Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg. (2014) Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2014 (11).
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Abstract
In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rentdissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff shares arise as the outcome of the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the answer is shown to be positive.
Faculties and Departments: | 06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke) 12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers |
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UniBasel Contributors: | Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg |
Item Type: | Working Paper |
Publisher: | WWZ, University of Basel |
Number of Pages: | 10 |
Note: | Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication |
Language: | English |
Identification Number: |
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edoc DOI: | |
Last Modified: | 09 Mar 2018 10:53 |
Deposited On: | 08 Mar 2018 13:29 |
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