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The coordination value of monetary exchange: empirical evidence

Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco. (2014) The coordination value of monetary exchange: empirical evidence. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (1). pp. 290-314.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/42854/

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Abstract

Under what conditions can cooperation be sustained in a network of strangers? Here we study the role of institutions and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems. In an experiment, anonymous subjects could cooperate or defect in bilateral random encounters. This sequence of encounters was indefinite; hence multiple equilibria were possible, including full intertemporal cooperation supported by a social norm based on community punishment of defectors. We report that such social norm did not emerge. Instead, the availability of intrinsically worthless tokens favored the coordination on intertemporal cooperation in ways that networks of strangers were unable to achieve through social norms.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Experimental Makroeconomics (Camera)
UniBasel Contributors:Camera, Gabriele
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:American Economic Association
ISSN:1945-7669
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:12 Dec 2016 10:08
Deposited On:12 Dec 2016 10:08

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