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The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge. (2016) The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 99. pp. 71-81.

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Abstract

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) . To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
e-ISSN:1090-2473
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Language:English
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Last Modified:10 Nov 2017 14:52
Deposited On:16 Dec 2016 09:37

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