RESERVATIONS AND THE CISG: THE BORDERLAND OF UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND TREATY LAW AFTER THIRTY-FIVE YEARS

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INTRODUCTION

A century ago, the goal of the international unification of private and commercial law was famously described by Lord Justice Kennedy as “the security and the peace of mind of the shipowner, the banker, or the merchant,”¹ thereby indicating that the primary beneficiaries of uniform lawmaking are private

citizens. Nevertheless, the most important vehicle in the unification of international law has traditionally been the convention, i.e., treaties under public international law between States. However, more recently other instruments like model laws or mere “soft law” texts have gained importance. The continued use of conventions can partially be explained by a second goal that States pursue through the unification of law that Lord Justice Kennedy referred to as “the resulting moral gain . . . , a neighbourly feeling, a sincere sentiment of human solidarity[,]” namely: the promotion of friendly relations among States.

The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“Sales Convention” or “CISG”) ranks today as one of the most successful conventions unifying matters of commercial law. With currently over eighty State parties, the CISG’s provisions on contract formation and the law of sales potentially apply to more than 80 percent of all international sales contracts worldwide. The CISG’s preamble clearly reflects the two goals that Lord Justice Kennedy identified seventy years earlier, stating on one hand “that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the development of international trade,” and on the other “that the development of international


5. As of May 1, 2015, eighty-three States had become Contracting States of the Sales Convention.

6. Even if the Convention’s prerequisites for its applicability are met, its application to a particular sales contract can be excluded by way of party agreement in accordance with Article 6 CISG.

trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly relations among States.” Thirty-five years after its adoption at a Diplomatic Conference in Vienna on April 11, 1980, the Sales Convention’s anniversary in 2015 provides a suitable occasion to consider a topic, which—maybe more than any other—tackles upon both the creation of uniform private law and the legal relations between States: Reservations and the CISG.

A. Reservations in Uniform Private Law Conventions

Within the realm of uniform private law, reservations are unusual creatures residing at the borderline between private law and the law of treaties. Tucked away in the far corner of uniform law conventions, like the Sales Convention, reservations are usually placed in the concluding part of a convention’s text with the imaginative title “Final Provisions,” and have traditionally been ignored by academics. Only in recent years have the CISG’s reservations for the first time attracted more attention, primarily because State practice in this area developed in a surprising direction. At the same time, case law emerging under the Sales Convention has demonstrated the unexpected difficulties that reservations can cause in everyday disputes arising out of ordinary cross-border sales contracts. As will be demonstrated in more detail below, these difficulties are mostly triggered by one and the same factor, namely the dual character of reservations as an instrument of both treaty law and internationally unified private law.

B. Introducing Reservations

In terms of customary public international law as codified in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation is “a unilateral statement, however


10. The definition in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention reflects the customary law notion of a reservation. Thomas Giegerich, Treaties, Multilateral, Reservations to, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 1 (R. Wolfrum ed., 2010); Christian Walter, Formulation of Reservations, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” 11 Beyond this commonly accepted definition, the subject of reservations has traditionally raised a host of difficult legal problems. A well-known public international law treatise once described it as “a matter of considerable obscurity in the realm of juristic speculation.” 12 The CISG authorizes no less than five of such reservations in its Articles 92–96, although this number is already a matter of some dispute. 13

What is equally disputed is the relative degree to which reservations have actually been used by CISG Contracting States. General assessments by commentators range from “reservations have been minimal” 14 to “have been widely utilized.” 15 If we let numbers speak (leaving aside the significant differences in effect that the various reservations have upon the Convention’s practical application), the count is as follows: on April 11, 2005, the 1980 U.N. Sales Convention’s twenty-fifth birthday, the then sixty-five Contracting States between them had declared a total of thirty-one reservations, 16 with the reserving States including some of the largest CISG Contracting States (such as the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and the United States). 17 After

Commentary 239, 240, para. 1 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).

13. See infra Part II.A.
16. Reservations made by a Contracting State in accordance with Article 93 or 94 CISG were counted as one reservation, even if they related to more than one territorial unit (Article 93 CISG) or to more than one other State with closely related legal rules (Article 94 CISG). For some more recent numbers, see infra p. 7.
that date, only two further States, Paraguay in 2006, and Armenia in 2008,\(^{18}\) made reservations, and Armenia has since remained the last State to declare a reservation under the Convention.

C. Experience with Reservations Under the CISG: Taking Stock of the First Thirty-Five Years

Thirty-five years after the adoption of the Sales Convention on April 11, 1980 is an appropriate time to look back and assess the experiences created by the reservations under the Convention. From the perspective of international law, the purpose of such an assessment is threefold.

First, one of the interpretative goals stipulated in Article 7(1) CISG—the need to promote uniformity in the Convention’s application—is commonly read as calling for the evaluation of existing case law\(^{19}\) and of legal writings\(^{20}\) that have previously addressed provisions in the Sales Convention. As Article 7(1) CISG’s guidelines also apply to the interpretation of the CISG’s Final Clauses (Articles 89–101 CISG),\(^ {21}\) an overview over the past practice in applying the Sales Convention’s reservations may serve as a useful tool in further enhancing their internationally uniform interpretation.

Second, customary public international rules on treaty interpretation similarly envisage taking into account past interpretation practices. In particular, Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that in interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes

\(^{18}\) For further remarks on the Armenian reservation, see infra Part IV.B.1.


the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”

When this provision is read in light of the Sales Convention’s nature as a uniform private law convention applied by commercial courts to contracts between private parties, its reference to the agreement of “the parties” regarding the treaty’s interpretation should be understood as referring to the agreement among the courts in different CISG Contracting States, i.e., the prevailing court practice. If so construed, the approach of Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is arguably in line with the interpretative goals imposed by Article 7(1) CISG.

Third, the experiences formulated by the use of reservations under the CISG may be helpful for future law unification projects in the area of contract and commercial law, e.g., a to-be uniform law instrument on general contract law. Should such a

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22. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(3)(b).
future instrument take the form of a convention (i.e. a public international law treaty),\textsuperscript{25} the subject of the inclusion and application of reservations would inevitably and by necessity arise, and any lessons learned under the Sales Convention would ideally be taken into account in drafting a new sister convention.

D. Outline

In describing the lessons learned, this article will not primarily focus on individual CISG reservations and the specific experiences relating to them. This has already been addressed by colleagues elsewhere, in particular with respect to the withdrawal of Article 92 CISG reservations in Scandinavia\textsuperscript{26} and with respect to the reservations under Articles 95 and 96 CISG.\textsuperscript{27} Instead, this article will provide a more general overview of the developments concerning the Convention’s reservations, combined with a critical assessment of those developments.

The article will proceed as follows: Part I is dedicated to two basic issues, namely the disputed qualification of some of the CISG’s provisions as “reservations” in the legal sense of the term\textsuperscript{28} and the historical background of these provisions.\textsuperscript{29} Part II will discuss reservations’ general usefulness in the uniform private law context and whether reservations decrease uniformity,\textsuperscript{30} or rather enable a wider uniformity in uniform law-making.\textsuperscript{31} Part III will also address a number of difficulties that

\textsuperscript{25} See Perales Viscasillas, \textit{supra} note 24, at 738; Schwenzer, \textit{supra} note 24, at 727–28, 730.


\textsuperscript{28} \textit{See infra} Part II.A.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{See infra} Part II.B.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{See infra} Part III.A.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{See infra} Part III.B.
have arisen in practice under the Sales Convention. More specifically, this part will focus on the fact that reservations have often been overlooked by courts, and the significant uncertainty reservations seem to cause in both the eyes of government officials and—maybe more importantly—of judges and arbitrators deciding cases. Part IV looks forward to the next thirty-five years and discusses the likely role of reservations in future CISG practice. This discussion examines the continuing trend to withdraw reservations, one reservation that may be here to stay, and another reservation that may even gain in importance in the future. The final part briefly concludes.

I. BASIC ISSUES CONCERNING THE CISG’S RESERVATIONS

As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to first address the question, which among the “declarations” authorized in Part IV of the Sales Convention constitute reservations as defined by the law of treaties. A brief overview of the drafting history of Articles 92–96 CISG will provide the background necessary to understand some of the difficulties that have arisen throughout the practical application of the CISG’s reservations.

A. “Reservations” and “Declarations” Under the CISG

The first indication of the uncertainties surrounding reservations under the CISG is that it is not only disputed how many different reservations the Convention’s text authorizes, but even whether the CISG contains reservations at all.

1. Views among Commentators

In legal writings on the Sales Convention, there are insofar three schools of thought. The majority among CISG commentators assumes that the Sales Convention allows five reservations,

32. See infra Part IV.A.
33. See infra Part IV.B.1.
34. See infra Part IV.B.2.
35. See infra Part V.A.
36. See infra Part V.B.
37. See infra Part V.C.
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. See infra Part II.B.
namely those defined in Articles 92, 93, 94, 95, and 96 CISG.\textsuperscript{40} Writers in this majority rarely give a reason for their position, maybe because its correctness is regarded as obvious. It indeed finds some support in the wording of Article 98 CISG, according to which “[n]o reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in this Convention,”\textsuperscript{41} the term “those” indicating that the Convention must contain more than one reservation. Furthermore, Articles 92–96 CISG seemingly match the general definition of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,\textsuperscript{42} as they all purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the CISG.

The second group of commentators nevertheless believes that the Sales Convention contains no reservations at all, in spite of the reference to “reservations” in Article 98 CISG. They rather


\textsuperscript{41} CISG, supra note 4, art. 98.

\textsuperscript{42} See supra Part I.A.
draw a strict distinction between “declarations” and “reservations,”
pointing out that the language of Articles 92–96 CISG exclusively speaks of “declarations,” without ever mentioning the term “reservation.”

A third group of writers accepts that Articles 92 and 94–96 CISG provide for reservations, but doubts whether Article 93 CISG constitutes a reservation stricto sensu. This position resounds a long-standing discussion in general treaty law, where the prevailing view today is that “federal state clauses” are not reservations in the sense of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This view was also expressed during the discussion of Article 93 CISG at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference by the Deputy Chief of the U.N. Treaty Session, who then served as Assistant Secretary of the Second Committee.

2. Discussion

In order to discuss the approaches outlined above, it is appropriate to distinguish between three issues. First, the legal qualification of the declarations authorized by Articles 92–96


44. Michael G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods 519–20 para. 10.54 (3d ed. 2013) (“The CISG nowhere else deals with ‘reservations,’ but it does allow in a number of instances States to make ‘declarations,’ which appear to serve the same purpose as reservations.”).


48. See supra Part II.A.1.
CISG as reservations will be addressed,\textsuperscript{49} before the special case of the federal state clause in Article 93 CISG is investigated in more detail.\textsuperscript{50} Finally, the applicability of Articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to reservations under the CISG will be discussed.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{a. Declarations Under Articles 92–96 CISG as Reservations}

It is submitted that Articles 92–96 CISG all qualify as reservations, and that the majority view summarized earlier\textsuperscript{52} is accordingly correct. This is first of all due to the fact that the language used in Articles 92–96 CISG, notably the lack of the term “reservation” therein, should be considered as irrelevant when it comes to the legal qualification of these treaty clauses. Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself makes this clear by defining “reservation” as “a unilateral statement, \textit{however phrased or named \ldots}.”\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, the International Law Commission’s “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties”\textsuperscript{54} as well as treaty law scholars\textsuperscript{55} agree that it is not the phrasing or name of a unilateral statement formulated in respect of a treaty that determines its legal nature, but rather the legal effect it purports to produce. That declarations made in accordance with Articles 92–96 CISG purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the Sales Convention (as required by Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention)\textsuperscript{56} becomes immediately obvious when looking at the wording in Article 95 CISG. Article 95 CISG authorizes Contracting States to “declare at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention,”\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{49} See infra Part II.A.2.a.
\textsuperscript{50} See infra Part II.A.2.b.
\textsuperscript{51} See infra Part II.A.2.c.
\textsuperscript{52} See supra note 40.
\textsuperscript{53} Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d).
\textsuperscript{54} Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 46, para. 1.3.2.
\textsuperscript{55} Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 1.
\textsuperscript{57} CISG, supra note 4, art. 95.
\end{flushleft}
but Articles 92, 93, 94, and 96 CISG similarly fit this description.

Contrary to what is implied by some authors, the term “declaration,” predominantly employed by the drafters of Articles 89–101 CISG, is therefore not being used therein as an alternative to “reservation,” but rather as a wider, more comprehensive term. A declaration made by a Contracting State in relation to the Sales Convention may accordingly qualify as a reservation if it meets the conditions of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It may, however, also be a declaration that is not a reservation, but rather purports to produce a different legal effect. Depending on their content, such declarations may, inter alia, be declarations amending prior declarations in accordance with Article 93(1) CISG in fine; declarations joining in another State’s declaration in accordance with Article 94(3) CISG; or denunciations of the Convention in accordance with Article 101 CISG. Apart from these types of declarations that are expressly mentioned in Articles 89–101 CISG, Contracting States may also make other “declarations in general” which similarly do not have the effect of reservations, as specifically clarified during the discussions at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference. Such declarations in general are governed by the rules of general treaty law, but must also be compatible with the provisions of the Sales Convention. As has been

58. For more information on CISG Article 93, see infra Part II.A.2.b.
59. See supra notes 43–44.
60. But see Michael Bridge, Uniform and Harmonized Sales Law: Choice of Law Issues, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 973–74, para. 16.121 (James J. Fawcett et al. eds., 2005) (“From this it may be inferred that what the Vienna [Sales] Convention calls a declaration is a reservation for the purpose of both the Convention itself and the UN Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
61. Evans, supra note 40, at 664–65, para. 2.3; Magnus, supra note 40, art. 98, para. 1; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1195.
63. For background information on “political” declarations, which occur in treaty practice, see AUST, supra note 46, at 103.
64. Evans, supra note 40, at 664–65, para. 2.3; Ferrari, supra note 40, art. 98, para. 2; Herre, supra note 40, at 1217; Magnus, supra note 40, Art. 98, para. 1; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1195, para. 2.
argued elsewhere, interpretative declarations relating to matters governed by the Sales Convention must insofar be considered incompatible with Article 7(1) CISG.

Finally, the interpretation outlined above is supported by the legislative history of Article 98 CISG, the only provision of the Sales Convention to explicitly mention “reservations.” The Austrian delegation that first proposed its inclusion at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference later suggested an alternative wording, which, after further modification by the French delegation, read: “No reservation or declaration other than those expressly provided for in this Convention shall be permitted.” During the ensuing discussion, there was agreement among the delegates that at least the draft provisions corresponding to today’s Articles 92, 94, and 96 CISG constituted reservations, irrespective of whether or not the reference to “reservation or declaration” would be kept. Article 93 CISG was regarded as a slightly more complicated case, and Article 95 CISG had at this stage not been (re-)proposed. Against this historic background, the use of the terms “reservation” in Article 98 CISG (as eventually adopted) and “declaration” elsewhere in Articles 89–101 CISG cannot support any challenge of the prevailing and correct view that Articles 92–96 CISG all qualify as reservations.

65. Torsello, supra note 40, at 117; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 455–56. But see Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 2.
67. Id. at 459.
68. See id. at 459. Dr. Ihor Tarko, representative of Austria, said that his delegation had proposed that the word “declaration” be included because the final clauses referred only to declarations and there might be some confusion between declarations proper and declarations containing reservations. If the sense was clear with the use of the word “reservation” alone, his delegation would agree to the omission of the word “declaration”.

Id.
69. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
70. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
b. Article 93 CISG as a Reservation

The nature of Article 93 CISG as a reservation requires further discussion, as this qualification has been challenged for the additional reason that federal state clauses are generally not considered to be reservations in treaty law doctrine.71

The cornerstone on which the latter position rests is the definition of the term “reservation” in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which speaks of “a unilateral statement made by a State whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”72 Federal state clauses, so the reasoning goes, are supposedly not covered by this definition because they do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects to an entire State. Instead they aim at the nonapplication of an entire treaty to a part of the declaring State’s territory. This type of declaration constitutes a deviation from the default rule concerning the territorial scope of treaties in Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pursuant to which a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established. Federal state clauses are accordingly not reservations, but rather an expression of a “different intention” in the sense of Article 29 of the Vienna Convention: the State is not excluding the legal effect of the treaty in respect of a particular territory but is identifying “its territory,” in the sense of Article 29, where the treaty is to be applied.73 This approach is also reflected in the 1974 United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, where the federal state clause in Article 31—the provision that Article 93 CISG was modelled after—is not contained in the Convention’s Part III titled “Declarations and reservations,” but rather in Part II titled “Implementation.”

71. See supra notes 45–47.
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d) (emphasis added).
73. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 46, para. 1.5.3; Kerstin Odendahl, Article 29, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 489, 493, para. 12 (Oliver Dörr & Kristin Schmalenbach eds., 2012) (citing Article 93 CISG as an example).
Irrespective of whether this outlined approach is considered convincing, it is submitted that its application does not affect the reservation status of Article 93 CISG, despite the latter’s common description as “federal state clause.” The reason is that an Article 93 CISG declaration not only defines the territory to which the declaring State will apply the Sales Convention, but modifies the application of one provision of the Convention in its application by courts of any Contracting State (\textit{erga omnes}). The provision so modified is Article 1(1) CISG, as indicated by Article 93(3) CISG. Although Article 93(3) CISG does not contain the arguably clearer terms “is not to be considered a Contracting State within paragraph (1) of article 1 of this Convention” that are used in Article 92(2) CISG, the words “is considered not to be in a Contracting State” in Article 93(3) CISG should equally be understood as a reference to Article 1(1) CISG. Accordingly, Article 93 CISG in fact does meet the “modification of certain provisions” criterion in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The Sales Convention’s federal state clause remains, however, ill at ease with the final requirement contained in Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, namely the modification of treaty provisions “in their application to that [i.e. the declaring] State.” As the wording of Article 93(3) CISG makes clear, a declaration under Article 93(1) CISG goes much further, as it results in the Convention’s nonapplication to contracts concluded by private parties residing in a certain territory...

75. See, e.g., Herre, \textit{supra} note 40, at 1217, para. 1.
76. Malcolm Evans, \textit{Article 93}, \textit{in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW} 645, 648, para. 2.4 (1987); see also \textit{infra} Part IV.B.2.b.i.
77. Vienna Convention, \textit{supra} note 11, art. 2(1)(d).
78. In addition, it should be pointed out that otherwise Article 94 CISG would arguably not qualify as a reservation, as this provision similarly results in a nonapplication of the entire Sales Convention.
79. Cf. Bridge, \textit{supra} note 44, at 522 para. 10.57 (addressing the same point with respect to the reservation under Article 95 CISG). \textit{But see ENDERLEIN \\& MASKOW, supra} note 45, 385, para. 1.
of the federal State and has to be observed by courts in all Contracting States (not only the declaring State), thereby creating the erga omnes effect described earlier. This apparent incompatibility is nevertheless not unusual, but rather occurs under almost every treaty creating uniform private law. The definition of Article 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has therefore long been recognized as hardly appropriate for normative treaties that do not create a bundle of bilateral treaty relationships but instead establish generally applicable erga omnes rules in the common interest of the treaty community as a whole. Uniform private law conventions being one example. The solution lies in the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, with Article 93(3) CISG insofar containing an admissible deviation from general treaty law.

In summary, the Sales Convention’s federal state clause in Article 93 CISG accordingly qualifies as a reservation.


At this point, it is useful to clarify that the conclusions previously stated do not propose that the rules on reservations contained in general treaty law and codified in Articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties necessarily apply to Articles 92–96 CISG. The reason is that the rules laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention are generally agreed to be merely residuary in nature and are accordingly displaced whenever a given treaty contains different rules on particularities of its reservations. As the Sales Convention’s Final Clauses in Part IV (Articles 89–101 CISG) contain explicit provisions as

80. Bridge, supra note 60, at 973–74, para. 16.123; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 444; Torsello, supra note 40, at 97–98. But cf. Filip De Ly, Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model, 25 J.L. & COM. 1, 9 (2005) (“It must be noted that [an Article 92 reservation] is inapplicable in non-contracting states and non-reservation states and that even in the reservation states . . . it will only apply if the law applicable by virtue of the reservation forum’s conflict rule is [that of the reservation state].”).


82. See infra Part II.A.3.

83. But see Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 43, 385 para. 1.

84. Giegerich, supra note 10, para. 7; Alain Pellet, Article 22, in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 568, 577, para. 34art. (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
well as general principles in accordance with Article 7(2) CISG governing the functioning of its reservations, there is hardly any room for recourse to the residuary Articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  

At the same time, there is no need to avoid a qualification of Articles 92–96 CISG as “reservations” with the primary aim to prevent general treaty law from interfering with uniform private law. The residuary nature of Articles 20–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention takes sufficient care of that.

B. Historical Background of the CISG’s Reservations in a Nutshell

We next turn to the historical background of the Sales Convention’s five reservations. This historical context is useful for purposes of interpreting the respective provisions, as recourse to the legislative history is recognized as one of the most important interpretative methods under Article 7(1) CISG. In this respect, the Sales Convention deviates from general rules on interpretation under treaty law, as Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties merely allows for a historic interpretation as a supplementary method (where interpretation otherwise “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” or leads “to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”). Again, Article 7(1) CISG must prevail in this context, as its principles also apply to the interpretation of the CISG’s reservations and thereby displace the residuary rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

85. See Bridge, supra note 60, at 973, para. 16.122; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 431.
86. This position was more recently adopted in UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 98, para. 317, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2007). (“This distinction [between reservations and declarations] is important because reservations to international treaties typically trigger a formal system of acceptances and objections, for instance as provided in articles 20 and 21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
87. Magnus, supra note 40, art. 7, para. 35; SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER, supra note 20, para. 105; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 19, at 130, para. 22.
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 32.
89. Schlechtriem et al., supra note 40, at 1170; Schroeter, supra note 21, at 428. Contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 55 para. 2.2; WITZ ET AL., supra note 23, para. 6.
90. See supra note 24.
1. Effect of Article 98 CISG on the Reservations’ Initiation

By way of a preliminary remark, it is important to note that Article 98 CISG limits reservations under the CISG to those expressly authorized in the Convention. This clause, which is based on Article 19(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and today constitutes a common feature in uniform international private law conventions, has a further indirect effect upon the manner in which reservations become part of a convention, as it leads to a two-step process. In the first step, the content of each admissible reservation must be agreed upon among the drafters of a convention, before in the second step one or more Contracting States can declare (Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention uses the term “formulate”) such an authorized reservation. Any State interested in using a certain reservation must therefore already initiate its authorization at a convention’s drafting stage, and cannot wait until it may later contemplate the ratification of the convention. Restricting admissible reservations to those expressly authorized in a convention’s text at the same time means that the range of possible reservations are “frozen in” at the moment the treaty’s text is being adopted in accordance with Article 9 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In case of the CISG, this date was April 11, 1980.

2. Historical “Sponsors” of Individual Reservations Under the CISG

Against this background, it is of interest to briefly look at the way in which the five reservations authorized by the CISG made their way into the Sales Convention’s final text. In this regard, three groups of reservations can be distinguished.

The first group comprises reservations that were already proposed by particular States during early stages of the preparations that culminated in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of 1980. From the outset, the concerned States regarded the inclusion of these reservations as an indispensable condition without which they would not be able to ratify the Convention. The representatives of other States in turn viewed these reservations as

91. Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 45, at 385 para. 1; Evans, supra note 40, at 664, para. 2.2; Herre, supra note 40, at 1217.
92. Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 1.
93. See infra Part III.B.2.
a compromise necessary in order to convince those States to accept the Sales Convention’s text with the content the majority considered desirable.\(^ {94}\) In view of these interests, the desirability of the reservations of this group was rarely challenged, and the discussions within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and later at the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna were limited to drafting issues.

This was true for the Article 94 CISG reservation which looks back on a particularly long history; already the very first draft for a uniform sales law written by Ernst Rabel\(^ {95}\) in 1935 contained a predecessor provision.\(^ {96}\) Notably, the Scandinavian States had always made clear that they would only be willing to accede to the Sales Convention if they could continue to apply their regionally harmonized sales laws to their intra-Nordic trade.\(^ {97}\) In order to do so, they proposed and supported a reservation like today’s Article 94 CISG.

The Article 96 CISG reservation, which makes an exception from the freedom-of-form principle under the Convention,\(^ {98}\) was included upon the request of the Soviet Union (“USSR”), which also spoke for other than Socialist countries with planned economies.\(^ {99}\) It first appeared (with a somewhat different wording) in

\(^{94}\) See Peter Schlechtriem, Articles 89–101, in Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 918, 929, para. 2 (2d ed. 2005) (“[O]nly in that way could, for example, the Scandinavian states be persuaded to apply the CISG at least in their relations with other countries.”); Schroeter, The Cross-Border Freedom of Form Principle Under Reservation, supra note 27, at 85–86 (discussing CISG Article 96).

\(^{95}\) For background information on Ernst Rabel, see generally Max Rheinstein, In Memory of Ernst Rabel, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 185 (1956); Bernhard Grossfeld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 3, 11 (1992).

\(^{96}\) See Schroeter, supra note 23, § 10 para. 2.

\(^{97}\) See Joseph Lokofofksy, Understanding the CISG in Scandinavia §§ 2–3, 3–1 (1996); Schlechtriem, supra note 94, at 929 para. 2. Other States that showed an interest in using Article 94 CISG were the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) as well as Australia and New Zealand. See Official Records, supra note 47, at 436.


\(^{99}\) See id. at 81–82.
a proposal made within UNCITRAL in 1971 and was subsequently included into the so-called New York draft of the Sales Convention of 1978, from where onwards it formed part and parcel of the general freedom-of-form discussion.

The Article 92 CISG reservation was the last of this group to enter the scene. It was only requested once the decision had been reached within UNCITRAL to include both the provisions on the formation of contracts and the provisions on the sale of goods into one and the same Convention. During the discussion preceding this decision, the Scandinavian States had insisted on a possibility to ratify only the sales law part, which therefore was introduced in the form of a reservation, which became Article 92 CISG.

The second group comprises one boilerplate reservation, namely the “federal state clause” in Article 93 CISG previously addressed. This provision was not included upon suggestion from a State, but rather from the UNCITRAL Secretariat that prepared a draft for the CISG’s final clauses for discussion at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of 1980. The reservation’s purpose is essentially unrelated to the uniform law content of the Sales Convention in that it exclusively responds to the particular territorial structure of some States (federal or other) and their impact on the implementation of uniform law conventions. In Vienna, Article 93’s inclusion was notably supported by Australia and Canada.

104. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
106. For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Part V.B.
The third and final group could be assigned the heading “last-minute additions.” It similarly comprises just one of the CISG’s reservations, namely Article 95 CISG.108 Unusually, this reservation neither had a direct predecessor in the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws109 nor was discussed within UNCITRAL or its working groups prior to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna. It was not until the Vienna Conference was well under way that the delegation representing Czechoslovakia (“CSSR”) first proposed today’s Article 95 CISG during the second meeting of the Second Committee on March 18, 1980,110 where it was rejected.111 On April 7, 1980, a mere four days before the Conference’s scheduled ending on April 11, 1980, the CSSR reintroduced its proposal in the Plenary, now offering two alternative wordings.112 The Plenary finally discussed the proposal during the late afternoon of April 10, 1980113 and accepted one of the proposed wordings by twenty-four votes to seven, with a comparatively high number of sixteen abstentions.114 The majority decision to accept the reservation at all was clearly driven by the desire not to risk the support of the CSSR and other Socialist countries for the Convention as a whole.115 The notable price for Article 95’s surprising last-minute adoption116 are uncertainties

108. For a discussion on the legislative history of Article 95 CISG, see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 118.
114. Id. at 230.
115. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 118; Evans, supra note 76, at 648, para. 2.3; Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 468 n.52 (“In the face of the threat of non-adaption by Eastern European States, the Conference ultimately inserted Article 95 . . . .”).
about its precise meaning that plague the provision’s practical application to this very day.\(^{117}\)

3. Authorization and Use of the CISG’s Reservations

Finally, it is worth noting that all reservations authorized by the CISG have actually been used by one or more Contracting States. In this respect, the CISG differs from many other uniform law conventions whose text authorizes reservations that later turned out to be superfluous, as no State saw the need to declare such a reservation upon accession.\(^ {118}\) The fact that such “orphan reservations” are relatively common under other conventions proves the excellent draftsmanship of the CISG, where reservations were successfully restricted to the necessary minimum.

II. Reservations: Decreasing Uniformity or Enabling a Wider Uniformity?

In looking back on the role that reservations have played during the first thirty-five years of the CISG’s practical application, it is helpful to commence with a general, bird’s-eye assessment, before turning to some more specific questions.\(^ {119}\)

A. The Critical View: Reservations as a Source of Nonuniformity

Taking the opinions expressed in legal writings as a starting point, it quickly becomes clear that the prevailing view of the CISG’s reservations is a skeptical or even outright critical one. Most of the critique has been directed at one and the same factor, namely the reservations’ perceived nature as a source of nonuniformity under the Sales Convention.\(^ {120}\) The impact of such

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\(^{117}\) For further detail about such uncertainties, see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 120–23.

\(^{118}\) The United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, is one of many examples. Out of the five reservations authorized by the Limitation Convention, only one (Article 34) was used by a single Contracting State (Norway). Id.

\(^{119}\) See infra Parts III, IV.

\(^{120}\) Camilla B. Andersen, Recent Removals of Reservations under the International Sales Law: Winds of Change Heralding a Greater Unity of the CISG, 8 J. BUS. L. 698, 706 (2012); Andersen, supra note 26, at 1–2; Bailey, supra
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nonuniformity has been viewed as considerable, even undermining the Sales Convention’s very goal of creating a uniform law of international sales. Related points of criticism are the increased likelihood of confusion regarding the CISG’s practical application and the resulting additional transaction costs. The critical view’s essential thrust, however, remains nonuniformity. The presence of reservations means that the search for a uniform solution has partially failed.

B. A More Positive View: Reservations as a Tool Enabling a Wider Uniformity

On the eve of the Sales Convention’s thirty-fifth birthday, the present article offers an alternative and more positive view of the CISG’s reservation regime. It rests on two separate foundations that differ from those used by the prevailing view. On one hand, it takes into account recent developments regarding the use of reservations by Contracting States (which admittedly could not be taken into account by most earlier writers—in this respect, it may be accused of profiting from the benefit of hindsight). On the other hand, it challenges the standard of uniformity implicitly underlying the general criticism of reservations by asking: reduced uniformity compared to what?

In a nutshell, the result of this combined approach can be described as follows: the use of reservations under uniform private law conventions like the CISG should not be viewed as a source

121. Flechtner, supra note 40, at 197.
122. Bailey, supra note 40, at 312.
123. Id. at 311.
125. See infra Part III.B.1.
126. See infra III.B.2.a. This question has also been raised in a more general context by Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 480 (“Criticism of the CISG requires an answer to the question: compared to what?”).
of nonuniformity, but is more fittingly regarded as a tool enabling what may be called a “wider uniformity.”

1. Taking into Account the Withdrawability of Reservations

The first justification for the present approach emerges when taking into account the possibility of withdrawing reservations, as provided for in the law of treaties in general (Article 22 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and in Article 97(4) CISG in particular. A reservation, once made, does not need to stay in effect forever, but can also result in a merely temporal reduction of uniformity. The recent wave of withdrawals of some or all of the CISG reservations that we have witnessed since 2011 in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, the People’s Republic of China, Lithuania, Norway, and Hungary,127 has reminded us of the inherent temporal scope of reservations under uniform private law conventions. While in the past, reservation withdrawals had played almost no practical role under such conventions, as reservations usually remained unmodified until the respective State eventually denounced the Convention,128 the CISG—once again—has been a ground breaker in this regard.

The withdrawability of reservations serves a useful function in the circumstances in which a State contemplating the ratification of or accession to a uniform private law convention finds certain provisions contained therein objectionable or contestable. In the case of uniform private law conventions, this is most likely to be the case where the convention dramatically departs from the State’s domestic law.129 A critical approach towards some of the Convention’s content complicates the respective State’s position towards the Convention, in that it renders its decision for or against a consent to be bound (Article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) more difficult.130 In such a context, the option to ratify a convention in combination with making a withdrawable reservation offers the

128. Schroeter, supra note 17, at 2; see also Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties 226 (1988) (describing reservation withdrawals as “a rare event” in general treaty practice); Walter, supra note 10, art. 22 para. 1.
129. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 467; see also infra Part III.B.2.b.
130. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
hesitant State the possibility to “test drive” the convention. In doing so, it can experience the convention’s application in practice, without immediately having to commit to provisions it at first sight finds objectionable. At the same time, “opting out” of these provisions by way of a reservation is not necessarily made for eternity, as the reservation may be withdrawn “at any time.”\textsuperscript{131}

This option may be more attractive to reluctant States than the obvious alternative, namely to refrain from immediate ratification of the Convention and to observe the development “from the outside,” i.e., the position of a non-Contracting State, before potentially ratifying at a later stage. One reason is that an early ratification (despite being accompanied by reservations) still brings the economic advantages that flow from the nonreserved parts of the Convention\textsuperscript{132} to the reserving State’s citizens and companies, while an abstention deprives them of these advantages. Another reason may lie in a Contracting State’s chance to influence the early interpretation of the Convention through its domestic courts, which will have the opportunity to play their part in the proverbial international “orchestra” made up of courts from all Contracting States.\textsuperscript{133} This may be viewed as more advantageous than remaining a non-Contracting State with the prospect of later ratifying the Convention including the interpretation it has already received at that stage, and that the new Contracting State will nevertheless need to “have regard to”

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{131. Under the Convention, any State which makes a declaration under this Convention may withdraw it at any time by a formal notification in writing addressed to the depositary. Such withdrawal is to take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of six months after the date of the receipt of the notification by the depositary.\par
CISG, supra note 4, art. 97(4).}
\footnote{132. For detailed background information on this point, see Spagnolo, supra note 14, at 47–148.}
\footnote{133. The picture of an “orchestra without conductor” was employed in Peter Schlechtriem, Einheitskaufrecht in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshof [Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof], in 50 JAHRE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF: FESTGABE AUS DER WISSENSCHAFT [50 YEARS OF THE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF: A CELEBRATION ANTHOLOGY FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY] 407, 408 (Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. eds., 2000).}}
in accordance with Article 7(1) CISG as well as Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\footnote{See supra Part I.B.}

As a first intermediate result, we can therefore identify a crucial difference between the treaty law perspective and the uniform private law perspective. From the viewpoint of general treaty law, a reservation expresses a “no,” while from the viewpoint of contemporary uniform private law it often merely expresses a “not yet.” This difference is further corroborated by State practice under the Sales Convention where most reservations were declared during the early years (and none since 2008)—a result that stands in contrast to observations under general treaty practice, where latecomers to treaties have been found to make more reservations than early ratifiers.\footnote{See Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 367, 370 (2006); Swaine, supra note 120, at 342 n.210.}


In addition, it will be argued in the following section that the use of reservations in fact enables a “wider uniformity” under uniform private law conventions, thereby not hindering uniformity, but rather contributing to it. In this context, it is first necessary to define the appropriate standard of uniformity before addressing a number of treaty design particularities that affect the making of uniform private law conventions and accordingly the use of reservations in such conventions.\footnote{See infra Part III.B.2.a.} \footnote{See infra Part III.B.2.b.} \footnote{See infra Part III.B.2.c.} Finally, a number of further advantages of reservations in a treaty-design context will be discussed.\footnote{See supra Part III.A.}

\textit{a. Measuring Uniformity: Selecting the Appropriate Standard}

We next turn to the standard of uniformity that should be used when measuring the effect of reservations. Insofar, the prevailing view that labels reservations a source of nonuniformity implicitly employs a complete uniformity within the scope of the convention as the standard of comparison. As far as a uniform
law text has been agreed upon, it should ideally be applied identically in all Contracting States thereto, and reservations are disturbing this uniformity. At the opposite end of the range of possible standards lies another uniformity standard which is equally radical, namely a complete lack of uniformity within the scope of the convention. If we picture a uniform law text that has been adopted with a content that no State is willing to accept unmodified, then all reservations would be a good thing, as they would make the convention more acceptable to States and would therefore be a source of uniformity, because the convention otherwise would attract no Contracting States. (This picture is, of course, somewhat unrealistic, as such a uniform law text would probably not have been adopted in the first place.)

It is submitted that both of these “radical” standards—complete uniformity and complete nonuniformity—are overly simplistic and should be replaced by a standard that is more attuned to the realities of uniform private lawmaking. In this context, the perspective should also be widened by looking beyond the scope of the adopted uniform law texts. Their scope could have been different had reservations been used when the respective text was drafted, which already indicates that reservations may well enable a “wider” uniformity.

b. Treaty Design Particularities Affecting Uniform Private Law Conventions

i. Reservations and Treaty Negotiations

As a starting point, it is useful to recall an issue in which uniform private lawmaking differs from treaty lawmaking in general. In case of other treaties, the adoption of the treaty text in accordance with Article 9 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is followed by a decision-making process in

140. See Knieper, supra note 124, at 479.
141. There are, however, conventions that were formally adopted and attracted almost no State parties, such as the European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, Jan. 20, 1966, E.T.S. No. 56, which was only signed by two States (Austria and Belgium) and ratified by one State (Belgium, subject to reservations). The Convention never entered into force. Details of Treaty No. 056: European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, COUNSEL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/056 (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
142. See supra Part II.B.1.
the individual States, during which each State decides whether or not to express its consent to be bound by the treaty143 and—most important in our context—which reservations to make, thereby potentially “turning a prix fixe menu à la carte.”144

In the case of uniform private law conventions, however, the freedom to make reservations is often much more limited, as provisions like Article 98 CISG145 typically restrict the possible content of reservations to those expressly authorized in the convention.146 This in turn leads to the discussion about admissible reservations already taking place during the phase preceding the uniform law text’s adoption, with reservations forming part and parcel of the general treaty negotiations.147 The drafting of reservations under uniform private law conventions is therefore intrinsically tied to the drafting of the uniform law text they relate to, and both endeavors closely interact with each other.

ii. Reservations Versus Other Design Options

Against this uniform private lawmaking background, reservations do not necessarily appear as an impediment to uniformity, but rather as a tool that provides a sensible design option in addition to those otherwise available.148 A situation in which these options need to be compared arises every time that an agreement about the content of a uniform law text cannot be reached, usually because the various domestic laws dealing with the respective topic differ to such an extent that delegates cannot agree on a universally acceptable compromise text.149 The existence of differences between domestic laws in itself is not surprising, as it constitutes the prerequisite for uniform private lawmaking (though not necessarily for treaty making in general150). Wherever all domestic laws have developed the same solution for a salient problem, there is no need for a uniform law in the first place, as it could do no more than codifying the already uniform

143. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 11.
144. Swaine, supra note 120, at 307.
145. See supra Parts II.A.2.a., II.B.1.
146. Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 98 para. 1. In other types of treaties, provisions of this kind are much less common. See Gregory F. Jacob, Without Reservation, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 287, 291 (2004); Swaine, supra note 120, at 325.
147. See supra Part II.B.1.
149. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 460.
solution through a uniform wording, thereby adding uniformity in form to the existing uniformity in substance. Uniform law-making efforts therefore necessarily presuppose that local approaches to a certain problem differ, and that any uniform law solution, whatever its content, will accordingly require some of the States involved to accept a text that is at least partially “foreign” to them. In such a situation, a number of different options are at the uniform lawmakers’ disposal.

Many controversies about the desirable uniform law solution may be solved through negotiations that eventually lead to a compromise acceptable to most or all of the drafters. A prominent example from the Sales Convention’s drafting history was the much-discussed regulation of the buyer’s notice of non-conformity, which resulted in a compromise solution combining a comparatively strict rule (Articles 39 and 43 CISG) with limited exceptions (Articles 40 and 44 CISG).151

It is in situations in which no commonly acceptable compromise text can be agreed upon that a choice must be made between a narrower and a wider controversial text,152 which amounts to a choice between a “narrower” or a “wider” uniformity. A “narrower” uniformity results from decisions to exclude the controversial issue(s) from the scope of the uniform text, thereby leaving it nonunified. This type of solution guarantees that no State is repelled from accepting the uniform text because of an unacceptable wording, but at the same time restricts the text’s scope within which uniformity can develop. When the Sales Convention was drafted, this approach was used with respect to the material “validity” of the sales contract, as no compromise about an acceptable text could be reached.153 The resulting “validity exception” in Article 4 sentence 2(a) CISG accordingly excludes this matter from the Convention’s material

152. Helfer, supra note 135, at 375 (stressing the “broad freedom of international contract” in negotiating treaties).
scope, although the meaning of this provision has in itself created much controversy.\textsuperscript{154}

In contrast, a “wider” uniformity is chosen whenever a controversial issue is covered in the uniform law text but accompanied by an authorized reservation that allows States to “opt out” of the compromise found. As such, reservations may later be withdrawn; this approach enables a wider uniformity by way of a more comprehensive scope of the convention\textsuperscript{155}—proof that reservations may in fact serve the goal of private law unification.

c. Further Advantages of Reservations in a Treaty Design Context

In addition, the use of reservations offers a number of further advantages, all of which eventually support the quest for uniformity. First, it allows for a more ambitious and “deeper”\textsuperscript{156} level of content in the uniform private law text concerned, which in the long term results in a wider uniformity than the alternative exclusion of controversial issues.\textsuperscript{157} The freedom-of-form question constitutes an example from the Sales Convention’s drafting history. Although the efficient\textsuperscript{158} freedom-of-form principle was unacceptable as a universally applicable rule to the Socialist planned economies when the Convention was drafted in the 1970s,\textsuperscript{159} it was eventually included in Articles 11 and 29 CISG, but accompanied by an authorized reservation (Article 96 CISG). The formal validity of sales contracts thereby became a matter governed by the Convention, with the resulting preemption of domestic laws.\textsuperscript{160} Although the freedom-of-form principle was initially affected by the numerous reservations under Arti-


\textsuperscript{155} But see Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 461.

\textsuperscript{156} Swaine, supra note 120, at 311, 331.

\textsuperscript{157} For a similar argument in relation to treaties in general, see Helfer, supra note 135, at 368, 378; Swaine, supra note 120, at 331–33.

\textsuperscript{158} For an efficiency assessment from a law and economics perspective, see Mark Cantora, The CISG After Medellin v. Texas, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 125–27 (2009); Spangnolo, supra note 14, at 81.


\textsuperscript{160} See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER, supra note 20, paras. 112–13.
cle 96 CISG that were made, a significant number of these reservations have since been withdrawn. Had the drafters of the Convention opted for a narrower scope of the uniform sales law excluding the issue of formal validity, the degree of uniformity would be significantly lower today.

Second, the use of reservations can eventually be advantageous to uniformity if it can solicit additional ratifications through a limited option to reserve. For example, by authorizing the nonapplication of one provision (Article 1(1)(b) CISG), Article 95 CISG enables the application of the other eighty-seven provisions in Parts I–III of the Sales Convention; a compromise that may well pass for a “good deal.”

Third, any decision in favor of a “wider” uniformity accounts for the fact that reservations—because of their withdrawability—are a more flexible component of uniform international law when compared to the convention’s text itself. Once it has been adopted and ratified by a relevant number of States, a uniform private law convention cannot realistically be modified. In contrast, the position of an initially hesitant reserving State can be modified, namely through the withdrawal of its reservation.

d. Conclusion

As a second intermediate result, we can accordingly conclude that a more ambitiously framed uniform private law text in combination with authorized reservations eventually results in a “wider” uniformity than a narrower uniform private law text without reservations. Insofar, reservations serve as a tool contributing to the international unification of laws.

3. Limits

There are, however, inherent limits to the use of reservations as a tool to enable wider uniformity. These limits are on the one hand reached whenever an authorized reservation is built “for eternity” (and will accordingly never be withdrawn), as such reservations do not aim at providing a mere “test drive” of the new uniform law convention. To a certain extent, Article 93

161. See supra Part III.B.1.
162. See supra Part III.B.1.
163. SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 13 para. 60.
164. See supra Part III.B.1.
CISG falls into this category to be addressed in more detail below. On the other hand, the more positive view proposed here does not apply to reservations that are so far reaching as amounting to a rejection of the uniform law's content in disguise: little is gained by adding a Contracting State that has opted out of too much, creating the risk that the entire convention “may ultimately be perceived as a mere sham, form with no substance.”

A prominent example of the latter type of reservation was Article V of the 1964 Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS). It read:

Any State may, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of or accession to the present Convention declare, by a notification addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, that it will apply the Uniform Law only to contracts in which the parties thereto have, by virtue of Article 4 of the Uniform Law, chosen that Law as the law of the contract.

Under the 1964 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom and the Gambia both made use of this reservation. The effect has been striking; although the 1964 Convention has been in force for both countries since 1972 and 1974 respectively and still is in force today, not a single case has ever been reported from the United Kingdom or the Gambia in which the ULIS was applied. The reason is that—according to Article V—the ULIS applies to a contract of sale only if it has been specifically chosen by the parties to the contract as the law thereof, and such a positive choice is hardly ever made in practice. The reservation has rendered the 1964 Uniform Sales Law accordingly meaningless in the two reserving States.

165. See infra Part V.B.
166. Gillette & Scott, supra note 15, at 469.
168. Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws para. 33-019 (15th ed. 2012). Interestingly, contractual clauses specifically choosing the CISG as the applicable law are now becoming more and more common in practice. See, e.g., Case No. 13184 of 2011, 36 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 96, 101 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) (“This agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and, as to matters not addressed in that Convention, by and in accordance with Mexican law applicable in Mexico City . . .”).
At the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna, proposals were nevertheless made to include a reservation in the Sales Convention similar to the one mentioned above.169 In its support, the Australian delegate suggested that the reservation would give businesses an opportunity to move gradually and by their own decision make the Convention apply to their contracts, but nevertheless would maximize the number of States which would ratify the Convention.170 Luckily, the proposals met with overwhelming opposition and were eventually rejected. In support of their rejection, delegates in Vienna pointed out that States using this type of “opting in” reservation would in consequence have almost no obligations under the Convention171 and could hardly be counted as Contracting States.172 And indeed, in view of their extent, reservations of the type described do not qualify as tools enabling a wider uniformity of uniform private law, irrespective of their withdrawability. In fact, they would arguably go beyond being sources of some nonuniformity by “upsetting the whole process of progress toward the unification of private law”173—a situation that should be avoided.

III. DIFFICULTIES IN PRACTICE UNDER THE CONVENTION

Even if reservations are viewed as a merely temporary restriction of the Convention’s applicability,174 reservations temporarily made affect the Convention’s practical application until they are withdrawn. In this context, as the Nordic Article 92 reservations175 demonstrate, “temporarily” may well mean twenty-two years or more. It is therefore of interest to briefly evaluate the practical effects that the CISG’s reservations have had in the past thirty-five years.

In evaluating these practical effects, the focus will once more not be on the way in which each reservation has resulted in the nonapplication of certain CISG provisions, but rather on general

170. Id. at 437.
171. Id. at 438.
172. Id. at 437.
173. Id. at 438; accord Winship, supra note 116, at 48–49.
174. See infra Part III.B.1.
175. See infra Part III.B.1.; Andersen, supra note 26, at 9–10; Andersen, supra note 120, at 708. See generally Neumann, supra note 26 (discussing the Nordic reservations, as well as the temporal issues they implicate).
difficulties that have emerged in practice. As will be demonstrated, all of these difficulties can essentially be traced back to one and the same reason, namely the nature of reservations as instruments of treaty law that affect the application of uniform sales law to contracts between private parties.176

A. Reservations Overlooked by Courts

In a number of cases, courts simply overlooked CISG reservations that should have been taken into account in deciding cases. A reason for these mistakes may have been the position of reservations that are tucked away in the far corners of the Sales Convention, in the Part titled “Final Clauses” that may seem as if directed at government officers only. In this respect, another prominent convention in the area of international commerce—the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards—is structured somewhat differently, as its drafters positioned two of the reservations authorized thereunder (the “reciprocity reservation” and the “commercial reservation”) directly in Article I(3) of the New York Convention.177 This approach made these reservations more difficult to overlook, as they form part and parcel of the Convention’s introductory provision. In contrast, courts have to read the Sales Convention’s text from beginning to end, because its Article 1 does not explicitly refer to the reservations in Articles 92–95 CISG—a factor which may well affect the Convention’s application.178

Another factor that appears to affect relevant court practice is the court’s location inside or outside a reserving State. Reservations have been more frequently overlooked by courts in Contracting States that had not themselves made a reservation, but were called upon to apply the Sales Convention in constellations

176. See supra Part 1.A.
in which they had to take a reservation made by another Contracting State\textsuperscript{179} into account.\textsuperscript{180} This phenomenon is not entirely surprising, as it is in conformity with observations from general treaty practice where reservations made by other States are frequently given less attention than reservations declared by the home State.\textsuperscript{181} An explanation in the context of uniform law conventions is that a reserving State’s government will take better care to provide its domestic courts with information about the reservations it has declared than about foreign reservations—when it comes to reservations of the latter kind, courts are often required to make do with information published by the convention’s depository.

Nevertheless, reservations have also occasionally been overlooked by a reserving State’s own domestic courts.\textsuperscript{182} And finally,

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\textsuperscript{179} Reservations authorized by Articles 92, 93, 94, and 96 CISG (but not the one authorized by Article 95 CISG) must be observed by courts in all Contracting States, although this is highly disputed. See Schroeter, \textit{supra} note 21, at 444–47.
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\textsuperscript{181} Swaine, \textit{supra} note 120, at 327.
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\textsuperscript{182} \textit{See} Oberlandesgerichte [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Düsseldorf, July 2, 1993, 17 U 73/93 (Ger.), translated in 16 J.L. & COM. 357 (1997). In this case, the Court did not address the interpretative declaration regarding the application of Article 95 CISG that has been made by Germany. This declaration reads as follows:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany holds the view that Parties to the Convention that have made a declaration under article 95 of the Convention are not considered Contracting States within the meaning of subparagraph (a) (b) of article 1 of the Convention. Accordingly, there is no obligation to apply – and the Federal Republic of Germany assumes no obligation to apply – this provision when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Party that has made a declaration to the effect that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1) (b) of article 1 of the Convention.
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there have been cases in which courts have noticed the possible effect of a foreign reservation, but refused to address the matter *ex officio* because the parties had failed to raise the CISG’s applicability to the dispute.\(^\text{183}\)

### B. Uncertainty Created By Reservations

In cases in which reservations were not outright overlooked by courts, the primary difficulty in practice has been a frequent uncertainty about a reservation’s meaning. Uncertainty of this kind has demonstrated itself both in the context of the making of reservations by States\(^\text{184}\) and, maybe even more important, of court and arbitral proceedings applying the Sales Convention to sales contracts.\(^\text{185}\)

1. Uncertainty Affecting Contracting States Making a Reservation

The first group to be affected by uncertainty about reservations are government officials in States that are about to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Sales Convention. In spite of John Honnold’s confident statement that “[t]hese matters are handled by government officers who have experience with similar provisions in other conventions,”\(^\text{186}\) there have been indications that the making of reservations is occasionally a matter of difficulty. The CISG itself provides little guidance in this respect: Article 98 CISG limits reservations to those expressly authorized in the Convention, and Article 97 CISG addresses formal aspects\(^\text{187}\) of declarations to be made under the Convention’s final provisions. The actual wording of reservations, on the contrary, has traditionally been left to the reserving State’s officials, and the Sales Convention continues this tradition by giving them no orientation apart from the language of Articles 92–96 CISG.

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\(^{184}\) See *infra* Part IV.B.1.

\(^{185}\) See *infra* Part IV.B.2.

\(^{186}\) HONNOLD, *supra* note 40, at 691–92, para. 458.

\(^{187}\) *Id.*
Where the language of these provisions contains uncertainties (even if only in the eyes of the government official concerned), these uncertainties may result in the making of unclear reservations.\textsuperscript{188} Under the Sales Convention, a much-discussed example was the reservation against oral contracts made by the People’s Republic of China in 1986 (but since withdrawn),\textsuperscript{189} which deviated from the language of Article 96 CISG, albeit in only minor respects.\textsuperscript{190} A both more recent and more intriguing example is the second\textsuperscript{191} Armenian declaration made by the Republic of Armenia upon its accession to the Sales Convention in 2008. It reads:

Pursuant to Article 95 of the Convention, the Republic of Armenia declares that it will not apply the Article 1, subparagraph (1)(b) of the Convention to the parties that declare not to be bound by the Article 1, subparagraph (1)(b) of the Convention.

The meaning of this declaration is not entirely clear, and its wording is quite obviously not in conformity with Article 95 CISG, despite its express reference to this provision. While one can only speculate about the precise purpose and historical background of the declaration, it can be surmised that its drafters were uncertain about the meaning of Article 95 CISG and therefore attempted to provide a clarification in their declaration. In doing so, they may have overlooked Article 98 CISG. (Note that Armenia on the same occasion also entered a reservation against oral contracts, and that the wording of this declaration was framed in perfect conformity with Article 96 CISG.)

It is a somewhat unfortunate effect of the unclear Armenian declaration (as of any other unclear declaration) that the uncertainty that affected government officials is thereby transferred into private practice under the Convention, with courts and ar-

\textsuperscript{188} See Schroeter, supra note 21, at 449–52.
\textsuperscript{189} See infra Part III.B.1.
\textsuperscript{191} The first Armenian declaration was made when Armenia deposited an instrument of accession in 2006, but subsequently withdrew its declaration of accession before the Sales Convention could enter into force for Armenia. See Schroeter, supra note 21, at 449–50. Interestingly, this first declaration also had an unclear content. See id.
Arbitral tribunals having to determine the declaration’s precise effect. A pragmatic solution would be to simply apply the declaration in full accordance with its wording, as supported by Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This would probably mean that the Armenian “Article 95-style” reservation would have no scope in practice, as it must be considered highly unlikely that the parties to any sales contract will ever expressly declare not to be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG, as the reservation’s wording presupposes. Arguably, this result would not even be an undesirable outcome, as it would leave the Sales Convention’s scope of application unaffected.

2. Uncertainty Affecting Judges and Arbitrators

Throughout practice under the Sales Convention, the more important group affected by reservation-induced uncertainty are judges, arbitrators, and attorneys advising buyers or sellers.

a. General

While the uncertainty of this group may on occasion be caused by the specific wording of individual Contracting States’ declarations, it is more often created by Articles 92–96 CISG themselves. The reason can again be traced to the dual character of reservations under uniform private law conventions, being both creatures of treaty law and of uniform private law at the same time. It is the resulting need of judges at civil and commercial courts to also handle the treaty law side of reservations that may give rise to difficulties. Even experienced judges are presumably puzzled when faced with provisions that were drawn up against a public international law background, with the obligations of States as sovereign entities in mind.

b. Uncertainty Under Specific CISG Reservations

The experience of thirty-five years demonstrates, however, that the risk of uncertainty is not the same under each of the CISG’s reservations. It rather depends on the manner in which the reservations were drafted, and notably the care that was taken in spelling out their effect upon the Convention’s application to individual sales contracts. In this respect, the numerical

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192. See also Schroeter, supra note 21, at 451–52.
193. See supra Part IV.B.1.
194. See supra Part I.A.
order of Articles 92–96 CISG happens to correspond to the easiness in which the reservations have been applied by courts and arbitral tribunals, with an imaginary curve commencing with the two easiest-to-apply (Articles 92 and 93 CISG) and making its way downhill via an intermediate degree of easiness (Article 94 CISG) towards the reservations that have caused the most difficulties (Articles 95 and 96 CISG).

i. Articles 92 and 93 CISG

A prize for excellent drafting goes to Article 92 CISG, which reads:

(1) A Contracting State may declare at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by Part II of this Convention or that it will not be bound by Part III of this Convention.

(2) A Contracting State which makes a declaration in accordance with the preceding paragraph in respect of Part II or Part III of this Convention is not to be considered a Contracting State within paragraph (1) of article 1 of this Convention in respect of matters governed by the Part to which the declaration applies.195

Article 92 CISG is divided into two paragraphs, with Article 92(1) CISG addressing the public international law side of the reservation (“that it [i.e. the reserving State] will not be bound by”)196 and Article 92(2) CISG clearly stipulating the reservation’s effect upon the Convention’s application in private court cases (in which the reserving State is not to be considered a Contracting State when the court applies Article 1(1) CISG). Article 92(2) CISG is therefore drafted to specifically address courts and arbitral tribunals and prevents them from having to “translate” a reservation framed in treaty law terminology into a rule that works in the context of the Sales Convention’s sphere of application.197

Article 93 CISG has a similar, although slightly more complicated structure, within which Article 93(3) CISG fulfils the same

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195. CISG, supra note 4, art. 92.
196. Id.
197. See Schroeter, supra note 21, at 431.
function as Article 92(2) CISG.\textsuperscript{198} It is worth noting that a paragraph comparable to Article 93(3) CISG was still missing in the older federal state clause in Article 31 of the 1974 United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, which only addressed the public international law side of the reservation. After this was noted, today’s Article 93(3) CISG was added during the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference with an aim toward “providing a gloss for the term ‘Contracting State’ in relation to the federal State clause . . . something that had been omitted in the 1974 Limitation Convention.”\textsuperscript{199} On the same occasion, the Limitation Convention was revised by way of a 1980 Protocol, and a similar paragraph was included in its Article 31(4).

ii. Article 94 CISG

In comparison, Article 94 CISG remained without a clear counterpart to Articles 92(2) and 93(3) CISG. Instead, Article 94(1) and (2) CISG adopted a primary focus on the reservation’s public international law component by providing that Contracting State(s) “may at any time declare that the Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or to their formation where . . . .”\textsuperscript{200} The reservation’s effect in practice is only addressed indirectly by the words “that the Convention is not to apply,” which has resulted in a heated dispute whether an Article 94 reservation needs to be observed only by courts in a reserving State\textsuperscript{201} or by all courts applying the Convention.\textsuperscript{202} A clear provision along the lines of Articles 92(2) and 93(3) CISG could have prevented this uncertainty from emerging in the first place.

iii. Articles 95 and 96 CISG

Article 95 CISG was drafted even more one-sided when it provides that “[a]ny State may declare at the time of the deposit of

\textsuperscript{198} Id. at 445. For a discussion of the slight difference in the language of Article 92(2) CISG and Article 93(3) CISG, see supra Part II.A.2.b.

\textsuperscript{199} Official Records, supra note 47, at 445.

\textsuperscript{200} CISG, supra note 4, art. 94(1), (2).

\textsuperscript{201} De Ly, supra note 80, at 10; Ferrari, supra note 40, art. 94 para. 3; ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 397–98, para. 8 (1991); Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 94 para. 14.

\textsuperscript{202} Flechtnner, supra note 40, at 194; HÖNNOLD, supra note 40, at 38 para. 47; Magnus, supra note 40, art. 94 para. 7; Schlechtriem et al., supra note 38, at 1171–72; Schröter, supra note 21, at 444–45; Torsello, supra note 40, at 97.
its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention.”

Couched in classical public international law terms, Article 95 CISG thereby merely excludes the reserving State’s duty under public international law to apply Article 1(1)(b) CISG, but entirely fails to specify what this means for the Convention’s application by courts and arbitral tribunals. This uncertainty, which can be traced to the provision’s last-minute addition and the resulting lack of scrutiny at the drafting stage, has given rise to extensive discussions among CISG commentators.

The same essentially applies to the reservation of Article 96 CISG, albeit in a slightly different way. In Article 12 CISG, Article 96 CISG is even being accompanied by a sister provision placed in Part I of the Sales Convention, which is clearly directed at courts in Contracting States and maybe also at arbitral tribunals. The language of Article 12 CISG, however, was apparently not drafted sufficiently clearly in that it uses an expression similar to Article 94(1), (2) CISG—“does not apply” in Article 12 CISG, as opposed to “is not to apply” in Article 94(1), (2) CISG—and has in consequence given rise to a similar amount of academic dispute, as well as divergent case law. As a result, Articles 95 and 96 CISG may eventually have caused more uncertainty than the other three CISG reservations combined.

203. CISG, supra note 4, art. 95.
204. Schroeter, supra note 21, at 440.
205. See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 26, at 120–21 cmts. 3.17–19.
206. See supra Part II.B.2.
208. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, supra note 27, at 116 cmts. 3.12–17.
209. Whether the Sales Convention is, in a technical sense, directly addressed at arbitral tribunals is a difficult question. For additional information on this topic, see SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER, supra note 20, para. 33; Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, CISG and Arbitration, 2011 BELGRADE L. REV. 211, 213 (2011).
210. HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 187 para. 129 (admitting that the language of Article 12 CISG “is difficult to parse”).
212. See generally id.
c. Summary

In summation, it is helpful to recall a remark once made by a delegate during the preparation of the 1988 United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, who pointedly said that

[t]he provision in question [Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] was more suitable for Judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague than for the judges of domestic commercial courts. It was essential to regulate the matter by way of a clear provision, drafted in precise and habitual terms.213

In the case of the Sales Convention’s reservations, this important guideline has not always been sufficiently observed. (The only upside of this neglect may be that it has given certain authors something to write about.)

IV. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE NEXT THIRTY-FIVE YEARS: THE (LIKELY) ROLE OF RESERVATIONS IN FUTURE CISG PRACTICE

When attempting a look into the Sales Convention’s future, with an aim toward identifying its reservations’ role in the years to come, three prognoses come to mind.

A. The Continuing Trend to Withdraw Reservations

1. Reasons for the Trend

The recent trend among CISG Contracting States to withdraw reservations in accordance with Article 97(4) CISG that has been referred to earlier,214 as well as elsewhere,215 is likely to continue in the years to come. This prognosis is supported by three different reasons. First, general policy arguments militate in favor of further withdrawals, as they reduce the potential for confusion in the Convention’s practical application.216 Second, principles of treaty law as embodied in the International Law Commission’s

213. See Winship, supra note 8, at 728.
214. See supra Part III.B.1.
215. Andersen, supra note 120, at 706–09; Schroeter, supra note 17, at 2–4.
“Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties” call upon reserving States to undertake a periodic review of their reservations and consider withdrawing those which no longer serve their purpose.\textsuperscript{217} And third, the view proposed here that characterizes reservations as a uniformity-enabling tool\textsuperscript{218} implies that States withdraw reservations once the initial reasons against a full accession\textsuperscript{219} or the uncertainty about the Convention’s application in practice\textsuperscript{220} have disappeared—a point that has arguably been reached, at least as far as the written form reservation under Article 96 CISG is concerned.\textsuperscript{221}

2. Potential Withdrawals of Article 95 CISG Reservations

It will be particularly interesting to see when future withdrawals will affect those two reservations that have hitherto remained almost\textsuperscript{222} untouched by withdrawals, namely the reservations under Articles 94 and 95 CISG.

With respect to Article 95 reservations, discussions about a possible withdrawal have been reported from a number of reserving States. In the United States, the matter was investigated in 2012 at a meeting of the State Department Advisory Committee on Private International Law.\textsuperscript{223} However, the view among CISG experts from the United States apparently remains divided.\textsuperscript{224} Indications for an upcoming withdrawal of its Arti-

icle 95 reservation have also been reported from the People’s Republic of China.\footnote{Anderse, \textit{supra} note 26, at 11--12; Li Wei, \textit{On China’s Withdrawal of Its Reservation to CISG Article 1(b), 2 Remin Chinese L. Rev. 300, 313--18 (2014); Spagnolo, \textit{supra} note 14, at 71.} In addition, academic commentators have in the past voiced pleas in favor of similar withdrawals to be made by other reservation States,\footnote{Bell, \textit{supra} note 207, at 55.} such as Singapore.\footnote{Bell, \textit{supra} note 207, at 55.} However, none of these initiatives have yet resulted in a declaration of withdrawal being formally notified to the Convention’s depositary, as required by Article 97(2), (4) CISG.

It is submitted that a withdrawal of Article 95 reservations would of course be a useful contribution to further uniformity under the Sales Convention, but from a comparative perspective does not rank as a high priority. This is due to the effect of this reservation, which only\footnote{Similarly, during the 1980 Vienna Conference, USSR delegate Novossiltev observed, “The proposed [Article 95 CISG] reservation would represent a very small departure from the Convention compared with the acceptance of by States of Part II or Part III only [as allowed under Article 92 CISG].” Official Records, \textit{supra} note 47, at 439.} excludes the reserving State’s obligation to apply Article 1(1)(b) CISG.\footnote{See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 15, \textit{supra} note 26, at 120--21, opinion 1 cmts. 3.17--19.} This very provision, however, has today lost much of its practical importance, because the Convention now applies in accordance with Article 1(1)(a) CISG in the vast majority of cases, given that the number of CISG Contracting States has reached eighty-three.\footnote{BITTLE L. Rev. 163, 199--203 (2009); Francesco G. Mazzotta, \textit{Reconsidering the CISG Article 95 Reservation made by the United States of America, 17 Int’l Trade & Bus. L. Rev. 442, 442--46 (2014); Winship, \textit{supra} note 223.} Any withdrawal of an Article 95 reservation would therefore merely open up a second avenue toward the application of the Convention that, in practice, would rarely come into play anyway.

3. Less Likely Withdrawals of Article 94 CISG Reservations

Compared to Article 95 reservations, a withdrawal of Article 94 reservations would be both more valuable for the uniform application of the Sales Convention and more unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. The greater value of such a withdrawal

\begin{itemize}
  \item\footnote{B RIDGE, \textit{supra} note 44, at 522 para. 10.57; Spagnolo, \textit{supra} note 14, at 71.}
  \end{itemize}
arises from the more far-reaching effect of Article 94 reservations, which exclude the application of the entire Convention whenever they apply, even if only to contracts between parties residing in reservation States (currently, the intra-Nordic trade). That Scandinavian States are nevertheless unlikely to initiate a withdrawal of their Article 94 reservations is indicated by recent developments.

Although Scandinavian commentators have for some time suggested that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden should withdraw their respective reservations under Article 94 CISG, they admitted as recently as 2012 that “there is currently little support among Scandinavian legislators for that proposal.” In fact, there more recently has been a rather clear sign against such a withdrawal, as Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden even extended their Article 94 reservations when they withdrew their Article 92 reservations in 2011–14. In that context, they declared that “[i]n addition to the previous declaration made under Article 94 . . . the Convention will not apply to the formation of contracts of sale where the parties have their places of business in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden or Norway.” They thereby extended the already existing non-application of the Convention between Scandinavian parties in sale of goods matters (resulting from the existing reservations under Article 94 CISG) and also to matters of contract formation that had previously been covered by the Article 92 reservations concurrently withdrawn. This combination of Article 92 CISG withdrawals with new Article 94 CISG reservations indicates the Nordic countries’ intention to make sure that the application


233. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHROETER, supra note 20, para. 811.

of the Sales Convention to the inter-Scandinavian trade will continue to be excluded.\textsuperscript{235}

Against this background, it must seem unlikely that they will withdraw the very reservations they so recently confirmed in the near future.

\textbf{B. A Reservation Here to Stay: The Federal State Clause (Article 93 CISG)}

Another reservation that is here to stay, albeit for a different reason, is Article 93 CISG.\textsuperscript{236} It becomes apparent when looking in more detail at the purposes for which the Sales Convention’s “federal State clause” has been used in treaty practice. Two purposes can be distinguished.

The first is the making of an Article 93 reservation in order to allow a federal State to adopt the CISG incrementally as the adopting legislation goes through the separate legislatures of each of the territorial units of that State.\textsuperscript{237} Where it is used to this end, the federal state clause works in conformity with the general view described earlier\textsuperscript{238} that regards reservations as a uniformity-enabling tool; it thus leads to a merely temporary reduction of uniformity. A practical example was the adoption of the Sales Convention by Canada. Upon accession to the Convention in 1991, the Government of Canada declared, in accordance with Article 93 CISG, that the Convention will extend to the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and the Northwest Territories.\textsuperscript{239} In April 1992, it then declared the Convention to apply also to Quebec and Saskatchewan,\textsuperscript{240} before further extending the CISG to the Territory of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Schroeter, \textit{supra} note 17, at 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{236} For a discussion of Article 93 CISG, see \textit{supra} Part II.A.2.b.
\item \textsuperscript{237} BRIDGE, \textit{supra} note 44, at 520 n.402.
\item \textsuperscript{238} See \textit{supra} Part III.B.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Declarations of Extension by Canada to Territorial Units: Withdrawal of a Declaration Made by Canada upon Accession, U.N. Doc. C.N.255.1992.TREATIES-3 (Oct. 19, 1992). Canada thereby used the option offered by Article 93(1) CISG \textit{in fine} to “amend” a declaration under the federal state clause “at any time,” which has to be distinguished from the withdrawal of a reservation as authorized by Article 97(4) CISG. A later amendment through unilateral declaration is not expressly foreseen for any other CISG reservation.
\end{itemize}
Yukon (in June 1992) and—although only a decade later (in 2003)—to the Territory of Nunavut.  

It is the second purpose which may give Article 93 CISG an “eternal” character. Federal state clauses can also be used in deference to local or regional particularities that exist in certain territorial units of a federal state, geographical, or otherwise. Where this is the case, the reservation is likely to stay in effect as long as these particularities remain unchanged. Under the Sales Convention, all Article 93 reservations currently in force seem to fall into this category. Australia has declared that the Convention shall not apply to the territories of Christmas Island, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and the Ashmore and Cartier Islands. Denmark has declared that the Convention shall not apply to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and New Zealand has declared that the Convention shall not apply to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. In present practice under the Convention, the Article 93 reservation is accordingly a pure “island reservation.” The special geographical situation of islands, often reflected in their special status under domestic constitutions, means that these reservations are unlikely to be withdrawn. At the same time, the amount of international trade conducted by parties from those islands is very limited. From a practical perspective, the effect of Article 93 CISG upon the Convention’s application is therefore close to zero.

It is another, more difficult question, whether the status of the important international trading hubs of Hong Kong and Macao are cases equally covered by Article 93 CISG, or not—a question that has been addressed in more detail elsewhere.

245. For a similar assessment, see De Ly, supra note 80, at 10; Magnus, supra note 40, art. 93 para. 8.
C. A Reservation Which May Gain in Importance: Article 94 CISG as a Tool to Accommodate a Regionalization of Uniform Lawmaking

Finally, there is one reservation authorized by the Sales Convention which may potentially gain in importance in the future, namely Article 94 CISG. In addition to the current use of this reservation by the Nordic States that was addressed earlier,247 Article 94 CISG could also be used in order to give precedence to other uniform law rules shared between certain CISG Contracting States.248 The existing trend toward a regionalization of uniform lawmaking that has been much discussed in legal writing249 may give rise to such rules that then would compete with the CISG. Certain rules, notably those emerging from EU directives, arguably already do so, albeit only with respect to limited subject matters.250 Rules made by other regional economic international organizations (“REIOs”) may follow.

As long as no Contracting State takes any action to the contrary, regionally unified or harmonized laws remain preempted by the Sales Convention in accordance with general rules governing the relationship between the Convention and other rules of law.251 There may, however, be pressure upon Contracting States to give precedence to regional law that may, for example, result from a duty to guarantee the full application of rules issued by regional organizations. A possible source of such a duty

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247. See supra Part V.A.3.
248. Stefan Leible, Konflikte zwischen CESL und CISG – Zum Verhältnis zwischen Art. 351 AEUV und Artt. 90, 94 CISG [Conflicts Between CESL and CISG—On the Relationship Between Article 35], in Festschrift für Ulrich Magnus zum 70 [Festschrift for Ulrich Magnus's 70TH BIRTHDAY]. Geburtstag 605, 615 (Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurnnest eds., 2013); Mankowski, supra note 43, art. 94 para. 5; Schroeter, supra note 23, § 10.
250. See Schroeter, supra note 23, §§ 6, 15.
251. Id. §§ 7–15; Schroeter, supra note 249, at 190.
is Article 351(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which obliges EU Member States to “take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established”\textsuperscript{252} to the extent that a concurrent international agreement (e.g. the CISG) is not compatible with EU Treaties or EU secondary law. As an appropriate step of this kind is notably the denunciation of a concurrent treaty,\textsuperscript{253} the European Commission could theoretically request EU Member States which have ratified the Sales Convention to denounce the Convention in accordance with Article 101 CISG.\textsuperscript{254} Should a Member State refuse to comply with such a request, the Commission could initiate an action under Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union before the European Court of Justice against the State for failure to fulfill obligations. In recent years, the European Commission has increasingly brought such actions for failure to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate incompatibilities with the EC Treaty of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) entered into with third countries prior to the respective Member States’ accession to the EU.\textsuperscript{255} It could do the same with respect to the Sales Convention.

Against this background, a reservation in accordance with Article 94 CISG would constitute a preferable alternative to the complete denunciation of the Sales Convention.\textsuperscript{256} The making of such a reservation would grant EU law precedence over the CISG’s rules, while leaving the Convention in force. From the perspective of global uniform sales law, this is the lesser of two evils when compared with the all-or-nothing solution offered by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{252} Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 351(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 47.
\item \textsuperscript{254} SCHROETER, supra note 23, § 13 para. 59.
\item \textsuperscript{255} See, e.g., Case C-205/06, European Commission v. Austria, 2009 E.C.R. I-01301.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Note that contrary to the CISG’s reservations under Articles 92, 93, and 95, and also contrary to the residuary rule in Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an Article 94 CISG reservation may not only be made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to the Convention, but also at any time thereafter. CISG, supra note 4, art. 94(1), (2). For a discussion of the relationship between reservations and denunciations from a general treaty law perspective, see HELFER, supra note 135, at 379–81.
\end{itemize}
Article 101 CISG. And from the perspective of EU law, the making of an Article 94 CISG reservation would constitute a sufficient elimination of possible incompatibilities between the two legal regimes. In its recent case law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that provisions reserving the application of EU law that are contained in concurrent international agreements may serve to eliminate incompatibilities. In particular, the ECJ mentioned “a clause which would reserve certain powers to regional organizations” (commonly referred to as “REIO clause”) and expressly acknowledged “that such a clause should, in principle, as the Commission admitted at the hearing, be considered capable of removing the established incompatibility.”

Having said this, it should be kept in mind that—as discussed earlier—it is one matter for the Sales Convention to authorize a certain reservation, but quite another whether Contracting States will or should make use of it. Where the choice is between the CISG and regionally unified law, it is submitted that the Sales Convention should preferably be left untouched, as cross-border trade is best served by a globally unified sales law. Article 94 CISG should accordingly offer no more than a last resort in case that political pressure imposes a different choice.

CONCLUSION

This article attempted to provide an overview of the experiences that have been made with the Sales Convention’s reservations during their first thirty-five years, from 1980–2015. In doing so, it has also attempted to challenge the traditionally prevailing notion which views reservations as a “necessary evil” and to demonstrate that reservations can instead be viewed as a tool enabling a wider uniformity under uniform private law conventions. When considering the widespread withdrawals of CISG reservations that have occurred since 2011, it is therefore one possibility to describe this development as a “decline of

258. Contra Leible, supra note 248, at 614.
259. European Commission v. Austria, supra note 255, para. 32.
260. Id. paras. 41–42.
261. See supra Part II.B.1.
262. Schroeter, supra note 249, at 189.
263. Andersen, supra note 26, at 5.
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. See supra Part III.B.1.
reservations” in accordance with a panel title at a recent CISG conference. Another possibility would be to view these withdrawals as indications of a “mission accomplished.”

At this stage, it is helpful to once more come back to numbers. When the Sales Convention entered into force on January 1, 1988, the then fourteen Contracting States had between them declared nine reservations, amounting to almost one reservation per Contracting State. As noted in the introduction, by the Convention’s twenty-fifth birthday both total numbers had increased to sixty-five Contracting States and thirty-one reservations, but the reservation to Contracting State ratio had dropped from almost 1:1 to less than 1:2. This year, as we are celebrating the CISG’s thirty-fifth birthday, we count eighty-three Contracting States, but only twenty-three reservations. If we furthermore deduct the “eternal” federal State reservations that probably will remain in effect forever, we arrive at a ratio of 20:83, or almost 1:4.

In conclusion, this development confirms a personal experience that many people have encountered. At thirty-five, one may be not be as young and fresh anymore as at twenty-five, but maybe a little wiser. And for a uniform law, that may well be the more important quality.

266. Conference “35 Years CISG and Beyond” held at the University of Basel (Switzerland) on January 29—30, 2015, organized by the University of Basel, the Swiss Association of International Law and UNCITRAL.

267. For the purposes of the present calculations, a “Contracting State” is every State that has deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the U.N. in accordance with Article 91(4) CISG, even if the Convention has not yet entered into force for that State due to Article 99(2) CISG. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, at 367. By January 1, 1988, Lesotho, France, the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Argentina, Zambia, the Peoples’ Republic of China, Italy, the United States, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Mexico (in chronological order) had become Contracting States of the CISG. Chronological Table of Actions: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status_chronological.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).

268. See supra Part I.A.

269. See supra Part V.B.