Governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being differentials across US states

Luechinger, Simon and Schelker, Mark and Stutzer, Alois. (2014) Governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being differentials across US states. Oxford economic papers, 66 (2). pp. 443-464.

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We analyse the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic rents. As a measure for these rents, we propose subjective well-being differentials between workers in the public administration and workers in other industries. Based on data for the US states, we estimate the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen bureaucratic accountability affect differences in well-being. We find that well-being differences are smaller in states with high transparency, elected auditors, and legal deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. No or weak effects are found for performance audits and regulatory review.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische ├ľkonomie (Stutzer)
UniBasel Contributors:Stutzer, Alois
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article -- This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The version of record is available online at: http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/content/66/2/443
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Last Modified:07 Feb 2018 10:56
Deposited On:02 Feb 2016 14:26

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