edoc

Does Remuneration Affect the Discipline and the Selection of Politicians? Evidence from Pay Harmonization in the European Parliament

Braendle, Thomas. (2013) Does Remuneration Affect the Discipline and the Selection of Politicians? Evidence from Pay Harmonization in the European Parliament. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2013 (03).

[img] PDF - Published Version
658Kb

Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/61351/

Downloads: Statistics Overview

Abstract

We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed information on individual MEPs between 2004 and 2011, we find that the reform, which comes with an exceptional increase of, on average, 200 percent per national delegation, has a positive incentive effect on in-office effort as approximated by engagement in speeches, written declarations and drafted reports. However, a higher remuneration increases absence. With respect to political selection, we find that a higher remuneration increases re-election rates. The composition of the pool of MEPs in terms of (ex-ante) quality approximated with formal education, previous political experience and occupational background is, however, unaffected. If we restrict our attention to freshmen, we find that a higher remuneration is related to a lower fraction of MEPs with previous political experience at the highest national level.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische ├ľkonomie (Stutzer)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Braendle, Thomas
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:46
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2013/03
Last Modified:21 Mar 2018 14:22
Deposited On:08 Mar 2018 08:21

Repository Staff Only: item control page