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On cheating, doping and whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander and Bruegger, Esther and Loertscher, Simon. (2008) On cheating, doping and whistleblowing. European journal of political economy, Vol. 24. S. 415-436.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5248815

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Abstract

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents` behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the loser to blow the whistle. We show that our whistleblowing mechanism reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto-improvement if punishments for cheating are sufficiently large. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Wirtschaftstheorie (Berentsen)
UniBasel Contributors:Berentsen, Aleksander
Item Type:Article, refereed
Bibsysno:Link to catalogue
Publisher:North-Holland
ISSN:0176-2680
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:31
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:18

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