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Bureaucratic rents and life satisfaction

Luechinger, Simon and Meier, Stephan and Stutzer, Alois. (2008) Bureaucratic rents and life satisfaction. Journal of law, economics, & organization, Vol. 24, H. 2. S. 476-488.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5248803

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Abstract

Institutions affect bureaucrats` possibilities to acquire rents; they determine the degree of accountability and responsiveness of officials and of political control of the bureaucracy and, thereby, the size and distribution of rents in the public sphere. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and nonmonetary fringe benefits, and bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the total of these rents: the difference in subjective well-being between bureaucrats and people working in the private sector. In a sample of 42 countries, we find large variations in the extent of rents in the public bureaucracy. The extent of rents is determined by differences in institutional and political constraints. In particular, we find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy. Further, our measure for rents correlates with indicators of regulatory policies and perceptions of corruption.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Politische ├ľkonomie (Stutzer)
UniBasel Contributors:Stutzer, Alois
Item Type:Article, refereed
Bibsysno:Link to catalogue
Publisher:Yale Univ. Press
ISSN:8756-6222
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
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Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:30
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:15

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