Money in Bilateral Trade

Berentsen, Aleksander and Rocheteau, Guillaume. (2002) Money in Bilateral Trade. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 138. pp. 489-506.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5250638

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In this paper we compare production inefficiencies in bilateral meetings generated by two types of trading frictions: double-coincidence frictions and information frictions. For both types of frictions, money enlarges the sets of incentive-feasible allocations relative to barter. In environments with double-coincidence frictions, the first-best allocation is incentive-feasible if the real stock of money is sufficiently high. In contrast, in environements with information frictions, the first-best allocation is never incentivefeasible regardless of the real stock of money. These results highlight a fundamental difference between these two types of frictions. While money can eliminate the production inefficiencies that arise in bilateral meetings with a double-coincidence problem, it can only ameliorate but not eliminate the inefficiencies that are due to private information.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Wirtschaftstheorie (Berentsen)
UniBasel Contributors:Berentsen, Aleksander
Item Type:Article, refereed
Article Subtype:Research Article
Publisher:Helbing und Lichtenhahn
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:28
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:01

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