An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry. (1993) An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction. Games and economic behavior, Vol. 5. pp. 425-454.

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5249188

Downloads: Statistics Overview


We examine the limiting outcomes of a dynamic evolutionary process driven by stochastic learning and rare mutations. We first show that locally stable outcomes are subgame perfect and satisfy a forward induction property. To address cases in which locally stable outcomes fail to exist, we turn to a dynamic analysis. The limiting distribution of the dynamic process in a class of extensive form games with perfect information always includes the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, but consists exclusively of that outcome only under stringent conditions. The limiting distribution in a class of outside option games satisfies a forward induction requirement.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Academic Press
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:28
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:02

Repository Staff Only: item control page