Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

Braendle, Thomas and Stutzer, Alois. (2010) Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2010 (08). Basel.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5308651

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In this paper, we integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight whereby oversight activities depend on individual control costs and incentives. We focus on public servants selected into parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. Based on a novel data set for German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische Ökonomie (Stutzer)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Stutzer, Alois and Brändle, Thomas
Item Type:Working Paper
Note: -- Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
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  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2010/08
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:13 Mar 2018 15:16
Deposited On:24 May 2013 09:06

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