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Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information

Bondarev, Anton. (2018) Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information. WWZ Working Papers, 2018 (01).

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Official URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/61298/

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Abstract

We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Umweltökonomie (Krysiak)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Bondarev, Anton A.
Item Type:Working Paper
Publisher:WWZ, University of Basel
Number of Pages:24
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Language:English
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2018/01
Last Modified:07 Mar 2018 11:46
Deposited On:07 Mar 2018 11:46

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