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Fraudulent accounting and other doping games

Berentsen, A. and Lengwiler, Y.. (2004) Fraudulent accounting and other doping games. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, Vol. 160, H. 3. S. 402-415.

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Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5253751

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Abstract

From a game-theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of both applications within the same model. We allow for heterogenous populations, such as highly talented versus more mediocre athletes, or high-quality managers versus less able colleagues. Interestingly, for some parameters, the replicator dynamics is characterized by cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport, and cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in some cases, high-ability players are more likely to commit fraud than low-ability types.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Wirtschaftstheorie (Berentsen)
UniBasel Contributors:Berentsen, Aleksander
Item Type:Article, refereed
Bibsysno:Link to catalogue
Publisher:J. C. B. Mohr
ISSN:0932-4569
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Identification Number:
Last Modified:14 Sep 2012 06:47
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:03

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