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Clausewitz on Auctions

Häfner, Samuel. (2012) Clausewitz on Auctions. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2012 (12).

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Abstract

A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conflicts, yields new theoretical justification for existing empirical findings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battlefield behavior.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Häfner, Samuel
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:30
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/12
Last Modified:13 Mar 2018 13:56
Deposited On:08 Mar 2018 13:16

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