Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

Brändle, Thomas and Stutzer, Alois. (2008) Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany. WWZ Discussion Papers, 2008 (07). Basel.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A4638525

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This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the
German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische Ökonomie (Stutzer)
12 Special Collections > WWZ Publications > WWZ Discussion Papers and Working Papers
UniBasel Contributors:Stutzer, Alois and Brändle, Thomas
Item Type:Working Paper
Note: -- Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Discussion paper / Internet publication
Identification Number:
  • handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2008/07
edoc DOI:
Last Modified:16 Mar 2018 15:14
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:18

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