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Troubled Resemblances.

Portrait and Poetics in Breitinger's *Critische Dichtkunst*, Wieland's *Don Sylvio*, Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry* and Radcliffe's *Castle of Udolpho*

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Abstract:

This article discusses the role of the portrait in German and English prose fiction between 1760 and 1800, in the heyday of the cultural use of portraiture, concentrating on novels by Wieland and Radcliffe in relation to the poetic theories of Breitinger and Burke. In many works from this period, the portrait figures not only as a requisite, but as a motor of the plot. In the most prevalent narrative scheme, a young man finds a miniature painting, falls in love with the woman depicted, and goes on a quest to find her; in the best case, a happy union results; in the worst case, he goes mad in a labyrinth of revenants and doppelganger. A frequent variant includes a genealogical (sub)plot, whereby the observer / pursuer is drawn into the abysses of his unknown family history. The article argues that the portrait can be understood as a figure of poetological reflection. Inasmuch as they incorporate the portrait into narrative events, Wieland's and Radcliffe's novels treat important aesthetic and poetic concerns of the day: 1. detachment from established models of mimesis and the problematization of the concept of "original image" [Urbild]; 2. (new) paradigms of the marvelous [das Wunderbare] and the Gothic; 3. models of literary animacy / animation [Lebendigkeit / Verlebendigung] and the superiority of literature over painting.

> Whom do I see, who here looks at me too?
> Did Nature make it, Herr Strobel, or did you?
> Picture! No picture! To see this smile, this blush,
> This throat, neck, and mouth—can it come from a brush?
>
> Where, then, does the spirit dwell? The visage is all I see
> Let the soul be where it will, the being stands with me:

It lives! Or something animate has given its bond—
Are you image or human life? Won't you respond?

[*Wem seh' ich, oder wer sieht mir vom Bilde zu?*
Hats die Natur gemacht, Herr Strobel, oder du?
O Bild! O nicht ein Bild! Dieß lieblich seh'n, dieß Lachen,
Den Hals, dieß Haar, den Mund, kann dieß der Pinsel machen?

Wo bleibet dann der Geist? Das Antlitz ist allhier;
Der Geist sey wo er will, das Mensch steht doch bey mir:
Es lebet!, oder muß ja etwas in ihm leben.
Bistu Bild, oder Mensch? Willstu nicht Antwort geben?]
(Opitz 495; Breitinger 305) [1]

Opitz's poem "An eben jhn / vber seine Abildung eines Frawenzimmers" ("To the Artist: On His Painting of a Lady," ca. 1628) extols a picture by the artist Bartholomäus Strobel. The verses raise a number of questions concerning the relationship between poetic language, pictorial representation, and the lyrical I. Enlisting a topos of the literary tradition of ekphrasis,[2] Opitz observes that the image seems to be alive. Although the observer knows he is looking at a painting, the woman strikes him as if she were flesh and blood: "Picture! No picture!" Initially, the poem names two possible creators of the image: Nature—which amounts to denying the artifact—or the artist, who has imitated Nature well enough to fool the human eye. That said, the second line—"Did Nature make it, Herr Strobel, or did you?"—opens another possibility. If "Herr Strobel" has ursurped the place

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[1] The editor of Opitz *Gesammelte Werke* indicates that the painting by Strobel named here is considered lost. The poem is quoted following Breitinger's mention of it in his *Critische Dichtkunst* (1740).

[2] Here, the term ekphrasis is used in the rhetorical sense: a vivid description of an object, with particular reference to the description of works of art and, in particular, images, as has been the norm since the mid-twentieth century. On the definition of the concept in recent scholarship, see Schaefer and Rentsch (2004), and Boehm and Pfotenhauer (1995).

of Nature, the picture may also be understood as the product of a fertile (artistic) imagination. And the question in the concluding line ("or did you") could be addressed to the portrait itself; in this case, the image is autonomous. Or else Opitz's words signal that the image depends on the observer and his literary *ekphrasis*: its qualities come to light only insofar as it is viewed and discussed. Finally, the poem confronts the lyrical I with an uncanny reciprocity: the observer can no longer be certain whether he is looking at the picture or if the picture is also looking at him.[3]

Questions of this kind recur throughout what follows. My article discusses the role of the portrait, especially the painted miniature, in German and English prose fiction between 1760 and 1800.[4] Pertinent examples include Wieland's *Die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva* (1764), Walpole's *Castle of Otranto* (1764), Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794), Matthew's *The Monk* (1796), Radcliffe's *The Italian* (1797), and Tieck's *Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen* (1798) to name but a few. In all of these works, the portrait serves as both a pillar and motor of plot.[5] The most prevalent scheme, best known through Mozart's *Zauberflöte* (1791), goes as follows: a young man finds a miniature likeness; he falls in love with the woman depicted and sets off on a quest to find her; in the best case, a happy union results; in the worst case, he goes mad in a labyrinth of revenants and doppelganger. A frequent variant includes a genealogical (sub)plot, wherein the observer/pursuer is drawn into the abysses of his unknown family history. To name just one example: In Tieck's *Franz Sternbald* (1798), the poet Rudolph tells the story of the young Ferdinand, who finds a miniature portrait in the woods, falls in love with the woman he sees, sets out to find her, and, in the course of events, also discovers his future wife's long lost family. This embedded narrative provides the model for the life story of Franz Sternbald, a young painter, who also carries a portrait of his unknown beloved on his person. But before he can find her, he must navigate a maze of ancestral secrets based on

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[3] Grootenboer considers this exchange of roles to typify the effect of so-called eye miniatures, which were popular during the late eighteenth century (4).

[4] To my knowledge, this topic has not received much critical attention. Two notable examples: Elliott and Fay.

[5] This list could be expanded well into the nineteenth century to include, among other works, Brentano's *Godwi oder Das steinerne Bild der Mutter* (1800–01), Jean Paul's *Titan* (1800–03), Eichendorff's *Ahnung und Gegenwart* (1815), and Hoffmann's *Elixiere des Teufels* (1815–16). Poe's "The Oval Portrait" (1842) and Wilde's *Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890) are also obvious candidates. Needless to say, the advent of photography raises new questions—evident, for instance, in Hawthorne's *House of Seven Gables* (1851).

resemblances to parties living and dead; the novel, which is fragmentary, leaves the question open whether he will also uncover his own heritage in the process.

On the one hand, the literary presence of portraits in these texts mirrors a widespread cultural use of the portrait at that time. The art of portraiture experienced a boom during these years; Kamilla Elliott describes the "cultural use of portraiture" between 1764 and 1835 as a phenomenon of "*mass* picture identification" (3): a semiotic practice for defining social identity and elevating social status. The ascendant bourgeoisie claimed a privilege formerly reserved for the aristocracy: to command both one's body and its representation by securing one's name and ancestral line in a domestic gallery (2–6). Simultaneously, this cultural predilection for the pictorial likeness amounted to a new practice of communication linked to the search for authenticity. It was sentimental fashion to exchange miniature portraits with relatives, friends, and—especially—one's beloved. Hanneke Grootenboer connects this "economy of exchange" to the "intimacy of letter writing" and stresses the affectionate reactions it prompted: miniatures could be "stared at, held, pressed to a bosom, and kissed" (22).[6] The practice was based on the notion that the individual personality finds its fullest expression in/through an image. The German philosopher and aesthetic theorist Johann Georg Sulzer, who also advised physiognomists to study portraits, summarized the rationale as follows: "A perfect portrait is an important painting [...] because it reveals the soul of a human being in its distinct, personal traits" (919). Accordingly, the miniature portrait counted as personal testimony in a double sense—as proof of belonging and as an illustration of the depicted individual's innermost being. For the same reason, the portrait was thought to be capable of arousing deep emotions and of strengthening emotional bonds: "Such painting [offers] a powerful means [...] for sustaining the bonds of reverence and love [...]. A portrait can make an impression on people almost as strong as the actual person" (Sulzer 919). In this context, lyrical ekphrases also flourished: people hymned the portraits of friends, those of celebrities, and even the pictures of fictive persons.[7]

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[6] On the development of portrait theory in general, see Pommier 11–32, 313–428; Preimesberger, Baader and Suthor 369–408; and Busch chapter 4.
[7] On this lyrical fashion, see Schumacher.

On the other hand—and this point represents the focus of my discussion here—the portrait functions as a central figure for poetological reflection, raising significant aesthetic and poetical concerns of the day: (1) The detachment from established models of mimesis and the problematization of the concept of "original image" [*Urbild*]; (2) the (new) paradigms of the marvelous [*das Wunderbare*] and the Gothic; (3) models of literary animacy / animation [*Lebendigkeit/Verlebendigung*] and the superiority of literature over painting.[8] The following explores this thesis by looking at two prototypical "portrait-novels" by Wieland and Radcliffe (and some others in passing) in relation to the theories of Breitinger and Burke.

I do not mean to suggest direct influence, even though Burke and Radcliffe found avid readers in German speaking countries and German works (especially Schillers *Geisterseher* [1787–9]) had a marked effect on the English Gothic novel, at least during the 1790s.[9] Rather, by looking at German *and* English writings in comparative context, I would like to draw attention to larger aesthetic and poetological concerns on both sides of the Channel and demonstrate the connection of seemingly independent literary modes—the marvelous [*das Wunderbare*] and the Gothic—as well as their common points of issue, such as the paragone between literature and painting, the conflict between verisimilitude and imagination, and—ultimately—their coming to terms with the powers of poiesis.[10]

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[8] An important context for the aesthetic and poetological thematization of animacy/animation [*Lebendigkeit / Verlebendigung*] that cannot be explored here is the discourse of the emerging life sciences, which defined life via movement, or, more precisely, as the dynamics between rest and movement. See Thüring 301–442.

[9] Cf. High. Horner speaks of a "spirited exchange" between the English and German Gothic. Murnane and Cusack also draw attention to the "transnationality" of Gothic literature (7).

[10] In this sense, I agree with Miles's position that: "[t]he origins of the Gothic lie, not in Horace Walpole's mind, but in the aesthetic that preceded his novel." For "many of the motifs, figures, topoi and themes that characterize Gothic writing find a previous expression"; that said, Gothic writing "does not absorb these motifs and figures as it finds them. They are, rather, mediated, and as a result, always on edge" (30). Along similar lines, Murnane and Cusack have recently affirmed that "German Gothic [*der deutsche Schauerrorman*] [...] emerges in the 1780s as a development out of the sentimental discourse (enthusiasm [*Schwärmerei*], imagination [*Einbildung*], effect aesthetics [*Wirkungsästhetik*] and the *Sturm und Drang* period" (9); earlier on, Viering explored the same connection with particular emphasis on Wieland. In Murnane's and Cusack's view, the Gothic novel marks the "threshold between enlightenment and romanticism" (11), in that it no longer follows the demand for *prodesse et delectare*, but still participates in the enlightenment's discourse on (problematizing) "imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], belief in ghosts and the possibility to calculate human action and thought" (14). My analysis of the poetological function of the portrait in Wieland's and Radcliffe's novels substantiates such claims.

Breitinger's Wondrous Animacy

Breitinger enlists Opitz's verse on Strobel's painting to develop a particular aspect of his poetic doctrine. His *Critische Dichtkunst* (Critical Art of Poetry, 1740) treats both the question of how the poet can follow the commandment of verisimilitude when representing wondrous events and the opposite question of how, when portraying everyday matters, it is possible to lend them a "sheen of novelty"—indeed, a wondrous quality: the "utmost echelon of the new" (110, 128; *äußersten Staffel des Neuen*). Different perspectives on artistic (re)presentation correspond to these two poles: whereas Breitinger's discussion of the verisimilitude of the marvelous primarily concerns the material to be treated, the discussion of making the ordinary wondrous concerns the matter of representation. He proposes three methods for the poet to dress the commonplace in an "appearance of falsehood" and thereby turn it into the object of marvel: by assuring that his words exploit the tricks played by the senses, by the emotions, and, finally, by superstition (299). The paramount example for the senses' deception, in Breitinger's eyes, is the painted image; his series of authoritative references culminates in the portrait painted by Strobel and praised by Opitz (305). Above all, what interests Breitinger about Strobel's painting is the superb imitation of nature, which seems deceptively real, causing Opitz's observer to marvel (305). In developing this argument, Breitinger also refers to the well-known episode that Pliny the Elder tells of Zeuxis, who painted grapes with such uncanny accuracy that birds were fooled and even tried to pick at them. Commenting on this passage, he observes that the masterpiece did not garner praise because of the subject matter but because of the "art [of imitation]" it displayed: "one admired [the artist's] brush, which proved able to reproduce nature so precisely; this makes it clear that successful imitation exalts the painter's achievement most of all" (83).[11] Breitinger thus declares that Strobel's picture may be classified as marvelous because it feigns remarkable animacy [*Lebendigkeit*], which exemplifies the art of imitating nature in admirable fashion.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Breitinger disregards the fact that Opitz's poem does *not* display clear awareness of the deception taking place; as such, the question

[11] On Zeuxis, also see Breitinger 65. For discussion of this anecdote, cf. Brandes 42, 44. Brandes also points to an analogous passage in Bodmer's *Betrachtungen über die poetischen Gemälden der Dichter*: "Among the painters, he is considered the greatest master who paints so skillfully according to nature that we view the copy [*Nachbild*] as the original [*Urbild*]" (41).

of imitating an original as perfectly as possible cannot provide the focus of the poem. Rather, another classic theme stands at issue: illusory animacy that conceals its own artifice (cf. Brandes 51). Accordingly, the reproduction presented here has no model (the woman is unknown to the observer); instead, it is the "afterimage" itself that aspires—to use the words of Bodmer in his *Betrachtungen über die poetischen Gemälden der Dichter* (*Observations on the Poetic Paintings of Writers*, 1741)—to take "the place of the original" (Bodmer 43, qtd. in Brandes 49). In this regard, the setting does not call Zeuxis to mind so much as another, well-known narrative of the living image: the myth of Pygmalion, to which Bodmer also refers here.[12] After all, the statue Pygmalion fashions is, quite purposively, a "work without a model" (Brandes 49; with reference to Schmitz-Emans) that, while indebted to the paradigm of mimesis, at the same time subverts it both inasmuch as it has no original and inasmuch as it endeavors "[entirely to hide] art within the work of art" (Ovid 1.252; qtd. in Brandes 48). As Brandes observes apropos of Pygmalion: "through its lifelike quality [*Lebendigkeit*], which causes its status as art to be forgotten, the image casts off the stigma of being secondary and derivative and assumes the 'ontological rank of the natural'" (48; citing Schmitz-Emans).

Ultimately, however, in this episode Breitinger is not interested in pictorial technique so much as the *poetic* means for establishing an "appearance of newness" (291). Thus, it is not the portrait, but Opitz's ekphrasis that defamiliarizes the commonplace by exploiting the senses' fallibility and presenting an inanimate image as an animate likeness. In the process, "his description, along with the painter's artistry" proves to be what "actually [makes the object] wondrous" (304). That is, for Breitinger, the marvelous vividness offered by this picture of a woman always already involves the literary realization of the same vital quality. In concrete terms, the matter concerns rhetorical figures: *evidentia* (in the sense of vividness, which became a synonym for animacy in the eighteenth century—and is how Breitinger employs the term[13]), but also *energeia* (both in the sense of picturing activity and in the sense of aesthetic efficacy); later, Adelung would declare

[12] Cf. Schmitz-Emans; Mülder-Bach; Brandes 47–55.

[13] "Upon this similarity and agreement of the likeness of nature rests […] the vivid clarity of representations, from which arises the wonderful power to touch our fantasy; it makes us say to ourselves when considering [one of them]: 'Truly, it is just what I saw, just what I heard—or what I would see with my eyes, or hear with my ears, if the original of this thing presented itself to my eyes or ears.' For this very reason, ancient teachers of art called it […] *evidentia*" (Breitinger 66).

that an expression is vivacious when it sets the lower forces of the soul in motion [274]), and *prosopopoeia*: "[poets] say that the figures on a painting live and speak," Breitinger writes (302). All three of these figures feature prominently in Opitz's ekphrasis, too.[14] Thus, it is only in and through literature that the picture of the woman comes alive for Breitinger.[15] Even though Breitinger says that literary depiction simply *follows* the "tricks of the senses" played by visual representation, at the same time—and this point is key—he sets the mere *illusion* of life in visual art apart from the *veracity* of life afforded by literature. For fine art lacks "motion, which belongs to life alone" (18–9),[16] writes Breitinger, and it seems one can already hear Lessing here. A picture can only communicate the "*appearance* of life and motion"; but literature can offer "motion that is true and real" (303; my emphasis). It follows, for Breitinger, that via ekphrasis the status of movement and animacy changes from being a matter of mere deception and becomes a "truth." Literature, then, achieves the "truth of imagination" that Breitinger postulates—a postulate that ultimately relativizes his rationalist conception of truth:

> One must distinguish what is true in understanding and what is true in imagination; what seems to be false to the understanding may be accepted by the imagination as

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[14] Thus, for example, demonstrative pronouns drawing attention to facial features seek to place the image before our inner eye; words addressed directly to the picture, endowing it with the ability to see and speak, make it into a living presence; the antithetical oscillation between questions and statements, between *either* and *or*, sets the whole poem into motion. On these rhetorical figures, see, in addition to the works cited in the next footnote, Brandes 34–41; Mülder-Bach 105–108.

[15] On the aesthetic topos of animacy, see Menninghaus "Ein Gefühl der Beförderung des Lebens"; "Darstellung" 214–16; as well as the essays to which Menninghaus refers: Fehrenbach "Color nativus"; "Kohäsion und Transgression"; "Lebendigkeit"; and "Das lebendige Ganze". Also see Brandes. Menninghaus describes how **"**Kant's reformulation of the topos [displaces] the primacy of the concept of livingness **[***Lebendigkeitsbegriff*] directly, and in an increasingly de-metaphorized sense, onto an autopoetic event within the subject. Accordingly, Kant speaks much more rarely of a representation [*Vorstellung*] that is inherently 'animated' [*lebhaft*] or 'animate' [*lebendig*] than of one 'animating' [*beleben*] the subject. The almost complete avoidance of the received topos, even as Baumgarten adapted it for philosophy—as 'animate / animated representation / portrayal' **[***lebendige / lebhafte Vorstellung / Darstellung*]—should be read, above all, as a thoroughgoing strategy for emphasizing the turn away from the rhetorical and poetic paradigm. To be sure, Kant continues to hold to received rules of poetic synthesis (*compositio*), according to which, e.g., novelty, contrast, variation, and amplification are able to 'animate' subjective representation. However, he does not affirm that 'products of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*]' corresponding to these rules automatically bring forth an animating effect. Instead, they aim for it because, and inasmuch as, they 'bring into motion' [*in Schwung versetzen*] the recipient's own imagination in such a way that it launches into 'play' of its own, 'which sustains itself and even strengthens the forces fueling it [*welches sich von selbst erhält und selbst die Kräfte dazu stärkt*]'" ("Ein Gefühl der Beförderung des Lebens" 93). The significance of autopoeisis (of the portrait, which creates its original after the fact) will also be evident below.

[16] See also footnote 13 above for an important context for this notion: the discourse of the emerging life sciences.

> true: [...] What is true for the understanding belongs to worldly wisdom [i.e., philosophy]; the poet, on the other hand makes what is true for imagination his own. (138–9)

In literature, what is "true in imagination" attains the reality that the lower faculties of insight have always already granted it: the image comes alive.

***The Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva,* or, The Copy as Original**

Breitinger's reflections on the wondrously vivid quality of the portrait in the literary *ekphrasis* raise questions of great import, then, even if he does not develop the radical potential identified by poetic theorists much later. These questions concern the truth of literature—or, more precisely, the truth of the marvelous in literature—and the subjectivity it implies.[17] The following takes up two texts that explore these issues by way of following up on the motif of an unknown woman's portrait: Wieland's *Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva* (*Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva*, 1764) and Radcliffe's *Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794).

Scholars have often observed that Wieland's *Don Quijotiade*, just as Radcliffe's *Mysteries*, for that matter, is about the excesses of the power of imagination—that is about an incongruous relationship between imagination and sensibility which is to be set right. At the same time, however, they have largely failed to remark that it is not only mental images that play a key role in Wieland's novel, but also an actual picture: the miniature portrait that Don Sylvio finds in the woods, which sends him searching for his imaginary princess.[18] In the conflict underlying the novel—whether the supernatural encounters amount to something imaginary or not—Don Sylvio relies on the painted likeness for proof that his experiences are real. When Pedrillo, the book's Sancho Panza figure, voices suspicions that the fairytale events are all just a dream, Don Sylvio replies:

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[17] Scholars still disagree about how far Breitinger is going here. For the most varied positions concerning Breitinger's proximity to Gottsched, relativistic (Italian) poetics, and orientation on reception that also incorporates cognitive-psychological factors, cf., respectively: Stöckmann 340–62; Gisi; and Sommadossi. These discussions may all be contrasted with a position articulated just one year after Breitinger's *Critische Dichtkunst,* which emphasizes a conception of mimesis focused on the difference between original and copy that bears on the discussion below: Schlegel's *Abhandlung von der Unähnlichkeit in der Nachahmung* (1741), as well as *Von der Nachahmung* (1742–3). On conceptions of likeness in the eighteenth century and in general, cf. Stöckmann 165–94; and Petersen.

[18] To my knowledge, this has only been discussed at length by Heins (540–5); the following comments build on his observations.

> "And do you suppose that my seeing the fairy Radiante, and her informing me of all I had to do for regaining my incomparable princess—tell me, blockhead, do you suppose all this to be a dream? and do you suppose this picture here at my neck too to be all a dream?" Saying this, he took the trinket, pressed the spring, and showed Pedrillo the little picture….
>
> "Ah! by Saint James," cried he, "… I must be an oaf indeed now, not to believe everything you have been telling me; though, on my conscience, I never could have believed it, had I not seen her with my own eyes. (*The Adventures* 46; *Der Sieg der Natur* 40–1)

The portrait offers sensory evidence in support of Don Sylvio's narrative. Thereby—and in contrast to images that are purely mental—it confirms the tale's truth: there must be an original [*Urbild*] that the likeness [*Abbild*] matches.

This might qualify as a naïve conception of visual art, were it not for the fact that it corresponds perfectly to Breitinger's claim that "all imitation [*Nachahmung*] … presupposes a determinate prototype [*Urbild*]" (63). In this context, the enchantment the miniature occasions in Don Sylvio may be read as Wieland contesting the theory of his teacher Breitinger. For the latter views it as proof of an artwork's quality when the observer is as spellbound by the reproduction as by the original. At the same time, however, such "equivalence of effect" must prove fleeting so that the hierarchical relationship between original and copy does not become imperiled (64). Ultimately, objects in nature—because they are "really real"—should elicit a stronger effect (64). Breitinger lends emphasis to this hierarchy by declaring that a portrait with a model unknown to the observer exercises a lesser effect than one with a known model. For, in the second case, one may compare the original and the copy and, on this basis, experience deeper delight:

> It has been observed that the artistic depiction of an unknown person, whom we have never seen before, causes a lesser joy than the counterfeit of a known person; […] because, when picturing an unknown thing, […] this pleasant comparison of the impression with the stamp [*des Abdruckes mit dem Urbilde*] does not take place. (73–4)

It is astonishing how exactly Wieland's novel treats and challenges Breitinger's theoretical claims about visual art through Don Sylvio's reactions to the miniature.[19] After all, Don Sylvio is delighted to no end by the depiction of a person he does *not* know—here, Wieland activates, as it were, the potential that already lies hidden in Breitinger's example: the poem by Opitz, which also presents an *unknown* beauty. What is more, when Don Sylvio brings the picture to life in his imagination, the matter does not resolve into emotion that ultimately concerns the original or expresses wonder at the artist's skill; rather, it entails an affective cathexis of the copy. Wieland modifies Breitinger's theory of art over its conceptual pivot: the notion of an original image [*Urbild*] and a copy based on it [*Abbild*]. For in *The Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva,* no original exists for the miniature portrait. The supposed model, Felicia, turns out to be just a copy of her grandmother—first, a genetic copy, and then a depicted copy in a large portrait in the picture gallery. Indeed, even the grandmother is not the miniature's original, for she had already died by the time it was made. Instead, two other images occupy the position of the "original." As Felicia explains, the miniature is based on two portraits of the grandmother; the second, smaller one, "perfectly resembles" the first:

> "It represents my grandmother, […] just as she was at sixteen years of age; and here," continued she, pointing to a little miniature portrait […] "here you see another picture of her, which was done nearly about the same time. It perfectly resembles the large one, and from these [*nota bene*, NG] was taken the small likeness [i.e., the miniature Don Sylvio adores, NG]." (*The Adventures* 428–9; *Der Sieg der Natur* 324)[20]

[19] In a certain sense, such closer examination also occurred *with* Breitinger, insofar as he already relativized the poetological significance of the original [*Urbild*] himself: "consequently, the poet must not only have familiarized himself with the works of Nature, which have achieved their reality through the power of Creation; he must also have zealously studied what still lies hidden in their powers—and all the more, since the latter, that is, the imitation of Nature in its range of possibility [*in dem Möglichen*], is the proper and primary work [*das eigene und Haupt-Werck*] of Poetry" (57). Thanks to a conception of mimesis he stretched almost to the point of breaking, Breitinger has the "poetic brush" (122) paint possible worlds—that is, ones arising from the (primarily reproductive) imagination. Here, the marvelous no longer appears merely as the altered version of something that is supposed to be known, but as something genuinely new—not new in the sense of a "completion of the spectrum of possible phenomena," but as their new combination (cf. Sommadossi 53). Only literature can afford insight into such novelty [*das Neue*]; at the same time, it represents the sole form in which this novelty materializes.

[20] Translation slightly modified.

Thus, even the image that takes the place of the original turns out to be divided: it has always already been marked by a relation of similarity, which is to say, difference. The miniature portrait simply has no *Urbild* in Breitinger's sense; there is no original, nor is there even a single image standing in for the original. Instead, it points only to other images like it, which, insofar as they refer to each other via the similarity they share, constitute a potentially infinite chain of iconic signs.

However, Don Sylvio does not arrive at this conclusion when matters are explained to him. In his eyes, the lack of an original even heightens the miniature "halo": "No matter whom it shows," he declares, he loves Felicia in the picture, even though it certainly does *not* represent her (*The Adventures* 435; *Der Sieg der Natur* 323). Even though the ontological reality of an originary image does not hold, the trace of the relationship to an archetype offers the promise of a reality effect. The miniature portrait unfolds a persuasive rhetoric out of which it belatedly generates its own original. In terms of the theory of art, Wieland is taking leave from the concept of imitation here: he grants the miniature portrait value in its own right. What Pygmalion asked of Venus, that she bring him a woman exactly like the one his statue represents, occurs in the novel when Don Sylvio encounters Felicia, who resembles the portrait to an extreme degree. As such, Felicia does not take the place of the portrait at the end of the book. Instead, Don Sylvio perceives her as a portrait that has come to life; retroactively, she is set in the position of an original.[21] Through Felicia, the image of the woman is elevated to the "ontological rank of the natural" that Don Sylvio has always already granted it (Schmitz-Emans 167; also qtd. in Brandes 49).

Wieland also employs this process of transformation, which runs through the novel, to demonstrate the imagination's dependency on enlivening media, as well as the complementary relationship between such media. Accordingly, the fantasy-image of the princess inspired by fairy tales receives sensory confirmation through painting. In a second step, the portrait image is woven into the plot, which reveals that the princess really exists—and this narrative thread is always already shown to be a novelistic plot. This occurs, on the one hand, by way of numerous metalepses, and, on the other, because

[21] Against the backdrop of Menninghaus's analyses, it is possible to see how this movement also announces the replacement of the concept of imitation by that of representation [*Darstellung*], which Menninghaus credits to Klopstock ("Darstellung") and Mülder-Bach to Herder (49–102): it is no longer copying [*Nachahmung*] but production [*Poiesis*] that stands at the heart of poetics.

Felicia's existence only stems from the universe described in another novel: Lesage's picaresque novel *Histoire de Gil Blas de Santillane* (1715); Don Eugenio and Felicia, his sister, present themselves as the grandchildren of the title character (*The Adventures* 411; *Der Sieg der Natur* 310).[22] At its end, *The Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva* leaves no room for doubt that the fantastic image ultimately derives its power to come alive from the medium of literature. This is evident, not least of all, in the possibility to read the enthusiast's animation of the portrait as a metaphorical transference: Don Sylvio transfers the image onto Felicia—that is, the portrait, which supplies the image, acts as filter through which he belatedly perceives her, the recipient of the image, as the original; conversely, as much it is cross-faded with Felicia, the portrait is endowed with the very animacy that Aristotle already expected of metaphor in general.

And so, what Breitinger recommended as a rhetorical technique for establishing the new and marvelous is employed to psychological ends by Wieland, an enthusiast who gives life to the figures of his imagination takes the place of literary ekphrasis (Preisendanz 81–8). To quote Jean Paul, whose novels, such as *Titan* (1800–3) follow in Wieland's footsteps in this regard, the marvelous takes the stage as the product of the "natural magic of imagination"—fittingly, the subtitle of Wieland's book announces that "all things marvelous [prove] natural [*alles Wunderbare natürlich*]" here.[23] Accordingly, at the end the novel relativizes the concept of reality by subverting the separation between Don Sylvio's world of illusion and the real world: on the one hand, the latter is shown to derive from another novel. On the other hand, numerous glosses offered by the narrator suggest that Don Sylvio's imaginary world might possess extra-diegetic validity. He invokes, thereby drawing radical conclusions from Breitinger's reflections on the "truth of imagination," a "second reality" (*Der Sieg der Natur* 44): it is internal, merely imagined things that have the greatest influence on the lives of all human beings; accordingly, these matters are subjectively true and just as real for a given individual as external facts. This inner reality takes form in keeping with the rules of literature (the inner world of a reader of fairytales looks different than that of a reader of chivalric novels [*Der Sieg der Natur* 303]), which is also the most important medium for bringing the mental images to life.

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[22] For the textual evidence, see the editor's afterword to Wieland *Die Abenteuer* (528).
[23] See on this new concept of the marvelous as "natural" and not "supernatural": Gess.

From Walpole and Burke to Radcliffe

Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto*, which inaugurated the genre of the Gothic novel, came out in 1764—the same year as Wieland's *Don Sylvio*—and deals with similar problems. What would later be termed "Gothic", is still termed "miraculous" here—which makes its proximity to the poetics of the marvelous quite explicit.[24] The preface to the first edition, written in the voice of a fictitious editor, establishes a clear distance between the original story, supposedly by an unknown author, and the reader; this occurs through multiple levels of mediation: the composition of the manuscript, its publication in Naples after hundreds of years, its discovery centuries later in an English library, its translation, and, finally, its appearance with pseudonymous attribution. However, none of this paves the way for metaleptic narration, as in Wieland; rather, it is meant to heighten the tale's authenticity and, correspondingly, the chills it offers: "I cannot but believe that the groundwork of the story is founded on truth" (8), the editor avows. All the same, Walpole dropped the editorial fiction in the preface to the second edition in order to take credit for his work, which had proven a success, and its new style. If, in the preface to the first edition, he still felt the need to offer excuses for the book's "*air* of the *miraculous*" and its many "preternatural events" by claiming that it had been written in the darkest Middle Ages (6), these same features, in the second preface, offer proof of his own ingenuity: "powers of fancy [...] to expatiate [at liberty] through the boundless realms of invention" (9).[25]

Presenting the second edition of his novel, Walpole stresses that—notwithstanding the "air of the miraculous" pervading the work—he has done right by the demands of modern poetics and adhered to the "rules of probability" inasmuch as his characters comport themselves in a manner appropriate to unusual situations (9–10). He has paired

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[24] Miles turns Walpole's effort to "get the adjustment between probability and the marvellous exactly right" (35) quite convincingly into an argument about genre: "The apologists for prose or Gothic romance naturally wished to distance themselves from the abortive novel; in this respect, the marvellous must be seen as an overdetermined mark of difference" (35). The affinity between the Gothic and the marvelous is also evident in Burke's treatment of terror, which greatly influenced the Gothic novel (especially Radcliffe). Burke understood terror to be strongly connected to astonishment—the aesthetic emotion central for the poetics of the marvelous as well (e.g., in Breitinger, who calls it *Verwunderung*). Also, compendia such as Lewis' "Tales of Wonder" and the anonymous "Tales of Terror" (which appeared with the same publisher), and "Legends of Terror! And "Tales of the Wonderful and the Wild" (1826) (cf. Townshend 17) bear witness to the affinity.

[25] Here, he joins the chorus of his contemporaries—e.g., Addison in "On the Pleasures of the Imagination," or Young in "Conjectures on Original Composition."

"preternatural events" with "cop[ies] of nature"; together, they are meant to help avoid excesses in either direction (9). The "preternatural events" include a "haunted portrait" destined for great fame: the picture of the departed grandfather, who groans when he sees his descendant's misconduct, abandons the frame, and gestures to the terrified Manfred to follow him. Walpole's ghost-painting has often been identified as the point of departure for the tradition of haunted portraits in Gothic fiction.[26] However, the novel also features another portrait, which has received less attention but is at least as important for this tradition—and holds even richer consequences for the development of the plot. This is the picture of the true progenitor and founder of the castle, the knight Alfonso. The portrait exercises an uncommon force of attraction on the young princess Matilda: "I know the adoration with which I look at that picture is uncommon" (41). The painting also comes alive, like the grandfather's portrait, but in a subtler way: Theodore, a stranger, appears at the castle, who is Alfonso's spitting image and therefore unsettles the occupants profoundly:

> she asked Matilda what occasioned Manfred to take Theodore for a spectre? Bless me, said Matilda, did not you observe his extreme resemblance to the portrait of Alfonso in the gallery? I took notice of it to Bianca even before I saw him in armour; but with the helmet on, he is the very image of that picture. I do not much observe pictures, said Isabella; much less have I examined this young man so attentively as you seem to have done. (88)

In contrast to the portrait of the grandfather—which should clearly be assigned to the sphere of the "preternatural"—Alfonso's portrait undermines Walpole's distinction between supernatural phenomena and "copies of nature" inasmuch as just the lifelike copy intimates a suprasensory power at work. Here, the "extreme resemblance"—praise of which represents a veritable topos of contemporary portrait-discourse—opens an abyss through the reversal of the positions of copy and original. It is not the portrait that resembles Theodore, but Theodore who seems to be modeled on the portrait: "he is the very image of that picture."

Here, in my view, is where Radcliffe takes up the motif of the haunted portrait in her own Gothic novel and shapes it in a way that will be extremely influential for later

[26] On the "Gothic" tradition of a portrait that has come to life, see Elliott, and Williams.

Gothic novels—from her own *Italian* and Lewis's *Monk* (which takes up many of the ideas introduced here, including the mediation and remediation of images or the trope of the veil) up to Hoffmann's *Elixiere des Teufels* (1815/16) and beyond.[27] In her novels, Radcliffe also seeks to justify the supernatural in literature. Her late essay, "On the Supernatural in Poetry" (1826), does so by way of the paradigm of possible worlds (like eighteenth-century poetics of the marvelous, including Breitinger's): viewed from the standpoint of God's "creative power," spirit apparitions may occur, and the poet has the license to shape whatever is possible (148). In addition, Radcliffe argues that her works maintain probability within the fiction: circumstances set the stage for the appearance of ghosts; indeed, one may almost expect them. This point clearly separates her from Walpole. Where he relies on sudden and drastic events, she relies on preparing an atmosphere to set the mood and on making spectral visitations obscure; indeed, she observes that the former merely produce "horror" whereas the latter induce enduring "terror" (149–50).

As has often been observed, Radcliffe's discussions of her craft refer explicitly to Burke's analysis of the sublime. Her novels exemplify, for example, his observations that terror arises from "darkness," "solitude," and "silence." What has been overlooked, however, is that the novels stand in opposition to Burke's theory in another respect, namely insofar as the aesthetic category of resemblance for her serves to produce terror. In his *Philosophical Enquiry* (1757) Burke names "resemblance" as the aesthetic quality that prepares the greatest "pleasure" for the imagination. He founds his claim on the basis of associative logic and observes that the human spirit finds a natural "satisfaction in tracing resemblances"; hereby, it brings forth new images, which continuously expand its supply of mental pictures (17). For Burke, in other words, it is not just the properties of the objects depicted that delight the observer in works of art, still more, it is the "resemblance, which the imitation has to the original" (17). Burke and Breitinger stand in agreement on this score: the pleasure afforded by art lies in one's ability to compare an original and its copy—

[27] Consider, in the *Monk*, the figure of Matilda, who is supposed to be the original but is in fact a copy Satan has modeled on the picture of the Madonna. Cf. in the *Italian*, the role played by the miniature portrait of the young Schedoni, which saves the heroine from being murdered; later, the image provokes terror in Olivia, who understands the actual original to be the evil brother of the beloved Count di Bruno. *Elixiere des Teufels* features an array of portraits whose uncanny likenesses to living originals propel the story forward—for example, the picture of Saint Rosalia (which resembles Aurelie) and the portraits of Francesco (which look like Medardus).

the greater the similarity between them, the greater the delight and the greater the value of the work. Burke's view of painting rests on the same premise. It is more suited to imitation than all the other arts: "[I]t is [in imitation] that Painting [...] ha[s] laid one of the principal foundations of [its] power" (45; also see 149). "Poetry and rhetoric do not succeed in exact description so well as painting does; their business is to [...] display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker [...] than to present a clear idea of the things themselves" (157). It follows that painting stands above literature when the objective is to achieve as much similarity as possible between the original and the copy—to convey as "clear an idea" as possible of the object depicted. However, this same superiority proves deficient when it is a matter of generating strong passions. Burke holds that unknowing, more than anything else, plays a role here: "It is our ignorance of things that [...] chiefly excites our passions" (57). Especially the most powerful passions—alternately, "astonishment" and "terror"—depend on "obscurity": "To make any thing very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary" (54). It follows that painting, which must always aim to afford the clearest representation possible, cannot rouse the strongest passions. Burke makes as much plain. In his eyes, it is ridiculous to seek to provide a clear depiction of what is inherently obscure in visual art. Likewise, he deems it impossible that one try to fashion an obscure representation. In such cases, keeping with the fundamental mimetic demand of painting, one is simply making bad art.

Radcliffe's novels take a stance against Burke's judgement. Here, painting—or, more precisely, portraiture—occasions terror not despite, but because of, its mimetic quality. The first few pages of *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794) already pronounce the aesthetic verdict that the key feature of portraits is the similarity between copy and original—and all the more if a passionate attachment to the original holds. When Emily's mother expresses sadness at the loss of her bracelet, the narrator explains: "What made this bracelet valuable to her, was a miniature of her daughter [...], esteemed a striking resemblance" (14). Although, in keeping with Burke's observations, this portrait affords pleasure to the imagination, which can compare the original and its copy and recognize their great similarity, and the miniature's loss initiates a sustained disruption of mimetic relations in the novel. Emily's picture is just the first of a long series of portraits in the work. From this point on, however, copy and original no longer coincide. Resemblance

continues to provide a constant point of reference, but now it always triggers profound unease—a feature of the Gothic that already announced itself in Walpole.[28] A closer look at these problems of resemblance affords deeper insight into some of the motifs addressed in *Don Sylvio* and opens space for reflecting on the terror of the Gothic as the uncanny flipside of the *poiesis* of the marvelous that Wieland affirms.

The Mysteries of Udolpho and Problems of Resemblance

The novel shows, first, that "extreme resemblance" leads to the reversal of copy and original. A drastic example occurs with the "veiled picture." Emily wishes to see a painting that is covered; she is horrified when the curtain reveals a decayed corpse, which she takes to belong to the castle's former owner. The picture that she hoped would clarify a crime in the past, then, is not a copy at all but the actual crime. The situation is repeated later, when Emily once again finds a disfigured corpse—her aunt, she believes—behind another curtain. However, the heroine proves mistaken in both instances. In the first place, the corpses are neither the owner nor her aunt—that is, Emily has identified the originals incorrectly. Moreover, only in the second instance—but not in the first—does an original even exist. Behind the "veil," one reads, only an "image" is hidden—the waxen figure of a corpse, which looks "horribly natural." Extreme resemblance ultimately makes it impossible for Emily ever to be certain whether an original is actually an original, or whether an image is actually an image: "are you sure it is a picture?" (264) she asks with trepidation.

Radcliffe uses the veil-motif to underscore the problematic epistemological status of resemblance, which makes the observer uncertain what is real and what is merely

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[28] In his classic essay "The Ghost of the Counterfeit – and the Closet – in *The Monk*" Jerrold Hogle observes: "there is no level in *The Monk* that is not fake and a faking of what is fake already." He hardly discusses Radcliffe, even though her *Mysteries* are certainly essential for Lewis, but he mentions Walpole's novel, stressing that it already presents "all the ghosts of past sins [...] as walking signifiers, the signs of fakes." Along similar lines, Jesse Molesworth has written that Walpole's novel "openly mocks the search for origins and authenticity" (406). But Molesworth is also mostly interested in Lewis' novel inasmuch as it exemplifies Derrida's insight: "We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, with a double that doubles no simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself already double. There is no simple reference" (417, quoting Derrida 206). In this light, Radcliffe's *Mysteries* represent an important step in the formation of this aspect of the Gothic, which—as the analysis of Wieland's novel has shown—is also a feature of the marvelous; accordingly, it should be understood as figuring a larger (multi-modal, multi-national, and enduring) poetological reflexion on problems of mimesis and anxieties of influence.

deception.[29] The motif of the wax figure, in turn, evokes the *imago* of Roman antiquity—that is, the waxen likeness of a relative that could be displayed and used in mourning ceremonies to signify that the deceased was "there," too. In *The Mysteries of Udolpho,* the wax image is also supposed to guarantee the presence of the departed after death: it reminds the murderer and his descendants of their guilt every day. As *imago*, it is to be taken as a sign that all portraits in the novel are *imagines*—albeit in a psychological sense. In the castle of Udolpho, for instance, Emily beholds the portrait of Lady Laurentini, who disappeared mysteriously before finally being declared dead, at her heir's insistence. Here, the portrait does not guarantee the continuity of the ruling dynasty. Instead, it becomes the ghostly revenant of the lady of the manor, who, the servants believe, has been haunting the castle ever since she disappeared:

> "I will shew you a picture." "A picture!" exclaimed Emily, and shuddered. "Yes, ma'am, a picture of the [...] lady who disappeared so strangely [...] that strange story [...] makes me thrill all over [...]." (263–4)

As in the case of the wax image, a complex of guilt bedevils the survivors, standing in the way of mourning and helping Lady Laurentini's *imago* to live on, even after the model has died.

Secondly, the novel shows that free-floating resemblance leads to false matches. Emily lost her miniature portrait to an unknown admirer, who now worships the love object as an *imago*—as Don Sylvio does with the miniature in his possession. As an original without a copy, Emily now faces a series of copies without originals. She comes into possession of the miniature portrait of a woman she does not know—the deceased Marchioness de Villeroi—whom, or rather *which*, her father once loved. In the course of the novel, two further pictures of this woman surface: another miniature, which is the "exact resemblance" of the first, and a portrait that bears a "strong resemblance" to the miniature (607, 609). Like Don Sylvio, then, Emily does not chance upon the original in her adventures, but rather upon a chain of icons. And, as in Wieland's novel, this circumstance does not prompt insight into the autonomy of the image; the paradigm of

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[29] Miles stresses the similar function of the veil in the *Monk*: "The figure of the veil perfectly sums up the fate of signifying practices in *The Monk* and elsewhere in the Gothic: it is no longer possible to see through the figure to its austere referents; figures, rather, turn opaque, become surfaces, as unwanted associations crowd in" (157).

faithful representation continues to structure the relationship between the pictorial medium and reality. In Radcliffe's work, however, the reality effect that the "original trace" generates is not affirmed as *poiesis* on the part of the observer. Instead, it proves utterly uncanny: Emily herself must occupy the place left empty by the original. As Lady Laurentini declares, she is "the original herself" (622).

Whereas Wieland's novel assumes the perspective of a masculine subject creating the desired original for the portrait via projection, Radcliffe's novel adopts the perspective of the feminine object of projection—i.e., ultimately, the standpoint of identification: when Emily loses the miniature, which functioned as an ego-image, a fundamental crisis of identity occurs. Following the death of the role models—mother and father—comes an unstable phase of assigning her role-images to others; finally, identification with the maternal *imago* occurs. In this process, the place of the old miniature is taken by the new one, which is literally presented to Emily as a mirror image: "'I will shew her to you, yet you need only look in that mirror, and you will behold her [...].' [...] she took [out of the casket] a miniature" (607). Even though Emily herself perceives *no* similarity between herself and the portraits of the marchioness, those who knew the latter are struck by the "resemblance": "[S]till gazing wildly upon Emily, [she] exclaimed, 'It is her very self!'" (606) In this manner, the novel demonstrates that talk about resemblance(s) never concerns objective similarity, but rather subjective likeness. A likeness is not simply factual; instead, others emphatically assign it to Emily when they make the suasive rhetoric of portraiture their own.

Thirdly, Radcliffe's novel implements Burke's suggestions, but at the same time it displaces the focus from producing terror rhetorically to the psychological generation of terror, which involves *both* painting *and* literature. For Emily's imagination is infected with terror through tales about the castle. Here, rumor—as a form of discourse at the border between fiction and document—plays a decisive role. The precarious truth-status of this exotic genre of popular prose rouses Emily's attention and fills the ancient battlements with intimations of crime and the supernatural: "'What wonderful story have you now to tell?' said Emily, concealing the curiosity, occasioned by the mysterious hints she had formerly heard [about the signora]" (225). On the other hand, the "veiled picture" is what first prompts the rumor to be shared and drives the plot onward: "'[W]hat have you heard of

this picture to terrify you so, my good girl?' [...] 'I have heard there is something very dreadful belonging to it—[...] and it somehow has to do with the owner of this castle'" (223). The narrative can only develop because portraits complement the rumor. Even though the truthfulness of the rumor *itself* remains uncertain—"is it true," Emily asks her informant over and over—it acquires evidentiary status and concreteness by way of the pictures: Lady Laurentini was a real person and the crime really happened, because her picture hangs in the gallery and her corpse lies behind the curtain. Image and rumor work hand in hand here. The same holds for the other portraits, whether that of the marchioness or Emily's miniature, whose loss puts the story of false matches in motion in the first place. The portraits set rumors free, offer riddles, motivate coincidences, and tie together loose ends of the narrative.

Troubled Resemblances

In both Wieland's and Radcliffe's novels, a pronounced temporal difference is inscribed in the portrait-stories. In either case, a young girl appears as the revenant of a deceased relative. In this fashion, the novels thematize adolescent discontent at not being an original so much as the likeness of one's parents; here, nature itself generates uncanny similarities: "so horribly natural" (623). But at the same time, the family histories also thematize the novels' own "anxiety of influence" (Bloom).[30] They engage with and contest the poetological authorities of preceding generations (in these cases: Breitinger and Burke), seeking both to be their heirs and to free themselves from overly restrictive mimetic chains. This interweaving of inheritance and emancipation is evident, above all, in the fact that dynamics of projection and semantic displacements can be problematized in literature only against the backdrop of the *classical* models of accurate portraiture and faithful representation; to put it more simply: you need the classics in order to distance yourself from them and their models of mimesis. Thus encountering the portraits does not block rumor, but instead proves productive—and the same holds for visual images throughout Radcliffe's and Wieland's works. The pictures' presence has an emancipatory effect

[30] Miles devotes an entire chapter to the "narratives of descent," central to the Gothic. Apart from the "aristocratic genealogies" treated in the novels, however, most of his attention falls on the "self-substantiating nature of their [i.e., the novels, NG] provenance," their "insist[ence] on the historical residue that authenticates their truth" (100).

insofar as enigmatic portraits destabilize models of mimesis based on an economy of correspondence between original and copy or between an external object and inner imagination. That is, the portraits in these texts are not models of perfect resemblance, as Breitinger and Burke would have it, but rather they call the very concept into question. Ultimately, terror and enchantment do not derive from supernatural events, as common theories of genre would have it, but from the dynamism of unstable mimesis, which fuels both the Gothic and the marvelous.

In positing a hierarchical relation, Breitinger and Burke describe an economy of loss: the difference between copy and original lessens aesthetic enjoyment. In contrast, the novels by Wieland and Radcliffe offer an economy of production, whereby the mere disturbance of resemblance generates surplus value: what is supposed to be similar is not; and what is should not be similar at all. Enjoyment of resemblance is replaced by a search for, or rather, the production of meaning. Troubled resemblances are the meaning-producing-mechanisms in this new brand of literature.[31]

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[31] Their emotional charge is highly ambivalent. Whether unsettling resemblances produce terror or positive wonder depends not only on the fictional universe to be explored (either a world of specters and horror, or a world of fairies and beautiful magic). Rather, poietic meaning-production enlists the powers of imagination to construct a subjective world of delight or to generate horror by making the "dreamer" get lost in the labyrinth of imagination. No one has explored this ambivalence and switch from jubilant poiesis to utter terror better than E.T.A. Hoffmann, e.g., in *Elixiere des Teufels*, but also in stories such as "Das öde Haus" (part of *Nachtstücke*, 1817). See Gess.

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