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The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge. (2015) The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information. WWZ Working Papers, 2015 (08).

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Abstract

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation NEWLINE game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confrm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg and Pena Suarez, Jorge Alejandro
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:21
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2015/08
Last Modified:07 Mar 2018 13:20
Deposited On:07 Mar 2018 13:20

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