Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests

Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg. (2014) Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2014 (11).

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In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rentdissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff shares arise as the outcome of the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the answer is shown to be positive.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:10
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2014/11
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:09 Mar 2018 10:53
Deposited On:08 Mar 2018 13:29

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