The pan-Islamic and anticolonial voices at the funeral was one of the peculiar features of the funeral, revealing the shared feeling of community among the Eastern revolutionaries, who found refuge in post-war Berlin, where Talat Pasha played an important role, especially within the Orient Club.\textsuperscript{156} An official from the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} would remember the exotic gathering as follows: «On this occasion you saw how many representatives of Eastern peoples were within the walls of Berlin at that time.»\textsuperscript{157} How far this commemoration of Talat went beyond Berlin and was shared in other Muslim and Eastern countries—Turkey left aside—remain though uncertain. Nevertheless, in their perception and imagination, as in Shakib Arslan’s words to Enver Pasha, Talat’s death was a matter of mourning to the whole Muslim

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\textsuperscript{153} One of them was probably Fatali Khan Khoytski who was killed on June 19, 1920, in Tiflis. It is not clear who the other one was.
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\textsuperscript{157} Blücher, \textit{Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo}, 136.
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world: «This calamity is not only the calamity of the [Committee of] Union and Progress, neither is it only the calamity of the Turkish race. It is the calamity of the Muslim world. The deceased was a person whose name was known in all corners of the Muslim world. There is no doubt that his murder will have a great echo in Turkey and in the Muslim countries.»

The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported similar claims over Talat Pasha’s reputation in the Islamic world:

The funeral of Talaat Pasha on March 20 of this year turned out to be a great demonstration of the confidence of all Islamic peoples in this man. The Ottoman statesman, who was cowardly shot by an assassin from behind, was for the peoples of the East far more than just a representative of the Turkish nation. He had become the symbol of the dawn of awakening that began to rise on the Orient after a long period of oppression.

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When Soghomon Tehlirian was caught by the violent mob of pedestrians after he had killed Talat, he cried in broken German what he had probably memorized for this long-awaited moment: «Me Armenian, he Turkish. No harm for Germany.» Nevertheless, the assassination of Talat Pasha was very much about influencing third parties. The executive minds behind the Operation Nemesis premeditated a political trial in Berlin. Shahan Natali, Tehlirian’s field commander had therefore gave the clear instruction: «You will stay at your place with your foot on the head of the dead body and you will surrender to the policemen who come, who arrest you.» Examples for such political trials had already existed. For instance, the release of Esad Pasha Toptani’s murderer Avni Rustemi from French courts one year earlier was believed to have encouraged the Armenian assassins. As political theorist Hannah Arendt noticed, Tehlirian belongs to a certain type of political assassins who voluntarily

160 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talaat Pacha, 21, 28. See also: Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 9; Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 11.
161 Shahan Natali quoted in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 140.
162 M. Mansur Rifat, Das Geheimnis der Ermordung Talaat Paschas: Ein Schlüssel für das englische Propagandasystem (Berlin: Morgen- und Abendland-Verlag, 1921), 87. Rustemi was acquitted by the French court, because «the murder was a crime of national passion sanctioned by a whole people» so that «Rustemi paid a single one-franc fine, returned to Albania as a national hero». Robert C. Austin, Founding a Balkan State: Albania’s Experiment with Democracy, 1920–1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 11.
«gave themselves up to the police and insisted on being tried» in order to «show the world through court procedure what crimes against his people had been committed and gone unpunished.»

For Arendt, this type of assassins emerged, because «there was no tribunal in the world». 

In the absence of international criminal law, the transnationalism of Tehlirian’s case made the Armenian Question a matter of national law in Germany as well as a matter of moral justice internationally. Robert M. W. Kempner, who would later serve as the assistant chief counsel at Nuremberg Trials, had witnessed Tehlirian’s trial as a law student at the University of Berlin and personally knew the defense lawyers. In his understanding, the importance of the Tehlirian’s trial for the history of international law was that for the first time human rights violations of a sovereign state was a matter of discussion at a foreign court case. By the successful activism of Tehlirian’s defenders, the focus of the trial and its public perception ultimately shifted from Tehlirian’s petty crime (homicide) to Talat’s great crime (genocide).

Of course, the term «genocide» was not yet coined by Raphael Lemkin. The legend has it that as a young student, Raphael Lemkin had followed Tehlirian’s trial closely and discussed it with his professors. He wrote in his autobiography:

His [Tehlirian’s] trial became, in actuality, a trial of the Turkish perpetrators. The sinister panorama of destruction of the Armenians was painted by the many witnesses [which] the destruction of the Armenians brought to the court. Through this trial the world finally obtained a real picture of the tragic events in Turkey.

Although the term «genocide» was not yet there, most of the German commentators reached, despite very different opinions, a shared understanding of the reality of the extermination of Ottoman Armenians, usually referred as «Armeniergräuel» (Armenian atrocities), which morally and substantially corresponded, as one historian concluded, to a «pre-Lemkin definition of genocide». From the point of view of German officialdom, the politicization of the trial

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166 Often it is said that Lemkin was present at the court, but this is not true. He was a philology and law student in Lvov. He followed the trial from its vast media coverage. John Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 15.
168 Ihrig, “Genocide Denied, Accepted, and Justified,” 169.
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was undesired and measures were taken to minimize its political blast radius. The whole trial was limited to its half-length. Instead of three days and fifteen testimonies, the trial was brought to an end after one and a half days and nine witnesses.\footnote{Hofmann, “New Aspects of the Talat Pasha Court Case,” 46.}

The trial’s timing came at a precarious time in German foreign affairs. The British were considering giving the disputed border region of Upper Silesia to Germany as a bargain for the upcoming reparation negotiations, while the French was objecting this rapprochement. The question of Upper Silesia was one of the concerns for German officials in this regard.\footnote{Hosfeld, \textit{Operation Nemesis}, 19.} German foreign policy was depended on the goodwill of the British in determining the future of Upper Silesia.\footnote{Gisela Bertram-Libal, “Die britische Politik in der Oberschlesienfrage 1919–1922,” \textit{Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte} 20, no. 2 (1972): 105–32.} It was feared that an anti-Armenian verdict might provoke British resentments. The outbreak of paramilitary violence between Polish irregulars and German \textit{Freikorps} from May until July 1921 made the political situation even denser.\footnote{T. H. Tooley, “German Political Violence and the Border Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1919–1921,” \textit{Central European History} 21, no. 1 (1988): 56–98.} All this made the upcoming trial of Soghomon Tehlirian a major concern in Berlin. The chief public prosecutor reported to the Ministry of Justice on May 25, 1921:

Comparing the Polish insurrection with the Turkish (action), especially (at this point in time), and in England, where (politics) lends a friendly ear to the Armenians, would be (most) undesirable, as long as the Upper Silesian problem (remains unsolved).\footnote{Quoted in Hofmann, “New Aspects of the Talat Pasha Court Case,” 45–46.}

Even more than the Upper Silesian crisis, the German officials were concerned about revelation of German culpability in the Armenian deportations and massacres.\footnote{Moses, “Assassination of Talaat Pasha in 1921 in Berlin,” 64.} Previously, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had commissioned the well-known Armenophile Dr. Johannes Lepsius to publish an official book in order to «whitewash» Germany’s role.\footnote{PA-AA, R 13758, 306.} Lepsius took this opportunity to illustrate the undeniable extent and brutality of the Armenian massacres.\footnote{Johannes Lepsius, \textit{Deutschland und Armenien 1914–1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke} (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919). For a brief note on the manipulation and selection of the documents see: Hilmar Kaiser, “The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916: A Case Study in German Resistance and Complicity,” in \textit{Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide}, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 67–112 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 68. Lepsius’s book was submitted by Tehlirian’s defense attorneys as an evidence to the case. Hosfeld, \textit{Operation Nemesis}, 20–21.}

A fierce contentious episode of public sense-making and claim-making took place starting from the assassination in mid-March to the aftermath of the trial in late June. This episode generated a great deal of media attention. It amounted to what historian Stefan Ihrig calls a «media event», in which Talat Pasha’s assassination as well as the Armenian Question was debated fiercely in the German newspapers with various cross-paper references. Both camps engaged in efforts to make sense of not only what Tehlirian did to Talat in Berlin on March 15, 1921, but even more of what Talat did to Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia in 1915. The trial of Soghomon Tehlirian was instantly referred as the «Talat Pasha Trial» (in German: Talaat Pascha Prozeß or Prozeß Talaat Pascha), as if it was Talat’s «ghost» standing in the dock instead of Tehlirian, as contemporary observer Armin Wegner aptly put it. The Talat Pasha Trial unexpectedly resulted in the acquittal of Soghomon Tehlirian due to his traumatized mental condition and the moral condemnation of Talat for the Armenian massacres. The extraordinary circumstances of the process and its unexpected outcome has recently attracted a wave of interest by historians as well as historical and legal anthropologists. More than the precarious legal process that resulted in Tehlirian’s acquittal, the whole

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177 Ihrig, “Genocide Denied, Accepted, and Justified,” 155–56.
contentious episode was a showdown arena of transnational contentious politics in which transnational activism, international affairs, and national structures were noticeably entangled with each other in a contest to frame the events.

In their efforts to make sense of the assassination of Talat Pasha, the Young Turk community in Berlin must have had access to the police investigation. They knew that Tehlirian was in Berlin since December or January; they also knew when he rented the apartment across the street, and he traveled to Germany from Geneva; they correctly assumed that he received the money in amount of 12,000 marks from the Tashnags; they knew that a secretary at the Armenian Embassy in Berlin had chattered in the presence of a German police informant that Talat and Enver would soon be killed. Allegedly, there were rumors that a list of targets was found after the investigations of Talat’s murder by the Berlin police and this list was even wired to the Italian police to take precautions against the Young Turk community in Rome. All this approved the existing rumors of Armenian assassin squads and the Young Turks maintained that Tehlirian was not a traumatized student acting by his own, as he claimed, but instead was part of a larger scheme of political assassinations planned by the Tashnags.

Many followers of Talat Pasha suspected even further conspiracies at work, whereby they usually associated the assassination with the intrigues of the Great Powers and other international conspiracies. The common explanation was: «England’s felonious hand everywhere.» (Englands verbrecherische Hand überall.) According to Dr. Nazim, all the Eastern orators at Talat’s funeral framed the assassination «not as the consequence of a private or national vengeance, but rather as the result of an imperialist policy executed against the Muslim peoples». The main message was: «We will avenge this. However, not like thugs by shedding
innocent blood, but rather by breaking the chains of enslavement and gaining independence.» Especially, the Iranian and Indian orators had accused the British with having a complicity in the assassination. Not only the Eastern orators, but also Ernst Jäckh claimed in his obituary that the reason behind the assassination was Entente’s fears of Talat’s ever-approaching return to Turkey:

The death of Turkish ex-Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha relieved England and France from their dangerous adversary [...]. London and Paris breathe a sigh of relief and gratefully acknowledge the Armenian assassin.

People in Constantinople did not want to believe the news of Talat Pasha’s death. Since the occupation of Constantinople was on March 16, 1920, nearly one year before Talat’s murder, Turkish nationalists connected these two tragic events in a grand narrative in which the Turks were subject to continuous imperial schemes of the British. This (near) coincidence of dates delivered occasion for nationalist speeches and poems. A German newspaper shared the same conspiracy theory, which was probably in the air among the frustrated losers of 1918: «England’s hand reaches far and is often invisible and visible only in retrospect. Sometimes, however, one sees its shadow clear and outlined. This is the case in the murder of Talaat Pasha.»

It was not an irrational conclusion to suspect the British behind the assassination of Talaat Pasha. Thus, it is legitimate to ask, as author Eric Bogosian did: «Was it possible that the British intelligence tipped off the Tashnags?» The British Intelligence knew the address of Talat as late as in October 1920. There was also a suspicious increase in interest in Talat

184 Most other speakers were careful in making references to the Armenian massacres. Dr. Nazım found it politically incorrect that the Azeri student as well as the Egyptian and Iranian orators insulted the Armenians in their speeches. Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, 105–8; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 185–87.
186 Report (Constantinople) to the General Staff (Ankara), March 28, 1921, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 661, gömlek no. 123.
187 Anonymous manuscript of a speech and a poem with the title “Eski Türkçülük” [Old Turkism], March 26, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 105, gömlek no. 28.
188 Reichswart, „Talaat Pascha?: Englands Hand,” March 19, 1921, quoted in Rifat, Das Geheimnis der Ermordung Talaat Pachas.
189 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 176.
190 Directorate of Intelligence, A Monthly Review of Revolutionary Movements in British Dominions Overseas and Foreign Countries, no 24, October 1920, C.P.2192/A, quoted in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 327. At least one time Talat Pasha had invited the British official with whom he was in contact in Berlin to
by British agents in early 1921, as it was illustrated in Chapter 9. The whole episode with Sir Basil Thomson sending Aubrey Herbert to meet Talat is indeed a matter suspicion. Herbert, too, seemed to be uncomfortable after his debriefing. The British connection was the intuitive explanation for many people, such as Shakib Arslan, who knew about Talat’s talks with Herbert. Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu), the representative of the Ankara government in Rome, reached similar conclusions. When he was woken up by the journalist M. Filippucci-Giustiniani from Il Messaggero at 2 o’clock in the morning of March 16 with the news of Talat’s assassination. Thinking about who could be responsible, Galip Kemali connected the dots, which again led to the work of «foreign hands»:

I knew that the English were recently in touch with Talat Pasha and even a special agent [Aubrey Herbert] had talked to him and he would go to Switzerland to meet with the same man. By then it was very possible to have a peace [settlement] very soon and there were no statesmen in the country who possessed the determination, the courage, and the bitter experience at Talat Pasha’s level. There was no doubt that those foreign hands, who would consider [him] harmful to their future policies, had their fingers in this despicable murder.

The timing of the murder was believed to be significant in indicating a Great Power intrigue. It was an open secret that Talat Pasha was residing in Berlin for two and a half years and it was argued that it would have been a lot easier for Armenians to assassinate him during the revolutionary days of post-war Germany. The British knew that Talat was more and more thinking about returning to Turkey. Sforza’s recent effort to convince the Entente to a rapprochement with Talat was believed to have backfired and pushed the Entente to get rid of
Talat before he would become too powerful once again.\textsuperscript{194} Talat’s followers assumed that there might be even Greek money involved in this assassination plot.\textsuperscript{195} In addition, there was an influx of dubious men like Caputto and Davidoff around Talat just recently before his death, who were somehow associated with the British Intelligence.\textsuperscript{196} There were also other rumors linking the British to the assassination. For instance, a fellow Young Turk and former Malta detainee Tahsin (Uzer) wrote in 1922 that the Tashnags prepared the assassination since 1920 and that

> Three or four months after Talat Pasha’s martyrdom, a noble and rich Indian was murdered by his chauffeur [in Berlin]. In the trial of the chauffeur, the wife or mistress testified: ‘The English got my husband killed, because he possessed many important secrets such as that the English Embassy gave a compensation to the Committee that killed Talat Pasha.’\textsuperscript{197}

The rumors were everywhere. Popular historian Cemal Kutay tells that Eyüp Sabri (Akgöl), one of the paramilitary leaders of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, heard from Cevat (Çobanlı) Pasha that a certain Esad Bey, the cipher clerk of the Anglophile Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, told him:

> Armenians were about to execute their assassination plan against Talat Pasha in few days, and they even choose who shall be the murderer. I gave the deciphered news from a very reliable place to Grand Vizier [Damad Ferid] Pasha. Suddenly a glimpse of excitement appeared on his face. He didn’t say anything, he folded it twice, put it in his pocket, and changed the subject. At least five days later Talat Pasha was martyred just as it was written in the cipher that I handed to Ferit Pasha.\textsuperscript{198}

One would definitely find even more rumors and assumptions about alleged British machinations behind Talat Pasha’s assassination. Without ruling out the possibility that the British Intelligence might have had a hand in the assassination, these conclusions by contemporary observers were speculative and biased explanations mostly based on coincidences and hear-

\textsuperscript{195} Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 185–87; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 105–8.
\textsuperscript{196} Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 127–29; İsmail Canbulat, letter (Rome) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 23, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 444–46.
say evidence. Bedeviled by the missing facts and tempting coincidences, they developed their own conspiracy theories.

One indirect conclusion of seeing the British as pulling the strings implies that the Armenians were seen as incapable of acting by their own. In an obituary Enver Pasha wrote for Talat Pasha in *Liwa-el-Islam*, he claimed that even the 1914 Hnchag assassination plot against Talat was originally a conspiracy by Lord Kitchener and the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos. Hence, Enver was sure that in Talat’s assassination «also other hands were involved other than the Armenian hands». And he added that «it is by no means possible for Armenians to undertake this plot for the pretext of Armenian deportations.» According to Enver, behind this Armenian student there was Armenia’s «big brother», England.199 This denies any form of Armenian agency. In the end, it was obvious for them that «the Armenians have been exploited», in fact by no one else but Britain.200 This perception of Armenians as marionettes or hired-guns of Great Power intrigues remains a common trope in Turkish nationalist narratives. The only agency attributed to Armenians—besides terrorism—is propaganda. In Turkish narratives—then and now—«Armenian propaganda» becomes the *deus ex machina* in finally pushing post-Versailles Germany to surrender to Entente pressures, where the acquittal of Tehlirian is seen as the symbolic turning point.201

To be sure, the Young Turk community and their friends, too, were similarly involved in conspiratorial and propagandistic efforts to manipulate the outcome of the trial and the public opinion. Although the CUP networks in Berlin were already involved in propaganda activities. They were caught off-guard by assassination. The *Liwa-el-Islam* announced the murder of Talat Pasha in its first issue on page three in small statement.202 As they soon witnessed

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200 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, 185–87; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 105–8
202 “Talat Paşa’nın Üfûl-i Ebedisi.” *Liwa-el-Islam* 1, no. 1 (March 15, 1921): 3. The day Talat Pasha was assassinated, March 15, 1921, was originally scheduled to be the release day of the first issue of the newspaper *Liwa-el-Islam*. Due to the shocking assassination of Talat Pasha and further technical problems the first issue was delayed, but still published with the symbolic date of March 15. Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver
the Armenian media campaign, the Young Turk community in Berlin channeled some of its efforts on propaganda activities. Dr. Nazım reported:

The Armenians here are working to mitigate the murderer’s punishment. For one or two newspapers they wrote articles with pretty heavy accusations against Talat and Enver. We are working hard to answer these on behalf his [Talat’s] family. For this we gathered together the Turks based in Berlin and elected an executive committee to work collectively. We have appointed the bureau that I am residing in as the headquarters. We will do as much as we can (even if it’s only a little).203

In fact, their own propaganda publications remained relatively marginal before the trial. It was only after the acquittal of Tehlirian that the Young Turk community engaged more ferociously in propaganda activities.204 The main propaganda on the Talat Pasha Trial was published by the Young Turk community’s Arab activists in Berlin. The Arab activists had more experience in propaganda publications and were considered to represent the case more objectively, as being no Turks. Most vocal one was Dr. Mansur Rifat, who published a pamphlet with the overtly suggestive title *The Secret of Talaat Pasha’s Murder: A Clue for the English Propaganda System*. Dr. Mansur Rifat was an Egyptian nationalist and associate of German-Ottoman pan-Islamic propaganda activities since World War I.205 For the preparation of his pamphlet, Dr. Mansur Rifat had requested a photograph of Tehlirian from the Berlin police, but the police had declined. The paranoid style in thinking was immediately set on course:

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203 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), April 2, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektubları*, 111–13.


I wanted to get the photograph of the murderer of Talaat Pasha for my book. I therefore sent a man with the manuscript to the police headquarters. A Privy X received him and told my messenger, how dare (!) we would write a book against England and whether we did not have fears (!). The killer had already been interrogated and had declared Talaat had killed his parents!! ... Ten days later they ordered me to the police headquarters, where they put me through a rigorous cross-interrogation, certainly much harsher than that Tellirian received. Finally, they told me that they could not give me the photograph, because a press order was released not to publish the photograph of the murderer! 206

Political measures of German officials to minimize the politicization of the trial have been immediately interpreted by the Young Turk community as a conspiracy to safeguard German interests towards the British. German officials were in a quagmire with the whole political dimension of the trial, and did their best in order to limit political damages, even if it meant to disappoint their former allies. The course of the prosecution made Mansur, however, more and more convinced that the Germans were too weak to withstand the British pressures. This was put forward in his second pamphlet after the trial, which was a collection of newspaper articles in support of Talat Pasha’s lost cause. 207 After the disappointing verdict of the trial, Dr. Mansur Rifat sent a protest telegram to Reich President Friedrich Ebert, claiming that the trial was «more of a conspiracy» (vielmehr eine Verschwörung), than a regular process. 208

Emir Shakib Arslan contributed to the public debate in November 1921 with a pamphlet of his own, The Armenian Web of Lies: Frivolous Stand of the Patrons of Armenia, in which Dr. Mansur Rifat wrote an afterword. 209 Dr. Mansur Rifat’s first pamphlet was also submitted to the district attorney Gollnick. 210 During the trial, defense attorney Gordon dismissively referred to Rifat’s pamphlet:

Gentlemen, […] in fact a few days ago a somewhat ostentatious brochure from the opposing side came out, The Secret of Talaat Pasha’s Murder—of course, it is no secret, because the matter is cleared up, these are mere sayings. «The young Armenian», it says, «who lent himself to be a murderer of Talat Pasha» (it is implied that a certain Great

207 Rifat, Talaat Paschas Prozeß, sein Verlauf und sein Ende.
208 Dr. med. Mansur Rifat, telegram to President of the German Republik Friedrich Ebert, June 17, 1921, in Rifat, Talaat Paschas Prozeß, sein Verlauf und sein Ende, 54–55.
The Young Turk community received crucial support from their German friends in defense of Talat Pasha. The internal sources of the Young Turk community go even further in suggesting the commitment of the German officials in intervening into the prosecution. Mrs. Talat tells that the Minister of Justice visited her at home and said: «Madam, don’t worry, as you will be present at the judgement, he [Tehlirian] will no longer live. You need to understand that we caught him alive, but we will only let his corpse go.» And the deputy director of the criminal investigation department, Bernhard Weiss, promised Talat’s widow: «We will take revenge». In context of the political murders and state terror that was taking place in Germany, these remarks, even if only meant as bold but empty gestures to a sorrowful widow, goes to show the general culture of justice in interwar Germany.

Within the media landscape, the mainstream nationalist papers positioned themselves mostly on Talat Pasha’s side, condemning Tehlirian’s crime and defending the Young Turk measures against the Armenians. Only a minority of German newspapers were profoundly pro-Armenian. The Young Turk community dismissively noted that especially the Jewish and social-democrat papers were pro-Armenian. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung under the editorial direction of Enver Pasha’s friend Hans Humann was the most radical and aggressive voice among the supporters of Talat that even went as far as grossly justifying the extermination of the Armenians. Hans Humann went also beyond journalistic propaganda and tried to intervene into the prosecution. Humann and General Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein made a visit to state prosecutor Gollnick on May 30, 1921. The next day Humann sent a list to Gollnick with names and addresses of Paul Weitz, Kress von Kressenstein, Otto von Feldmann, and Felix Guse, because they «possibly could be considered as potential witnesses in the trial against Tehlirian.» Also Franz Günther was considered

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211 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talat Pasha, 92.
214 Ihrig, “Genocide Denied, Accepted, and Justified,” 161.
by Humann as a possible source of information. Kress von Kressenstein had a meeting with the defense counsel Gordon, because he wanted to be considered as a possible witness, but Gordon dismissed him, since Kress von Kressenstein was supposed to be too loyal to the Turks. Kress von Kressenstein had the impression that defense counsel was planning to broach the subject of the Armenian massacres, and under no circumstances would he allow himself to be prevented from presenting a large number of witnesses and evidentiary materials to prove that Talaat was the instigator of, and therefore the culprit behind, the Armenian massacres. [...] Von Gordon spoke many times about the worldwide attention the case would attract. [...] in view of important political consequences that might ensue from an acquittal of the defendant [...] [it is] necessary to invite many witnesses and expert witnesses who would not speak merely in favor of the Armenians but—in order to provide a moment of respite for our former ally—would portray an objective depiction of the exigencies that our ally was facing.

As a matter of fact, the defense council and the Armenian community in Berlin and its transnational networks were all engaged in a collective effort to bring the Armenian Question into the focus of Tehlirian’s trial. Hence, some of the accusations about Armenian propaganda were not groundless. Although the ARF was behind the assassination plot, this also meant to downplay and deny the ARF’s role in order to present Tehlirian in a better light. From the Tashnag perspective, the news of the successful assassination of Talat Pasha arrived in a delicate time when the fate of the remaining parts of the Republic of Armenia was doomed in face of continuing Soviet invasion and international isolation. Armen Garo wrote that despite all the bad news, «Shahan’s success is the only consoling event.» Nevertheless, Armen Garo strongly urged to keep the role of the Tashnags a secret:

Apply every means there to prove that that was an individual act; it is not the time for party advertising; the situation in our country is very delicate; looking at the latest news, our leaders have been forced to work together with the Turks against the Bolsheviks in the war that they are waging; consequently, it is not at all the time to let this undertaking be ascribed to our party.

Thus, the role of the ARF was kept a secret. The possibility of an organized plot behind the assassination was never a matter of discussion during the proceedings. In his first letter to Armen Garo after the assassination of Talat Pasha, Shahan Nathali wrote from Amsterdam on his way from Berlin to Paris:

218 Ibid., 51–53.
219 Landesarchiv 1799, 92 and verso, quoted in ibid., 55.
220 Armen Garo, letter (Paris) to ARF Central Committee of America, March 17, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 200.
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This event not only became a sacred work of justice but also an occasion to propagandize the Armenian case; for that reason immediately send to Berlin the literature before or after the event, supporting the Armenian cause and also that information containing Turkish censorship, so that they are delivered to the lawyers; because on this occasion the German people will learn all that they have no information about.221

The Armenian and Armenophile networks in Berlin were already activated with strong ties to the German-Armenian Association and Dr. Lepsius. A new civil coalition emerged and prepared a solid defense case and vocal public propaganda on behalf of Tehlirian. When the ARF decided to deceive its own role in the assassination plot, Boghos Nubar Pasha’s Armenian National Delegation stepped in and took over the lead. Although the two Armenian parties were not necessarily on the same page on many issues, the trial of Tehlirian gave them a chance to cooperate. The collective effort was centered on the task of finding appropriate witnesses and textual evidence that would prove that there was an intended and centralized policy of extermination, and that Talat Pasha was at the top of this enterprise and Tehlirian was a victim.

Some of the evidence submitted in support of Tehlirian’s case still remains to be a matter of contention among historians. One of these disputed evidences is Tehlirian’s own testimony. Following Armen Garo and Shahan Natali’s strict instructions, Tehlirian not only denied any complicity of the ARF, but also altered his own life-history to create a—even more—tragic narrative of victimhood. In Tehlirian’s fabricated and coached testimony, his voluntary service in the Armenian Foreign Legion of the Russian Army was carefully replaced with a fictive eye-witness account of the massacres of his family in his hometown. This false testimony would not only have a great effect on the course of his trial, but would also shape Armenian nationalist narratives of his victim-turned-hero persona.222 Either way, Tehlirian was, like all Armenians worldwide, a victim and survivor of the Armenian Genocide and his family was exterminated.

The other evidence submitted to the court was a collection of Ottoman documents, also known as the Naim/Andonian documents (or sometimes referred as Talat Pasha telegrams).

221 Shahan Natali, letter (Amsterdam) to the ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), March 19, 1921, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 203.
222 Many Armenian and Armenophil narratives still choose either to ignore the contradictions between his biography and his testimony or to accept his fabricated eyewitness account as a quasi-veritable story. For a more detailed analysis of this silence over Tehlirian’s false testimony in Armenian narratives see: Gunn, “Getting Away with Murder,” 910–11.
Aram Andonian, an Armenian intellectual and survivor of the arrests of April 1915, brought to Tehlirian’s defense council a collection of alleged secret telegrams proving that the former Minister of Interior Talat Pasha gave direct orders to exterminate the Armenian population.223 Andonian claims to have obtained these telegrams from an Ottoman official from Aleppo by the name of Naim Bey.224 Andonian’s documents were not accepted as evidence, because it would have distracted the course of the trial even more to the question of Talat’s guilt.225 Nevertheless, the documents played an important part in the public discourse of the trial and in its legacy.226

However, these Naim/Andonian documents presented at Talat Pasha’s trial cannot be let pass without a comment, because their authenticity is very much disputed. The documents were immediately dismissed as forgeries by the Young Turk community in Berlin.227 The authenticity of the Naim/Andonian documents still constitute a major point of contention in the historiography.228 Turkish historians critically analyzed the paleography and diplomat-ics of the Naim/Andonian documents and demonstrated that they must be forgeries prepared

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223 Aram Andonian is considered as one of the fathers of Armenian Genocide studies. He has collected many oral histories and documents on the deportations and massacres. Rita Soulhanian Kuyumjian, The Survivor: Biography of Aram Andonian (London: Taderon Press, 2010).


225 Wegner, Der Prozeß Talat Pašcha, 69.


228 In their efforts to disprove the genocide accusations, the Turkish official historiography and its followers made the falsification of sources of the genocide claims as one of their main methods. Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres,” Middle Eastern Studies 12 (1976): 99–107. The Naim/Andonian documents were a particular bête noire of Turkish historians and officials, not only because these were considered as a major argument for the genocidal intent of the Ottoman Government, but also because these have been used as evidence in defense of ASALA and JCAG activists. Maxime Gauin, “Aram Andonian’s ‘Memoirs of Naim Bey’ and the Contemporary Attempts to Defend their ‘Authenticity’,” Review of Armenian Studies 23 (2011): 234.
for propaganda purposes. Armenian scholars, on the other hand, looked for ways to reestablish the reputation of the telegrams, but these efforts did not necessarily convince those outside the hermetic circle of Armenian studies. Most scholars rather prefer not to use the Naim/Andonian documents.

Once we disregard the question of authenticity and the content of the documents, the background story of how these documents ended up in Berlin reveals interesting details of transnational activism. Whereas Turkish official histories tend to see in this «larger organized undertaking» a sinister Armenian conspiracy to deceive the public and spread false propaganda, these efforts rather show the working of transnational contentious politics.

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229 Without going into further detail here, their close analysis demonstrated that there were major inconsistencies in the dates, signs, signatures, and language of the telegrams. There were further inconstancies in Andonian’s story of how he got to the documents and who Naim Bey really was. Orel and Yuca, *The Talat Pasha “Telegrams”* 7–12, 25–26. There was a concerted effort on behalf Turkish nationalist scholars to spread the news as quickly and as far as possible. Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Andonian “Documents” Attributed to Talat Pasha are Forgeries! Les “documents” d’Andonian attribués à Talat Pacha son des faux! Die Talat Pascha zugeschriebenen andonianischen ”Dokumente” sind Fälschungen!* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984).


231 Some recent works made some parenthetical remarks that the Naim/Andonian documents might need a reexamination as the Ottoman Archives are reopened. For instance, Hilmar Kaiser claims to have discovered the mysterious Naim Bey from Aleppo, whom Turkish scholars had argued he had probably never existed, and sees a confirmation of some of the content of Naim/Andonian documents in archival sources. Garabet K. Moumdjian, “Is a Long Overdue Controversy Finally Settled? According to Dr. Hilmar Kaiser: Aram Andonian’s Infamous Naim Bey’s Real Identity Is Now Considered Revealed,” http://garabetmoumdjian.blogspot.com/2008/05/aram-andonians-infamous-naim-beys-real.html; Kaiser, “The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916,” 108. In a similar take, also Taner Akçam claims in support of his «double-track» thesis that Talat Pasha was sending first harmless official orders to the local officials and then secret but decisive telegrams with the real orders for the extermination, that some documents are resembling or conforming—though not authenticating—the content of some Naim/Andonian documents. Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 254. For a critique of Akçam’s use of Naim/Andonian documents see: Maxime Gauin, “‘Proving’ a ‘Crime against Humanity’?,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2015): 142–43.

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The Armenian National Delegation has been collecting information and documents related to war crimes committed against Ottoman Armenians since 1915, which constituted the foundation of the Nubarian Library in Paris. After the war, Nubar Pasha and his Armenian National Delegation assigned Andonian to write a book based on documentary evidence. «The ‹National Union› has entrusted me with the task of choosing among the documents», Andonian wrote in a letter on June 10, 1921, and continues, «[…] I was trusted with the duty of bringing these documents [from Aleppo], and to submit them to the delegation of the Armenian National Union at the Peace Conference.» After the news of Talat Pasha’s murder Nubar Pasha wrote a letter to the German Ambassador in Paris, to issue Andonian a visa. The German Embassy granted this application and after arriving in Berlin, Andonian reported to Paris: «Tehririan’s trial is becoming very relevant to the Armenian Question. The defense is well organized and is entrusted to three of the best known lawyers of Berlin.» He also added that «[t]his will be the first time that the Armenian Question and the Armenian massacres will be discussed in a European courtroom.»

The defense council knew that it would be tricky to prove the authenticity of the Naim/Andonian documents. Hence, Dr. Lepsius brought Andonian’s book and the documents to Dr. Walter Rößler, the former German consul in Aleppo from 1910 to 1918. Despite the Andonian’s emotional lack of objectivity, as Dr. Rößler concluded, «the content of the book gives an impression of authenticity», because «[t]he published documents coincide with the course of events and share a similarity with reality.» However, Rößler argued that it was impossible to certify the authenticity of the documents, «because these telegrams contain only the handwriting of the telegraph officials and the individuals responsible for their decoding.» In defense of his book, Andonian later said that

234 National Archives of Armenia, Fund No. 430, file no. 670, p. 2, quoted in Kuyumjian, The Survivor, 45.
235 National Archives of Armenia, Fund No. 430, file no. 670, pp. 3, 4, quoted in Kuyumjian, The Survivor, 46.
236 For Rößler’s letter see: Fisch and Krikorian, Justicier du génocide arménien, 226–29, quoted here from the English translation in Orel and Yuca, The Talat Pasha “Telegrams” 16. See also: Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, 66–67. The question of Naim/Andonian documents is further plagued by the fact that the original Ottoman-language documents are missing. Orel and Yuca, The Talat Pasha “Telegrams” 19–23. Some of the documents related to the prosecution of Abdelahad Nuri Bey went missing after they were sent to Constantinople. Fisch and Krikorian, Justicier du génocide arménien, 230–31. Regarding the rest of the documents, Vahakh Dadrian writes that «Nubar library no longer has these documents, believed to
[Rößler] forgets that my book was not a historical one, but rather aiming at propaganda. Naturally, my book could not have been spared the errors characteristic of publications of this nature. ... I would also like to point out that the Armenian Bureau in London, and the National Armenian Delegation in Paris, behaved somewhat cavalierly with my manuscript, for the needs of the cause they were defending.237

Despite his skepticism over the authenticity of the documents, Rößler did not disagree with the message, «that Talaat was indeed one of those Turkish statesmen, who desired and executed according to plan the extermination of Armenians».238 The Auswärtiges Amt revoked Rößler’s permission to testify in order to limit the already growing politicization of the trial.239

Nonetheless, with all these efforts Tehlirian’s attorneys were successful to make the trial more about the Talat Pasha’s crimes than Tehlirian’s crime. Tehlirian openly admitted that he intentionally killed Talat to revenge the death of his family. It was his mother, he told, who ordered him to kill Talat. Since Tehlirian’s intention and action was no matter of contention the trial concentrated on Tehlirian’s legal liability for reasons of his mental culpability, on the one hand, and on the moral reliability of his motivation, on the other hand. Only moral acknowledgement of the causes of his mental trauma would enable Tehlirian to be acquitted. Both the question of his mental culpability and the moral reasons of his actions were connected to the events of 1915.

The argument of the defense counsel was that Tehlirian was, according to §51, «at the time of the commission of the act […] in a state of unconsciousness or disturbance of the mental processes due to illness», which would free him from culpability.240 But the medical testimony was ambivalent and did not necessarily support the claim that Tehlirian was unconscious or in a disturbed mental state during the killing.241 In support of Tehlirian’s moral cause, other testimonies approved the extent and intensity of the massacres in different regions and that

have been transferred to Soviet Armenia in the 1960s.» Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians,” 317.
238 Dr. Walter Rößler, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt, May 30, 1921, PA-AA, NL, Rößler, 2, quoted in Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 29.
239 Haniel, letter to Defense Attorney von Gordon, June 1, 1921, PA-AA, NL, Rößler, 2, cited in Hosfeld, Operation Nemesis, 29.
241 Ünal, Der Prozess gegen Salomon Tehlirian, 42–43.
Talat Pasha had ordered and managed the deportations and massacres, most notably the testimonies of Dr. Johannes Lepsius and Grigoris Balakian, a genocide survivor and pastor of Manchester. Although the prosecution made efforts to move the debate away from the Armenian Question and Talat’s responsibility, it proved to be impossible to disconnect Tehlirian’s crime from Talat’s crime. The cat was out of the bag.

In the final defense of Tehlirian, his defense attorney Gordon underlined the moral and historical significance of the case to the members of the jury: «I’ve already told you, jurors, earlier: Your verdict will be remembered probably after thousands of years because of this vicious crime.»\(^{242}\) Soghomon Tehlirian’s prosecution resulted with the sensational outcome that Tehlirian was acquitted by the jury as guilt-free because of his traumatized mental and medical condition. Supporters of Tehlirian applauded the verdict and celebrated and congratulated their hero before hurrying him out of the building to a nearby waiting car. Soon later, Tehlirian was out of the country. Nevertheless, Tehlirian’s case constituted an important precedent.\(^{243}\)

After the acquittal of Tehlirian, the Young Turk community in Berlin sharply proclaimed their disappointment to the officials of the Auswärtiges Amt.\(^{244}\) In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, none less than Abu Jihad himself, Max von Oppenheim, revealed his concerns and plied for a revision of the trial before Tehlirian would leave Germany:

As I have heard from local Turks, their discontent is increasingly on the rise about the way the trial of Talat’s murderer has proceeded and how the acquittal was received by the German press.\(^{245}\)

Oppenheim warned that the relations with Muslim peoples all over the world could be damaged by the acquittal of Talat Pasha’s murderer. And Oppenheim concluded: «It is a good-

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\(^{242}\) Wegner, *Der Prozeß Talat Pascha*, 123.


\(^{244}\) Orient Club and Turkish Club, memorandum on the Talat Pasha Trial to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), June 4, 1921, PA-AA, R 78551. See also: ZMO, NGH 07-03, 17.

\(^{245}\) Max von Oppenheim, letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 7, 1921, PA-AA, R 30648, K016860ff.
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old maxim that the enemies of our enemies are our friends, and we are not so rich that we
could go without any sympathy that we still get.»246 Oppenheim’s argument was disputed.
Another voice from the Auswärtiges Amt concluded that «no lasting damage to German in-
terests will result from this case. It is especially a mistake to assume that the Anatolian Gov-
ernment of Kemal Pasha is identical with the former Young Turk Committee circles and that
he cherishes particular sympathy for Enver and Talat.»247 Yet, another response argued the
contrary that Mustafa Kemal had good relations with Talat.248 According to many voices at
the Auswärtiges Amt, Talat was seen by the people of the East as «one of the great Orientals»
(einer der grössten Orientalen). It was reported that Aziz Ali al-Misri, who happened to be at
a spa in Bad Kissingen protested sharply, although he was known to have fallen from grace
with the Young Turks. Also, another Egyptian politician living in Munich was reported to
have written the following message:

I tell you most frankly that the process was to the whole Moslem world a great disap-
pointment. It proved the lack of commonsense in, and the shortsightedness of the court.
It may be interpreted as nothing but an ugly flattery to England. But it is to be lamented
that poor Germany, through such an ugly flattery is bound to lose the sympathy of the
whole Moslem world, if not of the whole Orient. Believe me, if I could go anywhere else,
I would not have remained here one day.249

The acquittal of Tehlirian indeed marked a turning point—especially on a discursive level—
that changed the relation of the Young Turk leaders to Germany. Attempts to win back the
confidence of the Young Turk community, such as organizing a «German-Turkish Talaat
Celebration», was rejected by the Young Turk community.250 Enver Pasha expressed his dis-
appointment with the German public and republic harshly in an anonymous article. Accor-
ding to Enver, the Muslim world needed to be prepared against the Western conspiracies more
than ever:

O, Turks and Moslems, I tell you: A judiciary of a people, at whose side we lost millions
of heroes and whom we considered a friend forever, has betrayed us! In a land that you
hold for the friendliest, your rights as well as your lives are not safe. This is proof that the
brilliant laws and the judiciary in Europe can be a means of cruelty to a Turk, just like
the European international law is on our nation. Therefore, we must turn to the most
primitive natural law, and just as we defend in Asia Minor our national law against a

246 PA-AA, R 30648, K016865.
247 Hesse, letter to Auswärtiges Amt, July 15, 1921, PA-AA, R 30648, K016867f..
248 PA-AA, R 30648, K016873.
249 PA-AA, R 30648, K016873.
250 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), June 27, 1921, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS
3158; PA-AA, R 30648, K016862.
world of cruel and unjust enemies by ourselves, so are we forced even in a friendly country like Germany to defend our personal rights and life with our own power and with our own resources. This shall be our law.\textsuperscript{251}

Blaming others—namely, the British for pulling the strings and the Germans for being subversive to British machinations—was in reality an outcry of one’s own increasing impotency and marginalization. Only one month previous to Talat Pasha’s assassination, Enver wrote to his wife: «Oh! Such questions that I feel unable to give an answer. It comes to me, as if I was virtually a toy of fortune being dragged away and I don’t have the strength to liberate myself of being a toy.»\textsuperscript{252} All the power networks in Berlin and the propaganda bureaus established all over Europe had proven to be ineffective against conspiracies of their enemies. Neither could they feel safe nor could they find justice, they believed. The fear of the lurking unknown in the form of further Armenian assassin squads and foreign intelligence intrigues continued to haunt the Young Turk community in Berlin. Shakib Arslan asked Enver Pasha to be cautious, since the Armenians had many fedayis shadowing him.\textsuperscript{253}

Indeed, the Operation Nemesis had only started and the Young Turk community was not mistaken in their increasing feeling of insecurity.\textsuperscript{254} Soon other culprits of the Armenian deportations were assassinated. The former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha was killed in December 5, 1921, in Rome.\textsuperscript{255} After Said Halim’s death, Enver was next on the list and it was reported by the Turkish Intelligence that the Armenian fedayis had established a training facility at the on the Prince Islands.\textsuperscript{256} More shocking for the Young Turk community was the assassination of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Cemal Azmi in April 17, 1922 in Berlin.\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{251} Enver Pascha, “Talaat Pascha und sein Mörder,” \textit{Liwa-el-Islam} 1, no. 1 (15.06.1921): 2.

\textsuperscript{252} Enver Pasha, letter (Stettin) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), February 13, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim}, 49.

\textsuperscript{253} Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 176–79.


\textsuperscript{256} Intelligence report, February 2, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 59, gömlek no. 94.

\textsuperscript{257} See: Cemal Pasha’s wife Seniye Cemal, letter to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), April 22, 1922, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., \textit{İttihatçı'nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Ataturk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı Kararlar} (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 345–46.
two men were strolling around with their wives in company of the widow of Talat Pasha, as they were gunned down by two Nemesis agents.\textsuperscript{258} The defenselessness in Germany ultimately eliminated the last remaining promises of the old German-Turkish brotherhood. Hans Humann, who had sat down with Bahaeddin Şakir only few weeks before and had «forged out cheerful plans» (schmiedeten wir frohe Pläne), was shocked by the murder of their «Turkish friends»: «You feel the Turkish eyes looking to you and feel immeasurably embarrassed so that you want to run away.»\textsuperscript{259} The men with dark eyes and eyebrows shadowing them in Berlin streets and pulling the triggers continued to be imagined as the hands of greater enemies in distant places like London. In reality, however, it was their not-so-distant past that was haunting them, and an organization which was, in its clandestine and violent methods, akin to their own.

\textsuperscript{258} Shiragian, \textit{The Legacy}, 169–81; Derogy, \textit{Resistance and Revenge}, 147–62. Around the same time, there were rumors that further Armenian agents were sent from an Armenian committee in the US to assassinate Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. See: Elif-Nun, intelligence report, April 18–21, 1922, TITE, kutu no. 57, gömlek no. 131.

\textsuperscript{259} Hans Humann, letter to Otto von Lossow, April 19, 1922, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158.
11. The Blind Man and the Lame:
The Crisis of Young Turks in the
Berlin-Moscow-Ankara-Kabul Axis

When Dr. Nazım and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir left the Charlottenburg morgue after Talat Pa-
sha’s assassination on March 15, 1921, Nazım told Bahaeddin now that Talat was gone, they
resembled somewhat to Jean Turcan’s statue of «The Blind Man and the Lame» in Paris.¹
According to the old fable a blind man carries a cripple on his back who leads the way for
the blind man towards their destination. Although the cooperation between the two can be
understood as a productive collaboration, the French idiom, «l'union de l'aveugle et le para-
lytique», is used to describe uneasy partners. In the crisis after Talat’s sudden death, the Young
Turk community sorrowfully realized that they were uneasy and handicapped partners. Many
believed that the Committee of Union and Progress, too, passed away together with Talat
Pasha.² Mithat Şükrü, for instance, wrote in his memoir:

When asked what kind of organization the Committee of Union and Progress really was,
Talat Pasha had once answered jokingly, «I don’t know what it is either, but it is something
very hard to manage».⁴ The message behind this joke was that Talat had become the manager
of the Central Committee of the CUP. He did not get to this position because of his charis-
matic authority or revolutionary experience but because he was able to effectively moderate
and manipulate between rival cliques and conflicting factions in an oligarchical system where
everybody was full of himself and believed to be destined to save the empire. Talat’s death

¹ Arıf Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992),
145.
² Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 144; Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aşlan ve Şehid-i Muhterem
Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005), 130.
³ Mithat Şükrü Bleda, İmparatorlukun Çöküşü: İttihat ve Terakki Kâtibi Umumisi (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları,
2010), 207.
⁴ Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki'de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan
(İstanbul: Kitap Yaynevi, 2006), I: 63–64.
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resulted in an existential crisis for the remnants of the CUP organization with serious consequences for the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. This chapter will explore the developments that took place after the demise of Talat on three levels and their intersections: CUP’s polity organization, national politics in Turkey, Russia, and Afghanistan, and international politics on the Ankara-Moscow-Kabul axis.

The organizational developments were directly connected to the power vacuum created by Talat Pasha’s death. The split among different factions were difficult to overcome and the ideals were too far to reach. This was also connected to the erosion of Berlin’s quality as a political location and the increasing material dependency of the organization to Soviet Russia. Such impending problems were increasingly illustrative of the international entanglements that limited the CUP’s course of action. When The Times announced Talat’s death on its March 17, 1921 issue, there were two other very important news on the very same page.  

The first one under the heading «Trade with Red Russia: Agreement Signed» reported that the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed on March 16, 1921. As it was underlined, the treaty had, as its first clause, the prohibition of any kind of propaganda activities in the East.  

The second article on the very same page, titled «Soviet Plots in the East: Overthrow of British Rule in India», warned about Bolshevik propaganda activities in Afghanistan and India, including Cemal Pasha’s mission in Kabul. While the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty made Bolshevik propaganda activities in the East difficult, a new Soviet system of treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan certified the official state actors in West Asia forcing other transnational and subaltern non-state actors to lose their ground. Although Cemal had become a senior state official in Afghan army, he was losing ground in Kabul as well, since his Bolshevik and Kemalist alignments were making him an obstacle in the looming Anglo-Afghan rapprochement. Kemalist Turkey’s increasing international recognition had left no room for the fugitive CUP leaders in national or international politics to act on their own. Eventually, Enver Pasha’s decision to intervene into national politics in Turkey would practically result in the end of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The whole episode and its geopolitical and strategic shifts were accompanied by politics of fear. Propaganda wars

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5 The Times, “The Late Talaat Pasha: An Engaging Villain,” March 17, 1921.
were now showing their consequence, as the intersubjective perception and misperception among the actors was increasingly a matter of contention.

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Instant reactions to Talat Pasha’s death by fellow Committee members expressed the sorrow feelings of loss and despair, but some of the Committee members soon saw opportunities created by Talat’s disappearance. A letter from the Rome Branch to Enver Pasha stated that Talat’s death was considered as if «the Committee of Union and Progress has collapsed and the collaboration of its fellows has dissolved». Nevertheless, it was proposed that «instead of further coupling the strength and power of our Committee with the existence of a single member, we will not spare any efforts for the realization of the union of the Islamic community.»

In fact, Talat’s demise offered a chance to reorganize the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies—especially for Enver.

In order to assemble fellow CUP colleagues around him, Enver had to make some concessions and build new coalitions. For instance, he saw in Cemal Pasha a strategic partner to undertake the reorganization of the movement after Talat’s death. «From now on we’re the only two close friends left in this world», declared Enver in a private letter to Cemal.

This theme of loneliness had been an important trope in Enver’s self-perception in exile, especially expressed in his letters to his wife Naciye and other close relatives. «Although I have many friends around me», Enver had confessed earlier to his brother-in-law Kazım (Orbay), «I am

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9 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds. İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 66.

10 See Enver Pasha’s letters to Naciye Sultan, February 17, 1921 (Reval); February 23, 1921 (Moscow); March 11, 1921 (Mocow); April 23/24, 1921 (Moscow), in Murat Bardakç, ed., Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yarıdoş Sürğün Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 50; 57; 83; 164.
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quite lonely.»11 Having evoked the same trope, Enver hoped to establish a working relationship with Cemal who had already had a good standing not only in Moscow and in Kabul but also with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Ankara. Yet, Cemal had never been an easy partner.

To a certain degree, the demise of Talat offered also a scapegoat to blame for their current misachievements. Although the cherished hadith «remember and speak well of your dead» forced Enver Pasha to be admittedly more restraint in his criticism, he did not withhold his opinion in private letters to Cemal Pasha.12 The main argument was that Talat had built a personal clique around him and placed himself in the center of affairs:

Lately, there has been a minor difference of opinion between us regarding our holy struggle for the redemption of Islamdom and our country. [Talat] had the idea of reaching the goal by uniting the whole movement and enterprise at his person. His loss in such a sudden way took with him also the whole labor and connections which were established according to this principle and can possibly result in discontinuing everything that is achieved so far. This shows that for the triumph of our holy struggle it is necessary to give attention to the organization rather than to the individuals. To do this, let’s concentrate on the organization: Let’s embrace it. Let’s train many heroic mujahideen who would be a chain joining each other. Let’s achieve our objective and goal for all.13

Enver Pasha was increasingly stressing the argument of a leaderless and post-charismatic organization that would produce multiple leaders whenever and wherever necessary, which was probably a discursive tactic to attract Cemal. «I think that once we can enroot our organization in a way that it can be saved from being dependent on the individuals», said Enver, «this would partly have the consequence of saving the Muslim peoples.» This idea was framed as particularly selfless. «Who knows! None of us has an insurance at hand that one day we will not drop dead like late Talat did!»14 The pre-revolutionary organization of the CUP with the politicized officer corps was idealized as a model by Enver. «I think, it was the cultivation of the army according to this idea that has now saved Anatolia by creating men such as Mustafa Kemal, Kazım etc.», Enver explained. The latter two men would be driven to fury if they would hear that they owed their upbringing to their fellow schoolmate and committee member, Enver. «If our organization can only achieve to raise a youth like that in every Muslim

11 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım (Orbay) (Erzurum), September 23, 1920, ATASE, İŞ, kutu no. 570, gömlek no. 54.
12 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 71–76.
13 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 20, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 65–66.
14 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 71–76.
country, then the job is done.» Enver again addressed the issue of educating the Muslim youth:

[...] and these young men who will be educated gradually will continue the work even if we retire or die. For this reason, I am in favor of the preparation of such an organization that is, of course, secret and dedicated to a principle instead of personalities and that would accordingly operate on its own at any occasion. As you see, our country is a great example for this idea of mine. Although we are not in leadership, trained young friends under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who was prepared for this position, conduct and enhance the operation. I am sure that even if we would lose Mustafa Kemal somehow, the work will continue. This means that I have the idea that the struggle that we started against the European and worldwide imperialism and capitalism needs to be extended and vitalized to a major ideal that would work without our day by day political labor.

How this revolutionary and political education of the Muslim youth was to be realized was not discussed, only to remain, like many others, a distant ideal. Only practical measure Enver Pasha noted was that one could only find proper personnel that could be sent to other Muslim countries to educate their youth in Turkey. «I regret to say that except for us, the best of all the other countries are behind our youngest and less experienced friends.»

In order to push forward the reorganization, Enver repeated the necessity of moving the center of the organization to Moscow, but he needed to explain his own position in this allegedly leaderless organization. «It is not my idea that I personally have the leadership of this organization», said Enver, «and that I stay and have fun in Moscow». However, for the time being Moscow was the best suited place, as Enver argued. Germans under the current pressure of the British would no more be able to guarantee the safety of a political organization that is against European powers.

His real plan, however, was to unite all the former CUP members under his leadership in Moscow. After Talat Pasha’s murder, Kamil Bey wrote to his brother Enver that the Young

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15 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 67.
16 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [end of March or early April 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 69.
17 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 82.
18 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [end of March or early April 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 69.
19 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 73.
20 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 20, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Rubum, Efendim, 95.
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Turk community in Berlin allegedly expressed their wish that «only if Ali Bey [Enver] would come and assemble us.»21 Similarly, Hacı Sami and Küçük Talat believed that Enver needed to take the lead of the organization after Talat’s death and thus hurry back to Berlin to assemble the fellow Committee members.22 Indeed, in May 1921, Enver made a trip to Berlin and Rome to unite the dispersed Committee members abroad and to get in touch with old CUP colleagues, who were recently released from Malta where they had been kept captive as war-criminals. The civil-military division was still a major issue that needed to be overcome.

In Berlin, Enver offered the so-called Doctors clique—namely Bahaeddin Şakir, Nazım, and Rüsuhi—to forget about the past disputes and work together with him:

> For the cause, I have put aside personal thoughts and animosities so far. After the martyrdom of the deceased we even decided at our general assembly, where Bedri also participated, to write to the Doctors in Berlin to join us and work together. And God willing, in this way our union that has been subjected to partition can become powerful again, so that from the martyr’s [Talat] demise a benefit for the Islamdom can arise.23

The «Doctors» had rather been associated with Talat Pasha’s faction so far and were due all respect rather suspicious of Enver Pasha’s way of politics. These three doctors were reluctant to work under Enver’s command. For instance, Dr. Nazım renounced all his political demands within the organization and proposed that Enver and Cemal should take over the leadership of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. He would rather prefer to go back to Anatolia and work as a physician or whatever duty the Ankara Government would assign him.

On May 19, 1921, Enver met with Vehip (Kaçı) Pasha in Rome.24 «Enver Pasha, who was believed to be in the Caucasus», reported The Times, «has been in Rome on his way to Switzerland, where he is to meet a number of Turkish politicians.»25 The Young Turk community in Rome was, however, already under surveillance of the Operation Nemesis, because the

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21 Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 20, 1921, TTK, P.02.08, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 175–76.
22 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Rome) to Enver Pasha, [March/April 1921], TTK, EP 2-72
23 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 75.
24 Enver Pasha, letter (Rome) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), May 19, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Rahum, Efendim, 197–98.
number 2 on the death list former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha was residing in Rome.

Enver was soon identified by Nemesis agents shadowing Said Halim Pasha:

The first time I saw Enver I was walking around the Hotel Plaza. I noticed two men, one of them wearing dark glasses. They were both carefully surveying the area as they walked. When they got close to me, I immediately recognized Enver with his dark, upturned mustache. [...] A few days later I saw Enver in the Villa Borghese. I was on a bench reading letters from Constantinople. Carelessly, I had thrown down next to me several copies of the Armenian newspaper Jagadamard. It was very stupid, a terrible mistake. Any Turk would be able to identify me as an Armenian reading a Dashnag paper. That is exactly what happened. Hearing a footstep, I raised my head. It was Enver walking toward me briskly. I tried to gather up the newspapers, but it was too late. He looked at me and at the newspapers. That day he was not wearing dark glasses; our eyes met.26

After talks in Rome, Enver Pasha returned to Berlin. The Doctors had still not made a decision. But then, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Rüsuhi convinced Dr. Nazım that he should rather keep an eye on Enver: «Enver Pasha is very lonely, certain kind of men might get around him. They might mislead him to wrong paths, therefore you should be at his side», they told Nazım.27 The latter wrote in despair to Cavid Bey:

I would prefer to work with all my soul in the homeland. But how? [...] Baha [eddin Şakir] and also Rüsuhi decided to work together with Ali Bey [Enver Pasha]. This decision—if it works out—might also have the advantage of keeping the excesses of Ali Bey [Enver Pasha] in check.28

Enver Pasha was successful in his reunion offer. «However, the organization abroad is going possibly well», Enver wrote to Cavid Bey from Berlin. «In this infertile soil it has struck root beyond my imagination.»29 Meanwhile in Switzerland, Cavid Bey was under the political pressure of the police of the Canton Vaud, suspicious of Cavid’s political ventures. The Canton police was rather interested in getting Cavid out of Switzerland. In order to avoid extradition, Cavid was asked to sign an official statement in which he declared to renounce any political activity in Switzerland. As it was still possible that Cavid could become a minister once again in case of a regime change in Turkey, as one Swiss official explained, it was better

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28 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), June 7, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 130.
29 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 77.
not to be too harsh with him.30 Enver was also informally requested by German officials to leave Germany.31

While the political atmosphere in Europe was turning dark on the Muslim émigré communities, on June 20, 1921, Dr. Nazım wrote to his wife in Smyrna that he had no more hope to return to Turkey either, so that he left for Moscow.32 While Dr. Nazım accompanied Enver to Moscow together with some Arab delegates, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was assigned to Thrace to prepare networks of underground resistance against the Greeks, and Dr. Rüsuhi remained in Berlin.33 Order was restored, brothers were reunited. Or so did it seem. But Shakib Arslan would reveal to the Kemalist ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow that he was rather a follower of Talat Pasha’s agenda, but now as there was no other possibility than working together with Enver Pasha, he came to Moscow.34 Previously, other Arab delegates, Dr. Ahmed Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish had resigned from the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, because of the developments within the organization that took place since the demise of Talat.35

On June 18, Enver left for Moscow. He would never return to Berlin thereafter.36 The propaganda bureau continued to work on its own and the newspaper Liwa-el-Islam was published until December 1922. Berlin also remained as the residence of families and politically passive colleagues, and hence continued to be an important hub of correspondence and retreat, although it ceased to be politically relevant within the movement. After the series of assassinations which resulted in the murder of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakир and Cemal Azmi Bey in April

30 Chief of Foreign Affairs Division Dr. Charles R. Paravicini, memorandum (Berne), November 20, 1920; Cavid Bey, statement (Berne), November 26, 1920, BAR, E2001B.1000/1501.307.
32 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Beria Hanım (Symrna), June 20, 1921, cited in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 194.
33 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 80.
34 Ali Fuat Pasha, report (Moscow) on the interview with Emir Shakib Arslan to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 22, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 36; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 18.
36 Enver Pasha, letter (Stettin) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), June 18, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Rubum, Efendim, 199.
1922, Berlin ultimately lost its appeal as a center of political exile for the Young Turk community. Eventually, after Talat Pasha’s death and in the absence of Enver Pasha, the Muslim émigré networks politically united within the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies got soon disengaged, although the organization continued to formally exist.

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Somehow considered as «state guests» of Soviet Russia, Enver Pasha with his entourage occupied the two-floored modest buildings at of the wings of the Sugar King’s Palace that had formerly served as business offices. Across the front yard in parallel wing there was the quarters of Cemal Pasha and his entourage. The overall presence of Enver and his friends in Moscow were also far from being a diplomatic delegation. «Karakhan was fed up with the continued presence of unwelcome guests in his courtyard», M. N. Roy wrote in his memoir. «They certainly went to the black-market, an offence liable to capital punishment in those days, and carried on clandestine traffic with Germany through the medium of the Afghan Embassy.» Enver was buying fur coats at the black market and sending them to Berlin. Even for Moscow standards where decadent Western formalities of politics were seen as prudish, Enver and his delegations constituted a gray area in diplomacy.

Entitlement and certification were getting more and more important, as the way of international affairs was settling down from revolutionary coalitions to formal diplomacy. This ambivalence of their diplomatic status was increasingly becoming a problem for the fugitive Young Turk leaders. More for Enver than for Cemal. While the latter was an official representative of the Afghan Government, Enver with his shallow Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was neither national nor international. The ambivalent status of Enver in diplomatic occasions was increasingly becoming a problem. He was either getting not the attention he expected or he was getting too much attention in the eyes of his rivals. At the banquet of the Afghan Embassy, for instance, Enver received far more respect and audience than the

38 Roy, Memoirs, 409.
39 See, for instance: Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), February 28, 1921, TTK, EP 01-42, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 164.
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delegates of the Ankara Government. Turkish diplomats Rıza Nur and Yusuf Kemal pro-
tested that «he doesn’t have any official title». «We are an official delegation entitled by the
Representatives of Turkey.»40 M. N. Roy remembers that Enver’s «behaviour was against the
unwritten rules of political asylum», as he was maintaining personal relationship with the
Afghan Embassy in Moscow. «But the leader of Pan-Islamism, though fallen, was still in a
privileged position», Roy considered. «The Russians dared not molest him, fearing thereby
to inflame Muslim sentiments.»41

In the course of early 1921 the dust was settling, as new international treaties were signed.
This was a process of certification of statehood. On the one hand this process was driven
forward by the ongoing trade negotiations in London which resulted in the Anglo-Soviet
Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921. This treaty meant the recognition of Soviet Russia in
the international community. The price the Soviet Government was willing to pay was the
renouncement of its propaganda activities in the East. As it will be discussed, this had certain
consequences on the policies of the CUP leaders. On the other hand, the Soviet Government
established in early 1921 what one scholar described as «a system of treaties linking Turkey,
Persia and Afghanistan with Soviet Russia and with one another».42 These treaties were liter-
ally based on the idea of strengthening national sovereignties in a mutual anti-imperialist
struggle.43 The treaties became certificates of prestige and recognition.44 These treaties with
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan were seemingly in accordance with the general agenda of the
Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. «I do not believe there can be any rational mind
that would not accept and admit that Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan will constitute a great
force by leaning against each other», said Azmi Bey in a report.45 In fact, Enver Pasha and
Cemal Pasha were in the midst of these diplomatic developments and played important roles
as intermediators. «Enver and Djemal are regarded as hand in glove with the [Bolsheviks]».

41 Roy, Memoirs, 404.
42 Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and
43 Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),
116.
44 Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923
45 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
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said one British official, «and, are in fact, considered to be practically Bolsheviks agents.»

Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout, they were increasingly losing ground as the inter-state problems came to a resolve, since they lacked diplomatic status and thrived as non-state actors in international chaos.

The curious thing about the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was, however, that its first clause required that «each party refrains [...] from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda [...]», and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan.»

Sir Robert Horne, the President of the Board of Trade, made serious accusations to his Soviet counterpart Krassin regarding the existing propaganda activities and demanded their abandonment:

Sir, […] I am instructed on behalf of his Majesty’s Government to bring to the notice of the Soviet Government facts within their knowledge which disclose activities on the part of the Soviet Government in the regions of India and Afghanistan which are inconsistent with the stipulations in the Agreement, and which therefore must at once be brought to an end if the good faith of the Agreement is to be observed.

The Soviet Government have made no secret in their public statements and in their official Press, that the main object of their recent policy is the overthrow of British rule in India; and his Majesty’s Government have for a long time past been aware of the intrigues in which the Soviet Government, with their agents, subordinates, and associates, have been engaged, by various means and from different directions, for the furtherance of the object.

«If we care about anything in the [Anglo-Soviet] Trade Agreement», a Foreign Office official wrote to Lord Curzon, «it is the possibility that it may stop Bolshevik propaganda against us in the East or elsewhere.»

The British decision-makers made it clear to the Krassin, the Soviet Commissar for Trade and Industry, that trade would only come for the price of omitting propaganda in Asia. Bolshevik propaganda, whether actual or alleged, had caused a political reaction of the highest order. The British decision-makers were highly alerted by

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what Foreign Secretary Curzon called a «real hurricane of propaganda, intrigue, and conspiracy against British interests and British power in Asia», which was unleashed since the Baku Congress. Yet, despite the paranoid visions of British intelligence officers, the true extent of Bolshevik propaganda still awaits its critical evaluation. This does not imply that the Bolsheviks had no subversive ambitions and propagandistic actions on their record. To the contrary, instead of summoning hope and inciting revolution among oppressed people, the Bolshevik propaganda had caused fear and paranoia among political enemies. It became a priority of British foreign policy to put a break on Bolshevik propaganda before everything else.

Collaborating with and putting pressure on other state actors in the framework of formal diplomatic relations was an effective method in policing subversive foreign non-state actors. If Britain wanted to bring an end to the revolutionary activities of Muslim or Indian nationalists, it only needed to coopt their guardian, namely Soviet Russia.

While the British intentions were clear in terms of what they wanted to accomplish, the consequences of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty remained ambiguous. To some degree, it was merely a «dead letter», as it is argued by some historians. The Soviets continued their anti-British policies by other means. There were, however, certain changes. Cemal Pasha’s «India plan», which Enver Pasha was discussing with Karahan in Moscow had to be handled very carefully in face of the British demands. Enver summarized the new situation to Cemal as follows:

After concluding the trade treaty with the English, Russians do not want to engage so openly. For now, they want to build themselves up so that they are not considering to wage a war against the English yet and attract their grudge. Nevertheless, they are considering to help us although not in a large scale as they had promised. Eventually, for you, as promised in the agreement they will deliver as the first part of the demands of Afghanistan three thousand rifles, 20 machine guns, 20 cannons, and many hand grenades. In order to transport them as soon as possible to Tashkent, they requested men from us. This will be discussed here at the War Ministry and they will then immediately

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53 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 9, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 64.
start transporting them from the capital to Tashkent. The Russians have the idea that we supposedly received these from a tradesman.\textsuperscript{54}

In mid-April, Enver was still negotiating for the arms deal on behalf of Afghanistan. It seems that the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement indeed had an effect. The diplomatic pressure of the British was not the sole reason for Enver getting the cold shoulder from the Soviet officials. There was certainly a mistrust towards Enver Pasha, as he was not a communist. «Nevertheless, the Russian administration, which is wrecked by the revolution, and the labor mentality that antagonizes us as the bourgeoisie has more or less its effect in every business.»\textsuperscript{55} Enver advised Cemal Pasha to build up a militia in Afghanistan and look for ways of producing its own weapons, because, he said: «To be honest, I am not convinced that you will receive from the Russians the amount of supplies you asked for.»\textsuperscript{56} At the end of the letter, however, Enver added a note that Bedri had talked with Karahan and that Karahan accepted to send one thousand rifles from the promised three thousand rifles and the money for the India plan was also granted and given to the Soviet Ambassador.\textsuperscript{57} In September 1921, diplomatic notes was given by Horne to Krassin, because propaganda activities against the British Empire were still far from being abandoned, including Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{58} These propaganda activities were, however, the last remnants of an old policy. «Socialism in one country» was yet to be announced by Stalin in 1924, but Soviet state interests were overruling the ideals of the Comintern and that of the world revolution already by 1921.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{54} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 66–67.
\textsuperscript{55} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 71.
\textsuperscript{56} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 73.
\textsuperscript{57} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 75.
\textsuperscript{58} The diplomatic notes were published in \textit{Izvestia}, September 29, 1921. See also: German Embassy in Moscow, report on the exchange of notes between the English and Russian governments regarding propaganda in Asia, October 3, 1921, PA-AA, R 31585-6. A German memorandum claims that at the third congress of the Comintern no common ground could be established on what policy to follow. Memorandum on military-political plans and preparations of the Bolsheviks in the Orient, enclosed in A.G.O. von Maltzahn, letter (Berlin) to the German Embassy (Moscow), November 20, 1921, PA-AA, Moskau 57.
On March 16, 1921, the same day as the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, the Treaty of Moscow was signed between the Soviet Government and the representatives of the Ankara Government. The coincidence of dates might suggest an international conspiracy, but it was rather the wish of the Turkish delegation to sign it on the one year anniversary of the British occupation of Constantinople. Enver Pasha has been involved in the Russian-Turkish talks in Moscow from the onset. "Yesterday we concluded a Turkish-Russian friendship treaty", reported Enver to General von Seeckt on February 26, 1921, after the first draft was approved. "So the Russians will support us with gold and all means." Since the negotiations in Moscow with the Kemalist delegation was taking place simultaneously with talks in London, Enver urged his "friends" from the Ankara delegation to "finish the deal with Moscow as soon as possible before a silly decision is made in London." "Enver has already showed great sacrifice for the realisation of the Turkish-Soviet relations", said Chicherin in April 1921. In a meeting with Shakib Arslan, Chicherin stressed also the "mutual advantage" of interstate relations between Turkey and Russia: "Angora had obtained many advantages and Russia had obtained the Trade Agreement with Great Britain."

As much as Soviet officials were pleased with Enver's involvement, the Kemalist delegation was not. A Turkish diplomat accused Enver of playing for both sides in the negotiations in order to keep himself relevant. In their growing self-confidence as representatives of people's government, the Kemalist officials saw the transnational activities of Enver and Cemal Pashas as an instrument of Soviet Government and therefore as an interference into their national and international sovereignty. They were not necessarily wrong in their assessment, since Commissar of Foreign Affairs Karahan had the intentions of using Enver as an asset in Russian-Turkish negotiations before the arrival of Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha to Moscow. "It would be great that Enver Pasha will return to Moscow", told Karahan Halil Pasha in January 1921. "Because very soon a special delegation headed by Fuad Pasha will arrive", he

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60 Dokumenty vnesnei politiki SSSR, III, 597–604.
61 Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, III, 795.
62 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), February 26, 1921, BA-MA, N247/195.
63 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 9, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 64.
64 Chicherin, letter to the Central Committee, April 18, 1921, quoted in Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 67.
66 Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, III, 783–785.
explained. Karahan’s idea was pretty straightforward: «It will be possible to learn the most recent policies of Anatolia from this delegation. In negotiations between this delegation and the Soviet Government of Russia, some issues will emerge in which including Enver’s judgement and consent will be useful.»\textsuperscript{67} Not without a reason, Karabekir wrote in his memoir that during the meetings with the Soviets, the CUP émigrés and the Kemalists were occasionally proposing conflicting policies and proposals.\textsuperscript{68} Enver himself stated that he advised the Kemalist delegation in Moscow to give up Batum in order to find an agreement with the Soviet demands.\textsuperscript{69} It was Chicherin who asked for Enver’s help in coming to an agreement with the Turkish Government regarding the border between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Armenia.\textsuperscript{70} Not only Enver, but also Cemal was similarly involved. In negotiations with the Kemalists, Chicherin would often say that Cemal Pasha had already agreed on a point that the Kemalists were rejecting.\textsuperscript{71} The multiplicity of authority was threatening the sovereignty of the Ankara Government, as long as Soviets were playing the Kemalist and the Unionist delegations in Moscow against each other.

This uncomfortable situation led the Ankara delegates to renounce any association with fugitive CUP leaders in foreign affairs. «For example, without any reason they wasted some unnecessary words to the Russians claiming that Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha have no authority to talk in the name of Anatolia in Moscow», Enver complained. «But especially I have never acted in the name of Anatolia», he said angered. His response to the Kemalist delegation amounted to a threat: «Therefore, we said that if there will be a government [in Ankara] that will not help us or act against us by conspiring with the Entente, then we are, of course, free [to act accordingly].»\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{67} Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 12, 1921, TTK, EP 02-66. See also: Sami Sabit Karaman, İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Pasha: Trabzon ve Kars Hatıraları, 1921–1922, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2002), 85.

\textsuperscript{68} Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Pasha ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 17.

\textsuperscript{69} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 6, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçi Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 63.

\textsuperscript{70} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 9, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçi Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 64.

\textsuperscript{71} Yusuf Kemal Tengirşen, Vatan Hizmetinde (İstanbul: Bahar Matbaası, 1967), 167.

\textsuperscript{72} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçi Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 67.
Meanwhile, the available space of independent activity in Muslim countries was shrinking as Soviets concluded further treaties in Asia. Soviet relations to Persia were turning from exporting revolution to formal bilateral diplomacy. When Azmi Bey was travelling from Tashkent to Baku, he happened to be in the same train as the newly appointed Soviet ambassador to Tehran, Theodor A. Rothstein. The Ambassador told Azmi Bey that it was possible to prepare a revolution in Persia. Others from Rothstein’s hundred men staff revealed to Azmi that the delegation was assigned to prepare a revolution. «This delegation», as Azmi concluded, «was not an embassy delegation, but a revolutionary one.» Rothstein’s plans were, however, interrupted by a coup. On February 21, 1921, General Reza Khan (Pahlavi) from the Iranian Cossack Brigade conducted a successful coup d’état in Tehran and the young intellectual Sayyed Ziya Tabatabai was made Prime Minister. The coup plotters had initially enjoyed British support and the formal legitimation of the coup was framed as a measure to stop the looming Bolshevik influence in Iran. Nevertheless, the new regime proved to be more eager in reestablishing Iran’s national sovereignty than becoming the playfield of another episode of the Anglo-Russian Great Game. Soon previous commitments to foreign powers such as the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 were annulled and the normalization of state of affairs was put on agenda. «Anyway as you know», Azmi wrote Enver, «recently a revolution [sic the coup d’état of February 1921; in original: inkilab] took place in Iran and Sayyed Nizam ed-Din [sic, Ziya Tabatabai] who came to government said stop to Rothstein’s delegation.» Although Soviet plans for a communist revolution were perhaps shattered, the post-coup regime did not stop the on-going negotiations with Soviet Russia. Only few days after the coup, on February 26, 1921, the Soviet-Persian Treaty was signed. The treaty practically enhanced the sovereignty of Persia with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Gilan region. Enver was getting information about the developments in Iran from his

73 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
75 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
friends and Iran constituted a major field of action in his mental map which was now practically unavailable.  

Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha in Kabul and Enver Pasha in Moscow had been very influential in pushing forward the Soviet-Afghan relations. The relations had been growing increasingly uneasy, because Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, had taken up talks with the British and was playing both sides against each other, as it will be discussed below in more detail. On February 28, 1921, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was signed in Moscow. Enver Pasha hoped that this Soviet-Afghan Treaty would have a positive effect on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. Enver was mistaken. Afghanistan was the only independent state named in the treaty where Bolshevik propaganda was declared undesired. «It is clear», as Cemal wrote to Enver, «that the only way for us to establish a secure and beneficial working area in Afghanistan is by way of Afghan-Russian friendship.» Cemal was similarly mistaken, because his dependency on Soviet interests would limit his policy options in Kabul. When the Turkish-Afghan Treaty was signed on March 14, 1921, this was certainly a cause célèbre for Cemal. However, again, interstate relations would restrict transnational contentious politics, as both Afghanistan and Turkey would soon opt for a settlement with Britain.

These Soviet treaties sealed the fate of other competing and rival quasi-states: the deal with Turkey meant the end of the Caucasus republics; the deal with Persia finished the Soviet Republic in Gilan, and the deal with Afghanistan enabled the incorporation of the Central Asian republics to Soviet Russia. It was easier for Soviet Russia to establish a collaboration with national leaders in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan instead of planning and executing a communist coup d’état or proletarian revolution with local subaltern groups or professional revolutionaries in exile. Behind the withdrawal of Bolshevik propaganda from Turkey, Iran,
and Afghanistan, as Bedri Bey told a German official after his return from Kabul, was the fact that these countries were previously exposed to Tsarist-Russian propaganda. Hence, Bolshevik propaganda was negatively perceived as Russian imperialism. As the Soviet leadership had few hopes of successful communist revolutions in Turkey and Iran (Afghanistan did not even have a communist party), it was a cheap price to pay to establish a safe bufferzone between Soviet Russia and British India and British Iraq.

The international state system was consolidating itself after a period of war and revolution. Of course, this is a retrospective insight. Contemporary eyes saw it rather differently. In the eyes of Entente intelligence officers, the Soviet treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan were perceived as the beginning of a Bolshevik sponsored anticolonial jihad front against Britain and France in the Middle East to South Asia. Ironically, this was perhaps the very same reason why the CUP leaders celebrated these treaties, although they ended being marginalized as a consequence of these international developments. The more they were preparing the ground for pro-Soviet and anti-British treaties in Muslim states, the more they were losing ground as transnational revolutionaries. The rise of nation-states facilitated further consolidation of international relations, not that of transnational contentious prospects.

This is the most apparent in the consolidation of the Ankara Government as a sovereign state which not only curtailed the national ambitions of the CUP leaders, but also the transnational politics of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in the wider Muslim geography. Enver, Halil, and Cemal had asked Mustafa Kemal Pasha to support their activities in Muslim countries. Yet, Mustafa Kemal was reluctant to approve it before signing a deal with Soviet Russia. After talking to Shakib Arslan, Ali Fuat Pasha concluded that the Ankara Government has aroused great hopes among the Arab nations so that their opponents, i.e. Enver Pasha and his Unionist clique were losing ground. Even Cemal, as Ali Fuat Pasha

84 Protocol of conversation with Bedri Bey, May 17, 1921, PA-AA, R 77922.
explained, was proposing to follow the policy guidelines of the Ankara Government.\textsuperscript{88} Ali Fuat Pasha was even involved in efforts to make Ankara the new «center of pan-Islam». Muslim delegates in Moscow were invited by Ali Fuat Pasha to go to Ankara instead.\textsuperscript{89} On June 27, 1921, at the Grand National Assembly, Fevzi Pasha proclaimed the continuation of the «oriental policy»:

The widespread rumors which have reached even this Assembly, and according to which [...] the Angora Government [...] has decided in contravention of its oriental policy as pursued since its creation, to cease to afford any further assistance to the Moslems of Syria and Mesopotamia, are nothing more or less than the calumnious inventions of our interior and exterior enemies. [...] With reference to the alleged abandonment of the Government of its oriental policy, I may say that in this regard also the Government will under no circumstances depart from the policy adopted with the consent of the Great National Assembly. [...] As with Afghanistan, our Government is about to contract an alliance with the Persian nation, and thus to take another step in the direction of the ideal of an Islamic United States of the Orient. With great attention than ever before we are following the course of events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and we are proving our deep sympathy for our brethren in religion who are striving to attain true independence.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus, the British Intelligence reported «that preparations for the carrying out of a definite pan-Islamic campaign have been perfected by the Angora administration, and that the Oriental policy [...] is indeed an integral part of the Kemalist programme.»\textsuperscript{91} Ali Fuat Pasha said that «pan-Islamist policies would no longer be an instrument of anybody and everybody.»\textsuperscript{92} At whose expense Ankara should become a center of pan-Islam was obvious.

In early June 1921, Enver complained that «Mustafa Kemal Pasha is not totally helping us in our policies abroad». «On the one hand», said Enver, «he says, don’t come to the homeland, work abroad. On the other hand, he says to the Russians and others: Enver and Cemal Pashas have no positions.» Even more annoyed was Enver that Mustafa Kemal was restricting their movement in other Muslim counties as well. «He argues that if you want do anything in the Muslim world, do it with me», complained Enver about Mustafa Kemal’s treatment, but then, as he added, the draft text of the Turkish-Afghan treaty was kept a secret from

\textsuperscript{88} Ali Fuat Pasha, report (Moscow) on the interview with Emir Shakib Arslan to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 22/July 3, 1921, TİТЕ, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 36; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 18.
\textsuperscript{89} Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
\textit{Moskova Hattoraları: Milli Mücadele ve Bolşevik Rusya}, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (İstanbul: Temel Yayımları, 2002), 290.
\textsuperscript{90} Secret Political Report on Turkey’s General Situation, July 15, 1921, FO 371/6473, 8417, 21-23.
\textsuperscript{91} Secret Political Report on Turkey’s General Situation, July 15, 1921, FO 371/6473, 8417, 25.
\textsuperscript{92} Cebesoy, 
\textit{Moskova Hattoraları}, 290.
him.\textsuperscript{93} Ali Fuat Pasha even went as far as telling Enver that he should not write directly to Mustafa Kemal Pasha anymore, but should rather report directly to him as the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, implying a chain of command subordinating Enver Pasha and his movement to Ankara’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. News that the Ankara Government was planning to organize an Islam congress in Anatolia also marginalized Enver’s own efforts. Enver came to the bitter conclusion: «But now, as it was not enough for them to take over domestic politics, they don’t want to leave room for us in foreign politics either.» Enver explained this behavior of Mustafa Kemal as jealousy, «because they think, if we would be triumphant in international politics in the future, we would win great fame and fondness in the homeland.»\textsuperscript{94}

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Cemal Pasha’s activities are particularly illustrative how a professional revolutionary could rise in national and international politics abroad. Cemal was successful in constituting very real threat to British policies without being part of paranoid conspiracy theories. Cemal’s military reforms in Afghanistan since the summer of 1920 was a matter of serious concern for British policy-makers. In a letter Sir Robert Horne, the President of the Board of Trade, wrote to Krassin during signing of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement explicitly underlined Cemal as a problem:

Jamal Pasha, whose mission to Afghanistan was undertaken with approval of Moscow as it was felt, no doubt, that his presence would appeal to the religious as well as national sentiment of the Afghans, has been in touch with the tribal leaders and, having been assured that the necessary funds would be supplied by the Soviet Government has promised them even larger quantities of munitions than [Yakov] Suritz [i.e. Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan] did.\textsuperscript{95}

Robert Horne’s allegations were not wrong. Cemal Pasha’s activities in Afghanistan were directed against British India. For instance, at the time of the trade treaty, it was known that an Afghan diplomatic delegation was on its way to Berlin via Moscow, in order to establish

\textsuperscript{93} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 81.

\textsuperscript{94} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), June 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 83.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{The Times}, “Soviet Plots in the East.” March 17, 1921.
bilateral relations and to make arms deals. The delegation was interested in German machines and engineers for the maintenance and development of textile and weapon factories in Kabul. Enver had written a reference letter to General von Seeckt for the Afghan chief diplomat Mohammad Wali Darwazi. In Berlin, the delegation made official visits to state officials and proclaimed the enthronement of Emir Amanullah Khan. While British officials were overtly concerned about the delegation’s visit to Berlin, German Orient experts were long disillusioned with the promises of the old Orientpolitik. “But except for the disappointment that Germany is indeed dependent on England,” wrote Middle-East expert Otto Günther von Wesendonk to a former colleague at the Auswärtiges Amt, “the [Afghan] General won’t bring any positive news back home.” The British were, however, far from disillusioned about the political ambitions of Afghanistan, where Cemal Pasha as the Commander-in-Chief of Afghan Armed Forces had become Soviet Russia’s key instigator of anti-British policies in Kabul. Indeed, shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Karahan was complimenting Cemal’s achievements in Afghanistan to his comrades in the Russian Communist Party:

The famous Young Turk leader Cemal Pasha (former minister and commander of Turkish forces in Syria) was sent by us to Afghanistan in August 1920 in order to collect intelligence and obtain an important military position by winning the trust of the Afghan Emir.

As of now, Cemal Pasha was entrusted with the task of commanding and reforming the Western Army located at the Indian border.

Karahan’s description of Cemal Pasha’s mission to Afghanistan renders it as secret intelligence mission of the Soviet Government. Indeed, Cemal had personally intervened into the Afghan-British negotiations. “Be careful, my brother!”, warned Cemal the Afghan Minister

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97 Gustav Hilger, letter (Moscow) to A.O. von Maltzahn (Berlin), September 27, 1920; report on the Afghan delegation’s arrival, March 24, 1921, PA-AA, R 77898.
98 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), February 26, 1921, BA-MA, N247/195, 9. The meeting of Bedri Bey with General von Seeckt regarding the Afghan delegation is mentioned in M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 1, 1921, TTK, EP 01-63.
100 Otto Günther von Wesendonk, letter (Berlin) to Edgar Haniel (Berlin), March 19, 1921, PA-AA, R 77898.
of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Khan Tarzi in a very hard protest letter. «The English have two great ambitions», Cemal explained. «First, they want you to rip apart the treaty you made with the Russians with your own hands. Second, they want to make sure that I go away by removing His Majesty’s confidence in me!» Cemal further told his Afghan colleague: «The English shall not materialize these ambitions by any means.»\textsuperscript{102} Tarzi had reopened the negotiations with the British in early 1921. Mahmud Khan Tarzi was an Afghan intellectual, who had spent most of his life in exile in the Ottoman Empire. Tarzi had become the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1919 and Emir Amanullah was married to his daughter.\textsuperscript{103} In December 1920, Cemal complained that the Russians were dragging in ratifying the treaty with Afghanistan. In ten days, a British delegation was awaited in Kabul, thus Cemal was concerned about losing Kabul to British overtures.\textsuperscript{104} At the end, Cemal was successful in the making of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on February 28, 1921. Looking back from nearly one year after his arrival in Kabul, Cemal could very well consider himself successful with his achievements in Afghanistan. In a letter to Enver Pasha in late July 1921, he summarized his achievements as follows:

\[\ldots\] after long talks with the Emir, I could convince him that the benefit of Afghanistan and that of the whole Muslim world lies in coming to terms with the Russians in order to receive the means from them that we depend on to be able to bring order and facility to the Muslim world. And I could convince him to adopt the policy of maintaining ostensibly peaceful relations until our preparations against the English are completed and to attack India only after we have revealed the Indian revolution and restructured and reordered our forces.\textsuperscript{105}

In similar terms, Cemal Pasha wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that «the greatest achievement of his coming to Kabul has been keeping Afghanistan away from the grip of the English and the ratification of the Afghan-Russian treaty».\textsuperscript{106} For Cemal, the Afghan-Indian struggle was part of a global anticolonial struggle against the machinations of Britain. It is no wonder why


\textsuperscript{104} Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), December 23, 1920, TTK, EP 01-66.

\textsuperscript{105} Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), July 29, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 268–69.

\textsuperscript{106} Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 29, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 369.
the British Intelligence was very much concerned about Cemal’s activities, which was described by Major Bray in January 1921 as follows:

Djemal Pasha is also to have complete control over all Indian work. In order to carry out his work he propose the formation of Indian units, improvement of existing defences, establishment of a young officers school, and to examine the conditions on the frontier. The Amir of Afghanistan is reported to have approved these steps being taken. ¹⁰⁷

As global as this struggle was framed, it was always connected in his mind to Turkish national interests. «It is about causing an Indian trouble to the English who only recently brought upon us the Greek trouble and by that it is perhaps about being the instigator of a great incident that would grant the whole world a moment to take a breath!», wrote Cemal to Mustafa Kemal. «This is my purpose. It is about facilitating and supporting your struggle at home [dahilde] by working abroad [harici mesai ile].» ¹⁰⁸ In return, Mustafa Kemal pronounced his support for Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan. ¹⁰⁹ Mustafa Kemal advised Cemal «to unify the growing national movements in Turkestan and Afghanistan and connect them a sort of special organization [bir takım teşkilat-ı mahsusaya raptetmek].». In addition to financial support from Soviet Russia, Mustafa Kemal urged Cemal not to forget «the special historic role fallen upon Turkey in the formation and direction of Muslim Eastern revolution». ¹¹⁰ Hence, Anatolia’s security was also to be defended at the Hindu Kush. A British report from Constantinople was speculated about Cemal’s relation to Ankara Government after the Turkish-Afghan Treaty:

There is, however, no evidence that he [Cemal] can as yet be regarded as being an instrument of Angora policy. He stands for the pan-Islamism of the Union and Progress gang, and a distinction must still be drawn between these and the Angora leaders, although in

¹⁰⁸ Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihaçlı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 368.
¹⁰⁹ Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), October 1, 1920, TTK, EP 03-29, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 108–10. There were also allegations that Cemal Pasha was sent to Afghanistan by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. See: The Times of India, “Jemal Pasha and his Schemes,” April 5, 1921. Similarly Alfred Rawlinson met during his captivity in the summer of 1921 in Erzurum a couple of Turkish intelligence officers returning from Afghanistan, implying connections between Ankara and Kabul.
so far as the extreme and at the present dominant party in Angora is concerned, there is no real difference in the ultimate programme.\footnote{Sir H. Rumbold, letter (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (London), April 27, 1921, FO 406/46, 40–41, no. 29, in Şimşir, \textit{British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938)}, Vol. 3, 301.}

In Cemal Pasha’s mind, his struggle in Kabul was connected to that of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia and to the general Asian policy of the Soviet Government in Moscow. Now, with the treaties concluded between Turkey, Russia, and Afghanistan, Cemal believed to have brought himself to a central position. From a fugitive war criminal and professional revolutionary looking for vengeance and venture, Cemal had become an international mediator and a military-civil reformer. Cemal was confident enough to threaten the then Foreign Secretary of British India, Henry R. Dobbs. While Dobbs was in Kabul for negotiations with the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cemal had openly threaten with revolution in India, if Britain would not make an «honorable peace» with Mustafa Kemal.\footnote{Hasan Zafer Ayberk, “Cemal Paşa, Afganistan’ın Teşkilatlanma ve Hindistan Meseleleri,” \textit{Resimli Tarih Mecmuası} 2, no. 12 (1950): 263, quoted in Hikmet Özdemir, \textit{Üç Jöntürk'ün Ölümü: Talat, Cemal, Enver} (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007), 204.} What Cemal did not consider was what to do if Ankara and Kabul would come to a settlement with Britain.

While Cemal Pasha saw the struggle in Afghanistan and Turkestan as part of a global anti-colonial struggle of Muslims and the national struggle in Turkey, other Muslim nationalists who were more committed to their local and regional issue saw these grand schemes as hazardous. Especially, the alliance with Soviet Russia was considered to be treasonous to the fate of Russian Muslims in Central Asia. One of them was the Turkestani leader Zeki Velidi (Togan). «Their thoughts of Central Asia intended to benefit Turkiye, to continue the [First World] war which they had lost in the West against the Allies», wrote Zeki Velidi in his memoir. He saw a clash of interests between Cemal’s policies in Afghanistan and the policy of Jadidist nationalists in Turkestan:

\begin{quote}
General Cemal was intending to start an uprising in India with the help of Afghans, and to include the Central Asian Turks into his Army of Islam with the aid of the Soviets. He was acting seriously. He sent […] letters to be delivered to the chiefs of the Basmaci. […] They were completely imaginary. We regarded the matters of Turkistan only from the prism of Turkiye. We were against the idea of melding it with the operations in Turkiye, or to eliminate the English dominion in India. […] At that time several of the Kazak and Ozbek intellectuals arrived in Bukhara […]. They told us that the General Cemal turned out to be an adventurist who had no idea of the realities; which Basmaci would go to India to fight against the English?\footnote{Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, \textit{Memoirs: National Existence and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and other Muslim Eastern Turks}, Translated by H. B. Paksoy (North Charleston: CreateSpace, 2012), 296.}"
\end{quote}
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No wonder that Cemal Pasha saw these less of an issue. The main challenge facing his reformation policy was not the alliance of Basmachi rebels to his Afghan army, but the modernization of Afghanistan and Turkistan so that they could become powerful on their own. Not unlike in his war-time military governorship in Syria, Cemal had committed himself to a civilizing mission in Afghanistan. Cemal was a believer in modernization. Cemal’s fellow traveler, Azmi Bey, wrote in a report:

I always thought and knew that Afghanistan was a fairly orderly government. This journey of mine disappointed me. Indeed, it depressed me. Let’s wish that Cemal Pasha’s leadership [irşadi] and the Emir’s good will and labor it will soon manifest itself in form of a government. Today’s Afghanistan is nothing but a great tribe.

Even though Cemal Pasha’s reform policies in Afghanistan still deserves a detailed study of its own, we know that he was very much devoted to his mission. He released new administrative laws, made fiscal reforms, let foreign books translated, and initiated several military reforms during his tenure as the commander-in-chief. The lack of modern military and human resources was the main problem to be solved. These resources were to be imported from Europe, Soviet Russia, and Turkey. For this purpose, the delegation of Mohammad Wali was trying to arrange the delivery of arms from Europe. Cemal had sent a report to Karahan with an offer to provide military supplies as well as Red Army personnel, which Karahan proposed to the Central Committee to grant Cemal’s demands. Cemal believed that there was a great demand for foreign experts who could offer the Afghan military elites a cultural and social education as well. Cemal believed that such foreign experts with cultural skills could only be found in Turkey. On his way to Kabul, Cemal had already assembled a group of former Ottoman POWs and placed them in new education facilities in Tashkent and Kabul. But this was not enough. Cemal requested fresh Turkish officers from Kemalist Turkey. On December 25, 1920, the Turkish General Staff reported that the Afghan Emir requested military

115 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
117 Karahan, letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, April 26, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 43–44.
officers from Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Cemal even proposed that the officers should bring their wives with them to educate the Afghan women. In similar terms, Cemal considered the emissary of the Ankara Government in Kabul, Abdurrahman (Samadan) Bey, despite his honest efforts not fit for this position, because he was an Ottoman officer with Afghan origins who did not necessarily represent the recent «Anatolian spirit» (Anadolu ruhunu). Instead, Cemal proposed: «It would be more appropriate if someone would be appointed to the Kabul position who exceedingly possesses the new spirit of Turkishness [yeni Türklik ruhuna].»

Things were going quite well for Cemal Pasha, one could argue. While Talat Pasha was shot from behind, while he was living incognito in Berlin and awaiting an invitation to return to Anatolia and while Enver Pasha was busy printing some pamphlets in his room in Moscow, Cemal was the only one of the Young Turk triumvirate who had come to occupy a state position and was preparing the coup against British Empire’s weakest spot, namely India. Cemal was more confident about his capabilities in Afghanistan: «There cannot be any other way of working as a revolutionary at the Indian border in Afghanistan than the way I proposed. If they do not concentrate the operational and actual enterprise of the Indian revolution in my person, then they will not achieve anything.»

Things were, however, about to change. As soon as the Soviets established their system of treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, the British Indian officials intensified their relations to the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Khan Tarzi. Both Tarzi and Cemal got involved in a struggle to win over the confidence of the Emir to their respective policies. Yet, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was still not ratified by the Emir. There was a general mistrust towards the Soviets in Kabul, as they were eager to open consulates throughout Afghan towns and these were accused of spreading Bolshevik propaganda. One day, the Minister of Security, Shuja ud-Daula, delivered Cemal Pasha the bad news:

Pasha, let me tell you this clearly, the policy of the Government has completely changed due to the influence of our Minister of Foreign Affairs. As of now, we will terminate the

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119 ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 866, gömlek no. 64.
120 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 370.
121 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 371.
122 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 17, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 264.
Cemal Pasha, in his anger, wrote a letter to the Emir, protesting his recent deal with British India and declared that he would leave Afghanistan, unless the Soviet-Afghan Treaty is ratified within six days. The next day he was invited to the Palace to give his statement personally to the Emir. Cemal explained to the Emir that the Emir was not actually powerful in his country, because his army was not powerful. It was that simple in Cemal’s mind. Only if the army was modernized—not just armed, as he explained—only then the Emir could be a powerful leader. Cemal was able to convince the Emir to reconsider his decision.

With the arrival of the Soviet delegation, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to give a reception event to the whole diplomatic representatives in Kabul. At this occasion, Cemal Pasha was able turn the tables, but in rather unexpected way. Prior to the reception, Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi send a very respectful message to Cemal, calling him «our teacher in all affairs» (bizim her hususta muallimimizdirler). The reason behind Tarzi’s courtesy was that he needed Cemal to consult him and the Afghan diplomatic corps on a very sensitive issue. «We do not know», explained Tarzi honestly, «what ceremonies are to be followed in such banquets and especially in occasions with women [alelhusus kadın bulunduğu halde].» Tarzi was, despite his social inexperience, a defender of women’s rights in Afghanistan and was ready to adopt international standards of diplomacy including festivities with the wives of the consular dignitaries.124 Cemal and his staff went over to the Ministry and instructed the members of the Afghan diplomatic corps on gentlemen etiquette. Of course, we do not know, whether the two political rivals in Kabul had practiced dance moves as well, but, apparently a cordial atmosphere emerged in this preparation session and continued throughout the event—very much to the appreciation of Cemal. He wrote that «Mahmud Khan Tarzi was not the old Mahmud Khan Tarzi.»125 After the relaxation of his dispute with Tarzi, Cemal offered the Emir that he will prepare a draft Anglo-Afghan treaty

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123 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), July 29, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 275.
125 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 17, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Yalçın and Kocahanoglu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 279.
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to be proposed to the British representatives. This will show, whether the British had a good will, or not. And if the British would reject his draft treaty and come with another harsher proposal, Cemal said, he would publish both of these drafts in foreign newspapers to show the whole world the British intrigues in Afghanistan.126

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Only few days before the assassination of Talat Pasha, on March 12, 1921, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara decided that Enver Pasha, Halil Pasha, and their friends were not allowed to enter to Turkey, because they were considered a threat to domestic and foreign policies.127 The description of Enver, Halil, and friends referred to a specific group. Neither Talat in Berlin nor Cemal in Kabul were meant by this decree, but a certain clique around Enver who had remained in Soviet Russia so far. The reason behind this decision was the increasing rumors that Enver Pasha would march into Anatolia with a Red Army force. Fevzi Pasha, the Ankara Government’s Minister of National Defense, had intelligence that the British were propagating that Bolshevism was getting spread in Anatolia by «Enver Pasha’s army» under the name of Green Army.128 The Turkish senior officials assumed that it was the British Intelligence behind these rumors who «under the mask of proclaiming communism» would «try to incite insurgencies here and there in Anatolia». All these rumors were connected to Enver being in Moscow and then in late summer 1921 in the Caucasus. The rumors claimed that Enver was working in the name of communism. It was even claimed that British Intelligence officials in Constantinople were spreading pseudo-Bolshevik propaganda to turn the Ankara Government against the Soviet Russia.129 Whether the British Intelligence spread such news or not, very soon the Ankara Government was reproducing the same rumors of Enver’s alleged Bolshevik invasion and making active propaganda against Enver Pasha. The Moscow Treaty of Friendship between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia did not help Enver elevate his position. To the contrary, he was even more regarded as an

126 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 17, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 280.
128 Fevzi Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Southern Front Command (Antalya), February 27, 1921; May 26, 1921, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 742, gömlek no. 8.
129 Chief of General Staff Fevzi Pasha, arrest warrant for Enver Pasha and his friends, May 29, 1921, in Bardakçı, Enver, 562.
illicit instrument of Soviet policies. The article VIII of the Moscow Treaty demanded the omission of propaganda activities against each other, implying that mutual trust between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia was not yet established. The Kemalist leadership in Anatolia, especially the Commander of the Eastern Front Kazım Karabekir Pasha were thoroughly suspicious of Bolshevism as an ideology and Russia as a regional power. In Ankara Government’s perception, Enver became one of the major points of mistrust in Soviet-Turkish relations—not without Enver’s own misdeeds and miscalculations.

Soviet officials were only beginning to grasp the rising Kemalist-Unionist conflict. In a meeting with Karahan on December 29, 1920, Halil Pasha asked about the Muslim cavalry units Enver had previously requested. Halil Pasha did not shy away from over-blown claims that once Enver enters Anatolia with these troops «Mustafa Kemal Pasha will not be in favor of a discord [ikilik]» and that Mustafa Kemal was «accustomed to obey Enver Pasha». «If Enver Pasha’s going to Turkey would cause a rivalry with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and result in a disunion in the country», Karahan told Halil at their next meeting, «this would cause the weakening of the defence forces of the country and serve the satisfaction of the English. Therefore, Russia would not support this.» In January 1921, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Upmal-Angarski, made a comment to Mustafa Kemal Pasha regarding the Unionists, noting that «there are those, namely the Unionists, who are poisoned down to the abyss of their soul with nationalism and pan-Islamism, but for now they are not involved in any movement directed against your vanguard battle.» The Kemalist delegations in Moscow was increasingly annoyed that Trotsky still believed that Enver was associated with the resistance movement in Anatolia. Thereafter, Riza Nur made once again clear to the Bolshe-
vik leaders that Enver had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the Anatolian Government. Nonetheless, Chicherin noted in a letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party that Enver Pasha and his friends

have undercover relations with the Kemalists and fields of joint action. In addition, it is beneficial that we have relations with an alternative Turkish group except for the Kemalists.

It is true that Enver belongs to more imperialist group, but for he is a more meticulous politician, as he can evaluate the realities of our time and appreciate our role far better than the Kemalists. No doubt that we will resort to his help and assistance in the future. We should continue our friendship with him and connect him to us.

The continuous dismissal by the Kemalist delegation in Moscow was rather counterproductive. The more Enver Pasha felt pushed away, the more he devoted himself to Anatolian affairs. After the last rejection, Enver proclaimed his independence from the Ankara Government which also gave him the freedom to intervene into Anatolia. «By this way, we declared that we will establish a society or a party to follow our ideals, although we are not against the current government in Turkey.» This alternative party was soon realized. Enver and his friends founded the People’s Councils Party (Halk Şuraları Fırkası or sometimes also in singular Halk Şura Fırkası), in March 1921 in Moscow. After a meeting with Enver in April 1921, in which Enver presented the programs of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and People’s Councils Party, Ali Fuat Pasha believed that Enver can be useful only if he continued to work abroad in the Muslim world under the supervision of Ankara. If the Ankara Government would not support and sponsor Enver’s struggle abroad, Ali Fuat feared that Enver would soon get frustrated and will direct his attention and activities towards Turkey. Ali Fuat Pasha was right with his instinct.

135 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 31, 1921, in Bardakç, Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 118.
136 Chicherin, letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, April 22, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 37–38.
137 Unionist attempts to regain control in Anatolia are still best summarized in Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, 127–31.
138 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 74.
139 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Yağcı and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 67.
140 Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), April 19, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 45. See also: Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), April 17, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 47.
More and more Enver Pasha’s focus was shifting towards Anatolia. Especially, news and emissaries coming from Anatolia were informing Enver that there was a great demand for his leadership in Anatolia. Most of these news were originating from Trabzon, a CUP stronghold, where especially among the guild of boatmen Unionist racketeers had established themselves as local rowdies. The leader of the boatmen’s guild was Yahya Kahya, one of the strongest racketeers in Trabzon. An intelligence report from Trabzon described these men as “this party is only a gang of vagabonds which Yahya Kahya assembled for the purpose of smuggling”. Trabzon, however, was not the only stronghold of CUP hooligans but one of the most significant one. “In those days,” wrote Feridun (Kandemir) who was an Intelligence officer back then, “like many places in the East, there was also in Trabzon a state within a state [hükümet içinde hükümet]. A warlord, a pretender, a strongman or something were showing up with a bunch of ignorants following them; these were believing that they were the representatives of the nation, founder of the state, or trying to represent themselves as such.”

Previously on January 28, 1921, Yahya Kahya was involved in the murder of the Turkish Communist leader Mustafa Subhi and his friends. The whole leadership cadre of Turkish Communist Party were put on a boat and drowned in the Black Sea. Ever since, Turkish leftists accuse the Kemalist regime for turning a blind eye to the murder of Turkish communists, and some evidence hints that Kemalists had indeed a hand in facilitating the path to this mass murder. Surprisingly, the relations to Soviet Russia were not damaged by this tragic incident, which was framed as a maritime accident in official narratives. Less mysterious is the fact that the local CUP hooligans under the leadership of Yahya Kahya had blood on their hands. A central decision by the CUP leadership to kill Mustafa Subhi can be

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141 Feridun Kandemir, Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistan’da (İstanbul: Barıman Yayınevi, 1945), 75–77.
142 Commander of Naval Transportation Fahri Bey, letter (Trabzon) to Department of Navy (Ankara), August 30, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1110, gömlek no. 52.
143 Kandemir, Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistan’da, 76.
146 Gökay, “The Turkish Communist Party,” 233.
ruled out, as Enver learnt only afterwards that Mustafa Subhi and his friends were killed by his own partisans in Trabzon and he was surely relieved as he was now the only Turkish asset of Soviet Russia.\textsuperscript{148}

Due to the encouraging news coming from Trabzon, Enver Pasha and his friends decided to send Halil Pasha there. Halil had also an official alibi to travel to Trabzon at the shores of Black Sea. Halil was recently diagnosed with tuberculosis in his lungs and he was prescribed by the doctor three months of rest under good weather conditions, which was supposedly typical for Trabzon.\textsuperscript{149} In addition, Halil Pasha had received the news that his family had also came to Trabzon. To Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Enver announced purpose of Halil’s arrival as recovering his health, but also mentioned opportunities to establish further communication links.\textsuperscript{150} In internal correspondence, as Enver revealed to Cemal, Halil’s actual mission was to inspect their organization’s standing in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{151} In another letter, Enver called Halil Pasha as the «inspector of Anatolia».\textsuperscript{152}

On March 20, Halil wrote Enver that he would take a boat to Trabzon.\textsuperscript{153} Halil was, however, under the surveillance of Turkish Intelligence. The Turkish Consul in Tuapse sent news of Halil Pasha’s coming to Trabzon. Thus, the officials in Trabzon asked Ankara what to do with Halil Pasha. Orders were sent demanding that Halil should be taken under custody without letting him talk to anyone and he should be extradited back to Tuapse with the next ship. After his arrival on the evening of March 22, the local commander told Halil Pasha that there was an order from Ankara to deport him. Halil Pasha protested that his children were in Trabzon and his wife was coming as well. Hence, he insisted to stay in Trabzon for two months. His wish was granted, but he remained in house arrest under the protection of the local Laz militias. After Halil Pasha’s wife arrived at Trabzon on April 14, Halil Pasha and

\textsuperscript{148} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), April 24, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Nacıyem, Ruhum, Efendim}, 166.

\textsuperscript{149} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), February 25, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Nacıyem, Ruhum, Efendim}, 61.

\textsuperscript{150} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), March 4, 1921, in Karabekir, \textit{İstiklal Harbinizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkâni}, 106–7.

\textsuperscript{151} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), March 30, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 67.

\textsuperscript{152} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, \textit{İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları}, 74.

\textsuperscript{153} Halil Pasha, letter (Tuapse) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 20, 1921, TTK, EP 07-13, in Yamauchi, \textit{The Green Crescent under the Red Star}, 174–75.
his family were deported on April 28, 1921, in a vessel to Tuapse.\footnote{See: Halil Pasha, letter (Trabzon) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara) and Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), March 21, 1921; Third Company Command, letter (Trabzon) to General Staff (Ankara), March 22, 1921; Third Company Command, letter (Trabzon) to the General Staff (Ankara), March 23, 1921; Yusuf Kemal (Tengişenk), letter to General Staff (Ankara), March 28, 1921; Third Company Command, letter (Trabzon) to Mustafa Kemal, April 15, 1921; Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to the General Staff (Ankara), May 4, 1921, in ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 107; Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), April 16, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Nacişem, Ruhum, Efendim*, 145. See also: Aydemir, “Son Osmanlı Paşası Halil Paşa’nın Hâtraları,” quoted in Bardakçı, *Enver*, 255. See also: Halil Kut, *İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütûlmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları*, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 260–61.} Halil Pasha said later to a Kemalist informant in Tuapse:

> They threw me out of Anatolia. This angered the Russians. Because of the treatment to me and to Mustafa Subhi, the Anatolian Government lost its earnings in the eyes of the Russian Soviet Government. After Bekir Sami’s recent trip to London Russians see the Anatolian Government as becoming an instrument of the English. I see it like this as well.\footnote{Intelligence report (Tuapse) to the General Staff (Ankara), July 9, 2021, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 120.}

Having arrived at Tuapse, Halil Pasha was assisted by Soviet officials and quarters were arranged for him and his family.\footnote{Aydemir, “Son Osmanlı Paşası Halil Paşa’nın Hâtraları,” quoted in Bardakçı, *Enver*, 258.} On July 30, Halil moved with his family to Batum.\footnote{Sabri, letter (Tuapse) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 2, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 124.} There, he was resided in a villa near the lake park. «Halil Pasha was living like the commander of a great army together with his staff and aid-de-camps», wrote Vala Nurettin in his memoir who occasionally was a guest at Halil’s famous dinner parties where sometimes fifty to sixty guests were assembled and alcoholic beverages were consumed in large volumes and political discussions went on until late in the night.\footnote{Vala Nureddin, *Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), 235–36.} Halil was still under surveillance of the Turkish Intelligence. It was regularly reported that Halil was meeting with Armenians, Russians, and Turkish communists once a week at his mansion and that he was involved in anti-Kemalist and pro-Bolshevik propaganda.\footnote{Intelligence report (Trabzon) to the General Staff, July 6/7, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 120.} Even one of the men who came from Trabzon, a Captain İsmail Hakki, who travelled to Tuapse to talk with Halil and then to Moscow to meet with Enver Pasha was sentenced to military tribunal.\footnote{Despatch to the Ministry of National Defence, August 9, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 130.}
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«The [Government of] Anatolia seems to be quite afraid of us», Enver Pasha wrote his wife. Enver believed that politics of fear were directing Mustafa Kemal’s measures against the Unionists. Responsible for these was not only Kemalist propaganda, but also their own overblown claims. «Some of Hacı Sami’s inappropriate words has upset the affairs», he noted angered. Previously Hacı Sami had travelled through Anatolia on his way from Russia to Germany. After the incident with Halil Pasha in Trabzon, also Küçük Talat, one of the CUP leaders in Anatolia, was forced to leave the country.161 «Therefore», Enver explained, «Mustafa Kemal Pasha came up with all sorts of lies, because he is afraid that I would enter Anatolia.» One of these most circulated rumors was that Enver would invade the six Eastern provinces with a Russian Army and help the Soviet Government establish a «Great Armenia». «In short, all kinds of allegations.»162 Enver came to the conclusion that the Ankara Government extradited Halil Pasha, because they feared that Europeans might start a public campaign claiming that the «Maneuver of the [Committee of] Union and Progress has started».163 Enver was not wrong in his assumptions. The propaganda against Enver was a concerted effort by the Ankara Government. Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself had ordered to broadcast «open propaganda against Enver» (Enver hakkında açık neşriyat).164 Due to rumors of a Soviet-sponsored Enverist coup in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal closed down the (official) Turkish Communist Party, the Green Army Society and all other oppositional groups which were initiated to give the Ankara movement a leftist-populist touch, but became the instruments of Enverists and other oppositionals in Anatolia.165 Ironically, it was exactly such behavior of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, presumably based on his fears of Enver’s alleged coming to Anatolia, that was provoking Enver to start an usurpation campaign.

161 Kazım Karabekir, letter (Erzurum) to the General Staff (Ankara), May 14, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 110; Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to the Ministry of National Defence (Ankara), June 6, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 122; Naval Transportation Commander Fahri Bey, intelligence report (Trabzon), attached to General Staff, secret message to the Ministry of National Defence (Ankara), July 12, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1110, gömlek no. 41.
162 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), June 28, 1921, in Bardakç, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 207.
163 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 16, 1921, TTK, EP 03-27, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektubları, 89.
164 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), June 3, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 115.
165 Hüsamettin Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, ed. Samih N. Tansu (İstanbul: Sebil Yaynevi, 1996), 477.
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The organizational platform for Enver’s usurpation plans was the People’s Councils Party. Regarding the political agenda of this party, Enver told Cemal, «in Anatolia in the Parliament we have a party by the name of People’s Council Party […]. They legally defend our goals in Anatolia.» While the political program of this party was strongly embedded in socialist phrasing, in Enver’s private correspondence it rather sounded like political gibberish. «When we say People’s Council Party, of course, it should not be understood as something republican», as Enver tried to explain himself. «We are in favor of the preservation of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, as long as the governance is brought to the people.»

Enver revealed in a letter to Cavid Bey that the pseudo-communist nature of the party program was intentional in order to «give it a populist form». A political party was needed in Anatolia, according to Enver, that would support the current government in Anatolia from the left, but also work against the spread of actual communist ideas. Enver imagined an opposition party in Grand Assembly in Ankara, but it shall not be a communist party. If one day working in Russia would become difficult, he believed that this party might become a political shelter for his return to Turkey. Enver was engaged in a very difficult balancing act between Ankara and Moscow—and he was failing tremendously in explaining himself:

But Mustafa Kemal Pasha isn’t totally helping us in politics abroad. Since he is in the government and forced to do politics with the English, we always regarded it as appropriate to have a populist party in domestic politics. And we had negotiated this openly with Fuat Pasha and wrote it to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. But for some reason, he became pretty suspicious.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha had every reason to get suspicious, as it was nearly impossible to make sense of Enver Pasha’s political messages. The party’s pseudo-communist program which was meant to please his Soviet sponsors, for instance, was interpreted rather seriously by Kemalist officials. «Totally based on the principles of Bolshevism and communism», noted Kazım

166 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), April 15, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 74.
167 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 77.
168 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 80–81.
169 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [end of March or early April 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 70.
170 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), [early June 1921], in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 81.
Karabekir Pasha on the program of the People’s Council Party which was already in circulation in Anatolia. «With a lot of money, they [the Soviets] will organize Enver Pasha a Red Army consisting of marauders», he concluded. Karabekir believed that the Bolsheviks were trying to accomplish the «Anatolian Red Revolution» with Enver Pasha now, since they have previously failed with Mustafa Subhi and his friends. After the revolution, Karabekir assumed that the Soviets would take over the power and eliminate the revolutionaries. Thus, he proposed: «Our Government must call Enver to account and extinguish his moral personality by confuting his program in the eyes of the people.»

In an another circular to military commanders, Karabekir stressed that «Karahan the Armenian» and Chicherin were trying to provoke a «Bolshevism revolution» in Turkey with the help of Enver Pasha. The program of the People’s Council Party was quoted and certain parts were criticized by Karabekir—including the passage on the equality of men and women—that were considered to be Bolshevik and seditious. «The purpose is clear», said Karabekir. «By giving the Government in the hands of the people they will inflict revolution. They will demobilize the army with the promise of founding a militia.» Karabekir finished his circular with a personal attack on Enver. Immediately thereafter, precautions were taken against the distribution of the program of the People’s Council Party in Anatolia. There were even plans to deceive Enver by encouraging or inviting him to come to Anatolia to arrest him. Mustafa Kemal Pasha requested from Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow to supply him regularly with intelligence on Enver’s movement as well as on Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan. Instead of offering him safe haven for Enver’s return to Turkey, the pseudo-communist program of the People’s Councils Party had fueled the fears of the Ankara Government and made his return only more difficult.

Kazım Karabekir Pasha was very influential in voicing and reproducing various conspiracy theories in this regard. He was overtly suspicious of both the Bolsheviks and the British as

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171 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erurum) to the General Staff (Ankara), May 8, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1167, gömlek no. 108.
172 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to the 12th Army, June 13, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1394, gömlek no. 49.
174 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Chief of General Staff Fevzi Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 12, 1921, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbiimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 124–25.
175 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), July 3, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 33. For Ali Fuat Pasha’s inquiry on Cemal Pasha’s activities see: Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Abrurrahman Bey (Kabul), July 26, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 30.
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well as Unionists. For instance, Kazim Karabekir while trying to make sense of Enver’s activities abroad suspected the influence of foreign hands behind Enver:

I assumed that the force that made Enver rush from Berlin to Baku had also set the Unionists within [Turkey] into motion and was this time trying to establish Bolshevism in our homeland through the hand of Enver. A convenient [policy] in such a vast area was only possible by foreign hands.

For Karabekir, these foreign hands belonged to no one but Britain. Nevertheless, Karabekir was openly confused regarding some of the implications of this theory of British influence and considered other similarly strange explanations: «I wonder whether the German diplomats are inciting and instigating the [Committee of] Union and Progress leaders to make the Turks become Bolsheviks, believing that this might prolong the war?» There were admittedly many other contradictions in his theory as well. «The English would, certainly, never call for Cemal Pasha’s operation in Afghanistan», Karabekir wondered curiously. After quoting several letters, however, Karabekir somehow reached the following conclusion: «Once laid down as such, it once again becomes necessary to believe in the cunning of English diplomats.»

While the British were in Karabekir’s perception the slick and fine gentlemen cleverly pulling the strings behind the curtains, the Russians, «regardless of the title and form» of their government, were considered as the traditional enemy of Turkey «who would never tolerate Turkey to grow stronger and become dominant in the East.» For Karabekir, neither the Soviet-Turkish Friendship Treaty, nor the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty needed to be taken seriously, because Britain was provoking a Russian-Turkish conflict in the Caucasus in order to safeguard its own geostrategic interests in the region.

A peculiar incident in April 1921 illustrated for Ankara regime the reach and threat of British intelligence operations. An Indian born Muslim activist, Mustafa Saghir, came to Ankara as a delegate of the Khilafat Movement. As the Turkish Intelligence soon discovered Saghir was

176 Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 29–30, 32.
177 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to the General Staff (Ankara), June 12, 1921, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 1157, gömlek no. 167.
in reality a British spy assigned for espionage and propaganda against the Ankara Government. Even more there was a British plan to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha so that Mustafa Saghir tried and sentenced to death penalty by hanging. Only few months after the assassination of Talat Pasha in Berlin, this discovery of this plot came as a bombshell in Ankara. The timing of the conspiracy coincided with Soviet-Turkish Treaty. Soviet officials in Ankara proudly reported to Moscow to have helped the authorities in their investigation.

Meanwhile, Enver Pasha was increasingly disturbed by the good relations the Ankara Government had developed with Soviet Russia. This role was meant to be played by himself. The more Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to terms with Soviet Russia, the less space of action was left for Enver. In a letter to Cavid Bey, Enver expressed his concerns:

I don’t like the recent situation in Anatolia at all. I had advised them [the Kemalists] to come more or less to terms with the Entente, as I have convinced Moscow [in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty?], so that they can grant serenity to the homeland that is in need of peace. In contrast, Ankara has thrown itself into personal dictatorship and altogether towards the Russian direction, but this will not please the Russians and perhaps it will go the way that I fear. Anyway, God forbid.

Regarding the military affairs in Anatolia, Enver Pasha was even more concerned, as he had only access to information through international news coverage, which was mostly pessimistic about the chances of a Turkish success against the Greek forces. The information he received from his colleagues in Europe was similarly colored. Enver again complained about false rumors that the Ankara Government was spreading about him. «It is strange, there is no fundamental news in the newspapers», he complained hungry for fresh news from the front. «Mustafa Kemal, that fool, would do a rather better job if he would strive for unification, instead of agitating against me and thereby encouraging the enemies.» After reading an...
article agitating against himself in the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*,185 the official mouthpiece of the Kemalist Government, Enver protested in a letter to Mustafa Kemal about the deceptive conspiracy theories about him:

> After all, even though you most certainly know that I would never serve the purpose of Germans or anyone else, why do you let others lie and poison the minds of my people according to your desires? […]
>
> You won’t achieve what you are looking for, if your propagandists spread such illogical lies, for instance, that I would come from Russia to establish a Great Armenia in the six provinces.186

Similar complaints about propaganda by the Kemalists, claiming that Enver Pasha and his supporters would «seize the six provinces with a Bolshevik force and give it away to Armenians», was mentioned also by Dr. Nazım who learned about these anti-Enver policies of Ankara Government only after coming to Moscow. «What is in Ankara’s mind?», wondered Nazım desperately.187 Eventually, Enver went as far as threatening Mustafa Kemal. «Anyway, if our staying abroad becomes useless for our general purpose of saving first of all Turkey and the Muslim world or if we feel that there is a threat, then we will immediately come to the homeland. That’s it.»188 According to a Turkish Intelligence report Enver even made several handwritten copies of this letter and circulated among the Turkish community in Moscow and perhaps beyond.189

Meanwhile, the British officials believed that in the military crisis of the National Resistance against the Greeks, «the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in control of the Nationalist movement, firstly, because he has been much more in their pockets than Mustapha Kemal»,  

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185 *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, June 13, 1921. See also a summary of the article in Intelligence circular of the Eastern Front, July 11, 1921, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1039, gömlek no. 131. See also an English summary in Secret Political Report on Turkey’s General Situation, July 15, 1921, FO 371/6473, 8417, 4–8.


187 Dr. Nazım, letter (Moscow) to Eyüp Sabri (Ankara), July 11, 1921, TTK, EP 03-23.


189 For a handwritten copy and the attached intelligence note sent to the Ankara Government see: TİTE, kutu no. 70, gömlek no. 35.
as one intelligence officer concluded. «I think», noted another British official in Constantinople, «that there can be no doubt that Enver and Committee of Union and Progress are gradually taking command of situation at Angora and that Kemalist Government must be [regarded as entirely] in the hands of Bolsheviks.» «Enver is doubtless scheming to be the Deus ex Machina», assumed another British official and suggested that Enver wanted to «repeat his sensational performance of 1913 when he re-entered Adrianople.» These fearful news of a potential Bolshevik take-over in Ankara was making Mustafa Kemal more and more as the moderate party. Recent developments were implying, as it was summarized in a report to Lord Curzon, that «Mustapha Kemal and his Minister, while anxious to show themselves not less zealous than the extremist group which looks to Enver Pasha, are in reality anxious to cut adrift from the Bolsheviks and so compromise with the Allies.» After a conversation with the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, the British representative reported to London: «If Kemalist defeat was indeed decisive there would be very likely be an anti-Kemalist movement in Anatolia, but I feared it might result in a Bolshevik-Enver combination with the object of continuing the war to the bitter end.» In August 1921, a British Intelligence agent recently released from captivity reported that Enver was «at the moment without power». «That they attempt a coup d’état is probable; that they will succeed is unlikely.»

Enver Pasha’s increasing obsession with the Anatolian affairs was casting a shadow on the raison d’étre of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. When Muhittin (Birgen) visited the Moscow Bureau, there were only three people working there and as Birgen noted,

192 General Harington, letter (Constantinople) to the War Office (London), July 7, 1921, FO 371/6473, 8417.
none of them was a revolutionary.»¹⁹⁶ One of them was Rashid Kaplanov, a Sorbonne-educated son of a landowner from Dagestan and former Minister of Finance in Musavvat Azerbaijan. Kaplanov was working as the translator and secretary of Enver Pasha’s bureau in Moscow. «The Revolutionary Societies or the Union of [Muslim] Revolutionary Societies was always something hollow», he told to Muhittin. He said that he had never seen an actual organization at work. «The whole society was made up of Enver Pasha and some of his friends.» For Rashid Kaplanov «Enver Pasha had only one idea in his head», namely «returning to Turkey and becoming the leader.»¹⁹⁷ Kaplanov criticized that the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies had no program that can be presented to its potential social movement base. «If the purpose of a committee is to incite the Muslim countries to rebel against the English and French, wouldn’t it be anything but upsetting the apple cart to intervene into the affairs of the one country that is in an excellent rebellion?»¹⁹⁸

Another dissident voice was Captain Hüseyin Fevzi. He had been dispatched as a paramilitary spy of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to Tripoli in 1915 to conduct unconventional warfare. He had not returned to Ottoman Turkey ever since. Hüseyin Fevzi was the delegate for Tripoli and Tunisia at the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. At the second congress of the Union, Captain Fevzi held the last speech as he represented the Muslims of North Africa, which was one of the main topics. He proposed that it should not be a priority of the organization to concentrate on Anatolia, since Anatolia had already established independent government and organized resistance. Yet, this proposal opposed Enver’s plans to shift the focus of the operations towards Turkey. The congress was rather pro forma as the decisions were prepared by Enver previously.¹⁹⁹ To Enver’s annoyance, however, other deputies like Emir Shakib Arslan and Khalid al-Gargani supported Fevzi’s proposal.²⁰⁰ Twenty days after the congress, Enver Pasha, ignoring the congress, sent a circular note to all branches of the CUP in Anatolia announcing that the name Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was «only a mask» (bir

¹⁹⁶ Birgen, Iittihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, II, 741.
¹⁹⁷ Birgen, Iittihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, II, 738, 741.
¹⁹⁸ Birgen, Iittihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, II, 742.
¹⁹⁹ Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 6, 1920, in Bardakçı, Naciyes, Ruhum, Efendim, 216. See also: Bardakçı, Enver, 280.
maskeden ibaret olduguunu) for the Committee of Union and Progress and that it will soon reappear «with its true name» (nam-i hakikisi ile).\(^{201}\) This circular note was secretly printed with a chapéographe by Enver and his friends in Moscow.\(^{202}\)

In an intercepted letter to Halil Pasha in the name of the Central Committee of the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies, Enver Pasha wrote that «instead of appearing under different names», the Committee of Union and Progress «with its glorious past» should rather «come out as it is». This move was based on the numerous «appeals coming from our organizations and our brothers abroad [baruq] and in the homeland [dahildeki]». «Therefore», the letter continued, «[…] the Central Committee decided that to give […] our organization in the homeland [dahili teşkilatımızda] […] instead of an assumed name […] its original name Union and Progress».\(^{203}\) This decision formally affected only the People’s Councils Party as it was the «organization in the homeland», but in its consequences the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was similarly exposed as a cover organization for the CUP’s plans of usurpation.

Captain Hüseyin Fevzi only accidently discovered this revelation. As being the deputy of Tripoli and Tunisia and a member of the League of Oppressed People, he openly protested.\(^{204}\) After Hüseyin Fevzi’s protest, a meeting of the Central Committee was summoned. Enver Pasha defended his policy by pointing out the authoritarian tendencies of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his military failures in the defense of the homeland. Dr. Nazım agreed with Enver’s assessment of the situation in Turkey, but expressed his doubts about their own chances of success in Anatolia without having a military force. Enver countered, «you’re not a soldier, you don’t understand it», and made his point: «When my homeland is exposed to such a danger, I would rather go and shed my blood for my homeland instead of shedding it for the Indians […]».\(^{205}\) Dr. Raik, on the other hand, who had recently arrived from Trabzon,

\(^{201}\) Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 961, 968. This circular note was signed by Ali (Enver) and Rüstem (Dr. Nazım).

\(^{202}\) Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 968.

\(^{203}\) Enver Pasha in the name of the Central Committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, letter (Moscow) to Halil Pasha (Batum), August 26, 1921, in Karaman, İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, 111–12.

\(^{204}\) Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 968.

\(^{205}\) Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eycin, Doktor Nazım Bey, 343.
backed Enver’s ambitions. Only Hüseyin Fevzi objected. He argued that Enver should rather coordinate the liberation movement of 300 million Muslims worldwide instead of intervening into the affairs of a single country. Fevzi proposed that every move regarding the Anatolian movement must be done in conjunction with its legitimate representatives, namely the Ankara Government. While Fevzi was speaking, Enver pulled out his revolver in a calm but threatful manner, looked at it and then put it away. He then asked if anyone was in favor of Fevzi’s proposal. No one dared to raise a hand. The decision was made. Fevzi immediately instructed Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha on Enver’s intentions.206 Hence, not without a reason, Ali Fuat Pasha wrote in his memoir that the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was simply another name for the exiled remnants of the CUP.207

After hearing continuous bad news from the Turkish-Greek War, Enver Pasha proposed to travel to Batum to have closer look at the incidents in Anatolia.208 When Enver talked with Ali Fuat Pasha, the latter told Enver that he should rather take the whole Unionist bunch and go to Bukhara in order to establish a government there.209 Whatever he would do, he should stay away from Anatolian affairs. Enver’s decision to travel to Batum, as Hüseyin Fevzi remembers, was highly criticized by the Tatar representatives and many others in Moscow.210 Dr. Nazım remembers that Libyan and Egyptian activists proposed that Enver to go to Tripoli or Benghazi.211 Ankara Government’s diplomat Rıza Nur tells that the plan behind going to Batum has been infiltrating with a group of men to Trabzon. According to rumors he heard, Enver had received 700 Russian gold coins, but was robbed on his way near Rustov.212 Hüseyin Fevzi tells that Enver received from the Soviet Government 4000 rifles and 400,000 franc and 700 Russian gold coins on behalf of the Egyptian revolutionaries, but

207 Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 238.
208 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 29, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim*, 250.
210 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 962.
211 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, *Doktor Nazım Bey*, 341.
sent these instead to Trabzon. After Enver left for Batum, Captain Fevzi submitted his resignation from the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and aligned himself with the Ankara delegation in Moscow.

Enver Pasha left Moscow on August 3, 1921, and rumors which were perhaps spread by no one but by himself that he actually went to Turkestan. When Enver and Dr. Nazım arrived at Batum, they first hid in an empty train wagon. After twenty-five days in the hot wagon, they moved to a residence in Batum provided by the Soviet Government. Enver was constantly working. «I’ve never, not even for a moment, seen this person being inactive», noted Dr. Nazım regarding Enver’s working regimen during their time in Batum. «He was falling asleep the moment he put his head on the pillow, he started working immediately after getting up from bed. If he was left with no work to do, then he was writing report-like letters to his beloved wife.»

According to Turkish Intelligence, Enver was staying as a guest, uncover under the assumed name Baharov, at one of the residences of the Russian Consulate. Allegedly not even the Russian Consul knew his true identity. At his residence, Enver had many visitors from Trabzon mostly local Laz militia leaders.

The Turkish Consul in Tuapse reported to Ankara that the CUP leaders were secretly summoning voluntary soldiers in Baku and Batum. «They say to the soldiers that it is to support Turkey and to the Russians they say that it is to bring communism into Turkey so that they get a lot of money for this.». The same report even claimed that Trotsky came to see Enver.

Informants said that they had established an «imposing clandestine organization» (dehşetli

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213 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Ersan, "Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu," 972.
214 Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), October 5, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 21. Later Captain Hüseyin Fevzi was allowed to enter Anatolia with official permission. Yusuf Kemal, letter (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), October 22, 1921; Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Nuri Bey (Berlin), October 23, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 19.
215 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to the Rifat Pasha, August 8, 1921, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 1110, gömlek no. 49; Ministry of National Defence, to the Central Army Command, August 16, 1921, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 1260, gömlek no. 30.
217 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Trabzon) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), September 1, 1921, ATASE, İŞH, kutu no. 1110, gömlek no. 53.
Further information on Enver Pasha’s activities were uncovered by the Ankara Intelligence, as they got hold of a letter Enver sent to his mother in Constantinople.\(^\text{219}\) These intelligence reports were enhancing the fear of an Enverist intervention. Meanwhile, the Soviet Ambassador Natsarenus reported to Moscow that there were rumors in Ankara that a coup d’état of the Enverist faction would soon take place.\(^\text{220}\) It was later supposed by British Intelligence that Natsarenus was supporting the Enverists and was therefore recalled to Moscow.\(^\text{221}\) In eyes of the British, Mustafa Kemal was the lesser of two evils. There was indeed a faction of forty Unionists in the Grand National Assembly. For instance, Hilmi Bey, the deputy of Ardahan, would even go far as threatening the intelligence officer of the Ankara Government in Trabzon. «For God’s sake, whom are you relying on so that you show your colors against Enver here?», asked Hilmi and continued, «whenever we desire, we can overthrow Mustafa Kemal and bring Enver at his place.»\(^\text{222}\) By that time, Enver had already went to Turkestan with broken heart. Nonetheless, while still in Batum Enver was aware of the zeal of his supporters in Anatolia and he was constantly playing with the idea of entering Anatolia.

In September 1921, Enver Pasha and his friends convened a congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in Batum. The Congress took place from September 4–8, 1921, in Enver’s small apartment in Batum with Dr. Nazım, Halil Pasha, Küçük Talat, and Raik.\(^\text{223}\) Halil Pasha told later that no real congress ever took place in Batum. Enver had prepared the documents and the others put their signatures on it out of solidarity.\(^\text{224}\) Following the previous decree by the Executive Committee, the name of the People’s Councils Party was officially

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\(^{218}\) Mustafa Kemal Pasha, forwarded report by Sabri Bey (Council in Tuapse) to Minister of National Defense and Internal Affairs Refet (Bele) Pasha, August 18, 1921, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 1110, gömlek no. 50.

\(^{219}\) Intelligence report (İnebolu) to the General Staff (Ankara), September 19, 1921, ATASE, ISH, kutu no. 1478, gömlek no. 15.


\(^{222}\) Bardakçi, Enver, 280–81. See also: Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, 103.

\(^{223}\) Bardakçi, Enver, 260. See also: Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, 103.
renamed as Union and Progress Party at this congress. Enver himself prepared the draft report of the congress in which the change of name back to Union and Progress was manifested. The stamps were already sent to Anatolian branches before the congress decision. Enver told Cemal that they had 29 branches in Constantinople and in nearly every Anatolian town they had contacts. There were, in fact, intelligence reports in Ankara by late June 27, 1921, that Enverists in Constantinople were founding secret societies (cemiyet-i hafiye). 

«By this, our spirit will be represented in the new war», wrote Enver to his wife. Enver had this idea that changing the name of the party from Soviet-style People’s Councils Party to Committee of Union and Progress would signalize the Ankara Government that he was not planning to bring Bolshevism to Anatolia: «I hope Mustafa Kemal sees this so that we will put a stop to the rumors which Kazım Karabekir is spreading about me establishing Bolshevism in Anatolia with a Red Army.» He was severely mistaken with this assumption. It was a foolish move, he made. Nothing could be a worse message to Mustafa Kemal than the resurrection of the CUP.

Nonetheless, it was still Enver Pasha’s hope to organize a Russian Muslim unit under his command and march to the help of the National Forces. Because the Turkish-Greek battle front was rather lengthy in Western Anatolia, as Enver explained Chicherin, he requested some Bashkir cavalry units. When Chicherin asked Ali Fuat Pasha on August 17, whether it was allowed for Enver to enter Anatolia with Muslim troops, Ali Fuat Pasha protested harshly. This would endanger the unity of the Anatolian movement, as he instructed the Soviet commissar. Meanwhile waiting for a definitive answered, Enver increasingly became

225 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), September 11, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 98; Proceedings and declarations of the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress (Batum), September 25, 1921, TTK, EP 02-84.
226 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 22, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 296.
227 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), September 11, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 98.
228 See, for instance: TİTE, kutu no. 55, gömlek no. 28.
229 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum), letter to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 4, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 281.
230 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Cemal Pasha (Kabul), September 11, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 98–99.
231 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 340.
232 Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 237.
pessimistic about any Russian support for Anatolia. He concluded that Soviet Russia was simply occupied with its own troubles. Chicherin recapitulated the events as follows:

In order to meet with a couple of friends he [Enver] had travelled to Batum; and he had promised me that he would support Kemal as long as he [Kemal] would struggle against the occupation and only if Kemal would betray this, then he would fight against Kemal. Enver shook our confidence in Batum.

There were rumors by then, as Chicherin heard afterwards, that a coup against Mustafa Kemal by the pro-Entente Constantinople faction was in the making, thus, Enver’s friends had urged him to enter Anatolia to save the nationalist movement. Ambassador Ali Fuat Cebesoy in his memoir confirms the existence of such rumors in Moscow. These fears of a pro-Entente coup strengthened Enver’s hand in the eyes of Soviet leaders for a while. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership decided against Enver’s intervention. The final rejection reached Enver in the night of September 26, 1921:

Late at night a secret telegraph came from Chicherin. In this, [...] he informed me that he didn’t think it was appropriate for me to travel to Anatolia. My previous suspicions found their approval. This means perhaps that the Russians don’t want me to go there believing that the Anatolian front might get broken. At the same time, while I am located in Russia, they have an ace in the hole against Mustafa Kemal, believing that I am their lap dog [zągar] eager to attack when needed.

This insight that Enver was «a sort of trump card» was severely disappointing and disillusioning for Enver to process. But Enver, ditching the prospects of the Soviet support, decided to enter Anatolia by boat via Trabzon. But once again, luck was not on his side. «Whenever

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233 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 29, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciym, Ruhum, Efendim, 250.
234 Chicherin, cipher to Sergei Petrovich Natseranus, November 6, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 50–51.
235 Chicherin, cipher to Sergei Petrovich Natseranus, November 6, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 50–51.
236 Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 289.
237 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 27, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciym, Ruhum, Efendim, 302.
238 Arthur Ransome, the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Moscow, who shared a house with Enver for a month in 1920 wrote that Enver was «a sort of trump card […] in case the Angora Turks should fail them. The allies had squared Constantinople, and if they should succeed in squaring Angora would find themselves face to face with Enver […]» Arthur Ransome, “The Last Adventure of Enver Pasha,” Manchester Guardian, December 2, 1922, 11.
239 See: Bardakçı, Enver, 276–78.
The Young Turk Aftermath

I attempt to go to Trabzon, the weather turns bad», wrote Enver in despair to his wife. 240 And then the news of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s victory at the Battle of Sakarya became public. The geopolitical context was once again shifting without Enver. While Britain was increasingly becoming concerned about further supporting the Greek forces, France had already approached the Ankara Government to bring an end to the fights in the Southern Front. A French Intelligence report from October 18, 1921, still believed that «the programs of action of the Bolsheviks, Turks, and Germans, have remained in accord in order to try in common to raise the Muslim world against the Entente Powers.»241 Yet, the solution was seen in Quai d’Orsay rather in coopting Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his Government. The Ankara Government signed the Ankara Treaty with France on October 20, 1921. This treaty meant that the new Turkey was now also recognized by the West as a legitimate state actor. Andrew Orr, a historian of French Intelligence, writes that «French government’s opening to the Kemalists was an attempt to prevent a feared Middle East-wide rebellion.»242

As much as the Turkish victory was good news for all Turkish nationalists, it also meant that Enver had lost the game. He could never go back to Turkey—at least not empty handed. On the other hand, the Ankara Treaty with France endangered Mustafa Kemal’s good relations with Soviet Russia. A British official noted: «Disappointed at recent success of Mustapha and Enver Pasha’s consequent loss of prestige Bolshevik Russia is fearful lest Franco-Turkish solidarity should defeat her ends in Turkey.»243 The Soviet Government was, in fact, concerned that they once again had to rely on Enver Pasha. Chicherin wrote to his comrades:

If the [Grand National] Assembly ratifies the [Ankara] treaty, then we will have to face the Enverists issue. And then, we will once again face the money issue in this regard. If we do not give Enver large sums of money, then all our efforts will be wasted. If he comes to government, he will face the same or even greater money problems like Kemal; and without our great assistance or credits he will not be able to hold on for long. If we choose to support Enver, we have to be sure about one thing: Can we afford to pay the high price of this support? This issue needs to be discussed very carefully. But, if we work closer with Enver, this will be the result of the coldness between us and the Kemalists.244

240 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 25, 1921, in Bardakç, Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 300.
241 Orr, “We Call You to Holy War,” 1117.
242 Orr, “We Call You to Holy War,” 1120.
244 Chicherin, letter to Lenin, October 20, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-Ittihatçı İlişkileri, 48.
Enver Pasha’s desire to enter Anatolia was not necessarily supported by some of his close friends either. Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat Bey were allegedly against Enver going to Anatolia as well as Dr. Nazım. However, it was Hacı Sami who was encouraging Enver for daring moves. Eventually, Enver made his mind and told Halil Pasha: «Uncle, you are right that despite my good will it might have terrible consequences if I go to Anatolia». Enver continued: «Therefore, I gave up the idea of going to Turkey. I will go to Turkestan. There, I will talk with Cemal Pasha who will come from Afghanistan and then I will return to Moscow and perhaps back to Germany.»

12. Impasses of Diplomacy and Insurgency:
The End of the Young Turk Politics in Exile

«What would the Russians say, if I went to the Afghan border under the pretext of meeting with Cemal Pasha?», Enver Pasha asked Dr. Nazım in Batum, after revealing that he was actually thinking about joining the Basmachi rebels. Dr. Nazım considered it a breach of hospitality of Soviet Russia and advised against such a dishonorable act. Nonetheless, they decided that a meeting with Cemal could be still meaningful. They sent an invitation to Cemal and made appointments. Meanwhile the military and political situation in Anatolia seemed to offer a sudden window of opportunity for Enver to cross the Black Sea. Enver decided to try his luck in Anatolia and let Dr. Nazım go alone to the Afghan border. However, Enver could not sail off due to the weather conditions and soon the window of opportunity was closed for good. After Mustafa Kemal Pasha had turned the tables with his victory at the battle of Sakarya, Enver had to postpone his return to Anatolia indefinitely. From Batum, Enver wrote to his wife that he wanted to travel first to Turkestan in order to meet with Cemal there and then travel back to Germany via Moscow. What Enver did not know was that Cemal was already on his way to Moscow, and that they would once again miss each other. The two men saw each other for the last time in spring 1920 in Berlin before Enver’s flight where he was later imprisoned in Latvia for three months. The two men would never see each other ever again.

This last chapter tells the story of how the exile activities of the Young Turk came to its ultimate end. At the center of this episode lies Enver’s fateful decision to join the anti-Soviet insurgents in Turkestan. This move created such a path-dependency that whole network of Young Turk activists was affected irreversibly. Although Cemal Pasha had achieved to be a respected and recognized political actor in international politics, Enver’s adventure—as it was called even by then—limited his space of movement in international affairs. Rumors of

2 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 22, 1921, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciye'em, Rhubum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürûn Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 296.
what Enver was actually doing in Turkestan would continue to affect the state of affairs in Moscow, Ankara, Kabul, and elsewhere. Cemal’s attempts to renounce Enver’s actions and achieve his political rehabilitation in Moscow and Ankara was interrupted by his mysterious murder in Tiflis on July 21, 1922. While Enver was able to make a lot of noise with the Basmachi insurgency, the reactions and consequences he would generate were rather unintended and undesired.

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In Kabul, Cemal Pasha received a telegram from Enver Pasha calling him to meet either in Kabul or at the Afghan-Russian border in order to consult something very important. Cemal sent a telegram back and requested to meet in mid-September at the border station. İsmet (Karadoğan), Cemal’s aid-de-camp, asked why he did not make Enver come to him, but instead take the trouble of traveling two weeks to a border outpost in the middle of nowhere. "Son", said Cemal to İsmet, "do you think I would ever let Enver come here?" Enver’s reputation and ambition could have easily upset the whole status quo in Kabul. The arranged rendezvous was at a border train station near River Amu Derya. After two weeks of travel, Cemal and İsmet arrived at the rendezvous, but Enver was not around. A former Ottoman POW showed up and delivered the news that not Enver, but Dr. Nazım had arrived few days ago. But instead of waiting for Cemal, Dr. Nazım had proceeded to Bukhara. At Bukhara, Dr. Nazım was welcomed by the local officials and dignitaries. He received a large amount of donation in gold by the Bukhara notables on behalf of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Cemal took the train to Bukhara the next day. There, Cemal was received by a joyful crowd of Turkestanis. Some of them had attended Ottoman schools during the Hamidian era and a group of former Ottoman POWs was also among the crowd. From these men Cemal learnt that Dr. Nazım had once again traveled further to Tashkent. Cemal and his aid-de-camp İsmet took the next train to Tashkent. There, again, Cemal was welcomed with a ceremony and this time Dr. Nazım was also among the crowd. Cemal immediately

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3 This gold issue is told later also in Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), May 26, 1922, TTK, EP 04-07.

asked, where on earth Enver was. «He went to Batum,» answered Dr. Nazım and continued: «He will go over to Anatolia.» Cemal Pasha got furious.

Are you crazy? Are you ruthless? When the homeland is in such a situation, how can you dare something like this? Don’t you see that Anatolia is in a struggle against enemies who surrounded them on four fronts? It is treason to go there in such a situation.5

Cemal Pasha decided to go to Moscow. He wanted to travel to Europe and make arrangements for arms transports to Afghanistan. And perhaps he could bring Enver to reason before he would go too far. Cemal and Nazım took a special train to Moscow. Twelve days later they arrived at Moscow.6

It was early October 1921. Cemal Pasha arrived at the Soviet capital with the official title «the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army».7 Only one and a half year ago Cemal had come to Moscow as a professional revolutionary looking for a calling. But the Moscow he had left in August 1920 had changed in the meantime. Cemal’s local patron was as usual Chicherin who arranged Cemal’s talks with other senior Soviet officials regarding the arms delivery to Afghanistan. «Trotsky is really the devil himself», as Cemal later noted, but he could still convince him to support the Afghan mission. Cemal had also a three-hour meeting with Stalin, where he pleaded for more support for Afghanistan.8 Cemal was previously praised by Chicherin to Stalin for he has been working closely with the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul.9 Nevertheless, Cemal was increasingly losing his patience with the stalling tactics of the Soviet officials, as the promised arms and supplies delivery for Afghanistan was still not realized. Cemal wanted to meet with Lenin to finally seal the deal. «Well-known Cemal Pasha arrived from Afghanistan and wishes to be received by you», Chicherin wrote to Lenin. After praising Cemal’s achievements in Afghanistan and stressing his influence on the Emir, Chicherin said: «All his thinking is set on the struggle against the English imperialism and in

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6 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eycil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 350, 353.
8 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), November 14, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 295–96.
all important decisions in Kabul he used every means to turn Afghanistan towards us.» Cemal was praised by Chicherin as a serious cause of concern for the British interests in the region.  

In fact, Chicherin was not exaggerating a bit. On September 7, 1921, only few weeks before Cemal Pasha returned to Moscow, the British Government had issued a diplomatic note to the Soviet Government, because propaganda activities in the East had not yet ceased after the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. Most outrageous evidence for the continuing Soviet intrigues in the East was described in this diplomatic note as Cemal’s mission in Kabul. After hearing about this note, Cemal protested that he was not an instrument of Soviet policies. He wrote a note to the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that he has been acting in Kabul only under the authority of Emir Amanullah and in conjunction with the Ankara Government. His mission, as Cemal feigned innocence, was only aimed at Afghanistan’s military modernization and national defense. And defense was necessary, as Cemal put it, since only recently Britain has offered arms and supplies to Afghanistan for the anti-Soviet policies in Turkestan. Cemal was, of course, not as innocent as he presented himself. In a personal memorandum to the Afghan Emir, which Cemal wrote at the instance of Chicherin during the very same time, he proclaimed:

I think that the key to the World Revolution lies in India. Cutting them off from India will please all the non-English nations. If the English will lose India, they will get paralyzed and will never again disturb other nations. If we evaluate this from the point of view of a revolutionary, we see that if India would drop out which is the source of life for thirty or forty million people on the Great Britain island then these people will be condemned to a famine. The English Government which has troubles to feed two million unemployed people will suffocate because of the ten or twelve million unemployed and ever hungry people that will be thrown down its throat.

In face of these not so secret ambitions of Cemal Pasha, the question that troubled Chicherin and Lenin was whether Cemal’s coming to Moscow had violated the non-propaganda clause of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. Chicherin argued that Cemal Pasha was a «high official statesman of a befriended state» and it would be inappropriate to forbid him to come to Soviet Russia. Diplomatic status was simply a force of its own. Chicherin explained that

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11 See: Izvestia, September 29, 1921. See also: German Embassy in Moscow, report on the exchange of notes between the English and Russian governments regarding propaganda in Asia, October 3, 1921, PA-AA, R 31585-6.
12 Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 285–86.
13 Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 300.
Cemal was disappointed that Moscow still did not completely deliver its promise to Afghanistan. Chicherin advised to entertain Cemal with honorary gestures to keep up his mood and recommended Lenin that he should invite Cemal to a meeting.14 «Comrade Chicherin», wrote Lenin in the beginning of his answer and said directly, «I am against a meeting.» The current state of affairs would not permit grandiose gestures towards a man in the likes of Cemal nor was delivering the promised military supplies possible. «If I keep my promise it will be harmful. If I reject it will be harmful as well», pondered Lenin and suggested: «The best would be to find an excuse or a way to hinder this meeting from taking place.»15

Cemal Pasha had soon more serious concerns than the stalling tactics of the Soviet leadership, however, since there were many bad rumors that kept him troubled. Cemal was concerned about rumors which the British were spreading around in Kabul during his absence. Cemal warned the Afghan Emir: «I beg you not to give attention at all to the rumors and assumptions that are based on useless and all sorts of interpretations and revelations.»16 In Cemal’s absence from Kabul, however, an Anglo-Afghan Treaty was signed on November 15, 1921.17 This treaty established the sovereignty of Afghanistan as «a fully entitled member of the international community», as one German official noted.18 Afghanistan had once again entered the British sphere of interest. Some observes assumed that Cemal could not return to Afghanistan because of British pressures on both Afghanistan and Soviet Russia.19

Rumors about Enver Pasha were in the air as well. The Enver-Kemal conflict had become public as late as in the autumn of 1921. The British High Commissioner in Constantinople reported to London in late November 1921: «Then, again, there are persistent rumours that

14 Chicherin, secret letter to Lenin, October 14, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 45–46.
15 Lenin, note to Chicherin, October 16, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 47.
16 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), November 14, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 297.
18 Note on the Anglo-Afghan Treaty (Berlin), January 6, 1922, PA-AA, R 77936.
19 Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 285.
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Enver Pasha is proving to be a thorn in the side of Mustapha Kemal.20 The British Intelligence had this time lost track of Enver's conspiracies, and was presenting old news which was probably only confirmed recently. «All that can be assured is that Enver is making a strong effort to re-enter Turkish politics, and has supporters in Angora and doubtless in the army, especially among those who favour a more whole-hearted co-operation with the Bolsheviks.»21 One of these rumors that was prominent in December 1921 was that Enver staged a coup d'état in Batum and took over the government of the Adjara province of Georgia.22 The British Intelligence corrected these rumors: «The rumour to the effect that Enver Pasha has carried out a coup in Ajaristan has not only been proven to be without foundation but no such coup appears to have been attempted.» The same report confirmed that Enver «seems really to have paid visit to Batum […] is understood to have gone to Moscow.»23 The information on Kemal-Enver conflict was late and partly misinformed as Enver did not return to Moscow.

Around the same time, a Times article reported that the Anatolian movement was divided into two camps, namely that of Kemalists and Enverists. It was also a rehash of old news from last summer, namely that former CUP members, Enver, Halil, Küçük Talat, and Dr. Nazım, «metamorphosed into delegates of the People's Soviet [Council] Party of Union and Progress» and that they were «summoning the Government of Angora to recognize their Party.» The article went on and said: «Rumours that Enver Pasha was posing as a Communist have long been prevalent, but this proof of his conversion to that creed is unexpectedly complete.»24 Dr. Nazım remembers that after reading such news he decided to correct this misunderstanding. He called the Turkish Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha and asked him to find a

22 A Turkish official requested in December 9, 1921, further intelligence whether the rumors were true that Enver Pasha had founded the Adjara Government in Georgia and how this would affect the relations to Soviet Russia. TİTE, kutu no. 51, gömlek no. 60.
24 The Times, “Enver Pasha’s New Pose: Even Angora Annoyed,” November 5, 1921. Another news which was translated by Turkish officials into French was The Times, “New Danger for Angora: Once Again Enver Pasha,” December 5, 1921, in TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 14.
British journalist. Dr. Nazım explained to the one available British journalist in Moscow that they «would never renounce Mustafa Kemal’s authority.» He said that The Times was trying to manipulate the public opinion by claiming that there was split among Turks and thus encouraging British policies. The belief that they were in a dialogue or interaction with the British through journalists was emblematic. In the aftermath of the events of summer 1921, the CUP émigré networks collectively invested efforts to correct the public opinion that a conflict existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver. The only enemy they could fight against were now the public rumors—a fight that they had actually long lost. In a lead article, the German-edition of the Liwa-el-Islam announced the following disclaimer:

Some rumors claim that there are antagonisms between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha; Enver Pasha and his political friends are said to be Bolsheviks; they are said to have organized forces in the Caucasus to march to Anatolia and to seize power; further Enver Pasha had overthrown the government of Adjara [in Georgia] and taken the administration into his own hands; political friends of Enver Pasha are said to have organized a congress in Berlin and protested his acts, etc. Such lies that come from certain hostile sources, has been officially denied by the Government of Anatolia. Since such shameful rumors can do no harm to the patriotism of Enver Pasha and that of his political friends, we would not care to deny them; but some German and Turkish newspapers have also given such nonsensical news space in their columns, so we thought that we are obliged to declare such rumors for completely untrue.26

«Only after my arrival at Moscow I learned about the undertaking of Enver and Halil Pashas in Anatolia», Cemal wrote in a concerned letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and promised: «I am working with everything at hand to hinder this undertaking.»27 Enver’s transgressive schemes were threatening to diminish Cemal’s own deal with Mustafa Kemal. Cemal’s move to declare Enver as rogue had worked out. Mustafa Kemal’s answer was very positive. In a letter to Ali Fuat Pasha, Mustafa Kemal declared: «If Cemal Pasha continues to demonstrate the honest behavior he put forward so far, we will support him. Needless to say, he must cut his relationship with Enver Pasha etc. […] We will strengthen Cemal Pasha by gradually telling the people of his achievements in Afghanistan.»28

Cemal Pasha’s concerns about Enver Pasha’s undertakings took soon a turn from bad to worse when he received a telegraph from Enver. The latter was apparently in Bukhara now,

25 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 352.
27 Cemal Pasha, telegraph (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), November 12, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 291.
28 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), November 26, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 12, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 309.
asking whether Cemal would soon return to Afghanistan. If not, Enver himself would go to Kabul. Cemal wrote that Enver should immediately return to Moscow. Enver had already ruined the relations with Ankara, he should stay away from Kabul. Bengalese revolutionary M. N. Roy supposed also that Enver would rather do harm in Afghanistan: «At Kabul, he was sure to intrigue against Amanullah, should the latter not fall in line with his treacherous plan.»\(^{29}\) Enver wrote back to Cemal that he could not find proper transportation to Moscow. Cemal urged Chicherin to organize Enver’s return to Moscow as soon as possible. Enver was disappointed that he was ordered back to Moscow, while Kabul was left alone for the British.\(^{30}\)

One morning, however, Chicherin called and invited Cemal Pasha to his office. Chicherin told Cemal: «Enver Pasha and his friends went hunting and never returned.» Cemal assumed that something bad was going on. Perhaps they had an accident or something similar, he said to Chicherin and continued to ignore the elephant in the room. Both men had most certainly assumed that Enver had possibly run away to the Basmachi rebels. But could he be so reckless? Muhittin Bey who was at Tiflis heard the news of Enver’s disappearance in Bukhara and remembers that there were already rumors about him joining the Basmachi.\(^{31}\) It was simply in the air. Meanwhile Dr. Nazım received a secret message from Enver ordering—in a military tone—him and other Young Turks to leave Russian territory as soon as possible.\(^{32}\) The dice was cast. At the same time a secret courier brought a message from Enver to Halil Pasha in Batum. Halil had assumed that Enver was going to Bukhara only with the idea of joining the Basmachi in his mind, although Enver never revealed his intentions.\(^{33}\) In the secret message, Enver gave orders to Halil to immediately start inciting an insurgency in the Caucasus. As the Caucasus was the main supply route to Anatolia, Halil decided to disobey the order and sent a message to Enver with the appeal to return to his family in Berlin.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{30}\) Enver Pasha, letter (Bukhara) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), October 30–31, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Naciyem, Rubum, Efendim*, 338.


\(^{32}\) Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Constantinople), August 8, 1922, in Bardakçı, *İttihadçı’nın Sandığı*, 102–3.

\(^{33}\) Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene*, II, 756.

\(^{34}\) Halil Kut, *İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları*, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 269.
One or two days later in Moscow, Chicherin showed Cemal Pasha a telegraph from the Russian representative in Bukhara that said: «It is assumed that Enver Pasha and his friends raided an outpost station near the Amu Derya river, stole the weapons, and crossed the Afghan border.» These were still underplayed speculations, as everybody feared the consequences of such a reckless move. Cemal was now in a difficult position. He had to prove his loyalty by protesting Enver and, if possible, by convincing him to surrender. Cemal decided to send Bedri Bey and Dr. Nazım to Bukhara to make Enver leave Central Asia.35 «I write this letter to you as I am a little offended», wrote Cemal in his letter to Enver and continued:

In order to verbally inform you about my thoughts, fears, and worries I am sending Doctor Nazım together with Bedri to Bukhara. For God’s sake, quit the stubbornness and persistence. For once in forty years please listen to the words of this friend of yours who truly loves you with all his heart and soul. Come back together with Doctor Nazım as soon as possible. Please don’t send Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat to Iran. Make sure that they also return to Moscow. […] Be aware that if you insist on staying in Bukhara, the fruits of our labor from the last one and a half years will be completely ruined. If we ruin and destroy this last undertaking of ours by our own hands, then we will have no other chance than to say farewell to this life.36

Cemal Pasha’s desperation was understandable. He explained the situation to Mustafa Kemal in similar words: «If I cannot get Enver Pasha out of Bukhara for good, then I will end up ruining my achievements in the last one and a half years. I am working with everything in my force to succeed. I am about to send Halil, Küçük Talat and others associated with Enver’s undertaking away from the Caucasus.»37 In return, Mustafa Kemal noted to Ali Fuat Pasha that «Cemal’s attitude towards Enver and his friends was very appropriate».38

In his letter quoted above, Cemal Pasha further told Enver to return to Berlin as soon as possible so that they can convene a congress in Europe with those CUP members who has been released from Malta. Cemal offered Enver to reorganize the movement together with the European exiles.39 Whether this was a bait to get Enver out of Bukhara or whether Cemal

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36 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Bukhara), November 15, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 291–92.
37 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), November 16, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 293. This message is confirmed also in Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), November 16, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 12.
38 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), December 2, 1921, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 23.
39 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Bukhara), November 15, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hattıraları, 291–92.
himself still hoped of a revival of the CUP is open to question. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, for instance, got the impression that Cemal was not very eager to do away with his oath to the CUP. Together with the Soviet emissary Mikhail Frunze Cemal had sent another letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in which he apparently allowed himself to express his vision for Turkey from a Unionist perspective. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was annoyed by Cemal’s arrogance. «Apparently, he believes that the Turkish Grand National Assembly is led and administered by caprice and desire. I cannot let the people summon under the banner of Union and Progress.» The spirits of the CUP were still around.

Although Enver Pasha was far away in Turkestan, he was continuing to trouble Turkish politics. Turkish Intelligence reported that the royalist opposition in Constantinople would take advantage of the Enverist movement and will try to take over the imperial government under the Grand Viziership of either Ali Rıza Pasha or Mahmut Muhtar [Katırcıoğlu] Pasha. Later, these rumors, which also included a forged declaration by Enver Pasha which was in circulation, were dismissed by Turkish Intelligence as fabrications of Entente propaganda. On the same day, Turkish authorities ordered to be careful with intelligence about Enver Pasha. Enverists in Eastern Anatolia were still proposing in January 1922 to allow the «secretly founded Muslim Revolutionary Society in Anatolia» (Anadolu’da hafi olarak teşkil ettikleri İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri) by Enver, Küçük Talat, Halil, and Dr. Nazım to operate openly and formally with the permission of the Ankara Government. Intelligence reports were continuing to hear news about Enverist groups here and there. For instance, a branch of People’s Councils Party was founded in Constantinople in early 1922. There were inquiries about the whereabouts of Enver, as the rumors once again spotted him allegedly in different

40 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, telegraph (Ankara) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), December 24, 1921, in Hüseyin Cahit Yağcı and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds., İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektubları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektublar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 367.
41 Intelligence report, December 11, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 58, gömlek no. 71; Intelligence report, December 22, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 58, gömlek no. 74.
42 Decree on intelligence about Enver Pasha, December 22, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 58, gömlek no. 76.
43 Notables of Trabzon, letter to the Investigation Commission (Trabzon), January 16, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 97, gömlek no. 28.
44 Intelligence report, January 22, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 58, gömlek no. 60.
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places. Intelligence reports about «Unionists and Enver supporters» in Constantinople and in Anatolia were continuing to come to Ankara as late as 1922.

Meanwhile, the British Intelligence was still unaware of Enver’s current activities in Turkestan, as it was reported on the occasion of the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Ankara: «Little is heard of open Bolshevik support of Enver Pasha and his party.» Nonetheless, conspiracy thinking of the British officialdom was still finding its way out, as the British High Commissioner noted on the nature of the Enverist opposition in Anatolia that «it seems more than probable that the strings of the opposition are pulled by Turks and Salonica crypto-Jews in Berlin and Switzerland.»

Hence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was continuing with his own propaganda against Enver Pasha. Mustafa Kemal told Frunze that «this man is addicted to power; he is an adventurist. As he did with us, he is now deceiving you.» Frunze who apparently was not yet informed about Enver’s recent undertakings in Bukhara, was rather in an urge to explain himself after hearing Mustafa Kemal’s accusations about Enver’s intervention attempts from Batum. Frunze explained that it actually has been the Comintern, and not the Soviet Government, that had supported Enver so far and that Enver was always warned not to intervene into Turkish affairs. This was only the part of the story, of course. «However, now after learning about Enver’s attitude towards Turkey», Frunze said to Mustafa Kemal, «I assure and promise that after my return to Moscow I will work to liquidate all his privileges for good and stop all kinds of support for him.» At the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal openly distanced himself from Enver’s past and present policies. He told the Ankara deputies in December 1921:

45 Turkish Conculate in Novorossiysk, letter to Turkish Embassy in Moscow, March 11, 1922; Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to the Turkish Consulate in Novorossiysk, March 16, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 53.
46 Central Committee of the National Defence Society, intelligence report (Constantinople), December 5, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 42, gömlek no. 169. Regarding the activities of Unionists in Constantinople see also: General review of the British SIS information on Turkey during the period April–August 1922, August 23, 1922, FO 371/7916, 13321, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 4, 355.
48 Mikhail Frunze, interview (Ankara) with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, December 25, 1921, in Mehmet Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005), 32061.
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We don’t belong to those crook [sahtekar] people who follow fantasies and appear to be able to do things which we actually can’t. Gentlemen; we summoned the whole world’s animosity, grudge, and hatred onto this country and onto this nation, because of appearing to have done great and fantastic things before even doing them. We didn’t pursue pan-Islamism. Maybe, we said, we do, we will. The enemies than said, we will kill them to stop them. We didn’t pursue pan-Turanism. We said, «we do, we are, we will» and again they said, we will kill you. This is the whole deal. Gentlemen, the idea that set the whole world in fear and panic is nothing else. Instead of following ideas that we don’t and can’t reach and increasing the pressure of our enemies against us, let us rather return to our legitimate boundaries [haddi meşrua]. Let us know our limits.50

This quote is not only one of the first markers of the post-Ottoman nationalist isolationism of the Kemalist doctrine, but also underlines the elusive power the CUP leaders possessed in the eyes of their enemies by threatening with deceptive conspiracy theories of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism, which now was about to enter its final act.

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Cemal Pasha decided to leave for Europe with the promise of arranging funds and supplies for his modernization plans in Afghanistan. As he reported to the Afghan Emir about his upcoming trip to Europe, Cemal wanted to look for financiers to establish a state bank of Afghanistan, attract investors and engineers to build a railroad between Mazar-i Sharif and Kabul, and arrange a scientific research mission to map out natural resources.51 All evidence shows that Cemal, despite British pressures on Kabul and regardless of the rumors about Enver joining the anti-Soviet rebels, was more than serious with his modernization plans and ambitions for Afghanistan. Despite his Afghan diplomatic passport, Cemal requested two additional passports from the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, and his request was granted.52 Traveling was no more an adventure.

After arriving in Germany, Cemal Pasha stayed for 25 days with his family in Munich. In Berlin, Cemal had the chance to talk with the Afghan delegation of Mohammad Wali

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51 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), November 14, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 298.
52 For his Afghan diplomatic passport see: TTK, CP 01-01. For the Turkish passports see: Turkish Embassy in Moscow, letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara) and Nuri Bey (Berlin), November 11, 1921, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 17.
Darwazi. He also had meetings with the industrial mogul Hugo Stinnes and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Walther Rathenau. Both men, although representing politically opposing parties, told Cemal the very same thing. It was impossible for Germany to invest in Afghanistan under the burden of the reparations. Cemal contacted also August Meiñner «Pasha» from the Hedjazbahn project and invited him to Afghanistan to make inquiries about constructing a railway from Mazar-i Sharif to Kabul. But as it soon become clear, without German investors hiring German engineers was impossible. On March 13, 1922, German Ambassador in Moscow Dr. Kurt Weidenfeld informed the Auswärtiges Amt that the news broke public that Enver Pasha had joined the insurgents in Fergana. In trying to make-sense out of these recent developments, German officials speculated that Enver was possibly supported by the British.

While still in Berlin, Cemal Pasha was approached by Théodore Tissier, a French deputy and a member of Briand’s cabinet. Tissier interviewed Cemal on behalf of Prime Minister Briand. In the meantime, however, Briand resigned and former President Raymond Poincaré became the new Prime Minister. Cemal also talked with the Ambassador of the French Republic and the French Government decided to officially invite Cemal Pasha to Paris.

Cemal Pasha made first a visit to Switzerland where he had a meeting with the Undersecretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Cemal informed the Swiss officials about the upcoming visit of the Afghan Delegation and plead for the affiliation of Afghanistan to the League of Nations, Universal Postal Union, and International Red Crescent Organization. On his
way to Paris, he stayed for six days at Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın)’s place in Menton in the Provence. Cemal complained to Cahit that Enver’s cross-over to the Basmachi insurgents might scare off the Soviet Government and attract their animosity towards him as well.  

Arrived at Paris, Cemal Pasha met several times with Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré.  Having official papers certifying him as Ahmed Cemal Khan, the commander-in-chief (serdar) of the «Afghan Empire», was certainly opening diplomatic doors in the West.  In his meetings with French officials, Cemal tried to mobilize economic investments for Afghanistan as he did previously in Germany.  Cemal was playing on the card that French-British relations were still restrained. Poincaré requested Cemal to wait for the on-going Peace Conference to end. Thus, Cemal stayed for four weeks in France.  During his stay, Cemal had many meetings with several French dignitaries, including former Prime Minister Briand, Marshall Huber Lyautey, General Henri Gouraud, industrialist and former minister Louis Loucheur, the former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Maurice Bompard.  As Cemal told afterwards to a German official, however, he could not attract the interest of the French Government.  He only managed to secure a promise to send a scientific delegation to Afghanistan.

Mustafa Chokay, the leading Turkestani politician in exile had also heard that Cemal Pasha was in Paris. The two men arranged a meeting at Cemal’s hotel room in Paris. After exchanging words about the situation in Turkestan, they soon discovered their fundamental differences. When Chokay expressed his intention to start a nationalist movement to throw off the Russian dictatorship in Turkestan, Cemal protested and advised him and his friends to work

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62 See Cemal Pasha’s Afghan Passport and his French diplomatic visa issued on January 31, 1922, by the French Ambassy in Berlin, in TTK, CP 01-01.

63 See the protocoll of Cemal Pasha’s interview with Emmanuel de Peretti, March 6, 1922, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 292; 383–385.

64 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), July 1, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 30, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 292–93.

65 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), July 1, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 30, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 292–93.

together with the Soviet Government. Chokay believed that Cemal’s sole purpose of being in Afghanistan was rather to «punish» the British Empire by liberating India. Chokay would, however, prefer to liberate his own national country instead. Cemal countered that Chokay had long been away from Turkestan and did not know the current situation. Cemal believed that there was an «unrighteous animosity» towards the Soviet Government in Turkestan. The only way for Turkestan or Afghanistan to achieve national modernization was through collaboration with Soviet Russia. When Chokay asked about Enver Pasha who was already rumored to be leading the Basmachi rebels, Cemal said that he vehemently opposed Enver’s actions.

Later Cemal Pasha wrote that the Enver question had been troubling his mind all the time, while he was in Europe. While the news of Enver had joined the Basmachi were getting public, Cemal was concerned whether he would be allowed to return to Moscow. In letters sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Cemal was repeatedly denouncing Enver’s actions. Mustafa Kemal showed these letters to Soviet representative Abilov and said: «this is the evidence of what an irrelevant person and a despicable adventurer he [Enver] is.» Although Enver was to be condemned, Cemal could be rehabilitated and utilized, as Mustafa Kemal noted. «I ask you to explain your situation when you speak with him [Cemal]. It is possible to remove the old influences of Enver from his mind and to benefit from him in Eastern affairs.» Yet, Mustafa Kemal was presenting himself to the Russian Ambassador as a grand player in the Muslim world. «We [the Turks] have a great influence in the East. Therefore, we can work there more successful than others. Of course, this cannot be done with a pan-Islamist spirit, but rather within the framework of the right of the people to determine their true national destiny.»

Enver’s activities in Turkestan could affect Turkish foreign policy as well. If Enver would win over the Afghan Emir to his rebellion, as Ali Fuat Pasha reported, this would endanger also Turkish-Russian relations. Thus, the appointment of the new Turkish Ambassador to

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69 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), July 1, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 30, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 294.
70 Cemal Pasha’s wife Seniye Cemal, letter to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), April 22, 1922, in Bardakç, İttihatçı’nın Sandığı, 346.
Kabul became an urgency in the Ankara-Moscow axis. Cemal declared yet in another letter to Mustafa Kemal: «Two mistakes Enver did [...] in the last two years left no possibility for me to work together with him. From now on, there is no chance to see me in a union of labor or forces with him.» Cemal went on to ask Mustafa Kemal to release a declaration through the Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow regarding his activities in Afghanistan that proclaimed: «Cemal Pasha is entirely in union and alliance [müttehid ve mütefık] with Ankara.» Information which the Turkish Intelligence would collect in the following months would even more justify Mustafa Kemal’s fury against Enver. In some intercepted letters between Enver and Hacı Sami as well as told by informants, Enver himself was arrogantly pondering about his relationship with Mustafa Kemal:

The essence of my purpose is to unite the Muslims and connect them with each other. First, I wanted to come to Anatolia. But my presence there would result in many personal clashes. Therefore, for now I decided to work in Central Asia and achieved to constitute here a Muslim Government. I appreciate Mustafa Kemal Pasha and I am fond of him, because most of his decisions are identical with my own notions. He has been against me since the Balkan Wars. I can’t understand his opposition. While I was the commander-in-chief, I had the power to do everything, but I left him act freely. Why is he afraid of me? All the administrative organizations and developments are the sow of the seeds we casted. God willing, he will understand the truth once the enemy left the country.

In the meantime, the news of Enver’s military success as the leader of the Basmachi rebels came as a bombshell in Moscow. The Soviet regime had to recapitulate its investments in Enver in the last two years. The Soviet Intelligence was now discovering—perhaps in a bitter-sweet relief—that Enver’s influence in Turkey did not go far beyond «exaggerated rumors». A Soviet report from Ankara in May 1922 noted:

Enverism is not strong in Central Anatolia. In some places, there are some dispersed societies without any connection among each other. It is said that there are some remnants among the officers. But I think that these are basically exaggerated rumors. As of now, they do not have a serious importance in Anatolia. Unionism lives on in secret. Nevertheless, it has not yet taken the form of actual propaganda, agitation, or action.

Even if Enver did not pose a direct threat to Ankara any longer, it was still necessary to take action against Enver’s reputation in the Muslim world. But for fears of stirring further anti-

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72 Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Eastern Front Command (Erzurum), March 29, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 10.
73 Cemal Pasha, letter (Munich) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), April 12, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 26.
74 Intelligence report, October 26, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 58, gömlek no. 69.
75 Semyon Ivanovich Aralov, letter (Ankara) to Karahan (Moscow), May 6, 1922, in Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetlerle Görüştüleri, 370.
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Russian feelings, the Soviet Government could not publicly endorse Enver Pasha. Therefore, Karahan requested from the Soviet Ambassador Aralov in Ankara to let the Ankara Government release an official rejection of Enver Pasha’s policies in Turkestan:

Since Muslim masses generally believe that Enver’s venture in Bukhara is supported by the Ankara Government and by Mustafa Kemal and that Enver Pasha is the executor of Ankara’s orders, we request that Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara Government takes a clear stance against Enver Pasha’s venture in Bukhara at the parliament or in the press by making an informative statement or by other means.76

“I stand against Enver; I regard him as an adventurist and I’ve always talked about this with you”, Mustafa Kemal Pasha answered to Soviet Ambassador Aralov. “When Frunze and Mikhailov proposed me to let Enver enter Anatolia and make peace and cooperate with him, I told them clearly that I will not make peace. And I recommended them to send him away and be cautious with him.” Mustafa Kemal was righteous as he was now proven right. His fears were now justified by Enver’s misdeeds and anybody who had trusted Enver was nothing but a fool. «Yet», he said with confidence to Ambassador Aralov, «Soviet Russia realized the truthfulness of my words and was forced to invest more efforts against his adventurism.»77

Later, Mustafa Kemal read Aralov a letter from Cemal Pasha from Dresden, dated April 12, 1922. In the letter Cemal once again condemned Enver’s turn against the Bolsheviks as adventurism. Cemal advised to send a courier to Emir Amanullah to warn him about Enver’s intrigues as soon as possible. Mustafa Kemal suggested that Cemal should be sent to the Afghan Emir to settle the Enver situation.78 In order to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviets, Mustafa Kemal offered to send Ali Galip (Pasiner) Pasha, the former Governor of Konya, as an Ambassador to Bukhara in order to counter Enver’s influence in the region.79 The Soviets, however, suspicious of further Turkish elements in Turkestan did not issue the visa for Galip Pasha’s diplomatic mission.80

76 Karahan, letter (Moscow) to Semyon Ivanovich Aralov (Ankara), May 11, 1922, in Stefanos Yerasimos, Kurtuluş Savası’nda Türk-Soyet İlişkileri (1917–1923), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplar, 2000), 456.
77 Semyon Ivanovich Aralov, letter (Ankara) to Karahan (Moscow), June 1, 1922, in Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri, 381–82.
78 Semyon Ivanovich Aralov, letter (Ankara) to Karahan (Moscow), June 1, 1922, in Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri, 383.
79 Semyon Ivanovich Aralov, letter (Ankara) to Karahan (Moscow), June 1, 1922, in Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri, 380–84.
80 A. Ahat Andican, Turkestan Struggle Abroad: From Jadidism to Independence (Haarlem: SOTA Publ., 2007), 85.
When Cemal Pasha arrived at Moscow, he saw Ali Fuat Pasha at the train station, who was leaving Russia. The buildings of the Turkish military attaché were raided by Cheka officials on April 21, 1922, due to an espionage accusation. As a protest, Ali Fuat Pasha had decided to leave the country.\(^1\) The British Intelligence supposed that the Cheka raided the attaché because they believed that Enver Pasha had made an agreement with the Ankara Government and his anti-Soviet campaign was coordinated by Ankara.\(^2\) Before Ali Fuat departed, he suggested Cemal to return to Europe as soon as possible.\(^3\) Trouble was in the air.

Before Cemal Pasha had returned to Moscow, Halil Pasha was brought in from Batum to be interviewed. While he was trying to escape with his wife to Anatolia, Halil was arrested by the Georgian Cheka, but he was released soon afterwards. His intention was to hand in the correspondence with Enver Pasha to Kazım Karabekir Pasha as a voucher of his loyalty to Ankara. Karabekir believed that Halil could be of use in order to ensure the isolation of Enver Pasha.\(^4\) Halil sent away his family back to Anatolia, as he feared further measures by the Cheka, and went to Moscow. In a conversation with Chicherin and Karahan, Halil proposed to travel to Bukhara and convince Enver to retreat to Afghanistan or Iran, but his proposal was declined by the Politburo.\(^5\) Dr. Nazım was also not allowed to meet with Enver, as Cemal had previously proposed.

«Since you have arrived only recently from Europe, maybe you aren’t sufficiently informed about Enver Pasha’s latest adventures», said Karahan after receiving Cemal Pasha in Moscow. «Let me briefly instruct you», he said and continued: «After escaping from Bukhara in a strange way, as you know, Enver Pasha joined the insurgents in Eastern Bukhara and declared war against us.»\(^6\) As Cemal feared, Karahan was very angered and this would have serious consequences. «I arrived in Moscow», wrote Cemal to a German friend. «The situation has

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\(^{1}\) Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 357.
\(^{3}\) Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 357.
\(^{4}\) Ali Fuat Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Sarıkamış), April 6, 1922; Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Sarıkamış) to Ali Fuat Pasha (Moscow), April 22, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 326, gömlek no. 9.
\(^{5}\) Kut, *İttihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e Bitmeyen Savaş*, 271–72. This is also confirmed in Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), April 18, 1922, TTK, EP 01-85, in Ari İnan, ed., *Enver Paşa'nın Özel Mektupları* ( Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1997), 56.
\(^{6}\) Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), July 1, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 30, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, *İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları*, 295.
entirely changed. The adventure of Enver Pasha has upset all the old projects."⁸⁷ Cemal’s aid-de-camp İsmet (Karadoğan) was more open in his letter to the same German friend:

We are here for one week and found out that almost a radical change had occurred in official circles due to Enver’s adventure who is at the head of the bands in the province of Bukhara and declared war against the Russians. By his actions he ruined our achievements for the last two years as well as damaged our Muslim policy in Central Asia. His stupidity played into the hands of England and put us all in the greatest embarrassment. […] That, my dear friend, is the pickle in which Enver and his criminal band have put us, which will have no other result than the bloodshed of hundreds of thousands of Muslim victims, because the Russians decided to crush the revolt of Bukhara with armed forces.⁸⁸

The Soviet Government was also accusing the Afghan Government for supporting Enver Pasha and, thus, violating the Afghan-Soviet Treaty.⁸⁹ The Afghan Government was officially denying any support to Enver, but, as one Afghan diplomat in Berlin explained in a confidential conversation to a German friend, there was a strong social movement in Afghanistan and Turkestan that was in favor of Enver. Kabul was once again «the center of intrigues», as the German informant reported to the Auswärtiges Amt. The Afghan diplomat in Berlin claimed that «rumors about worsening of their relation to the Soviets were originating from England.»⁹⁰ Karahan was also concerned about the possible schemes by the British which will result from Enver’s actions in Turkestan:

As of now, the influence of the English has increased amazingly in Afghanistan. We don’t regard it as possible that Enver Pasha is working on behalf of the English. Nevertheless, thanks to the well-known devilry of the English we will find and have found ways to benefit as much as possible from this undertaking.⁹¹

The fugitive CUP leaders in Russia were subject to harsh treatment and interrogations in this time. The Cheka interrogated Cemal, Halil, Nazım and others for three to five hours and accused them of complicity with Enver Pasha’s actions in Eastern Bukhara. They all denied any knowledge of or links to Enver after he left for Turkestan. The Cheka officials were unimpressed.⁹² Halil and Dr. Nazım were forced to leave Russian territory as soon as possible

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⁸⁷ Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), May 14, 1922, PA-AA, R 78490.
⁸⁸ İsmet Bey, letter (Moscow) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), May 14, 1922, PA-AA, R 78490.
⁸⁹ Ali Fuat Pasha, report (Moscow) on Soviet reactions to Enver Pasha’s undertakings in Turkestan, March 28, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 25, enclosed also in Yusuf Kemal, letter to the General Staff (Ankara), April 15, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 27.
⁹¹ Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), July 1, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 30, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 295.
as they were declared *persona non grata*. Cemal was similarly in the hot seat, but he could maneuver himself more effectively out of the trouble by publicly disclaiming and condemning Enver. He had openly told everything he knew to the Cheka and agreed repeat it publicly to clear his name. For this purpose, Cemal gave an interview to *Izvestia*. Cemal’s interview was not different than what he was saying in private letters, thus he did not shy away from forwarding the statement also to Mustafa Kemal. «This political enterprise of Enver Pasha is not in the name of any Turkish or Muslim political group», Cemal declared to *Izvestia*. «I assure you that this move of Enver Pasha is only associated with his person.» After this article was published it was suggested that Cemal could move more freely in Soviet Russia. But he was only tolerated, and no more actively supported—or in Karahan’s words:

Cemal Pasha!... You may stay here, you may go to Afghanistan, you may return to Germany… Proceed as you wish!... But from now on don’t expect any support from us. If you go to Afghanistan, we will not deal with Afghanistan anymore, as long as our relations are as good as they were before you left there.

Cemal Pasha answered to Karahan that he would go to Afghanistan, but he would first travel to the Turkish border to have a direct conversation via telegraph with Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The Soviet Government accepted this and allowed Cemal to travel to Tiflis. In Tiflis, Cemal’s aid-de-camp İsmet was given secret reports about the situation in Central Asia and on Russian-Afghan relation as well as on Enver Pasha’s movements to be delivered to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Ankara. Perhaps, Cemal could return to Turkey—so he hoped.

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95 *Izvestia*, June 28, 1922. A Turkish translation of this interview is located at ATASE, given in its full-length in: Aydin Idil, *Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı: Basmacı Hareketinin Önderi Seyyid Enver Emir-i Leşker-i İslam* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2013), 397–400. This article seemed to have left mark on Russian Muslim activists of the time such Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan and Mehmed Emin Resülzade. Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkistan ve Yakın Mazisi* (Cairo: El Arabiye & El Itimad, 1940), 456; Mehmet Emin Resulzade, *Bir Türk Milliyetçisinin Stalin’le İhtilal Hatıraları*, ed. Sebahattin Şimşir (İstanbul: Turan Yayıncılık, 1997), 99.
96 Otto Günther von Wesendonk, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), July 6, 1922, PA-AA, R 77925.
97 Karadoğan, “Cemal Paşa’yı Ruslar Öldürmüştü,” 37–38. The same quote is given also in İsmet Bey (Moscow), letter to Dr. Bedri Bey (Kabul), n.d. [autumn 1922], in Bardakçısı, *İttihadçı’nın Sandığı*, 349.
As Enver Pasha decided to try his chance in Turkestan, the Soviet Government was initially supportive of such initiative—as it seems, it was not a \textit{fait accompli} of Enver to travel to Bukhara. «Let the embarrassing guest go to remote Central Asia, as he desired so very eagerly», wrote M. N. Roy in his memoir while trying make sense of the Soviet decision.\textsuperscript{99} One idea was that Enver might serve Soviet interests by negotiating with the Young Bukharan opposition and the Basmachi insurgents on behalf of the Soviet Government.\textsuperscript{100} Enver travelled to Baku on his way to Bukhara, according to Muhittin (Birgen), who met Enver at the Turkish Embassy in Baku, remembers that Enver was traveling under «strict incognito» and made rather a confused and tired impression.\textsuperscript{101} From Baku Enver took the ferry across the Caspian to Krasnovodsk in order to reach his long desired destination, Turkestan.\textsuperscript{102}

Unlike some later imaginations and rumors, Enver Pasha’s arrival at Bukhara was not the occasion of celebrations by the local people with «Long Live Turan!» shouts.\textsuperscript{103} Enver arrived late at night on October 11, 1921, with the secret password to enter the gates of the city walls.\textsuperscript{104} After arriving in Bukhara, Enver figured out that he had missed Cemal Pasha and Dr. Nazım. Initially, Enver intended to stay in Central Asia for two weeks and then return to Berlin.\textsuperscript{105} Rumors and disinformation along the lines that Cemal was sent to Moscow by force irritated Enver and made him more suspicious of the Soviet interests in Turkestan. Enver got the impression that «the Russians prevented» Cemal’s meeting with Dr. Nazım at Tashkent and that they were «sent on to Moscow immediately».\textsuperscript{106}

After his arrival, Enver Pasha was invited to several government officials and was informed about the situation in Bukhara. The Bukhara Emirate was captured by the Red Army in the

\textsuperscript{100} Chicherin, letter to Stalin, December 11, 1921, cited in Bülent Gökay, \textit{A Clash of Emperors: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923} (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 120.
\textsuperscript{101} Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene}, II, 746.
\textsuperscript{102} Birgen, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene}, II, 750.
\textsuperscript{103} These depictions have been criticized in Bardakçı, \textit{Enver}, 312–13.
\textsuperscript{104} Enver Pascha, letter (Bukhara) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), October 11, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim}, 316.
\textsuperscript{105} Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 13, 1921, in Bardakçı, \textit{Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim}, 229–30.
The Young Turk Aftermath

summer of 1920 by a coalition of the Red Army under the command of Mikhail Frunze in conjunction with the local Young Bukharans (Yosh Bokhoroliklar). The Young Bukharans were part of the Jadidist (jadidci) movement, supporters of the «new ways» in the Muslim reform in Russia. The Jadidist movement was revolutionized during the course of the Russian Revolution. While some supported the Soviets others joined insurgents. As a political movement the Young Bukharans, like Young Khivans and others, were modelled after the Young Turks. After his defeat, the Emir of Bukhara Said Alim Khan, and according to legends «his female and boy harem», had escaped first to Dushanbe and then to Kabul. The local tradition of brigands and high-way raiders, called basmach, was previously politicized by the Young Bukharans in opposition to the Amir. After the Soviet invasion, the Basmachis become more and more dominated by the Qadimists (qadimci), the proponents of the «old ways», hence fundamentalists and royalists. A British report on the situation of the Basmachi explained that

It is necessary to distinguish between two classes of Basmachis in Fergana. The genuine political Basmachis, the original Soviet rebels against Soviet rule, are represented by Sher Mohammed […]. He is at present practically powerless, owing to lack of ammunition, but he and his men do little looting and are in fact popular among the inhabitants, who feed them and otherwise keep them supplied. On the other hand, there are the purely bandit Basmachis, under such leaders as Ahmad Pahlawan […], who terrorise the countryside. These men originally went out, like others, from hatred of the Bolsheviks, but shortage of food and other necessities was too much for them and the patriot became merged in the brigand. […] The latter Basmachis are hated by the people of the towns and by the militia.

The term Basmachi literally means «raiders» and it was primarily a derogative term given by outsiders. The Soviet Government played an important role in manifesting the term Basmachi (Basmachestvo) as the official description of the insurgents in order to publicly frame them as highway brigands and tribal bands. The tribal and partisan warlords were called qurbashi (leader of a camp). Basmachi warlords should also not be exoticized and Orientalized, for there was in most former regions of Tsarist Russia a rise of «warlordism» that went beyond the neat Red vs. White struggles of the Russian Revolution. Nonetheless, the term Basmachi has gained very soon currency internationally that transcended the initial derogative connotations so that even Enver used to term in his correspondence.

Besides the Soviet officials, Enver Pasha had several secret meetings with the political oppositionals in Bukhara. One of them was the leader of Turkestan Union Ahmed Zeki Velidi (Togan). Zeki Velidi was rather critical about the success chances of Enver’s secret plans to join the Basmachi. Zeki Velidi supported the idea that Enver should rather struggle against Soviet Russia in Turkestan, but he was critical about Enver collaborating with the Basmachi brigands against the Red Army. «The Soviets can easily deceive our friends», as Zeki Velidi explained. «They will announce your movement as Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist. Those are not popular here. […] Russians are showing Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism as abhorrent so much that those who have contacts with the Russians find it necessary to stay away from those conceptions.» Furthermore, in the eyes of Zeki Velidi, a collaboration with the exiled Emir was undesirable. «The thorny side of our problems involves the Emir of Bukhara.» Ahmet Zeki explained to Enver: «He left; we do not want him back, he cannot return. He is

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117 Togan, Memoirs, 305.
an enemy of modernity and you. Here, he has partisans who are loyal to him. They will be opposing you.\textsuperscript{118} Instead, Enver should go over to Afghanistan, as Zeki Velidi suggested, and coordinate regional and international support from abroad. Albeit his arguments, Zeki Velidi had the impression that Enver was rather under the influence of his fellow traveler Hacı Sami.

Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı like his even more notorious older brother Eşref (Sencer) Kuşçubaşı was a paramilitary spy for the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.\textsuperscript{119} He had spent the war years first in captivity in British India and then he was an undercover in Chinese and Russian Turkestan. He had allegedly been active during the 1916 rebellion against the Tsarist regime in the Kyrgyzstan.\textsuperscript{120} «If a person like me whose name is never even heard of can cause a revolt in Kyrgyzstan with only one signal», said Hacı Sami in Batum, «you, Enver Pasha, who has been the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman Empire, whose fame is spread around the whole Muslim world, and who is the son-in-law of the Caliph, could by God raise hell in whole Turkestan within a day». Hacı Sami had been pushy to make Enver go to Turkestan and start an insurgency: «What are you waiting for Pasha? Will this chance ever come again?».\textsuperscript{121} Hacı Sami was surely known to be an exaggerator and a professional adventurer so that his words were not always taken at face value. Enver himself was not uncritical about Hacı Sami’s promises: «If we are to listen Sami, he is founding sultanates in India and in Central Asia, and all our friends are in favor of him. Whatever! Let’s hope that Allah grants Islamdom and the nation the most beneficial path somehow.»\textsuperscript{122} Back in Batum, Halil Pasha had already warned Enver about Hacı Sami’s urge for reckless adventures. While Halil was in Turkestan a year ago in company of Hacı Sami, the latter had also tried to incite Halil to join the rebels. «Listen Enver», said Halil, «I beg you to resist being carried away by these incitements.» «Uncle, am I a child?», said Enver and assured Halil that this will never happen.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{118} Togan, Memoirs, 304.
\textsuperscript{119} For the most recent publication on Eşref Kuşçubaşı see: Benjamin C. Fortna, The Circassian: A Life of Eşref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special Agent (London: Hurst, 2016).
\textsuperscript{120} For the uprising in Central Asia in 1916 see: Jörn Happel, Nomadische Lebenswelten und zarische Politik: Der Aufstand in Zentralasien 1916 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010).
\textsuperscript{121} Feridun Kandemir, Atatürk’e İzmir Suikastından Ayırı 11 Suikast (İstanbul: Ekiciğil, 1955), 62, quoted in Bardakçı, Enver, 609, note 285.
\textsuperscript{122} Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 28, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 305.
\textsuperscript{123} Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumbhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 267.
Now in Bukhara during the secret meetings with Zeki Velidi, Hacı Sami was telling the exact same stories. «I am a plain Turk, yet I was able to rouse entire Kirgizstan. Your fame and influence can aid us to cause a tumult Turkistan-wide.» This time, however, their conversation partner was no one less than Zeki Velidi a renowned expert of Turkestani history and politics. Zeki Velidi immediately protested to Hacı Sami’s version of the events. The 1916 uprising was a generic social movement without propaganda, as Zeki Velidi explained, that started as a popular reaction to the Tsar’s conscription order and that Hacı Sami was known to have joined the revolt only «at the very end». Nevertheless, Zeki Velidi’s advice to Enver to go to Afghanistan and work from there was dismissed, as Enver had already made up his own mind.

Enver Pasha was himself a dreamer enough to tilt against the wind. Long before coming to Bukhara, Enver knew that he himself was in fact very popular in Turkestan. Enver had already got a foretaste of his fame among the Turkic tribes while he was at the Baku Congress one year ago. He was celebrated like a savior. There were also other relatively more reasonable voices other than Hacı Sami who had seen Turkestan and also reported to Enver that his reputation in Turkestan was a matter of political sacrality. Azmi Bey was one of them. He had previously reported that a kind of mahdi belief about Enver Pasha existed among local Muslims in Central Asia. Azmi wrote in late March 1921 that people believed that Enver Pasha «would come and save them one day». «I know very well that it is said every single day either you had arrived or you were coming.» Azmi also noted on the political potentials of this belief. «Dear Pasha, the Muslims of this region consider after Allah and the Prophet, you as the representative of the Caliph as a complete and perfect being. And there is no doubt that after a small signal, millions of Turks and Muslims will summon around you.» Partially under the influence of such beliefs, Enver wrote to his wife, after having read the Turkestan travelogue of Sven Hedin in Moscow, that: «I wonder if I can establish a Turkic government in Central Asia consisting of forty million people?»

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125 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57.
126 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 10, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Naciyem, Rahum, Efendim*, 225. See also: Bardakçi, *Enver*, 203.
Enver Pasha’s final quest in Turkestan is commonly labelled under the slogan of pan-Turkism without any critical assessment. It is said that Enver wanted to found a Turkic empire in Central Asia. Behind this assessment, there is the burden of Orientalist and imperialist prejudices of the time depicting Enver as the «Napoleon of Asia». This assumption has survived as a common wisdom until today in academic and popular history-writing. As much as Enver cherished and romanticized ideas about uniting the Turkic people, Enver was even more an adherent of uniting the Muslims.¹²⁷ In Enver’s mind the Basmachi struggle in Bukhara was part of a grand movement of Muslim masses rising against Western (and now Soviet) imperialism. Whether in Tripoli or Turkestan, Enver—in his self-perception—was struggling for the very same cause.

While in Bukhara, Enver Pasha also devoted many ideas to the modernization of the region—not very different from Cemal Pasha, although Enver lacked the latter’s governmental authority.¹²⁸ But he was also concerned about the political situation in the region. Only recently some members of the Young Khiva Party were arrested.¹²⁹ Enver ambitiously wrote a letter to the People’s Commissariat in Moscow requesting the withdrawal of the Red Army from the region in return for a «Independent Bukhara» which would facilitate the «liberation of Muslim Asia from the British imperialism […] under the revolutionary guidance of Soviet Russia».¹³⁰ He had also established contact with Ali Reza, the commander of the militia in Bukhara.¹³¹ Meanwhile, Enver was slowly but surely cutting his ties to Soviet Russia. On October 29, he ordered his brother not to send anybody to Russia anymore.¹³² But things turned serious only when Enver asked the Russian Consul Jurinev about Cemal’s return. The answer was shocking, as the Consul said, «let alone allowing Cemal to travel, we also know

¹²⁷ Recently, Murat Bardakçılı made it one of the major arguments of his Enver Pasha biography that it was rather Islam, not Turan, what Enver was striving for so passionately. Bardakçılı, Enver, 20, 158–159, 310–312, passim.
¹²⁸ Bardakçılı, Enver, 322.
¹³⁰ Mustafa Chokay, “Merhum Enver Paşa Hakında Hatıra Parçaları,” Yaş Turkistan, no. 33 (1933), 5–12, quoted in Bardakçılı, Enver, 323.
what business you have been pursuing here.» Enver was naturally threatened by these remarks. He feared that both Cemal and he was in danger. Enver was not mincing the matters either. In a letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, a Turkburo representative reported that

Enver threatens us with causing great troubles. He wants that we retrieve from Central Asia and that the Turkestanis and Bukharis determine their own fate. This really surprised me. We could not convince this Turkish lion to work according to our goals. Perhaps this revolutionary who could took refuge in Bukhara due to our carelessness, cherish ever more feelings of revenge and he is looking for a chance to get revenge.

Now as Turkey was no more an option after the victory of Mustafa Kemal, Enver feared that he would never be able to come back to Turkestan again if he returned to Europe. He simply wanted to go to the border and inspect the situation of the rebels. From now on, as Enver instructed his brother, correspondence with him was to be conducted via the Afghan Embassies in Moscow and Bukhara. Russians were not to be trusted anymore. Enver had already made his decision. On November 7, 1921, he wrote to his wife: «By God, I will leave Bukhara tomorrow. Let’s see what God will reveal at this new attempt.»

Enver Pasha in company of Hacı Sami, Yaver Muhittin, deputy police director of Bukhara Khalil, Nafi from Manastır (Bitola), Cavalry Captain Hasan, and some others, in total 25 person, told the Soviet authorities that they were going on a hunting expedition and left Bukhara with their horses and their field equipment. Enver informed the revolutionary committees in Bukhara and Khive with a secret message of the new revolutionary movement he was directing. The immediate Soviet response was relatively small. «Though not ignorant of the conspiracy», as M. N. Roy observed, «the Russians did not want to precipitate the situation. […] Enver Pasha was still only conspiring, building castles in the air.»

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135 Enver Pasha, letter (Bukhara) to Kamil Bey (Berlin). October 16, 1921, TTK, EP 01-16, in İnan, *Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları*, 111.
136 Enver Pasha, letter (Bukhara) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), November 7, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim*, 345.
138 Enver Pasha, letter (Karakolpazarı) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), November 9, 1921, in Bardakçı, *Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim*, 347–48.
day, October 28, Enver Pasha and I left Bukhara», wrote Hacı Sami, «and went over to Eastern Bukhara in order to incite the whole Muslims of Turkestan to an insurgency against the Russian Government.»

The Soviet version of the same story was sharply contrasting: «That adventurist, not staying idle for a moment, while the better sons of Turkey were fighting for the freedom of their motherland, arrived in Bukhara as a visitor and decided to take advantage of the difficult situation and laid his blood-stained hands on the Bukharan Revolution.»

Enver Pasha went on his way from village to village and recruited fighters who were all required to give an oath. Enver, Hacı Sami, their aid-de-camps as well as a group of former Ottoman POWs soon summoned around 90 men. The strongest of all the Basmachi leaders in the region was the leader of the Lakay tribe, İbrahim Lakay, who was leading the brigands on behalf of the Emir of Bukhara. He was known to be a difficult and ignorant man and the local notables had warned Enver about him. But as they were crossing through Lakay territory, Enver felt obliged to approach the bandit leader. After Enver and his men found shelter at the Karamuntu winter quarters, invitations were sent to İbrahim Lakay to have an audience with Enver Pasha.

Meanwhile, Enver wanted to get in touch with the former President of the Bukhara Republic Osman Khoja (Kocaoğlu) at Dushanbe. After Osman Khoja resigned from the Bukhara Soviet Government, he had joined the Basmachi rebellion. While Osman Khoja has opted for the anti-Soviet insurgents, many other Jadidist would remain loyal with the Soviets to

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140 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter addressed to İli Hacı, June 13, 1922, TTK, EP 02-68.
143 Enver Pasha, letter (Kurgantübe) to İbrahim Lakay, November 24, 1921, in Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaşlar ve Enver Paşa, II, 62.
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radically reform their homeland from its backwardness. Enver’s arrival had upset these relations.\(^{146}\) Jadidists and Young Bukharans were now fighting on both sides of the conflict.\(^{147}\)

Hence, Hacı Sami and some of the men parted from Enver headed to Dushanbe to meet with Osman Khoja.

When İbrahim Lakay arrived on November 30 to Karamuntu, Enver Pasha said: «İbrahim Bek, I will give you my soldiers in your war against the Russians and those Jadidists who cooperate with the Russians.» İbrahim Lakay had only heard of the fame of Enver Pasha through the news and stories of those elders from Bukhara and Samarkand who had went to the \(hajj\) to Mecca via Constantinople. İbrahim Lakay could not believe that the man he was talking to was this legendary general and the son-in-law of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. With his Prussian mustache, English-style tight riding trousers, and Western hunting jacket, Enver did not matched the image of an Ottoman warrior in Lakay’s imagination. «I thought he was one of the Jadidists from Bukhara», said İbrahim Lakay during his interrogation to the Cheka in 1931.\(^{148}\) Thus, until his real purpose and identity was approved, Enver and his men were disarmed and taken into custody by İbrahim Lakay at Koktash.\(^{149}\) Lakays were not revolutionary Basmachis and preferred to avoid military clashes and lived off brigandage and racketeering.

Meanwhile, Hacı Sami together with Osman Khoja and Ali Reza’s militia attempted a coup d’état in Dushanbe.\(^{150}\) Russians were, however, supported by the brigands of the Lakay tribe. After three days of fighting, the insurgents had to retrieve with Hacı Sami and Osman Khoja, fleeing to Afghanistan. After these fights, some of Enver Pasha’s men, Nafi Bey, Khalil, Firuk, Osman Bey, and Mustafa Shaquli, run into Lakay brigands who—as it was later pardoned—«mistakenly» (\(bir\) \(yalışlık\) \(neticesi\) \(olarak\)) robbed them of all their property, including their clothes down to underpants.\(^{151}\) Lakays were practically brigands in the rural areas and bigot


\(^{148}\) İrfan Ülkü, \textit{KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa} (İstanbul: Kamer Yayımları, 1996), 32.

\(^{149}\) Nabican Bakiyev, \textit{Enver Paşa’nın Vatıyeti}, ed. Çağatay Koçar (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006), 141.

\(^{150}\) Fraser, “Enver Pasha’s Bid for Turkestan, 1920–1922,” 204.

\(^{151}\) Nafi Bey, letter to former Turkish Cavalry Lieutenant Cavid Bey, December 1, 1921, TTK, EP 03-44. See also: Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), December 27, 1921, in Bardakçıl, \textit{Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim}, 395.
hooligans when they came across villages. Not without a reason, the civil-war plagued setting of Central Asia was later cinematographically imagined as Soviet Russia’s «Wild East».\textsuperscript{152}

Enver Pasha stayed in captivity under the Lakays for more than a month, where he was forced to accompany İbrahim Lakay from one village to another as show quest.\textsuperscript{153} Out of fear of being labelled as a Jadidist by the bigot men of Lakay and to avoid further propaganda, Enver secretly burned the photographs of his wife and children—the ban on images was a disappointing reality of Turkestan for Enver.\textsuperscript{154} Enver and his men received «almost a hostage-like treatment» (adeta esir muamelesi) at the hands of the Lakays. Enver wrote to the Afghan Emir a letter with the plea to write a decree to the Lakays to release Enver Pasha.\textsuperscript{155} Soon emissaries of the Emir of Afghanistan and the Emir of Bukhara arrived at the Lakay camp with reference letters for Enver. The Afghan emissary brought a letter by the Afghan Emir and another letter by the Afghan Minister of War Mahmud Sami, both confirming Enver’s identity and promising help for the anti-Soviet struggle. Only afterwards İbrahim Lakay ordered the release of the prisoners. When the Afghan emissary invited Enver on behalf of the Afghan Emir to Kabul, Enver’s answer was: «I will go nowhere; I have no business in Kabul! [...] I came here to fight the Russians.»\textsuperscript{156} Impressed by this reaction, İbrahim Lakay and his men sworn an oath to Enver Pasha in his struggle to «liberate the Muslim world from enemy» (alem-i İslam’ın düşmandan kurtulmasına).\textsuperscript{157} Enver understood early on that «it is pretty difficult to deal with the Lakays.»\textsuperscript{158} Regarding the difficult start with the Lakays, Enver told the Emir of Bukhara that «even though our hearts were broken, we are determined to work on behalf of the redemption of Islam and to forgive them.»\textsuperscript{159} However, İbrahim Lakay would continue to cause problems for Enver.

\textsuperscript{152} Such is also the setting of many movies in the Soviet film genre of «Easterns», for instance, White Sun of the Desert (Beloye solntse pustyni), 1970.
\textsuperscript{153} Bardakç, Enver, 332–33.
\textsuperscript{154} Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), December 1, 1921, in Bardakç, Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 364.
\textsuperscript{155} Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa, 34.
\textsuperscript{156} See: Field journal entry (Koktash), December 23, 1921, TTK, EP 04-02. See also: Said Alim Khan, La voix de la Boukharie opprimée (Paris: Maisonneuve frères, 1929), 36–37.
\textsuperscript{157} Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), December 23, 1919, TTK, EP 04-02.
\textsuperscript{158} Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa, 34.
\textsuperscript{159} See: Field journal entry (Koktash), December 23, 1921, TTK, EP 04-02. See also: Said Alim Khan, La voix de la Boukharie opprimée (Paris: Maisonneuve frères, 1929), 36–37.
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In his letters to Afghan Emir, Enver Pasha warned that «the supports of the Bukhara Emir here have started rumors that your Majesty and his Government as well as myself were «Jadidists» and claim that I allegedly desire to become the Sultan of Bukhara.» Thus, Enver had to get rid of the rumors and ensure the alliance of the Emir of Bukhara to certify his leadership in the eyes of the local warlords. In a following letter on the same day, Enver explained to the Afghan Emir the geopolitical situation as follows: «Emir of Bukhara is already at war with the Bolsheviks. It is important that he shall neither come to terms with the Bolsheviks nor becomes an instrument of the English.»

Enver Pasha sent a letter written in a Turkic dialect to the Turcoman tribal leaders signed with the title «Son-in-Law of the Caliph of the Muslims» (Halife-yi Müslimin Damadi): «For this, it is required that you, our brothers […], give all the power in your hands for the defense of Islam and Islamic law in the name of the of the general salvation of Islam.» Soon after Enver’s release, a tribal council was summoned with the attendance of leading tribal leaders, warlords, and local notables. At this meeting Enver proclaimed:

Muslims shall never be deceived by Bolsheviks and never cooperate with them again. Otherwise, Turkestan will remain under Russia’s enslavement. […] It is ordered that all believers and Muslims should unite under one body and fight against the infidel. […] I do not desire to take the throne of Sacred Bukhara. It is enough to throw out the Russians from this land. I will herewith invite the Emir of Bukhara Alim Khan from Kabul to take back his throne. Great Turkestan has become a prey of the Russians for 50 years. It is enough now!163

Enver Pasha was appointed as the commander of the qurbashis. In demonstrating their obedience to their new leader, some Basmachis would even go far as to appoint Enver as the new Emir of Bukhara. Yet, Enver would politely decline such overtures, since he would rather prefer to remain as the «servant of Islam». Notwithstanding, Enver would himself adopt many honorific titles, both secular and sacred, including sayyid, the title reserved only to

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160 Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), December 23, 1919, TTK, EP 04-02.
161 Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), December 23, 1919, TTK, EP 04-02.
163 Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa, 34.
164 Bardakçı, Enver, 338.
direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammed. Enver’s narcissism and his need for traditional prestige symbols were working hand in hand where he could simply let make up new stamps and titles.

The battles were not easy for the Basmachi. There was a lack of resources and military know-how. Even the geography and communication were constituting severe problems. Letters were sent by horseman couriers and international correspondence was only possible through Kabul. Enver once wrote in confusion about navigation to Hacı Sami Bey: «I can’t say where I should be going?» As there was no calendar, Enver was starting to mix up the days in his diary-like letters to his wife. Furthermore, the Basmachi movement was plagued with chief-tain rivalries, inter-tribal conflicts, and socio-economic grievances. Enver was acquainted with the problems of tribalism in unconventional warfare campaigns from his experience in Tripoli, but he was now totally disillusioned and disappointed about the moral and material state of the Central Asian tribes—he was now dearly missing his Benghazi Bedouins.

Nonetheless, Enver Pasha’s troops were able to achieve military successes after their first re-organization. They could take Dushanbe in early 1922. Some Red Army units in Eastern Bukhara, consisting of Kazak soldiers, collectively turned to Enver and joined the Basmachi. The popularity of the Basmachi movement was on the rise, respectively anti-Soviet feelings were increasing among the Central Asian population. In the last months since Enver’s disappearance, the Soviet Russia had increased its reach into the Soviet Republics in Central Asia. The Communist Party of Bukhara (and Khorezm) were put under the direct control of the Russian Communist Party in February 2, 1922. The political and military

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166 Enver Pasha, letter (Rasid Barracks) to Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşi (Darbaz), n.d., TTK, EP 01-76. «Hangi taraфа hareket edeceğimi tayin edemiyorum.»
administration of Bukhara was transferred to directly to Moscow and to the Turkestan Bureau (Turkburo).\(^{172}\)

Enver Pasha was also concerned about making his struggle against the Red Army public throughout the world. In a letter to his brother in Berlin, Enver wrote that he «wants to write on the battles with the Russian in Eastern Bukhara for the Liwa-el-Islam and for Humann’s newspaper [Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung] including a sketch.»\(^{173}\) This article including Enver’s hand-drawn sketch with Turkish and German descriptions could, however, only be published in August 1922 in the Liwa-el-Islam.\(^{174}\) The cause for this delay was that the correspondence via the couriers of the Afghan diplomatic corps was taking several months to reach Europe.\(^{175}\) Thus, the turn against the Bolsheviks came late in the Liwa-el-Islam. The animosity against Russians and Bolshevism was explained as follows:

> Although the Russians enjoyed more benefits from the Islamic-Bolshevik cooperation, they did not abandon their destruction policy towards the Muslims under their administration. Enver Pasha, who listened to the complaints of the people every day, constantly tried to convince the Bolshevik dignitaries to bring an end to the calamities that have been inflicted on the Muslims. The promises by the Russians never delivered fruitful and constructive results. Finally, at the first given opportunity Enver Pasha made his long-desired Turkestan trip. Wherever he passed, he closely observed the destruction by the Russians and the atrocities that are inflicted upon the Muslim population. Following the requests of the population to put an end to these atrocities, he once again approached the Russians on friendly terms. Despite all his efforts, he could not make the Bolsheviks listen. After that he decided to operate against the Bolsheviks.\(^{176}\)

The Liwa-el-Islam’s political position—even after Enver declared war against Soviet Russia became public—was never based on pan-Turkism, as Muslim nationalism continued to be the main ideological pillar of the movement.\(^{177}\) Enver’s operations in Eastern Bukhara were described in the same issue of the Liwa-el-Islam as follows:

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\(^{173}\) Enver Pasha, letter (Ahcar) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), January 28, 1922, TTK, EP 01-40, İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 117.


\(^{175}\) The most recent information in the above cited article was from April 1922.

\(^{176}\) “Bolşeviklerin Kafkasya ve Türkistan İstilası ve Enver Paşa,” Liwa-el-Islam 2, no. 11–12 (August 1, 1922): 42.

The insurgency in Eastern Bukhara was very widespread. However, since the insurgents were in separate small detachments and there was no iron hand that could unite these dispersed forces, Russians were not very affected by these insurgencies. With the arrival of Enver Pasha, the dispersed forces have been put together and the struggle started to deliver positive results.178

For the first time since November 1918, Enver Pasha was leading a campaign of unconventional warfare against the infidel enemy. He was once again scheming grand ideas. «Now the things are going the way I wanted», Enver reported to his remaining colleagues at the Berlin Bureau. He told that he was planning to form a new Bukhara Government which then in tribal confederation will form the «first independent Government of Turkestan».179 There were even plans to dispatch fifty officers from Constantinople to Turkestan.180 In many letters to his wife, Enver was even inviting her to come and settle in Kabul, and later move to Bukhara once it was liberated.181 Enver was requesting delivery of small arms from Germany, considering to bring a mining engineer to explore the natural resources of Turkestan, and even thinking about purchasing a Zeppelin to transport the goods from Germany to Eastern Bukhara.182 Enver’s older brother Nuri Pasha, who was now also in Berlin, wrote that if it would work out with the purchase of the Zeppelin, he would fly with it to Bukhara and bring himself the supplies.183 Apparently, only the sky was the limit. In face of the Rapallo Treaty, signed on April 16, 1922, between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, these requests from Germany were simply impossible. The Soviet-German treaty which Enver had envisioned for so long had now came at a time, when it double-crossed Enver’s own plans. When the news arrived that Cemal Pasha and Dr. Nazım renounced Enver Pasha’s turn against the Soviets, Enver believed that they were deceived by the Russians.184 Deception was now depicted as the main feature of the Bolsheviks. The Liwa-el-Islam would write: «For the realization of their intentions, the Bolsheviks concealed their true intentions with clever lies and

178 “Şark-ı Buhara Vekaiyi,” Liwa-el-Islam 2, no. 11-12 (August 1, 1922): 49.
179 Enver Pasha, letter (Eastern Bukhara) to the Berlin Bureau (Berlin), January 28, 1922, TTK, EP 01-40, in İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 118.
180 Hacı Sami Kuşçu, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), May 26, 1922, TTK, EP 04-07.
181 Bardakçı, Enver, 352–53.
182 Enver Pasha, letter (Ahcar) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), January 28, 1922, TTK, EP 01-40, in İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 117.
183 Nuri Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), July 10, 1922, TTK, EP 02-02, in İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 62.
184 Enver Pasha, letter (Turkestan) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 19, 1922, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 503.
By March 1922, the Basmachi under the leadership of Enver Pasha increased their pressure on the Soviet outposts. The Red Army’s response has not been very strong in the region yet. «If you will not leave these regions, you will be responsible for shedding ever more blood for nothing», declared Enver in an ultimatum to Lenin, Trotsky, and Radek. «If you would accept, perhaps we might consider a conciliation, otherwise the circumstances will deteriorate from day to day.» Few days later, Enver sent an ultimatum to the Russian Consulate in Baysun to leave the region within 24 hours. It was reported that Russians left the Consulate behind. But Enver could still not take Baysun, the gate to Western Bukhara. Nevertheless, the news that the Basmachi insurgency was now more organized than ever was travelling fast.

Afghanistan was already intervening in Soviet affairs, hence violating the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, by giving refuge to the exiled Emir Alim Khan and support for the Basmachi rebels through its embassy in Bukhara. From the Afghan Government, Enver Pasha requested arms and supplies. The Afghan Government sent, in fact, some troops. However, the Lakay «Mujahidin» mistakenly engaged in a firefight with the arriving Afghan troops, causing few casualties. After the first victories against the Red Army in the Spring of 1922, Enver wrote a letter to Emir Amanullah Khan:

The situation in Bukhara and Turkestan turned entirely to our advantage. […] With internal support, the Russian rule over Bukhara and Turkestan will come to an end and under our leadership a Union of Eastern-Muslim Governments [Şark İslam Hükümeti ittihadi] will be founded. Thereby, a new government will emerge that will soon […] challenge the whole world like the German federation did.

190 Intelligence report (Moscow) to the Auswärtiges Amt, April 10, 1922, PA-AA, Moskau 57.
192 Enver Pasha, letter to Mahmud Khan Tarzi (Kabul), January 23, 1922, TTK, EP 04-02.
Enver Pasha was, however, seemingly disappointed, as the Afghan delivery of men and supplies remained clearly below his needs. Afghan operations had to remain a secret, because the British were supporting Afghanistan only because they believed to be in competition with Soviet Russia. If it came out that the Kabul Government had abandoned the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, the British might lose interest in Kabul. “Because the Government of England is not entirely our friends. They are depended on us only for our current friendship with Russia,” said a letter from Kabul to Enver. After the Afghan forces took part in the fights against the Red Army, Enver reported to the Emir that the Afghans fought “heroically” against the Russians. Afghan passports were found on dead insurgents and some Afghan fighters were even taken prisoner by the Red Army—further straining the Soviet-Afghan relations. On April 19, Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked the British representative Colonel Humphrys, if Britain would support Enver Pasha’s enterprise in Bukhara which would result in the formation of a buffer-state between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. This proposal was, however, declined by the British official as it would equal a declaration of war in its consequences.

Enver Pasha had sent Hacı Sami to Kabul to coordinate relations with the Afghan Emir as well as with exiled Emir of Bukhara. Nonetheless, Enver was apparently a little uneasy that Hacı Sami might go too far in his efforts to instigate the Afghan Government. Besides Hacı Sami, Enver’s second man in Kabul was Bedri Bey. Enver instructed Bedri Bey in Kabul to publish a declaration that propagated about the “Russian colonial aims pursued by the Bolsheviks in Bokhara and Turkestan, which he [Enver] considers to be a threat to both Afghanistan’s and Turkey’s interests.” When Enver tried to approach Raskolnikov, the

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195 Fraser, “Basmachi I,” 60.
196 Letter from Afghanistan to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), May 2, 1922, TTK, EP 01-09.
200 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), May 26, 1922, TTK, EP 04-07.
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Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, via Bedri Bey, that the Soviet Government should open negotiations with him in the name of the independent governments of Bukhara and Turkestan. Raskolnikov answered that «Enver may not be recognized as a representative of those states which either have friendly relations with Russia or are members of the same federations. Negotiations with Enver would be possible only after his capitulation.»\(^{202}\)

In the spring of 1922, Enver Pasha organized an inter-tribal assembly which took place in Kafirun, with ten-thousands of dignitaries attending it. Enver is said to have hold a speech there and then prepared a declaration on behalf of the assembly.\(^{203}\) Enver’s rise was making Emir Alim Khan more and more distrustful. It was rumored in Soviet publications that Enver’s self-given title «Commander in Chief of all the Islamic troops, son-in-law of the Caliph, and representative of the Prophet» and some of his socially progressive decrees have offended Alim Khan’s own claim to authority.\(^{204}\) On the other hand, Alim Khan’s resources as an exiled monarch were limited so that his support was decreasing towards summer 1922.\(^{205}\)

The Soviet regime was not disinclined to come to terms with Enver Pasha. «Soviet authorities», as Şuhnaz Yılmaz rightly concludes, «seemed to be more concerned with Enver’s prestige in the Muslim world than with his military capabilities».\(^{206}\) A Soviet journal said:

> What will be the outcome of this enterprise? From a military point of view, there can be only one opinion, that the large Soviet Federation which knew how to contain the English and the French attack when fighting Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel, is strong enough to destroy the enterprise of Enver Pasha. […] It is not the military aspect of this affair which makes us worry, it is more the political aspect. […] In effect, the past glory of Enver as man of the Muslim state, can still attract crowds of ignorant dehghans [peasants] in some remote regions today.\(^{207}\)

On April 12, it was proposed to get in negotiations with Enver Pasha. The Soviet regime was ready to compromise to settle the situation without arousing further discontent among its


\(^{205}\) Fraser, “Basmachi I,” 60.

\(^{206}\) Yılmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 58.

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Muslim population.208 The commander of the Garrison at Baysun even offered Enver to remain in Eastern Bukhara, where he was free to establish a new Government.209 But Enver insisted on the Soviet surrender of whole Bukhara. The newly appointed head of the counterinsurgency operations Yakov Peters wrote to Stalin that the solution must be searched in the political sphere, not in the military:

If you look at it from the outside, I think we are making a great mistake by intervening directly into the independence of Bukhara. By this, we are inciting the people against the Russians and create an excuse for Enver's invasion. By contrast, if we would maintain Bukhara's external independence and display friendly gestures with its internal affairs, we would enable an opportunity for them to accept Soviet rule.210

When Emir Shakib Arslan confronted Chicherin at the Genoa Congress in April-May 1922, Chicherin admitted that making peace with Enver Pasha would be the best.211 Nariman Narimanov was sent to Bukhara as a part of a negotiation commission to make a deal with Enver. The two men knew each other from the Baku Congress. However, Enver was not interested in a deal. On May 19, 1922, Enver sent another ultimatum with Narimanov.212

Enver’s ultimatum said:

In the event of Soviet Russia finding it unnecessary to respect the wishes of the Muslim peoples, who are under the oppressive yoke of dishonest Commissars, and who have sprung to arms to free their territory from the alien power of Moscow, I must warn you Mr. Commissar, that two weeks after the handing over of the present memorandum from the Supreme Council, I shall act according to my own judgement.213

Meanwhile, the Soviet regime had started take more radical measures against Enver Pasha. Senior Soviet officials, G. Ordzhonikidze and Slava Eliava, were sent to Tashkent to make inquiries. They reported to Stalin that the insurgency in Eastern Bukhara became more organized under Enver’s leadership. Their verdict was simply the death sentence of Enver. «It is necessary to eliminate Enver in order to achieve liberation, hence preparations have been

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208 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 56.
209 Commander Zaisov, letter (Baysun) to Enver Pasha (Eastern Bukhara), May 1922, in Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaşları ve Enver Paşa, II, 172.
211 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 92–93.
made in this regard.»214 Thereafter, Stalin presented to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party the following proposal regarding Enver Pasha:

In order to facilitate a turn towards Soviet sovereignty among the popular masses and in the military struggle against the Basmachi, instructions will be given to Central Asian Bureau and the national Central Committee of the three republics to execute on behalf of Soviet sovereignty a political campaign against Enver in conjunction with Soviet departments. For this,

a) Enver will be declared an English agent and an enemy of the Eastern peoples;

b) Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khive will be cleansed from anti-Soviet Turkish-Afghan elements.215

The claim that Enver Pasha was a British agent was purely an invention, although in his desperation Enver would thankfully accept any help from London. «Whether Enver accepts it or not, he is today an agent of the English imperialism that has colonized millions of Muslim people in India, Egypt, and Asia Minor», said a Soviet document, implying that Enver was functionally serving the interests of the British even if he was not following British orders.216 Others turned to conspiracy theorization in making sense of Enver’s actions. «The socialist republics of Central Asia are facing a new venture from the Imperial English, connected this time with the name of Enver Pasha», announced one Red Army journal, «Enver has the insolence to address the Soviet Federation with propositions which are visibly dictated by Lloyd George and Barthou.»217

Meanwhile, the Young Turk émigré networks were quickly eroding due to the political isolation of Enver Pasha in Eastern Bukhara. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies were giving their last breath. The secretary general Ziya Bey described to Enver the pitiful situation as follows:

After Cemal Azmi and Bahaeddin Şakir Beys were martyred, the activities of the Berlin Bureau completely ceased. Rome does not recognize us anymore. Only Azmi Bey is left here. Rüsuhi Bey is about to leave for Ankara after the letter he received from Kara Kemal. Rome [Bureau] continues to work as the society of «Oppressed Nations» with the half a million gold coins they received from the Russians a while ago. İstanbul [Branch] is of no use due to pennilessness. I had attempted to send you arms and men from there.

214 G. Ordzhonikidze and Shalva Eliava, telegraph (Tashkent) to Stalin (Moscow), May 12, 1922, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 52.
However, for the lack of money it is not possible. […] Küçük Talat is in Istanbul and he is working fully together with us. […] However, lack of money is restricting all our activities. […] As I said though, if money won’t come, we will need to bid farewell to all these organizations. […] For now, dear Pasha, we ask you to send immediately money to the Berlin Bureau as well as to the Rome and Istanbul bureaus. Nobody here knows what to do.218

The Soviet Government went full force on the Basmachi after May 1922. A purge against Jadidist elites compromised of having anti-Soviet motivations started as well as former Ottoman POWs who had settled in the region were arrested.219 A full-scale battle against the Basmachi forces took place on June 15. The head of the Soviet counterinsurgency operations Yakov Peters published an article in the Izvestia, mocking Enver’s claim to be «commanding all the armed Musselman forces in Central Asia» whereas he was actually sharing the leadership with four «bandit chiefs».220 On July 14, Dushanbe was taken by the Red Army. Enver and his troops were outnumbered and outgunned five hundred to five thousand.221 Enver had neither machine guns nor artillery. During a briefing at the Military Academy in Moscow in August 1922, the lecturer General Mikhail K. Lewadowski discussed why Enver was not conducting guerilla warfare tactics, but rather creating windows of opportunity for conventional battles again and again, even though his forces were clearly inferior from the onset.222 On July 14, Enver requested Afghan Emir to negotiate a deal for him and his men with the British officials in Kabul.223 On July 26, Enver and his men engaged yet in a firefight, as he wrote his last letter to his wife.224 The military battle was lost, it was now a struggle for survival, if not a suicide.

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Before leaving for Tiflis, Cemal Pasha made a visit to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow and told the chief diplomat Dr. Riza Nur that he would like to go to Ankara. Cemal was already

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218 M. Ziya Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), June 27, 1922, TTK, EP 02-24.
221 Enver Pasha, letter (Pul-i Hakiyan) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), March 27, 1922, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 507.
222 Şevket Süreyya, as one of the few Turkish students at Moscow University of the Toilers of the East, was allowed to attend this lecture. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 7th Ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979), 261–65. This is also one of the conclusions in Fraser, “Basmachi I,” 8, 62.
223 Enver Pasha, letter (Kavaklı) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 14, 1922, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 554.
224 Enver Pasha, letter (Satılmış) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), July 26, 1922, in Bardakçı, Naciye, Ruhum, Efendim, 560–61.
in touch with Mustafa Kemal, as he told, and was leaving for Tuapse to wait for a response from Ankara. «You’re going there for nothing, Mustafa Kemal won’t let you in», said Rıza Nur dismissively and noted in his memoir the following thoughts which he most certainly did not dare to tell in Cemal’s face: «The man [Mustafa Kemal] is busy with cleansing and removing his rivals in Turkey. Would he ever shoulder the burden of a man like Cemal? Cemal has no qualities either in military or elsewhere, he is just a komitadji. If he would find an opportunity, he would throw off Mustafa Kemal from the government position.»

The day before Cemal left to Tiflis, he wrote a letter to Fahrettin (Türkkan) Pasha to congratulate him to his new appointment as the first Turkish ambassador to Afghanistan. Fahrettin Pasha was a very strong pick for the ambassador position in Kabul. He was famous for being the relentless defender of Medina against the British-Sharifian forces. Fahrettin had also been associated with the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. This was certainly a man with whom Cemal could collaborate in Kabul.

As it seems, going back to Turkey was a matter of political certification and rehabilitation for Cemal Pasha, so that he can go back to Afghanistan and work there again. Before leaving Moscow, Cemal was able to convince the Soviet Government about his integrity. Karahan told him: «Sir, we are very grateful for that you have been one of the most important supporters of the friendship between us and the Ankara Government and we hope that you will continue your great work for the enhancement of the friendly relations between the Asian Muslim world and the Russian Soviet Republic.»

On July 10, Cemal Pasha arrived at Tiflis, and the Turkish Military Attaché reported that Cemal desires to travel to Ankara, if not possible then to Kars, to talk with Mustafa Kemal. In Tiflis, Cemal was hosted as an official state guest and was given official papers. Cemal

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226 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Fahrettin Pasha (Kabul), July 4, 1922, in Feridun Kandemir, Medine Müdafaası: Peygamberimizin Gölgesinde Son Türkler (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1991), 563–64.

227 See also for Cemal Pasha’s positive remarks on Fahri Pasha and his plans for further collaboration with the Ankara Government in Afghanistan: Cemal Pasha, letter (Munich) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), April 12, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 32.

228 Hüsamettin Bey, letter (Tiflis) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), July 11, 1922, in Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 280. See also: ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 32.
continued to complain about Enver’s actions: «He ruined all our honor as revolutionaries»
(Heşimizin inkılapçı şerefimizi berbat etti).\(^{230}\) Apparently, there was a kind of honor among revolutionaries in Cemal’s understanding, and Enver had ruined it.

On the night of July 21, Cemal Pasha and his two aid-de-camps Süreyya and Nusret were invited to a dinner at the Turkish Consulate in Tiflis. Süreyya had arrived from Ankara that morning, so he had many news on Anatolia and about the war. A letter Süreyya brought from Ankara said that Cemal should continue his good work in Afghanistan. After the dinner Cemal and his friends said goodbye and walked to their residence provided by the Soviet Government. Tiflis was still under martial law so that there was a curfew during the nights. The Turkish Ambassador Muhtar Bey offered the guests to stay overnight. Cemal politely rejected, since he had official papers. The diplomats Firuz (Kesim) and Osman Kemal accompanied Cemal and his friends for a block and then they parted their ways. Only a minute or so later Firuz and Osman Kemal heard shots fired around the corner. They first ran back to the Embassy and returned with embassy guards and found the three men lying dead on the ground. Cemal had tried to reach to his revolver but was killed immediately. Nusret and Süreyya were shot dead as well. The hand case with the documents Süreyya Bey had brought from Anatolia was missing too.\(^{231}\)

The question who actually murdered Cemal Pasha and his friends has been a matter of rumors and speculations ever since. Turkish historians mapped out the different evidence and narratives that has been put forward by contemporaries.\(^{232}\) The main suspects in these rumors and speculations were the Armenian Tashnags, the Soviet Cheka, and the British Intelligence—although the British were imaged only as the instigator of the Armenians. These conspiracy theories, rumors, and speculations unveil the political intentions and preconceptions of the time.

The official reaction of the Soviet Government was an expression of condolence. The Soviet Government of Georgia organized an official funeral ceremony with a military parade.\(^{233}\) The

\(^{230}\) Birgen, *İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene*, II, 763.


\(^{232}\) These different theories has been discussed in more detail from two different view points in Özdemir, *Üç Jöntürk’ün Ölümü*, 193–212; Ayşe Hür, “Cemal Paşa’yı (aslında) kim öldürdü?,” *Agos*, October 10, 2008.

\(^{233}\) Kesim, “Cemal Paşa Nasıl Katledildi,” 132.
funeral prayers were held at the Shah Abbas Mosque in Tiflis. Russian Ambassador Aralov in Ankara delivered to Rauf (Orbay) Bey, on August 5, «their great sorrow since Cemal Pasha was a great son of Turkey and a fervent supporter of the Russian-Turkish friendship.» The Soviet Government paid five thousand gold to Cemal’s widow as a compensation.

The officials of the Transcaucasian Soviet identified alleged culprits as Tashnag extremists who had killed Cemal Pasha as a revenge for the Armenian massacres. After Cemal’s assassination, the arrest of 199 Tashnag members was reported to have taken place in the Turkish newspapers. The next day, two Tashnag fedayis Larakin Lalayan and Sergo Vartanyan were arrested, but are said to be released afterwards. Turkish-Armenian historian Kevork Pamukciyan gives the names of the Armenian assassins as Bedros Bogosyan and Ardashen Kevokyan. Although both Turkish and Armenian nationalists still want to see Armenian revolutionaries behind the assassination, the evidence is rather speculative. Contrary to some popular claims, Cemal Pasha’s assassination was not organized by the Operation Nemesis, although it certainly served the same purpose.

The Ankara Government sent a note to the Transcaucasian Federation to punish the Tashnag assassins responsible for the assassinations. In a comment in The Times, it was noted that Ankara’s diplomatic note «appears in some degree to be modelled on that addressed to Serbia by Austria-Hungary in July 1914». Budu Mdivani, the President of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, told Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the murderer of Cemal

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234 Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adama: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 214.
235 Rauf Orbay, Rauf Orbay’ın Hatıraları, 1914–1945, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2005), 305.
238 Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adama, 214. See also: Birgen, İtihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, II, 765.
Pasha was a Tashnag member and a former officer who was now arrested.\textsuperscript{243} Ankara Government’s official reaction to the incident was in fact very harsh. Despite all the disclaimers, Kemalist regime’s crypto-CUP tenets were revealing themselves once again in these moments of «Armenian terrorism». Kazım Karabekir Pasha proposed to transport the remains of Cemal Pasha to Erzurum to be buried there in a symbolic grave that would «constitute an eternal commemoration of the Tashnag massacres in Erzurum».\textsuperscript{244} The General Staff forwarded Karabekir’s proposal to the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{245} In the end, it was decided by the Grand National Assembly to transport the remains of Cemal Pasha and his fellow men to Turkey.\textsuperscript{246} The remains of Cemal Pasha and his two friends were brought to Erzurum on September 21, 1922.\textsuperscript{247} Due to fears of further Tashnag assassinations, it was allowed for Halil Pasha, Dr. Nazım, and Küçük Talat Bey to return to Turkey.\textsuperscript{248}

The Soviet Government saw not only the Tashnags, but also other hidden hands behind it all. Nikolai Ravich, a Soviet diplomat serving in Ankara, claimed that it was the British Intelligence that organized the assassination of Cemal Pasha.\textsuperscript{249} It is doubtful that the Soviets had any evidence that led to British agents. In fact, the rumors of British complicity seem to be propagated purposefully. In a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in Moscow, Karl Radek was given the task by Karahan and Stalin to prepare a press release that Cemal was assassinated by Tashnags with the support of English agents.\textsuperscript{250} In an article published in Germany, Karl Radek wrote:

\textsuperscript{243} Perinçek, \textit{Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri}, 152.
\textsuperscript{244} Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Sarıkamış) to the General Staff (Ankara), August 8, 1922, BCA-030-0-010-000-000-204-392-17. See also: ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1543, gömlek no. 106.
\textsuperscript{245} Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha, letter (Ankara) to the Cabinet Council, August 10, 1922, BCA-030-0-010-000-000-204-392-17.
\textsuperscript{246} Cabinet Council, letter (Ankara) to the General Staff, August 12, 1922, BCA-030-0-010-000-204-392-17. See also: Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Sarıkamış), August 20, 1922, ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 33.
\textsuperscript{247} Report (Erzurum) to the Ministry of National Defence (Ankara), September 26, 1922, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 1548, gömlek no. 14.
\textsuperscript{249} Perinçek, \textit{Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri}, 146.
At the hands of a nationalist died Talaat Pasha, the head of the Young Turk Revolution and the Young Turk Government. He is now followed by Djemal Pasha, the Governor-General of Baghdad [sic; Damascus], one of the leading spirits of Young Turk Party, who is probably also murdered by Dashnaks. Slowly the old generation disappears from the stage that tried to resist the European imperialism and to save the independence of Turkey without compromising the privileges of the old ruling class and its political methods. And the youngest leaders of the Young Turk Party, Enver Pasha is undertaking a foolish adventure that we will make him not only a traitor of the Turkish people, but a traitor of all oppressed Muslim peoples. [...] Djemal Pasha, a man with a sharp and cool mind, condemned this policy of Enver. It was also condemned by the Government of Angora.251

Despite these official expressions of condolence by the Soviet Government, there were serious suspicions that the Cheka was behind the killings. «It is doubtful whether Jemal Pasha was killed by Armenians, whom he sometimes used to protect from massacre», commented The Times on July 27, 1922, and went on with an alternative theory: «It is hinted that Jemal Pasha was suspected of wishing to reconcile Enver Pasha with Mustapha Kemal Pasha on an anti-Bolshevik basis, and that he was, consequently, eliminated by the Cheka.»252 This was, of course, a «white-washing» of Cemal Pasha. There was no public or secret information that Cemal was considering an anti-Bolshevik course. Another news at the very same page announced under the title «The New Era in Kabul» summarized the prospects of Cemal’s murder from the British official point of view perhaps more precisely. The article advised that Afghanistan should take a lesson from Cemal’s murder and drop the Bolshevik policies: «In the chaos of the Near and Middle East, which is hindering the re-settlement of the war-weary nations of Europe, a wise and peaceful government in Afghanistan has boundless opportunities.»253

However, the accusations that Cemal Pasha was killed by the infamous Soviet secret police Cheka did not only come from the British opinion-makers. Under the rising social pressure after the victory of the Nationalist Forces, Armenian (and even Tashnag) newspapers in Constantinople preferred to reject the possibility of any Armenian role and accused instead the Bolsheviks.254 Also some Turkish nationalists who were traditionally suspicious of Russia saw

252 The Times, “Jemal Pasha’s Dead,” July 28, 1922. This news was reproduced in numerous Turkish newspapers, see: Artuç, Cemal Paşa, 389. Turkish Intelligence collected these news from domestic and foreign newspapers that Cemal Pasha was murdered by Soviets in Tiflis. See: Intelligence reports presented to the Cabinet, July 27, 1922, BCA-030-0-010-000-000-101-653-2.
Cheka behind the assassination. For instance, Cemal’s adjutant İsmet (Karadoğan), who was by the time of assassination delivering messages to Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, assumed that the Cheka was behind the assassination. He imagined the Bolshevik leaders saying: «How do we know that these men [Cemal and his men] would not act as Enver did… We should better get rid of them.» Some officials in Turkey believed also that it was the Soviet Government that killed Cemal because of Enver’s participation in the Basmachi movement. These were all rumors and speculations—if not even wishful-thinking—of distant observers. After a fire incident, possibly even a case of arson, in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara on August 15, 1922, Ambassador Aralov suspected an international conspiracy led by the French that caused the recent rise of anti-Soviet resentments in Ankara. While the Bolsheviks turned to conspiracy theories, there was a political mindset in Ankara that favored suspicion against the Bolsheviks.

There is, however, some others who were closer to the lion’s den that also heard that it was the Cheka that assassinated Cemal Pasha, although their evidence was also very suggestive and similarly based on rumors. For instance, Dr. Rıza Nur later heard from an informant that the killers were unassuming Armenians, one of them a baker, but it was actually the Russian Government that gave the assignment. Rıza Nur found this information convincing, since by then Cheka was rumored to be behind numerous political murders. Indeed, the collective mentality and cult of Cheka that legitimized political violence was fully established in 1922. Before leaving Moscow, Halil Pasha had heard from an informant that the Soviet Government decided to assassinate Cemal and then blame the Armenians. Allegedly Halil Pasha could warn Cemal, but the latter did not take it seriously, as he could not imagine that the Bolsheviks would kill him. Similarly, Turkestani politician Mustafa Chokay tells that he had warned Cemal during their meeting in Paris about traveling to Afghanistan through

255 Karadoğan, “Cemal Paşa’yi Ruslar Öldürmüştü,” 38. «Yarın bunların da Enver gibi yapmayacakları ne malum… İyisi mi temizleyelim.»
256 Sami Sabit Karaman, Istiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa: Trabzon ve Kars Hatıraları, 1921–1922, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2002), 70.
258 Nur, Hayat ve Hatrattım, III, 932.
260 Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumbhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 273.
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Tiflis, because in Tiflis «Soviet agents» might kill him, because only there the Soviets could execute such an operation and still put the blame on the Armenians. As Chokay tells, Cemal thought that this was ridiculous.261 Both Halil’s and Chokay’s alleged warnings to Cemal about Cheka assassins are to be taken with a grain of salt as these were written years and decades later.

Years later Chokay read in a book under the title «In the Service of Cheka and Comintern» (Na sluzhbe Cheka i Kominterna) by a former Cheka official E. Dumbadze that Cemal Pasha was assassinated by the Georgian Cheka by the order of the Moscow Government. A famous hitmen Sergo Lobadze was assigned for this task and later it was fabricated in the news coverage that the Armenian Tashnags were responsible.262 Sergo Lobadze was arrested and executed by the Cheka one month after the incident for some other reason.263 Rumors continued that Cemal was killed by Russians. A Georgian refugee in Hopa at the Black Sea coast claimed that he could deliver secret documents that reveal Russian complicity.264 Zeki Velidi (Togan) tells that he came across one of the assassins of Cemal Pasha, a certain Garabet, in Afghanistan and adds that he was a Soviet agent.265 I do not want to dismiss the possibility that Cheka was complicit in Cemal’s assassination, nevertheless, we must note that for anti-Soviet activists, like Chokay and Togan and others, rumors and legends about Cheka’s political violence gave the ideal template in making sense of Cemal Pasha’s mysterious assassination.

The Young Turk émigré community rather chose to believe that it was the British Intelligence that killed Cemal Pasha. Shakib Arslan was in London, when he heard about Cemal’s assassination. At the time Shakib Arslan and his colleagues were protesting the French Syrian mandate over Syria and the British mandate over Palestine. At the Hotel Cecil, Arslan was confronted by a British General: «Cemal Pasha is killed, I hope that Enver will soon join him.» Shakib Arslan assumed that the British Intelligence was behind the assassination, be-

264 Arif, letter (Hopa) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara), November 29, 1923, BOA.HR.İM.22.149.
265 Togan, Memoirs, 389.
cause «in the eyes of the English the Muslim menace was greater than the Bolshevik menace.»

Similarly, Cavid Bey noted in his diary: «The martyrdom of poor Cemal Pasha has been approved. He has been martyred by an Armenian bullet, but it is more unjust than the others. Perhaps there is the English hand in it. But I am sure that the finger that pulled the trigger belonged to an Armenian’s hand.»

«As Talaat Pasha, like Jemal, has already been shot», as The Times announced the current state in the body count, «Enver Pasha is now the only survivor of the C.U.P. triumvirate.» But Enver’s days were already counted.

The newspaper Peyam-ı Sabah under the editorship of Ali Kemal Bey, «the only anti-Kemalist Turkish paper now appearing in Constantinople», as the British officials put it, became confused as what to support in the looming final victory of the Ankara forces in summer 1922. The newspaper has been conducting a propaganda warfare against Ankara Government for years. Now in his current frustration, Ali Kemal had even published a peculiar editorial that celebrated Enver Pasha’s struggle against Soviet Russia. The British officials supposed that Ali Kemal was trying to build an alliance between two anti-Kemalist blocks, namely pro-Entente royalists and pro-Enver Unionists. Turkish Intelligence did not miss this news by the Peyam-ı Sabah either. This article coincided with other rumors that Küçük Talat Bey and Enver’s brother Nuri Pasha were rumored to be in Constantinople as well as news of Enver trying to reach out to the British in the Indo-Afghan region. Yet, enough evidence had come together to construct a new conspiracy theory. This conspiracy theory assumed a (potential) alliance between the Sultan Vahideddin and Enver Pasha was (to be) formed as «a possible means of destroying Mustafa Kemal». For the «lack of positive evidence», it was, nevertheless, admitted that «the suggestion that they are coming together as being for the moment no more than a theory which must be tested by close observation of future developments.» Possible ramifications of a Sultan-Enver pact was still not better off for the British than the current situation. «I doubt if we could swallow Enver for the sake of the Sultan,

266 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 135.
267 Diary entry, July 22, 1922, in Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Raznamesi, IV, 381.
269 Neville Henderson, letter (Constantinople) to Earl of Balfour, July 11, 1922, FO 7868, 7072, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 4, 301. Only even recently, the Peyam-ı Sabah was still displaying a strong anti-Enver and anti-Unionist agenda and claiming Enver was a Bolshevik agent. See, for instance: Peyam-ı Sabah, "Enver Tahrikattan Vazgeçmiyor," May 1, 1922.
270 Intelligence report, July 8, 1922, TİTE, kutu no. 67, gömlek no. 96.
even to get rid of Kemal».271 Although such an alliance was purely imaginary, nonetheless, by chance Enver was having the Friday prayers called in the name of the (Ottoman) Caliph, as he sarcastically told his wife, not without expressing his dislike of Vahideddin.272 On the other hand, Enver’s brother Kamil Bey in Berlin considered this article by Ali Kemal as a signal from the British officials for a rapprochement with Enver Pasha.273

Meanwhile, there were other rumors about the alleged alliances of Enver Pasha. «A secret Treaty is stated to have been signed in the beginning of June at Soujbulak, near Lake Urma, on the Persian frontier, between Mustapha Kemal and Enver Pasha», reported, for instance, The Times from its Berlin correspondent, on August 1, 1922. «By its terms both leaders agree to direct their activities towards the strengthening of the Pan-Islamic movement. Otherwise both are to retain their independence, Kemal adhering to his Treaty with Soviet Russia and Enver Pasha continuing to fight the Bolshevists.»274 Nothing could have been more far from the truth. Again from Berlin, The Times reported on September 18 that the «the suspected rapprochement between Mustapha Kemal and Enver Pasha has been consolidated into a definite alliance. [...] Enver Pasha’s sphere is Central Asia and Persia, while Asia Minor and Mesopotamia form that of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.»275 Since both these news were telegraphed from Berlin, it is not unlikely that these news were fabricated by the Young Turk community in Berlin. Similarly, Le Temps reported on August 5 a telegraph from Constantinople that claims that a triple alliance between Ankara, Moscow, and Enver took place and that Enver was granted with the Government of Bukhara.276

On August 3, 1922, General Bronsart von Schellendorf sent a letter to Enver Pasha, congratulating him for his prideful struggle against the «Russian yoke». «This new Muslim government of yours which will prepare a promising future for all Turks aroused nothing but great sensation.» Bronsart told that some Turkish friends in Berlin were thinking about going to

272 Enver Pasha, letter (Turkestan) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), April 7, 1922, in Bardakçı, Nacîyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 522.
273 Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), July 10, 1922, TTK, EP 01-86, in İnan, Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 60.
274 The Times, “Enver’s Treaty with Angora: Peace and War with the Soviets,” August 1, 1922.
Turkestan and joining Enver. «I had the desire to accompany them and offer my humble service to you, but I fear that I am too old to serve the purpose.»277 Thus, the news in *Daily Telegraph* that General Bronsart was directing the military operations of the Afghan volunteer units in Enver Pasha’s army was surely nonsense as well, although it corresponded to the General’s wishful-thinking.278

One day after General Bronsart von Schellendorf’s letter, on August 4, 1922, Enver Pasha was killed. Before diving into the ocean of rumors, it is still necessary to look at the evidence at hand. The situation for Enver and his friends was getting worse each day. In July 1922, the *Pravda* proudly reported that Enver was trying to organize the Basmachi in Fergana and Samarkand, but his troops were abandoning him.279 Whether some fighters had deserted or not, Enver was also sending away his fighters to their villages due to the Feast of Sacrifice (*Eid al-Adha*).280 One last eye-witness of Enver’s last days was Molla Nafiz (Türker), a Jadidi teacher who joined the Basmachi and belonged to the staff of Enver Pasha as his intelligence officer.281 According to Molla Nafiz’s field diary, the fights continued on August 2. The next day, Enver and his guards rested at the nearby village and attended the festivities and feast prayers at the local mosque.282 The next day, on August 4, Enver and his few men made preparations to meet with the other fighters. On their way, their old Tajik guide warned them of a Red Army cavalry unit heading directly towards them. Enver spotted the reconnaissance troops with his binoculars. He pulled out his saber and ordered his guardsmen to charge. Enver galloped to the Red Army troops. He could slay two soldiers before he was shot in the breast by the next cavalry on his way. Turcoman riders arrived at that moment and slayed the Soviet unit and chased them away. A Mullah came from the nearby village to the site of fighting with dead bodies. He found Enver and wrapped the dead body into the

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277 Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf, letter (Braunstein) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), August 3, 1922, TTK, EP 04-17.
281 Later Nafiz immigrated to Turkey, where he entrusted his private papers, including his field diary, to Ali Bademci. See: Ali Bademci, *Sarkli Basmacı: Türkistan’da Enver Paşa’nın Umumi Muhaberat Müdürü Molla Nafız’in Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2010). Molla Nafiz’s field diary was first published as a series in *Tarsus Gazetesi*, April 21 to May 7, 1962. The diary was published in its original wording by the courtesy of Ali Bademci in Bardakça, *Enver*, 371–374, also 626–634, note 363.
garment of his turban. He carried the body to the cemetery of his village. The next day, Enver’s fighters collected Enver’s body and buried him with a small ceremony on top of the Chegan hill near the same named village, today in Tajikistan. Molla Nafiz’s field diary contradicts the Red Army’s field diary in regard to the military outcome of the clash and who found Enver’s body first:

04.08. […] Enver attacked our First Squad together with 100 experienced fighters and defeated it. But then our Third Squad charged and Enver Pasha got five wounds and was killed in action. After that, the enemy escaped to the mountains without even taking the body of Enver Pasha. In the pockets of Enver’s clothes letters from his wife and other women was found. In addition, his revolver was found on his body.

Abdullah Recep (Baysun) who was there among Enver’s fighters also acknowledges that they had lost the fight and that they run away without Enver’s body. The next day they met the village mullah who showed him the body of Enver. Russians had not recognized him; they only stole his German boots and hunting jacket. Few days after the burial a public gathering took place at Enver’s grave with prayers and mourning. Most sources say that twenty or thirty thousand people were gathered. For the Mazar-i Sharif based newspaper İttihad-i İslam, it was important to underline: «His body was recovered and buried with all honour.»

«Enver’s death was also surrounded by a cloud of intentional and unintended pieces of misinformation, rumours and an odd combination of myth and reality», noted Şuhnaz Yılmaz. Like in the death of Talat and Cemal, there has been several rumors and theories about Enver’s death—which still continue to this day. For instance, there are rumors that Enver was decapitated. These rumors come from a Cheka agent, an Armenian by the name of Grigori Agabekov (Nerses Ovsepyan), who led the reconnaissance and intelligence operations in the region. Furthermore, it is said that the Red Army officer who was responsible for the death

283 Molla Nafiz (Türker), field diary, August 4, 5, 1922, in Bardakçı, Enver, 372–73. See also: Togan, Memoirs, 362.
284 Red Army’s military report on the fightings in Eastern Bukhara, June 8 – August 11, 1922, Uzbekistan State Archive, reference 48, serial 1, dossier 48, 309–313, in İdil, Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı, 393.
285 Baysun, Türkistan İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, 127.
286 Baysun, Türkistan İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, 127.
288 Yılmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 60.
289 These are best summerized in: Bardakçı, Enver, 379–83; İdil, Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı, 194–99.
290 Austrian adventurer Gustav Krist writes that he met Agabekov in Denov (in Uzbekistan) on July 9, 1925, where Agabekov told him the «truth» about Enver Pasha’s death. Agabekov told Krist that Enver was killed in battle of sabers and bajonets, and that he was consequently decapitated by a Red Army soldier. A week later Krist met with Dunov, another Red Army officer, in Bukhara who told that actually Agabekov himself.
of Enver Pasha was another Armenian by the name of Hagop Melkonian who was later decorated for his services. The claim that Melkonian was acting on behalf of secret orders from the Operation Nemesis is, of course, rather absurd.

However, the above cited Red Army field diary shows that Enver Pasha’s death was confirmed immediately. For some reason, the Soviet officials were rather reserved with announcing the news publicly. Perhaps, they were concerned that news of Enver’s death would only stir up more Muslim animosity towards Soviet Russia. When Karahan finally told Rıza Nur that Enver Pasha was killed, Rıza Nur asked astonished: «Why didn’t you make this public?» Karahan answered that they wanted to be sure that it was really Enver Pasha. Men were sent to identify his body. Love letters to his wife, his stamp as the son-in-law of the Caliph, and his custom made kalpak were confiscated as evidence and brought to Moscow. A document from the archives of the Tajik Communist Party shows that the officials learned about the death and commemorations of Enver from an article in The Times on September 18, 1922.

The Manchester Guardian, where Enver Pasha’s friend from Moscow Arthur Ransome was working, was probably the first Western newspaper to announce the death of Enver, already on August 18. Other than that, however, there was a general confusion in the press. Even after death, Enver continued to star in conspiracy theories. Like pop culture conspiracy theories that claim that «Elvis lives» or «Tupac ain’t dead», rumors circulated that Enver was still alive and leading the remnants of the Basmachi insurgents. At the beginning, these were decapitated Enver Pasha. While Enver was drinking water from a fountain Agabekov approached him, undercover as a local merchant, and cut off Enver’s head with a single struck. Gustav Krist, Allein durchs verbotene Land: Fahrten in Zentralasien (Wien: Seidel & Sohn, 1937), 54–60. Later Agabekov would become the first senior Soviet agent who deserted to the West. Agabekov wrote several books from European exile, exposing Soviet secrets, in which he also told Enver’s death, again, in the battle version. Georgij S. Agabekov, G.P.U.: (Zapiski chekista) (Berlin: Strela, 1930), 52–63, cited in Essad Bey, Die Verschwörung gegen die Welt: G.P.U. (Berlin: E.C. Ethhofen-Verlag, 1932), 224–38. Agabekov’s account was also published in Turkey as a series in the newspaper Son Posta, from November 13 to December 30, 1930, republished in Grigoriy S. Agabekof, Enver Paşa Nasıl Öldürüldü?, ed. Hasan Babacan and Servet Avşar (İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2011).

292 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 189.
293 Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, III, 926; Fischer, “The End of Enver Pasha,” 239.
294 Idil, Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı, 395.
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deceptive conspiracy theories, spread around to avoid mass hysteria among the popular masses and fighters and to spread frustration and confusion for the Red Army commanders. Hacı Sami ordered the remaining fighters to keep Enver’s death a secret. One of them Qadir told in the autumn of 1923:

Sami Bey suspected treachery. He said that the Committee must give out that Enver was not dead; simply that he had disappeared. This was necessary in order to keep the movement going; if it were known that Enver were dead it would collapse altogether. Qadir stoutly maintained that Enver had been assassinated by Bolshevik agents.296

For instance, two Ottoman ex-POWs told to British officials in September that Enver Pasha was wounded, but for the time being already recovered.297

The impact of this deceptive strategy, probably enhanced by the oral culture of the Central Asiatic nomads, was immediately effective. It was only in mid-October, when news of Enver’s dead become a rumor in the Indo-Iranian region south of Turkestan. «All sorts of rumours are still current about Enver Pasha», as The Times reported from Peshawar in October, «but Afghan official circles are now satisfied that he was killed at Raljiwan in July.» The same news concluded: «The rumors of Enver Pasha’s death are now so frequent that they must be taken seriously.»298 Few days later, it was also reported from Simla that «Enver Pasha was killed by Red Troops when going to prayers at the mosque on August 4, 1922.»299 It was, nevertheless, noted: «The opinion was for a long time widely held that the Pasha had allowed reports of his death to circulate in order to mask his activities.»300 Even a newspaper in the Soviet center of Tashkent was reporting on October 29 that a deal was made with Enver. «Peace has at last been made between Enver Pasha and ourselves […] Our proposal is that he is to take command of the Muslim troops who agree to assist Mustapha Kemal in the occupation of the neutral zone of Chanak.»301 From Peshawar, it was reported also that «there are many who

296 Fraser, “Basmachi I,” 61.
298 The Times, “Enver Pasha: More Rumours of His Death,” October 17, 1922.
300 Ibid..
301 Intelligenge report (Meshed) to India Office, November 20, 1922, quoted in Fraser, “Enver Pasha’s Bid for Turkestan, 1920–1922,” 211.
think the report is a ruse to cover his disappearance with a view to a fresh adventure elsewhere."302 "Enver Pasha Alive", was the message that was telegraphed from Meshed on November 9 to *The Times*: "Enver Pasha is undoubtedly alive, and is conducting a peace conference with the Bolshevists. He is reported to have refused the Governorship of Bokhara."303 The British Intelligence reported also from Meshed that he was not only alive, but also the President of the Republic of Turkestan.304 Such rumors continued, as Salahi Sonyel argues, until April 1923.305 But also far away the world of rumors of the Asiatic steppes and deserts, the idea that Enver Pasha was still alive and fighting for the liberation of the Muslim world was common. A Sarajevo newspaper announced on September 16, 1922:

The situation in the British Dependencies is dangerous from without as well as from within. Clouds are gathering on their outskirts. The ruler of Turkestan, Enver Pasha, is forming against England a coalition of Moslem States including Persia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Khiva, and Bokhara. Already an Afghan concentration is reported on the Indian frontier. For the past hundred years England has been digging a grave for Turkey. She is likely to fall into herself.306

305 Sonyel, "Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia," 63.
Conclusion

During my first year of my PhD studies, I was doing some preliminary research at the Ottoman Archive in İstanbul—by then still located at the beautiful buildings within the Sublime Porte complex in the Cağaloğlu district. While I was curiously scrolling through the digital catalogue one day, a professor of history sitting next to me asked what I was researching. I simply answered, «Young Turks», and specified my answer with the remark, «Committee of Union and Progress after 1918». The gentleman nodded approvingly and said: «Well, you must know then that the Young Turks were all crypto-Jews, Freemasons, and Zionists.» I was, of course, aware of this «unholy trinity» of conspiracy theories in Turkey and its projection onto Young Turks by conservative circles. Yet, I was still naïve enough to try to explain the gentleman that not all CUP members were crypto-Jews or Freemasons and the question of Zionism was not that straightforward. He shook his head in disbelief. «I saw it all», he said authoritatively. «I saw it in the British archives. It writes on hundreds of documents.» Discussion was meaningless, but it was an eye-opening experience for me. I had to take the conspiracy theories seriously—but again, perhaps not so much.

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As I’ve noted in the introduction, I’ve benefitted a great deal from the existing literature on the topic—both popular and academic histories. Nevertheless, this study has certain historiographical implications. The historiography on the topic, both popular and academic, has certain common fallacies which I tried to avoid. First, there is a general focus on Enver Pasha in the literature. This is, of course, given «Enver’s ‘direct action’ method of playing politics»—as Louise Bryant put it beautifully—to a certain degree in the nature of the beast.¹ Hence, Enver remains in the spotlight

¹ Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 160.
anyhow. Nevertheless, he had to share his stage time with others. By incorporating Talat Pasha’s activities in Berlin, their collective struggle becomes, as I have illustrated, more entangled within the complex and fascinating world of revanchist milieus, anticolonial social movements, and Muslim émigré networks in Europe. This is an important aspect in understanding this movement as a transnational contentious politics campaign. Although there is yet no definitive study on Cemal Pasha’s activities in Afghanistan, Cemal’s story is essential in understanding the interaction between transnational activism and international relations, especially on the Ankara-Moscow-Kabul axis. Understanding the reciprocal interactions required to go beyond the biographical approaches to the Young Turk triumvirate and incorporate other actors into the narrative, including German, British, Russian, Armenian, and Kemalist perspectives. The second common feature of the literature is the focus on five milestone events and to assume a linear progression between them: The first milestone is their escape from Constantinople in November 1918; the second milestone is the meeting with Radek in the summer of 1919 where the alliance with Bolsheviks is established; the third milestone is the Baku Congress in September 1920 which is considered as the heyday of Islamic-Bolshevik cooperation; the fourth milestone is Enver’s failed attempt to enter into Anatolia in September 1921; the fifth and last milestone is Enver’s death in Turkestan in August 1922, which was depending on the standpoint of the historian either a desperate suicide or a prideful martyrdom. Yet, there is always nearly a year between these milestone events, which are commonly summarized or skipped in narratives. By giving attention to the processes «in-between», I underlined the complexities and contingencies in the development of the events.

In processes of sense-making, historians—like contemporary observers—can also fail to distinguish fact from fiction. «In all these accounts the figure of Enver Pasha himself remains enigmatic, full of contradictions, the dates imprecise, the facts veiled in mystery», wrote one historian on the general source material.² Indeed, especially when the foreign intelligence reports are read not in their corresponding context, contemporary misconceptions—or even conspiracy theories—can get reproduced. As it has been seen most of the intelligence reports with fascinating theories about the alleged machinations of the CUP leaders corresponded to a time when the CUP leaders has been relatively inactive or unsuccessful. The private papers of the CUP leaders—what I have called the Young

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Turk republic of letters—offers a way forward to unveil most of the uncertainties. Another fallacy in making sense of fact and fiction lies in the tendency of the literature in over-evaluating the interrelations of the Young Turk leaders with post-Versailles Germany, Soviet Russia, and Kemalist Turkey as international conspiracies. As John Ferris correctly put it, «these parties were aligned with but not allied to each other.» Hence, I critically reviewed the quality of these political alignments.

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«Since the armistice we are continually getting mysterious news from Enver Pasha», said Falih Rifki (Atay) in 1922. Therefore, I’ve incorporated speculations, gossips, rumors, and conspiracy theories—as modes of sense-making in social complexity—into the analysis. The perception of most actors under study was based on rumors and speculation, as they had to rely on unverifiable information. They were interacting in a world of political uncertainty, where intentions and actions of distant actors remained a matter of guesswork. Hence, also their own actions and reactions were stimulated mostly by perceptions and misperceptions of the actions of others. The amount of rumors about the fugitive CUP leaders was, as it has been demonstrated in detail, is a testimony of how much curiosity and suspicion they aroused internationally. Like no single other person between the years 1918 and 1922, the CUP leaders, especially Enver Pasha, were the international men of mystery. Rumor is the first step towards conspiracy theory and both rumors and conspiracy theories constitute an important feature in the dialectic of conspiracy. Sooner than later the rumors turned into conspiracy theories, as esoteric explanations of political complexity. Some of these conspiracy theories even found their way into the historiography. «During the War of Independence

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1 Yet, the sources, although for large part even accessible as publications, has only been partly utilized by scholars so far, and those studies which are based on these letters are more reliable. Most notably: Murat Bardakçıl Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015); Masayuki Yamauchi, ed., The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991). It must be noted here that the Young Turk republic of letters offers still enough material for many other studies.


many intrigues were set around Enver Pasha», said the opening sentences of Kazım Karabekir’s book, Enver Pasha during our Independence War, and continued: «It will be seen in the documents that foreign hands played terrific roles in all these undertakings in order to drag our national movement into a fiasco.»  

Karabekir may have belonged to the opposition against Mustafa Kemal in the early Republican years, but when it came to Enver, he also contributed to the official historiographical consent. Foreign and hidden hands, including those behind Enver, were seen as working against the Turkish national sovereignty over Anatolia. On the other hand, the official circles in Entente countries saw the CUP leaders as the «hidden hand» behind the assumingly unexplainable opposition to colonial rule in Muslim lands. There were, of course, real conspiracies both by foreign states and by Enver and his friends, but, as it has been illustrated, the picture was more complex.

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In their self-imposed exile, the Young Turks committed themselves to a campaign of transnational contentious politics in the name of the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movement. Contrary to the paranoid assumptions of their enemies, the conspiracy at hand was rather disenchanting. In their path from empire to exile, the Young Turk leaders lost their party apparatus, local resources, and most importantly their state-actor status. Their committee organization was splintered into factions and groups and persecuted by the post-armistice regime in Ottoman Turkey. The leading cadre was criminalized by court-martials and internally plagued with interpersonal disputes. Their transnational networks were maybe impressive in reach and variety, but increasingly less functional for political mobilization. Transnational communication from Europe to the Middle East was particularly difficult and interrupted. War and revolution as well as border regimes made illicit transnational mobility dangerous. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the CUP leaders possessed limited financial resources and were dependent on the benevolence of old friends and interest of others. Their alleged partners and patrons, Germans or Bolsheviks, were mostly incapable or reluctant to provide the demanded resources and had often conflicting interests. Their strategy to find Soviet support for anti-British activities caught a window of opportunity but, in its core, it was banal and imprudent so that political differences could never be put aside with the Soviet regime. Although they were leading an organization to unite and represent numerous Muslim revolutionary societies,

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they had barely any contact to—let alone control over—local revolutionary organizations in the Middle East. They were spatially disconnected from the oppressed popular masses from North Africa to Central Asia, whom they repeatedly valued in their propaganda. They were even undesired by the local insurgency leaders.

Thanks to the discourse of their elusive power, however, the fugitive CUP leaders indeed became powerful in the eyes of their blind believers and paranoid enemies. A part of the curiosity and suspicion they were arousing internationally was due to the notoriety of the political background of the CUP leaders as reckless professional revolutionaries. But to a certain degree, this suspicion was based on the very nature of international politics which the fugitive CUP leaders with their transnational clandestine networks were transgressing. As their transnational and clandestine agency could not be accepted as it actually was, hence, it was imagined to be more conspiratorial and far-reaching. Thus, paranoid epistemologies emerged and some of these rumors turned into conspiracy theories. Behind distant uprisings and distinct movements many observers assumed falsely the hidden-hand of the CUP leaders.

Only the conspirator and his counter-conspirator believe that they are in the midst of a great conspiracy. The elusive power projected by the fugitive CUP leaders was too easily taken for granted by the British intelligence community and later also by the Kemalists and Soviets—though the latter two were less sensationalist in this regard. The wishful-thinking of the conspiracy plotter and the paranoid thinking of the conspiracy theorist were working hand in glove with each other. Their notoriety made the Young Turk leaders first prized as revolutionary non-state actors, but soon started to haunt them by making them more capable than they were in the eyes of their allies and enemies. Rumors—real or not—resulted in their political isolation and persecution. The rumors made the Kemalists in Anatolia more cautious in their relation to their CUP colleagues, hindering their return to Ottoman Turkey, restricting their space of movement. Bolshevik leaders’ distrust limited their political maneuverability. Not without a reason, the British made the prohibition of propaganda in the East their first principle in negotiating with Soviet Russia. As A.L. Macfie put forward, the paranoid intelligence reports on Enver’s pan-Islamic-Bolshevik activities pushed the British policy makers to consider a rapprochement with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.8 It was the same for

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the French before concluding the Ankara Treaty. In the dialectic of conspiracy, the more active, more visible, and more vocal the CUP leaders became after the summer of 1920, the more the epistemic gap between conspirators and conspiracy theorists was closed. While the disenchantment about Enver’s ever-less surprising intrigues became public, the news slipped more and more to the lower and less seen columns of the newspaper pages.

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By the time Talat, Cemal, and Enver were dead, a new world order was nearly settled. Kemalist Turkey came out victorious out of its War of Independence and could manifest its sovereignty at the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after the abolition of the Sultanate. Other post-Ottoman countries were not as lucky in establishing their independence: Syria came under French mandate; Palestine became a mandate under British control; Iraq became a British mandate with Faysal as its new King; Transjordan was newly created for the other Sharifian Prince Abdallah; Sharif Husayn reigned over Hedjaz only to be overrun by the Saudis; Egypt enjoyed semi-independence in 1922, but British continued to rule without governing. Meanwhile, Russia united with the other Soviet republics in the Soviet Union in 1922 and continued to extend its control over the Muslim regions from Crimea over the Caucasus to Central Asia.

The aftermath of World War I ended in the Middle East with the Kemalist abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924. This was certainly a great shock for Muslims throughout the world. It created a very strong rupture in the perception of the state of affairs that ultimately gave pan-Islamism its coup de grace. Fruitless consequent attempts to revitalize the Caliphate would further support the claim that pan-Islamism has been a hoax from the start. Orientalist fears of a worldwide «Muslim menace» was dismissed by the other Orientalist prejudice «Orientals cannot organize themselves politically». Nationalism would become the new paradigm in the Middle East in the region’s supposedly inescapable marriage with Western modernity. One British Intelligence officers, Andrew Ryan, who had been very vocal in the official conspiracy theories confessed what kind of conceptions and misconceptions were coloring his views:

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I feared political pan-Islamism. It looked as though Mustafa Kemal might make that his instrument as Enver had almost certainly dreamt of doing. I did not see much difference in, so far as I remember, between Kemal’s group and the old Committee of Union and Progress, apart from a struggle for leadership. Nor did I see much essential difference for practical purposes between pan-Turanianism, which was now coming to evidence, and pan-Islamism. Both aimed at an extension of Turkish influence over wide Islamic areas, even though the areas might be different. They seemed to me like two horses which could be harnessed to the Turkish coach, the ultimate preference to be determined according to which should prove the better puller. Last, but by no means least, I was concerned for the future of the Christian minorities if they were left under uncontrolled Turkish rule.

I cannot now claim that all these views were right. I can only say that they were tenable at the time. Subsequent events disproved some of them, notably the fear of pan-Islamism. That virus was driven out for an indefinite period by the stronger virus of nationalism.¹¹

Not without a reason, the CUP leaders has been considered as one of the villains and losers of the Great War—condemned for their crimes and misdeeds. Their last attempt to turn the tables after the armistice by a transnational uprising of Muslims against the Entente resulted in failure as well. In the new order of the interwar period there was no room for Enver, Talat, and Cemal anymore. They were all eliminated and marginalized. Nevertheless «the Young Turk aftermath», as it has been told here, had also certain afterpains and phantom pains. After the remaining CUP leaders had returned to Turkey, Cavid Bey and Dr. Nazım were executed in 1926, as it was discovered that they were conspiring to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha in İzmir.¹² The verdict of the Independence Tribunal that sentenced the CUP leaders to death practically wrote the official history of this Young Turk movement in Turkey:

> It has been established as its details are included in the protocols that as soon as they anticipated the capability of the national resistance the fugitives of the Great War committed themselves to these undertakings and activities starting in Berlin and then continued in Moscow and Batum. Once again with the purpose of seizing the destiny of the homeland, they were engaged in activities that would impossibly repair and compensate the catastrophes they caused from which the nation was trying to save itself.¹³

Thus, the history of Young Turk exile was reduced to a foreign intervention to a struggle of national self-determination by rogue revolutionaries. The Kemalist regime would even be proven right with its paranoia about further subversive schemes by former CUP members only one year after the İzmir assassination attempt. In 1927, Hacı Sami secretly entered Anatolia from the Greek islands

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with a paramilitary band, possibly with the purpose of assassinating Mustafa Kemal Pasha or conducting a coup. He was subsequently captured and executed. Hacı Sami had taken the command of the Basmachi insurgents after Enver’s death, but soon he was forced to retrieve to Afghanistan in face of the Soviet advance. He could not legally return to Turkey, as he was put on the list of 150 *persona non grata*. Enver’s family clan, with the exception of Kamil who married Enver’s widow, all returned to Turkey, but remained publicly loyal to the Kemalist regime.

Although they were condemned and marginalized by their successors, the Young Turks simultaneously represented the new face of the Middle East. The Young Turk zeitgeist prevailed in the post-Ottoman Middle East. In Turkey, this was more obvious as the new Kemalists were all ex-Unionists or crypto-Unionists at best. British Intelligence verdict on the Kemalist-Unionist relations in 1922 was that «no hard and fast distinction can be made between the two Turkish parties» and that «practically all the political leaders and prominent officials in Anatolia were closely connected with the C.U.P. up the time of the Armistice». The first three presidents of the Republic of Turkey until 1960, namely Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and Celal Bayar, were all members of the CUP. The Young Turk era ended in Turkey perhaps only with the military intervention of 1960.

The Young Turk legacy continued in the Ottoman Middle East as well. Several Iraqi Prime Ministers were CUP members or classmates of prominent Young Turks. «The new generation of Iraqis», as Middle-East historian Phebe Marr concluded, «no matter how vociferously they might denounce the Young Turks, resembled nothing so much as an Arab version of the Young Turks themselves.»

The *Nadi al-Arabi* Club in Palestine was called by a British official as bearing «resemblance in its

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16 The family history of the Enver clan after 1922 is told in Bardakç, *Enver*, 377–401.
own country to the C.U.P. in Turkey». The initiation oath ritual of the CUP, where a hand was put on Quran and on a revolver, was later copied by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and by secret societies of Indian Muslims. In a Soviet report from 1925, it was complained that Enver Pasha’s tomb has become a local place of pilgrimage. One of the mentors of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the former President of Egypt, was none but Aziz Ali al-Misri, a prominent CUP member and an Ottoman officer trained and served in revolutionary warfare alongside with Enver and Mustafa Kemal. The communist leader of Albania Enver Hoxha, born in the year of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and Nasser’s successor as Egypt’s president Anwar al-Sadat born in December 1918 after the end of World War I were both named after Enver Pasha. Not only in regard to military and revolutionary politics, there was a certain continuity of the Young Turk legacy, but unfortunately also in regards to the treatment of non-Muslim and «tribal» minorities. The Young Turk style of top-down measures of assimilation and suppression as well as populist mob violence against minorities continued to plague the post-Ottoman lands in the following decades.

While the British and French intelligence services were still reporting on the phantom pains of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies up until 1925, the transnational movement of anticolo- nial Muslim nationalism propagated by the Young Turks served, as Zafer Toprak argues, as a «pre-cursor» of the decolonization and independence movements of the Muslim world in the twentieth century. The significance of this particular microhistory of a bunch of professional revolutionaries is that it offers an understanding of contentious politics at the meso level of transnational activist networks and their interaction with the macro level of international relations in the aftermath of

22 Nabican Bakiyev, Enver Paşa’nın Vasiyeti, ed. Çağatay Koçar (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006), 273.
World War I. A dialectic process of deception, speculation, and paranoia connected distant actors and events in a formative moment in world politics. On the meta level, the «Young Turk aftermath» illustrates uniquely how some of the most essential continuities and discontinuities were drawn in the making of epistemes of the post-Ottoman Middle East.
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Archives of the German Museum (Archiv des Deutschen Museums), Munich

JW
Junkers-Werke Papers

AMAE
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères), Paris

ATASE
Turkish General Staff’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), Ankara

ATAZB
Atatürk Kolleksiyonu

İSH
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BA-MA
German Military Archives (Bundesarchiv, Militärarchive), Freiburg im Breisgau

BAR
Federal Archives of Switzerland (Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv), Berne

BayHStA
Bavarian Central State Archives (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv), Munich

BCA
Prime Ministerial Republican Archives (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi), Ankara

BOA
Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Istanbul

BL
British Library, London

IO
India Office Records and Private Papers

PA-AA
Political Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), Berlin

StdAM
City Archive Munich (Stadtarchiv München)

TİTE
Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü), Ankara

TNA
The National Archives, Kew Gardens

CAB
Cabinet Papers

FO
Foreign Office Papers

WO
War Office Papers

TTK
Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu), Ankara

CP
Cemal Paşa Kolleksiyonu

EP
Enver Paşa Kolleksiyonu

ZMO
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NGH
Nachlass Prof. Dr. Gerhard Höpp

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