edoc

An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry. (1993) An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction. Games and economic behavior, Vol. 5. S. 425-454.

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5249188

Downloads: Statistics Overview

Abstract

We examine the limiting outcomes of a dynamic evolutionary process driven by stochastic learning and rare mutations. We first show that locally stable outcomes are subgame perfect and satisfy a forward induction property. To address cases in which locally stable outcomes fail to exist, we turn to a dynamic analysis. The limiting distribution of the dynamic process in a class of extensive form games with perfect information always includes the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, but consists exclusively of that outcome only under stringent conditions. The limiting distribution in a class of outside option games satisfies a forward induction requirement.
Faculties and Departments:06 Faculty of Business and Economics > Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Professuren Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)
UniBasel Contributors:Nöldeke, Georg
Item Type:Article, refereed
Bibsysno:Link to catalogue
Publisher:Academic Press
ISSN:0899-8256
Note:Publication type according to Uni Basel Research Database: Journal article
Last Modified:22 Mar 2012 14:28
Deposited On:22 Mar 2012 14:02

Repository Staff Only: item control page