Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg. (2016) Payoff shares in two-player contests. Games, 7 (3). p. 25.

[img] PDF - Published Version
Available under License CC BY (Attribution).


Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/44219/

Downloads: Statistics Overview


In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium shares and the parameters of a class of asymmetric Tullock contest success functions. Our main finding is that any players’ shares that sum up to less than one can arise as the unique outcome of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for appropriate parameters.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Related URLs:
Identification Number:
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:14 Nov 2017 10:43
Deposited On:16 Dec 2016 09:18

Repository Staff Only: item control page