Central bank design with heterogeneous agents

Berentsen, Aleksander and Strub, Carlo. (2009) Central bank design with heterogeneous agents. European economic review, Vol. 53, H. 2. pp. 139-152.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5250209

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We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Wirtschaftstheorie (Berentsen)
UniBasel Contributors:Berentsen, Aleksander
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:North Holland Publ.
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Last Modified:22 Nov 2018 15:01
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:03

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