Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?

Finke, Daniel and Bailer, Stefanie. (2018) Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure? European Union Politics, 20 (1). pp. 109-133.

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/68535/

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To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis.
Faculties and Departments:04 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Departement Gesellschaftswissenschaften > Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft > Politikwissenschaft (Bailer)
UniBasel Contributors:Bailer, Stefanie
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:29 Sep 2023 13:36
Deposited On:12 Feb 2019 13:27

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