edoc

Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests

Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg. (2016) Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests. WWZ Working Papers, 2016 (02).

[img] PDF - Published Version
469Kb

Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/61613/

Downloads: Statistics Overview

Abstract

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face dierent challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an incumbent, thereby regaining an incumbency position. We consider steady-state equilibria of this process and study how and to which extend individuals sort into the incumbency positions depending on their valuations. In particular, we identify sucient conditions for positive sorting, meaning that the share of individuals with a given valuation holding an incumbency position is increasing in the valuation, and provide an example to show that negative rather than positive sorting may arise in equilibrium. Further results show how incumbency rents and sorting are aected by the frequency at which incumbency is contested and the scarcity of the incumbency positions.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:33
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2016/02
Last Modified:08 Mar 2018 13:35
Deposited On:08 Mar 2018 13:35

Repository Staff Only: item control page